History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953 – 1954
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 January 1954. Left to right: General Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, USAF; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, Chairman, JCS; General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, USA; General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant, USMC; and Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, USN.
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Volume V

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
1953 – 1954

Robert J. Watson

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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of background information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series have been prepared in classified form. In recent years, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945–1951 and the Korean War, have been reviewed and declassified. Since no funds were available for publication, these volumes were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. Subsequently, they have been reproduced and published by a private concern.

When this the fifth volume of the series The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, covering the period 1953–1954, was declassified, funds were provided for its official publication. Volume V describes JCS activities during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration. It traces the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of the basic national security policies of those years, in force planning and strategy development, and in the nascent area of arms control. The volume also describes JCS participation in planning and operations in various areas of the world where the United States was involved, with the exception of the Korean War—a subject covered in The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III, The Korean War.

Volume V was completed and issued in classified version in 1970. It appears here basically as completed in 1970 with minor editorial revisions and a few excisions dictated by security considerations.
Foreword

Robert J. Watson, the author of the volume, earned a Ph.D. degree in history from the University of Virginia. He served as a historian with the JCS Historical Division from 1963 to 1976 and as Chief of the Division from 1977 until his retirement in 1983.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. Although the text has been declassified, some of the cited sources remain classified. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, D.C.       Willard J. Webb
June 1986            Chief, Historical Division
                       Joint Chiefs of Staff
Preface

The volume here presented was written between 1963 and 1970 on a classified basis for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff officers. It is now made available to the public for the first time, as originally written, in the hope that it will prove valuable to students of recent US history and those interested in the processes of formulating defense policy under the American political system.

If the book has a single major theme, it is the redirection of US military strategy and force planning during the first two years of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The New Look, as the revised military policy was called, emphasized strategic retaliatory striking power (primarily atomic) at the expense of conventional balanced forces and sought to maximize firepower while reducing the numbers of men and units. The changes were justified both on military grounds, as a modernization of strategy to reflect advancing technology, and as a means of economizing on the size and cost of the military establishment. Other important developments treated in the volume include construction of an integrated air defense system for the North American continent; the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the Federal Republic of Germany, and the beginning of that country’s rearmament; the introduction of guided missiles into the armory of US weapons; the enlargement of the system of defense alliances aimed at preventing the spread of Soviet-backed communism; and the continuing search for some method of scaling back or controlling the development of increasingly costly weapons of mass destruction. In all of these developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a key role, providing a source of authoritative military advice. Of course their advice was not always accepted, nor did they always speak with a single voice, since their viewpoints were inevitably shaped by years of experience in their respective Services.

Readers familiar with the present-day organization and operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a somewhat different organization and procedures, which dated in part from World War II and were given legal standing by the National Security Act of 1947 (with its 1949 amendments). During 1953–1954 the Joint Staff, which served the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appreciably smaller than at present. Essentially it consisted of three components: the Joint Strategic Plans Group, Joint Intelligence Group, and Joint Logistics Plans Group. At a higher organizational echelon were three joint committees composed of Service representatives (such as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint Strategic Plans Group).
Preface

The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned a task to one of the committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff group for a report. The resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment, and approval (or return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This system prevailed until 1958, when the present Joint Staff with its integrated planning and operations sections was established.

Some relevant topics have been omitted from the volume or dealt with summarily. Stringent security restrictions within the Executive Branch at the time of writing precluded an account of the development of nuclear weapons during 1953—1954 (though much of the information has now been declassified). Little has been said of the Korean War since the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that conflict has been described in another volume in this series. Likewise, changes in the organization of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been mentioned only in passing, since they too have been dealt with in other studies prepared by the JCS Historical Division.

Since the book was completed numerous additional sources of relevant information have become available. The opening of records at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, has provided an enormous mass of materials bearing on policy decisions at the highest level and the relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Documents published by the Department of State in the series Foreign Relations of the United States for the years 1952—1954 illuminate the role of diplomatic considerations in national security policy. Additional memoirs by participants have appeared, notably those of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, successive Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is also a voluminous secondary literature on the Eisenhower administration.

These additional sources afford a much more complete picture of the events described in this volume. We now have, for example, details of the discussions within the National Security Council that led to the key decisions of the New Look. We have records of meetings of the President with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially with their Chairman, Admiral Radford. We have a better understanding of matters that originally appeared somewhat obscure. For example, we now know that the President’s decision in December 1954 in favor of drastic military cutbacks, as described in Chapter 3, was less startling than it appeared on the basis of less complete evidence. So far as the author knows, however, no information has come to light that throws into question any of the major conclusions in the volume. The fact can be attributed to the thoroughness of JCS record-keeping, which makes it possible, in most instances, to follow national security issues from inception to disposal through use of JCS documents and records.

In writing the volume, the author incurred many debts, which he is happy to acknowledge. The project began under the supervision of the late Wilber W. Hoare, formerly Chief of the JCS Historical Division, who followed it with interest and encouragement and gave final approval to the completed manuscript. Fellow historians in the Division, particularly Kenneth W. Condit and Byron
Fairchild, were generous in offering sage counsel during the preparation of the manuscript and in reviewing numerous chapter drafts. Kent S. Larsen carried out some of the research for Chapter 11. As Chief of the Histories Branch of the Division, Vernon E. Davis exercised his matchless editorial skill in reviewing and revising the manuscript. Anna M. Siney directed its preparation in printed form for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the published version, the author had the advantage of association with Dr. Richard M. Leighton, who is currently preparing a history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1953 to 1956. He provided an authoritative source of information on additional documentation, offered comments from a different perspective, and called attention to various minor errors. Barbara C. Fleming and Linda A. Fithian prepared the manuscript for publication. Finally, two individuals in particular must be singled out for special appreciation. Willard J. Webb, Chief of the JCS Historical Division, saw the manuscript though the declassification process, edited and improved the entire volume (text, footnotes, and headings), and supervised the endless details of publication. Colonel Donald W. Williams, USA, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secured approval for publication of the volume and obtained the necessary funding. The author alone, of course, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation that may have crept into the volume.

Washington, D.C.  
June 1986  

ROBERT J. WATSON
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
1953 – 1954
Basic National Security Policy, 1953

As 1953 opened, it was almost a foregone conclusion that US national security policy and military strategy were headed for a searching reexamination. The victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, in the 1952 Presidential election had brought about a change in party administration for the first time in 20 years. It seemed unlikely that the new administration would radically alter the foreign policy goals pursued by the outgoing administration of President Harry S. Truman, which by now commanded wide bipartisan support. But there were significant differences between the two parties concerning the means to be used in seeking these objectives and the importance to be assigned, at the same time, to the domestic goals of tax reduction and a balanced Federal budget. At the least, the new President, on the basis of his campaign statements, could be expected to seek a new balance between these two sets of goals.

Before the year was out, the international situation was to be altered by important developments elsewhere in the world. These included the death of Premier Josef V. Stalin of the Soviet Union on 5 March 1953 and his replacement by Georgi M. Malenkov; the conclusion of an armistice in Korea on 27 July 1953, ending three years of warfare; and the explosion of the first Soviet thermonuclear device on 12 August 1953, which made plain to all the unexpectedly rapid growth in the military capabilities of the communist bloc. Even had there been no change of administration, these events would have compelled some review of policies and courses of action adopted several years earlier.

The Eisenhower administration’s reexamination of national security policy occupied most of 1953. The process, and the changes in national strategy and military force structure to which it led, became known, in the press and in popular discussion, as the “New Look.”

1
Policy Issues at the Beginning of 1953

Since the end of World War II, the United States had based its national security policy on a conviction that the hostile and potentially aggressive Stalin regime in Soviet Russia represented a danger to peace. Beginning in 1947, the Truman administration had adopted a policy intended to restrain communism from spreading beyond those areas where its control had already been consolidated. This goal was to be sought by maintaining a level of US military force considered sufficient to deter aggression, and by building up the military, political, and economic strength of friendly nations in Western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean region. This policy, popularly known as “containment,” had been officially approved in 1948 and reaffirmed at various times, most recently in September 1952.

The assumption of possible communist aggression was at first judged not to be incompatible with a stringent program of military economy. For several years after World War II, defense budgets were held to levels that prevented the Services from rebuilding their shrunken strengths as the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired. But with the outbreak of war in Korea, the economy program went into the discard. The Truman administration embarked upon a massive and rapid expansion of the military forces. Although the rate of increase was slackened after the first year of fighting, by the end of 1952 the Army and Navy had almost reached their authorized force levels. The Air Force, however, remained far below its objective of expansion to 143 wings, a level almost 50 percent above its current strength of 98 wings.\(^2\)

Whether these force levels were adequate, in the face of rising Soviet and Communist Chinese military strength, was a question that came before the Truman administration in 1952. The President directed Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, to examine the allocation of resources for all programs connected with national security.\(^3\) Since Mr. Truman was about to go out of office, it would be the task of his successor to consider the results of this review and, if necessary, to expand the budget for these programs. For the purposes of the examination, the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished an analysis of military programs in which they concluded that these were inadequate to provide forces of the magnitude that would be required by 1954–1955. Without going into detail, they made it clear that the Services were short of both manpower and materiel. They urged that, at the least, current force goals should be attained as soon as possible.\(^4\) When a draft of the completed report was sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, they warned that any new programs that might be undertaken should not be allowed to divert funds from existing ones.\(^5\)

The final report, NSC 141, was sent to President Truman on 19 January 1953, just before his term ended. Its conclusion was that a selective increase in security programs was needed. The most pressing requirement was for stronger continental and civil defense. Economic and military aid programs should also be enlarged, though on a selective basis. The costs of the recommended increases were not indicated.\(^6\)
Meanwhile, in December 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun preparing a report on the status of Service programs as of the end of the year, to be reviewed by the Secretary of Defense and then forwarded to the National Security Council. Before it was completed, the new administration took office and Mr. Lovett was replaced by President Eisenhower's appointee, Charles E. Wilson. The final report, reviewed and revised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was sent to the Council on 6 March 1953.  

The burden of this report, NSC 142, was that US forces were barely adequate for the present world situation and could not cope with any new crisis. Army and Navy forces were fully committed; there was no strategic reserve. The Air Force had insufficient offensive and tactical aircraft, but its gravest shortages were in fighter interceptors and in aircraft control and warning facilities. Some of these deficiencies were expected to be remedied under the budget for fiscal year 1954 that President Truman, in one of his last official acts, sent to Congress on 9 January 1953. It called for $41.3 billion in new obligatory authority for military programs, and estimated military expenditures at $45.5 billion. The largest share of the new appropriations, $16.8 billion, would go to the Air Force, to allow it to expand from 98 wings to 133 by July 1954. The Navy would increase its ships from 1,116 to 1,200; the Army would be maintained at its current strength of 20 divisions. Military manpower, which totaled 3,512,453 on 31 December 1952, would rise to 3,647,612 by the end of FY 1954.

**Early Decisions of the New Administration**

With the inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 20 January 1953, the membership of the National Security Council underwent a complete change. The incoming members soon found themselves confronted with a call for higher defense spending (NSC 141) and a warning that US forces were stretched dangerously thin (NSC 142).

How the new administration would respond to this situation was not clear. Mr. Eisenhower entered office pledged to the same general foreign policies as his predecessor: pursuit of world peace, continued resistance to the expansionist aims of communism, and support of US obligations to the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These policies obviously required a large and expensive military establishment. At the same time, during his campaign Mr. Eisenhower had taken a stand for drastic reduction of Federal expenditures and for a balancing of the Federal budget, though not at the expense of safety. In one of his major campaign speeches he said:

We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength . . . the big spending is . . . the $60 billion we pay for national security. Here is where the largest savings can be made. And these savings must be made without reduction of defensive power. That is exactly what I am now proposing.
Reconciliation of "security" and "solvency," he continued, could be achieved by better management of the defense effort, notably by bringing about real unification of the Services in order to reduce the enormous costs of procuring and managing materiel. But all these steps would require an overhauling of the defense machinery by a new administration that would "call a halt to stop-and-start planning" and would "plan for the future on something more solid than yesterday's headlines." In another speech, he described the principal issue as that of "finding a way of dealing with the world in cooperation with all free countries so that our boys may stay at home . . . and not go off to foreign shores to protect our interests." \(^{10}\)

Later events were to show that these statements contained the germ of some of the important features of the New Look. But there was no trace in the candidate's speeches of what was later to emerge as one of the key elements: greater reliance upon atomic weapons, with their enormous firepower, to make possible a reduction in conventional forces and a corresponding cut in costs. This expedient had been adopted in 1952 by the Government of the United Kingdom, when faced with a financial crisis that made expenditure reduction imperative. The British Chiefs of Staff, who had formulated this strategy at the request of Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, had tried in vain to persuade their American colleagues to endorse it for adoption by NATO. \(^{11}\)

In his first utterances as President, Mr. Eisenhower reaffirmed his belief that security and solvency were two sides of the same coin—coequal elements of national strength. "Our problem," he said on 2 February 1953 in his first State of the Union message to Congress, "is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy. To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another." Similar statements were, of course, common enough in American political life—notably in the annual Congressional discussion of defense budgets. In their present context, however, the President's words carried the implication that the previous administration had misjudged the balance between security and solvency, and therefore that its military spending plans must be scrutinized with a view to reducing them. Such a reduction, the President implied, could be achieved with no sacrifice of combat strength. "Both military and economic objectives demand a single national military policy, proper coordination of our armed services, and effective consolidation of certain logistics activities," he said, echoing his campaign statements. "We must eliminate waste and duplication of effort in the armed services. We must realize clearly that size alone is not sufficient." \(^{12}\)

The President's statements did not foreclose the possibility of selective increases in security expenditures, such as NSC 141 had called for. Some of his appointees, however, seemed to place solvency ahead of security and took an attitude highly unfavorable to any such increases. Mr. Joseph M. Dodge, who had been named Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. George M. Humphrey, the incoming Secretary of the Treasury, became the principal spokesmen for the primacy of expenditure reduction. They believed that every existing Federal program should be scrutinized to see if it could be cut back or eliminated,
and that no new programs should be approved unless equivalent savings could be achieved by reductions elsewhere.\textsuperscript{13}

The assault on President Truman’s proposed FY 1954 budget, intended to reduce the expected deficit of $9.922 billion, was not long delayed. On 3 February 1953 Budget Director Dodge notified all departments and agencies that it was the President’s policy to reduce both obligatory authority and expenditures. All governmental programs were therefore to be examined critically.\textsuperscript{14} Military programs, which accounted for more than half of all expenditures, were not exempt. On 7 February 1953 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roger M. Kyes, directed the Service Secretaries to review the military budget to ascertain where intelligent savings could be made.\textsuperscript{15}

The Armed Forces Policy Council discussed Mr. Kyes’ directive in light of the requirements of the Korean War, for which the Truman budget had computed ammunition requirements through 31 December 1953. On 10 February 1953 the Council decided that the budget, when revised, should be expected to finance ammunition procurement through 30 June 1954 and to provide for training and equipping four additional South Korean divisions.\textsuperscript{16} Presumably these larger allowances would require compensating cuts elsewhere.

To adjust the somewhat conflicting goals of economy and national security was a major task for the National Security Council. It was characteristic of Mr. Eisenhower that he was to make far more intensive use of this body than his predecessor.\textsuperscript{17} In the hope of improving the efficiency of the Council, the new President reorganized it in March 1953 and placed it under the direction of a newly appointed Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Robert Cutler. The Senior Staff was redesignated the Planning Board, with Mr. Cutler as its chairman, while the Council’s professional staff was enlarged. Several months later an Operations Coordinating Board was established to monitor the execution of NSC decisions.\textsuperscript{18} These changes did not affect the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they were represented on the Planning Board, as on the Senior Staff, by an adviser, while their Chairman continued his advisory role in the Council.

Following the change of administration, the Council met on 29 January and 4 February 1953 and discussed national security policy, but reached no conclusions.\textsuperscript{19} In preparation for further discussion, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on NSC 141 and on the most recent policy directive of the previous Council, NSC 135/3 (approved on 25 September 1952).\textsuperscript{20} In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the comments they had made on the draft of NSC 141, and warned that, under existing fiscal limitations, the enlarged programs for continental defense and foreign aid recommended in NSC 141 would entail reductions in established programs. As for NSC 135/3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that its conclusions, asserting a need to maintain and augment US and allied military strength, were valid and should be confirmed.\textsuperscript{21}

The Council resumed its consideration of policy on 18 February 1953 and at the same time considered NSC 141 and NSC 142. The discussion quickly turned to the costs of current policies. Mr. Dodge forecast increasing deficits for fiscal years 1953 through 1955 even without the new programs called for by NSC 141, and he saw no prospect of a balanced budget before 1958. These predictions
were enough to doom NSC 141, which received no further consideration, although the Council apparently did not formally reject it.  

A week later, Mr. Dodge told the Council that, under present plans, military expenditures for FY 1955 would probably total $44.0 billion. The Council called on each department and agency to review the figures on which this prediction was based. The members agreed also to appoint an ad hoc committee of outside consultants to examine national security policies in relation to costs.

On 4 March 1953 Mr. Dodge suggested a reduction of 10 percent ($7.8 billion) in expenditures for FY 1954 and of $15 billion for FY 1955, in order to bring the budget into balance by the latter year. He proposed to allocate most of the reductions to national security programs in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military program</td>
<td>$4.3</td>
<td>$9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual security program</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national security programs</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NSC programs</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Council agreed that the Secretary of Defense and the Director for Mutual Security should explore the effect of this suggestion.

The suggested reductions, applied to the projected figures of $45.5 billion and $44.0 billion for military expenditures would mean limits of $41.2 billion and $34.6 billion, respectively, for FYs 1954 and 1955. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes allocated these provisional totals among the Services as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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He directed each Military Department to determine the forces that could be maintained with these expenditures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were then to review the findings of the Services and evaluate the capability of the reduced forces to carry out commitments.

The Army replied that it would be forced to reduce its division strength from 20 divisions to 12 by FY 1955. The Navy would be less adversely affected; it would be able to maintain ship strength at or near current levels, but existing deficiencies in mine, antisubmarine, and amphibious lift capabilities would be perpetuated. The Air Force would have to abandon all hope of expansion and to reduce its strength to 79 wings by 1955.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that force reductions of these magnitudes would make it impossible to meet existing commitments and hence would require complete reexamination of US objectives and policies. Casting their argument in
strong terms, they asserted that the imposition of the proposed expenditure limits "would so increase the risk to the United States as to pose a grave threat to the survival of our allies and the security of this nation."27 Secretary Wilson sent these conclusions to the National Security Council on 24 March 1953. He accepted them as essentially correct, although he believed the Services had somewhat overstated the effects of the proposed budget reductions upon their programs.28

At a meeting of the Council on 25 March, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized the JCS views concerning the effects of the suggested expenditure reductions; then each of his colleagues spoke for his own Service. Officially, the Council took no action except to note the President's desire that the Secretary of Defense make a tentative estimate of the money that might be saved by reducing overhead and duplication.29 But the arguments presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been convincing; the attempt to balance the budget by FY 1955 was dropped.30

On 31, March 1953 the Council members met with "Seven Wise Men"—the outside consultants who had been appointed in accordance with the decision of 25 February.31 They approved a statement of defense policy that would provide the rationale for budget reductions (more modest in scale than those discussed earlier).32 It rested upon the basic assumption that "the survival of the free world depends on the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy." To achieve this economic stability, it would be necessary to balance expenditures with income "as rapidly as is consistent with continuing our leadership in the free world." The goal of a balanced budget should be announced at once, though it could be achieved only gradually. On the other hand, the United States would continue to maintain armed forces sufficient to defend itself and its allies; to contain Soviet expansion; and to deter the Soviets from aggressive war. The following specific objectives and courses of action were to be emphasized: settlement of the war in Korea and of the communist rebellion in Indochina; protection of the continental United States; offshore procurement of military supplies, as a means of assisting friendly nations; revision of mobilization plans to emphasize maintenance of production capacity rather than stockpiling of end-items; reduction of overhead and of waste and duplication in the defense establishment; and removal of trade barriers. Less emphasis than before would be placed on building up US and NATO forces to authorized goals by early fixed target dates.

To reach and maintain the force goals contemplated under present plans was estimated to require annual outlays of $45 billion for the next three fiscal years and of $40 billion thereafter. These amounts were judged inconsistent with the new policies. The Council therefore drew the outlines of a new and smaller military program, based on the departmental reviews carried out in response to Mr. Kyes' directive of 7 February 1953.33 This program abandoned specific target dates for completing the military buildup. It was to be related to a floating, rather than a specific, D-day. The object would be to achieve, by FY 1956 or FY 1957, force levels of the following general order of magnitude: 18 Army divisions, 1,200 Navy ships, and 105 to 115 Air Force wings. The expected costs of this program were: $43.2 billion, $40 billion, and $35 billion, respectively, for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956, and $33 billion annually thereafter. These figures
assumed an estimated $1 billion annual savings in overhead and duplication. The 1954 and 1955 totals included $2 billion for the Korean War and for expansion of the ROK Army. The appropriations request in the FY 1954 budget was to be reduced by approximately $5 billion.

This statement of policies was referred to the NSC Planning Board to be incorporated into a formal directive. The result was NSC 149/2, approved by the Council on 28 April 1953 and by the President on 29 April. In this paper, the new approach to defense was summarized as follows:

The entire military program, including missions, forces and readiness levels, will not be related to a "specified" date for D-day readiness and will be reviewed and modified from time to time as the result of periodic recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in view of changing tactical, strategic, and economic considerations throughout the world. In particular, all missions will be carefully reviewed as rapidly as possible in order to determine whether or not there is any overlapping which unnecessarily commits any of the services to responsibilities which can better be served by another service or by a combination of services as a result of changing capabilities, modernization or more effective planning. This military program assumes a steady improvement in defense capabilities, with a substantial base for full mobilization in the event of all-out war. It is a program that should continue to be sound and livable [sic] over a period of years.

The guidelines for the new military program were now expressed in manpower limits rather than force levels. From their strengths as of 28 February 1953, the Army was to be reduced by 74,000 men and the Navy and Marine Corps together by 70,000 during FY 1954. The Air Force would be cut by 50,000 by the end of FY 1955.

The effect of these decisions was to impose an end FY 1954 strength of 1,421,000 on the Army and of 975,236 for the Navy and Marine Corps. Together with Secretary Wilson’s later action in establishing a 1954 strength of 960,000 for the Air Force, they would require the Services to reduce to 3,356,236 men by the end of FY 1954, compared with 3,505,661 on 28 February 1953. Nevertheless, according to NSC 149/2, it was expected that, through better utilization of manpower, the Army and Navy would be able to retain approximately the same numbers of major units and that the Air Force could achieve an important increase in the number of combat wings. All the Services were to be provided with modernized equipment that would increase their combat power.

In approving NSC 149/2, the Council agreed that the Department of Defense would present to Congress a revised FY 1954 defense budget based on the new program. For FY 1955, the Department, after further studies, would propose a force structure compatible with the hoped-for expenditure limit of $40 billion. The Council also directed the Planning Board to draft a comprehensive directive on national security policy that would supersede previous ones still in effect (NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2, and NSC 135/3).

The new approach reflected in NSC 149/2 was described to the public in statements by the President during the next few weeks. "The essence of the change is this," said Mr. Eisenhower in a news conference on 30 April 1953. "We reject the idea that we must build up to a maximum attainable strength for some
specific date theoretically fixed for a specified time in the future. Defense is not a matter of maximum strength for a single date. It is a matter of adequate protection to be projected as far into the future as the actions and apparent purposes of others may compel us. 37 He repeated this conviction on 19 May in a radio address in which he explained the basis for the revised FY 1954 budget that had by then been sent to Congress. The object, he said, was to avoid both “the indefinite continuance of a needlessly high rate of Federal spending” and “any penny-wise, pound-foolish policy that could, through lack of needed strength, cripple the cause of freedom.” 38

The new budget called for $36 billion in new obligational authority and $43.2 billion in expenditures. Most of the reduction was at the expense of the Air Force, which was cut from $16.8 to $11.7 billion in new obligational authority. The Navy was reduced from $11.4 to $9.7 billion; the Army, however, was increased from $12.1 to $13.7 billion, to meet the new Korean requirements. 39

Secretary Wilson outlined the new force goals for FY 1954 in testimony before a House committee on 11 May 1953. The Army would maintain 20 divisions, but would increase the number of antiaircraft battalions—its contribution to continental defense—from 113 to 117. The Navy would maintain about the same number of warships. 40 The Air Force was expected to have 114 wings by the end of 1954, and would continue to expand further. A strength of 120 wings had been established as its interim goal; the final force objective was yet to be determined. 41

The Secretary explained, however, that these force levels were subject to change after a new look at the entire defense picture to be undertaken later in the year. “This will involve an intensive and detailed study of all aspects of defense—forces, missions, weapons, readiness levels, strategic plans, and so forth,” said Mr. Wilson, “and will provide the basis for the fiscal year 1955 budget.” 42

A New Statement of National Security Policy: NSC 153/1

The Council’s new statement of national security policy was circulated in draft to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 1 June 1953. 43 Insofar as it had military implications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it subject to minor changes. 44 A revised version, NSC 153/1, was approved by the Council on 9 June 1953 and by the President the next day. 45 It was in large measure a restatement of previously approved policies, though modified in the direction of NSC 149/2.

NSC 152/1 found two principal threats to the survival of fundamental values and institutions of the United States. as follows:

a. The formidable power and aggressive policy of the communist world led by the USSR.
b. The serious weakening of the economy of the United States that may result from the cost of opposing the Soviet threat over a sustained period.
The basic problem for the United States was to strike a balance between these dangers. Of the two, the first must continue to receive primary consideration. Nevertheless, sound fiscal policy might require the United States to assume increased risks in relation to the Soviet threat.

The general objectives of US policy, according to NSC 153/1, were as follows:

a. To create and maintain sufficient strength, both military and non-military, to provide for the security of the United States, assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world, prevent or counter aggression, deter general war, protect the continental United States, and provide the basis for winning a general war if one should be forced on us.

b. To maintain a sound and strong US economy based on free enterprise.

c. To maintain free US political institutions supported by an informed public opinion.

d. To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the free world, individually and collectively, to deter or oppose communist aggression and achieve internal stability.

e. To prevent significant expansion of Soviet bloc power, even though in certain cases measures to this end may be used by the Soviet bloc as a pretext for war.

f. To delay and disrupt the consolidation of Soviet bloc power and influence, and eventually to reduce such power and influence to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to our security, without unduly risking a general war.

g. To establish an international system based on freedom and justice as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations.

h. To continue in effect US objectives *vis-a-vis* the USSR in the event of war. [These objectives had been set forth in NSC 20/4, and were repeated verbatim in NSC 153/1.]

