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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY BY SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB. VOLUME ONE ^^
\<LV
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. :
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON :
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY. 1897.
/■A
PREFACE
We have attempted in these volumes to give a scientific analysis of Trade Unionism in the United Kingdom. To this task we have devoted six years' investigation, in the course of which we have examined, inside and out, the constitution of practically every Trade Union organisation, together with the methods and regulations which it uses to attain its ends. In the History of Trade Unionism, published in 1894, we traced the origin and growth of the Trade Union movement as a whole, industrially and politically, concluding with a statistical account of the distribution of Trade Unionism according to trades and localities ; and a sketch from nature of Trade Union life and character. The student has, therefore, already had before him a picture of those external characteristics of Trade Unionism, past and present, which — borrowing a term from the study of animal life — we may call its natural history. These external characteristics — the outward form and habit of the creature — are obviously insufficient for any scientific generalisation as to its purpose and its effects. Nor can any useful conclusions, theoretic or practical, be arrived at by arguing from " common notions " about Trade Unionism ; nor even by refining these into a definition of some imaginary form of combination in the abstract. Sociology, like all other sciences, can ad- vance only upon the basis of a precise observation of actual facts.
The first part of our work deals with Trade Union Struc- ture, In the Anglo-Saxon world of to-day we find that Trade Unions are democracies : that is to say, their internal constitu-
vi Industrial Democracy
tions are all based on the principle of " government of the people by the people for the people." How far they are marked off from political governments by their membership being voluntary will be dealt with in the course of the analysis. They are, however, scientifically distinguished from other democracies in that they are composed exclusively of manual- working wage -earners, associated according to occupations. We shall show how the different Trade Unions reveal this species of democracy at many different stages of development. This part of the book will be of little interest to those who want simply to know whether Trade Unionism is a good or a bad influence in the State. To employers and Trade Union officials on active service in the campaign between Capital and Labor, or to politicians hesitating which side to take in a labor struggle, our detailed discussions of the relations between elector, representative, and civil servant ; between central and local government ; and between taxation and representation — not to speak of the difficulties connected with federation, the grant of " Home Rule " to minorities, or the use of the Referendum and the Initiative — will seem tedious and irrelevant. On the other hand, the student of de- mocracy, not specially interested in the commercial aspect of Trade Unionism, will probably find this the most interesting part of the book. Those who regard the participation of the manual-working wage-earners in the machinery of government as the distinctive, if not the dangerous, element in modern politics, will here find the phenomenon isolated. These thou- sands of working-class democracies, spontaneously growing up at different times and places, untrammelled by the traditions or interests of other classes, perpetually recasting their constitu- tions to meet new and varying conditions, present an unrivalled field of observation as to the manner in which the working man copes with the problem of combining administrative efficiency with popular control.
The second part of the book, forming more than half its total bulk, consists of a descriptive analysis of Trade Union Function : that is to say, of the methods used, the regulations
Preface vii
imposed, and the policy followed by Trade Unions. We have done our best to make this analysis both scientifically accurate and, as regards the United Kingdom at the present day, completely exhaustive. We have, of course, not enumer- ated every individual regulation of every individual union ; but we have pushed our investigations into every trade in every part of the kingdom ; and our analysis includes, we believe, every existing type and variety of Trade Union action. And we have sought to make our description quantitative. We have given statistics wherever these could be obtained ; and we have, in all cases, tried to form and convey to the reader an impression of the relative proportion, statical and dynamic, which each type of regulation bears to the whole body of Trade Union activity. In digesting the almost innumerable technical regulations of every trade, our first need was a scientific classification. After many experi- ments we discovered the principle of this to lie in the psycho- logical origin of the several regulations : that is to say, the direct intention with which they were adopted, or the im- mediate grievance they were designed to remedy. Our consequent observations threw light on many apparent con- tradictions and inconsistencies. Thus, to mention only two among many instances, the student will find, in our chapter on " The Standard Rate," an explanation of the reason why some Trade Unions strike against Piecework and others against Timework ; and, in our chapter on " The Normal Day," why some Trade Unions make the regulation of the hours of labor one of their foremost objects, whilst others, equally strong and aggressive, are indifferent, if not hostile to it. The same principle of classification enables the student to comprehend and place in appropriate categories the seem- ingly arbitrary and meaningless regulations, such as those against " Smooting " or " Partnering," which bewilder the superficial observer of working-class life. It assists us to unravel the intricate changes of Trade Union policy with regard to such matters as machinery, apprenticeship, and the admission of women. It serves also for the deeper analysis
viii Industrial Democracy
of the division of the whole action of Trade Unionism into three separate and sometimes mutually exclusive policies, based on different views of what can economically be effected, and what state of society is ultimately desirable. It is through the psychology of its assumptions that we discover how significantly the cleavages of opinion and action in the Trade Union world correspond with those in the larger world outside.
It is only in the third part of our work — the last four chapters of the second volume — that we have ventured into the domain of theory. We first trace the remarkable change of opinion among English economists as to the effect of Trade Unionism on the production and distribution of wealth. Some readers may stop at this point, contented with the authorita- tive, though vague, deliverances favorable to combination among wage-earners now given by the Professors of Political Economy in the universities of the United Kingdom. But this verdict, based in the main upon an ideal conception of competition and combination, seems to us unsubstantial. We have, therefore, laid before the student a new analysis of the working of competition in the industrial field — our vision of the organisation and working of the business world as it actually exists. It is in this analysis of the long series of bargainings, extending from the private customer in the retail shop, back to the manual laborer in the factory or the mine, that we discover the need for Trade Unionism. We then analyse the economic characteristics, not of combination in the abstract in a world of ideal competition, but of the actual Trade Unionism of the present day in the business world as we know it. Here, therefore, we give our own theory of Trade Unionism — our own interpretation of the way in which the methods and regulations that we have described actually affect the production and distribution of wealth and the development of personal character. This theory, in conjunction with our particular view of social expediency, leads us to sum up emphatically in favor of Trade Unionism of one type, and equally emphatically
Preface ix
against Trade Unionism of another type. In our final chapter we even venture upon precept and prophecy ; and we consider the exact scope of Trade Unionism in the fully developed democratic state — the industrial democracy of the future.
A book made up of descriptions of fact, generalisations into theory, and moral judgments must, in the best case, necessarily include parts of different degrees of use. The description of structure and function in Parts I. and II. will, we hope, have its own permanent value in sociology as an analytic record of Trade Unionism in a particular country at a particular date. The economic generalisations contained in Part III., if they prove sound on verification by other investigators, can be no more than stepping-stones for the generalisations of reasoners who will begin where we leave off. Like all scientific theories, they will be quickly broken up, part to be rejected as fallacious or distorted, and part to be absorbed in later and larger views. Finally, even those who regard our facts as accurate, and accept our economic theory as scientific, will only agree in our judg- ment of Trade Unionism, and in our conception of its permanent but limited function in the Industrial Democracy of the future, in so far as they happen to be at one with us in the view of what state of society is desirable. .;
Those who contemplate scientific work in any depart- ment of Sociology may find some practical help in a brief account of the methods of investigation which we have found useful in this and other studies.
To begin with, the student must resolutely set himself to find out, not the ultimate answer to the practical problem that may have tempted him to the work, but what is the actual structure and function of the organisation about which he is interested. Thus, his primary task is to observe and dissect facts, comparing as many specimens
X Industrial Democracy
as possible, and precisely recording all their resemblances and differences whether or not they seem significant. This does not mean that the scientific observer ought to start with a mind free from preconceived ideas as to classification and sequences. If such a person existed, he would be able to make no observations at all. The student ought, on the contrary, to cherish all the hypotheses he can lay his hands on, however far-fetched they may seem. Indeed, he must be on his guard against being biassed by authority. As an instrument for the discovery of new truth, the wildest sugges- tion of a crank or a fanatic, or the most casual conclusion of the practical man may well prove more fertile than verified generalisations which have already yielded their full fruit. Almost any preconceived idea as to the connection between phenomena will help the observer, if it is only sufficiently limited in its scope and definite in its expression to be capable of comparison with facts. What is dangerous is to have only a single hypothesis, for this inevitably biasses the selection of facts ; or nothing but far-reaching theories as to ultimate causes and general results, for these cannot be tested by any facts that a single student can unravel.
From the outset, the student must adopt a definite prin- ciple in his note-taking. We have found it convenient to use separate sheets of paper, uniform in shape and size, each of which is devoted to a single observation, with exact particulars of authority, locality, and date. To these, as the inquiry proceeds, we add other headings under which the recorded fact might possibly be grouped, such, for instance, as the industry, the particular section of the craft, the organisation, the sex, age, or status of the persons concerned, the psycho- logical intention, or the grievance to be remedied. These sheets can be shuffled and reshuffled into various orders, according as it is desired to consider the recorded facts in their distribution in time or space, or their coincidence with other circumstances. The student would be well- advised to put a great deal of work into the completeness and mechanical perfection of his note-taking, even if this
Preface xi
involves, for the first few weeks of the inquiry, copying and recopying his material.
Before actually beginning the investigation it is well to read what has been previously written about the subject. This will lead to some tentative ideas as to how to break up the material into definite parts for separate dissection. It will serve also to collect hypotheses as to the con- nections between the facts. It is here that the voluminous proceedings of Royal Commissions and Select Committees find their real use. Their innumerable questions and answers seldom end in any theoretic judgment or practical conclusion of scientific value. To the investigator, however, they often prove a mine of unintentional suggestion and hypothesis, just because they are collections of samples without order and often without selection.
In proceeding to actual investigation into facts, there are three good instruments of discovery : the Document, Personal Observation, and the Interview. All three are useful in obtaining preliminary suggestions and hypotheses ; but as methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis, or of verifica- tion, they are altogether different in character and unequal in value.
The most indispensable of these instruments is the Document. It is a peculiarity of human, and especially of social action, that it secretes records of facts, not with any view to affording material for the investigator, but as data for the future guidance of the organisms themselves. The essence of the Document as distinguished from the mere literature of the subject is the unintentional and automatic character of its testimony. It is, in short, a kind of mechanical memory, registering facts with the minimum of personal bias. Hence the cash accounts, minutes of private meetings, internal statistics, rules, and reports of societies of all kinds furnish invaluable material from which the in- vestigator discovers not only the constitution and policy of the organisation, but also many of its motives and intentions. Even documents intended solely to influence other people,
xii Industrial De7H0C7'acy
such as public manifestoes or fictitious reports, have their documentary value if only as showing by comparison with the confidential records, what it was that their authors desired to conceal. The investigator must, therefore, collect every document, however unimportant, that he can acquire. When acquisition is impossible, he should copy the actual words, making his extracts as copious as time permits ; for he can never know what will afterwards prove significant to him. In this use of the Document, sociology possesses a method of investigation which to some extent compensates it for inability to use the method of deliberate experiment. We venture to think that collections of documents will be to the sociologist of the future, what collections of fossils or skele- tons are to the zoologist ; and libraries will be his museums. Next in importance comes the method of Personal Observation. By this we mean neither the Interview nor yet any examination of the outward effects of an organisation, but a continued watching, from inside the machine, of the actual decisions of the human agents concerned, and the play of motives from which these spring. The difficulty for the investigator is to get into such a post of observation without his presence altering the normal course of events. It is here, and here only, that personal participation in the work of any social organisation is of advantage to scientific inquiry. The railway manager, the member of a municipality, or the officer of a Trade Union would, if he were a trained investi- gator, enjoy unrivalled opportunities for precisely describing the real constitution and actual working of his own organisa- tion. Unfortunately, it is extremely rare to find in an active practical administrator, either the desire, the capacity, or the training for successful investigation. The outsider wishing to use this method is practically confined to one of two alternatives. He may adopt the social class, join the organisation, or practise the occupation that he wishes to study. Thus, one of the authors has found it useful, at different stages of investigation, to become a rent collector, a tailoress, and a working-class lodger in working-class
Preface xiii
families ; whilst the other has gained much from active membership of democratic organisations and personal par- ticipation in administration in more than one department. Participation of this active kind may be supplemented by gaining the intimacy and confidence of persons and organisa- tions, so as to obtain the privilege of admission to their establishments, offices, and private meetings. In this passive observation the woman, we think, is specially well-adapted for sociological inquiry ; not merely because she is accustomed silently to watch motives, but also because she gains access and confidence which are instinctively refused to possible com- mercial competitors or political opponents. The worst of this method of Personal Observation is that the observer can seldom resist giving undue importance to the particular facts and connections between facts that he happens to have seen. He must, therefore, record what he has observed as a set of separate, and not necessarily connected facts, to be used merely as hypotheses of classification and sequence, for verification by an exhaustive scrutiny of documents or by the wider-reaching method of the Interview.
By the Interview as an instrument of sociological inquiry we mean something more than the preliminary talks and social friendliness which form, so to speak, the antechamber to obtaining documents and opportunities for personal observation of processes. The Interview in the scientific sense is the skilled interrogation of a competent witness as to facts within his personal experience. As the witness is under no compulsion, the interviewer will have to listen sympathetically to much that is not evidence, namely to personal opinions, current tradition, and hearsay reports of facts, all of which may be useful in suggesting new sources of inquiry and revealing bias. But the real business of the Interview is to ascertain facts actually seen by the person interviewed. Thus, the expert interviewer, like the bedside physician, agrees straightway with all the assumptions and generalisations of his patient, and uses his detective skill to sift, by tactful cross-examination, the grain of fact from the
xiv Industrial Democracy
bushel of sentiment, self-interest, and theory. Hence, though it is of the utmost importance to make friends with the head of any organisation, we have generally got much more actual information from his subordinates who are personally occupied with the facts in detail. But in no case can any Interview be taken as conclusive evidence, even in- matters of fact. It must never be forgotten that every man is biassed by his creed or his self-interest, his class or his views of what is socially expedient. If the investigator fails to detect this bias, it may be assumed that it coincides with his own ! Conse- quently, the fullest advantage of the Interview can be obtained only at the later stages of an inquiry, when the student has so far progressed in his analysis that he knows exactly what to ask for. It then enables him to verify his provisional conclusions as to the existence of certain specified facts, and their relations to others. And there is a wider use of the Interview by which a quantitative value may be given to a qualitative analysis. Once the investigator has himself dissected a few type specimens, and discovered which among their obviously recognisable attributes possess significance for him, he may often be able to gain an exhaustive knowledge of the distribution of these attributes by what we may call the method of wholesale interviewing. One of the most brilliant and successful applications of this method was Mr. Charles Booth's use of all the School Board visitors of the East End of London. Having, by personal observation, dis- covered certain obvious marks which coincided with a scien- tific classification of the East End population, he was able, by interviewing a few hundred people, to obtain definite par- ticulars with regard to the status of a million. And when results so obtained are checked by other investigations — say, for instance, by the Census, itself only a gigantic and some- what unscientific system ~ wholesale interviewing — a high degree of verified quantitative value may sometimes be given to sociological inquiry.
Finally, we would suggest that it is a peculiar advantage, in all sociological work, if a single inquiry can be conducted
Preface xv
by more than one person. A closely-knit group, dealing contemporaneously with one subject, will achieve far more than the same persons working individually. In our inquiry into Trade Unionism we have found exceptionally useful, not only our own collaboration in all departments of the work, but also the co-operation, throughout the whole six years, of our colleague and friend, Mr. F. W. Galton. When the members of a group " pool " their stocks of preconceived ideas or provisional hypotheses ; their personal experience of the facts in question, or of analogous facts; their knowledge of possible sources of information ; their opportunities for interviewing, and access to documents, they are better able than any individual to cope with the vastness and com- plexity of even a limited subject of sociological investigation. They can do much by constant criticism to save each other from bias, crudities of observation, mistaken inferences, and confusion of thought. But group -work of this kind has difficulties and dangers of its own. Unless all the members are in intimate personal communication with each other, moving with a common will and purpose, and at least so far equal in training and capacity that they can understand each other's distinctions and qualifications, the result of their common labors will present blurred outlines, and be of little real value. Without unity, equality, and discipline, different members of the group will always be recording identical facts under different names, and using the same term to denote different facts.
By the pursuit of these methods of observation and verification, any intelligent, hard-working, and conscientious students, or group of students, applying themselves to definitely limited pieces of social organisation, will certainly produce monographs of scientific value. Whether they will be able to extract from their "icts a new generalisation, applicable to other facts — whether, that is to say, they will discover any new scientific law — will depend on the possession of a somewhat rare combination of insight and inventiveness, with the capacity for prolonged and intense reasoning. When
b
xvi ■ Industrial Democracy
such a generalisation is arrived at, it provides a new field of work for the ensuing generation, whose task it is, by an incessant testing of this " order of thought " by comparison with the " order of things," to extend, limit, and qualify the first imperfect statement of the law. By these means alone, whether in sociology or any other sphere of human inquiry, does mankind enter into possession of that body of organised knowledge which is termed science.
We venture to add a few words as to the practical value of sociological investigation. Quite apart from the interest of the man of science, eager to satisfy his curiosity about every part of the universe, a knowledge of social facts and laws is indispensable for any intelligent and deliberate human action. The whole of social life, the entire structure and functioning of society, consists of human intervention. The essential characteristic of civilised, as distinguished from savage society, is that these interventions are not impulsive but deliberate ; for, though some sort of human society may get along upon instinct, civilisation depends upon organised knowledge of sociological facts and of the connections between them. And this knowledge must be sufficiently generalised to be capable of being diffused. We can all avoid being practical engineers or chemists ; but no consumer, producer, or citizen can avoid being a practical sociologist. Whether he pursues only his own pecuniary self-interest, or follows some idea of class or social expediency, his action or inaction will promote his ends only in so far as it corresponds with the real order of the universe. A workman may join his Trade Union, or abstain from joining ; but if his decision is to be rational, it must be based on knowledge of what the Trade Union is, how far it is a sound benefit society, whether its methods will increase or decrease his liberty, and to what extent its regulations are likely to improve or deteriorate the conditions of employment for himself and his class. The employer who desires to enjoy the maximum freedom of enterprise, or to gain the utmost profit, had better, before either fighting his workmen or yielding to their demands, find out the cause and
Preface xvii
meaning of Trade Unionism, what exactly it is likely to give up or insist on, its financial strength and weakness, and its hold on public opinion. Common hearsay, or the gossip of a club, whether this be the public-house or a palace in Pall Mall, will no more enable a man intelligently to " manage his own business," than it will enable the engineer to build a bridge. And when we pass from private actions to the par- ticipation of men and women as electors, representatives, or officials, in public companies, local governing bodies, or the State itself, the inarticulate apprehension of facts which often contents the individual business man, will no longer suffice. Deliberate corporate action involves some definite policy, communicable to others. The town councillor or the cabinet minister has perpetually to be making up his mind what is to be done in particular cases. Whether his action or abstention from action is likely to be practicable, popular, and permanently successful in attaining his ends, depends on whether it is or is not adapted to the facts. This does not mean that every workman and every employer, or even every philanthropist and every statesman, is called upon to make his own investigation into social questions any more than to make for himself the physiological investigations upon which his health depends. But whether they like it or not, their success or failure to attain their ends depends on their scientific knowledge, original or borrowed, of the facts of the problem, and of their causal connections. Perfect wisdom we can never attain, in sociology or in any other science ; but this does not absolve us from using, in our action, the most authoritative exposition, for the time being, of what is known. That nation will achieve the greatest success in the world-struggle, whose investigators discover the greatest body of scientific truth, and whose practical men are the most prompt in their application of it.
What is not generally recognised is that scientific investi- gation, in the field of sociology as in other departments of knowledge, requires, not only competent investigators, but a considerable expenditure. Practically no provision exists in
xviii Industrial Democracy
this country for the endowment or support from public funds of any kind of sociological investigation. It is, accordingly, impossible at present to make any considerable progress even with inquiries of pressing urgency. Social reformers are always feeling themselves at a standstill, for sheer lack of knowledge, and of that invention which can only proceed from knowledge. There is, we believe, no purpose to which the rich man could devote his surplus with greater utility to the community than the setting on foot, in the hands of competent investigators, of definite inquiries into such questions as the administrative control of the liquor traffic, the relation between local and central government, the popu- lation question, the conditions of women's industrial employ- ment, the real incidence of taxation, the working of municipal administration, or many other unsolved problems that could be named. It may be assumed that to deal adequately with any of these subjects would involve an out-of-pocket expenditure for travelling, materials, and incidental outlays of all kinds, of something like ;^iooo, irrespective of the maintenance of the investigators themselves, or the possible expense of publication. To make any permanent provision for discovery in any one department — to endow a chair — requires the investment of, say, ;^ 10,000. At present, in London, the wealthiest city in the world, and the best of all fields for sociological investigation, the sum total of the endowments for this purpose does not reach ;^ioo a year.
It remains only to express our grateful acknowledgments to the many friends, employers as well as workmen, who have helped us with information as to their respective trades. Some portions of our work have been read in manuscript or proof by Professor Edgeworth, Professor Hewins, Mr. Leonard Hobhouse, and other friends, to whom we are indebted for many useful suggestions- and criticisms. Early drafts of some chapters have appeared in the Eco7toniic Journal^ Economic Review, Nijieteenth Century, and Progressive Review in this country ; the Political Science Quarterly in New York ;
Preface ' xix
and Dr. Braun's Archivfur Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik in Berlin. They are reproduced here by permission of the editors. A large portion of the book was given in the form of lectures at the London School of Economics and Political Science during 1896 and 1897.
SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB.
41 Grosvenor Road, Westminster, London, November 1897.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I
PART I TRADE UNION STRUCTURE
CHAPTER I
PAGE
Primitive Democracy 3
CHAPTER n Representative Institutions ;^8
CHAPTER HI The Unit of Government . . . . . . 72
CHAPTER IV
INTERUNION RELATIONS I04
PART II TRADE UNION FUNCTION
CHAPTER I Introduction 145
The Method of Mutual Insurance . . . . 152
xxii Indtistrial Democracy
CHAPTER II
PAGE
The Method of Collective Bargaining . . . 173
CHAPTER HI Arbitration . 222
CHAPTER IV The Method of Legal Enactment .... 247
CHAPTER V The Standard Rate 279
CHAPTER VI The Normal Day 324
CHAPTER VII Sanitation and Safety 354
CHAPTER VIII
New Processes and Machinery 392
CHAPTER IX Continuity of Employment 430
PART I TRADE UNION STRUCTURE
VOL. I
CHAPTER I
PRIMITIVE DEMOCRACY^
In the local trade clubs of the eighteenth century, democracy appeared in its simplest form. Like the citizens of Uri or Appenzell ^ the workmen were slow to recognise any other authority than " the voices " of all concerned. The members of each trade, in general meeting assembled, themselves made the regulations, applied them to particular cases, voted the expenditure of funds, and decided on such action by individual members as seemed necessary for the common weal. The early rules were accordingly occupied with securing the maintenance of order and decorum at these general meetings of " the trade " or " the body." With this view the president, often chosen only for the particular meeting, was treated with great respect and invested with special, though temporary,
1 Copyright in the United States of America, 1896, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
- The early Trade Union general meetings have, indeed, many interesting resemblances, both in spirit and in form, to the " Landesgemeinden," or general meetings of all citizens, of the old Swiss Cantons. The best description of these archaic Swiss democracies, as they exist to-day, is given by Eugene Rambert in his work Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Hisioriqites et Naiionales (Lausanne, 1889). J. M. Vincent's State and Federal GovernT?ient in Switzerland (Baltimore, 1891) is more precise and accurate than any other account in the English language. Freeman's picturesque reference to them in The Growth of the English Constitu- tion (London, 1872) is well known.
4 T^-ade Union Structure
authority. Thus the constitution of the London Society of Woolstaplers, established 1785, declares "that at every meeting of this society a president shall be chosen to preserve the rules of decorum and good order ; and if any member should not be silent on due notice given by the president, which shall be by giving three distinct knocks on the table, he shall fine threepence ; and if any one shall in- terrupt another in any debate while addressing the president, he shall fine sixpence ; and if the person so fined shall return any indecent language, he shall fine sixpence more ; and should any president misconduct himself, so as to cause uproar and confusion in the society, or shall neglect to enforce a strict observance of this and the following article, he shall be superseded, and another president shall be chosen in his stead. The president shall be accommodated with his own choice of liquors, wine only excepted," ^ And the Articles of the Society of Journeymen Brushmakers, to which no person was to be admitted as a member " who is not well-affected to his present Majesty and the Protestant succession, and in good health, and of a respectable char- acter," provide " that on each evening the society meets there shall be a president chosen from the members present to keep order ; to be allowed a shilling for his trouble ; any member refusing to serve the office to be fined sixpence. If any member dispute on politics, swear, lay wagers, promote gambling, or behave otherwise disorderly, and will not be silent when ordered by the chairman, he shall pay a fine of a shilling."^
The rules of every old society consist mainly of safe- guards of the efficiency of this general meeting. Whilst political or religious wrangling, seditious sentiments or songs, cursing, swearing, or obscene language, betting, wagering, gaming, or refusing to keep silence were penalised by fines, elaborate and detailed provision was made for the entertain-
1 The Articles of the London Society of Woolstaplers [X-'^'^^^'^^ 1813).
2 Articles of the Society of Journeytnen Brushmakers, held at the sign of the Craven Head, Drury Lane (London, 1806).
Primitive Democracy 5
ment of the members. Meeting, as all clubs did, at a public- house in a room lent free by the landlord, it was taken as a matter of course that each man should do his share of drinking. The rules often prescribe the sum to be spent at each meeting : in the case of the Friendly Society of Iron- founders, for instance, the member's monthly contribution in 1809 was a shilling " to the box," and threepence for liquor, " to be spent whether present or not." The Brushmakers provided "that on every meeting night each member shall receive a pot ticket at eight o'clock, a pint at ten, and no more." ^ And the Manchester Compositors resolved in 1826 " that tobacco be allowed to such members of this society as require it during the hours of business at any meeting of the society." ^
After the president, the most important officers were, accordingly, the stewards or marshalmen, two or four members usually chosen by rotation. Their duty was, to use the words of the Cotton-spinners, " at every meeting to fetch all the liquor into the committee room, and serve it regularly round " ; ^ and the members were, in some cases, " forbidden to drink out of turn, except the officers at the table or a member on his first coming into the town."* Treasurer
1 The account book of the little Preston Society of Carpenters, whose mem- bership in 1807 averaged about forty-five, shows an expenditure at each meeting of 6s. to 7s. 6d. As late as 1837 the rules of the Steam-Engine Makers' Society provided that one-third of the income — fourpence out of the monthly contribution of a shilling — "shall be spent in refreshments. ... To prevent disorder no person shall help himself to any drink in the club-room during club hours, but what is served him by the waiters or marshalmen who shall be appointed by the president every club night." Some particulars as to the dying away of this custom are given in our History of Trade Unionism, pp. 185, 1 86 ; see also the article by Prof. W. J. Ashley on "Journeymen's clubs," in Political Science Quarterly, March 1897.
2 MS. Minutes of the Manchester Typographical Society, 7th March 1826.
' Articles, Rules, Orders, and Regulations made and to be obsefved by and between the Friendly Associated Cotton-spinners within the township of Oldham (Oldham, 1797 : reprinted 1829).
^ Friendly Society of Ironfounders, Rules, 1809. The Rules of the Liverpool Shipwrights' Society of 1784 provided also " that each member that shall call for drink without leave of the stewards shall forfeit and pay for the drink they call for to the stewards for the use of the box. . . . That the marshalmen shall pay the over- plus of drink that comes in at every monthly meeting more than allowed by the
6 Trade Union Struchire
there was often none, the scanty funds, if not consumed as quickly as collected, being usually deposited with the publican who acted as host. Sometimes, however, we have the archaic box with three locks, so frequent among the gilds ; and in such cases members served in rotation as " keymasters," or, as we should now say, trustees. Thus the Edinburgh Shoemakers provided that " the keymasters shall be chosen by the roll, beginning at the top for the first keymaster, and at the middle of the roll for the youngest keymaster, and so on until the roll be finished. If any refuse the keymaster, he shall pay one shilling and sixpence sterling." ^ The ancient box of the Glasgow Ropemakers' Friendly Society (established 1824), elaborately decorated with the society's "coat of arms," was kept in the custody of the president, who was elected annually.^ Down to within the last thirty years the custom was maintained on the " deacons' choosing," or annual election day, of solemnly transporting this box through the streets of Glasgow to the house of the new president, with a procession of ropespinners headed by a piper, the ceremony terminating with a feast. The keeping of accounts and the writing of letters was a later develop- ment, and when a clerk or secretary was needed, he had perforce to be chosen from the small number qualified for the work. But there is evidence that the early secre- taries served, like their colleagues, only for short periods,
society ; and no member of this society is allowed to call for or smoak tobacco during club hours in the club room ; for every such offence he is to forfeit and pay fourpence to the stewards for the use of the box." — A7-ticles to be observed by a Society of Shipivrights, or the True British Society, all Freemen (Liverpool, 1784), Articles 8 and 9.
1 Articles of the Journeymen Shoemakers of the City of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1778) — a society established in 1727.
2 Articles and Regulations of the Associated Ropemakers'' Friendly Society (Glasgow, 1836), repeated in the General Laws and Regulations of the Glasgow Ropemakers' Trade Protective and Friendly Society {Glzsgovf, 1884). The members of the Glasgow Typographical Society resolved, in 1823, "that a man be pro- vided on election nights to carry the box from the residence of the president to the place of meeting, and after the meeting to the new president's house." — MS. Minutes of general meeting, Glasgow Typographical Society, 4th October 1823.
Primitive Democracy 7
and occupied, moreover, a position very subordinate to the president.
Even when it was necessary to supplement the officers by some kind of committee, so far were these infant demo- cracies from any superstitious worship of the ballot-box, that, although we know of no case of actual choice by lot,^ the committee-men were usually taken, as in the case of the Steam-Engine Makers' Society, " in rotation as their names appear on the books." ^ "A fine of one shilling," say the rules of the Southern Amicable Union Society of Wool- staplers, " shall be levied on any one who shall refuse to serve on the committee or neglect to attend its stated meetings, . . . and the next in rotation shall be called in his stead." ^ The rules of the Liverpool Shipwrights declared " that the committee shall be chosen by rotation as they stand in the books ; and any member refusing to serve the office shall forfeit ten shillings and sixpence."^ As late as 1843 we find the very old Society of Curriers resolving that for this purpose " a list with three columns be drawn up of the whole of the members, dividing their ages as near as possible in the following manner : the elder, the middle-aged and the young ; so that the experience of the elder and the sound
1 The selection of officers by lot was, it need hardly be said, frequent in primitive times. It is interesting to find the practice in the Swiss " Landes- gemeinden." In 1640 the " Landesgemeinde " of Glarus began to choose eight candidates for each office, who then drew lots among themselves. Fifty years later Schwyz followed this example. By 1793 the " Landesgemeinde " of Glarus was casting lots for all offices, including the cantonal secretaryship, the steward- ships of dependent territories, etc. The winner often sold his office to the highest bidder. The practice was not totally abolished until 1837, and old men still remember the passing round of the eight balls, each wrapped in black cloth, seven being silvern and the eighth gilt. — Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Historiques et Nationales, by Eugene Rambert (Lausanne, 1889), pp. 226, 276.
2 Rules of the Steam-En^ne Makers' Society, edition of 1837.
3 Rules of the Southern Amicable Unioti of Woolstaplers (London, 1837).
* Articles to be observed by the Association of the Friendly Union of Shipwrights, instituted ijt Liverpool on Tuesday, nth November 1800 (Liverpool, 1800), Rule 19. The London Sailmakers resolved, in 1836, "that from this evening the calling for stewards shall begin from the last man on the committee, and that from and after the last steward the twelve men who stand in rotation on the book do form the committee." — MS. Minutes of general meeting, 26th September 1836.
8 Trade Union Striichire
judgment of the middle-aged will make up for any deficiency on the part of the young." ^ In some cases, indeed, the members of the committee were actually chosen by the officers. Thus in the ancient society of Journeymen Paper- makers, where each " Grand Division " had its committee of eight members, it was provided that " to prevent imposition part of the committee shall be changed every three months, by four old members going out and four new ones coming in ; also a chairman shall be chosen to keep good order, which chairman, with the clerk, shall nominate the four new members which shall succeed the four old ones." ^
The early trade club was thus a democracy of the most rudimentary type, free alike from permanently differentiated officials, executive council, or representative assembly. The general meeting strove itself to transact all the business, and grudgingly delegated any of its functions either to officers or to committees. When this delegation could no longer be avoided, the expedients of rotation and short periods of service were used " to prevent im- position " or any undue influence by particular members. In this earliest type of Trade Union democracy we find, in fact, the most childlike faith not only that "all men are equal," but also that " what concerns all should be decided by all."
It is obvious that this form of democracy was compatible only with the smallest possible amount of business. But it was, in our opinion, not so much the growth of the financial and secretarial transactions of the unions, as the exigencies of
^ MS. Minutes of the London Society of Journeymen Curriers, January 1843.
2 Rules and Articles to be observed by the Journeymen Papermakers througJwut England {l2i2T,), Appendix 18 to Report on Combination Laws, 1825, p. 56. The only Trade Union in which this example still prevails is that of the Flint Glass Makers, where the rules until lately gave the secretary "the power to nominate a central committee (open to the objection of the trade), in whose hands the executive power of the society shall be vested from year to year." — Rules and Regulations of the National Flint Glass Makers'" Sick and Friendly Society (Man- chester, 1890). This has lately been modified, in so far that seven members are now elected, the central secretary nominating four " from the district in which he resides, but open to the objection of the trade." — Rule 67 (Rules, reprinted with additions, Manchester, 1893).
Primitive Democracy 9
their warfare with the employers, that first led to a departure from this simple ideal. The legal and social persecutions to which Trade Unionists were subject, at any rate up to 1824, made secrecy and promptitude absolutely necessary for suc- cessful operations ; and accordingly at all critical times we find the direction of affairs passing out of the hands of the general meeting into those of a responsible, if not a repre- sentative, committee. Thus the London Tailors, whose militant combinations between 1720 and 1834 repeatedly attracted the attention of Parliament,^ had practically two constitutions, one for peace and one for war. In quiet times, the society was made up of little autonomous general meet- ings of the kind described above at the thirty " houses of call " in London and Westminster. The organisation for war, as set forth in 1 8 1 8 by Francis Place, was very different : " Each house of call has a deputy, who on particular occasions is chosen by a kind of tacit consent, frequently without its being known to a very large majority who is chosen. The deputies form a committee, and they again choose, in a somewhat similar way, a very small committee, in whom, on very particular occasions, all power resides, from whom all orders proceed, and whose commands are implicitly obeyed ; and on no occasion has it ever been known that their commands have exceeded the necessity of the occasion, or that they have wandered in the least from the purpose for which it was understood they were appointed. So perfect indeed is the organisation, and so well has it been carried into effect, that no complaint has ever been heard ; with so much simplicity and with so great certainty does the whole business appear to be conducted that the great body of journeymen rather acquiesce than assist in any way in it." ^ Again, the protracted legal proceedings of the Scottish Hand-
^ See the interesting Select Documents illustrating the History of Trade Unionism: I. The Tailoritig TVao'is, edited by F. W. Galton (London, 1896), being one of the "Studies" published by the London School of Economics and Political Science.
2 The Gorgon, No. 20, 3rd October 1818, reprinted in The Tailoring Trade by F. W. Galton, pp. 153, 154.
lo Trade Union Structure
loom Weavers, ending in the great struggle when 30,000 looms from Carlisle to Aberdeen struck on a single day (loth November i 8 1 2), were conducted by an autocratic com- mittee of five, sitting in Glasgow, and periodically summon- ing from all the districts delegates who carried back to their constituents orders which were implicitly obeyed.^ Before the repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824, the employers in all the organised trades complained bitterly of these " self- appointed " committees, and made repeated attempts to scatter them by prosecutions for combination or conspiracy. To this constant danger of prosecution may be ascribed some of the mystery which surrounds the actual constitution of these tribunals ; but their appearance on the scene when- ever an emergency called for strong action was a necessary consequence of the failure of the clubs to provide any con- stitutional authority of a representative character.
So far we have dealt principally with trade clubs confined to particular towns or districts. When, in any trade, these local clubs united to form a federal union, or when one of them enrolled members in other towns, government by a general meeting of " the trade," or of all the members, be- came impracticable.^ Nowadays some kind of representa-
' Evidence before the House of Commons Committee on Artisans and Machinery, 1824, especially that of Richmond.
^ A branch of a national union is still governed by the members in general meeting assembled ; and for this and other reasons, it is customary for several separate branches to be established in large towns where the number of members becomes greater than can easily be accommodated in a single branch meeting- place. Such branches usually send delegates to a district committee, which thus becomes the real governing authority of the town or district. But in certain unions the idea of direct government by an aggregate meeting of the trade still so far prevails that, even in so large a centre as London, resort is had to huge mass meetings. Thus the London Society of Compositors will occasionally summon its ten thousand members to meet in council to decide, in an excited mass meeting, the question of peace or war with their employers. And the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, which in its federal constitution adopts a large measure of representative institutions, still retains in its local organisation the aggregate meeting of the trade as the supreme governing body for the district. The Shoemakers of London or Leicester frequently hold meetings at which the attendance is numbered by thousands, with results that are occasionally calamitous to the union. Thus, when in 1891 the men of a certain London firm had impetuously left their work contrary to the agreement made by the union with
Primitive Democracy 1 1
tive institutions would seem to have been inevitable at this stage. But it is significant to notice how slowly, reluctantly and incompletely the Trade Unionists have incorporated in their constitutions what is often regarded as the specifically Anglo-Saxon form of democracy — the elected representative assembly, appointing and controlling a standing executive. Until the present generation, no Trade Union had ever formed its constitution on this model. It is true that in the early days we hear of^ meetings of delegates from local
the employers, their branch called a mass meeting of the whole body of the London members (seven thousand attending), which, after refusing even to hear the union officials, decided to support the recalcitrant strikers, with the result that the employers " locked out " the whole trade. {Monthly Report of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, November 1891.) In 1893 the union executive found it necessaiy to summon at Leicester a special delegate meeting of the whole society to sit in judgment on the London members who had decided, at a mass meeting, to withdraw from the national agreement to submit to arbitration. The circular calling the delegate meeting contains a vivid description of the scene at this mass meeting: "The hall was well filled, and Mr. Judge, president of the union, took the chair. From the outset it was soon found that the rowdy element intended to again prevent a hearing, and thus make it impossible for our views to be laid before the bulk of the more intelligent and reasonable members. ... If democratic unions such as ours are to have the meetings stopped by such proceedings, ... if the members refuse to hear, and insult by cock-crowing and cat-calls their own accredited and elected executive, then it is time that other steps be taken." The delegate meeting, by 74 votes to 9, severely censured the London members, and reversed their decision (Circular of Executive Committee, 14th March 1893 • Special Report of the Delegate Meeting at Leicester, 17th April 1893). In most unions, however, experience has shown that in truth "aggregate meetings" are "aggravated meetings," and has led to their abandonment in favor of district committees or delegate meetings. ^ In the History of Trade Unionism, p. 46, we described the Hatters as hold- ing in 1772, 1775, and 1777, "congresses" of delegates from all parts of the country. Further examination of the evidence (House of Commons Journals, vol. xxxvi. ; Place MS. 27,799-68; Committee on Artisans and Machinery) inclines us to believe that these "congresses," like another in 18 16, comprised only delegates from the various workshops in London. We can discover no instance during the eighteenth century of a Trade Union gathering made up of delegates from the local clubs throughout the country. But though the con- gresses of the Hatters probably represented only the London workmen, their " bye -laws " were apparently adopted by the clubs elsewhere, and came thus to be of national scope. Similar instances of national regulation by the principal centre of a trade may be seen in the "resolutions" addressed "to the Wool- staplers of England " by the London Society of Woolstaplers, and in the "articles to be observed by the Journeymen Papermakers throughout England," formulated at a meeting of the trade at large held at Maidstone. In the loose alliances of the local clubs in each trade, the chief trade centre often acted, in fact, as the "governing branch."