Most of these objectives were long-established. The influence of NSC 149/2 was seen in the second, as well as in some of the courses of action proposed to attain this and other objectives: reduction of Federal expenditures, lessened dependence on stocks of finished end-items (as distinct from additional production facilities) in mobilization planning, and deemphasis of early target dates for reaching NATO force levels.

The need to maintain the nation’s strategic deterrent was stressed in connection with the first objective. The United States, said NSC 153/1, must “develop and maintain an offensive capability, particularly the capability to inflict massive damage on Soviet warmaking capacity, at a level that the Soviets must regard as an unacceptable risk in war.” The implied primacy of retaliatory capability as compared with other components of military strength was somewhat more emphatic than in the most recent previous policy directive (NSC 135/3), which had spoken merely of “the capability to inflict massive damage on the Soviet warmaking capacity.”

A few of the actions proposed by NSC 153/1 were wholly new. For example, in connection with preventing Soviet expansion, it was stated that the United States should be willing to undertake unilateral action, if necessary, against “local communist aggression in key areas.”
Project Solarium

NSC 153/1 was accurately described in its title as a restatement of national security policy. For the most part, it reaffirmed objectives and methods inherited from the previous administration, though with some changes in emphasis. For that reason, it could hardly satisfy the expectations of those of Mr. Eisenhower's supporters who had hoped for radical departures in foreign policy. Some adherents of his party had become impatient with the doctrine of containment and had urged instead a policy of liberation—an aggressive course of action that would seek, by means short of military attack, to disrupt communist regimes and bring about the release of the peoples living under their rule. At one point in the 1952 campaign, John Foster Dulles had indicated that General Eisenhower, if elected President, would abandon containment for a policy of liberating captive nations by nonviolent means.

A study intended to evaluate the containment policy in relation to possible alternatives had been launched by the administration even before NSC 153/1 was approved. In May 1953, in a conference held in the sunroom (solarium) of the White House, President Eisenhower and several of his advisers had agreed that three possible national strategies should be carefully examined. Two of these—at opposite ends of the spectrum—would be containment and liberation, respectively. The third would be an intermediate course, in which the United States would in effect draw a line around those regions vital to its interests and would warn the Soviets that any violation of the line would mean general war. Each of these courses of action was to be analyzed by a task force of experts who would plead the case for it.

The President placed this Solarium project (as it was called) under the direction of Lieutenant General H.A. Craig, USAF, the Commandant of the National War College. It was to begin about 10 June 1953, and was expected to require about six weeks. High level supervision was to be exercised by a committee of the National Security Council, consisting of the Acting Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith; the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles; and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Robert Cutler.

The task forces included both civilian and military personnel. The policy alternatives to be examined were set forth as follows in the instructions issued to the members: Alternative A [essentially the containment policy, as already set forth in NSC 153/1].

(1) To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world;
(2) To continue to assist in building up the economic and military strength and cohesion of the free world; and
(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political, economic and psychological measures.
Alternative B [drawing the line].
(1) To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond which the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance without general war;
(2) To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable way that the U.S. has established and is determined to carry out this policy; and
(3) To reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all measures necessary to reestablish a situation compatible with the security interests of the U.S. and its allies.

Alternative C [liberation].
(1) To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free world to enable it to assume the greater risks involved; and
(2) To create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet bloc.

The task forces rendered their reports to the National Security Council on 16 July 1953. Task Force A, under the chairmanship of Mr. George F. Kennan, took the position that the strategy pursued by the United States so far was basically sound and should be continued, with certain changes to make it bolder and more flexible. It viewed the trend of international events as favorable, and asserted that the United States "is today in a position to assume the strategic offensive in its conflicts with Soviet Communism." This offensive, however, was to be limited to diplomatic initiatives and to cautious encouragement of stresses and strains in the Soviet system.

Task Force A endorsed most of the objectives and courses of action in NSC 153/1. It placed special stress on the importance of strengthening and solidifying the free world coalition, since collaboration among the free nations was "essential to the successful pursuit of all our objectives with regard to Soviet power." The task force considered the subject of continental defense, which was currently a live issue before the Council, and recommended stronger defenses to reinforce the US deterrent capacity.

The members of Task Force A acknowledged that their recommendations would mean some initial increases in security costs but considered these well within the nation's capabilities. "The United States can afford to survive," asserted their report.

The report of Task Force B, which was headed by Major General James McCormack, Jr., USAF, was based on the following premise: "The warning of general war as the primary sanction against further Soviet-Bloc aggression, under clearly defined circumstances, is the best means available for insuring the security of the United States, for the present and the foreseeable future." Under the policy advocated by this group, the United States would make it plain that any new communist aggression would result in war. In other words, the line beyond which the United States would permit no further communist advance was to take in all areas not then under communist control. Such a policy was not wholly incompatible with either of the other alternatives. It was, said Task Force B,
"proposed as a support, rather than as a substitute, for existing policies." It would provide a single, clear-cut strategic concept, which would make possible the most efficient and economic development of US forces (although it would not necessarily lead to a reduction in expenditures).

The war envisioned by Task Force B, in case the communists crossed the line, would be general as distinct from merely local; that is, one in which the United States "would apply its full power—whenever, however, and wherever necessary to defeat the main enemy." This assumption did not necessarily mean that bombs would "fall automatically on Moscow on H-hour"; whether or not they did so would depend on the war plan in effect at the time. However, the policy would "find its military basis solidly in the capabilities of atomic weapons." The expression "massive retaliation" was not used in the report, but the concept seemed clearly present.

Task Force B's report implied that the only alternative to its strategy was a choice between continuing acceptance of Soviet pressures and aggressions and confrontation with an endless succession of "costly small wars none of which seems to lead anywhere except to another one." While admitting that the strategy was, in the final analysis, unilateral, the report foresaw a need for allies, both to provide military bases and to supply additional forces along the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

Task Force C, under Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, USN, urged "a positive course of action designed to seize the strategic initiative and deliberately undertake the task of eliminating the Communist threat to the free world." Unlike Task Force A, this group believed that the trend of events was running against the United States and could only be reversed by dynamic, offensive political action. Its report outlined a strategy in three phases. In the first, the United States would complete its military buildup, construct the necessary covert apparatus, and launch an economic, political, and diplomatic offensive against the communist bloc. Successive stages would see attempts to detach the satellites from Soviet control, followed by an effort to disrupt the alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The hope for success of this policy rested on the assumption that "the whole enemy power structure, dominated as it is by a dictatorial minority, is basically unstable." Implementation would "involve the use of conceptions and techniques of international action—such as subversion, pressure, and threat of force—previously foreign to us." However, Task Force C believed that "the adaptation called for is probably within the power of our country to make."

Task Force C rejected any idea of preventive war or of an ultimatum to the Soviet Union. It conceded, however, that its policy might increase the risk of general war in the short run. The task force recognized also that most US allies would draw back in terror from such a policy, but it believed that their estrangement would be overcome as successes created a climate of victory.

The cost of this policy was estimated at $60 billion annually for FYs 1954 and 1955, declining to $45 billion by FY 1958. The size of these figures practically guaranteed that the policy would be rejected by the Council, although Task Force C argued that they were not prohibitive.51
When the Council discussed the reports, the irreconcilable differences between the recommendations of Task Forces A and C, and lesser degree of conflict between those of A and B, soon became apparent. In preparation for further discussion, the NSC staff prepared condensed versions of each report,52 which were sent for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services.53

The JCS Adviser to the Planning Board, Major General John K. Gerhart, USAF, after studying the reports, characterized their proposals as a mixture of approved objectives and courses of action with others that had been discontinued or rejected during past considerations. Careful study of the current validity of the reasons that in the past had caused rejection of similar proposals seemed indicated, and for this purpose General Gerhart recommended referral to the NSC Planning Board.54 The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted this suggestion to the Secretary of Defense on 28 July. They advised him that any changes in national policy arising from the Solarium project would require intensive study and proposed, as a first step, that six to eight weeks be allowed for the development of guidance for the members of the Planning Board by their parent departments and agencies.55

The Council, however, decided on 30 July 1953 to proceed at once with the preparation of a new policy statement, to be drafted by the Planning Board with the assistance of representatives of the task forces, which would incorporate proposals from all three reports. Maintenance of US military strength, solidarity with friendly nations, and assistance to the noncommunist world—goals stressed by Task Force A—would continue as the central objectives of US policy. At the same time, the new statement would specify those areas of the world in which a Soviet advance would be considered a casus belli, as urged by Task Force B, and would call for some of the aggressive actions recommended by Task Force C. But there was to be no abrupt redirection of diplomatic or military policy. The Council thus in effect rejected the strategy of liberation.56

The Planning Board assigned the task to a special committee, the membership of which included the JCS Adviser, General Gerhart. Preparation of a first draft was to keep the special committee and the Planning Board occupied through September 1953.

The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Recommendations

Between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the election of 1952, US foreign policy and military strategy had been intensely and publicly debated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found themselves caught in this political crossfire. Criticism of the Truman administration by prominent Republicans had sometimes extended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the grounds that the latter had become partisans of existing policies. The criticism usually focused on the Chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. Senator Robert A. Taft, one of the most influential spokesmen for his party, believed that General Bradley had stepped out of his proper role in publicly supporting the administration's
policies—which, in Senator Taft's view, overstressed Europe at the expense of Asia and relied on a military strategy that placed too little emphasis on air-sea power. During his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, he had promised to replace General Bradley if elected. After the election of Mr. Eisenhower, Senator Taft and many others regarded the incumbent Chiefs of Staff as a probable obstacle to large budget reduction, since they were identified with the programs to be cut.

Fortuitously, the terms of the principal JCS members were due to expire in mid-1953. All were completing at least four years in office except Admiral William M. Fechteler, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, whose tenure dated from 1951. Early in 1953, Senator Taft and other Republicans in Congress urged Mr. Eisenhower to designate their successors immediately, in order that the new appointees, before assuming office, would have an opportunity to take a new look at existing military programs with a view to possible budget reductions.

President Eisenhower accepted this suggestion and decided upon a replacement of the incumbent Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 7 May 1953 he nominated General Nathan F. Twining (then Vice Chief of Staff, USAF) to succeed General Vandenberg, who was ill and had announced plans to retire effective 30 June 1953. Several days later, the White House announced that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, currently serving as Commander in Chief, Pacific, would succeed General Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that General Matthew B. Ridgway would leave his post as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to become Chief of Staff, US Army, in succession to General J. Lawton Collins. To complete the sweep, Admiral Fechteler would not be reappointed for another two-year term, but was to be replaced by Admiral Robert B. Carney, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe. General Twining would assume office on 1 July; the others, in mid-August. General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., continued as Commandant of the Marine Corps (by legislation of June 1952 the Commandant had co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps were under consideration).

The new appointees were the choice of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who had been given a free hand by the President in selecting them. Senator Taft had also been consulted.

The key appointment was that of the Chairman, Admiral Radford. His views on strategy had been made known to the President-elect and to Mr. Wilson in December 1952, in conferences held aboard the *USS Helena* while Mr. Eisenhower was en route home from his visit to Korea. In these discussions, Admiral Radford had expressed the view that US forces were committed in too many parts of the world. It would be better to redeploy some of them to create a strategic reserve in the continental United States, and to rely on other nations to provide the first line of defense along the periphery of the communist world. Moreover, he believed that US policy and strategy had underestimated the importance of Asia. These views found a ready response among his hearers.

The significance of the Radford appointment was increased by a reorganization of the Department of Defense that was submitted to Congress by the President on 30 April 1953 and became effective two months later. The announced
objectives of Reorganization Plan No. 6 were to strengthen civilian authority, to reduce costs, and to improve joint planning. In general, it enhanced the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the Services. It created six new Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a General Counsel, filling in the structure of a full-scale executive department that would take over the work previously performed by a congeries of boards and committees (the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and others) on which the Services had been represented. The reorganization plan also enlarged the power of the Chairman, by making the selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff, and their tenure, subject to his approval, and by transferring to him, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body, the responsibility for “managing the Joint Staff and the Director thereof.”

When the appointments were announced, Mr. Eisenhower warned against expecting the new Joint Chiefs of Staff to introduce any abrupt or radical changes in strategy. “The great facts that affect a so-called strategic situation and plan do not change rapidly,” he pointed out. “No strategic plan suitable to the United States can be greatly different from any other, as long as it is based upon these facts.” But, he continued, there could be differences in methods and means. Moreover, he promised that there would be “a new approach, a study that is made without any real chains fastening to the past.” At the same time, he warmly praised the outgoing JCS members, with all of whom he had served during his military career. He made it clear that they were being replaced because Secretary Wilson had wanted an entirely new team, not because he was dissatisfied with their performance in office.

The President determined that the incoming JCS members should spend a month or so in an intensive, full-time analysis of US military problems and strategy while they were yet free from the manifold tasks that would descend upon them as soon as they took the oath of office. The nature of the study that he desired them to undertake was set forth in the following memorandum:

I wish the newly-appointed Chiefs of Staff, before assuming their official duties, to examine the following matters:
(a) our strategic concepts and implementing plans,
(b) the roles and missions of the services,
(c) the composition and readiness, of our present forces,
(d) the development of new weapons and weapons systems, and resulting new advances in military tactics, and
(e) our military assistance programs.

I do not desire any elaborate staff exercise. As a result of this examination, I should like a summarized statement of these officers’ own views on these matters, having in mind the elimination of overlapping in operations and administration, and the urgent need for a really austere basis in military preparation and operations.

This examination should be made with due regard for the basic national security policies stated in NSC 153/1. While I do not fix any arbitrary budgetary or personnel limitations as a basis for this study, it should take into consideration our major national security programs for the fiscal years 1954 and 1955, as outlined in NSC 149/2, Part II. With reference to our national policy expressed in pars 8b and 20-25, NSC 153/1 [the paragraphs dealing with the maintenance of a
sound and strong US economy through reductions in expenditures and in the Federal deficit, the views of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget should be obtained.

Such an examination should provide a fresh view as to the best balance and most effective use and deployment of our armed forces, under existing circumstances. What I am seeking is interim guidance to aid the Council in developing policies for the most effective employment of available national resources to insure the defense of our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.

For the purpose of carrying on this examination together, wherever it may take them, I want you to arrange the duties of these officers so that, beginning as early as possible in July and prior to undertaking the responsibilities of their new offices, they can give to the examination full-time uninterrupted attention, freed of all other duties.  

President Eisenhower delivered this memorandum in person to the new Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting at the White House about the middle of July 1953.

The President's instructions left no doubt that he expected the new appointees to recommend a military strategy that could be implemented with smaller forces and would thus justify lower military budgets in the future. This fact was evident from the references to an "austere basis" of preparation and from the portions of NSC 149/2 and NSC 153/1 that were cited. At the same time, the President's explicit disavowal of ceilings left it uncertain how far the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider themselves obligated to remain within the expenditure limits in NSC 149/2.

The stress on economy was reinforced in a later memorandum addressed to the other appointees by General Twining, who had already assumed office. The president, he pointed out, wished them to recommend forces that could be "maintained and operated for an indefinite period without forcing such a financial burden on the country as to endanger a strong, sound U. S. economy." He went on to suggest a possible justification for force reductions. "I believe," he wrote, "that insufficient account has been taken of new weapons and their effect on the composition and employment of our forces, particularly in the field of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Forces of a power never before known to man are now available. I believe we should accept these weapons as accomplished facts and employ them more fully ourselves while preparing to cope with them if they are used by the enemy." He left it to his readers to draw the conclusion that the enormous firepower of these new weapons might justify reductions in the number of men in uniform.

Preparation of the study requested by the President kept the new appointees occupied for the better part of a month. Part of this time was spent in inspection trips to military installations, and another three days (23–26 July 1953) at a conference of high-ranking military and civilian officials at the US Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia, where addresses were given by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others, including General Bradley and Admiral Radford.

The new appointees finished their task during a cruise on the Chesapeake Bay on 6–7 August 1953 aboard the Sequoia, the official yacht assigned the Secretary of the Navy. On 8 August 1953 they tendered their conclusions in a report
addressed to the Secretary of Defense. The report represented the initial views of Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and General Twining as incoming JCS members and was not a corporate position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The general conclusion was that US military strategy had thus far been essentially correct but that a redirection was now called for. The opening paragraph set forth this view as follows:

A review of our military plans and their implementation since June 1950 must result in the conclusion that in general they were sound and adequate. The exceptions were generally the result of immediate pressures, inadequate intelligence, or both. That these plans have served their purpose is a fact, since we have successfully averted a general war. We do find ourselves, however, militarily extended at this time with our existing armed forces so deployed or committed that we have little strategic reserve. Our Armed Forces are of such a size that augmentation of any magnitude could take place only after full scale mobilization. Their roles and missions as stated in the functions paper are clear and that document as now written provides reasonable workable guidance for service programs. There is no reason to believe that our combat readiness or overall military power will be materially increased in the immediate future by the advent of new weapons or tactics except perhaps in the atomic field [a very important exception, the implications of which were not discussed in the report]. Any across the board reduction in the military budget would result in an almost equal reduction in overall security.

With these words, the new Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled out any hope for prompt, large-scale reduction in military expenditures. Nevertheless they believed that it would be possible to attain a "satisfactory military position for the long pull from a budgetary point of view." Any such position must be one that would remedy certain deficiencies in the US military situation, which they described as follows:

Currently the most critical factors in the military aspects of our security are air defense of our Continental U. S. vitals and our ability to retaliate swiftly and powerfully in the event we are attacked. These air defenses need bolstering to a degree which can hold damage to nationally manageable proportions. A capability for swift and powerful retaliation is a deterrent and, in event of hostilities, will blunt the enemy offensive and reduce his capabilities.

Our current military capabilities are inadequate to provide essential national security and at the same time to meet our global military commitments. We are over-extended.

We continue to place our major emphasis in the military field on peripheral deployments overseas, to the neglect of our vitals in Continental United States. Our freedom of action is seriously curtailed, the exercise of initiative severely limited.

Our state of readiness for timely military reaction to full-scale armed aggression continues to deteriorate. We have used in World War II and in the Korean War practically our entire pool of trained military reservists, particularly specialists. For any emergency short of general war, we shall now be forced to the time-consuming procedure of training new personnel.

There seemed only one course of action that could reverse this deterioration
without seriously weakening the stability and durability of the national economy. This course, they continued,

would reverse our present strategic policy. It would place in first priority the essential military protection of our Continental U. S. vitals and the capability for delivering swift and powerful retaliatory blows. Military commitments overseas—that is to say, peripheral military commitments—would cease to have first claim on our resources.

What they had in mind was a program of redeployment and reorientation of US military forces. They did not describe this program in detail, nor did they spell out its advantages. The implication, however, was that US forces brought home from overseas could be used both to strengthen continental defense and to create a strategic reserve that would restore flexibility to US strategy. Military expenditures could then be reduced because it was cheaper to keep uniformed men at home than to maintain them abroad; moreover, some of the forces withdrawn from foreign bases might be disbanded, thus lessening the demand on the nation’s financial resources and manpower.

The new JCS appointees made it clear, however, that economy would be an ultimate rather than an immediate reward. They saw no hope that the budget could be balanced during the two years estimated to be required to accomplish the program. Nor could they promise that their plan would result in smaller military forces, since, as they pointed out, time had not permitted them to go into the question of force levels.

But there was one serious potential danger in this course of action: its possible effect on public and official opinion in other countries. Ever since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, the United States had been pushing its Western European allies to carry a bigger defense burden and to expand their forces. How could it continue to do so in the face of an announced intention to withdraw some of its own forces from the continent? And what of the consequences of removing forces from the Far East, where the Korean War had ended only a few weeks earlier?

The authors of the report faced squarely up to these questions. “Adoption of this course of action,” they admitted, “would involve a change in basic foreign policy of fundamental and far-reaching implications.” Therefore, they warned, if adopted, these changes in our foreign policy and military deployments should be made only after the most exhaustive consideration by the highest governmental officials, and dissemination of knowledge of the decision should be most carefully controlled. Finally, implementing plans would have to be prepared on a carefully phased schedule, carefully coordinated at home and abroad, and given the most effective security practicable.

A well-conceived public information program was also necessary. Moreover, it would be essential to define, and to make clear to other nations, the US national objectives “in situations short of a general emergency.”

Only the President was in a position to judge whether this policy should be attempted in the face of perhaps irreparable diplomatic consequences. The new JCS appointees therefore recommended only that its possible effects be studied
by the National Security Council. They also submitted two other recommenda-
tions, as follows:

1. The United States should formulate a clear, positive policy with respect
to the use of atomic weapons, and should announce it publicly.
2. Military assistance should be dispensed with caution. "We should be
more discriminatory in extending any form of our aid or protection,"
they recommended, "and should require an appropriate contribution or
concession in return." What they had in mind was that aid should be
channeled principally to nations willing to build up their own indigenous
forces to offset the effects of US withdrawal.\textsuperscript{76}

Shortly after submitting this report, Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, and
Admiral Carney assumed their new positions and the turnover in JCS member-
ship was accomplished.\textsuperscript{77} The new Chairman held his first press conference on
26 August 1953, and told reporters that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking a
long, hard look at security problems. "Our review of U. S. strategic needs and
capabilities, which was ordered by President Eisenhower, is something that will
continue indefinitely," he said. He added that this review would not be influ-
enced by economic considerations—a statement difficult to reconcile with others
that he was to make later.\textsuperscript{78}

On 27 August 1953 the newly installed Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before
the National Security Council to describe their proposed new "concept" (as the
Council members called it). They explained that they were not proposing that
the United States withdraw from its alliances or abandon its foreign bases. They
listed some possible benefits of redeployment not touched on in their report:
reduction of friction between US troops and indigenous populations, lowering
of international tension, and assistance in recruiting career professionals who
might otherwise be discouraged by prospects of long overseas tours. At the
same time, they stressed the importance of convincing the Allies that the adop-
tion of the concept did not stem from any conviction that the Soviet threat had
lessened; rather it was based on a desire to increase the mobility and readiness of
US forces, in the face of a danger that remained as great as ever.

All four of the JCS members stressed that they had not been led to the
concept by budgetary considerations alone, and that they recognized the mili-
tary danger of over-extension of forces under present deployments. But two
members, General Ridgway and Admiral Carney, indicated that they had
approved the concept merely as a subject for further study, which might show it
to be unacceptable. General Ridgway, who had only recently returned from
Europe, stressed the possible dangers to NATO unless the program were carried
out with great care. Admiral Carney bluntly characterized the program as the
best that could be devised under the indicated budgetary limitations; if enough
men and money were available, he said, it would be better to increase US forces
(rather than merely reshuffling them) to meet the need for continental defense
and for a strategic reserve. Both he and General Ridgway warned that the US
military deterrent must include adequate surface forces.

The National Security Council tentatively approved the concept. Secretary of
the Treasury Humphrey was particularly outspoken in praising it; he saw it as a
means of reducing or holding down military expenditures and thus avoiding the imposition of controls over the nation’s economy. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, though sympathetic to the concept, nevertheless had reservations. He warned that the United States could not alone match the Soviet bloc in military strength, and that it was essential to avoid any action that would disrupt free world unity. In the end, the President and the Council agreed that Secretary Dulles should analyze the possible diplomatic consequences of the concept before the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied it further.79

Secretary Dulles reported his conclusion to the Council on 9 September 1953.80 Judging by the Council’s later actions, he evidently gave assurance that the strain on US foreign relations would not be fatal. The way was thus open for the National Security Council to adopt the new strategy. For the moment, however, the Council took no action, pending the revision of national security policy that was already in process.

A New Policy Directive: NSC 162/2

The Solarium Committee of the NSC Planning Board, appointed in response to the Council’s decision of 30 July 1953, completed a draft policy statement on 17 September. When it was submitted to the Board, however, disagreements quickly became apparent. On 30 September, after five fruitless sessions, the Planning Board abandoned the effort to reach agreement and forwarded a split draft, NSC 162, to the Council.81

In NSC 162 the world situation was viewed as highly alarming. The paper took note of the Soviets’ mounting atomic capabilities, and assessed the Soviet regime as essentially unchanged despite the passing of Stalin. In broad terms, it set forth US military requirements: a massive retaliatory capacity, mobile forces in readiness, and an adequate and well-protected mobilization base. The Treasury and Budget representatives, however, felt that the danger of unsound fiscal policies should virtually be equated with that presented by Soviet hostility and military power. The majority view held that the United States could and should pay whatever price was needed for safety.

Those portions of the draft that dealt with military strategy clearly reflected the concept put forward by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may have been inserted at the instigation of the JCS Adviser to the Board, General Gerhart, who had served on the drafting committee. Thus NSC 162 advocated that the United States use “special” (i.e., nuclear) weapons whenever required for its security. It also gave general sanction to redeployment of US forces, although here the Planning Board split. Some members admitted that redeployment might be desirable, but urged further study of foreign political repercussions. Others favored an immediate decision to withdraw some US forces, coupled with an attempt to persuade allied nations that this step was in their own interests.

NSC 162 specified some of the aggressive actions against the communist bloc that the guidelines had called for. General Gerhart, however, wished to go
farther in this direction than most others. For example, he urged deletion of a paragraph renouncing aggressive actions involving force against Soviet bloc territory. Again, in a discussion of the possibility of negotiation, he wished to stress the need to maintain pressure on the Soviets to induce them to negotiate. The representatives of the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization joined him in upholding this hard line.

When Admiral Radford and his colleagues received NSC 162 for review, they sent it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), which criticized it rather severely. “The principal themes running through the paper,” observed the Committee, with some exaggeration, “appear to be: (1) that we should pursue a policy of inaction for fear of antagonizing the Soviets and of alienating our Allies; and (2) that a balanced budget should take precedence over an adequate defense.” Nevertheless the Committee found NSC 162 generally acceptable, subject to favorable resolution of the disputed portions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, withheld their endorsement. They told the Secretary of Defense on 6 October 1953 that the five days allowed them for study of the military implications of NSC 162 had been insufficient and that, in any event, a definitive evaluation would be possible only after the divergent paragraphs had been resolved, since the matters at issue were basic to the direction of policy. Addressing themselves to the two principal issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear their conviction that national security should take precedence over budgetary considerations and that negotiations with the Soviet leaders were unlikely to be productive unless the United States provided the Soviets with an incentive to negotiate by seizing the initiative in the cold war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that no action should be taken on NSC 162 until its implications had been carefully studied. However, they proposed a number of detailed changes to be incorporated in NSC 162 if an immediate decision were judged necessary. The general effect of these changes would be to stress the need for defense rather than economy.

One paragraph in NSC 162 had called for the United States to maintain a “capability . . . to inflict massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that this be amended to state a need for a military posture that would include this capability. This change had been suggested by Admiral Carney. The effect would be to emphasize that retaliatory airpower was only one element of offensive strength.

Concerning the disputed issue of redeployment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed views that reflected the same differences of emphasis that had already become apparent during their presentation of the new concept. All favored a positive statement that US forces were overextended, or maldeployed, but Admiral Carney and General Ridgway wished to add the following caution:

However, any major withdrawal of United States forces from Europe or the Far East would be interpreted as a diminution of United States interest in the defense of those areas and would serve to undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition unless it were phased with a corresponding increase in the capabilities of indigenous forces to insure an adequate defense.
The National Security Council discussed NSC 162 on 7 October 1953 and sent it back to the Planning Board, which prepared three successive revisions. The last of these, NSC 162/1, was circulated for review on 19 October 1953.\textsuperscript{86} In this version, the Treasury-Budget view of the relative importance of the economic and the military threats was rejected. One issue was thus settled as the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired. Their other recommendations, however, met with a mixed reception. Thus the statement of military requirements called for "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power." This was closer in spirit to the original in NSC 162 than to the rewording sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSC 162/1 also failed to go as far as they had wished in recommending aggressive actions against the Soviet bloc. The disagreement over redeployment was settled by a compromise, which asserted a need for some redeployment while warning of possible adverse psychological effects in foreign countries if major forces were withdrawn.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred NSC 162/1 to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, whose members decided that it would be inappropriate to repeat earlier recommendations that had been rejected by the Council. They therefore recommended only one minor change, in a paragraph that seemed to them unduly pessimistic in evaluating the prospects of NATO.\textsuperscript{87}

Admiral Carney, however, took exception to the statement of military capabilities in NSC 162/1. He pointed out that the Planning Board's first tentative redraft of NSC 162 (containing changes adopted by the Council on 7 October) had accepted the amendment sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the US military posture would include massive retaliatory capability. The new statement, calling for emphasis upon this capability, thus departed significantly from phraseology that had been approved by the Council.\textsuperscript{88}

Accepting Admiral Carney's suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense on 27 October 1953 that the statement of military capabilities be revised as they had urged in their comments on NSC 162. They endorsed the change suggested by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and proposed several others of a minor nature. Subject to these comments, they considered NSC 162/1 acceptable.\textsuperscript{89}

The National Security Council discussed NSC 162/1 on 29 October, at an important meeting attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. The members debated at some length the paragraph on retaliatory power. Although the amendment sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was supported by Secretary Wilson, it was finally rejected. President Eisenhower insisted that it was necessary to establish a priority among the elements of military power. But to make certain that this decision would not prejudice the results of the review of strategy on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were then engaged, the President stipulated that the Secretary of Defense might ask for revision of this paragraph if he found that its provisions, "when read in the context of the total policy statement, operate to the disadvantage of the national security."\textsuperscript{90} As a further hedge against overemphasis upon a single Service, Mr. Eisenhower ruled that
the phrase "offensive striking power" would be interpreted to include all offensive forces, including aircraft carriers. The other amendments sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepted. The final version, approved by President Eisenhower on 30 October, was issued as NSC 162/2.

NSC 162/2 defined the basic problems of national security policy as follows:

a. To meet the Soviet threat to US security.

b. In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions.

Here the domestic danger was clearly subordinated to the foreign. Elsewhere, NSC 162/2 characterized Soviet hostility toward the West, together with the military power of the Soviets and their control of a formidable subversive apparatus, as the primary threat to the United States. This threat remained great, despite the more conciliatory attitude shown by the regime of Premier Georgi M. Malenkov. But there was room for hope that pressures inside the Soviet bloc, together with growing strength and unity of noncommunist countries, might ultimately induce the Soviets to agree to a settlement, that would be acceptable to the free world.

The requirements for defense against the Soviet threat were listed as:

a. Development and maintenance of:
   (1) A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;
   (2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication; and
   (3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general war.

b. Maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy, capable of providing through the operation of free institutions, the strength described in a above over the long pull and of rapidly and effectively changing to full mobilization.

c. Maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.

NSC 162/2 conceded the need for allies, without which the United States could not, even at exorbitant cost, meet its defense needs. The strengths and weaknesses of the free world coalition were appraised realistically, and the bases for maintenance of a position of strength in each part of the world were set forth. In Western Europe, this position should be based primarily on cooperation with the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; in the Far East, on existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, pending more comprehensive regional agreements; and in the Middle East, on support of the few stable countries there (Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Iran).

The importance of the uncommitted areas of the world was recognized. "Constructive U. S. policies, not related solely to anti-communism," would be required to create a sense of mutuality of interest with these regions. Both neutral and allied countries could be strengthened by policies aimed at stimulating trade and promoting the growth of under-developed nations.
Turning to economic considerations, NSC 162/2 stressed that security expenditures should not be allowed to "impair the basic soundness of the U.S. economy by undermining incentives or by inflation." Nevertheless the United States must "meet the necessary costs of the policies essential for its security." The Federal Government should make a determined effort to bring expenditures into line with revenues.

NSC 162/2 asserted that "the armed forces of the United States are overextended," but it admitted that major force withdrawals from Europe or the Far East would imply a lessening of US interest in those areas and would thus seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition. Hence, US diplomacy must seek to convince allied nations that their best defense rested upon their own efforts, coupled with a commitment by the United States to strike back against aggression with its mobile reserves. The concept proposed by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff thus received firm approval.

"In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an added deterrent," proclaimed NSC 162/2, "the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces." An attack on any of the following would automatically involve the United States in war with the aggressor: the NATO countries, West Germany, Berlin, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the American Republics, and the Republic of Korea. Certain other regions (Indochina and Taiwan were cited as examples) were so important strategically that an attack on them would probably compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor. Moreover, the principle of collective security through the United Nations was to be supported "even in areas not of vital strategic importance." But unlike NSC 153/1, NSC 162/2 did not suggest that the United States take unilateral action against aggression.

If hostilities occurred, the United States would "consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." When these weapons had to be delivered from bases on allied territory, however, advance consent would be obtained from the countries involved. The United States would also seek the understanding and approval of this policy by other nations.

Counterbalancing its emphasis on military preparedness, NSC 162/2 declared that the possibility of negotiation with the communist bloc must be kept open. The chances of successful negotiation would be greater if the United States and its allies preserved their strength and unity and maintained enough retaliatory power to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet system in case of war. In the absence of any such resolution of the cold war, the United States should seek to reduce the capabilities of the communist powers through diplomatic, political, economic, and covert measures intended to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology, to undermine the strength of communist parties throughout the world and to disrupt relations among the nations of the Soviet bloc.

The final paragraphs of NSC 162/2 faced up to the ominous threat of a world
of proliferating nuclear weapons, a threat foreshadowed by the recent Soviet thermonuclear explosion:

In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of U. S. security policies must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards. The United States and its allies must always seek to create and sustain the hope and confidence of the free world in the ability of its basic ideas and institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat, but to provide a way of life superior to Communism.

The foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as the United States maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise Soviet attack. Therefore, there must be continuing examination and periodic report to the National Security Council in regard to the likelihood of such neutralization of U. S. retaliatory capability.

Military Strategy Reexamined: JCS 2101/113

NSC 162/2 obviously had direct military implications, but their precise nature remained to be determined. How far should force levels reflect the emphasis on retaliatory capacity? How many and what kind of military units should be redeployed from overseas, and how soon? These questions required the new Joint Chiefs of Staff to move from a consideration of broad national strategy, such as they had dealt with in their initial study, to details of force compositions and deployments.

In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already confronted some of these questions. In September 1953, Secretary Wilson had asked them to recommend force levels to provide the basis for the FY 1955 budget. In reply, they had submitted proposals on 2 October 1953 that would allow all three Services a modest expansion, explaining that they knew of no justification for proposing reductions. On the basis of these recommendations, Secretary Wilson and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) submitted a preliminary budget to the National Security Council on 13 October 1953 calling for expenditures of $43 billion in FY 1955—slightly below the revised 1954 budget, but considerably more than the target figure of $40 billion set in NSC 149/2.94

Objections arose at once from Council members who had hoped for a sizable reduction in FY 1955. Admiral Radford, who attended the meeting, was drawn into the controversy. He explained that he and his colleagues could not conscientiously propose smaller force levels under existing conditions. But, he suggested, a basis for reductions might be found if the National Security Council would give the Joint Chiefs of Staff a clear-cut authorization to base their plans on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used immediately in case of war.95

The implication was that plans could then be drawn for only one kind of war rather than for several (conventional and atomic, each limited or general). Moreover, the increased firepower of nuclear weapons would justify reduction
in the size of conventional forces. The Council took no action at that time, except to direct Secretary Wilson to revise his budget estimates. 96

The problem was to find a military strategy that would justify smaller forces in being, both for the coming fiscal year and for subsequent years (the long haul). Secretary Wilson took the matter back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The outcome of this discussion was the following directive, which Secretary Wilson addressed to Admiral Radford on 16 October 1953:

It is of urgent importance that we determine now the broad outline for the size and composition of our armed forces for some years ahead in the light of foreseeable developments in order to establish a sound basis for planning best to meet the security requirements of the United States for the long pull ahead.

U.S. national policy, strategy and the considerations which lead to their adoption are set forth in NSC 162 and related documents. Certain salient factors are:

a. The Communist hierarchy, based on the power position of the USSR, seeks to achieve world domination by any measures best calculated by them to serve their aim.

b. The United States must provide for their [sic] own security and, in its own interest, assist its allies in their security. This must include adequate defensive forces, particularly for the air defense of the continental U.S., of our own striking forces and their bases, and for the protection of our essential sea and air communications.

c. We have entered an era where the quantity of atomic weapons and their military application necessitates a review of their impact on our strategy. We shall assume that such weapons will be used in military operations by U.S. forces engaged whenever it is of military advantage to do so.

d. The sound economy of the free world, particularly dependent upon that of the United States, is an essential bulwark in the preservation of our freedom and security.

I request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit to me not later than 15 December 1953 their recommendations as to:

a. An outline military strategy for the United States to implement the national strategy of the U.S. set forth in NSC 162.

b. The size and composition of the armed forces for the fiscal years 1955, 1956, and 1957 with a point of departure the end forces and personnel strengths established within the FY 1954 budget, in the light of:

1. feasible annual expenditures and new appropriations of funds for maintenance of such forces. Guide lines should be obtained from current reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget.

2. remunerative utilization of the qualified manpower that can be made available. I estimate that this would be in the bracket 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 men on active duty in the military services.

3. the necessity for adequate air defense of the continental U.S. within the completely integrated military programs.

4. the importance on maintaining the readiness and modernization of equipment of the combatant forces to increase our capabilities and to maintain the war potential of our industrial complex.

c. Reasonably attainable action the U.S. should take in the politico-military field in modifying existing commitments or to enhance the implementation of the strategy.

The facilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Service Departments will be available to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their studies. 97
The third of Mr. Wilson's salient factors listed in this directive conveyed the authority for use of nuclear weapons that Admiral Radford had requested. The mention of continental defense reflected an NSC decision on 24 September 1953 to construct an enlarged and integrated air defense system.\textsuperscript{98} The reference to modification of commitments suggested that Secretary Wilson expected the Joint Chief of Staff to base their plans on the concept that they had proposed two months earlier.

It was also clear from the directive that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were expected to recommend a smaller military establishment. No expenditure ceilings were laid down, but the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget could be expected to guide the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward the narrowest possible budgetary limits. Moreover, the manpower figures set forth by Mr. Wilson were well below the current uniformed strength of approximately three and a half million.\textsuperscript{99} The end of the Korean War would of course reduce requirements somewhat, but by itself it could hardly justify reductions of the required magnitude. The difficulty was sure to be compounded by the simultaneous need to find more men and money for continental defense.

At the suggestion of Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a special ad hoc committee to prepare a reply to Secretary Wilson’s directive. It was headed by the Director, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest, USAF, and included two other officers from each Service.\textsuperscript{100}

The committee’s reply, submitted on 30 November 1953, constituted a plan for carrying out the new concept. It recommended that some US forces be withdrawn from overseas and regrouped to form a strategic reserve in the United States. This step would regain strategic flexibility and at the same time make it possible to reduce the size and cost of the military establishment. It should be accompanied by a reorientation of strategy toward greater reliance on new weapons, in order to exploit US technological superiority and to offset the communists’ advantage in manpower.

The committee assumed that all major US forces would soon be withdrawn from Korea. It recommended that US troops be removed from Japan as Japanese forces came into existence. Air and naval forces should remain in the Far East, however, and should be armed with nuclear weapons. It was agreed that some troops must remain in Europe, for political and psychological as well as military reasons, but their number was a matter of dispute among the committee members. The representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force wished to set a limit of three divisions by 1957—a 40 percent reduction from the five divisions then in Europe. The Army members declined to propose a target figure; they insisted that no troops should be withdrawn from Europe until the political climate was known to be favorable for such a step.

An educational program would be needed to convince the allies that the new strategy would enhance their security in the long run, and to persuade them to furnish most of the ground forces for their own defense. The United States could then adjust its NATO commitments as necessary. Foreign aid should be administered so as to encourage other countries to create forces that would complement those of the United States.
The report urged that force requirements for each area be continuously reviewed in the light of US atomic capabilities. Apparently the implication was that the void left by the departing US forces could be filled, in whole or in part, by equipping the remaining forces with tactical atomic weapons. For the same purpose, the creation of West German and Japanese forces should be expedited.

The committee did not recommend force levels for FYs 1955 or 1956, but sought to agree on a level-off figure to be attained by FY 1957. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force members proposed an overall FY 1957 personnel strength of 2.750 million—halfway between the upper and lower limits given by Secretary Wilson. The Army members recommended 2.765 million. But the distribution of the total among the Services was a matter of disagreement as shown by the following tabulation in thousands:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army recommendation</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps recommendation</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force recommendation</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recommended force levels were as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army Divisions</th>
<th>Navy Ships</th>
<th>Marine Corps Divisions and Wings</th>
<th>Air Force Wings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army recommendation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps recommendation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force recommendation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army members emphasized that their recommendations for their Service were an absolute minimum. Their willingness to accept even as few as 14 divisions was contingent upon the assumption that eight Japanese divisions would be in existence by FY 1957 and that the world situation would make it feasible to withdraw Army forces from the Far East.

Despite their divergency, all the recommendations had one feature in common. They would allow the Air Force to increase its force levels while requiring reductions in the other Services.

The fiscal guidelines used by the committee consisted of Federal revenue estimates for fiscal years 1954 through 1957, accompanied by estimated expenditures for each year for programs other than national security.101 The remainder,
minus the expected costs of the atomic energy and mutual security programs, was the amount available for military expenditures. For FY 1957, this balance amounted to $33.8 billion. In estimating the costs of their recommended programs, all the committee members kept within this figure except the representatives of the Army, who priced their proposals at $34.235 billion.\textsuperscript{102}

The Army members placed on record a protest against the manpower and dollar guidelines. Under the committee’s terms of reference, they said, these had to be regarded as firm ceilings, but their acceptance as such required the committee to make unduly optimistic assumptions and to take unacceptable risks. The other Service members believed that the risks were acceptable.\textsuperscript{103}

When the committee’s report reached the JCS agenda, each Service Chief upheld the position taken by his representatives on the committee. General Twining endorsed the report without qualification as wholly compatible with NSC 162/2.\textsuperscript{104} Admiral Carney, while not rejecting the committee’s proposed strategy, opposed any interpretation of it that would overemphasize strategic bombing; General Shepherd, Commandant of the Marine Corps, called attention to those portions of NSC 162/2 that had qualified the emphasis on retaliatory capacity. Both argued for a FY 1957 force structure that would provide balanced forces capable of responding to a broad variety of contingencies.\textsuperscript{105} General Ridgway, so far as is known, did not comment in writing, but his later actions and statements indicated his firm support of the Army position.

In the end, after considerable discussion,\textsuperscript{106} all the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the substance of the Everest Committee report. They resolved the dispute over FY 1957 force levels on the basis of a slightly higher manpower total—2,815,000—which was large enough to provide each Service almost the full strength sought by its representative on the committee.\textsuperscript{107} In their formal agreement (JCS 2101/113, approved on 10 December 1953), they recommended the following objectives for FY 1957:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel Strength (thousands)</th>
<th>Force Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>14 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,030 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>3 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>137 wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures required a reduction of almost 600,000 men from the current total and a drastic reallocation of the remainder among the Services. The Army would bear the brunt of the reduction, with a loss of almost a third of its manpower. The Navy and the Marine Corps would be cut by approximately 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Air Force, on the other hand, would increase by over 60,000 men.\textsuperscript{108} The force levels (the indicated number of major units) were not intended as rigid limits; it was agreed that the Services would be encouraged to exceed them (subject to prior JCS approval) if able to do so within
their limits of men and money. The costs of this military establishment in billions of dollars were estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$7,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy and Marine Corps</td>
<td>8,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>14,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allocated by Service</td>
<td>2,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$32,912</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The revised force structure was considered appropriate to implement the strategy proposed by the Everest Committee, which was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with the reasoning behind it. Its elements were summarized in the following list of requirements for a military strategy to support NSC 162/2:

a. Changes in the present US deployments in some forward areas.
b. Emphasis upon the capability of inflicting massive damage upon the USSR by our retaliatory striking power as the major deterrent to aggression, and a vital element of any US strategy in the event of general war.
c. An integrated and adequate continental defense system.
d. The provision of tactical atomic support for US or allied military forces in general war or in a local aggression whenever the employment of atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous.
e. The constitution, generally on US territory, of a strategic reserve with a high degree of combat readiness to move rapidly to any threatened area.
f. The maintenance of control over essential sea and air lines of communication.
g. The maintenance of a mobilization base adequate to meet the requirements of a general war.
h. The maintenance of qualitative superiority of our armed forces.

As provided in JCS 2101/113, any withdrawal of US forces from Western Europe must await the successful conduct of an educational program to win over the allies to the new strategy. It also accepted the necessity to retain some ground forces in Western Europe even after 1957. The arbitrary assumption was made that a maximum of six Army divisions would be available for peacetime deployment overseas, but it was not specified how many of these would be assigned to Europe.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the proposals by the Everest Committee that foreign aid be allocated so as to shape allied military forces in the desired direction, that force requirements be constantly reviewed in the light of nuclear capabilities, and that the establishment of German and Japanese forces be encouraged. These steps, along with the educational program, were listed as the "reasonably attainable actions in the politico-military field" to which Mr. Wilson had referred in his directive of 16 October. Apparently it was assumed that
atomic weapons would be available in large quantity by FY 1957 and that suitable allied forces would be in existence, but these conditions were not stated as assumptions.\(^{109}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 11 December. In doing so, they cautioned Mr. Wilson that their endorsement of the proposals was not unqualified. “This strategy and these policies . . . reflect our agreed recommendations under the assumption that present international tensions and threats remain approximately the same,” they said. “Any material increase in danger or reduction in threat would require complete new studies and estimates.”\(^{110}\)

Admiral Radford appeared before the National Security Council on 16 December and outlined the proposed strategy and force levels. At the same time, the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Kyes, submitted a revised FY 1955 budget calling for substantially lower expenditures than in 1954, which was presented as part of a three-year program for reaching the FY 1957 strengths proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council and the President approved both the military program in JCS 2101/113 and the proposed budget.\(^{111}\)

With these actions, the administration’s new look at the entire defense picture was complete. It remained only to apply the new strategy by adjusting force structure and deployments. How this was done is described in later chapters.

Differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone on record as approving JCS 2101/113, they had done so with varying degrees of enthusiasm and in some cases with important mental reservations. Their conflicting opinions about the wisdom of its conclusions became evident in comments, public or private, made during the next few months.

Admiral Radford, who was perhaps the major architect of the new strategy, was wholehearted in his support of it. Even before it had been approved by the Council, he praised it in a public speech as one that brought the military establishment into line with technological and other developments, and one that could be supported indefinitely with minimum strain on the nation’s economy.\(^{112}\)

In hearings on the FY 1955 budget, he testified that the strategy on which it was based as well as the budget itself, had his full endorsement.\(^{113}\)

Admiral Radford’s judgment was in some degree shaped by the fact that by the end of 1953 he had come to accept the President’s view that military and economic security were coequal in importance. From this conviction, he drew the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must consider both of these objectives in drawing up their plans. “In this day and age,” he said on 14 December 1953, in the speech already cited, “the military must be realistically concerned about keeping our national economy strong as an indispensable bulwark of the Free World. It is a most important facet of our national security problems.”\(^{114}\)

Even more emphatic was a statement he made to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 16 March 1954, in defending the FY 1955 budget. “I honestly felt
and still feel," he declared, "that the economic stability of the United States is a
great factor of military importance over the long pull . . . Without any reservation, I
subscribe to the theory that as military men . . . we must take economic factors into consideration." 115 This view went beyond mere acceptance of a decision by
the civilian authorities to impose ceilings on defense expenditures (a frequent practice in American peacetime military planning). It seemed to imply that mili-
tary planners should weigh cost considerations against other factors of military
importance in drawing up their requirements. In other words, military men,
rather than their civilian superiors, would bear the onus for a decision to limit
the size of the military establishment in order to minimize expenses.

General Twining also approved JCS 2101/113. Its stress on retaliatory capacity
and on air defense and the new balance of strength that it established among the
Services were wholly in accord with his views on strategy. Although it had cut
back the final Air Force goal from 143 to 137 wings, the difference resulted from
the elimination of six troop-carrier wings, a step that he viewed as in harmony
with the decision to reduce peripheral commitments. Like Admiral Radford, he
fully endorsed the new military program in testifying on the FY 1955 budget. 116
The next year, when the FY 1956 budget had further accentuated the emphasis
on firepower, he restated his belief in the soundness of the New Look strategy,
which he believed had been confirmed by the trend of events. 117

General Ridgway challenged some of the basic beliefs held by Admiral Radford
and General Twining. On military, political, and moral grounds, he opposed
what he regarded as overemphasis on strategic firepower and mass bombing. 118
General Ridgway rejected completely the idea that economic stability was a
factor of military importance. In his view, military men were without compe-
tence in economic matters and had no responsibility in this field except to keep
their requests within the broad area of reasonable appropriations; final decisions
on acceptable costs were the responsibility of the President and the Secretary of
Defense. 119 He disputed the contention that improved weapons constituted a
reason for reducing military manpower, a view put forth by Admiral Radford
and others in defending the new force goals. 120 Rather, because of their greater
complexity, these weapons would require more men for operation and main-
tenance. 121 In any case, he believed, it was most unwise to reduce forces at once
in anticipation of weapons not yet available, or of German and Japanese forces
that had still to be raised and equipped. 122

General Ridgway had made it clear to the National Security Council in August
1953 that he had approved the suggested redeployment program only as a
subject for further investigation. It is therefore not surprising that his assent to
JCS 2101/113 was a highly qualified one. When questioned by the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations in connection with the Army's FY 1955 budget, he
declared that the unanimous endorsement of the program by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was on the basis of stated assumptions and limitations. 123 A year later,
during FY 1956 budget hearings, General Ridgway described the FY 1957 force
levels under the New Look program as the result of a directed verdict, following
from "fixed manpower and dollar ceilings . . . given the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
start with." 124
The assumptions referred to by General Ridgway were in part those clearly set forth as such in JCS 2101/113 or in the accompanying memorandum to the Secretary of Defense: that the world situation would not worsen and that Soviet capabilities would not significantly increase before 1957. All the JCS members had accepted these, but only General Ridgway called attention to them in his public utterances. He had, moreover, conditioned his approval of JCS 2101/113 upon the further assumption that a Japanese army would be able to shoulder some of the burden of Far Eastern defense by 1957.\textsuperscript{125}

Admiral Carney agreed with General Ridgway to a considerable extent. In commenting first on the new JCS concept in August 1953, and then on the ad hoc committee report that became JCS 2101/113, he made it clear that he opposed over-emphasis on strategic airpower and remained convinced of a continuing need for powerful surface forces. Moreover, again like the Army Chief of Staff, he disputed the view that more powerful weapons justified cuts in manpower.\textsuperscript{126} But he was less alarmed than General Ridgway over the trend of events, perhaps because JCS 2101/113 could be read as fully acknowledging the importance of seapower in preserving the nation’s security. He testified in 1954 that the Navy understood and accepted the changes in force levels under the new program and would do its utmost to assure the effective accomplishment of its mission.\textsuperscript{127} This willing compliance with a superior’s adverse decision was in accord with military ethics, but it fell short of the full endorsement given by General Twining and Admiral Radford. However, Admiral Carney asserted without qualification that the program had been unanimously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{128}

Thus by the end of 1953, two rather well-defined viewpoints had emerged within the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the product of deeply felt convictions about the most effective strategy for the United States and the proper allocation of military resources. The spokesmen for the surface forces—General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and General Shepherd—were generally pitted against General Twining, whose conclusions were usually supported by Admiral Radford. But the depth and intensity of this disagreement should not be exaggerated. On many matters the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves in full agreement, while occasionally they divided along other lines of cleavage.

The actions of Admiral Radford and his colleagues during the first six months of their tenure reflected the interplay of the two viewpoints described above. In the initial concept that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed in August 1953, the views of Admiral Radford and General Twining prevailed, with the qualified assent of their colleagues. The actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff two months later, when they sought to qualify the emphasis on strategic airpower in the successive drafts of NSC 162/2, evidently resulted from initiatives by General Ridgway or Admiral Carney or both. The Radford-Twining position again dominated the final strategy recommended in JCS 2101/113. Nevertheless it should be emphasized that this strategy was broad enough for interpretation in more than one direction, according to which of the requirements were to be emphasized. This fact doubtless made it easier for General Ridgway and Admiral Carney to approve JCS 2101/113.
The New Look and Its Interpretation

That the Eisenhower administration was reexamining defense strategy had been a matter of public knowledge since early 1953. Inevitably, the process was described as taking a new look.129 The phrase came readily, the more so as it had been in common use a few years earlier, though in a wholly different context—in reference to radically altered styles of women’s dress introduced shortly after World War II. To extend it from the activity to the results was equally natural. By the end of the year the complex of related decisions by the Eisenhower administration concerning strategy, force levels, and defense budgets had come to be collectively referred to as the “New Look.”

This usage was exemplified by Admiral Radford on 14 December 1953 in a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., which constituted a public exposition of the decisions in JCS 2101/113 and of the reasons underlying them. Admiral Radford traced the New Look to the President’s statement on 30 April 1953 concerning plans for the long-term pull. “Here,” he said, “is the real key to our planning.” The New Look, he continued, “is aimed at providing a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater costs for a particular period of tension.”

The strategy of the New Look frankly emphasized airpower. “Today, there is no argument among military planners as to the importance of airpower,” said Admiral Radford. And he promised that the United States would maintain a national airpower superior to that of any other nation. But he used this phrase to include not only the Air Force itself, but also Naval, Marine Corps, and Army aviation, as well as the US aircraft industry and civil air transport system. Moreover, airpower alone was not enough; the military establishment must be balanced, although this goal did not require an equal three-way division of men and money. The object was to be prepared both for “tremendous, vast retaliatory and counteroffensive blows in event of a global war” and also for “lesser military actions short of all-out war.” He took special note of continental defense, which, he said, was increasingly important.