12 Trade Union Structure
clubs to adopt or amend the " articles " of their association. A " deputation " from nine local societies of Carpenters met thus in London in 1827 to form the Friendly Society of Operative House Carpenters and Joiners, and similar meetings were annually held to revise the rules and adjust the finances of this federation. It would have been a natural development for such a representative congress to appoint a standing committee and executive officers to act on behalf of the whole trade. But when between 1824 and 1840 the great national societies of that generation settled down into their constitutions, the congress of elected representatives either found no place at all, or else was called together only at long intervals and for strictly limited purposes. In no case do we see it acting as a permanent supreme assembly. The Trade Union met the needs of expanding democracy by some remarkable experiments in constitution-making.
The first step in the transition from the loose alliance of separate local clubs into a national organisation was the appointment of a seat of government or " governing branch." The members residing in one town were charged with the responsibility of conducting the current business of the whole society, as well as that of their own branch. The branch officers and the branch committee of this town accord- ingly became the central authority.^ Here again the leading idea was not so much to get a government that was repre-
1 In some of the more elaborate Trade Union constitutions formulated between 1820 and 1834 we find a hierarchy of authorities, none of them elected by the society as a whole, but each responsible for a definite part of the common admini- stration. Thus The Rules and Articles to be observed by the Journeymen Paper- makers va. 1823 provide "that there shall be five Grand Divisions throughout England where all money shall be lodged, that when wanted may be sent to any part where emergency may require." These "Grand Divisions" were the branches in the five principal centres of the trade, each being given jurisdiction over all the mills in the counties round about it. Above them all stood " No. I Grand Division " (Maidstone), which was empowered to determine business of too serious a nature to be left to any other Grand Division. This geographical hierarchy is interesting as having apparently furnished the model for most of the constitutions of the period, notably of the Owenite societies of 1833- 1834, includ- ing the Builders' Union and the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union itself.
Primitive Deinocracy 13
sentative of the society as to make each section take its turn at the privileges and burdens of administration. The seat of government was accordingly always changed at short intervals, often by rotation. Thus the Steam-Engine Makers' rules of 1826 provide that "the central branch of the society shall be held alternately at the different branches of this society, according as they stand on the books, commencing with Branch No. i, and the secretary of the central branch shall, after the accounts of the former year have been balanced,* send the books to the next central branch of the society." ^ In other cases the seat of government was periodically deter- mined by vote of the whole body of members, who appear usually to have been strongly biassed in favor of shifting it from town to town. The reason appears in this statement by one of the lodges of the Ironfounders : " What, we ask, has been the history of nearly every trade society in this respect ? Why, that when any branch or section of it has possessed the governing power too long, it has become care- less of the society's interests, tried to assume irresponsible powers, and invariably by its remissness opened wide the doors of peculation, jobbery, and fraud." ^
The institution of a " governing branch " had the advantage of being the cheapest machinery of central administration that could be devised. By it the national union secured its executive committee, at no greater expense than a small local society.^ And so long as the function of the national
The same geographical hierarchy was a feature of the constitution of the Southern Amicable Society of Woolstaplers until the last revision of rules in 1892. In only one case has a similar hierarchy survived. The United Society of Brushmakers, established in the eighteenth century, is still divided into geographical divisions governed by the six head towns, with London as the centre of communication. The branches in the West Riding, for instance, are governed by the Leeds com- mittee, and when in 1892 the Sheffield branch had a strike, this was managed by the secretary of the Leeds branch.
1 Rule 19 ; rules of 1S26 as reprinted in the Annual Report for 1837.
2 Address of the Bristol branch of the Friendly Society of Ironfounders to the members at large (in Annual Report for 1849).
^ Both the idea of rotation of office, and that of a local governing branch, can be traced to the network of village sick-clubs which existed all over England in the eighteenth century. In 1824 these clubs were described by a hostile critic as " under the management of the ordinary members who succeed to the several offices
14 Trade Union Structure
executive was confined to that of a centre of communication between practically autonomous local branches, no alteration in the machinery was necessary. The duties of the secretary, like those of his committee, were not beyond the competence of ordinary artisans working at their trade and devoting only their evenings to their official business. But with the multi- plication of branches and the formation of a central fund, the secretarial work of a national union presently absorbed the whole time of a single officer, to whom, therefore, a salary had to be assigned. As the salary came from the common fund, the right of appointment passed, without question, from the branch meeting to " the voices " of the whole body of members. Thus the general secretary was singled out for a unique position : alone among the officers of the union he was elected by the whole body of members. Meanwhile the supreme authority continued to be " the voices." Every pro- position not covered by the original " articles," together with all questions of peace and war, was submitted to the votes of the members.^ But this was not all. Each branch, in
in rotation ; frequently without being qualified either by ability, independence, or impartiality for the due discharge of their respective offices ; or under the control of a standing committee, composed of the most active and often the least eligible members residing near the place of meeting" — The Constitution of Friendly Societies upon Legal and Scietitific Principles, by Rev. John Thomas Becher (2nd edition, London, 1824), p. 50.
Comparing small things with great, we may say that the British Empire is administered by a "governing branch." The business common to the Empire as a whole is transacted, not by imperial or federal officers, but by those of one part of the Empire, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ; and they are supervised, not by an Imperial Diet or Federal Assembly, but by the domestic legislature at Westminster.
1 The very ancient United Society of Brushmakers, which dates from the early part of the eighteenth century, retains to this day its archaic method of collecting " the voices." In London, said to be the most conservative of all the districts, no alteration of rule is made without " sending round the box " as of yore. In the society's ancient iron box are put all the papers relating to the subject under dis- cussion, and a member out of employment is deputed to carry the box from shop to shop until it has travelled "all round the trade." When it arrives at a shop, all the men cease work and gather round ; the box is opened, its contents are read and discussed, and the shop delegates are then and there instructed how to vote at the next delegate meeting. The box is then refilled and sent on to the next shop. Old minutes of 1829 show that this custom has remained unchanged, down to the smallest detail, for, at any rate, a couple of generations. It is probably nearly two centuries old.
Primitive Democracy 1 5
general meeting assembled, claimed the right to have any proposition whatsoever submitted to the vote of the society as a whole. And thus we find, in almost every Trade Union which has a history at all, a most instructive series of experi- ments in the use, misuse, and limitations of the Referendum.
Such was the typical Trade Union constitution of the last generation. In a few cases it has survived, almost unchanged, down to the present day, just as its pre- decessor, the archaic local club governed by the general meeting, still finds representatives in the Trade Union world. But wherever an old Trade Union has maintained its vitality, its constitution has been progressively modified, whilst the most powerful of the modern unions have been formed on a different pattern. An examination of this evolutionary process will bring home to us the transitional character of the existing constitutional forms, and give us valuable hints towards the solution, in a larger field, of the problem of uniting efficient administration with popular control.
We have already noted that, in passing from a local to a national organisation, the Trade Union unwittingly left behind the ideal of primitive democracy. The setting apart of one man to do the clerical work destroyed the possibility of equal and identical service by all the members, and laid the foundation of a separate governing class. The practice of requiring members to act in rotation was silently abandoned. Once chosen for his post, the general secretary could rely with confidence, unless he proved himself obviously unfit or grossly incompetent, on being annually re-elected. Spending all day at office work, he soon acquired a professional expert- ness quite out of the reach of his fellow -members at the bench or the forge. And even if some other member possessed natural gifts equal or superior to the acquired skill of the existing officer, there was, in a national organisa- tion, no opportunity of making these qualities known. The general secretary, on the other hand, was always adver- tising his name and his personality to the thousands of
1 6 Trade Union Structure
members by the printed circulars and financial reports, which became the only link between the scattered branches, and afforded positive evidence of his competency to perform the regular work of the office. With every increase in the society's membership, with every extension or elaboration of its financial system or trade policy, the position of the salaried official became, accordingly, more and more secure. The general secretaries themselves changed with the develop- ment of their office. The work could no longer be efficiently performed by an ordinary artisan, and some preliminary office training became almost indispensable. The Coalminers, for instance, as we have shown in our description of the Trade Union world, have picked their secretaries to a large extent from a specially trained section, the checkweigh-men.^ The Cotton Operatives have even adopted a system of competitive examination among the candidates for their staff appointments.^ In other unions any candidate who has not proved his capacity for office work and trade negotiations would stand at a serious disadvantage in the election, where the choice is coming every day to be confined more clearly to the small class of minor officials. The paramount necessity of efficient administration has co-operated with this permanence in producing a progressive differentiation of an official governing class, more and more marked off by character, training, and duties from the bulk of the members. The annual election of the general secretary by a popular vote, far from leading to frequent rotation of office and equal service by all the members, has, in fact, invariably resulted in permanence of tenure exceeding even that of the English civil servant. It is accordingly interesting to notice that, in the later rules of some of the most influential of existing unions, the practical permanence of the official staff is tacitly recognised by the omission of all provision for re-election. Indeed, the
1 History of Trade Unionism, p. 291.
2 Ibid. p. 294 ; see also the subsequent chapter on "The Method of Collective Bargaining," where a specimen examination paper is reprinted.
Primitive Democracy 1 7
Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners goes so far as expressly to provide in its rules that the general secretary " shall continue in office so long as he gives satis- faction." ^
While everything was thus tending to exalt the position of the salaried official, the executive committee, under whose direction he was placed, being composed of men working at their trade, retained its essential weakness. Though modi- fied in unimportant particulars, it continued in nearly all the old societies to be chosen only by one geographical section of the members. At first each branch served in rotation as the seat of government. This quickly gave way to a system of selecting the governing branch from among the more important centres of the trade. Moreover, though the desire periodically to shift the seat of this authority long manifested itself and still lingers in some trades,^ the growth of an official staff, and the necessity of securing accommodation on some durable tenancy, has practically made the head- quarters stationary, even if the change has not been ex- pressly recorded in the rules. Thus the Friendly Society of Ironfounders has retained its head office in London since 1846, and the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons since 1883. The United Society of Boilermakers, which long wandered from port to port, has remained in Newcastle since 1880; and finally settled the question in 1888 by building itself palatial offices on a freehold site.^ Here again
1 Rule 12 in the editions of Rules of 1891 and 1894.
2 Notably the Plumbers and Irondressers. In 1877 a proposal at the general council of the Operative Bricklayers' Society to convert the executive into a shift- ing one, changing the headquarters every third year, was only defeated by a cast- ing vote. — Operative Bricklayers^ Society Trade Circular, September 1877.
^ Along with this change has gone the differentiation of national business from that of the branch. The committee work of the larger societies became more than could be undertaken, in addition to the branch management, by men giving only their evenings. We find, therefore, the central executive committee becoming a body distinct from the branch committee, sometimes (as in the United Society of Operative Plumbers) elected by the same constituents, but more usually by the members of all the branches within a convenient radius of the central office. Thus the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters gives the election to the members within twelve miles of the head office— that is, to the thirty-five branches in and near Manchester — and the Friendly Society of Ironfounders to the six branches of the VOL. I C
1 8 Trade Union Structure
the deeply-rooted desire on the part of Trade Union demo- crats to secure to each section an equal and identical share in the government of the society has had to give way before the necessity of obtaining efficient administration. In ceas- ing to be movable the executive committee lost even such moral influence over the general secretary as was conveyed by an express and recent delegation by the remainder of the society. The salaried official, elected by the votes of all the members, could in fact claim to possess more representative authority than a committee whose functions as an executive depended merely on the accident of the society's offices being built in the town in which the members of the committee happened to be working. In some societies, moreover, the idea of Rotation of Office so far survived that the committee men were elected for a short term and disqualified for re-election. Such inexperienced and casually selected committees of tired manual workers, meeting only in the evening, usually found themselves incompetent to resist, or even to criticise, any practical proposal that might be brought forward by the permanent trained professional whom they were supposed to direct and control.^
In face of so weak an executive committee the most obvious check upon the predominant power of the salaried officials was the elementary device of a written constitution. The ordinary workman, without either experience or imagina- tion, fondly thought that the executive government of a great national organisation could be reduced to a mechanical obedience to printed rules. Hence the constant elaboration of the rules of the several societies, in the vain endeavor to leave nothing to the discretion of officers or committees. It was an essential part of the faith of these primitive democrats that the difficult and detailed work of drafting and amending
London district. In the United Society of Boilermakers, down to 1897, the twenty lodges in the Tyne district, each in rotation, nominated one of the seven members of which the executive committee is composed.
^ The only organisation, outside the Trade Union world, in which the execu- tive committee and the seat of government are changed annually, is, we believe, the Ancient Order of Foresters, the worldwide federal friendly society.
Primitive Democracy 19
these rules should not be delegated to any particular person or persons, but should be undertaken by " the body " or " the trade " in general meeting assembled.^
When a society spread from town to town, and a meeting of all the members became impracticable, the " articles " were settled, as we have mentioned, by a meeting of delegates, and any revision was undertaken by the same body. Accordingly, we find, in the early history of such societies as the Iron- founders, Stonemasons, Carpenters, Coachmakers, and Steam- Engine Makers, frequent assemblies of delegates from the different branches, charged with supplementing or revising the somewhat tentative rules upon which the society had been based. But it would be a serious misconception to take these gatherings for " parliaments," with plenary power to determine the policy to be pursued by the society. The delegates came together only for specific and strictly limited purposes. Nor were even these purposes left to be dealt with at their discretion. In all cases that we know of the delegates were bound to decide according to the votes already taken in their respective branches. In many societies the delegate was merely the vehicle by which " the voices " of the members were mechanically con- veyed. Thus the Friendly Society of Operative Stone- masons, at that time the largest and most powerful Trade
1 This preference of Trade Unionists for making their own rules will remind the political student that "direct legislation by the people" has an older and wider history with regard to the framing and revising of constitutions than with regard to ordinary legislation. Thus, already in 1779 the citizens of Massa- chusetts insisted on asserting, by popular vote, that a constitution should be framed, and equally on deciding that the draft prepared should be adopted. In 1 81 8 the Connecticut constitution included a provision that any particular amendment to it might be submitted to the popular vote. In Europe the first constitution to be submitted to the same ordeal was the French constitution of 1793) which, though adopted by the primary assemblies, never came into force. The practice became usual with regard to the Swiss cantonal constitutions after the French Revolution of 1830, St. Gall leading the way in July 1831. See the elaborate treatise of Charles Borgeaud on The Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions (London, 1895); Bryce's The American Co?nmo7ncealth (London, 1891); and Le Referendum en Suisse hy Simon Deploige (Brussels, 1892), of which an English translation by C. P. Trevelyan and Lilian Tomn, with additional notes and appendices, will shortly be published by the London School of Economics and Political Science.
20 Trade Union Structure
Union, held annual delegate meetings between 1834 and 1839 fo^ th^ sc)l^ purpose of revising its rules. How limited was the power of this assembly may be judged from the following extract from an address of the central executive : " As the delegates are about to meet, the Grand Committee submit to all lodges the following resolutions in reference to the conduct of delegates. It is evident that the duty of delegates is to vote according to the instructions of the majority of their constituents, therefore they ought not to propose any measure unless recommended by the Lodges or Districts they represent. To effect this we propose the following resolutions : that each Lodge shall furnish their delegates with written instructions how to vote on each question they have taken into their consideration, and that no delegate shall vote in opposition to his instructions, and when it appears by examining the instructions there is a majority for any measure, it shall be passed without discussion." ^ The delegate meeting of 1838 agreed with this view. All lodges were to send resolutions for alterations of rules two months before the delegate meeting ; they were to be printed in the Fortnightly Return, and discussed by each lodge ; the delegate was then to be instructed as to the sense of the members by a majority vote ; and only if there was no decided majority on any point was the delegate to have discretion as to his vote. But even this restriction did not satisfy the Stone- masons' idea of democracy. In 1837 the Liverpool Lodge demanded that " all the alterations made in our laws at the grand delegate meeting" shall be communicated to all the lodges " for the consideration of our society before they are printed." " The central executive mildly deprecated such a course, on the ground that the amendment and passing of the laws would under those circumstances take up the whole time of the society until the next delegate meeting came round. The request, however, was taken up by other
1 Stonemasons' Fortnightly Return, May 1836 (the circular issued fortnightly to all the branches by the executive committee).
2 Ibid. May 1837.
Primitive Democracy 21
branches, and by 1844 we find the practice established of making any necessary amendment in the rules by merely submitting the proposal in the Fortnightly Return, and adding together the votes taken in each lodge meeting. A similar change took place in such other great societies as the Iron- founders, Steam-Engine Makers, and Coachmakers. The great bulk of the members saw no advantage in incurring the very considerable expense of paying the coach fares of delegates to a central town and maintaining them there at the rate of six shillings a day,^ when the introduction of penny postage made possible the circulation of a fortnightly or monthly circular, through the medium of which their votes on any particular proposition could be quickly and inexpensively collected. The delegate meeting became, in fact, superseded by the Referendum.^
By the term Referendum the modern student of political institutions understands the submission to the votes of the v/hole people of any measure deliberated on by the repre- sentative assembly. Another development of the same prin- ciple is what is called the Initiative, that is to say, the right of a section of the community to insist on its proposals being submitted to the vote of the whole electorate. As a repre- sentative assembly formed no part of the earlier Trade Union constitutions, both the Referendum and the Initiative took with them the crudest shape. Any new rule or amendment of a rule, any proposed line of policy or particular application of it, might be straightway submitted to the votes of all the
^ In 1838 a large majority of the lodges of the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons voted "that on all measures submitted to the consideration of our Society, the number of members be taken in every Lodge for and against such a measure, and transmitted through the district Lodges to the Seat of Government, and in place of the number of Lodges, the majority of the aggregate members to sanction or reject any measures." — Fortnightly Return, 19th January 1838.
^ It is interesting to find that in at least one Trade Union the introduction of the Referendum is directly ascribed to the circulation in England between 1850 and i860 of translations of pamphlets by Rittinghausen and Victor Considerant. It is stated in the Typographical Circular for March 1889, that John Melson, a Liver- pool printer, got the idea of " Direct Legislation by the People " from these pamphlets, and urged its adoption on the union, at first unsuccessfully, but at the 1 86 1 delegate meeting with the result that the Referendum was adopted as the future method of legislation.
22 Trade Union Structure
members. Nor was this practice of consulting the members confined to the central executive. Any branch might equally have any proposition put to the vote through the medium of the society's official circular. And however imperfectly the question was framed, however inconsistent the result might be with the society's rules and past practice, the answer re- turned by the members' votes was final and instantly operative. Those who believe that pure democracy implies the direct decision, by the mass of the people, of every question as it arises, will find this ideal realised without check or limit in the history of the larger Trade Unions between 1834 and 1870. The result was significant and full of political instruction. Whenever the union was enjoying a vigorous life we find, to begin with, a wild rush of propositions. Every active branch had some new rule to suggest, and every issue of the official circular was filled with crude and often inconsistent projects of amendment. The executive committee of the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers, for instance, had to put no fewer than forty-four propositions simultaneously to the vote in a single circular.^ It is difficult to convey any adequate idea of the variety and, in some cases, the absurdity of these propositions. To take only those recorded in the annals of the Stonemasons between 1838 and 1839; ^^^ have one branch proposing that the whole society should go in for payment by the hour, and another that the post of general secretary should be put up to tender, " the cheapest to be considered the person elected to that important office." ^ We have a delegate meeting referring to a vote of the members the momentous question whether the central executive should be allowed " a cup of ale each per night," and the central executive taking a vote as to whether all the Irish branches should not have Home Rule forced upon them. The members, under fear of the coming Parliamentary
1 Quarterly Report, June i860.
2 The sale of public offices by auction to the highest bidder was a frequent incident in the Swiss " Landesgemeinden " of the seventeenth century. See Eugene Rambert's Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Historiques et Nationales, p. 225.
Primitive Democracy 23
inquiry, vote the abolition of all "regalia, initiation, and pass-words," but reject the proposition of the Newcastle Lodge for reducing the hours of labor " as the only method of striking at the root of all our grievances." The central executive is driven to protest against " the continual state of agitation in which the society has been kept for the last ten months by the numerous resolutions and amendments to laws, the tendency of which can only be to bring the laws and the society into disrespect." ^ As other unions come to the same stage in development, we find a similar result. " It appears evident," complains the executive committee of the Friendly Society of Ironfounders, " that we have got into a regular proposition mania. One branch will make propo- sitions simply because another does ; hence the absurd and ridiculous propositions that are made." ^ The system worked most disastrously in connection with the rates of contributions and benefits. It is not surprising that the majority of work- men should have been unable to appreciate the need for expert advice on these points, or that they should have disregarded all actuarial considerations. Accordingly, we find the members always reluctant to believe that the rate of contribution must be raised, and generally prone to listen to any proposal for extending the benefits — a popular bias which led many societies into bankruptcy. Still more dis- integrating in its tendency was the disposition to appeal to the votes of the members against the executive decision that particular individuals were ineligible for certain benefits. In the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers, for instance, we find the executive bitterly complaining that it is of no use for them to obey the rules, and rigidly to refuse accident benefit to men who are suffering simply from illness ; as in almost every case the claimant's appeal to the members, backed by eloquent circulars from his friends, has resulted in the decision being overruled.^ The Friendly Society of
^ Fortnightly Return, July 1838.
^ Ironfo7inders' Monthly Repoii, April 1855.
2 United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers' Quarterly Report, September 1859.
24 Trade Union StrucHire
Ironfounders took no fewer than nineteen votes In a single year, nearly all on details of benefit administration.^ And the executive of the Stonemasons had early occasion to protest against the growing practice under which branches, preparatory to taking a vote, sent circulars throughout the society in support of their claims to the redress of what they deemed to be personal grievances.^
The disadvantages of a free resort to the Referendum soon became obvious to thoughtful Trade Unionists. It stands to the credit of the majority of the members that wild and absurd propositions were almost uniformly rejected ; and in many societies a similar fate became customary in case of any proposition that did not emanate from the responsible executive.^ The practical abandonment of the Initiative ensued. Branches got tired of sending up proposals which uniformly met with defeat. But the right of the whole body of members themselves to decide every question as it arose was too much bound up with their idea of democracy to permit of its being directly abrogated, or even expressly criticised. Where the practice did not die out from sheer weariness, it was quietly got rid of in other ways. In one society after another the central executive and the general secretary — the men who were in actual contact with the problems of administration — silently threw their influence against the practice of appealing to the members* vote. Thus the executive committee of the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers made a firm stand against the members' habit of overruling its decision in the grant of benefits under the rules. The executive claimed the sole right to decide who was eligible under the rules, and refused to allow discontented claimants to appeal through the official circular. This caused great and recurring discontent ; but the executive committee
1 Report for 1869.
2 Fortnightly Return, 1 8th January 1849.
^ The political student will be reminded of the very small number of cases in which the Initiative in Switzerland has led to actual legislation, even in cantons, such as Zurich, where it has been in operation for over twenty years. See StUssi, Referendum und Initiative im Canton Zurich.
Prhnitive Democracy 25
held firmly to their position and eventually maintained it. When thirteen branches of the Operative Bricklayers' Society proposed in 1868 that the age for superannuation should be lowered and the office expenses curtailed, the general secretary bluntly refused to submit such inexpedient proposals to the members' vote, on the excuse that the question could be dealt with at the next delegate meeting.^ The next step was to restrict the number of opportunities for appeals on any questions whatsoever. The Coachmakers' executive announced that, in future, propositions would be put to the vote only in the annual report, instead of quarterly as hereto- fore, and this restriction was a few years later embodied in the rules.^ Even more effectual was the enactment of a rule throwing the expense of taking a vote upon the branch which had initiated it, in case the verdict of the society proved to be against the proposition.^ Another device was to seize the occasion of a systematic revision of rules to declare that no proposition for their alteration was to be entertained for a specified period : one year, said the General Union of Car- penters in 1863 ; three years, declared the Bookbinders' Consolidated Union in 1869, and the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons in 1878 ; ten years, ordained the Operative Bricklayers' Society in 1889.* Finally, we have the Referendum abolished altogether, as regards the making or alteration of rules. In 1866 the delegate meeting of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters decided that the execu- tive should " not take the votes of the members concerning any alteration or addition to rules, unless in cases of great emergency, and then only on the authority of the General Council."^ In 1878 the Stonemasons themselves, who forty years previously had been enthusiastic in their passion for voting on every question whatsoever, accepted a rule
1 Monthly Circular, April 1868.
2 Quarterly Report, November 1854 ; Rules of 1857.
' Rules of the Associated Blacksmiths' Society (Glasgow, 1892), and many others.
* Monthly Report, October 1889.
* Monthly Circular, April 1866.
26 Trade Union Structure
which confined the work of revision to a specially elected committee.
Thus we see that half a century of practical experience of the Initiative and the Referendum has led, not to its extension, but to an ever stricter limitation of its application. iThe attempt to secure the participation of every member in the management of his society was found to lead to in- stability in legislation, dangerous unsoundness of finance, and general weakness of administration. The result was the early abandonment of the Initiative, either by express rule or through the persistent influence of the executive. This produced a further shifting of the balance of power in Trade Union con- stitutions. When the right of putting questions to the vote came practically to be confined to the executive, the Referen- dum ceased to provide the members with any effective control. If the executive could choose the issues to be submitted, the occasion on which the question should be put, and the form in which it should be couched, the Referendum, far from supply- ing any counterpoise to the executive, was soon found to be an immense addition to its power. Any change which the executive desired could be stated in the most plausible terms and supported by convincing arguments, which almost invariably secured its adoption by a large majority. Any executive resolution could, when occasion required, thus be given the powerful moral backing of a plebiscitary vote.^ The reliance of Trade Union democrats on the Referendum resulted, in fact, in the virtual exclusion of the general body of members from all real share in the government. And
^ Mr. Lecky points out {Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 12, 31, 32) how, in France, "successive Governments soon learned how easily a plebiscite vote could be secured and directed by a strong executive, and how useful it might become to screen or justify usurpation. The Constitution of 1795) which founded the power of the Directors ; the Constitution of 1799, which placed the executive power in the hands of three Consuls elected for ten years ; the Constitution of 1802, which made Buonaparte Consul for life, and again remodelled the electoral system ; the Empire, which was established in 1804, and the additional Act of the Con- stitution promulgated by Napoleon in 181 5, were all submitted to a direct popular vote." The government of Napoleon III., from 1S52 to 1870, was ratified by four separate plebiscites. See also Laferriere, Constitutions de la France deptiis I/Sg; Jules Clere, Histoire du Souffrage Universel.
Pi'i77titive Democracy 27
when we remember the practical subordination of the executive committee to its salaried permanent officer, we shall easily understand that the ultimate effect of such a Referendum as we have described was a further strengthen- ing of the influence of the general secretary, who drafted the propositions, wrote the arguments in support of them, and edited the official circular which formed the only means of communication with the members.
We see, therefore, that almost every influence in the Trade Union organisation has tended to magnify and con- solidate the power of the general secretary. If democracy could furnish no other expedient of popular control than the mass meeting, the annual election of public officers, the, Initiative and the Referendum, Trade Union history makes it quite clear that the mere pressure of administrative needs would inevitably result in the general body of citizens losing all effective control over the government. It would not be difficult to point to influential Trade Unions at the present day which, possessing only a single permanent official, have not progressed beyond the stage of what is virtually a personal dictatorship. But it so happens that the very development of the union and its business which tends, as we have seen, to increase the influence of the general secretary, calls into existence a new check upon his personal authority. If we examine the constitution of a bank or joint stock company, or any other organisation not formed by the working class, we shall find it almost invariably the rule that the chief executive officers are appointed, not by the members at large, but by the governing committee, and that these officers are allowed a free hand, if not absolute power, in the choice and dismissal of their subordinates. Any other plan, it is contended, would seriously detract from the efficient working of the organisation. Had the Trade Unions adopted this course, the general secretary would have been absolutely supreme. But working-class organisations in England have, almost without exception, tenaciously clung to the direct election of all officers by the general
28 Trade Union Structure
body of members. Whether the post to be filled be that of assistant secretary at the head office or district delegate to act for one part of the country, the members have jealously retained the appointment in their own hands. In the larger trade societies of the present day the general secretary finds himself, therefore, at the head, not of a staff of docile subordinates who owe office and promotion to himself, but of a number of separately elected functionaries, each holding his appointment directly from the members at large.^ Any attempt at a personal dictatorship is thus quickly checked. There is more danger that friction and personal jealousies may unduly weaken the administration. But the usual outcome is the close union of all the salaried officials to conduct the business of the society in the way they think best. Instead of a personal dictatorship, we have, therefore, a closely combined and practically irresistible bureaucracy.
Under a constitution of this type the Trade Union may attain a high degree of efficiency. The United Society of Boilermakers and Ironshipbuilders (established 1832; membership in December 1896, 40,776) is, for instance, admittedly one of the most powerful and best conducted of English trade societies. For the last twenty years its career, alike in good times and bad, has been one of continuous prosperity. For many years past it has dominated all the shipbuilding ports, and it now includes practically every ironshipbuilder in the United Kingdom. As an insurance company it has succeeded in paying, even in the worst years of an industry subject to the most acute depressions, benefits of an unusually elaborate and generous character. Notwith- standing these liberal benefits, it has built up a reserve fund of no less than ;^ 175,560. Nor has this prosperity been
1 Even the office staff has been, until quite recently, invariably recruited by the members from the members ; and only in a few unions has it begun to be realised that a shorthand clerk or trained bookkeeper, chosen by the general secretary or the executive committee, can probably render better service at the desk than the most eligible workman trained to manual labor. The Operative Bricklayers' Society, however, lately allowed their executive committee to appoint a shorthand clerk.
Primitive Democracy 29
attained by any neglect of the militant side of Trade Unionism. The society, on the contrary, has the reputa- tion of exercising stricter control over the conditions of its members' work than any other union. In no trade, for instance, do we find a stricter and more universally enforced limitation of apprentices, or a more rigid refusal to work with non-unionists. And, as we have elsewhere described, no society has more successfully concluded and enforced elaborate national agreements applicable to every port in the kingdom. Moreover, this vigorous and successful trade policy has been consistent with a marked abstention from strikes — a fact due not only to the financial strength and perfect combination of the society, but also to the implicit obedience enforced upon its members, and the ample dis- ciplinary power vested in and exercised by the central executive.^
The efficiency and influence of this remarkable union is, no doubt, largely due to the advantageous strategic position which has resulted from the extraordinary expansion of iron- shipbuilding. It is interesting, however, to notice what a perfect example it affords of a constitution retaining all the features of the crudest democracy, but becoming, in actual practice, a bureaucracy in which effective popular control has sunk to a minimum. The formal constitution of the Boiler- makers' Society still includes all the typical features of the early Trade Union. The executive government of this great national society is vested in a constantly changing committee, the members of which, elected by a single district, serve only for twelve months, and are then ineligible for re-election during three years. All the salaried officials are separately elected by the whole body of members, and hold their posts only for a prescribed term of two to five years. Though provision is made for a delegate meeting in case the society desires it, all the rules, including the rates of contribution and
^ See the enthusiastic description of this organisation in Zum Socialen Frieden (Leipzig, 1890), 2 vols., by Dr. G. von Schulze-Gaevernitz, translated as Social Peace (London, 1893), pp. 239-243,
2,0 Trade Union Structu7'e
benefit, can be altered by aggregate vote ; and even if a delegate meeting assembles, its amendments have to be submitted to the votes of the branches in mass meeting. Any branch, moreover, may insist that any proposition whatsoever shall be submitted to this same aggregate vote. The society, in short, still retains the form of a Trade Union democracy of the crudest type.
But although the executive committee, the branch meeting and the Referendum occupy the main body of the society's rules, the whole policy has long been directed and the whole administration conducted exclusively by an infor- mal cabinet of permanent officials which is unknown to the printed constitution. Twenty years ago the society had the good fortune to elect as general secretary, Mr. Robert Knight, a man of remarkable ability and strength of character, who has remained the permanent premier of this little kingdom. During his long reign, there has grown up around him a staff of younger officials, who, though severally elected on their individual merits, have been in no way able to compete with their chief for the members' allegiance. These district dele- gates are nominally elected only for a term of two years, just as the general secretary himself is elected only for a term of five years. But, for the reasons we have given elsewhere, all these officials enjoy a permanence of tenure practically equal to that of a judge. Mr. Knight's unquestioned superiority in Trade Union statesmanship, together with the invariable support of the executive committee, have enabled him to construct, out of the nominally independent district delegates, a virtual cabinet, alternately serving as councillors on high issues of policy and as ministers carrying out in their own spheres that which they have in council decided. From the written constitution of the society, we should suppose that it was from the evening meetings of the little Newcastle committee of working platers and rivetters that emanated all those national treaties and elaborate collective bargains with the associated employers that have excited the admiration of economic students. But its unrepresentative character, the
Primitive Democracy 3 1
short term of service of its members and the practical rota- tion of office make it impossible for the constantly shifting executive committee to exercise any effective influence over even the ordinary routine business of so large a society. The complicated negotiations involved in national agreements are absolutely beyond its grasp. What actually happens is that, in any high issue of policy, Mr. Knight summons his district delegates to meet him in council at London or Manchester, to concert, and even to conduct, with him the weighty negotiations which the Newcastle executive formally endorses. And although the actual administration of the benefits is conducted by the branch committees, the absolute centralisa- tion of funds and the supreme disciplinary power vested in the executive committee make that committee, or rather the general secretary, as dominant in matters of finance as in trade policy. The only real opportunity for an effective expression of the popular will comes to be the submission of questions to the aggregate vote of the branches in mass meeting assembled. It is needless to point out that a Referendum of this kind, submitted through the official circular in whatsoever terms the general secretary may choose, and backed by the influence of the permanent staff in every district, comes to be only a way of impressing the official view on the whole body of members. In effect the general secretary and his informal cabinet were, until the change of 1895, absolutely supreme.^
In the case of the Boilermakers, government by an informal cabinet of salaried officials has, up to the present time, been highly successful. It is, however, obvious that a less competent statesman than Mr. Knight would find great difficulty in welding into a united cabinet a body of district
^ In 1895, after this chapter was written, the constitution was changed, owing to the growing feeling of the members in London and some other towns, that their bureaucracy was, under the old forms, completely beyond their control. By the new rules the government is vested in a representative executive of seven salaried members, elected by the seven electoral districts into which the whole society is divided, for a term of three years, one-third retiring annually. — Rules of the United Society of Boilermakers, etc. (Newcastle, 1895). It is as yet too soon to comment on the effect of this change, which only came into operation in 1897.
32 Trade Union Structure
officers separately responsible to the whole society, and nominally subject only to their several district committees. Under these circumstances any personal friction or disloyalty might easily paralyse the whole trade policy, upon which the prosperity of the society depends. Moreover, though under Mr. Knight's upright and able government the lack of any supervising authority has not been felt, it cannot but be regarded as a defect that the constitution provides no prac- tical control over a corrupt, negligent, or incompetent general secretary. The only persons in the position to criticise effectually the administration of the society are the salaried officials themselves, who would naturally be indisposed to risk their offices by appealing, against their official superior, to the uncertain arbitrament of an aggregate vote. Finally, this constitution, with all its parade of democratic form, secures in reality to the ordinary plater or rivetter little if any active participation in the central administration of his Trade Union ; no real opportunity is given to him for expressing his opinion ; and no call is made upon his intelligence for the formation of any opinion whatsoever. In short, the Boilermakers, so long as they remained content with this form of government, secured efficient administration at the expense of losing all the educative influences and political safeguards of democracy.
Among the well-organised Coalminers of the North of England the theory of "direct legislation by the people" is still in full force. Thus, the 19,000 members of the Northumberland Miners' Mutual Confident Association (estab- lished 1863) decide every question of policy, and even many merely administrative details, by the votes taken in the several lodge meetings ; ^ and although a delegate meeting is held every quarter, and by a rule of 1894 is expressly declared to " meet for the purpose of deliberating free and untrammelled upon the whole of the programme," its function is strictly limited to expressing its opinion, the entire list of propositions
1 See, for instance, the twenty-five separate propositions voted on in a single batch, 9th June 1894. — Northumberland Miners' Minutes, 1894, pp. 23-26.
Primitive Democracy 33
being then " returned to the lodges to be voted on." ^ The executive committee is elected by the whole body ; and the members, who retire after only six months' service, are ineligible for re-election. Finally, we have the fact that the salaried officials are themselves elected by the members at large. To this lack of organic connection between the different parts of the constitution, the student will perhaps attribute a certain instability of policy manifested in successive popular votes. In June 1894, a vote of all the members was taken on the question of joining the Miners' Federation, and an affirmative result was reached by 6730 to 5807. But in the very next month, when the lodges were asked whether they were pre- pared to give effect to the well-known policy of the Federa- tion and claim the return of reductions in wages amounting to sixteen per cent, which they had accepted since 1892, they voted in the negative by more than two to one ; and backed this up by an equally decisive refusal to contribute towards the resistance of other districts. " They had joined a Federation knowing its principles and its policy, and im- mediately after joining they rejected the principles they had just embraced," was the comment of one of the members
1 Rule 15. We see here a curious instance of the express separation of the deliberative from the legislative function, arising out of the inconvenient results of the use of the Imperative Mandate. The committee charged with the revision of the rules in 1893- 1894 reported that "the present mode of transacting business at delegate meetings has long been felt to be very unsatisfactory. Suggestions are sent in for programme which are printed and remitted to the lodges, and delegates are then sent with hard and fast instructions to vote for or against as the case may be. It not unfrequently happens that delegates are sent to support a vote against suggestions which are found to have an entirely different meaning, and may have a very different effect from those expected by the lodges when voting for them. To avoid the mischief that has frequently resulted from our members thus committing themselves to suggestions upon insufficient information, we suggest that after the programmes have been sent to the lodges, lodges send their delegates to a meeting to deliberate on the business, after which they shall return and report the results of the discussion and then forward their votes by proxy to the office. To carry out this principle, which we consider is of the greatest possible interest and importance to our members, no more meetings will be required or expense incurred than under the present system, while on the other hand lodges will have the opportunity of casting their votes on the various suggestions with full information before them, instead of in the absence of this information in most cases, as at present." — Report of 3rd February 1S94, in Northumberland Miners' Minutes, 1894, pp. 87-88.
VOL. I " D
34 - Trade Union Structure
of their own executive committee.^ This inconsistent action led to much controversy, and the refusal of the Northumber- land men to obey the decision of the special conference, the supreme authority of the Federation, was declared to be inconsistent with their remaining members of the organisation. Nevertheless, in July 1894 they again voted, by 8445 to 5507, in favor of joining the Federation, despite the power- ful adverse influence of their executive committee. The Federation officials not unnaturally asked whether the re- newed application for membership might now be taken to imply a willingness to conform to the policy of the organisa- tion which it was wished to join. On this a further vote was taken by lodges, when the proposition to join was negatived by a majority of over five to one.^
It may be objected that, in this instance of joining the Miners' Federation, the question at issue was one of great difficulty and of momentous import to the union, and that some hesitation on the part of the members was only to be expected. We could, however, cite many similar instances of contradictory votes by the Northumberland men, on both matters of policy and points of internal administration. We suggest that their experience is only another proof that, whatever advantages may be ascribed to government by the Referendum, it has the capital drawback of not providing the executive with any policy. In the case of the Northumber- land Miners' Union, the result has been a serious weakening of its influence, and, on more than one occasion, the gravest
1 Report of Conference, 23rd September 1893, in Northumberland Miners Alimites, 1893.
2 It should be explained that the Referendum among the Northumberland Miners takes two distinct forms, the " ballot," and the so-called "proxy voting." Questions relating to strikes, and any others expressly ordered by the delegate meeting, are decided by a ballot of the members individually. The ordinary business remitted from the delegate meeting to the lodges is discussed by the general meeting of each lodge, and the lodge vote, or " proxy," is cast as a whole according to the bare majority of those present. The lodge vote counts from one to thirty, in strict proportion to its membership. It is interesting to note (though we do not know whether any inference can be drawn from the fact) that the two votes in favor of the Federation were taken by ballot of the members, whilst those against it were taken by the " proxy " of the lodges.