Admiral Radford told his hearers that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently submitted plans to assure mobile, versatile combat forces in readiness, plus an adequate mobilization base, through FY 1957. For reasons of economy there would be fewer men in uniform than previously planned, but the effects of this reduction would be offset by new weapons and new techniques—including atomic weapons, which, he said, “have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces.”130

Admiral Radford thus described the New Look as characterized by: general reduction of expenditures, planning on a long-term basis, predominance of airpower, stronger continental defense, fewer men in uniform, and more powerful weapons (“bigger bang for a buck,” in the words of another widely-used phrase). Other important features, which he did not stress in this speech, were: partial disengagement abroad, creation of a central strategic reserve, and reliance on foreign countries for initial ground defense. All these provisions were to
be found in the two governing directives of the New Look, NSC 162/2 and JCS 2101/113. In various combinations, these elements of the new strategy were publicly expounded by administration spokesmen during the ensuing months.\(^{131}\)

Some of these elements were already well established in defense planning, but under the New Look they were interpreted or applied somewhat differently. Thus the idea of the long haul—the need to maintain military strength for an indefinite period—had long been recognized.\(^ {132}\) But the Truman administration had envisioned the long haul as beginning after its projected military buildup had been accomplished. The new administration proposed to begin the long haul at once.\(^{133}\) Similarly, the importance of airpower had never been disputed; it was regarded as an integral part of the military deterrent required for containment. The new emphasis on airpower was relative rather than absolute; the Air Force was actually to be slightly smaller than previously planned, but it was to receive a much bigger slice of a shrinking budgetary pie.

Taken together, the individual elements of the New Look added up to an important redirection in military planning. The change was less abrupt, however, than the name might suggest.\(^ {134}\) Indeed, from one point of view, the New Look might be regarded as an inevitable retrenchment after the end of the Korean War and as a return to the normal peacetime practice of placing the military establishment under rigid expenditure limits.

Insofar as it provided a basis for reduced expenditures, the New Look met a major need of the administration—a resolution of the conflict between security and solvency. But it could also be justified on wholly military grounds: as a means of regaining freedom of action for US forces, as an improvement in the capability of defending the American homeland, and as an updating of strategy and force structure to keep pace with advances in weapons technology. These were legitimate military objectives. That they coincided with the desire for economy did not mean that they were necessarily mere rationalizations.

The convergence in the New Look of two sets of objectives—military and economic—renders it difficult to appraise the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in its formulation. But the evidence indicates that their role was secondary. Even before his election, Mr. Eisenhower was convinced of the importance of economy, of planning for the long haul, and of keeping the boys at home. The strategic concept suggested by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953 fitted neatly into the President’s frame of thought. The arguments of Admiral Radford and General Twining furnished a basis for overriding the objections of General Ridgway and Admiral Carney.

When the general nature of the New Look became known outside the Executive Branch, the disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff spread to the public arena with magnified intensity. A major stimulus to debate was a speech by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on 12 January 1954. “The way to deter aggression,” said Mr. Dulles on this occasion, “is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.” The administration had wished to regain for the United States the initiative in the cold war, and, in order to do so, had taken some basic policy decisions. The Secretary described
the major decision in a manner that showed how, in his view, the New Look met
the objective of flexibility while at the same time providing “a maximum deter-
rent at a bearable cost”:

The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate,
instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit
what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy’s many
choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication
of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at
less cost.135

In itself, the threat of nuclear retaliation uttered by Mr. Dulles was not new.
The near-certainty of such action in case of Soviet invasion of Western Europe
had been a cornerstone of NATO strategy. But his words seemed to suggest that
it was now considered an appropriate reaction in a much wider range of
contingencies. No other contemporary statement by an administration spokes-
man put such emphasis on the willingness to resort to this expedient.136

The Secretary’s speech touched off a chorus of criticism from leading mem-
ers of the Democratic Party. Fastening upon his remark about retaliating
instantly, the critics assailed the administration’s New Look as placing too
much reliance upon a single method of warfare that would turn every conflict
into a nuclear holocaust, frighten the nation’s allies and jeopardize America’s
moral standing. In reply, Mr. Dulles restated and elaborated upon the qualifica-
tions with which he had surrounded the doctrine of instant retaliation in his
speech. “To deter aggression,” he said, “it is important to have the flexibility
and the facilities which make various responses available.”137

Admiral Radford also publicly denied that the New Look strategy was one-
sided. An address he delivered on 9 March 1954 contained the following passage:

Our planning does not subscribe to the thinking that the ability to deliver
massive atomic retaliation is, by itself, adequate to meet all our security needs. It
is not correct to say we are relying exclusively on one weapon, or one Service, or
that we are anticipating one kind of war. I believe that this Nation could be a
prisoner of its own military posture if it had no capability, other than one to
deliver a massive atomic attack.138

The controversy illustrated the remark made above, that the strategy in JCS
2101/113 allowed room for different interpretations. In practice, its application
would be determined by decisions on force levels. For this reason, the critics
centered their fire upon the FY 1955 defense budget, which the administration
unveiled in January 1954 as the first step in carrying out the New Look. They
claimed that the proposed reduction of the Army and Navy would make it
difficult, if a crisis arose, to take any effective military action short of all-out
nuclear bombing.139 But this viewpoint was rejected. The military budget for
fiscal 1956, formulated by the administration at the end of 1954, continued the
trend of development set in motion by the 1955 budget, and thus decisively
shaped the strategy of the New Look in the direction of massive retaliation.
Basic National Security Policy, 1954

At the end of 1953 the Eisenhower administration hoped that it had settled upon a national strategy that would be valid for some years to come—for the long haul. But this hope soon vanished. Before 1954 was out, the administration was compelled to reexamine both its overall security policy and its decisions regarding the size and structure of military forces. The first of these reexaminations is described in this chapter, the second in the succeeding one.

Framework of Policy Discussion in 1954

The reconsideration of strategy was compelled by developments abroad that threatened to invalidate a basic assumption underlying the New Look Policy: that the world situation would not change appreciably for the worse. In other words, the impetus for policy discussion in 1954 was external, whereas in 1953 it had been internal, springing from the desire of the administration to find a new balance between security and solvency. This changed context turned discussion toward questions of ends rather than means. In 1953 the deliberations of the National Security Council had in large measure concerned the instruments of national policy, military forces and strategy. In contrast, in 1954 the major problem was to determine what foreign policy goals were attainable in a new international setting.

In the discussion of this problem, the principal role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to point out possible military consequences of unwise choices among diplomatic objectives. In doing so, they could speak with a single voice, inspired by concern that the US strategic position might deteriorate to indefensibility. Nevertheless, within this broad area of agreement, the differing viewpoints described in the preceding chapter emerged on several occasions.

In both 1953 and 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves ranged against other elements in the National Security Council. In the previous year,
these had been the spokesmen for fiscal conservatism: the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget. In 1954 the principal opponent was the Secretary of State. But the opposition was not complete in either case. Just as the advocates of economy in 1953 had found in Admiral Radford an ally among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so in 1954 Secretary Dulles was to find some support from General Ridgway, the chief military advocate of a flexible national strategy.

Developments that shaped policy discussion in 1954 were two in number. The first was the increasing capacity of the Soviet Union to strike directly at the United States. The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities had been recognized by the Council in NSC 162/2. Paragraph 45 of that document had called for certain actions to be taken before the achievement of “mutual atomic plenty.”

This paragraph was written after the Soviet Union had successfully tested an experimental thermonuclear device on 12 August 1953. Although this event did not signify an immediate threat to the US margin of superiority, it had profound effects on opinion in other countries, where it contributed to a growing fear of atomic war and to a rising opposition to any acts that might conceivably lead to hostilities. This fear was aggravated by US thermonuclear tests carried out in the Pacific early in 1954. Technologically, the age of mutual atomic plenty remained several years in the future; psychologically speaking, it had already begun by the end of the year.

This growing apprehension was directly related to the other development referred to above: a loosening of solidarity between the United States and its allies, and an increasing reluctance in other countries to support strong action, under US leadership, in the face of threatened communist aggrandizement. Like most trends, this one had grown slowly over a period of time, and its origin was difficult to date precisely. NSC 135/3, approved by the National Security Council in September 1952, had commented on the growth of defeatist neutralism among noncommunist nations. A year later, NSC 162/2 pointed out that “allied opinion, especially in Europe, has become less willing to follow US leadership.” By 1954 the strains in the Western coalition had become still more apparent, partly as a result of the skillful diplomacy of the Soviet government of Premier Georgi M. Malenkov, who had adopted a more conciliatory tone in foreign relations than his predecessor and dangled before the world the vague hope of a relaxation of tensions. Since the USSR still showed no disposition to settle major issues on terms acceptable to the West, US leaders believed that the need for free world unity remained as great as ever. But the maintenance of solidarity was manifestly more difficult than in the days when Josef Stalin ruled in the Kremlin.

The lessening of allied cohesion was evident in the crisis over Indochina that dominated international headlines throughout the first half of 1954. The cause of this crisis was the progress of the communist-led Viet Minh rebels in their efforts to overthrow French rule in Vietnam. As their revolt moved toward success, the United States sought to rally its allies to support some form of military intervention to prevent complete communist victory. But the leaders of those nations rejected the US lead and pinned their hopes on the possibility of a peaceful settlement. Ultimately the United States was compelled to acquiesce in an agreement that abandoned the northern half of Vietnam to communist rule.
On the other side of the world, allied disunity appeared in the failure of the proposed European Defense Community (EDC), which was intended to add West German military resources to those of NATO. Successive French governments, inspired by fears of revived German militarism, repeatedly postponed action on the EDC Treaty, which had been signed in 1952. Finally, in August 1954, the French National Assembly rejected the Treaty, in an action that Secretary of State Dulles characterized as a “shattering blow” to US policy.

Fortunately the trend of events during the last part of the year was less unfavorable to the United States. In both Asia and Europe, the West was able to salvage something out of the wreckage and to prevent the breakup of the coalition. In Southeast Asia, the consolation prize took the form of the Manila Pact, or Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which bound the Western Big Three with Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan in a defensive agreement intended to bar further communist advance in that part of the world. In Europe, the objective of the EDC Treaty was attained in October 1954 through admission of West Germany to NATO.4

These events—especially the Indochina crisis and its outcome—exposed a deficiency in existing US policies. NSC 162/2 had recognized the possible need for measures to block communist subversion in noncommunist countries. It had mentioned Indochina among those areas that the United States might be forced to defend militarily, but the threat envisioned in such cases was clear-cut aggression from outside. It was assumed that France could hold Indochina and thus provide a strong point for a Western position in Asia. For dealing with a communist-led nationalist movement that could succeed without overt military aid from the Soviet Union or China, NSC 162/2 provided little guidance. Moreover, its emphasis on the importance of collective security as an integral part of US strategy implied that at least the major Western Allies would support any drastic measures proposed by the United States, as they had in Korea. Clearly it was essential for US policy-makers to do some hard thinking about how to meet such situations in the future.

But it was equally necessary to think about certain broader questions that went to the heart of US policy as embodied in NSC 162/2. How could the United States best use the time that remained before its effective monopoly of thermonuclear weapons disappeared? Even if the United States were able to maintain some superiority after the onset of mutual atomic plenty, would its margin exert a deterrent effect after each side had become powerful enough to inflict fatal damage on the other? Would the Soviets’ arsenal of thermonuclear weapons—their own nuclear shield—tempt them to indulge more freely in subversion or local aggression? Would the growing allied fear of war inhibit American willingness to use nuclear weapons—the basis for the strategy of the New Look? These questions came to the surface in the National Security Council in 1954.
NSC 162/2 and the FY 1956 Budget

Early in 1954 the administration began looking ahead to the budget for fiscal 1956. At that time, the need to revise policy was not yet evident; it was expected that NSC 162/2, if supplemented with more detailed guidelines, would suffice for preparation of the national security budget. Preparation of these guidelines was entrusted to the NSC Planning Board on 22 March 1954. They were to be based on a series of appraisals of political and economic trends in the noncommunist world for the period 1956—1959, prepared by the Department of State, the Council of Economic Advisers, and other appropriate agencies, together with an intelligence appraisal of the Soviet bloc by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Department of Defense was to supply a forecast of the anticipated military posture of the free world.5

The Planning Board established a special committee, headed by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Council, Mr. S. Everett Gleason, to draft the guidelines.6 In the first meeting, on 5 May 1954, the committee decided to ask the departments and agencies preparing the basic reports to submit preliminary proposals for the guidelines. At the same time, foreseeing that NSC 162/2 might have to be amended instead of merely supplemented, the members directed that each agency suggest any appropriate revisions.7

JCS Appraisal of Free World Military Posture

Secretary Wilson called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the military appraisal of free world prospects for which his Department had been asked. They replied on 21 May 1954.8 Since time was pressing, the Acting Secretary of Defense forwarded their analysis at once to the Planning Board, without holding it up for discussion within the Department.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff opened their appraisal with a recapitulation of the force goals established in JCS 2101/113 and a pointed reminder that these reflected the international situation as of December 1953. They indicated that little progress had been made in meeting the strategic requirements laid out in JCS 2101/113. How much progress could be expected by 1956—1959 depended partly on matters beyond US control, such as the pace of Soviet weapons development and the extent to which the international situation would permit redeployment of US forces (which had been suspended in view of the Indochina crisis). The military capabilities of most of the rest of the noncommunist world, except for Western Europe, were rated as generally low and the prospects for improvement were poor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that US national security policy "is premised on the existence of strong collective security arrangements among the anti-Communist nations. Fundamental to this concept," they continued, "is the development and maintenance of solidarity on the part of our Allies to the point where they will not only unite in the determination of measures vital to the
common security, but will support these measures when the need arises." But, they asserted, in a reference to the Indochina crisis, recent developments showed "that the firm foundation requisite to prompt and effective action in implementation of the concept of collective security has not yet been fully achieved."

The relative strengths of the Soviet and Western blocs were assessed. Both the United States and the USSR, it was believed, would enter the era of atomic plenty before 1959. The West would remain superior in nuclear weapons, but the effectiveness of this margin would decline as the Soviets approached the capability of inflicting critical damage on the United States and its allies.

Not content merely to forecast trends, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested some actions to give the West a better military posture by 1956. A suitable political framework for collective action against communist aggression was essential. If the international situation continued to deteriorate, larger US military programs and budgets might be necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States take steps to broaden its mobilization base, to strengthen its offensive striking forces, and to plug the gaps in air defense. They emphasized the importance of military assistance to friendly nations and warned that any substantial reduction in its amount might compel a reexamination of US military posture. Moreover, military contributions from West Germany and Japan to the collective defense were essential.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also anticipated that the United States would be faced increasingly with the problem of limited military aggression. They recommended that the United States rely on its allies to furnish most of the ground forces required to deal with such situations. The United States should contribute additional forces and material, as necessary, and should at the same time undertake a degree of national mobilization commensurate with the increased risk of general war.

In a somber concluding paragraph, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that time was running out for the United States to make use of its nuclear advantage—the first of several such warnings they issued during 1954:

Increasing Soviet atomic capability will tend to diminish the deterrent effect of United States atomic power against peripheral aggression. With respect to general war, the attainment of atomic plenty by both the United States and the USSR could create a condition of mutual deterrence in which both sides would be strongly inhibited from initiating general war. Under such circumstances, the Soviets might well elect to pursue their ultimate objective of world domination through a succession of local aggressions, either overt or covert, all of which could not be successfully opposed by the Allies through localized counter-action, without unacceptable commitment of resources. . . . This situation serves to emphasize the time limitation, as recognized in paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2, within which conditions must be created by the United States and the Free World coalition such as to permit the Soviet-Communist threat to be met with resolution, to the end that satisfactory and enduring arrangements for co-existence can be established.

The final sentence implied that the allies could somehow be induced to support any measures that the United States considered necessary to block communist aggression. But the course of events during the Indochina crisis
suggested that the United States might some day have to choose between maintaining solidarity with other nations and taking action in the face of allied disapproval. Should such a situation arise, which principle of national policy must be sacrificed? It could be assumed that, in the final analysis, the United States would act alone if convinced that its survival was at stake. But the clear-cut statement in NSC 153/1 of US willingness to act unilaterally had been left out of NSC 162/2, which as a result was ambiguous on this issue. Its commitment to collective security was unequivocal. Even in stating willingness to use nuclear weapons, NSC 162/2 had provided that advance approval of other nations would be sought. At the same time, a possible need to act without allied approval was recognized, but not elaborated upon, in a statement that collective security "does not imply the necessity to meet all desires of our allies."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not discussed this possible conflict between international obligations and national safety. Its implications were drawn out, however, in comments on the JCS views prepared by representatives of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The ODM spokesmen foresaw that the attempt to maintain the Western alliance might undermine the strategy of the New Look, which was based squarely upon the employment of nuclear weapons. With the experience of Indochina in mind, they pointed out that other countries were in effect demanding the right to veto the use of these weapons. It might be impossible for the United States to retain allies on its own terms.

It followed that NSC 162/2 must be revised. The ODM representatives urged that any such revision include a statement expressly reserving the US right to use nuclear weapons in situations like the Indochina crisis. Otherwise, the United States should at once drastically increase its spending for conventional forces.

First Budget Guidelines

In NSC 5422, a draft of budgetary guidelines sent to the Council on 14 June 1954, the Planning Board faced up to the inadequacies of NSC 162/2. Instead of mere supplementary instructions for use in applying NSC 162/2, NSC 5422 contained recommendations for courses of action intended to meet problems that had arisen, or had assumed new urgency, since NSC 162/2 was approved. The nature of these problems was shown by the titles assigned the two principal sections of NSC 5422: "Issues Posed by Nuclear Trends" and "Maintenance of the Cohesion of the Free World." The paper recommended that the United States take measures to improve its defenses, to deal with local aggression and subversion, and to strengthen political and economic ties among noncommunist nations. For the most part, the recommendations were broad in nature and did not indicate the specific steps required.

NSC 5422 asserted flatly that the United States should be willing to take whatever action seemed necessary in a crisis, including use of nuclear weapons, even if allied approval could not be obtained. It thus dealt squarely with the problem cited by the Office of Defense Mobilization and removed the ambiguity
that had surrounded this aspect of policy in NSC 162/2. But the Planning Board members disputed whether unilateral action should be taken only as a last resort, or whether the United States should exercise maximum freedom of action, relying on its European allies to recognize that their own security interests required them to remain in alignment with the United States.

Another unresolved issue in NSC 5422 concerned disarmament. Some members of the Board wished to commit the United States to negotiations on this subject; others asserted that any such discussions with the Soviet bloc were sure to be fruitless, and pointed out that the whole subject of disarmament policy was then under study.

Should general war occur, NSC 5422 stated, the United States must be able to wage it with maximum prospect of victory. But whether the United States should commit itself in advance to all-out use of nuclear weapons—in the face of the prospect that the Soviet bloc would have achieved a nuclear balance by 1956—1959—was a matter for dispute. Disagreement resulted also from the attempt by some Board members to include in NSC 5422 a commitment to enlarge both military forces in being and the mobilization base.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee reviewed NSC 5422 and concluded that it did not meet its intended purpose. Even if the conflicting views were resolved, it would not provide adequate guidelines for developing security programs under NSC 162/2. Moreover, the Committee believed, it dwelt excessively on the problems associated with increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities, the implications of which had been adequately considered in the formulation of NSC 162/2. Regarding the disputed viewpoints in NSC 5422, the Committee opposed any mention of disarmament; asserted that NSC 162/2 had settled the question of using nuclear weapons; and favored an improved military posture.\footnote{13}

The Committee’s report drew dissenting comments from Admiral Carney and General Ridgway, who disputed the assertion that the issue of nuclear weapons in war had already been settled.\footnote{14} The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no formal action, however. On 21 June 1954 they merely agreed to note the report and the comments.\footnote{15}

**JCS Views on Negotiations with the Soviets**

On one key issue in NSC 5422—the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviet Union—the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already decided to send their views to the Council. Apparently they were inspired to do so by the opening of a conference in Geneva on 26 April 1954 to seek a solution to the Indochina crisis. This meeting could be regarded as the result of an excessive eagerness to negotiate—a hasty search for an immediate settlement before the military balance had been redressed on the battlefield. On 30 April 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff called on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for a historical summary of US-Soviet negotiations, together with policy recommendations. This report was completed
on 9 June 1954; after amending it slightly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent it to Secretary Wilson on 23 June.16

In this report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the struggle against communism as entering a precarious if not critical stage. They cited the long record of agreements broken by the Soviets and their satellites, and warned against assuming good faith on the part of the Soviet government until it demonstrated a basic change of attitude by specific actions, such as release of German and Japanese prisoners of war, liberation of the satellites, or conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. The USSR would never enter into meaningful negotiations until the West took positive actions to convince the Soviet rulers that their present belligerent course endangered the safety of their regime.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that their views be considered in the review of disarmament policy then in progress. They summed up their conclusions as follows:

a. Until the USSR, by positive action, demonstrates a basic change of attitude . . . the United States should refrain from further attempts through negotiations to arrive at agreements with the USSR on the subjects of disarmament, atomic energy or any other of the world issues, and should so inform the USSR officially and repeatedly, publicly releasing each such announcement.

b. The United States should recognize now, and should seek to persuade its Allies, that time limitations dictate the necessity of confronting the Soviets with unmistakable evidence of an unyielding determination to halt further Communist expansion, and of convincing them that aggression will be met with counteraction which, inherently, will hold grave risks to the maintenance of their regime;

c. The United States should take all reasonable measures to increase political solidarity and staunch determination among its Allies, recognizing, however, that US security interests may require, on occasion, United States action which not all of our Allies would endorse or be willing to join.

Interim Policy Revision: NSC 5422/2

The National Security Council began discussing NSC 5422 on 24 June 1954. Admiral Radford, who was present, distributed copies of the warning against negotiation that he and his colleagues had sent to Secretary Wilson the day before.17 But neither at this meeting nor in a subsequent discussion a week later did the members show any disposition to accept the JCS viewpoint.18 Secretary of State Dulles conceded the logic of the JCS position, but insisted that, in the face of the growing worldwide fear of nuclear war, it was unrealistic to believe that the United States could retain its allies while pursuing a hard policy. The other members agreed, and voted to commit the United States to explore the possibility of disarmament. On the other hand, there was no disagreement that the nation must be willing to act alone if necessary. The Council accepted the use of strategic nuclear weapons in general war and left intact a paragraph asserting that allied objections should not inhibit the use of nuclear weapons when neces-
sary for US security. The disagreement over the question of unilateral action was resolved by a compromise that called on the United States to decide each case on its own merits and to exercise its freedom of action only after carefully weighing the dangers to allied solidarity.

Not surprisingly, the Council rejected the proposals to augment US military strength, which ran counter to the administration’s desire to economize. President Eisenhower conceded a possible need to spend more for some programs but vetoed any across-the-board increase.\(^19\)

These decisions were incorporated in NSC 5422/1, a revised draft circulated on 26 July 1954.\(^20\) The new version was again criticized by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on much the same grounds as before. The Committee recommended that it be returned to the Planning Board for complete revision.\(^21\) Instead of acting on this advice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely advised Secretary Wilson on 4 August 1954 that NSC 5422/1 correctly identified many problems, but that it provided little guidance in meeting them. If it were approved in its present form, they said, the strength and composition of US forces would continue substantially unchanged, pending complete revision of NSC 162/2 and clarification of worldwide military commitments.\(^22\)

The Council discussed NSC 5422/1 on 5 August. The members voted to withdraw for further revision a section discussing mobilization policy. They approved some changes in the rest of the draft, including one that strengthened the declaration of willingness to take unilateral action. The final version, NSC 5422/2, was issued on 7 August 1954.\(^23\)

The rationale of NSC 5422/2 was set forth in the opening paragraph, which pointed out that, since NSC 162/2 was adopted, there had been substantial changes in estimates of current and future Soviet capabilities, while at the same time, unity of action among the noncommunist nations had been increasingly strained. This combination of unfavorable developments suggested that the communists would be increasingly tempted to try to expand their area of control through penetration and subversion of other countries.

Growing stockpiles of increasingly destructive nuclear weapons were expected to produce a condition of mutual deterrence by 1959, according to NSC 5422/2. To maintain and protect the nation’s retaliatory striking force was therefore urgent. But the United States should also continue to explore fully the possibility of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Planning for general war should assume that all available weapons would be used. Since overseas bases might become unavailable, for military or political reasons, if war broke out, the United States should strive to make its forces self-sufficient as far as possible.

Confronting the problem of local, or limited, aggression, NSC 5422/2 expressed a hope that strategic airpower would act as a deterrent. Nevertheless the United States should be prepared to defeat such aggression without resorting to general war, by furnishing logistic support to indigenous forces and, if necessary, by committing its mobile reserve. At the same time, the United States “must be determined to take, unilaterally if necessary, whatever additional action its security requires, even to the extent of general war, and the Communists must be convinced of this determination.”
Another danger—indeed, the immediate and most serious threat—was that of piecemeal conquest by the communists, through “subversion, indirect aggression, and the instigation or exploitation of civil wars . . . rather than direct armed aggression.” It could only be met through a flexible combination of political, psychological, economic and military actions, which should include the following: politico-economic cooperation with underdeveloped nations, direct countermeasures (political, economic, or covert) to thwart communist efforts to seize power, and military assistance—or, if necessary, outright military support—to friendly nations in danger of communist insurrection.

The need for allies was reaffirmed in NSC 5422/2, but at the same time it was admitted that the attainment of decisive collective action was growing more difficult. The importance of shoring up alliances before atomic stalemate set in was recognized in language borrowed in part from paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2.

While not neglecting Western Europe, the United States should increase its attempts to create a position of strength in Asia, which was highly vulnerable to the creeping expansion of communism. The uncommitted or underdeveloped areas should be helped toward stability, but they should not be pressed to become active allies of the United States.

NSC 5422/2 recognized that the need to act in defense of US security interests might sometimes be incompatible with the maintenance of collective security. It was unequivocal in declaring that the United States should act alone if necessary. But the recognition of this need was carefully balanced by qualifications that recognized the dangers of unilateral action:

The U.S. should attempt to gain maximum support from the free world, both allies and uncommitted countries, for the collective measures necessary to prevent Communist expansion. As a broad rule of conduct, the U.S. should pursue its objectives in such ways and by such means, including appropriate pressures, persuasion, and compromise, as will maintain the cohesion of the alliances. The U.S. should, however, act independently of its major allies when the advantage of achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of lasting damage to its alliances. In this connection, consideration should be given to the likelihood that the initiation of action by the U.S. prior to allied acceptance may bring about subsequent allied support. Allied reluctance to act should not inhibit the U.S. from taking action, including the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent Communist territorial gains when such action is clearly necessary to U.S. security.