Primitive Democracy 35
danger of disintegration.^ Fortunately, the union has enjoyed the services of executive officers of perfect integrity, and of exceptional ability and experience. These officers have throughout had their own clearly defined and consistent policy, which the uninformed and contradictory votes of the members have failed to control or modify.
It will not be necessary to give in detail the constitution of the Durham Miners' Association (established 1869), since this is, in essential features, similar to that of the Northumber- land Miners.^ But it is interesting to notice that the Durham experience of the result of government by the Referendum has been identical with that of Northumberland,^ and even more detrimental to the organisation. The Durham Miners' Association, notwithstanding its closely concentrated 60,000 members, fails to exercise any important influence on the Trade Union world, and even excites complaints from the employers as to " its internal weakness." The Durham coal- owners declare that, with the council overruling the executive, and the ballot vote reversing the decision of the council, they never know when they have arrived at a settlement, or how long that settlement will be enforced on a recalcitrant lodge.
It is significant that the newer organisations which haye sprung up in these same counties in direct imitation of the miners' unions give much less power to the members at large. Thus the Durham Cokemen's and Laborers' Association, which, springing out of the Durham Miners' Association in 1874, follows in its rules the actual phrases of the parent organisa- tion, vests the election of its executive committee and officers, not in the members at large, but in a supreme " council."
1 See, for instance, the report of the special conference of 23rd September 1893, expressly summoned to resist the "disintegration of our Association." — Northumberland Aliners" Minutes, 1893.
2 In the Durham Miners' Association the election of officers is nominally vested in the council, but express provision is made in the rules for each lodge to "empower" its delegate how to vote.
3 This may be seen, for instance, from the incidental references to the Durham votes given in the Miners' Federation Minutes, 1893- 1896; or, with calamitous results, in the history of the great Durham strike of 1892 ; or in that of the Silk- stone strike of 1891. The Durham Miners' Minutes are not accessible to any non-member.
36 Trade Union Structure
Much the same may be said of the Durham County Colliery Enginemen's Mutual Aid Association, established 1872; the Durham Colliery Mechanics' Association, established 1879; and (so far as regards the election of officers) the Northumber- land Deputies' Mutual Aid Association, established 1887.
If, therefore, democracy means that everything which " concerns all should be decided by all," and that each citizen should enjoy an equal and identical share in the government, Trade Union history indicates clearly the inevitable result. Government by such contrivances as Rotation of Office, the Mass Meeting, the Referendum and Initiative, or the Delegate restricted by his Imperative Mandate, leads straight either to inefficiency and disintegration, or to the uncontrolled domin- ance of a personal dictator or an expert bureaucracy. Dimly and almost unconsciously this conclusion has, after a whole century of experiment, forced itself upon the more advanced trades. The old theory of democracy is still an article of faith, and constantly comes to the front when any organi- sation has to be formed for brand-new purposes ; ^ but Trade Union constitutions have undergone a silent revolution. The old ideal of the Rotation of Office among all the members in succession has been practically abandoned. Resort to the aggregate meeting diminishes steadily in frequency and im- portance. The use of the Initiative and the Referendum has
1 We may refer, by way of illustration, to the frequent discussions during 1894-1895 among the members of the political association styled the " Independ- ent Labor Party." On the formation of the Hackney Branch, for instance, the members "decided that no president and no executive committee of the branch be appointed, its management devolving on the members attending the weekly conferences" {Labour Leader, 26th January 1895). Nor is this view confined to the rank and file. The editor of the Clarioti himself, perhaps the most influential man in the party, expressly declared in his leading article of 3rd November 1 894 : "Democracy means that the people shall rule themselves ; that the people shall manage their own affairs ; and that their officials shall be public servants, or dele- gates, deputed to put the will of the people into execution. ... At present there is too much sign of a disposition on the part of the rank and file to overvalue the talents and usefulness of their officials. ... It is tolerably certain that in so far as the ordinary duties of officials and delegates, such as committee men or members of Parliament, are concerned, an average citizen, if he is thoroughly honest, will be found quite clever enough to do all that is needful. . . . Let all officials be retired after one year's services, and fresh ones elected in their place. "
Primitive Democracy 37
been tacitly given up in all complicated issues, and gradually- limited to a few special questions on particular emergencies. The delegate finds himself every year dealing with more numerous and more complex questions, and tends therefore inevitably to exercise the larger freedom of a representative. Finally, we have the appearance in the Trade Union world of the typically modern form of democracy, the elected repre- sentative assembly, appointing and controlling an executive committee under whose direction the permanent official staff performs its work.
CHAPTER II
REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS
The two organisations in the Trade Union world enjoying the greatest measure of representative institutions are those which are the most distinctly modern in their growth and pre- eminence. In numbers, political influence, and annual income the great federal associations of Coalminers and Cotton Operatives overshadow all others, and now comprise one-fifth of the total Trade Union membership. We have elsewhere pointed out that these two trades are both distinguished by their establishment of an expert civil service, exceeding in numbers and efficiency that possessed by any other trade.^ They resemble each other also, as we shall now see, in the success with which they have solved the fundamental problem of democracy, the combination of administrative efficiency and popular control. In each case the solution has been found in the frank acceptance of representative institutions.
In the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton- spinners, which may be taken as typical of cotton organisa- tions, the "legislative power" is expressly vested " in a meeting comprising representatives from the various provinces and dis- tricts included in the association." ^ This " Cotton-spinners' Parliament " is elected annually in strict proportion to
^ History of Trade Unionism, p. 298 ; see also the subsequent chapter on "The Method of Collective Bargaining."
2 Rides of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners (Man- chester, 1894), p. 4, Rule 7.
Representative Institutions 39
membership, and consists of about a hundred representatives. It meets in Manchester regularly every quarter, but can be called together by the executive council at any time. Once elected, this assembly is, like the British Parliament, abso- lutely supreme. Its powers and functions are subject to no express limitation, and from its decisions there is no appeal. The rules contain no provision for taking a vote of the members ; and though the agenda of the quarterly meeting is circulated for information to the executives of the district associations, so little thought is there of any necessity for the representatives to receive a mandate from their constituents, that express arrangements are made for transacting any other business not included in the agenda.-^
The actual " government " of the association is conducted by an executive council elected by the general representative meeting, and consisting of a president, treasurer, and secretary, with thirteen other members, of whom seven at least must be working spinners, whilst the other six are, by invariable custom, the permanent officials appointed and maintained by the principal district organisations. Here we have the " cabinet " of this interesting constitution — the body which practically directs the whole work of the association and exercises great weight in the counsels of the legislative body, preparing its agenda and guiding all its proceedings. For the daily work of administration this cabinet is authorised by the rules to appoint a committee, the " sub-council," which consists in practice of the six " gentlemen," as the district officials are commonly called. The actual executive work is performed by a general secretary, who himself engages such office assistance as may from time to time be necessary. In marked contrast with all the Trade Union constitutions which we have hitherto described, the Cotton-spinners' rules do not
^ Rule 9, p. 5. The general representative meeting even resembles the British Parliament in being able itself to change the fundamental basis of the constitution, including the period of its own tenure of office. The rules upon which the Amalgamated Association depends can be altered by the general representative meeting in a session called by special notice, without any confirmation by the constituents. — Rule 45, pp. 27-28.
40 Trade Union Structure
give the election of this chief executive officer to the general body of members, but declare expressly that " the sole right of electing a permanent general secretary shall be vested in the provincial and district representatives when in meeting assembled, by whom his salary shall be fixed and deter- mined." ^ Moreover, as we have already mentioned, the candidates for this office pass a competitive examination, and when once elected the general secretary enjoys a permanence of tenure equal to that of the English civil service, the rules providing that he " shall be appointed and continue in office so long as he gives satisfaction." ^
The Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton- spinners is therefore free from all the early expedients for securing popular government. The general or aggregate meeting finds no place in its constitution, and the rules con- tain no provision for the Referendum or the Initiative. No countenance is given to the idea of Rotation of Office. No officers are elected by the members themselves. Finally, we have the complete abandonment of the delegate, and the sub- stitution,^both in fact and in name, of the representative. On the other hand, the association is a fully-equipped democratic state of the modern type. It has an elected parliament, exercising supreme and uncontrolled power. It has a cabinet appointed by and responsible only to that parliament. And its chief executive officer, appointed once for all on grounds of efficiency, enjoys the civil-service permanence of tenure.^
1 Rule 12, p. 6. 2 Hid,
3 The other branches of the cotton trade, notably the federations of weavers and cardvoom hands, are organised on the same principle of an elected repre- sentative assembly, itself appointing the officers and executive committee, though there are minor differences among them. The United Textile Factory Workers' Association, of which the spinners form a part, is framed on the same model, a "legislative council," really an executive committee, being elected by the "conference," or representative assembly. (This organisation temporarily suspended its functions in 1S96.) Moreover, the rules of the several district associations of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners exhibit the same formative influences. In the smaller societies, confined to single villages, we find the simple government by general meeting, electing a committee and officers. Peraianence of tenure is, however, the rule, it being often expressly provided that the secretary and the treasurer shall each ' ' retain office as long as he gives satisfaction." More than half the total membership, moreover, is
Representative Institutions 41
We have watched the working of this remarkable consti- tution during the last seven years, and we can testify to the success with which both efficiency and popular control are secured. The efficiency we attribute to the existence of the adequate, highly-trained, and relatively well-paid and permanent civil service.^ But that this civil service is effectively under public control is shown by the accuracy with which the cotton officials adapt their political and industrial policy to the developing views of the members whom they serve. This sensitiveness to the popular desires is secured by the real supremacy of the elected representatives. For the " Cotton-spinners' Parliament " is no formal gathering of casual members to register the decrees of a dominant bureaucracy. It is, on the contrary, a highly -organised deliberative assembly, with active repre- sentatives from the different localities, each alive to the distinct, and sometimes divergent, interests of his own constituents. Their eager participation shows itself in constant " party meetings " of the different sections, at which the officers and workmen from each district consult together as to the line of policy to be pressed upon the assembly. Such consulta- tion and deliberate joint action is, in the case of the Oldham representatives at any rate, carried even further. The consti- tution of the Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association is, so far as we know, unique in all the annals of democracy in making express provision for the " caucus." ^
included in two important *' provinces," Oldham and Bolton, which possess elaborate federal constitutions of their own. These follow, in general outline, the federal constitution, but both retain some features of the older form. Thus in Oldham, where the officers enjoy permanence of tenure and are responsible only to the representative assembly, any vacancy is filled by general vote of the members. And though the representative assembly has supreme legislative and executive powers, it is required to take a ballot of all the members before deciding on a strike. On the other hand, Bolton, which leaves everything to its repre- sentative assembly, shows a lingering attachment to rotation of office by providing that the retiring members of its executive council shall not be eligible for re-election during twelve months.
1 The nineteen thousand members of the Amalgamated Association of Opera- tive Cotton-spinners command the services of ten permanent officials, besides numerous local officers still working at their trade.
2 The •* caucus," in this sense of the term, is supposed to have been first
42 Trade Union Structure
The rules of 1891 ordain that "whenever the business to be transacted by the representatives attending the quarterly or special meetings of the Amalgamation is of such import- ance and to the interest of this association as to require unity of action in regard to voting by the representatives from this province, the secretary shall be required to summon a special meeting of the said representatives by announcing in the monthly circular containing the minutes the date and time of such meeting, which must be held in the council room at least seven days previous to the Amalgamation meeting taking place. The provincial representatives on the amalga- mated council shall be required to attend such meeting, to give any information required, and all resolutions passed by a majority of those present shall be binding upon all the representatives from the Oldham province attending the amalgamated quarterly or special meetings, and any one acting contrary to his instructions shall cease to be a repre- sentative of the district he represents, and shall not be allowed to stand as a candidate for any office connected with the association for the space of twelve months. The allowance for attending these special meetings shall be in accordance with the scale allowed to the provincial executive council." ^ But even without so stringent a rule, there would be but little danger of the representatives failing to express the desires of the rank and file. Living the same life as their constituents, and subject to annual election, they can scarcely fail to be in touch with the general body of the members. The common practice of requiring each representative to report his action to the next meeting of his constituents, by whom it is discussed in his presence, and the wide circulation
introduced about the beginning of this century, in the United States Congress, by the Democratic Party. See the Statesman's Manual, vol. i. pp. 294, 338 ; Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 12th edit. (New York, 1896), pp. 327-330; Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science (New York, 1891), vol. i. p. 357. The "caucus" in the sense of " primary assembly " is regulated by law in many American States, especially in Massachusetts. See Nominations for Elective Office in the United States, by F. W. Dallinger (London, 1897).
1 Rule 64, pp. 41-42, of Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association (Oldham, 1891).
Representative Institittio7is 43
of printed reports among all the members furnish efficient substitutes for the newspaper press. On the other hand, the facts that the representative assembly is a permanent insti- tution wielding supreme power, and that in practice its membership changes little from year to year, give it a very real authority over the executive council which it elects every six months, and over the officers whom it has appointed. The typical member of the "Cotton-spinners' Parliament" is not only experienced in voicing the desires of his constituents, but also possesses in a comparatively large measure that knowledge of administrative detail and of current affairs which enables him to understand and control the proceedings of his officers.
The Coalminers are, as we have elsewhere mentioned, not so unanimous as the Cotton Operatives in their adoption of representative institutions. The two great counties of Northumberland and Durham have unions which preserve constitutions of the old-fashioned type. But when we pass to other counties, in which the Miners have come more thoroughly under the influence of the modern spirit, we find representative government the rule. The powerful associations of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the Midlands are all governed by elected representative assemblies, which appoint the executive committees and the permanent officers. But the most striking example of the adoption of repre- sentative institutions among the Coalminers is presented by the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, established 1887. This great federal organisation, which now comprises two -thirds of the Coalminers in union, adopted from the outset a completely representative constitution. The supreme authority is vested in a " conference," summoned as often as required, consisting of representatives elected by each county or district association. This conference exercises uncontrolled power to determine policy, alter rules, and levy unlimited contributions.^ From its decision there is no
^ This was expressly pointed out, doubtless with reference to some of the old- fashioned county unions which still clung to the custom of the Referendum or the
44 Trade Union Structure
appeal. No provision is made for taking the votes of the general body of members, and the conference itself appoints the executive committee and all the officers of the Federa- tion. Between the sittings of the conference the executive committee is expressly given power to take action to promote the interests of the Federation, and no rule savoring of Rotation of Office deprives this executive of the services of its experienced members.
The " Miners' Parliament," as this conference may not improperly be termed, is in many respects the most im- portant assembly in the Trade Union world. Its regular annual session, held in some midland town, lasts often for a whole week, whilst other meetings of a couple of days' dura- tion are held as business requires. The fifty to seventy members, who represent the several constituent bodies, consti- tute an exceptionally efficient deliberative assembly. Among them are to be found the permanent officers of the county unions, some of the most experienced of the checkweigh-men and the influential leaders of opinion in the mining villages. The official element, as might be expected, plays a prominent part in suggesting, drafting, and amending the actual pro- posals, but the unofficial members frequently intervene with effect in the business-like debates. The public and the press are excluded, but the conference usually directs a brief and guarded statement of the conclusions arrived at to be supplied to the newspapers, and a full report of the proceedings — sometimes extending to over a hundred printed pages — is subsequently issued to the lodges. The subjects dealt with include the whole range of industrial and political policy, from the technical grievance of a particular district up to the " nationalisation of mines." ^ The actual carrying out of the
Imperative Mandate, in the circular summoning the important conference of July 1893 : "Delegates must be appointed to attend Conference -with full po-zver to deal with the wages question. "
1 Thus the agenda for the Annual Conference in 1S94 comprised, besides formal business, certain revisions of rules and the executive committee's report, the Eight Hours Bill, the stacking of coal, the making of Saturday a regular whole holiday, the establishment of a public department to prevent unscrupulous competition in trade, the amendment of the Mines Regulation and Employers'
Representative Institutions 45
policy determined on by the conference is left unreservedly to the executive committee, but the conference expects to be called together whenever any new departure in policy is required. In times of stress the executive committee shows its real dependence on the popular assembly by calling it together every few weeks.^ And the success with which the Miners' Federation wields its great industrial and political power over an area extending from Fife to Somerset and a
Liability Acts, international relations with foreign miners' organisations and the nationalisation of mines. It may here be observed that the representatives at the Federal Conference have votes in proportion to the numbers of the members in their respective associations. This practice, often called "proxy voting," or, more accurately, " the accumulative vote," has long been characteristic of the Coalminers' organisations, though unknown to any other section of the Trade Union World. Thus the rules of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain are silent as to the number of representatives to be sent to the supreme " Conference," but provide "that each county, federation or district vote upon all questions as follows, viz. : one vote for every looo financial members or fractional part of 1000, and that the vote in every case shall be taken by numbers" (Rule lo, Rules of the Miners^ Federation of Great Britain, 1895). A similar principle has always been applied at the International Miners' Conferences, and the practice prevails also in the several county unions or federations. The Lancashire and Cheshire Federation fixes the number of representatives to be sent to its Conferences at one per 500 members, but expressly provides that the voting is to be "by proxy" in the same proportion. The Midland Federation adopts the same rule. The Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Durham, and West Cumberland associations allow each branch or lodge only a single representative, whose vote counts strictly in proportion to the membership he represents. This "accumulative vote" is invariably resorted to in the election of officers and in all important decisions of policy, but it is not uncommon for minor divisions to be taken, unchallenged, on the principle of " one man one vote." It is not easy to account for the exceptional preference of the Coalminers for this method of voting, especially as their assemblies are, as we have pointed out, in practice more "representative" in their character, and less trammelled by the idea of the imperative mandate, than those of any other trade but the Cotton Operatives. The practice facilitates, it is true, a diminution in the size of the meetings, but this appears to be its only advantage. In the absence of any system of "pro- portional representation " it affords no real guide to the relative distribution of opinion ; the representatives of Yorkshire, for instance, in casting the vote of the county, can at best express the views only of the majority of their constituents, and have therefore no real claim to outvote a smaller district, with whose views nearly half their own constituents may be in sympathy. If, on the other hand, the whole membership of the Miners' Federation were divided into fairly equal electoral districts, each electing a single member, there would be more chance of every variety of opinion being represented, whilst an exact balance between the large and the small districts would nevertheless be preserved.
^ During the great strike in 1893 the Conference met eight times in six months.
46 Trade Union Structure
membership numbering two hundred thousand, furnishes eloquent testimony to the manner in which it has known how to combine efficient administration with genuine popular assent.
The great federal organisations of Cotton Operatives and Coalminers stand out from among the other Trade Unions in respect of the completeness and success with which they have adopted representative institutions. But it is easy to trace a like tendency throughout the whole Trade Union world. We have already commented on the innovation, now almost universal, of entrusting the task of revising rules to a specially elected committee. It was at first taken for granted that the work of such a revising committee was limited to putting into proper form the amendments pro- posed by the branches themselves, and sometimes to choosing between them. Though it is still usual for the revised rules to be formally ratified by a vote of the members, the revising committees have been given an ever wider discretion, until in most unions they are nowadays in practice free to make changes according to their own judgment.^ But it is in the constitution of the central executive that the trend towards representative institutions is most remarkable, the old expedient of the " governing branch " being superseded by an executive committee representative of the whole body of the members.^
^ There is a similar tendency to disapprove of the Imperative Mandate in the principal Friendly Societies. The Friendly Societies' Mo7ithly Magazine for April 1890 observes that " Lodges are advised ... to instruct their delegates as to how they are to vote. With this we entirely disagree. A proposition till it is properly thrashed out and explained, remains in the husk, and its full import is lost. Delegates fettered with instructions simply become the mechanical mouthpiece of the necessarily unenlightened lodges which send them, and there- fore the legislation of the Order might just as well be conducted by post."
2 Thus the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (established 1872) administers the affairs of its forty-four thousand members by an executive committee of thirteen (with the three officers), elected annually by ballot in thirteen equal electoral districts. This committee meets in London at least quarterly, and can be summoned oftener if required. Above this is the supreme authority of the annual assembly of sixty delegates, elected by sixty equal electoral districts, and sitting for four days to hear appeals, alter rules, and determine the policy of the union. A similar constitution is enjoyed by the Associated Society of
Representative Institutioits 47
This revolution has taken place in the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (37,000 members) and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (87,313 members), the two societies which, outside the worlds of cotton and coal, exceed nearly all others in membership. Down to 1890 the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives was governed by a local executive council belonging to a single town, controlled only by occasional votes of a delegate assembly, meeting, at first, every four years, and afterwards every two years. Seven years ago the constitution was entirely trans- formed. The society was divided into five equal electoral districts, each of which elected one member to serve for two years on an executive council consisting of only these five representatives, in addition to the three other officers elected by the whole body of members. To the representative execu- tive thus formed was committed not only all the ordinary business of the society, but also the final decision in cases of appeals by individual members against the decision of a branch. The delegate meeting, or " National Conference," meets to determine policy and revise rules, and its decisions no longer require ratification by the members' vote. Although the Referendum and the Mass Meeting of the district are still formally included in the constitution, the complication and difficulty of the issues which have cropped up during the last few years have led the executive council to call together the national conference at frequent intervals, in preference to submitting questions to the popular vote.
Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen (established 1880). It is this model that has been followed, with unimportant variations in detail, by the more durable of the labor unions which sprang into existence in the great upheaval of 1S89, among which the Gasworkers and the Dockers are the best known. The practice of electing the executive committee by districts is, as far as we know, almost unknown in the political world. The executive council of the State of Penn- sylvania in the eighteenth century used to be elected by single -member districts {^Federalist, No. LVII.), and a similar arrangement appears occa- sionally to have found a place in the ever-changing constitutions of one or two Swiss Cantons. (See State and Federal Government in Sivitzerland, by J. M. Vincent, Baltimore, 1891.) We know of no case where it prevails at present (Lowell's Goveriunents and Parties in Continental Europe, London, 1896).
48 Trade Union Structure
In the case of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers the constitutional revolution has been far more sweeping. In the various editions of the Engineers' rules from 185 i to 1 89 1 we find the usual reliance on the Mass Meeting, the Referendum and the direct election of all officers by the members at large. We also see the executive control vested in a committee elected by a single district, — the chairman, moreover, being forbidden to serve for more than two years in succession. In the case of the United Society of Boiler- makers we have already described how a constitution of essentially similar type has resulted in remarkable success and efficiency, but at the sacrifice of all real control by the members. In the history of the Boilermakers from 1872 onwards we watch the virtual abandonment in practice, for the sake of a strong and united central administration, of everything that tended to weaken the executive power. The Engineers, on the contrary, clung tenaciously to every institution or formality which protected the individual member against the central executive.-^ Meanwhile, although the very object of the amalgamation in 1 8 5 i was to secure uniformity of trade policy, the failure to provide any salaried official staff left the central executive with little practical control over the negotiations conducted or the decisions arrived at by the local branch or district committee. The result was not only failure to cope with the vital problems
1 In financial matters, for instance, though ever)^ penny of the funds belonged to the whole society, each branch retained its own receipts, subject only to the cumbrous annual " equalisation." The branch accordingly had it in its power to make any disbursement it chose, subject only to subsequent disallowance by the central executive. Nor was the decision of the central executive in any way final. The branch aggrieved by any disallowance could, and habitually did, appeal — not to the members at large, who would usually have supported the executive — but to another body, the general council, which met every three years for the express purpose of deciding such appeals. There was even a further appeal from the general council to the periodical delegate meeting. In the meantime the payment objected to was not required to be refunded, and it will therefore easily be understood that the vast majority of executive decisions were instantly appealed against. And when we add that each of these several courts of appeal frequently reversed a large proportion of the decisions of its immediate inferior, the effect of these frequent appeals in destroying all authority can easily be imagined.
Representative Institutions 49
of trade policy involved in the changing conditions of the industry, but also an increasing paralysis of administration, against which officers and committee-men struggled in vain. When in 1892 the delegates met at Leeds to find a remedy for these evils, they brought from the branches two leading suggestions. One party urged the appointment, in aid of the central executive, of a salaried staff of district delegates, elected, in direct imitation of those of the Boilermakers, by the whole society. Another section favored the transforma- tion of the executive committee into a representative body, and proposed the division of the country into eight equal electoral districts, each of which should elect a representative to a salaried executive council sitting continually in London, and thus giving its whole time to the society's work. Probably these remedies, aimed at different sides of the trouble, were intended as alternatives. It is significant of the deep impression made upon the delegate meeting that it eventually adopted both, thus at one blow increasing the number of salaried officers from three to seventeen.^
Time has yet to show how far this revolution in the constitution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers will conduce either to efficient administration or to genuine popular control. It is easy to see that government by an executive committee of this character differs essentially from government by a representative assembly appointing its own cabinet, and that it possesses certain obvious dis- advantages. The eight members, who are thus transferred by the vote of their fellows from the engineer's workshop to the Stamford Street office, become by this fundamental change of life completely severed from their constituents. Spending all their days in office routine, they necessarily lose the vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man
^ It is interesting to observe that the United Society of Boilermakers, by adopting in 1895 a Representative Executive, has made its formal constitution almost identical with that of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The vital difference between these two societies now lies in the working relation between the central executive and the local branches and district committees ; see the subsequent chapter on " The Unit of Government."
VOL. I E
50 Trade Union Structure
who works at the lathe or the forge. Living constantly in London, they are subject to new local influences, and tend unconsciously to get out of touch with the special grievances or new drifts of popular opinion on the Tyne or the Clyde, at Belfast or in Lancashire. It is true that the representa- tives hold office for only three years, at the expiration of which they must present themselves for re-election ; but there would be the greatest possible reluctance amongst the members to relegate to manual labor a man who had once served them as a salaried official. Unless, therefore, a re- vulsion of feeling takes place among the Engineers against the institution itself, the present members of the representa- tive executive committee may rely with some confidence on becoming practically permanent officials.
These objections do not apply with equal force to other examples of a representative executive. The tradition of the Stamford Street office — that the whole mass of friendly- society business should be dealt with in all its details by the members of the executive committee themselves — involves their daily attendance and their complete absorption in office work. In other Trade Unions which have adopted the same constitutional form, the members of the represent- ative executive reside in their constituencies and, in some cases, even continue to work at their trade. They are called together, like the members of a representative assembly, at quarterly or other intervals to decide only the more im- portant questions, the detailed executive routine being delegated to a local sub -committee or to the official staff. Thus the executive committee of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives usually meets only for one day a month ; the executive committee of the Associated Loco- motive Engineers and Firemen is called together only when required, usually not more than once or twice a month ; the executive council of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants comes to London once a quarter, and the same practice is followed by the executive committee of the National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers. It is
Representative Institutions 51
evident that in all these cases the representative executive, whether formed of the salaried officials of the districts or of men working at their trade, has more chance of remaining in touch with its constituents than in the case of the Amalga- mated Society of Engineers.
But there is, in our opinion, a fundamental drawback to government by a representative executive, even under the most favorable conditions. One of the chief duties of a representative governing body is to criticise, control, and direct the permanent official staff, by whom the policy of the organisation must actually be carried out. Its main function, in fact, is to exercise real and continuous authority over the civil service. Now all experience shows it to be an essential condition that the permanent officials should be dependent on and genuinely subordinate to the representative body. This condition is fulfilled in the constitutions such as those of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners and the Miners' Federation, where the representative assembly itself appoints the officers, determines their duties, and fixes their salaries. But it is entirely absent in all Trade Union constitutions based on a representative executive. Under this arrangement the executive committee neither appoints the officers nor fixes their salaries. Though the representative executive, unlike the old governing branch, can in its corporate capacity claim to speak in the name of all the members, so can the general secretary himself, and often each assistant secretary. All alike hold their positions from the same supreme power — the votes of the members ; and have their respective duties and emoluments defined by the same written constitution — the society's rules.
This absence of any co-ordination of the several parts of the constitution works out, in practice, in one of two ways. There may arise jealousies between the several officers, or between them and some of the members of the executive committee. We have known instances in which an incom- petent and arbitrary general secretary has been pulled up by one or other of his colleagues who wanted to succeed to
52 Trade Union Structure
his place. The suspicion engendered by the relation of competitors for popular suffrage checks, it may be, some positive malpractices, but results also in the obstruction of useful measures of policy, or even in their failure through dis- loyalty. More usually the executive committee, feeling itself powerless to control the officials, tends to make a tacit and half-unconscious compact with them, based on mutual support against the criticism of their common constituents. If the members of the committee are themselves salaried officials, they not only have a fellow-feeling for the weak- nesses of their brother officials, but they also realise vividly the personal risk of appealing against them to the popular vote. If, on the other hand, the members continue to work at their trade, they feel themselves at a hopeless disadvantage in any such appeal. They have neither the business ex- perience nor the acquaintance with details necessary for a successful indictment of an officer who is known from one end of the society to the other, and who enjoys the advantage of controlling its machinery. Thus we have in many unions governed by a Representative Executive the formation of a ruling clique, half officials, half representatives. This has all the disadvantages of such a bureaucracy as we have described in the case of the United Society of Boilermakers, without the efficiency made possible by its hierarchical organisation and the predominant authority of the head of the staff. To sum up, if there are among the salaried repre- sentatives or officials restless spirits, " conscientious critics," or disloyal comrades, the general body of members may rest assured that they will be kept informed of what is going on^ but at the cost of seeing their machinery of government constantly clogged by angry recriminations and appeals. If, on the other hand, the men who meet at headquarters in one or another capacity are " good fellows," the machine will work smoothly with such efficiency as their industry and capacity happens to be equal to, but all popular control over this governing clique will disappear.
We see, then, that though government by a representa-
Representative Institutions 53
tive executive is a real advance on the old expedients, it is likely to prove inferior to government by a representative assembly, appointing its own cabinet and officers. But a great national Trade Union extending from one end of the kingdom to the other cannot easily adopt the superior form, even if the members desire it. The Cotton Operatives enjoy the special advantage of having practically all their member- ship within a radius of thirty miles from Manchester. The frequent gatherings of a hundred delegates held usually on a Saturday afternoon entail, therefore, no loss of working time and little expense to the organisation. The same con- sideration applies to the great bulk of the membership of the Miners' Federation, three-fourths of which is concentrated in Lancashire, West Yorkshire, and the industrial Midlands. Even the outlying coalfields elsewhere enjoy the advantage of close local concentration, so that a single delegate may effectively represent the hundreds of lodges in his own county. And it is no small consideration that the total membership of the Miners' Federation is so large that the cost of frequent meetings of fifty to seventy delegates bears only a trifling proportion to the resources of the union. Very different is the position of the great unions in the engineering and building trades. The 46,000 members of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters in the United Kingdom, for instance, are divided into 623 branches, scattered over 400 separate towns or villages. Each town has its own Working Rules, its own Standard Rate and Normal Day, and lacks intimate connection with the towns right and left of it. The representative chosen by the Newcastle branch might easily be too much absorbed by the burning local question of demarcation against the Shipwrights to pay much attention to the simple grievances of the Hexham branch as to the Saturday half-holiday, or to the multiplication of apprentices in the joinery shops at Darlington. Similar considerations apply to the 497 branches of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, whose 80,000 members in the United Kingdom are working in 300 different towns. In view of the increasing
54 Trade Union Structure
uniformity of working conditions throughout the country, the concentration of industry in large towns, the growing facih- ties of travel and the steady multiplication of salaried local officialSj'we do not ourselves regard the geographical difficulty as insuperable. But it is easy to understand why, with so large a number of isolated branches, it has not yet seemed practicable to constitutional reformers in the building or the engineering trades, to have frequent meetings of repre- sentative assemblies.
The tardiness and incompleteness with which Trade Unions have adopted representative institutions is mainly due to a more general cause. The workman has been slow to recognise the special function of the representative in a democracy. In the early constitutional ideals of Trade Unionism the representative finds, as we have seen, absolutely no place. The committee-man elected by rotation of office or the delegate deputed to take part in a revision of rules was habitually regarded only as a vehicle by which "the voices " could be mechanically conveyed. His task required, therefore, no special qualification beyond intelligence to comprehend his instructions and a spirit of obedience in carrying them out. Very different is the duty cast upon the representative in such modern Trade Union constitutions as those of the Cotton Operatives and Coalminers. His main function is still to express the mind of the average man. But unlike the delegate, he is not a mechanical vehicle of votes on particular subjects. The ordinary Trade Unionist has but little facility in expressing his desires ; unversed in the technicalities of administration, he is unable to judge by what particular expedient his grievances can best be remedied. In default of an expert representative he has to depend on the professional administrator. But for this particular task the professional administrator is no more competent than the ordinary man, though for a different reason. The very apartness of his life from that of the average workman deprives him of close acquaintance with the actual grievances of the mass of the people. Immersed
Representative Institutio7is 55
in office routine, he is apt to fail to understand from their inconsistent complaints and impracticable suggestions what it is they really desire. To act as an interpreter between the people and their servants is, therefore, the first function of the representative.
But this is only half of his duty. To him is entrusted also the difficult and delicate task of controlling the pro- fessional experts. Here, as we have seen, the ordinary man completely breaks down. The task, to begin with, requires a certain familiarity with the machinery of government, and a sacrifice of time and a concentration of thought out of the reach of the average man absorbed in gaining his daily bread. So much is this the case that when the administra- tion is complicated, a further specialisation is found necessary, and the representative assembly itself chooses a cabinet, or executive committee of men specially qualified for this duty. A large measure of intuitive capacity to make a wise choice of men is, therefore, necessary even in the ordinary repre- sentative. Finally, there comes the important duty of deciding upon questions of policy or tactics. The ordinary citizen thinks of nothing but clear issues on broad lines. The representative, on the other hand, finds himself con- stantly called upon to choose between the nicely balanced expediencies of compromise necessitated by the complicated facts of practical life. On his shrewd judgment of actual circumstances will depend his success in obtaining, not all that his constituents desire — for that he will quickly recognise as Utopian, — but the largest instalment of those desires that may be then and there possible.
To construct a perfect representative assembly can, therefore, never be an easy task ; and in a community ex- clusively composed of manual workers dependent on weekly wages, the task is one of exceptional difficulty. A community of bankers and business entrepreneurs finds it easy to secure a representative committee to direct and control the paid officials whom it engages to protect its interests. Constituents, representatives and officials are
56 Trade Union Structure
living much the same life, are surrounded by the same intellectual atmosphere, have received approximately the same kind of education and mental training, and are con- stantly engaged in one variety or another of what is essentially the same work of direction and control. More- over, there is no lack of persons able to give the necessary time and thought to expressing the desires of their class and to seeing that they are satisfied. It is, therefore, not surprising that representative institutions should be seen at their best in middle-class communities.^ In all these respects the manual workers stand at a grave disadvantage. Whatever may be the natural endowment of the workman selected by his comrades to serve as a representative, he starts unequipped with that special training and that general familiarity with administration which will alone enable him to be a competent critic and director of the expert pro- fessional. Before he can place himself on a level with the trained official whom he has to control he must devote his whole time and thought to his new duties, and must there- fore give up his old trade. This unfortunately tends to alter his manner of life, his habit of mind, and usually also his intellectual atmosphere to such an extent that he gradually loses that vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man at the bench or the forge, which it is his function to express. There is a certain cruel irony in the problem which accounts, we think, for some of the unconscious exasperation of the wage-earners all over the world against representative institutions. Directly the working - man representative becomes properly equipped for one -half of his duties, he ceases to be specially qualified for the other. If he remains essentially a manual worker, he fails to cope with the brain-working officials ; if he takes on the character of the brain-worker, he is apt to get out of touch with the constituents whose desires he has to interpret. It will, therefore, be interesting to see how the shrewd workmen of
1 In this connection see the interesting suggestions of Achille Loria, Les Bases Economiques de la Constitution Sociale (Paris, 1893), pp. 150-154.
Representative Institutions 57
Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the Midlands have surmounted this constitutional difficulty.
In the parliaments of the Cotton-spinners and Coalminers we find habitually two classes of members, salaried officials of the several districts, and representative wage-earners still working at the mule or in the mine. It would almost seem as if these modern organisations had consciously recognised the impossibility of combining in any individual representa- tive both of the requirements that we have specified. As it is, the presence in their assemblies of a large proportion of men who are still following their trade imports into their deliberations the full flavor of working-class sentiment. And the association, with these picked men from each industrial village, of the salaried officers from each county, secures that combination of knowledge, ability, and practical experience in administration, which is, as we have suggested, absolutely indispensable for the exercise of control over the professional experts. If the constituencies elected none but their fellow- workers, it is more than doubtful whether the representative assembly so created would be competent for its task. If, on the other hand, the assembly consisted merely of a conference of salaried officials, appointing one or more of themselves to carry out the national work of the federation, it would inevitably fail to retain the confidence, even if it continued to express the desires of the members at large. The conjunction of the two elements in the same repre- sentative assembly has in practice resulted in a very efficient working body.
It is important to notice that in each of the trades the success of the experiment has depended on the fact that the organisation is formed on a federal basis. The constituent bodies of the Miners' Federation and the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton - spinners have their separate constitutions, their distinct funds, and their own official staffs. The salaried officers whom they elect to sit as representatives in the federal parliament have, therefore, quite other interests, obligations, and responsibilities than those of
58 Trade Union Structure
the official staff of the Federation itself. The secretary of the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association, for instance, finds himself able, when sitting as a member of the Conference of the Miners' Federation, freely to criticise the action of the federal executive council or of the federal official staff, with- out in any way endangering his own position as a salaried officer. Similarly, when the secretary of the Rochdale Cotton-spinners goes to the quarterly meeting at Manchester, he need have no hesitation in opposing and, if possible, defeating any recommendation of the executive council of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners which he considers injurious to the Rochdale spinners. In the form of the representative executive, this use of salaried officers in a representative capacity is likely to tend, as we have seen, to the formation of a virtually irresponsible governing clique. But in the form of a federal representative assembly, where the federal executive and official staff are dependent, not on the members at large but on the assembly itself, and where the representatives are responsible to quite other constituencies and include a large proportion of the non-official element, this danger is reduced to a minimum.
We have now set before the reader an analysis of the constitutional development of Trade Union democracy. The facts will be interpreted in different ways by students of different temperaments. To us they represent the long and inarticulate struggle of unlettered men to solve the problem of how to combine administrative efficiency with popular control. Assent was the first requirement. The very formation of a continuous combination, in face of legal persecution and public disapproval, depended on the active concurrence of all the members. And though it is con- ceivable that a strong Trade Union might coerce a few individual workmen to continue in its ranks against their will, no such coercive influence could permanently prevail over a discontented majority, or prevent the secession, either individually or in a body, of any considerable number who were seriously disaffected. It was accordingly assumed
Representative Institutions 59
without question that everything should be submitted to " the voices " of the whole body, and that each member should take an equal and identical share in the common project. As the union developed from an angry crowd unanimously demanding the redress of a particular grievance into an insurance company of national extent, obliged to follow some definite trade policy, the need for administrative efficiency more and more forced itself on the minds of the members. This efficiency involved an ever-increasing special- isation of function.^ The growing mass of business and the difficulty and complication of the questions dealt with involved the growth of an official class, marked off by capacity, training, and habit of life from the rank and file. Failure to specialise the executive function quickly brought about extinction. On the other hand this very specialisation undermined the popular control, and thus risked the loss of the indispensable popular assent. The early expedients of Rotation of Office, the Mass Meeting, and the Referendum proved, in practice, utterly inadequate as a means of securing genuine popular control. At each particular crisis the individual member found himself overmatched by the official machinery which he had created. At this stage irresponsible bureaucracy seemed the inevitable outcome. But democracy found yet another expedient, which in some favored unions has gone far to solve the problem. The specialisation of the executive into a permanent expert civil service was balanced by the specialisation of the legis- lature, in the establishment of a supreme representative assembly, itself undertaking the work of direction and control for which the members at large had proved incompetent. We have seen how difficult it is for a community of manual workers to obtain such an assembly, and how large a part is
^ "The progressive division of labour by virhich both science and government prosper." — Lord Acton, The Unity of Modern History (London, 1896), p. 3. " If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this : that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be trusted. . . . Power and strict accountability for its use, are the essential constituents of good government." — Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Gover7W!ent {^tvfYorV., 1S96), 12th edit.