The final portion of NSC 5422/2 dealt with economic problems. It suggested ways in which the progress of the underdeveloped areas might be assisted. It recognized a need for foreign aid, both economic and military, but in diminishing volume.

Policy Debate Continued

After bringing NSC 162/2 up to date through the medium of NSC 5422/2, the Council undertook to replace both these directives with a newer one attuned
to the international situation of the last half of 1954. On 19 October 1954 Secretary Wilson, looking toward the approaching discussions in the Council, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend changes in NSC 162/2 and to suggest methods of implementing paragraph 45, which had urged a need to create suitable conditions for negotiation with the Soviet bloc before the onset of atomic plenty. He also requested them to recommend courses of action to meet the dangers of limited or piecemeal aggression, against which NSC 5422/2 had warned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already learned of the impending policy review and had anticipated a request for their advice. They sent Secretary Wilson a statement of their views on 3 November 1954. While making no specific recommendations, they asserted that the free world must take some sort of action soon. Their views were based on a belief that the struggle with the communist world was approaching a decisive stage. The military capabilities of the Soviet bloc were growing, while neutralism and fear increasingly bedeviled the noncommunist world.

The noncommunist world, if it takes positive and timely dynamic countermeasures, presently has ample resources to meet this situation, and with high chance of maintaining world peace without sacrifice of either vital security interests or fundamental moral principles, or in the event of war being forced upon it, of winning that war beyond any reasonable doubt. On the other hand, failure on the part of the free world and particularly of the United States to take such timely and dynamic action could, within a relatively short span of years, result in the United States finding itself isolated from the rest of the free world and thus placed in such jeopardy as to reduce its freedom of action to two alternatives—that of accommodation to Soviet designs or contesting such designs under conditions not favorable to our success.

This general warning did not satisfy Secretary Wilson's request for advice on certain specific questions. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed it with another on 12 November 1954, in which they characterized NSC 162/2 as sound but asserted that its application had been faulty. Instead of seizing the initiative, the United States was still relying on reactive-type security measures that had not lessened the threat to the free world. The essence of their views lay in the following paragraph:

The timely achievement of the broad objective of US security policy cannot be brought about if the United States is required to defer to the counsel of the most cautious among our Allies or if it is unwilling to undertake certain risks inherent in the adoption of dynamic and positive security measures. In summary, it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the objective stated in paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2 remains valid but it is imperative that our basic security policy, when revised, reflect throughout the greater urgency of the present situation, define concretely the conditions which it is the aim of our security policy to create, and direct the formulation of courses of action designed to achieve the basic objective. In the final analysis, the criterion as to each course of action to be adopted should be determined by what best serves the interests of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not themselves suggest any changes in NSC 162/2, but asked that their views be made available to the National Security
Council. Regarding Secretary Wilson’s request for actions to meet limited aggression and piecemeal conquest, they suggested merely that the task of preparing recommendations on these subjects be given to some agency of the National Security Council, which could consider the problems in the light of all military, political, and economic factors.\(^27\)

These conclusions had the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But General Ridgway wished to go much farther and to recommend that the new policy statement include proposals that would in effect reverse the strategy of the New Look. In his view, national policy should unequivocally place security ahead of cost considerations and should reject retaliatory striking power as the principal deterrent to aggression, relying instead upon a balanced and flexible military establishment.\(^28\) His colleagues declined to approve these suggestions but did forward them with the agreed memorandum, as “Additional Views of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.”

Secretary Wilson sent the basic JCS memorandum, but not General Ridgway’s separate proposals, to the National Security Council on 22 November 1954 with his own approval and that of the Service Secretaries.\(^29\) In the Council, their viewpoint was opposed by Secretary of State Dulles, who believed that the United States should adjust to the trend of world opinion instead of seeking to reverse it, and should base its policy on recognition of the fact that total war would be an incalculable disaster. Mr. Dulles did not dispute the need for adequate military strength or for a policy of determined resistance to aggression. Nevertheless, to retain the support of allies, the United States should forego actions that appeared provocative, and, if hostilities occurred, should meet them in a manner that “will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war.” Moreover, he was ready, under proper conditions, to negotiate with the communist nations concerning disarmament and other issues. Even if such negotiations yielded no agreement, they would at least expose the falsity of the Soviets’ peace offensive.\(^30\)

To the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Secretary Dulles’ views amounted to a rejection of paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2. The Committee believed that Secretary Dulles had overemphasized political at the expense of military considerations; had unrealistically assumed that use of nuclear weapons could be avoided in a general war; and had evidenced a premature readiness to negotiate.\(^31\)

In criticizing the JSSC comments, General Ridgway made it clear that, to a large extent, he shared the outlook of the Secretary of State. He did not regard Mr. Dulles’ views as inconsistent with NSC 162/2. Rather than foreswearing all attempts to negotiate, as the JSSC report appeared to suggest, General Ridgway would direct attention to insuring that the nation was militarily powerful enough to be able to negotiate from strength.\(^32\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, took no action on the Committee’s report and made no official comment on the views of the Secretary of State.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, fully agreed with the Secretary’s assessment. “There is throughout Europe,” he warned the Council, “an impatience to explore the possibilities of ‘coexistence’ that will be increas-
ingly difficult to resist.” Although the United States might ignore this attitude for a time, a continuation of the Soviets’ peace offensive could eventually force the nation to participate in the search for a general settlement if it did not wish to be diplomatically isolated. He offered no suggestions for coping with this difficulty, but did propose a coordinated economic, military, and covert counter-offensive against the Soviets’ subversive warfare.\textsuperscript{33}

The National Security Council took up the question of a revised national security policy on 24 November 1954. The members directed the Planning Board to prepare the draft of a new directive. They also considered, and referred to the President, a suggestion for a special study, to be made by governmental or private agencies, of ways in which, before the beginning of mutual nuclear plenty, the unity of the free world might be increased and the Soviet bloc divided and weakened.\textsuperscript{34}

While awaiting the draft, the Council discussed the subject inconclusively on 3 December and again on 9 December. At the first of these meetings, General Ridgway explained his dissenting views on national policy and strategy.\textsuperscript{35} On the second occasion, the discussion turned to purely military matters. The President commented on the need to emphasize those elements of national defense that were applicable to a general war: continental defense, improved weapons (notably guided missiles), and the reserve forces and materiel needed immediately after hostilities began. But there was to be no overall increase in the armed forces. At this same meeting, the President laid down new and lower manpower limits for fiscal year 1956.\textsuperscript{36}

The new draft, NSC 5440, was forwarded by the Planning Board on 13 December 1954.\textsuperscript{37} It recognized the increase in Soviet bloc capabilities, foresaw a condition of mutual deterrence, and emphasized the need to maintain strength and unity in the noncommunist world and to pursue lines of action that would encourage the Soviets to drop their expansionism. There was little trace of the feeling of urgency that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed. But some willingness to accept the separate viewpoint upheld by General Ridgway appeared in recognition of the need for conventional military forces to deal with local aggression—a provision doubtless inspired by the recent Indochina crisis.

A conflict of opinion between the hard line upheld by most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the softer approach of the Secretary of State was apparent in NSC 5440. Thus in a discussion of the desirability of negotiations with the Soviet Union, the JCS Adviser had advocated the inclusion of a warning that negotiation would probably be fruitless and dangerous until the USSR had given evidence of a basic change of attitude. The State Department member wanted the draft to commit the United States to an active strategy of negotiation that would, at the least, expose the hollowness of the Soviets’ peace offensive. He had also urged a specific renunciation not only of preventive war, but of any actions that might be considered provocative.

To the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented unfavorably on NSC 5440 on grounds that it did not meet the criteria that they had set forth in their memorandum of 12 November. It did not define the conditions that the United States should seek to create, nor did it stress the urgency of acting while
the United States still retained its atomic superiority. Its proposal to encourage favorable tendencies within the communist bloc, they said, would be ineffective without the dynamic and timely action that they had proposed. Moreover, they believed that it underrated the probability of armed aggression by the communists.  

On 21 December 1954 the Council discussed NSC 5440 along with the JCS comments. The members adopted a compromise version of the paragraph concerning negotiation, which was incorporated in a redraft, NSC 5440/1, completed by the Planning Board on 28 December. Since this version was otherwise little changed from NSC 5440, the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely reaffirmed their comments on the latter.

The Council worked over NSC 5440/1 on 5 January 1955 and put it into final form, making numerous changes without altering its substance. The members accepted the State Department position on most of the disputed issues, but allowed the dissenting JCS views to appear as footnotes. The completed version, NSC 5501, was approved by the President on 7 January 1955.

**A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5501**

In its estimate of the current world situation, NSC 5501 emphasized the growing peril in the era of approaching nuclear plenty. Soviet air-atomic capability was increasing rapidly, and might by 1963 (or even by 1960) include intercontinental ballistic missiles. A condition of mutual deterrence was foreseen that would make deliberate resort to war unlikely, but war might occur through miscalculation; also, the balance might be upset by a major Soviet technological breakthrough. Nevertheless, despite the expected military and economic growth of the communist bloc, the free world had the capacity (but not necessarily the will) to maintain enough strength to deter or defeat aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had wished this last statement amplified with a description of the type of military strength that should be maintained for this purpose: “Sufficient conventional armed strength, including the capability of adequate and timely reinforcement, along with US strategic nuclear striking power.”

Neither the USSR nor Communist China, according to NSC 5501, had modified its basic hostility toward the noncommunist world, especially the United States. But the more flexible Soviet foreign policy was significant, though difficult to account for. It was even possible, though highly unlikely, that the Soviets wanted genuine arms control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to this discussion of the Soviet soft line on the grounds that it overemphasized the significance of a mere change in tactics.

Whatever its motivation, the new Soviet approach was dangerous, according to NSC 5501, since it would probably tempt the allies “to go to further lengths than the US will find prudent” in seeking a basis for accommodation. While preaching coexistence, the communist nations would probably continue or intensify efforts to expand their hegemony without involving the main sources of
communist power. This strategy would "probably present the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years."

In outlining a proposed national strategy, NSC 5501 set forth fundamental considerations in the following terms:

_The basic objective_ of US national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

_The basic threat_ to US security is posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its international Communist apparatus.

_The basic problem_ confronting the US is how, without undermining fundamental US values and institutions or seriously weakening the US economy, to meet and ultimately to diminish this threat to US security.

Since military action to eliminate the communist threat was out of the question, the only alternative was to attempt to influence the communist regimes in ways that would encourage tendencies that led them to abandon expansionist policies. This effort would require "a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of US initiative."

If successfully carried out, it would offer the hope of a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful and orderly world environment. But "failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the US in great jeopardy." The last sentence was apparently borrowed in part from the JCS memorandum of 3 November 1954 to Secretary Wilson.

In dealing with military strategy, NSC 5501 recognized the importance of nuclear retaliatory capacity, but, unlike NSC 162/2, stressed the fact that this capacity was insufficient by itself. It held that the United States must have forces over and above those assigned to NATO that could deter or defeat local aggression, in concert with allied forces, in a manner designed to prevent limited hostilities from escalating into total nuclear war. Such forces "must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war."

This military policy assumed the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other free world countries. The United States should therefore take steps to strengthen the collective defense system, making use, where appropriate, of the possibilities for collective action offered by the United Nations. Military and economic assistance should also be continued, as necessary, to dependable allied nations.

In two paragraphs the NSC essayed the difficult task of striking a balance between the need to pursue national interests, on the one hand, and the maintenance of collective security, on the other—a balance that necessitated a precise definition of the line between firmness and provocation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The statement of policy on this subject was more careful and cautious, and therefore more complex, than the corresponding portion of NSC 5422/2. It was as follows:
The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression. As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance US security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.

NSC 5501 stressed the importance of the strength and cohesion of the free world. It endorsed the measures proposed in NSC 5422/2 to block piecemeal conquest. For countries threatened with communist subversion, the United States should provide covert assistance, aid the development of internal security forces, and take military or other action to thwart any threat of an immediate seizure of power. In the long run, it would be necessary to prove that the noncommunist world could meet the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples. Toward this end, the United States should take the lead in stimulating trade and economic activity, and should provide financial, technical, and educational assistance to underdeveloped areas (even while seeking to reduce the total amount of US economic aid). But undue pressure should not be exerted to bring the underdeveloped nations into active alliance, and the United States should cooperate with constructive nationalist and reform movements in those countries.

In a more aggressive vein, NSC 5501 called for a political strategy against the communist bloc, to reduce the danger of aggression and to influence developments within the communist world in a favorable direction. It would be necessary, while convincing the communist countries of the firmness and cohesion of the free world, to persuade them that there were alternatives compatible with their basic security interests and at the same time acceptable to the West. No actions were suggested to attain these purposes, other than a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union whenever it clearly appeared that US security interests would be served thereby and to undertake discussions on specific subjects with Communist China.

The recommendation for a political strategy was an innovation in NSC 5501, as was another for a coordinated counteroffensive against Soviet subversion. Together they replaced the more general provision in NSC 162/2 for selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-communist control over any areas of the free world.
The concluding paragraphs of NSC 5501 were largely a restatement of corresponding portions of NSC 162/2. The United States should maintain a strong economy and seek to minimize Federal expenditures, though not at the expense of national security. Internal security and civil defense programs, an informed public, an adequate mobilization base, and an effective intelligence system were essential.  

The Direction of Policy in 1954

In adopting NSC 5501, the National Security Council maintained the basic continuity in foreign policy that the Eisenhower administration, after briefly considering alternatives, had reaffirmed in 1953. The broad objectives remained as before: firm resistance to international communism (but without overt provocation) and support of the nation’s international obligations. The innovations introduced in NSC 5501 and its predecessor, NSC 5422/2, were essentially changes in emphasis and did not alter these basic goals. In fact, in bowing to the trend of world opinion and committing the United States to a general willingness to negotiate, the Council moved even farther from the aggressive policy of liberation, which had been the most widely discussed alternative to containment. But the Council was under no illusion that the cold war could be expected to end soon. The declaration that the United States would if necessary intervene unilaterally in future situations like that in Indochina was a movement toward a harder line, as were the proposals in NSC 5501 for countersubversive action and for a political strategy against communism. All these changes represented a response, in one direction or another, to the changing world climate of opinion or to the particular difficulties created or revealed by the crisis in Southeast Asia.

NSC 5501 also represented an innovation in another way. Though not so intended at the time, it proved to be the first of a regular series of directives issued at the beginning of each year. Under the Truman administration, the National Security Council had reexamined policies and objectives at irregular intervals, as part of a process of appraising the adequacy of security programs. Preparation of a comprehensive guide to basic national security policy (a phrase apparently not used before 1953), to replace NSC papers issued over a period of several years, had been undertaken by the Eisenhower administration. At first it had been assumed that such comprehensive policy guidance would be valid for more than a year. But beginning with the approval of NSC 5501, and continuing throughout the rest of President Eisenhower’s term, annual review and revision of national security policy was standard practice.

The general policy of firmness that was restated in NSC 5501 had the full support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As they made clear in their memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 12 November 1954, they believed that the United States, hobbled by allied timidity, had maintained a passive and ineffectual posture and had failed to make use of the possibilities for a bolder course of action that were inherent in NSC 162/2. In January 1954, Secretary Dulles had proclaimed as a
major objective of the administration the seizure of the initiative in the cold war. Without referring to this speech, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear that, in their view, this goal had not been attained.

Most of the JCS members viewed with deep disquiet the Council’s move toward negotiation. They believed that the United States and its allies should first build a secure military and political position that would enable the West to lead from strength in discussions with the communist bloc. They viewed the new approach by the Malenkov regime as a change in tactics rather than in objectives. They recalled what leaders in some other nations seemed to forget: the long Soviet record of broken promises.

The emphasis that the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed on unity between the United States and its allies sprang from their recognition of the military importance of collective security. Although the strategy of the New Look stressed protection of the homeland, it could in no sense be characterized as isolationist. In fact, it made allies even more necessary than before, since it implied a partnership in which the United States and its allies would develop specialized military establishments that complemented each other. The prospect of future Indochinas underscored the importance of the allied contribution of ground forces if the United States, as envisioned in JCS 2101/113, were to pull back most of its troops.

But when the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke of solidarity, they appeared to have in mind the full acceptance by other countries of the policy that they themselves advocated. How other countries were to be brought to accept this policy, and to act upon it, was a political-diplomatic problem rather than a military one, although the military implications of failure seemed clear. In such a matter the National Security Council was naturally disposed to defer to the views of the Secretary of State. From his intimate knowledge of the attitudes of allied leaders, Secretary Dulles was convinced that an attempt to resist the pressure for negotiation on disarmament and other matters would be unwise. As he saw it, the United States had no choice but to explore the possibilities of negotiation, even if only to expose the falsity of Soviet gestures.

Among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway alone showed some sympathy for Secretary Dulles’ views. The Army Chief of Staff shared his colleagues’ conviction that the Soviet government had not changed its objectives, as well as their misgivings about the trend of allied opinion. He agreed that negotiation must follow rather than precede the creation of strength, but he did not wish to foreclose the possibility of any and all negotiation in the immediate future. General Ridgway’s openmindedness on the question of negotiation was wholly consistent with his critical attitude toward massive retaliation; both followed from his conviction that the United States needed military forces suitable for purposes other than merely deterring or winning an all-out nuclear conflict. He expressed this view in a letter to Secretary Wilson in June 1955, on the eve of his retirement. “If military power is to support diplomacy effectively,” he wrote, “it must be real and apparent to all concerned, and it must be capable of being applied promptly, selectively and with the degree of violence appropriate to the occasion.”
From General Ridgway's point of view, NSC 5501 was a definite improvement upon NSC 162/2, which had deliberately placed emphasis upon retaliatory striking power. Although NSC 5501 had reaffirmed the need for this component of military strength, it had also recognized the importance of conventional forces that would enable the United States to resist limited aggression without automatically triggering a nuclear exchange. Thus the Council responded to the developing prospect of a nuclear stalemate, and, more immediately, to the success of the Indochinese Communists in winning a war without overt military intervention by established communist regimes.

Had the policy in NSC 5501 been applied as written, it would have led the Council and the Department of Defense, in planning the US military establishment, to stress those military requirements in JCS 2101/113 that were more applicable to limited than to total war: a mobile strategic reserve (including ample ground forces), sea and air transport capacity, and a readily expansible mobilization base. But even as they were being approved by the Council, the portions of NSC 5501 calling for stronger conventional forces were nullified by the President's decisions regarding budgets and force levels for fiscal year 1956, which are described in the following chapter.
Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, the administration of President Harry S. Truman had launched a massive build-up of US armed strength. The increase had to be spread over a period of many months, inasmuch as the effects of several years of stringent economy could not at once be overcome, even by the large emergency appropriations voted by Congress in 1950. After the first year of the war, however, the sense of urgency diminished. Considerations of economy reasserted themselves in defense planning and led to the postponement of force goals hastily set during the dark days of the Korean crisis.1

The personnel strengths and force levels attained by the Services at the end of 1952, as compared with the ultimate objectives, are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The process of expansion was almost accomplished except for the Air Force, which remained far short of its authorized strength of 143 wings. Completion of the Air Force buildup, originally scheduled for FY 1953, was now programmed for FY 1955.2

Table 1—Actual and Authorized US Military Strength: 31 December 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Actual 31 December 1952</th>
<th>Authorized for 30 January 1953</th>
<th>Goal for 30 June 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,523,152</td>
<td>1,544,000</td>
<td>1,538,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>802,452</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>229,245</td>
<td>246,354</td>
<td>248,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>957,453</td>
<td>1,016,800</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,512,453</td>
<td>3,607,154</td>
<td>3,647,612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes USMA cadets and USNA midshipmen.
Sources: NSC 142, 10 Feb 53, sec 1, pp. 41-42. Budget of the US Government, FY 1954, p. 563.
### Table 2—Actual and Authorized US Force Levels: 31 December 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service and Force</th>
<th>Actual 31 December 1952</th>
<th>Authorized for 30 June 1953</th>
<th>Goal for 30 June 1954</th>
<th>Ultimate Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions^a</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments and regimental combat teams</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft battalions</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships^c</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other combatant ships^d</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total combatant ships</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships^e</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total active ships</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air wings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic wings</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-defense wings</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical wings</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total combat wings</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop-carrier wings^f</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wings</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a Does not include training divisions.
^b Not available.
^c Includes carriers (CVA/CVS/CVE/CVL), battleships (BB), cruisers (CA/CL/CLAA/CAG), destroyers (DD/DDE/DDR/DL), and submarines (SS/SSG/SSK/SSR/SSN).
^d Includes mine-warfare, patrol, and amphibious-warfare ships.
^e Various auxiliaries.
^f Air Force troop-carrier groups, so referred to in NSC 142, were redesignated “wings” in 1953. For simplicity the term “wings” has been used.

Sources: NSC 142, 10 Feb 53, sec 1, pp. 41-42; Budget of US Government, FY 1954, p. 563.

In his budget for fiscal year 1954, President Truman requested new obligatory authority of $72.9 billion and estimated that Federal expenditures would reach $78.6 billion. Of these amounts, military programs would account for $41.3 billion and $45.5 billion, respectively. The Air Force would receive the largest share of the defense dollar, $16.788 billion in new obligatory authority and $17.51 billion in estimated expenditures. The Army would receive $12.12 billion in new obligatory authority and $15.3 billion in estimated expenditures, while the Navy (including the Marine Corps) would receive $11.381 billion in new obligatory authority and $12 billion in estimated expenditures. Office of the Secretary of Defense and interservice costs would amount to $1.031 billion in new obligatory authority and $690 million in estimated expenditures. These
sums represented the peak of defense spending under current plans. After FY 1954, according to President Truman’s budget message to the Congress, military expenditures should decline to an eventual level of some $35 billion to $40 billion annually—enough to maintain the Services in a state of readiness.  

**FY 1954 Goals under the Eisenhower Administration**

As soon as the new administration took office, the Truman defense budget was subjected to severe scrutiny, in accordance with orders issued in February 1953 by Budget Director Dodge and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes. As a result of this reexamination, Secretary Wilson concluded that substantial reductions could be made with no effect on combat strength. Sizable amounts could be saved by cutting the budget item for aircraft procurement, since a large backlog of unobligated funds had built up from earlier appropriations. Downward adjustment of lead-time estimates for future procurement made it possible to reduce funding requirements without cutting back planned increases in the production of combat planes. Other economies could be achieved by adjusting interrelated programs in which slippages had occurred, by cutting out nonessential construction projects, by reducing planned stockpiles of items readily procurable from industry, and by cutbacks in both military and civilian manpower in the defense establishment. Offsetting these reductions (most of which affected the Air Force) was a need to provide more funds for the Army to finance operations in Korea through 30 June 1954 (six months longer than estimated in the Truman budget) and to supply additional aid to the South Korean Army. The net saving was about $5 billion in appropriations.

In reducing military manpower, Secretary Wilson had at first projected a cut of 250,000 men (entirely from noncombat units) in FY 1954. He soon found it impracticable, however, to require the Air Force to absorb its share of this reduction (50,000 men) within this period, because large numbers of enlistments were scheduled to expire in 1955. It was also apparent that the Army and Marine Corps would require additional allowances to support their rotation policies in Korea as long as fighting continued there. The 250,000-man goal was therefore modified.

The reductions in money and manpower proposed by Secretary Wilson, after being adopted by the National Security Council on 31 March 1953, were written into NSC 149/2, the first of the new administration’s policy directives, which the President approved on 29 April. This paper committed the United States to the goal of a balanced budget (though not at the expense of national security) and abandoned fixed target dates for force level planning in favor of a so-called floating D-day. It specified manpower reductions to be applied to the Service personnel strengths as of 28 February 1953, which were as follows: 1,495,000 Army, 802,936 Navy, 242,300 Marine Corps, and 965,425 Air Force—a total of 3,505,661.

From these strengths, the Services were to be reduced by 250,000 men,
distributed as follows: Army, 125,000; Navy and Marine Corps (combined), 75,000; Air Force, 50,000. The Air Force was given until the end of FY 1955 to accomplish its reduction; the other Services were to carry out theirs during FY 1954. However, so long as the Korean War continued, the Army and Marine Corps might retain, out of these reductions, 51,000 and 5,000 men, respectively, to support their rotation policies. Thus the Army would drop to 1,421,000 men and the Navy-Marine Corps to 975,236.7

The Services were expected not only to absorb these reductions through administrative economies, but at the same time to improve their overall combat strength by modernizing their equipment. The objectives were to maintain the Army and Navy at about the same unit strength and to allow an important increase in the number of combat wings in the Air Force.

These economies, according to NSC 149/2, should make it possible to reduce the appropriations request in the FY 1954 budget by $5 billion and to bring down expenditures to $43.2 billion. Moreover, it was hoped that expenditures could be reduced to $40 billion in 1955 and $35 billion in 1956. But these figures were not considered as ceilings.8

NSC 149/2 directed the Department of Defense to revise the FY 1954 budget to reflect the above decisions and to submit a revised force structure for FY 1955. Pending this revision, force levels currently planned for 30 June 1953 were to remain valid, except that the Air Force might add additional combat units if able to do so within its allotted manpower and money.