6o Trade Union Struchire
inevitably played in it by the ever-growing number of salaried officers. But in the representative assembly these salaried officers sit in a new capacity. The work expected from them by their employers is not that of execution, but of criticism and direction. To balance the professional civil servant we have, in fact, the professional representative. \.'
This detailed analysis of humble working-class organisa- tions will to many readers be of interest only in so far as it furnishes material for political generalisations. It is there- fore important to consider to what extent the constitutional problems of Trade Union democracy are analogous to those of national or municipal politics.
The fundamental requisites of government are the same in the democratic state as in the Trade Union. In both cases the problem is how to combine administrative efficiency with popular control. Both alike ultimately depend on a continuance of general assent. In a voluntary association, such as the Trade Union, this general assent is, as we have seen, the foremost requirement : in the democratic state relinquishment of citizenship is seldom a practicable alternative, whilst the operation of changing governors is not an easy one. Hence, even in the most democratic of states the continuous assent of the governed is not so imperative a necessity as in the Trade Union. On the other hand, the degree of administrative efficiency necessary for the healthy existence of the state is far greater than in the case of the Trade Union. But whilst admitting this transposition in relative importance, it still remains true that, in the democratic state as in the Trade Union, government cannot continue to exist without com- bining a certain degree of popular assent with adequate administrative efficiency.
More important is the fact that the popular assent is in both cases of the same nature. In the democratic state, as in the Trade Union, the eventual judgment of the people is pronounced not upon projects but upon results. It avails not that a particular proposal may have received the prior
Representative Instittitions 6i
authorisation of an express popular vote ; if the results are not such as the people desire, the executive will not continue to receive their support. Nor does this, in the democratic state any more than in the Trade Union, imply that an all-wise government would necessarily secure this popular assent. If any particular stage in the march of civilisation happens to be momentarily distasteful to the bulk of the citizens, the executive which ventures to step in that direction will be no less ruthlessly dismissed than if its deeds had been evil. All that we have said as to the logical futility of the Referendum, and as to the necessity for the representative, therefore applies, we suggest, even more strongly to demo- cratic states than to Trade Unions. For what is the lesson to be learned from Trade Union history ? The Referendum, introduced for the express purpose of ensuring popular assent, has in almost all cases failed to accomplish its object. This failure is due, as the reader will have observed, to the constant inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will be the effect of a particular proposal. What Democracy requires is asseyit to results ; what the Referendum gives is assent to projects. No Trade Union has, for instance, deliberately desired bankruptcy ; but many Trade Unions have persistently voted for scales of contributions and benefits which have inevitably resulted in bankruptcy. If this is the case in the relatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, still more does it apply to the infinitely complicated questions of national politics.
But though in the case of the Referendum the analogy is sufficiently exact to warrant the transformation of the empirical conclusions of Trade Union history into a political generalisation, it is only fair to point out some minor differences between the two cases. We have had occasion to describe how, in Trade Union history, the use of the Referendum, far from promoting popular control, has some- times resulted in increasing the dominant power of the permanent civil service, and in making its position practically impregnable against any uprising opinion among its con-
62 Trade Union Structure
stituents. This particular danger would, we imagine, scarcely occur in a democratic state. In the Trade Union the executive committee occupies a unique position. It alone has access to official information ; it alone commands expert professional skill and experience ; and, most important of all, it monopolises in the society's official circular what corre- sponds to the newspaper press. The existence of political parties fairly equal in knowledge, ability, and electoral organisation, and each served by its own press, would always save the democratic state from this particular perversion of the Referendum to the advantage of the existing government. But any party or sect of opinion which, from lack of funds, education, or social influence, could not call to its aid the forces which we have named, would, we suggest, find itself as helpless in face of a Referendum as the discontented section of a strong Trade Union.
We have seen, moreover, that there is in Trade Union government a certain special class of questions in which the Referendum has a distinct use. Where a decision will involve at some future time the personal co-operation of the members in some positive act essentially optional in its nature — still more where that act involves a voluntary personal sacrifice, or where not a majority alone but practically the whole body of the members must on pain of failure join in it, — the Referendum may be useful, not as a legislative act, but as an index of the probability that the members will actually do what will be required of them. The decision to strike is obviously a case in point. Another instance may be found in the decisions of Trade Unions or other bodies that each member shall use his municipal or parliamentary franchise in a particular manner. Here the success or failure of the policy of the organisation depends not on the passive acquiescence of the rank and file in acts done by the executive committee or the officers, but upon each member's active performance of a personal task. We cannot think of any case of this kind within the sphere of the modern democratic state. If indeed, as Mr. Auberon Herbert
Representative Institutions 63
proposes, it were left to the option of each citizen to determine from time to time the amount and the appHcation of his contributions to the treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would probably find it convenient, prior to making up the estimates, to take a Referendum as a guide to how much would probably be paid. Or, to take an analogy very near to that of the Trade Union decision to strike, if each soldier in the army were at liberty to leave at a day's notice, it would probably be found expedient to take a vote of the rank and file before engaging in a foreign war. In the modern democratic state, however, as it actually exists, it is not left to the option of the individual citizen whether or not he will act in the manner decided on. The success or failure of the policy does not therefore depend on obtaining universal assent and personal participation in the act itself. Whether the citizen likes it or not, he is compelled to pay the taxes and obey the laws which have been decided on by the competent authority. Whether or not he will maintain that authority in power, will depend not on his original impulsive judgment as to the expediency of the tax or the law, but on his deliberate approval or disapproval of the subsequent results.
If Trade Union history throws doubt on the advantages of the Referendum, still less does it favor the institution of the delegate as distinguished from the representative. Even in the comparatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, it has been found, in practice, quite impossible to obtain definite instructions from the members on all the matters which come up for decision. When, for instance, the sixty delegates of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers met in 1892 to revise the constitution and trade policy of their society, they were supposed to confine themselves to such amendments as had previously received the sanction of one or other of the branches. But although the amendments so sanctioned filled over five hundred printed pages, it was found impossible to construct from this material alone any consistent constitution or line of policy. The delegates were
64 Trade Union Structicre
necessarily compelled to exercise larger freedom and to frame a set of rules not contemplated by any one of the branches. And this experience of the Engineers is only a type of what has been going on throughout the whole Trade Union world. The increased facilities for communication, on the one hand, and the growth of representative institutions, on the other, have made the delegate obsolete. Wherever a Trade Union has retained the old ideal of direct government by the people, it has naturally preferred to the Delegate Meeting the less expensive and more thoroughgoing device of the Referendum. For the most part the increasing complication and intricacy of modern industrial affairs has, as we have seen, compelled the substitution of representative institutions. These con- siderations apply with even greater force to the democratic state.
Trade Union history gives, therefore, little support to the Referendum or the Delegate Meeting, and points rather to government by a Representative Assembly as the last word of democracy.^ It is therefore important to see whether] these Trade Union parliaments have any lesson for the political student. The governing assemblies of even the most democratic states have, unlike Trade Union parliaments, hitherto been drawn almost exclusively from the middle or upper classes, and have therefore escaped the special difficulties of communities of wage-earners. If, however, we assume that the manual workers, who number four-fifths of the population, will gradually become the dominant influence in the elector- ate, and will contribute an important and increasing section of the representatives, the governing assemblies of the Coal-
^ " There are two elements co-existent in the conduct of human affairs — policy and administration — but, though the confines of their respective jurisdictions overlap, the functions of each must of necessity be exercised within its own domain by its own hierarchy — the one consisting of trained specialists and experts, intimately conversant with the historical traditions of their own depart- ment and with the minutest details of the subjects with which they are concerned, the other qualified by their large converse with whatever is influential and intelligent in their own country or on the European Continent, and, above all, by their Parliamentary talents and their tactful appreciation of public opinion, to determine the general lines along which the destinies of their country should be led." — Speech by the Marquis of Dufferin, Times, 12th June 1897.
Representative Institutions 65
miners or Cotton Operatives to-day may be to a large extent prophetic of the future legislative assembly in any English- speaking community.
One inference seems to us clear. Any effective participa- tion of the wage-earning class in the councils of the nation involves the establishment of a new calling, that of the professional representative. For the parish or town council it is possible to elect men who will continue to work at their trades, just as a Trade Union branch can be administered by committee-men and officers in full work. The adoption of the usual Co-operative and Trade Union practice of paying travelling expenses and an allowance for the actual time spent on the public business would suffice to enable workmen to attend the district or county council. But the governing assembly of any important state must always demand practically the whole time of its members. The working-man representative in the House of Commons is therefore most closely analogous, not to the working miner or spinner who attends the Coal or Cotton Parliament, but to the permanent and salaried official representatives, who, in both these assemblies, exercise the predominant influence and control the executive work. The analogy may therefore seem to point to the election to the House of Commons of the trained representative who has been successful in the parliament of his trade.
Such a suggestion misses the whole moral of Trade Union history. The cotton or coal -mining official repre- sentative succeeds in influencing his own trade assembly because he has mastered the technical details of all the business that comes before it ; because his whole life has been one long training for the duties which he has to discharge ; because, in short, he has become a professional expert in ascertaining and representing the desires of his constituents and in bringing about the conditions of their fulfilment. But transport this man to the House of Commons, and he finds himself confronted with facts and problems as foreign to his experience and training as his VOL. I F
66 Trade Union Structure
own business would be to the banker or the country gentle- man. What the working class will presently recognise is that the duties of a parliamentary representative constitute as much a new business to the Trade Union official as the duties of a general secretary are to the ordinary mechanic. When workmen desire to be as efficiently represented in the Parliament of the nation as they are in their own trade assemblies, they will find themselves compelled to establish a class of expert parliamentary representatives, just as they have had to establish a class of expert trade officials.
We need not consider in any detail what effect an influx of " labor members " of this new type would probably have upon the British House of Commons. Any one who has watched the deliberations of the Coal or the Cotton Parlia- ment, or the periodical revising committees of the other great unions, will have been impressed by the disinclination of the professional representative to mere talk, his impatience of dilatory procedure, and his determination to " get the business through " within working hours. Short speeches, rigorous closure, and an almost extravagant substitution of printed matter for lengthy " front bench " explanations render these assemblies among the most efficient of demo- cratic bodies.^
More important is it to consider in what respects, judging from Trade Union analogies, the expert professional representative will differ from the unpaid politician to whom the middle and upper classes have hitherto been accustomed. We have already described how in the Trade Union world the representative has a twofold function, neither part of which may be neglected with impunity. He makes it just as much his business to ascertain and express the real desires of his constituents as he does to control and direct the operations of the civil servants of his trade. With the
1 These representative assemblies present a great contrast to the Trade Union Congress, as to which see the subsequent chapter on " The Method of Legal Enactment."
Representative Institutions 67
entrance into the House of Commons of men of this type, the work of ascertaining and expressing the wishes of the constituencies would be much more deHberately pursued than at present. The typical member of Parliament to-day attends to such actual expressions of opinion as reach him from his constituency in a clear and definite form, but regards it as no part of his work actively to discover what the silent or inarticulate electors are vaguely desiring. He visits his constituency at rare intervals, and then only to expound his own views in set speeches at public meetings, whilst his personal intercourse is almost entirely limited to persons of his own class or to political wire-pullers. Whatever may be his intentions, he is seldom in touch with any but the middle or upper class, together with that tiny section of all classes to whom " politics " is of constant interest. Of the actual grievances and " dim in- articulate " aspirations of the bulk of the people, the lower middle and the wage-earning class, he has practically no conception. When representation of working-class opinion becomes a profession, as in the Trade Union world, we see a complete revolution in the attitude of the representative towards his constituents. To find out what his constituents desire becomes an essential part of his work. It will not do to wait until they write to him, for the working-man is slow to put pen to paper. Hence the professional Trade Union representative takes active steps to learn what the silent members are thinking. He spends his whole time, when not actually in session, in his constituency. He makes few set speeches at public gatherings, but he is diligent in attending branch meetings, and becomes an attentive listener at local committees. At his office he is accessible to every one of his constituents. It is, moreover, part of the regular routine of such a functionary to be constantly communicat- ing with every one of his constituents by means of frequent circulars on points which he believes to be of special interest to them. If, therefore, the professional representative, as we know him in the Trade Union world, becomes a feature of
68 Trade C/nioiz Structure
the House of Commons, the future member of Parliament will feel himself not only the authoritative exponent of the votes of his constituents, but also their " London Correspondent," their parliamentary agent, and their expert adviser in all matters of legislation or general politics.^
It is impossible to forecast all the consequences that would follow from raising (or, as some would say, degrading) the parliamentary representative from an amateur to a pro- fessional. But among other things the whole etiquette of the situation would be changed. At present it is a point of honor in a member of Parliament not to express his constituents' desires when he conscientiously differs from them. To the " gentleman politician " the only alternative to voting as he himself thinks best is resigning his seat. This delicacy is unknown to any paid professional agent. The architect, solicitor, or permanent civil servant, after tendering his advice and supporting his views with all his expert authority, finally carries out whatever policy his employer commands. This is also the view which the professional representative of the Trade Union world takes of his own duties. It is his business not only to put before his constituents what he believes to be their best policy and to back up his opinion with all the argumentative power he can bring to bear, but also to put his entire energy into wrestling with what he conceives to be their ignorance, and to become for the time a vigorous propagandist of his own policy. But if, when he has done his best in this way, he fails to get a majority over to his view, he loyally accepts the decision and records his vote in accordance with his constituents' desires. We imagine that professional repre- sentatives of working-class opinion in the House of Commons would take the same course.^
1 " Representatives ought to give light and leading to the people, just as the people give stimulus and momentum to their representatives." — ^J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (London, 1 891), vol. i. p. 297.
2 It is interesting to notice that in the country in which the ' ' sovereignty of
Representative Institutions 69
This may at first seem to indicate a return of the pro- fessional representative to the position of a delegate. Trade Union experience points, however, to the very reverse. In the great majority of cases a constituency cannot be said to have any clear and decided views on particular projects. What they ask from their representative is that he shall act in the manner which, in his opinion, will best serve to promote their general desires. It is only in particular instances, usually when some well-intentioned proposal entails im- mediately inconvenient results, that a wave of decided opinion spreads through a working-class constituency. It is exactly in cases of this kind that a propagandist campaign by a professional debater, equipped with all the facts, is of the greatest utility. Such a campaign would be the very last thing that a member of Parliament of the present type would venture upon if he thought that his constituents were against him. He would feel that the less the points of difference were made prominent, the better for his own safety. But once it came to be understood that the final command of the constituency would be obeyed, the repre- sentative would run no risk of losing his seat, merely because he did his best to convert his constituents. Judging from Trade Union experience he would, in nine cases out of ten, succeed in converting them to his own view, and thus perform a valuable piece of political education. In the tenth case the campaign would have been no less educa- tional, though in another way ; and, whichever was the right view, the issue would have been made clear, the facts brought out, and the way opened for the eventual conversion of one or other of the contending parties.
Trade Union experience indicates, therefore, a still further development in the evolution of the representative. Working-
the people " has been most whole-heartedly accepted, the Trade Union practice prevails. The members of the Swiss " Bundesrath " (Federal Cabinet) do not resign when any project is disapproved of by the legislature, nor do the members of the " Nationalrath " throw up their legislative functions when a measure is rejected by the electors on Referendum. Both cabinet ministers and legislators set themselves to carry out the popular will.
JO Trade Union Structure
class democracy will expect him not only to be able to understand and interpret the desires of his electors, and effectively to direct and control the administrating executive : he must also count it as part of his duty to be the expert parliamentary adviser of his constituency, and at times an active propagandist of his own advice. Thus, if any inference from Trade Union history is valid in the larger sphere, the whole tendency of working-class democracy will unconsciously be to exalt the real power of the representative, and more and more to differentiate his functions from those of the ordinary citizen on the one hand, and of the expert admini- strator on the other. The typical representative assembly of the future will, it may be suggested, be as far removed from the House of Commons of to-day as the latter is from the mere Delegate Meeting. We have already travelled far from the one man taken by rotation from the roll, and changed mechanically to convey " the voices " of the whole body. We may in the future leave equally behind the member to whom wealth, position, or notoriety secures, almost by accident, a seat in Parliament, in which he can, in such intervals as his business or pleasure may leave him, decide what he thinks best for the nation. In his stead we may watch appearing in increasing numbers the professional representative, — a man selected for natural aptitude, deliberately trained for his new work as a special vocation, devoting his whole time to the discharge of his manifold duties, and actively maintaining an intimate and reciprocal intellectual relationship with his constituency.
How far such a development of the representative will fit in with the party system as we now know it ; how far it will increase the permanence and continuity of parliamentary life ; how far it will promote collective action and tend to increasing bureaucracy ; how far, on the other hand, it will bring the ordinary man into active political citizenship, and rehabilitate the House of Commons in popular estimation ; how far, therefore, it will increase the real authority of the people over the representative assembly, and of the repre-
Representative Institutions 71
sentative assembly over the permanent civil service ; how far, in fine, it will give us that combination of administrative efficiency with popular control which is at once the requisite and the ideal of all democracy — all these are questions that make the future interesting.
CHAPTER III
THE UNIT OF GOVERNMENT
The trade clubs of the eighteenth century inherited from the Middle Ages the tradition of strictly localised corpora- tions, the unit of government necessarily coinciding, like that of the English craft gild, with the area of the particular city in which the members lived. And we can well imagine that a contemporary observer of the constitution and policy of these little democracies might confidently have predicted that they, like the craft gilds, must inevitably remain strictly localised bodies. The crude and primitive form of popular government to which, as we have seen, the workmen were obstinately devoted, could only serve the needs of a small and local society. Government by general meeting of all the members, administration by the forced service of indi- viduals taken in rotation from the roll — in short, the ideal of each member taking an equal and identical share in the management of public affairs — was manifestly impracticable in any but a society of which the members met each other with the frequent intimacy of near neighbours. Yet in spite of all difficulties of constitutional machinery, the historian watches these local trade clubs, in marked contrast with the craft gilds, irresistibly expanding into associations of national extent. Thus, the little friendly club which twenty -three Bolton ironfounders established in 1809 spread steadily over the whole of England, Ireland, and Wales, until to-day it numbers over 16,000 members, dispersed among 122 separate
The Unit of Government ^2)
branches. The scores of little clubs of millwrights and steam-engine makers, fitters and blacksmiths, as if impelled by some overmastering impulse, drew together between 1840 and 1 8 5 1 to form the great Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (established i860) has, in the thirty-five years of its existence, absorbed several dozens of local carpenters' societies, and now counts within its ranks four-fifths of the organised carpenters in the kingdom. Finally, we see organisations established, like the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in 1872, with the deliberate intention of covering the whole trade from one end of the kingdom to the other. How slowly, painfully, and reluctantly the workmen have modified their crude ideas of democracy to meet the exigencies of a national organisation, we have already described.