The guidelines in NSC 149/2 had been established without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had not been consulted after the Council’s initial request for their comments on proposals to balance the budget by 1955. They learned of the proposed reductions on 27 April, just before NSC 149/2 was approved. In the absence of a detailed breakdown by Service, it was impossible for them to evaluate the effects of the reductions involved. Consequently, when General Vandenberg, acting as JCS Chairman, attended the Council meeting of 29 April at which NSC 149/2 was approved, he was in no position to protest or otherwise comment on the new expenditure and manpower limits.9

The revised FY 1954 budget was also drafted by Secretary Wilson’s office and the Military Departments, without the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.10 It was presented to Congress on 7 May 1953.11 The most striking difference from the original budget was a reduction of $5 billion in Air Force funds. The Air Force was to receive $11.688 billion in new obligatory authority and $15.1 billion in estimated expenditures. The Navy (including Marine Corps) was to be cut $1.7 billion in new obligatory authority to $9.651 billion and to $11 billion in estimated expenditures. The Army budget was not cut but instead received an increase of $1.5 billion in new obligatory authority to $13.671 billion and $16.5 billion in estimated expenditures. With the addition of $1.03 billion in new obligatory authority for the office of the Secretary of Defense and interservice items and $593 million in estimated expenditures, the total defense budget came to $36.04 billion in new obligatory authority and $43.193 billion in estimated expenditures.12

Under this budget approved manpower strengths (slightly adjusted from the
figures in NSC 149/2) were 1.421 million for the Army, 745,066 for the Navy, 230,021 for the Marine Corps, and 960,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3,356,087.\textsuperscript{13} The total represented a reduction of approximately 150,000 as compared with 28 February 1953. In order to begin the cutback at once, the administration reduced the authorized end strength for FY 1953 to 3,555,062.\textsuperscript{14}

The revised FY 1954 budget and personnel strengths were translated into force levels by the individual Services.\textsuperscript{15} The Army and Navy found that they would be unable to increase their current unit strength, except that the Army would organize four more antiaircraft battalions, for a total of 117. The Air Force, however, would rise to 114 wings during FY 1954, and Secretary Wilson termed this a very substantial increase in defending the new budget before Congress. The interim goal for the Air Force, he revealed, was 120 wings; the final goal would be determined after further study.\textsuperscript{16}

The proposed reduction of $5 billion in Air Force appropriations aroused considerable criticism in Congress and elsewhere. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, General Vandenberg assailed the reduction for its disruptive effect on Air Force programs. Secretary Wilson and his subordinates insisted that combat power would not be affected and emphasized that the goal of 143 wings had only been suspended, not abandoned.\textsuperscript{17} In the end, Congress not only accepted the reduction but cut the appropriation request still further, to $34.474 billion.\textsuperscript{18}

**The JCS Interim Look for FY 1955**

Months before the revised FY 1954 budget went to Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already planning for FY 1955. Tentative force level recommendations submitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 6 March 1953 called for substantial increases, principally in antiaircraft battalions, radar picket ships, and fighter aircraft for the coordinated air defense system that had been proposed by President Truman. The Committee’s report was split, with some of the Services seeking larger increases than others were willing to endorse.\textsuperscript{19}

By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff received this report, it had become clear that the attitude of most of the members of the National Security Council made it useless to seek any general increase in Service strength for 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore rejected the report and told the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to draft two alternatives to be sent to the Secretary of Defense. One would urge that the current FY 1954 force levels be adopted without change as 1955 goals; the other would propose increases in continental defense forces only.\textsuperscript{20}

The Committee submitted the two drafts on 14 April 1953. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred action on them pending the final decision of the National Security Council on NSC 149/2.\textsuperscript{21} Its subsequent adoption, with reduced budgetary guidelines for FY 1955, seemed to foreclose any hope even of holding force goals at current levels. Shortly thereafter, the administration announced that all the
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would soon be replaced. On 4 June 1953 General Bradley and his lame duck colleagues decided to withdraw both drafts and to leave to the Services the task of preparing preliminary plans for FY 1955. It was not certain, however, that the administration would enforce the $40 billion expenditure limit for FY 1955 mentioned in NSC 149/2. The size of the reductions to be expected in the next year's budget was debated for several months at high levels. Mr. Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey urged cutbacks for 1955 at least as great as those carried out for 1954. Secretary of Defense Wilson, on the other hand, believed that strategic planning should precede budgeting and that the new Joint Chiefs of Staff should be allowed to complete their review of strategy before any drastic reductions were ordered. President Eisenhower took a middle position; he believed that cuts would be possible but on a smaller scale than those envisioned by Dodge and Humphrey. On 6 August 1953 he laid down a general requirement that all departments make substantial reductions in their expenditure estimates and appropriations requests for FY 1955.

The conclusion of the Korean War spurred the drive for economy. On 26 July 1953, just before the armistice was signed, officials of the Department of Defense attending a conference at Quantico, Virginia, predicted that the end of hostilities would make it possible to reduce expenditures by as much as $1 billion during the next fiscal year. On the other hand, the Soviet thermonuclear explosion of 12 August 1953 provided a justification for larger forces and, specifically, for the expanded continental defense program that was then being discussed within the administration.

The concept submitted to the President by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 August 1953 was too broad and tentative to provide a basis for the FY 1955 budget. Consequently, on 15 September the Armed Forces Policy Council asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit force level recommendations for this purpose, along with tentative plans for FYs 1956 and 1957. The Council also agreed that it was essential to reduce the number and size of the support units (those other than major combat forces), which accounted for over half of all expenditures of the Department of Defense.

Secretary Wilson embodied these decisions in a formal directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 September. Two days later, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), W. J. McNeil, described to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the kinds of data requested for budget planning. They included the personnel strength and the number of major combat units proposed for each Service, with the recommended manning level for each unit (expressed as a percentage of wartime personnel strength). The JCS recommendations were also to extend to supporting units—those classified by the Army as Other Combat Forces and by the other Services as Combat Support Forces. Army and Air Force Reserve and National Guard units were to be included as well. Recommendations (if any) for changes in FY 1954 goals were also to be included. Actual strengths as of 30 June 1953 were to be shown for comparison.

Initial recommendations were drafted by the Services and forwarded to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which attempted to harmonize them, but with-
out success. Both within and outside the Committee, the Services used different guidelines in planning for FY 1955. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps took the position that, in principle, the manpower limits in NSC 149/2 should be followed, with increases confined to continental defense forces. In practice, however, these Services did not restrict their plans in this manner. Thus the Army and Marine Corps assumed the continuation of the special authorizations of 51,000 and 5,000 men, respectively, for their Korean pipelines, which they viewed as necessary so long as US forces remained in Korea. The Army and Navy added allowances of 2,000 and 6,634 respectively for officer candidates (cadets and midshipmen), who were not included in the NSC 149/2 strength figures. For the Army, the result would be 1,423,000 men. Nevertheless, Army planners maintained that their Service could not meet its commitments with that strength. They recommended 1,508,000 men for FY 1955, of whom 6,000 would be required to provide an additional 13 antiaircraft battalions. They also urged that the final FY 1954 manpower goal be raised to 1,540,000. The Army’s divisional strength under their plans would remain constant at 20 through 1955.

The Navy sought no increase in FY 1954, but proposed 767,700 men for FY 1955, which was 16,000 more than the approved 1954 figure (745,066) plus the officer candidate allowance. The increase would go entirely for continental defense forces: destroyer escorts, minesweepers, and patrol aircraft. The Marine Corps assumed the continuation through FY 1955 of its approved 1954 strength (230,021 men), and of its statutory three-division structure (a requirement laid down by Congress in 1953).

The Air Force rejected both the FY 1955 personnel strength in NSC 149/2 and the FY 1954 limit established by the Secretary of Defense. Its representatives quoted from NSC 149/2 and from Secretary Wilson’s statements to show that the decisions of the National Security Council in April 1953 were intended merely as temporary expedients. For 1954, they sought 975,000 men (15,000 more than currently authorized) and 115 wings. For 1955, they recommended 1,002,000 men—enough to reach the interim goal of 120 wings.31 Of the proposed 1955 increase, 9,700 men would be used for additional continental defense forces (four fighter wings and two AEW squadrons).32

The Service recommendations for FY 1955 added up to a total of 3,507,721 men. This was approximately 150,000 more than the actual strength at the end of FY 1953.33

For FYs 1956 and 1957, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps proposed to use their recommended FY 1955 figures temporarily, pending further studies after revision of the current national security policy paper (NSC 153/1). The Air Force estimated a requirement for 149 wings by 1956-1957, but, by assuming increases in allied forces and accepting some risk, reduced this to 137 wings (123 combat and 14 troop carrier), which would require 1,060,000 men. The Air Force thus abandoned its 143-wing goal.34

The Joint Strategic Planning Committee passed these Service proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford and his colleagues were of course aware that they ran counter to the administration’s desire for lower expenditures in FY 1955. Nevertheless they did not feel justified in recommending smaller force
levels than those sought by the Services. Accordingly, on 2 October 1953 they forwarded the Service figures to Secretary Wilson with a recommendation that he approve the major combat forces listed therein. They explained their position as follows:

The major forces recommended for achievement in FY 1955 do not represent any material change from those developed in the formulation of previously approved plans. There has been no change in United States foreign commitments, no reduction in the threat to US national security, and no new decisions at governmental level with regard to the use of atomic weapons. Therefore, no major departure from these forces appears to be justified at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that their recommendations were in consonance with NSC 149/2, except for those increases required for continental defense. Nevertheless, they took note of the desire for economy and promised every effort to meet force requirements within predicted manpower availabilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the major Army, Navy, and Marine Corps combat units proposed for FY 1955 should be used as the basis for preliminary FY 1956 and FY 1957 plans. For the Air Force, they recommended 127 wings for FY 1956 as a planning target in connection with long lead-time procurement. They cited the proposed goal of 137 wings but took no position on it pending completion of their overall review of forces, which, they asserted, was awaiting "certain decisions from higher authority"—presumably a reference to the fact that the administration had not yet formally approved the strategic concept that they had proposed in August.  

These recommendations were the product of what was later described as an interim look by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as distinct from the new look at the entire defense picture of which Secretary Wilson had spoken earlier. Secretary Wilson tentatively accepted them for planning purposes. Using them as a basis, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) prepared preliminary estimates for FY 1955 of $35.273 billion in new obligational authority and $43.0 billion in expenditures. On 13 October 1953 Mr. McNeil and Secretary Wilson submitted these to the National Security Council. Because the figures were only slightly below those for 1954 and were appreciably higher than the $40 billion expenditure target in NSC 149/2, they aroused immediate opposition from some of those present, notably Secretary Humphrey and Mr. Dodge.

Admiral Radford was called upon to defend the force levels on which the estimates were based. He explained why the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not felt free to reduce them. In particular, he stressed the absence of a firm policy regarding the use of atomic weapons, which would make it possible to deliver equivalent firepower with fewer men.

The National Security Council directed the Department of Defense to review the estimates in the light of the discussion and submit them again for further consideration. The clear expectation was that they would be revised downward. In other words, the Council had rejected the interim look program.
The FY 1955 Budget: Impact of the New Look

Three days after this meeting, Secretary Wilson set in motion the study that was to eventuate in JCS 2101/113, as already described. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest a new military strategy and a force structure for fiscal years 1955 through 1957. They were to base their proposals on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used whenever the national interest so required, and at the same time they were to recognize the importance of maintaining a sound economy, or, in other words, of holding defense costs to a minimum.40

The budget process, however, could not await the completion of this study. Accordingly, on 16 October 1953, Secretary Wilson asked the Service Secretaries to submit FY 1955 estimates by 5 December 1953. These were to be based on the major combat forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with minimum supporting forces. They were expected to reflect economies resulting from increased efficiency and from the end of the war in Korea.41

In itself, this directive did not insure that the Services would hold their requests to a level that the administration would regard as acceptable. Secretary Wilson and his subordinates therefore sought a surer basis for reductions. On 23 October the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Dr. John A. Hannah, in a memorandum to the Services, suggested that these figures be used for planning purposes: 1.281 million for the Army, 670,000 for the Navy, 207,000 for the Marine Corps, and 970,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3.128 million.42 These figures represented a reduction of approximately 10 percent in the approved FY 1954 strength for all the Services except the Air Force, which would be allowed a modest increase.43 Dr. Hannah expected that savings of as much as $1 billion might result.44 Secretary Wilson suggested that the Services make a real effort to meet the listed strengths.45 His use of this phraseology, which fell short of a direct order, left the Services free to seek a reconsideration of Dr. Hannah’s proposal. General Ridgway opposed it strenuously, as did Admiral Carney to a lesser degree.46

Secretary Wilson postponed a decision until almost the last minute. On 4 December 1953 he authorized FY 1955 end strengths totalling 3,167,000 with man-year averages of 3,225,500.47 On the following day he received Service budget requests, prepared in response to his directive of 16 October, amounting to $35.901 billion in new obligatory authority—a figure even higher than that rejected by the National Security Council on 13 October.48 Thereupon, on 11 December 1953, he issued new instructions reducing the man-year average strength to 3.186 million, distributed as follows: 1.3 million for the Army, 706,000 for the Navy, 220,000 for the Marine Corps, and 960,000 for the Air Force. The Services were directed to submit proposals for beginning and end strengths adjusted to these averages.49 Following further discussions with the Services, the administration finally approved FY 1955 end strengths as follows: 1.162 million for the Army, 682,000 for the Navy, 215,000 for the Marine Corps, and 970,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3.029 million.50 At the same time, the FY 1954 strength objective was reduced to 3,327,800.51

These FY 1955 strength objectives were regarded as stepping stones, so to
JCS and National Policy

speak, on the path toward the FY 1957 goal of 2.815 million approved in connection with the New Look.\textsuperscript{52} But if the goal was to be reached in three annual strides, the first was to be by far the biggest; considerably more than a third of the total planned shrinkage would occur under these 1955 plans. The cutback would be particularly abrupt for the Army, which had fared even worse than it would have under the 10 percent proposal (the Navy and Marine Corps came out somewhat better). This apportionment may perhaps have been influenced by the Korean Armistice, which could be viewed as justifying immediate manpower savings.\textsuperscript{53} Secretary Wilson later testified that the Army would have been cut by another 100,000 had it not been for the continuing uncertainty of the Korean situation and the looming crisis in Indochina.\textsuperscript{54}

On the basis of these decisions regarding personnel strengths, the administration was able sharply to reduce the budget estimates submitted earlier by the Services. The final military budget for FY 1955, as sent to Congress, was as follows: $8.236 billion for the Army in new obligatory authority and $10.198 billion in estimated expenditures; $9.882 billion for the Navy in new obligatory authority and $10.493 in estimated expenditures; $11.206 billion for the Air Force in new obligatory authority and $16.209 billion in estimated expenditures. With $1.669 billion in new obligatory authority and $675 million in estimated expenditures for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and interservice the total defense budget was $30.993 billion in new obligatory authority and $37.575 billion in estimated expenditures.\textsuperscript{55}

The National Security Council and the President had approved the budget on 16 December 1953. Mr. Eisenhower ruled, however, that both the budget and the FY 1957 New Look military program, which was approved at the same time, would be “kept under continuous scrutiny in relation to world developments” and that any Service might request review of its program if a change seemed necessary.\textsuperscript{56}

The fiscal and manpower limits established by the administration became the basis for force goals established by the individual Services. The Army proposed to reduce its division strength from 20 to 17 in FY 1955, to retain 18 regiments and regimental combat teams, and to increase its antiaircraft battalions to 122. The divisional reduction accorded with the views of General Ridgway, who had wanted the number of combat units to reflect the manpower reduction; Secretary Wilson had favored retention of the same number of divisions at reduced strengths.\textsuperscript{57}

The Navy would maintain 404 warships and 676 other vessels, a decline of 50 from the 1954 total. The Air Force would have 120 wings, 107 combat and 13 troop carriers.\textsuperscript{58} All the Services would strengthen their air defense forces.\textsuperscript{59}

The administration unveiled its FY 1955 budget as the first step in putting the New Look into execution. It was, the President advised the Congress on 7 January 1954, based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{60} Echoing the President, Secretary Wilson told the House Appropriations Committee that the budget was the first phase of the “carefully considered and unanimously agreed long-range plan of the JCS.”\textsuperscript{61} Admiral Radford implied the same thing in his testimony. The 1957 New Look
manpower objectives, he explained, "are actually for planning purposes" and "are not inflexible . . . The only firm plans in attaining these ultimate goals are those represented by the force levels on which the current annual budget is based."62

The unanimously recommended program to which the President and the Secretary of Defense referred was, of course, JCS 2101/113, although a hasty reading of their remarks might suggest that the budget itself had the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.63 As both President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson were doubtless aware, neither the budget nor its related personnel and force levels had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. Secretary Wilson, however, apparently regarded General Ridgway's failure to protest the final 1955 personnel ceilings as implying approval of them.64

When the House Appropriations Committee opened hearings on the budget, each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked to verify the assertion that the basic FY 1957 program had been unanimously approved. All did so, although General Ridgway was careful to point out that the approval was conditioned on certain assumptions.65 Admiral Radford was also asked specifically for comments on the FY 1955 budget; he replied that it had his unqualified approval.66 In hearings on the separate budgets, General Twining indicated his satisfaction with that of the Air Force.67 General Ridgway and Admiral Carney pointed out that their Services would lose some combat manpower and would find their materiel readiness impaired. But neither protested the budget, and Admiral Carney expressed the belief that the Navy's overall combat effectiveness would increase as a result of new weapons and techniques to be introduced in 1955.68

When the budget reached the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South Carolina, disturbed by rumors of dissatisfaction among Army officers, questioned General Ridgway closely about his attitude toward the budget. Obviously reluctant to criticize a decision by his superiors, the General sought to evade a direct answer to the question whether he was satisfied with Army force levels under the budget. His stated position was that, in accord with military discipline, he accepted the budget as a sound decision by his lawful superiors.69

The new budget, like the administration's earlier one for 1954, aroused considerable criticism, though for different reasons. Previously, airpower enthusiasts had assailed the reduction of funds for the Air Force; now the cutback in the Army and Navy became the focus of protest. Comments on this feature of the budget tied in with criticism of the doctrine of massive retaliation attributed to Secretary of State Dulles, on the basis of his speech on 12 January 1954.70 As before, however, Congress remained unmoved by the criticism, and not only declined to reverse the proposed reductions, but superimposed its own economy program on that of the administration. The final appropriations figure enacted was $29.584 billion.71
FY 1956 Plans and the Indochina Crisis

The goals to be attained by FY 1957, established in JCS 2101/113 which set forth the New Look strategy, were for US armed forces of 2.815 million in manpower to comprise 14 Army divisions, 1,030 Navy ships, 3 Marine Corps divisions, and 137 Air Force wings. The manpower strength was set at 1 million for the Army, 650,000 for the Navy, 190,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for the Air Force. As soon as the JCS 2101/113 goals had been approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to prepare summary programs and budget estimates for fiscal years 1956 and 1957, planned so as to reach the above figures on schedule (or earlier if possible). The force goals set by JCS 2101/113 were to be used for planning purposes but might be exceeded, subject to prior JCS approval in each case, if the excess units were attainable within manpower and dollar limits.72

In their replies, submitted in March 1954, the Services proposed the goals set out in Table 3. As the table shows, the Army, in preparing its plans, had wholly departed from JCS 2101/113. Army planners maintained that the manpower goals in JCS 2101/113 were based on assumed conditions that had not yet materialized. “The Army should not be forced to program itself into a position of inability to meet national commitments,” ran their argument, “on the basis of ‘arbitrary assumptions’ to the effect that these commitments will be reduced.”73

Most of the other Service objectives were in conformity with JCS 2101/113. The Navy proposed to maintain an excess of two ships—1,032 instead of 1,030—but to remain within its allotted manpower limit. The Navy’s plans for FY 1956 also allowed for two aircraft carriers temporarily retained in the active fleet, with the President’s approval, to meet the crisis in Indochina. For all practical purposes, the Navy was proposing to reach its allotted ship strength a year ahead of the schedule in JCS 2101/113. Similarly, the Air Force programmed its final manpower strength for attainment in FY 1956 instead of FY 1957. Its increase from

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Service</th>
<th>FY 1956</th>
<th>FY 1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Combat Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>*1,164,000</td>
<td>17 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>666,435</td>
<td>1,034 active ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>3 divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975,000</td>
<td>127 wings</td>
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<td>Total Strength</td>
<td>3,010,435</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Army approved strength for FY 1955; includes 2,000 USMA cadets.

Sources: JCS 1800/213, 2 Mar 54; JCS 1800/214, 10 Mar 54; JCS 1800/215, 11 Mar 54; JCS 1800/216, 11 Mar 54.
127 to 137 wings during FY 1957 would be achieved by reducing the number of men in headquarters, administrative, and support elements. The 137-wing total would consist of 126 combat wings (three more than previously planned) and 11 of troop carriers. However, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps gave notice that if the Army were to be exempted from the guidelines in JCS 2101/113, they would wish to revise their programs.

The cost estimates submitted by the Services totalled $37.4 billion for 1956—considerably more than the $32.8 billion that, according to JCS 2101/113, was expected to be available. For FY 1957, the estimates were incomplete, and the Services had not made it clear whether they applied to appropriations or to expenditures.74

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received these proposals for action on 29 April 195475 and discussed them on 10 May 1954, but reached no decision.76 Four days later, the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit FY 1956 force and manning level recommendations, covering both major combat forces and supporting units, by 1 July.77

Meanwhile events abroad threatened to undermine the assumptions of JCS 2101/113 and threw doubt on the wisdom of the force reductions planned for the coming fiscal year. The deterioration of the French position in Indochina compelled the administration to suspend its plans to withdraw forces from the Far East. In another part of the world, the uncertain prospect for French ratification of the European Defense Community treaty cast a shadow over hopes that NATO could count on the early addition of West German forces. Faced with these developments, the administration perforce reconsidered its earlier decisions. Secretary Wilson suggested on 26 April 1954 that it might be necessary to take a second new look. “The next few months are obviously critical ones in world affairs,” he said, “and what happens in Europe and Asia during this period may force a soul-searching review of our specific policies, plans, objectives and expenditures.”78

Admiral Carney saw the Far Eastern crisis as justifying a request for more manpower in FY 1955. He urged that the Navy’s personnel strength be increased to 733,916, sufficient to maintain a force of 1,131 ships. For the Marine Corps, he asked an increase to 225,021.79

If the FY 1957 figures in JCS 2101/113 were no longer valid as objectives, and if the approved strengths for FY 1955 were to be amended, there seemed no firm basis for FY 1956 plans. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, charged with drafting a reply to Mr. Anderson’s request, figuratively threw up its collective hands in despair. “At this time, there exist no beginning or end parameters upon which FY 1956 forces and manning levels can be based,” asserted the Committee on 29 June.80

Further progress was impossible until the administration decided how far to pursue its goal of economy in the face of the Far Eastern situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had by now accepted the Army view that the cutback of manpower should be abandoned, or at least suspended. They discussed the issue with the Secretary of Defense, who agreed with them. On 29 June 1954 Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff settled upon the following personnel strengths
for FY 1956, to apply to both the beginning and the end of the fiscal year: 1,173 million for the Army, 682,000 for the Navy, 215,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for the Air Force. Under this plan, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would be continued without change from FY 1955 and the Air Force would reach its final strength by FY 1956—a year earlier than originally planned. 

Within these limits, the Army would attempt to maintain “as near a twenty division structure as is feasible,” perhaps by reducing the strength of some divisions. The Navy would maintain maximum operating strength, including its current force of 14 attack carriers (CVAs), the backbone of the fleet’s striking power. The Air Force would raise its FY 1956 goal to 130 wings.

On 1 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Wilson to confirm this oral agreement, indicating that they would then forward the detailed recommendations requested by Mr. Anderson. At the same time, they called attention to a pending proposal by the Army to increase its FY 1955 strength to 1,282,000. They also informed the Secretary that they intended in December 1954 to review the world situation and, if necessary, to submit new force level recommendations for FY 1957 to supersede those in JCS 2101/113.

The Secretary of Defense tentatively confirmed these FY 1956 strengths and force levels in writing on 15 July 1954. He also approved the JCS plan to review FY 1957 levels in December. However, he disapproved the Army’s request for more manpower in 1955. Two weeks later he obtained the tentative approval of the National Security Council and the President for the use of these figures in budget planning.

On 19 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended major combat forces for FY 1956. For the Army they recommended 19 divisions, 12 regiments and regimental combat teams, and 136 antiaircraft battalions; for the Navy, 408 warships, 442 other combatant ships, and 281 other ships, for a total of 1,131 active ships; for the Marine Corps, 3 divisions and 3 air wings; and for the Air Force, 119 combat wings and 11 troop-carrier wings, for a total of 130 wings. Under these recommendations, the Army would retain its current division strength while significantly increasing the number of antiaircraft battalions. The Navy would reach the ship strength that had earlier been sought by Admiral Carney for FY 1955 (1,131 vessels, 18 more than the existing total). Both Services, however, would be forced to accept lower manning levels for most units, and the Army would reduce the number of its separate regiments and regimental combat teams (RCTs) by one third.

Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 September 1954 that he would submit these recommendations, with his approval, to the National Security Council. Meanwhile, they were to be used in budget preparation.

The JCS objectives seemed to preclude any major budget reductions for FY 1956. Secretary Wilson apparently considered that the objectives of the 1953 economy drive had been accomplished; he was now willing to be guided wholly by JCS estimates of military needs. But the goal of economy had not been abandoned by the administration. On 23 July 1954 the Bureau of the Budget sent the Secretary of Defense an outline of fiscal policies laid down by the President for FY 1956, which called for continuing attempts to reduce expenditures and for
reductions in appropriations requests as compared with FY 1955. A policy conflict thus loomed upon the horizon; it could only be settled by the President.

The Issue of Support Force Recommendations

In sending Secretary Wilson their force goal recommendations on 19 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had transmitted the Service proposals for supporting units. They had urged the Secretary to approve these as an order of magnitude and to leave the military chief of each Service free to adjust them, within approved personnel ceilings. Secretary Wilson, however, felt that he needed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the numbers and manning levels of these units in appraising Service programs and budget requests. He insisted also that the composition of support forces, when once approved, should be altered only with the prior approval of his office and of the cognizant Service Secretary.

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff should debate the need for each Army engineer battalion, Navy fleet tow-target squadron, and Air Force photo mapping group seemed hardly reasonable. Moreover, to require previous Departmental approval at two levels for all adjustments would impose a hopelessly cumbersome procedure. On 22 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed their Operations Deputies to seek clarification of the reasons for these requirements from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

When the Operations Deputies conferred with Mr. McNeil, he readily agreed that the requirement for Secretarial approval of changes should be dropped. But he was less accommodating on the other issue, since, as he pointed out, support forces accounted for over half of the Departmental budget. The Operations Deputies rejoined that, given personnel and fiscal ceilings, the individual chiefs had an obvious incentive to minimize support forces in order to maximize combat strength. It was finally agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should indicate how far down into the area of supporting forces they believed they could extend their consideration.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then advised Secretary Wilson that they could not profitably go into this matter at all. The detailed and time-consuming analysis that would be required was beyond the capacity of their organization. Moreover, they deemed it inappropriate for them to concern themselves with the subject. Advice concerning support forces, they said, should come from the Military Departments, through the Secretaries. Mr. Wilson made no reply and allowed the matter to drop for the time being.

The Decision to Accelerate Retrenchment

Service budget estimates for FY 1956, based on the force levels tentatively approved by Mr. Wilson on 17 September, were sent to the Secretary's office
on 4 October 1954. They added up to $37.397 billion in new obligational authority. This figure, well above the amount in the FY 1955 budget, violated the guidelines laid down by the Bureau of the Budget on 23 July 1954. Some reduction could be anticipated when the estimates were reviewed in the Department of Defense. But even Secretary Wilson was not certain that they could be cut below the 1955 figure. On 30 November he predicted that the 1956 budget would call for between $29 and $34 billion in new obligational authority, and that expenditures would amount to roughly $35 billion.

On 3 December 1954 Admiral Radford summarized for the National Security Council the force levels and personnel strengths tentatively approved for FY 1956. The Comptroller followed with a budget analysis that pointed to a substantial increase in military appropriations. The Council noted and discussed these presentations, but took no other action.

The Council’s tacit acceptance of the prospect of higher defense costs for FY 1956 contrasted sharply with its actions in October 1953, when it had rejected preliminary 1955 estimates as excessive. The difference can be ascribed to the alarming developments in the Far East. In Indochina, the US retaliatory capacity had not deterred the native communist rebels from an aggressive course, even without overt aid from the Soviet Union or Communist China. The possible repercussions of this crisis made it appear dangerous to cut back US military strength, especially in conventional forces—those most likely to be required if the United States were forced to intervene in similar situations. Recognition of this fact was to be reflected in NSC 5501, which was under discussion at this time in the National Security Council, in the form of statements concerning the need to enlarge conventional warfare capabilities.

All the signs were that the defense economy program had run its course. Secretary Wilson announced on 7 December 1954 that the administration planned no further cuts in defense spending unless there was a definite improvement in the international situation. “We are getting close to the bottom,” he said.

Meanwhile the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had been working on the preliminary FY 1957 recommendations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had promised Mr. Wilson. The members were presented with a plan for an impressive increase in the Army—the outgrowth of an earlier proposal to reorganize that Service and to augment the number of combat divisions without increasing manpower. Under this reorganization plan, five of the Army’s six training divisions would be upgraded to combat status. They would become eligible for overseas assignment in accordance with a new system that would involve the rotation of complete divisions between foreign bases and the zone of the interior. Divisions returning home would assume the task of training recruits; they would spend two years thus engaged, followed by a year of combat training in preparation for reassignment overseas. Thus the number of combat divisions would rise from 19 to 24. At the same time, to replace two National Guard divisions recently brought home from Korea and scheduled for early release to state control, the Army would activate two new divisions by amalgamating existing units in the Pacific Northwest and the Caribbean. These would be divisions in name only, however; their component units would remain at their current stations. General
Ridgway and Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens had presented this plan to President Eisenhower in September 1954 and had obtained his approval.97

Of the 24 divisions, it was expected that, at any one time, five would be occupied with recruit training. Three would be stationed in the Far East and one would be required for the Western Hemisphere Reserve. The two new divisions would be limited to static defensive missions in the theaters where they were stationed. Thus only 13 divisions would be available to meet other commitments, the most important of which involved NATO. The United States had indicated to its NATO allies that it could make 17 divisions available for European defense within six months after hostilities began. Although the other nations had not formally accepted this offer, General Ridgway considered that the United States was committed to provide 17 divisions, and that all of these must be in readiness on D-day, since new divisions could not be raised and trained within six months.98

In view of these considerations, the Army member of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee proposed a goal of 28 divisions by the end of FY 1957. This objective would require 1,352,000 men—an increase of 169,000 over the FY 1956 strength approved by Secretary Wilson on 15 July 1954. In the Committee’s report, JCS 1800/225, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 November 1954, the Army proposal received the approval of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Army in turn endorsed a Navy request for beginning and end strengths of 698,000 and 740,000 men in 1957, with an increase to 16 attack carriers. The Air Force was willing to endorse the carrier figure, but not the larger personnel strengths for either the Army or the Navy. All the Services agreed that the Marine Corps and Air Force should maintain their 1956 manpower strengths without change. The Air Force goal of 137 wings was also reaffirmed.99

Without taking a formal position on the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed it with the Secretary of Defense on the morning of 8 December. The principal issue was the increase in the Army, which was defended by General Ridgway. Secretary Wilson, instead of rendering a decision himself, evidently decided that the question was important enough to require the attention of the President.100

Accordingly, at a meeting at the White House that afternoon, the Secretary and Admiral Radford discussed the subject of force goals with the President. Apparently Mr. Eisenhower became concerned at the prospect of an enlargement of the military establishment, in the face of his hopes for further reductions. Perhaps the magnitude of the increase sought by the Army angered him. At any rate, he seized the opportunity presented by this discussion to reactivate the lagging economy drive. Rejecting the idea of augmenting the Army and Navy in FY 1957, he not only reaffirmed the manpower objectives in JCS 2101/113 but ruled that they must be achieved a year earlier than planned—by the end of FY 1956, with part of the reduction to be carried out in FY 1955.101

The President announced this decision to the National Security Council on 9 December 1954. He directed the Department of Defense to begin moving at once to reach the following strength limits by 30 June 1955, the end of FY 1955: 1.1 million for the Army, 870,000 for the Navy-Marine Corps, and 970,000 for the
Air Force, a total of 2.94 million. At the same time he set a general target of 2.815 million for 30 June 1956, including 975,000 for the Air Force.  

In the light of what had gone before, the President’s decision appeared surprisingly abrupt. Secretary Wilson later ascribed it to the President’s conviction that the stabilization of the situation in the Far East had made it safe to proceed “as rapidly as we can” to the final manpower objectives of the New Look. 

On 9 December 1954, Secretary Wilson allocated the FY 1956 total manpower ceiling among the Services in the same manner as in JCS 2101/113: 1.0 million for the Army, 650,000 for the Navy, 190,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for the Air Force. He directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use these figures in preliminary planning for FY 1957.

Despite President Eisenhower’s ruling, however, the last word had not yet been said on FY 1956 manpower. A year earlier, General Ridgway had accepted the decision of the President and the Secretary as closing the issue of FY 1955 personnel strengths, and had seen his acceptance interpreted as concurrence. Probably for this reason, he chose to appeal the President’s decision of 8 December 1954. With some support, apparently, from Admiral Carney and General Shepherd, he won the President’s agreement to raise the 1956 ceiling by 35,000, from 2.815 million to 2.850 million.

The revised ceiling was announced to the National Security Council on 5 January 1955. On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to divide the additional 35,000 spaces as follows: 25,000 to the Army, 7,000 to the Navy, 3,000 to the Marine Corps, and none to the Air Force. The new end strengths for FY 1956 (30 June 1956) were 1.025 million for the Army, 657,000 for the Navy, 193,000 for the Marine Corps, and 975,000 for the Air Force. They communicated this agreement at once, by telephone, to Mr. McNeil, the Comptroller. On the following day Secretary Wilson approved it.

**Force Levels under the New Ceilings**

After FY 1956 personnel strengths had been determined, Mr. Wilson instituted a new procedure. He turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, instead of the separate Services, for translation of the manpower figures into force levels. On 9 December 1954, after the President had announced his first decision to the Council, Secretary Wilson asked them to indicate the changes in approved force levels for FYs 1955 and 1956 that would be required under the new ceiling.

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1954 sent Mr. Wilson an outline of proposed major forces, drafted by the Services, which they had accepted. Under these plans, the Army would have 20 divisions by the end of FY 1955. Two of these were the static divisions that had been activated to replace the departing National Guard units; three others would be occupied in training recruits, in accordance with the earlier decision to reduce the separate units maintained for that purpose. Thus only 15 mobile divisions would remain for
combat assignment. For FY 1956, the Army would shrink to 17 divisions, with one static and two mobile divisions eliminated.\textsuperscript{110}

The Navy planned to cut its ship strength to 1,063 in FY 1955 and 989 in FY 1956, but it would increase to 1,008 in FY 1957. The totals in each case would include 15 attack carriers. The Air Force goals remained unchanged: 121, 130, and 137 wings for FYs 1955, 1956, and 1957 respectively. The Marine Corps force structure of three divisions and three air wings would likewise remain intact.\textsuperscript{111}

These recommendations were too sketchy to satisfy Secretary Wilson, who wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to extend their consideration to the numbers of supporting and reserve units and to manning levels for all forces. He also asked them to submit several alternative deployment plans.\textsuperscript{112}

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could comply with this new request, the President raised the FY 1956 manpower ceiling. Their reply accordingly took account of the new ceiling. On 11 January the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded proposals for fiscal years 1955, 1956, and 1957 that called for major combat forces as shown in Table 4. As compared with the plans submitted on 22 December, the Army now proposed to field one more static division in FY 1956.\textsuperscript{113} The Navy would maintain a few more ships in each fiscal year.\textsuperscript{114} The major force structures of the Air Force and the Marine Corps had not been affected.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this general composition of the major forces was the best possible with the manpower available. That conclusion, however, was based on an initial analysis; comments based on more careful study would follow later. Whether or not it was intended to apply also to the accompanying proposals for supporting and reserve forces was unclear. Secretary Wilson apparently so interpreted it, since he did not pursue this issue.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also forwarded the force deployments planned by each Service. They endorsed these as the best possible within the recommended force levels and, in fact, as dictated by existing policy. "Deployments must be predicated on strategic concepts which stem from approved United States policy or other forms of commitment," they declared. "Unless alternate strategic concepts are evolved or unless there are assumptions of new or revised commitments not presently known, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to recommend any alternate deployments."\textsuperscript{115}

Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1955 that the proposed force structures had his general approval. He did not renew his request for alternative deployments. However, he specified that the proposed deployments, insofar as they involved changes, were not to be carried out without his prior approval.\textsuperscript{116}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson their final comments on 18 March 1955. They reaffirmed their earlier approval of the proposed forces and deployments, subject to continuing review of both. At the same time, they noted that Generals Ridgway and Shepherd had called attention to the effects of prospective reductions in air and amphibious lift capacity, and promised to give this question special study in the near future.\textsuperscript{117}
Table 4—JCS Recommendations on Major Combat Forces for FYs 1955—1957: January 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service and Force</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
<th>FY 1956</th>
<th>FY 1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments/regimental combat teams</td>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft battalions</td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Warships*</td>
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<td>405</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other combatant ships</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total wings</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Warships include carriers (CVA/CVS/CVE/CVL), battleships (BB), cruisers (CA/CL/CLAA/CAG), destroyers (DD/DDE/DDR/DL), and submarines (SS/SSG/SSK/SSB/SSN). Other combatant ships include mine-warfare, patrol, and amphibious-warfare ships.

Source: Memo, JCS to SecDef, 11 Jan 55, JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55.

FY 1956 Defense Budget

On 9 December 1954 Secretary Wilson had submitted to the National Security Council a defense budget that called for $34.275 billion in new obligatory authority and predicted that expenditures would amount to $35.750 billion. These estimates were based on the manpower strengths tentatively approved in July; they were rendered obsolete by the new and smaller manpower figures announced by the President at the same meeting. Revision of the estimates had not been completed when the budget was sent to Congress on 17 January 1955. At that time, the request for new obligatory authority had been cut to $32.9 billion. A target of $34 billion had been set for expenditures, but, as the President explained in his budget message, the reductions in Service programs that would be necessary to reach this figure had not yet been worked out.
The rationale for the President’s budgetary decisions was explained in a letter from President Eisenhower to Secretary Wilson on 5 January 1955, which was made public. The primary objective, according to the President, was “to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes—by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness. These two tasks logically demand priority in all planning.” To meet lesser hostile action, he said, “growing reliance can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world.” He reassured objectives already familiar in earlier statements by administration spokesmen: to maximize technological innovation in order to minimize military manpower, to plan ahead so as to avoid wasteful and expensive changes, and to preserve a strong and expanding economy in which military expenditures would not constitute an intolerable burden. At the same time, he brought forward another justification for force reductions that had been mentioned briefly in connection with the FY 1955 budget. Transport capacity would limit the number of men who could be deployed early in a war; hence the size of active forces could be correspondingly reduced and greater reliance could be placed on reserves.120

In light of these considerations, said the President, professional military competence and political statesmanship must combine to determine the minimum defensive structure that should be supported by the nation. His recently announced manpower decisions for FYs 1955 and 1956 represented his own response to the various requirements described above. At the same time, he held out hope that the FY 1956 goal might be reduced further if the world situation improved.121

The President described the FY 1956 military program as one that had been “under development during the past two years,” and that was based on the same philosophy as those for fiscal years 1954 and 1955. In other words, it was a continuation of the New Look. Admiral Radford also emphasized this point in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee.122

The individual comments of the JCS members on the FY 1956 budget during Congressional hearings generally echoed those they had made a year earlier. Admiral Radford and General Twining endorsed the budget as submitted, without qualifications.123 General Ridgway indicated that the Army’s combat capability would be impaired, but he made clear that he was not challenging the decisions of his lawful superiors.124 Admiral Carney departed somewhat from his previous position by stressing that his acceptance was conditional. “If the New-Look assumptions were to come true,” he said, “I believe the Navy could live with these figures [on manpower and ship strength for 1956] very well.” But he warned that if conditions in the Far East continued to prevent redeployment of ships to home waters, he might have to ask for a review of the budget.125

Congressional criticism of the administration’s planned reductions was again forthcoming. Because Congress had passed under control of the Democratic Party in the November 1954 election, the critics were now strong enough to force a partial reversal of the administration’s decisions. The final appropriations figure—$33.053 billion—was larger than the President had requested. Congress
added extra funds to maintain the Marine Corps at a strength of 215,000 and to accelerate production of the B-52 intercontinental bomber for the Air Force.\textsuperscript{126}

**Force Levels and Strategy, 1953–1954**

The major decisions taken in 1953 and 1954 in reshaping the US military force structure are summarized in Tables 5–10. Analysis of authorized and actual military personnel strengths, force levels, and reduced defense appropriations and expenditures supports the following conclusions:

1. The overall cost of the defense establishment declined by roughly 20–25 percent between FY 1953 and FY 1956.
2. Military manpower dwindled by 706,012, or over 20 percent, between 31 December 1952 and 30 June 1956.
3. The share of the defense dollar allotted to the Air Force declined in FY 1954 but rose sharply thereafter while the Army’s share dropped.
4. The ratio of the strength of the Air Force to that of the other Services increased steadily between 1952 and 1955, although the Army still remained the largest Service.
5. The combat strength of the Air Force (measured in terms of the number of wings) increased by almost one half between 1952 and 1956, although the number of troop carrier wings declined both relatively and absolutely.
6. The number of divisions and regiments/RCTs in the Army declined, but the number of antiaircraft battalions—the Army’s contribution to continental defense—increased.
7. The number of Navy warships—carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—remained almost constant; the total number of vessels, however, dropped sharply.

All these trends illustrated certain features of the New Look already described: curtailment of defense expenditures, decrease of military manpower, stress on airpower and on continental defense, and reduction of surface forces.

The effect of these developments on the military establishment as of the end of 1954 was illuminated by a status report rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Wilson on 18 March 1955. It showed that many of the deficiencies existing two years earlier were still present. As before, Army and Navy forces were overextended; the mobilization base was inadequate; the Navy’s ships were becoming obsolete faster than they were being replaced; mine warfare and antisubmarine capabilities were marginal at best; Reserve forces of all the Services were below the desired state of readiness; no strategic reserve had as yet been created. On the other hand, the Air Force was stronger in all combat categories (strategic, tactical, and air defense); tactical atomic weapons were becoming available in increasing quantities; aircraft control and warning facilities, though still inadequate, had improved.\textsuperscript{127}

The changes in size and strength of the Services, both relative and absolute, during 1953 and 1954 were decisive in shaping the strategy of the New Look,
## Table 5—Projected Authorized Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces: FYs 1953–1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1953 (end FY 1953)</td>
<td>3,607,154</td>
<td>1,544,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>246,354</td>
<td>1,016,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1953a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1953b</td>
<td>3,555,062</td>
<td>1,532,100</td>
<td>792,950</td>
<td>249,842</td>
<td>980,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1954 (end FY 1954)</td>
<td>3,647,612</td>
<td>1,538,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>248,612</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1953c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1953d</td>
<td>3,356,087</td>
<td>1,421,000</td>
<td>745,066</td>
<td>230,021</td>
<td>960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1954e</td>
<td>3,273,800</td>
<td>1,407,200</td>
<td>740,600</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1955 (end FY 1955)</td>
<td>3,507,721</td>
<td>1,508,000</td>
<td>767,700</td>
<td>230,021</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1953f</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1954g</td>
<td>3,029,000</td>
<td>1,162,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1954h</td>
<td>3,045,000</td>
<td>1,173,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1955i</td>
<td>2,940,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>665,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1956 (end FY 1956)</td>
<td>3,045,000</td>
<td>1,173,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1954l</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1954k</td>
<td>2,815,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1955l</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>1,025,000</td>
<td>657,000</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1957 (end FY 1957)</td>
<td>2,815,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1953m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1955n</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>1,025,000</td>
<td>657,000</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

a NSC 142, 10 Feb 53.
c Truman administration budget request of January 1953 for FY 1954.
d Revised budget FY 1954; see b above.
e Revisited FY 1954 objective; HR Hearings, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 117.
f JCS 1800/211, 2 Oct. 53.
g Eisenhower administration budget request of January 1954 for FY 1955.
h JCS 1800/222, 1 Jul 54; N/H of JCS 1800/222, 15 Jul 54.
i JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan. 55. Presidential directive specified a combined goal for the Navy and Marine Corps.
j JCS 1800/222, 1 Jul 54; N/H of JCS 1800/222, 15 Jul 54.
k JCS 1800/228, 9 Dec 54.
l NSC Action 1293, 5 Jan 5.
m JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53.
n JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55.
which had originally allowed latitude for differing interpretations. The strategic concept in JCS 2101/113 had laid down a comprehensive list of eight requirements, but the administration’s budgetary decisions emphasized two of these—retaliatory airpower and continental defense—at the expense of the others.

In public statements, the President and other administration spokesmen often qualified the emphasis on these two elements of military power by asserting that they were insufficient by themselves. "Undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another," said President Eisenhower, in his annual message to the Congress on 6 January 1955. "We must, therefore, keep in our armed forces balance and flexibility adequate for our purposes and objectives." Admiral Radford spoke in a similar vein during the 1956 budget hearings: "It is important for us to have the flexibility and facilities to respond in whatever manner appears to be to our advantage under the circumstances existing at the time."

This flexibility was to be provided by the strategic reserve called for in JCS 2101/113: a well-rounded force of all three arms, based on US territory but ready for immediate deployment to meet any threat that exceeded the capability of local defensive forces. Such a force could find a use in situations where (as in Indochina) strategic airpower was, effectively speaking, useless. The National

### Table 6—Actual Personnel Strengths of US Armed Forces: 1952–1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>31 December 1952</th>
<th>30 June 1953</th>
<th>30 June 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number*</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,523,152</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1,533,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>802,453</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>794,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>229,245</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>249,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>957,603</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>977,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,512,453</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,555,067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>30 June 1955</th>
<th>30 June 1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,109,296</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>660,695</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>205,170</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>959,946</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,935,107</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include USMA cadets and USNA midshipmen; the other figures include them.

Source: Figures for 31 December 1952 are from NSC 142, 10 Feb 53; others are from Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, January to June 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957, respectively.
Table 7—Projected Authorized Force Levels of US Armed Forces: FYs 1953–1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments/regimental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combat teams</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft battalions</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other combatant ships</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total combatant ships</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total active ships</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air wings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic wings</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-defense wings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical wings</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total combat wings</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop-carrier wings</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wings</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not available.

Sources:

a NSC 142, 10 Feb 53.  
b Truman administration budget request of January 1953 for FY 1954.  
c Revised budget FY 1954, HR Hearings, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 324, 335; Navy figures from JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53.  
d JCS 1800/211, 2 Oct 53.  
f JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55.  
g JCS 1849/127, 20 Sep 54.  
h JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55.  
i JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53.  
j JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55.
Security Council had recognized this condition in NSC 5501, notably by including a prediction that "the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important."\textsuperscript{130}

An implicit assumption in the strategy of the New Look, as it was conceived in 1953, was that the strategic reserve would be constituted of military and naval units withdrawn from overseas. Hence, when the Far Eastern crisis of 1954 interrupted this planned redeployment, the situation seemed to call for some expansion of conventional forces—or, at the very least, for an end to their curtailment—to provide the nucleus of the reserve. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\hline
Service and Force & 31 December 1952\textsuperscript{a} & 30 June 1953\textsuperscript{b} & 30 June 1954\textsuperscript{c} & 30 June 1955\textsuperscript{d} & 30 June 1956\textsuperscript{e} \\
\hline
\textbf{Army} & & & & & \\
Divisions & 20 & 20 & 19 & 20 & 18 \\
Regiments/regimental combat teams & 18 & 18 & 18 & 12 & 10 \\
Antiaircraft battalions & 113 & 114 & 117 & 122 & 133 \\
\textbf{Navy} & & & & & \\
Warships & 401 & 409 & 405 & 402 & 404 \\
Other combatant ships & 432 & 433 & 419 & (*) & (*) \\
Total combatant ships & 833 & 842 & 824 & (*) & (*) \\
Other ships & 283 & 287 & 289 & (*) & (*) \\
Total active ships & 1,116 & 1,129 & 1,113 & 1,030 & 973 \\
\textbf{Marine Corps} & & & & & \\
Divisions & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 \\
Air wings & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 \\
\textbf{Air Force} & & & & & \\
Strategic wings & 39 & 41\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 44 & 46 & (*) \\
Air-defense wings & 21 & 26 & 28 & 29 & (*) \\
Tactical wings & 23 & 23 & 27\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 33 & (*) \\
Total combat wings & 83 & 90\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 99\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 108 & 118 \\
Troop-carrier wings & 15 & 16\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 16 & 13 & 13 \\
Total wings & 98 & 106\textsuperscript{2}/\textsuperscript{3} & 115\textsuperscript{1}/\textsuperscript{3} & 121 & 131 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{*} Not available.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{a} NSC 142, 10 Feb 53.
\textsuperscript{b} JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53.
\textsuperscript{c} JCS 1800/231, 5 Jan 55; JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; JCS 1800/235, 22 Jan 55; JCS 1849/125, 10 Aug 54.
JCS 1800/231 and JCS 1800/234 omit Air Force statistics.
\textsuperscript{d} OASD (Comptroller) Statistical Services Ctr, Selected Manpower Statistics, 29 Jan 60, p. 27; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January-June 1955, pp. 3-6.
\textsuperscript{e} Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January-June 1956, pp. 2-4.
\end{flushleft}
\end{table}
accepted this conclusion in their preliminary plans for FY 1956, drafted in the summer of 1954. But the administration, when faced with the costs involved, had chosen instead to accept the risk attendant on postponement of the creation of the strategic reserve.

Even had this reserve existed, its capacity for rapid deployment—another essential requirement for flexibility—was declining. On 30 June 1954 the Navy had 223 amphibious vessels in service; by the end of FY 1956 it would have only 151. As a result, amphibious lift capability would decline from two divisions to one and one-third. The Navy had chosen to make this reduction as an alternative to cutting back its combat forces.\(^{131}\)

For similar reasons, the Air Force had reduced its projected troop carrier capability, from 17 wings under the original 143-wing plan to 11 under the new 137-wing goal. An Air Force statement of early 1955 offered the following rationale:

The Air Force accepts the fact that it will not be possible to build and maintain an Air Force fully prepared for all of the tasks which several alternate strategies for both limited and general war might require, and at the same time stay within present and projected budget and personnel ceilings. However, the 137 Wing Program is oriented primarily to the requirements for general war, and a degree of risk in regard to certain other tasks is accepted.\(^{132}\)

Table 9—DOD Budget Requests for New Obligational Authority and Estimates of Expenditures: FYs 1954—1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Request and Estimate</th>
<th>FY 1954 Original</th>
<th>FY 1954 Revised</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
<th>FY 1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New obligational authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$12.120</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>$13.671</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
<td>11.381</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>9.651</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>16.788</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>11.688</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD and interservice</td>
<td>1.031</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$41.320</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$36.040</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Expenditures                |        |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------|---------|
|                             | Amount | Percent | Amount | Percent | Amount | Percent | Amount | Percent |
| Army                       | $15.300 | 33.7    | $16.500 | 38.2    | $10.198 | 27.1    | $ 8.850 | 24.0    |
| Navy\(^a\)                  | 12.000 | 26.4    | 11.000  | 25.5    | 10.493  | 28.0    | 9.700   | 27.1    |
| Air Force                   | 17.510 | 38.6    | 15.100  | 34.9    | 16.209  | 43.1    | 15.600  | 43.6    |
| OSD and interservice        |  .590  | 1.3     |  .593   | 1.4     |  .675   | 1.8     |  1.600  | 4.5     |
| Total                       | $45.400 | 100.0   | $43.193 | 100.0   | $37.575 | 100.0   | b$35.750 | 100.0   |

\(^a\) Includes Marine Corps.

\(^b\) FY 1956 expenditure estimate subject to reduction of $1.75 billion to be allocated later.

The strength and force level decisions made during 1953 and 1954 became the basis for charges that the administration was overstressing nuclear striking power. The same trend, continued into successive years, was eventually to make the New Look virtually identical with massive retaliation in the public mind.  

In appraising the effects of this development as it had progressed by the end of 1954, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed widely. Admiral Radford viewed it with general approval. In a statement prepared early in 1955, he held that "the policies and actions which have shaped the development of our military forces thus far are substantially sound and should be continued." Echoing the President, he stressed the primary importance of retaliatory airpower and continental defense. He also reaffirmed his belief in the need for economy, or, as he put it, "reasonable conservation of manpower, materiel, and money." He admitted the absence of the strategic reserve but saw the remedy in redoubled efforts to induce allied nations to create military forces that would complement those of the United States. He believed that, as long as US strength was maintained, the principal threats to peace would come from infiltration and subversion in those areas best calculated by the communists to offer hope for success. Such threats, in his view, were not likely to be reduced by mere increases in the number of men in uniform. On the basis of these considerations, he affirmed that the administration's FY 1956 manpower goals were adequate for the foreseeable future.  

**Table 10—DOD Actual New Obligational Authority and Expenditures: FYs 1953–1956 ($ billions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Obligational Authority and Expenditures</th>
<th>FY 1953</th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
<th>FY 1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$13.234</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>$12.937</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20.595</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>11.409</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD and interservice</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$47.031</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$34.474</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$16.605</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>$12.910</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy *</td>
<td>11.640</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>11.293</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15.210</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>15.668</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD and interservice</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.464</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$43.864</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$40.335</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Marine Corps.

General Twining also believed that the direction of US military policy was soundly conceived. The decision to adopt the New Look, he considered, had been supported and strengthened by recent developments, notably the prospect that Japanese and West German contingents would soon join the military forces of the noncommunist world. Nor did he overlook considerations of economy. “Our national policy has placed stress on austerity of forces for the ‘long pull,’” he pointed out, “and, to my knowledge, there has been no change in the conditions which dictated the necessity for this economy in force.” He recognized that the strength and force levels approved for the Air Force contained an element of risk but believed this acceptable.\textsuperscript{135}

General Ridgway, on the other hand, saw US defense planning as increasingly divorced from international realities. He regarded a 28-division Army as the minimum needed to meet the commitments into which the United States had entered. “Present United States military forces cannot support fully America’s diplomacy,” he asserted in a letter to Secretary Wilson in June 1955. “It is my view,” he continued, “that the commitments which the United States had pledged create a positive requirement for an immediately available mobile joint military force of hard hitting character in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized and the preponderance of any one part is deemphasized.” At the same time, he stressed another consideration that had been recognized in NSC 5501: that the age of atomic plenty would create a condition of mutual deterrence that would in turn increase the likelihood of small-scale aggressions not involving nuclear weapons. The United States should therefore be prepared for small perimeter wars in which nuclear weapons might not be used. After his retirement, General Ridgway was to carry his case to the public through the medium of the press and thus to furnish new impetus to the debate over the New Look.\textsuperscript{136}

Admiral Carney also apparently viewed the trend with a certain dismay. The measure of his developing concern was the fact that, whereas he had told Congress early in 1954 that he accepted the FY 1955 budget without reservation, a year later he made it plain that his acceptance of the FY 1956 budget was qualified. But he evidently did not share the intensity of General Ridgway’s convictions.