But it was not merely the workman's simplicity in matters of government that hampered the growth of national organisa- tion. The traditional policy of the craftsman of the English town — the restriction of the right to work to those who had acquired the " freedom " of the corporation, the determined exclusion of " interlopers," and the craving to keep trade from going out of the town — has left deep roots in English industrial life, alike among the shopkeepers and among the workmen. Trade Unionism has had constantly to struggle against this spirit of local monopoly, specially noticeable in the seaport towns.^
Down to the middle of the present century the ship- wrights had an independent local club in every port, each of which strove with might and main to exclude from any chance of work in the port all but men who had learnt their trade within its bounds. These monopoly rules caused incessant friction between the men of the several ports. Shipwrights out of work in one town could not perma- nently be kept away from another in which more hands were
^ It is interesting to note that the modern forms of the monopoly spirit are also specially characteristic of the industry of shipbuilding ; see the chapter on " The Right to a Trade."
74 Trade Uni07i Structure
wanted. The newcomers, refused admission into the old port society, eventually formed a new local union among them- selves, and naturally tended to ignore the trade regulations maintained by the monopolists. To remedy this disastrous state of things a loose federation was between 1850 and i860 gradually formed among the local societies for the express purpose of discussing, at annual congresses, how to establish more satisfactory relations between the ports. In the records of these congresses we watch, for nearly thirty years, the struggle of the monopolist societies against the efforts of those, such as Glasgow and Newcastle, whose circumstances had converted them to a belief in complete mobility of labor within a trade. The open societies at last lost patience with the conservative spirit of the others, and in 1882 united to form a national amalgamated union, based on the principle of a common purse and complete mobility between port and port. This organisa- tion, the Associated Shipwrights' Society, has, in fifteen years, succeeded in absorbing all but three of the local societies, and now extends to every port in the kingdom. " In these times of mammoth firms, with large capital," writes the general secretary, " the days of local societies' utility have gone by, and it is to be hoped the few still remaining outside the consolidated association of their trade will ere long lay aside all local animus and trivial objections, or personal feeling . . . for the paramount interest of their trade," ^
The history of the Shipwrights' organisation is typical of that of other port unions. The numerous societies of Sailmakers, once rigidly monopolist, are now united in a federation, within which complete mobility prevails,'-^ The Coopers' societies, which in the port towns had formerly much in common with the Shipwrights, now, with one excep- tion, admit to membership any duly apprenticed cooper from
1 Twelfth Annual Report of Associated Shipwrights' Society (Newcastle, 1 894), p, xi,
2 Rules for the Guidance of the Federation of the Sailmakers of Great Britain and Ireland (Hull, 1890),
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another town. But the main citadels of local monopoly in the Trade Union world have always been the trade clubs of Dublin, Cork, and Limerick. The Dublin Coopers have, even at the present time, a rigidly closed society, which refuses all intercourse with other unions, and maintains, through an ingenious arrangement, a strict monopoly of this important coopering centre •} and the Cork Stonemasons, who are combined in an old local club, whilst insisting on working at Fermoy whenever they please, will not, as we learn, suffer any mason, from Fermoy or elsewhere, to obtain employment at Cork.
Even in Ireland, however, the development of Trade Unionism is hostile to local monopoly. Any growing in- dustry is quickly invaded by members of the great English societies, who establish their own branches and force the local clubs to come to terms. One by one old Irish unions apply to be admitted as branches into the richer and more powerful English societies, and have in consequence to accept the principle of complete mobility of labor. The famous
1 The arrangement is as follows : The DubUn Coopers do not prohibit strangers from working in Dublin when more coopers are wanted. On such occasions the secretary writes to coopers' societies in other towns, notably Burton, stating the number of men required. Upon all such outsiders a tax of a shilling a week is levied as " working fee," half of which benefits the Dublin society, the other half being accumulated to pay the immigrant's return fare. As soon as work shows signs of approaching slackness, the "foreigner" receives warning that he must instantly depart : it is said that his return ticket is presented to him, with any balance remaining out of his weekly sixpence. As many as 200 " strangers " will in this way sometimes be paid off, and sent away in a single week. By this means the Dublin Coopers (a) secure absolute regularity of employment for their own members, {b) provide the extra labor required in busy times, and (<:) maintain their own control over the conditions under which the work is done. The employers appear to be satisfied with the arrangement, which, so far as we have been able to ascertain, is the only surviving instance of what was once a common rule of port unions. Thus, the rules of Queenstown Ship- wrights' Society, right down to its absorption in the Associated Shipwrights' Society (in 1894), included a provision that "no strange shipwright" should be allowed to work in the town while a member was idle. And the Liverpool Sailmakers' Society (established i8i7)has, among the MS. rules preserved in the old minute-book, one providing that "strangers" with indentures should be allowed to work at "legal sail-rooms," but should members be unable to obtain employment elsewhere, then "the stranger shall be discharged and the member be engaged."
76 Trade Union Structure
" Dublin Regulars," a rigidly monopolist local carpenters' union, claiming descent from the gilds, and always striving to exclude from admission any but the sons of the members,^ became, in 1890, at the instance of its younger members, one of the 629 branches of the Amalgamated Society of Car- penters and Joiners, bound to admit to work fellow-members from all parts of the world. Among the Irish Shipwrights, too, once the most rigidly monopolist of all, this tendency has progressed with exceptional rapidity. The annual report of the Associated Shipwrights' Society for 1893 records^ the absorption in that year alone of no fewer than six old Irish port unions, each of which had hitherto striven to maintain for its members all the work of its own port.
But although the growth of national organisation has done much to break down this spirit of local monopoly, we do not wish to imply that it has been completely eradicated. The workman, whether a Trade Unionist or not, still shares with the shopkeeper and the small manu- facturer, the old instinctive objection to work " going out of the town." The proceedings of local authorities often reveal to us the " small master," the retail tradesman, and the local artisan all insisting that " the ratepayers' money " should be spent so as directly to benefit the local trade. Trade Unionists are not backward in making use of this vulgar error when it suits their purpose, and the " labor members " of town or county councils can seldom refrain, whenever it is proposed " to send work into the country," from adopting an argument which they find so convincing to many of their middle-class colleagues.^
^ See, for instance, the detailed account of it given in the Report on Trade Societies and Strikes of the National Association for the Proi7iotion of Social Science (i860), pp. 418-423-
2 Twelfth Animal Report of the Associated Shipwrights' Society, p. xi. (New- castle, 1894).
3 During the first eight years of the London County Council (1889-97) several attempts were made to confine contracts to London firms. It is interesting to note that these all emanated from middle-class members of the Moderate Party, and that they were opposed by John Burns and a large majority of the " Labor Members" and Progressives, as well as by the more responsible of the " Moderates."
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But if we follow the Labor Member from the council chamber to his Trade Union branch meeting, we shall recognise that the grievance felt by his Trade Unionist constituents is not exclusively, or even mainly, based on the " local protectionism " of the shopkeeper and the small manufacturer. What the urban Trade Unionist actually resists is not any loss of work to a particular locality, but the incessant attempt of contractors to evade the Trade Union regulations, by getting the work done in districts in which the workmen are either not organised at all, or in which they are working at a low Standard Rate. Thus the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons incurs consider- able odium because the branches in many large towns insert in their local rules a prohibition of the use of stone imported in a worked state from any outside district. But this general prohibition arises from the fact that the practical alternative to working the stone on the spot is getting it worked in the district in which it is quarried. Now, whatever mechanical or economic advantage may be claimed for the latter practice, it so happens that the quarry districts are those in which the Stonemasons are worst organised. In these districts for the most part, no Standard Rate exists, the hours of labor are long and variable, and competitive piece- work, unregulated by any common agreement, usually prevails. Moreover, any transference of work from the Stonemasons of large cities where jobs dovetail with each other, to the Stonemasons of quarry villages, entirely dependent on the spasmodic orders for worked stone received by the quarry owner, necessarily involves an increase in the number of Stonemasons exposed to irregularity of work, and habitually " on tramp " from county to county.^
1 For instance the "Working Rules to be observed by the Master Builders and Operative Stonemasons of Portsmouth," signed in 1893, by ten master builders and four workmen, on behalf of their respective associations, include the following provision, "That no piecework be allowed and no worked stone to come into the town except square steps, flags, curbs, and landings, and no brick- layers to fix worked stone." The London rules are not so explicit. As formally agreed to in 1892 by the associations of employers and employed, they provide
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Trade Union Structure
We may trace a similar feeling in the protests frequently made by the branches of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, against work being sent into the country villages, or even from a centre in which wages are high, to one working under a lower " statement." That this is not merely a disguised " local protectionism " may be seen from the fact that the Northampton Branch actually resolved in 1888 to strike, not against Northampton employers sending work out of the town, but against a London manufacturer sending his work to Northampton.^ In 1889, the Executive Council of the same union found itself driven to take action against the systematic attempts of certain employers to evade the wages agreement which they had formally entered into, by sending their work away to have certain processes
that " piecework and subcontracting for labor only shall on no account be resorted to, excepting for granite kerb, York paving and turning." The London Stone- masons, however, claim, as for instance in their complaint in 1894 against the Works Department of the London County Council, that this rule must be interpreted so as to exclude the use in London of stone worked in a quarry district. This claim was successfully resisted by the Trade Union repre- sentatives who sat on the Works Committee. We subsequently investigated this case ourselves, tracing the stone (a long run of sandstone kerb for park railings) back to Derbyshire, where it was quarried and worked. We found the district totally unorganised, the stonemasons' work being done largely by boy- labor, at competitive piecework, without settled agreement, by non-unionists, working irregular and sometimes excessive hours. It was impossible not to feel that, although the London Stonemasons had expressed their objection in the wrong terms and therefore had failed to obtain redress, they were, according to the "Fair Wages" policy adopted by the County Council and the House of Commons, justified in their complaint. Unfortunately, instead of bringing to the notice of the Committee the actual conditions under which the stone was being worked, they relied on the argument that the London ratepayers' money should be spent on London workmen. This argument, as they afterwards explained to us, had been found the most effective with the shopkeepers and small manufacturers who dominate provincial Town Councils. The Trade Unionist members of the London County Council proved obdurate to this economic heresy.
^ Shoe and Leather Record, 28th July 1888. In the same way a general meeting of the Manchester Stonemasons, in 1862, decided to support a strike against a Manchester employer who, carrying out a contract at Altrincham, eight miles off, had his stone worked at Manchester, instead of at Altrincham, as required by the working rules of the Altrincham branch. In this case, the Manchester Stonemasons struck against work coming to themselves at a higher rate per hour than was demanded by the Altrincham masons. — Stonemasons'' Fortnightly Return, September 1862.
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done in lower - paid districts. These employers were accordingly informed, not that the work must be kept in the town, but that, wherever it was executed, the " shop statement " which they had signed must be adhered to. It was at the same time expressly intimated that if these employers chose to set up works of their own in a new place, " they will be at perfect liberty to do so," without objection from the union, even if they chose a low-paid district, " provided that they pay the highest rate of wages of the district to which they go," ^
We have quoted the strongest instances of Trade Union objection to " work going out of the town," in order to unravel, from the common stock of economic prejudice, the impulse which is distinctive of Trade Unionism itself. It is customary for persons interested in the prosperity of one establishment, one town or one district, to seek to obtain trade for that particular establishment, town or district. Had Trade Unions remained, like the mediaeval craft gilds, organisations of strictly local membership, they must, almost inevitably, have been marked by a similar local favoritism. But the whole tendency of Trade Union history has been towards the solidarity of each trade as a whole. The natural selfishness of the local branches is accordingly always being combated by the central executives and national delegate meetings, in the wider interests of the whole body of the members wherever they may be working. Just in proportion as Trade Unionism is strong and well established we find the old customary favoritism of locality replaced by the impartial enforcement of uniform conditions upon all districts alike. When, for instance, the Amalgamated Association of Cotton Weavers, in delegate meeting assembled, finally decided to adopt a uniform list of piecework prices, the members then working at Great Harwood found no sympathy for their plea that such a measure would reduce
1 The "National Conference" of the Union passed a similar resolution in 1886 ; Monthly Report of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, January 1 8S7 and February 1889.
8o Trade Union Striichire
their own exceptionally high rates. And although it was foreseen and declared that uniformity would tend to the concentration of the manufacture in the most favorably situated districts, to the consequent loss of the more remote villages, the delegates from these villages almost unanimously supported what was believed to be good for the trade as a whole.^
In another industry, the contrast between the old " local protectionism " and the Trade Unionist view has resulted in an interesting change in electioneering tactics. The London Society of Compositors and the Typographical Association have, for the last ten years, used more electoral pressure with regard to the distribution of local work, than any other Trade Union. So long as parliamentary electors belonged mainly to the middle class, a parliamentary candidate was advised by his agent to distribute his large printing orders fairly among all parts of his constituency, and under no circumstances to employ a printer living beyond its boundary. Now the astute agent, eager to conciliate the whole body of organised workmen in the constituency, confines his printing strictly to the best Trade Union establishments, although this usually involves passing over most of the local establishments and sometimes even giving work to firms outside the district. The influence of the Trade Union leaders is used, not to maintain their respective trades in all the places in which they happen to exist, but to strengthen, at the expense of the rest, those establishments, those towns, and even those districts, in which the conditions of work are most advantageous.
We see, therefore, that in spite of the difficulties of government, in spite of the strong inherited tradition of local exclusiveness, and in spite, too, of the natural selfish- ness of each branch in desiring to preserve its own local monopoly, the unit of government in the workmen's organ- isations, in complete contrast to the gilds of the master-
1 Special meeting of General Council of Amalgamated Association of Cotton Weavers, 30th April 1892, attended by one of the authors ; see other instances cited in the chapter on " The Standard Rate."
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craftsmen, has become the trade instead of the town.^ Our description of this irresistible tendency to expan- sion has already to some extent revealed its cause, in the Trade Union desire to secure uniform minimum conditions throughout each industry. In our examination of the Methods and Regulations of Trade Unionism, and in our analysis of their economic working, we shall discover the means by which the wage-earners seek to attain this end, and the reasons which convince them of its importance. In the final part of our work we shall examine how far such an equality is economically possible or desirable. For the moment the reader must accept the fact that this uniformity of minimum is, whether wisely or not, the most permanent of Trade Union aspirations.
Meanwhile it is interesting to note that this conception of the solidarity of each trade as a whole is checked by racial differences. The great national unions of Engineers and Carpenters find no difficulty in extending their organisa- tions beyond national boundaries, and easily open branches in the United States or the South African Republic, France or Spain, provided that these branches are composed of British workmen,^ But it is needless to say that it has not yet appeared practicable to any British Trade Union even to suggest amalgamation with the Trade Union of any other country. Differences in legal position, in political status, in industrial methods, and in the economic situation between
1 Where at the present day a widespread English industry is without a pre- ponderating national Trade Union, it is simply a mark of imperfect organisation. Thus the numerous little Trade Unions of Painters, and Chippers and Drillers include only a small proportion of those at work in the trades.
^ The Amalgamated Society of Engineers had, in 1896, 82 branches beyond the United Kingdom, and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners no fewer than 87. About half of these are in the United States or Canada, and most of the remainder in the Australian Colonies or South Africa, The Engineers had one branch in France, at Croix, and formerly one in Spain, at Bilbao, where the United Society of Boilermakers also had a branch until 1894. I" the years 1880-82 the United Society of Boilermakers even had a branch at Con- stantinople. The only other English Trade Union having branches beyond sea is the Steam-Engine Makers' Society, which has opened lodges at New York, Montreal, and Brisbane.
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French and English workers — not to mention the barrier of language — easily account for the indisposition on the part of practical British workmen to consider an international amalgamated union. And it is significant that, even within the British Isles, the progress towards national union has been much hampered by differences of racial sentiment and divergent views of social expediency. The English carpenter, plumber, or smith who finds himself working in a Scotch town, is apt to declare the Scotch union in his trade to be little better than a friendly society, and to complain that Scotch workmen are too eager for immediate gain and for personal advancement sufficiently to resist such dangerous innovations as competitive piecework, nibbling at the Standard Rate, or habitual overtime. The Scotchman retorts that the English Trade Union is extravagant in its expenditure, especially at the head office in London or Manchester, and unduly restrictive in its Regulations and Methods. In some cases the impulse towards amalgama- tion has prevailed over this divergence as to what is socially expedient. The United Society of Boilermakers, which extends without a rival from sea to sea, was able in 1889, through the loyalty of the bulk of its Scottish members, to stamp out an attempted secession, aiming at a national society on the banks of the Clyde, which evoked the support of Scottish national feeling, voiced by the Glasgow Trades Council. In other cases Scotch pertinacity has conquered England. The Associated Shipwrights' Society, the rise and national development of which we have already described, sprang out of the Glasgow Shipwrights' Union, which gave to the wider organisation its able and energetic secretary, Mr. Alexander Wilkie. The British Steel Smelters' Associa- tion (established 1886) has spread from Glasgow over the whole industry in the Northern and Midland districts of England. In both these cases the Scotch have " stooped to conquer," the Scottish secretary moving to an English town as the centre of membership shifted towards the south. But in other trades the prevailing tendency towards complete
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national amalgamation is still baffled by the sturdy Scotch determination — due partly to differences of administration but mainly to racial sentiment — not to be " governed from England." -^ The powerful English national unions of Car- penters, Handworking Bootmakers, Plumbers, and Bricklayers have either never attempted or have failed to persuade their Scottish fellow-workmen to give up their separate Scottish societies. The rival national societies of Tailors are always at war, making periodical excursions across the Border, this establishment of branches in each other's territories giving rise to heated recriminations. In many important trades, such as the Compositors, Stonemasons, and Ironfounders, effective Trade Unionism is as old in Scotland as in England, and the two national societies in each trade, whilst retaining complete Home Rule, have settled down to a fraternal relationship, which amounts to tacit if not formal federation.
Ireland presents a similar case of racial differences, working in a somewhat different manner. Whereas the English Trade Unions have keenly desired union with Scottish local societies, they have, until lately, manifested a marked dislike to having anything to do with Ireland.^ This has been, in some cases at least, the result of experience.
1 xVnalogous tendencies may be traced in the Friendly Society movement, though to a lesser extent. The Scottish lodges of the Manchester Unity of Odd- fellows have their own peculiar rules. The Scottish delegates to the Foresters' High Court at Edinburgh in 1894, were among the most strenuous opponents of the proposal to fix the headquarters (at present moving annually from town to town) in London or Birmingham. And though exclusively Scottish Orders have never yet succeeded in widely establishing themselves, it is not uncommon for Scottish lodges to threaten secession, as when, in 1889, five Scottish lodges of the Bolton Unity of the Ancient Noble Order of Oddfellows endeavoured to start a new "Scottish Unity" {Oddfellows' Magazine, March 1889, p. 70). Such a secession from the Manchester Unity resulted in the "Scottish Order of Odd- fellows" which has, however, under 2000 members. There exist also the "St. Andrew's Order of Ancient Free Gardeners of Scotland," with 6000 members, and a " United Order of Scottish Mechanics," with 4000 members, which refuse to merge themselves in the larger Orders.
2 Scottish branches are declared by Trade Union secretaries to be profitable recruits from a financial point of view, because they are habitually frugal and cautious in dispensing friendly benefits.
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From 1832 down to 1840, Irish lodges were admitted to the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, on the same footing as English, whilst the Scotch masons had already their independent organisation. The fortnightly reports during these years reveal constant friction between the central executive and the Irish branches, who would not agree among themselves, and who persisted in striking against members from other Irish towns. At the Delegate Meeting in 1839 ^^^ Irish branches had to be specially deprived of the right to strike without prior permission, even in those cases in which the rules allowed to English branches the instantaneous cessation of work to resist encroachments on established customs.^ But even with this precaution the drain of the Irish lodges upon the English members became unendurable. At length in 1840, the general secretary was sent on a special mission of investigation, which revealed every kind of financial irregularity. The Irish lodges were found to have an incurable propensity to dispense benefits to all and sundry irrespective of the rules, and an invincible objection to English methods of account- keeping. The Dublin lodge had to be dissolved as a punishment for retaining to itself monies remitted by the Central Committee for other Irish lodges. The central executive who, in 1837, had successfully resisted a proposi- tion emanating from a Warwickshire district in favor of Home Rule for Ireland, " as such separation would injure the stability of the society," ^ now reported in its favor. " We are convinced," says the report, " that a very great amount of money had been sent to Ireland for the relief of tramps, etc. ... to which they