These appraisals reflected the differing viewpoints of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that have been described earlier. The preconceptions and assumptions that lay back of the conclusions of each Service chief were deeply felt throughout the respective Services and, as a consequence, pervaded the subordinate planning agencies of the JCS organization. The effect of this condition on the development of strategic plans during 1953 is the subject of the succeeding chapter.
Strategic Planning, 1953-1954

In a broad sense, planning was the cardinal function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least during peacetime. When Congress established the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a statutory basis in 1947, it listed the following tasks at the head of their assigned responsibilities:

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans.\(^1\)

Before 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged these responsibilities in a rather unsystematic manner. Plans were developed for war contingencies, intended to guide force deployments and mobilization during the first months of conflict, but they were not prepared or revised on a regular schedule. Moreover, they provided no guidance for any situation short of outright hostilities. Decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization had to be made separately, with no overall guiding framework other than that existing in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, or the President.\(^2\)

The JCS Planning Program: Policy Memorandum 84

A suggestion that planning be placed on a regular and systematic basis was made by the Director of the Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, in December 1949.\(^3\) After considerable delay, perhaps occasioned by the pressures of the Korean War, this suggestion eventuated in Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 84, “Joint Program for Planning,” approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 July 1952. This directive established a family of three plans, applicable either to peace or to war, and designed to translate national policy into long-, medium-, and short-range strategic objectives over a span extending ten years into the future.\(^4\)
The farthest ranging of the three was to be a Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE), which, as its title indicated, was not a plan in the strict sense (though often referred to as such). It was to be a forecast of “the probable areas of conflict, the outline of the type of war expected and the basic undertakings required” during a five-year period beginning five years after the date of issuance of the JLRSE. Although the description of the nature and purposes of the JLRSE was somewhat vague, it was intended primarily as a guide for research and development. It was expected to translate military strategy into objectives of technical development; to establish a basis for assigning priorities to research and development programs; and to evaluate the effects of research on military strategy. Though necessarily broad in nature, it was at the same time to include a year-by-year schedule, or forecast, of expected technological changes. It was to be based upon requirements, but the nature and source of the requirements were not specified.

Guidance for the mid-range period was to be provided by a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), which would be based upon the assumption of a war beginning on 1 July three years after the plan was approved. Thus the first JSOP, which would presumably be issued in 1953, would have an assumed D-date of 1 July 1956. The JSOP would provide strategic concepts for war and for the period preceding D-day, and would guide the development of the forces required under these concepts. It was expected to provide the Services with a basis for preparing their budget requests for the fiscal year immediately before D-day. It would also guide the development of Service mobilization plans; would aid in determining requirements for military assistance to allies, both before and after D-day; and would provide short-range guidance for weapons development. The JSOP was to be developed in three sections, dealing respectively with: (1) peacetime or conflict short of global war, (2) the first or emergency phase of a general war, and (3) the additional forces and resources needed for the mobilization base before D-day, as well as US and allied mobilization requirements through the first 48 months of a general conflict.

Finally, there was to be a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), covering the approaching fiscal year (the first day of which was to be assumed as D-day). It would guide the disposition, employment, and support of existing forces. This was the plan that would go into effect if war broke out. It was to follow the format of the JSOP in providing guidance for three different contingencies—peacetime (or limited war), and general war both in its early phases and through its first 48 months. In this plan, and in the JSOP as well, it was assumed that D-day and M-day would coincide.

Both the JSCP and the JSOP were to take cognizance of combined plans, such as those of NATO, for the corresponding periods. They would also guide the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reviewing such plans in the future.

The JLRSE and the JSOP were to contain logistic annexes that would indicate the logistic and supporting actions for which the Services were responsible. For the same purpose, the JSCP was to have a separate, but accompanying, Joint Logistic Plan.

The task of preparing the plans was assigned to three committees of the JCS.
organization: the Joint Strategic Plans, Joint Logistics Plans, and Joint Intelligence Committees. In the organization as it stood in 1953, these committees corresponded to the three groups of the Joint Staff and constituted an echelon above the Joint Staff where its work was reviewed and passed upon before submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, for instance, assigned tasks to the Joint Strategic Plans Group of the Joint Staff and received its reports for consideration. The formal membership of each committee consisted of four officers: one representative each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, usually of two-star rank and drawn, part-time, from the cognizant element of his Service staff, plus the Deputy Director who headed the corresponding Joint Staff Group. In addition, a representative of the Marine Corps attended as a member whenever one of the committees considered an agenda item recognized as being of direct concern to that Service. This practice paralleled the procedure adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves in 1952, when legislation assigned to the Commandant, USMC, a status co-equal with the other JCS members when considering matters that directly concerned the Marine Corps. 

In the new planning program the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) was given primary responsibility for preparing plans. The other two committees were to collaborate. In addition, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was to prepare intelligence estimates to serve as the basis for each plan, and the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) would draft the logistic plans and annexes. The strategic concept of each plan was to have the concurrence of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

All three plans were to be prepared or revised annually in accord with the following schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Deadline for Submission to JCS</th>
<th>Expected Date of Approval and Dissemination by JCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JLRSE</td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>30 September ^6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>1 November</td>
<td>31 December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The schedule was based on the functions and interrelationships of the various plans. The JSOP was expected to be guided by the forecast of trends in the JLRSE; distribution of the latter on 30 September would allow nine months for its use in preparation of the former. The deadline of 30 June for the JSOP afforded the Services two years in which to prepare their supporting budgets for the fiscal year that would begin two years after the JSOP was distributed and would end on the assumed D-day. The JSCP was to be used by commanders of unified and specified commands in preparing their own plans; for this purpose the schedule allowed them the six-month interval that lay between dissemination of the approved JSCP and the plan’s D-day. ^7

The necessary intelligence estimates were to be approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee in time to allow the Joint Strategic Plans Committee four months in which to complete each plan. The Joint Logistic Plan was to be
approved within a month after its related JSCP; the logistic annexes to the JLRSE and JSOP would be approved concurrently with the latter. The force levels in the JSCP were to be reviewed on 1 January, or whenever a major change in forces took place.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that these carefully interrelated plans would correlate peacetime and wartime strategy in a manner never before attempted. They would furnish a basis for advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. They would provide guidance for US representatives in such international organizations as NATO and the UN Military Staff Committee, and for agencies concerned with foreign aid programs. They were expected to put an end to piecemeal or crisis planning and to provide a ready basis for solutions, through routine staff action, to otherwise time-consuming problems.

**Planning at the Beginning of 1953**

At the time Policy Memorandum 84 was adopted, there was in effect a Joint Outline War Plan (JOWP), approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 December 1950, which assumed a four-year war between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning on 1 July 1954. A series of short-range plans had been initiated in 1948 and periodically updated; the latest (Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, or JOEWP), for a D-day of 1 January 1952, was under consideration. Both the JOWP and the JOEWP were based on the assumption of an initial Soviet attack on Western Europe, during which the allies would be forced onto the defensive but would seek to hold as much territory as possible while launching nuclear air strikes at enemy forces and territory. It was anticipated that at some point the communist onslaught would be halted and the allies would launch their own land, sea, and air offensive against Soviet forces in Europe. The JOWP foresaw the allied offensive as taking place through the North German plain; the JOEWP did not attempt to forecast its locale. Both plans assumed that atomic weapons would be used immediately by both sides./footer

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also approved a Joint Mobilization Plan, JCS 1725/47, related to the JOWP, but with D-day (which was also assumed as M-day) advanced to 1 July 1952 as a result of the Korean crisis. No long-range plan was in effect or under consideration. A plan covering a war with the USSR beginning on 1 January 1957 had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1949, but it was withdrawn from consideration in 1951.

In order to bring these plans into phase with the new program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they issued Policy Memorandum 84, directed that the JOWP be amended for a D-day of 1 July 1955, to furnish mid-range guidance pending completion of the first JSOP (with D-day of 1 July 1956). The JOEWP was to be updated to 1 July 1952 and would remain in effect until 1 July 1953, when it would be superseded by the first JSCP. At the same time, recognizing
that the JSCP would not be ready by 1 November 1952 as scheduled, they
extended to 1 March 1953 the deadline for its submission.\textsuperscript{11}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JOEWP on 19 September
1952.\textsuperscript{12} Meanwhile, they had called for the first JSOP by 1 January 1953, in order
that it might be used in mobilization planning.\textsuperscript{13} On 14 November 1952 they
decided that the JOWP would not be revised unless it proved necessary later to
update it as a basis for FY 1955 force level planning before the JSOP was
completed.\textsuperscript{14} Implicit in these JCS decisions was an assumption that the guidance
provided by the JSOP in future years would make a separate Joint Mobiliza-

Preparation of all three of the new plans was begun by the Joint Staff in
response to directives issued by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 5 August
1952. The Committee set deadlines that would allow two months for reviewing
and revising each draft before it was due to go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When
the Joint Chiefs of Staff advanced the date of the JSOP to 1 January 1953, the
Committee accordingly called for a first draft by 20 November 1952.\textsuperscript{16} But the Joint
Strategic Plans Group was unable to meet this schedule; the draft of the
JSOP was not ready until 13 February 1953. The JSCP was delayed even longer,
reaching the Committee on 2 March.\textsuperscript{17} By that time the deadlines for submitting
both plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already passed.

As of 12 March 1953 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had spent 37 hours
discussing the JSCP and had tentatively approved only 32 of its 140 pages. Since
this plan would be needed soon as guidance for the unified commands, Major
General J. S. Bradley, USA, the Committee Chairman, suggested that it be given
priority over the JSOP.\textsuperscript{18} His suggestion was adopted, and the progress of the
JSCP soon outstripped that of the JSOP.

Progress of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

A
fter the Committee began discussing the JSCP, the draft went through
three revisions in as many months. Each version, redrafted by the Joint
Staff, had to be circulated for review to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the
Joint Logistics Plans Committee.\textsuperscript{19}

During discussion in the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Service differences
of opinion made their appearance. In the launching of the new planning program,
the eagerness of each Service for maximum advantage led its representatives to
contend for unnecessarily detailed statements of objectives and tasks that would
reflect its own views. The Committee was thus drawn into disputes that would
have been more appropriate in connection with the JSOP (where, in fact, they
were also to appear).\textsuperscript{20}

After two months' discussion of the fourth draft, the members abandoned
the attempt to reach agreement. On 14 August they approved a draft, JCS
1844/151, that incorporated conflicting versions of several portions and thus
passed the disputes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. By that time the plan was already threatened with obsolescence, since it assumed a D-day of 1 July 1953.21

The basic disagreement was between the Air Force and the other Services and concerned the degree of reliance to be placed upon nuclear retaliatory capacity in the design of US strategy. It appeared in the introductory appraisal of the strengths of the allies and the Soviet bloc. The Air Force asserted that the US superiority in atomic weapons could “serve to neutralize the Communist preponderance of ground forces” and “enable the Allies to hold large areas of Europe.” The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps believed that this superiority would suffice only to assist in achieving those objectives.

In discussing pre-D-day strategy, the Air Force wished to emphasize the need for a deterrent that would consist of “an offensive capability, particularly the capability to inflict massive damage on Soviet war-making capacity.” Although this language was borrowed verbatim from the current statement of national security policy (NSC 153/1), the other Services were unwilling to commit the United States to such a degree of reliance on nuclear weapons. They preferred to speak of “a level of military readiness which will continuously confront the Soviet Bloc with convincing evidence of . . . Allied capability.”

Behind these verbal quibbles lay a strategic disagreement of real substance. It found expression in other passages as well. The Air Force contended that all peacetime military plans should assign clear-cut priority to the development of forces for D-day and to the provision of their logistic support for the first six months of war, and should downgrade the importance of accumulating mobilization reserves needed after D plus six months. The Air Force also sought the narrowest possible statement of required naval capabilities—one that saw naval forces as filling a largely passive role, the defense of shipping.

The war strategy proposed in JCS 1844/151 resembled that in the JOEWP. During the initial, or emergency phase (defined as the first six months after D-day), the allies would seek to defeat or arrest Soviet offensives and to launch allied attacks as soon as possible. The Air Force envisioned “strategic air warfare operations to create conditions . . . which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of Allied war objectives.” The other Services, less hopeful of a quick and easy victory, spoke of conducting “strategic air and naval offensives” which would merely contribute to the creation of favorable conditions. Since the disagreement involved the strategic concept for the initial phase, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had been consulted, and had concurred in the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view.

For the final section, which extended plans through D plus 48 months, the Air Force and the other three Services submitted separate versions. Both envisioned a shift from defense to offense after the initial phase. Both also agreed that land operations would be necessary, and they outlined plans for an offensive through either north central or southeastern Europe, with the final choice to be made after hostilities began. The Army-Navy-Marine Corps version set forth the alternative campaign plans in somewhat more detail than that of the Air
Force, which emphasized the difficulties of conducting a major ground offensive against the Soviet Union and warned that it should not be attempted until strategic bombing had inflicted critical damage upon the enemy.

The planned buildup and deployment of forces during the first 48 months of war were set forth in force tabs prepared individually by each Service. Those of the Navy were criticized by the Army and Air Force because they proposed to divert certain forces from CINCFE to CINCPAC by D plus three months. The Air Force also wished the Navy to list naval air units by type. There was no disagreement over the force tabs of the other Services.\(^{22}\)

The Joint Logistics Plans Committee had warned that the JSCP could not be "fully logistically supported." Even without making allowances for enemy bomb damage, the deficiencies in aircraft, construction facilities, petroleum, ammunition, and other items would make it impossible to meet the mobilization and deployment schedules.\(^{23}\) The Joint Strategic Plans Committee incorporated these warnings in JCS 1844/151, but concluded that the plan was nevertheless acceptable.

JCS 1844/151 came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 September 1953. Finding the disagreements too numerous to be readily resolved, they remanded it to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee with orders to prepare a brief summary of the issues involved.\(^{24}\)

The Committee complied on 19 October 1953. Its statement described as follows the conflicting views on strategy:

a. The over-all U.S. strategic concept for deterring aggression, defeating local aggression, and providing the basis for winning a general war, should place primary reliance on the ability to cope with any military threat now existing or which may develop. This concept necessitates maintenance of a tailored combination of combat ready forces of all Services during a long period of tension, and in event of general war, the provision for the mobilization of additional forces required, without placing pre-determined emphasis on any one concept or type of operations. [This was the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view.]

   - OR -

b. In developing an over-all strategic concept for deterring or winning a war, and in the face of increasing Soviet atomic capability, particular emphasis should be placed on our capability to conduct strategic air warfare with the reasonable assurance that this capability, considered with the total military strength of the United States, will provide a dynamic deterrent to war, and should war occur, that this capability, with the capabilities of other forces, would produce favorable decisive action during the emergency phase of the war and thus provide the basis for attainment of national objectives through exploitation. [Air Force view].\(^{25}\)

By the time this statement reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delays in the JSOP and JLRSE had raised the possibility that the entire Joint Program for Planning might have to be revised. Hence, action on the JSCP was postponed.
Development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

The draft JSOP that went to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 13 February 1953 was revised in March and again in June. Each version supported a broad strategy similar to that in the draft JSCP: maintenance of a deterrent posture during the cold war, a holding operation immediately after D-day to contain the Soviet assault, and eventually the initiation of a major allied offensive, including a land attack through north central or southeastern Europe. Once again, the Air Force member of the Committee differed with the representatives of the other Services over the extent of reliance on nuclear striking power in overall strategy, the assignment of priorities in mobilization planning, and the scope to be assigned naval warfare capabilities.

The force tabs were a source of even more conflict than those of the JSCP. The Army objected that the Navy’s planned expansion was excessive (a view concurred in by the Air Force) and was not phased with projected land operations, and that the Air Force deployment plans exceeded capabilities and would not provide adequate close support for troops. The Navy’s proposal to operate its own early-warning aircraft was criticized by the Air Force as an intrusion upon the latter’s responsibility. An ad hoc group appointed by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was unable to resolve these disagreements.

On 17 August 1953 the Committee distributed to holders of the draft a tabulation of the points at issue, to accompany the plan when it went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thus signified that the JSPC members had abandoned hope of reaching agreement. On 21 August the draft went to the Joint Logistics Plans and Joint Intelligence Committees for review.

On 12 October 1953 the Director, Joint Staff, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the JSOP was “in final stages of Committee consideration and should be completed in November.” By that time nearly a year would have elapsed since the plan’s originally scheduled submission date of 1 January 1953.

The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate

In developing a JLRSE, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was handicapped by the ambiguity of Policy Memorandum 84 regarding its purpose. Though referred to as an estimate, it was expected to embody decisions that would shape the nature of US armed forces; hence in some degree it partook of the nature of a plan.

The three Groups of the Joint Staff, working with the Joint Advanced Study Committee and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), completed a draft JLRSE on 30 July 1953. It consisted of a discussion of probable trends in weapons development and their effect on warfare, with recommendations for the direction of weapons research. The forecast was general in nature and made no attempt to meet the requirement posed in the terms of reference.
for a year-by-year chronology of expected technical changes. Scheduled for submission by 1 May, the draft was three months late.\textsuperscript{30}

The draft was rejected, however, by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The members found themselves fundamentally at odds over the nature of the JLRSE. On 7 August they appointed an ad hoc committee to prepare an outline for a new estimate.\textsuperscript{31} Although this group agreed on a format, they too disagreed over purpose and content. Some conceived the JLRSE as a purely technical guide for research and development, others as a broader appraisal of political, social, and other trends. The underlying question, said the ad hoc committee, was: "Does strategy evolve from weapons, or do the weapons evolve from the strategy?"\textsuperscript{32}

Choosing the second of these alternatives, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee issued a new directive on 24 August 1953 that interpreted broadly the role of the JLRSE. The estimate was to be based on an appraisal of geographical, political, economic, social, religious, scientific, technical, and military factors and trends. It was to include a long-range strategic concept together with a description of the forces required for its support. These requirements would then serve to orient research and development programs. In other words, the JLRSE would guide technological development instead of merely reflecting it.\textsuperscript{33}

On 13 October 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were advised that a new JLRSE was in final stages of preparation and should be ready for committee review before the end of the month. This forecast, however, was to prove no more accurate than similar ones.\textsuperscript{34}

The Planning Program Reconsidered

By October 1953 the Joint Program for Planning launched by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1952 was fifteen months old. According to the original schedule, all three plans should have been approved and disseminated and the second year of the planning cycle should be well under way. Instead, the only visible fruits were a JSCP, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but not yet acted upon, and drafts of the JSOP and JLRSE in various stages of completion.

What had gone wrong? Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest, the Director, Joint Staff, had begun an investigation of this question in July 1953. It was apparent that a major reason for delay was the search for maximum advantage by the Services, which led their representatives in the planning committees to wrangle at length over phraseology and force tabs. Another reason was incomplete coordination among the groups and individuals involved, especially between logisticians and strategic planners. Experience showed that approximately four weeks were required, after force tabs became available, to complete a logistic analysis.\textsuperscript{35}

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sought reasons for the breakdown of the planning program. Admiral Carney saw the principal obstacle as poor coordination between strategic and logistic planners within each Service. He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide initial guidance for each plan, thus settling
in advance the basic issues—strategic concepts and force levels. With the same end in view, General Ridgway recommended that draft plans be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in outline form for approval before being developed in detail.

General Twining was more concerned with the status of the plans under consideration than with the reform of the planning process. At present, he pointed out, the Services had no guidance for developing their plans. For example, the Air Force, to meet its 1953 schedule, had been forced to issue its emergency plan without waiting for approval of the JSCP. To complete the draft JSCP and JSOP with their present target dates would throw the planning cycle hopelessly askew. He therefore urged that the JSCP be completed with a new D-day of 1 July 1954; interim short-range guidance could be provided by updating the JOEWP force tabs to 1 January 1954. The draft JSOP and JLRSE should be revised for target dates of 1 July 1957 and 1 July 1959, respectively.

General Twining’s suggestion that the JSCP be updated was adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 November 1953. They set a deadline of 1 January 1954 for distribution of the revised plan. They took no action at that time, however, to resolve the disputed issues, as they would have to do before revision could begin. Nor did they act on the JSOP or the JLRSE.

In the weeks that followed, progress of the JSOP continued to lag. One reason for delay was adoption of a new statement of basic national security policy (NSC 162/2), which required revision of the draft.

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a directive from Secretary Wilson on 16 October 1953, had begun their search for a military strategy to accompany NSC 162/2, and in so doing, were brought face to face with the issues that had deadlocked the planning committees. The resulting statement, JCS 2101/113, had some of the characteristics of a JSOP, and could serve some of the same purposes. It was based upon a planning date of 1 July 1957, three years in the future; it provided general budgetary guidance, in the form of force objectives attainable within the limits of the money expected to be available; and it set forth a strategic concept for development and deployment of peacetime forces. Its principal difference from the JSOP was that it assumed no outbreak of war and thus furnished no guidance for wartime strategy or for mobilization.

General Twining was the first to suggest using JCS 2101/113 as a guide for completing the JSOP. Admiral Carney endorsed his suggestion. General Everest went still farther and proposed that the JSOP be abandoned in favor of a mid-range war plan, which, in combination with JCS 2101/113, would provide all necessary guidance for both war and peace. While this new plan was under preparation, he suggested, the entire Joint Program for Planning should be restudied.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Everest’s proposal on 10 February 1954. They specified that the new mid-range plan, like the JSOP, would assume a war of 48 months’ duration. The force levels in JCS 2101/113 would serve as the basis for the plan, and the date of 1 July 1957 would be assumed as both D-day and M-day. Any disagreements arising in the drafting of the plan would be referred to them promptly. At the same time, Policy Memorandum 84 was to be
reexamined by an appropriate committee. On 11 February 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred these decisions to the three planning committees for action.44

Shortly thereafter the JLRSE was also abandoned. The Joint Strategic Plans Group submitted a revised version on 1 February 1954,45 prepared in accordance with the Joint Strategic Plans Committee’s directive of 24 August 1953. Nevertheless the JSPC rejected it. The members agreed that they would prepare statements of their conception of the nature and purposes of the JLRSE, and would use these as the basis for a fresh start. “It has been found impracticable to develop a meaningful and acceptable JLRSE in strict conformance with the Joint Program for Planning,” reported the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans on 9 March 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this decision.46

The First Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Completed

A
der the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 24 November that the draft JSCP should be updated, they were at first too busy to settle the disagreements that stood in the way of its completion. On 16 December 1953 General Everest proposed to use JCS 2101/113 as a basis for settlement. He submitted revised versions of the disputed paragraphs of JCS 1844/151, using phraseology taken as far as possible from JCS 2101/113 or oriented toward the goal of strategic flexibility that had been proclaimed as desirable in that document.47

Most of General Everest’s proposals proved acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.48 A high-ranking inter-Service working group settled some of the other areas of disagreement.49 On 12 January 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these changes, resolved the remaining disputes, and sent JCS 1844/151 back to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for final revision.50

Since JCS 2101/113 was a broadly worded statement, which did not in itself commit the United States to any single strategy, the result of borrowing language from it was to reject the extreme emphasis on airpower that the Air Force had sought to include in the JSCP. Thus the key disagreement, involving the strategic concept for the cold war, was settled by a statement that the United States would seek to achieve its objectives by:

Minimizing the risk of Soviet aggression by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis upon offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength—this to be based upon a massive retaliatory capability, including the necessary secure bases, an adequate continental defense system, and by combat forces of the United States and its Allies suitably deployed or capable of immediate deployment to deter or counter aggression and to discharge required initial tasks in the event of a general war. An important characteristic of this posture is the strategic flexibility required to meet the broad retaliatory and counter offensive demands associated with a general war as well as the varied and recurrent military requirements short of a war.

The first sentence combined the requirements for defense against the Soviet threat, as stated in NSC 162/2, with those for a supporting military strategy
outlined in JCS 2101/113. The second, which had been suggested by General Ridgway, qualified the emphasis on airpower in NSC 162/2.

Elsewhere the Joint Chiefs of Staff substituted broad statements of objectives or tasks, consonant with JCS 2101/113, for the needlessly detailed portions of JCS 1844/151 that had occasioned disputes. In every case the final version was closer to the Army-Navy-Marine Corps views than to those of the Air Force. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the US superiority in atomic weapons should serve to reduce, but not to eliminate, the Soviets’ manpower advantage. They specified that the United States, during the early phase of the war, would “conduct offensive operations against the enemy, exploiting US capability to inflict massive retaliatory damage,” but no attempt was made to estimate how far these operations alone would achieve US war objectives. They assigned no mobilization priorities, and incorporated a broad rather than a narrowly defensive statement of naval capabilities. The Navy force tabs were approved as submitted, with a stipulation that the allocation of forces between CINCFE and CINCPAC would be reviewed after D-day. For the final section, outlining operations through D plus 48 months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a version drafted by General Everest that was close to the one proposed by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.51

The Joint Strategic Plans Group rewrote JCS 1844/151 to incorporate these changes, at the same time revising the force tabs to reflect increases in continental defense forces that were now expected by 1 July 1954. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee pointed out that the enlargement of these forces and the more rapid expansion projected for them after D-day would aggravate the deficiencies in transportation facilities and petroleum that had been cited in connection with JCS 1844/151.52 Despite these deficiencies, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan on 31 March 1954. In final form, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1954-1955 was disseminated on 14 April 1954 as JCS 1844/156.

This plan, the first to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under their new planning system, contained an opening section dealing with strategy before D-day. This strategy was intended to deter war or to lay the basis for victory if war should come. The possibility of operations short of general war was recognized, but no guidance was offered for such a contingency, except a prescription for mobile forces ready for deployment to meet aggression in any part of the world. The plan then set out detailed guidance for general war with the Soviet bloc based on the assumption that both adversaries would at once employ nuclear weapons.53

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan

The first draft of the Joint Mid-Range War Plan (JMRWP) was completed by the Joint Staff in May 1954. Reflecting recent advances by the United States and the USSR in thermonuclear weaponry, it stressed the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy and warned that there was no alternative to complete
preparations for nuclear warfare. Nevertheless the war strategy proposed in the JMRWP was similar to that in the draft JSOP, except that no effort was made to forecast the theater of land operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{54}

When the draft reached the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Army member objected to the use of JCS 2101/113, which had imposed on the Army an eventual manpower limit of 1,000,000, as a basis for force tabs. He proposed instead to use the figure of 1,152,000, for which the Army was currently seeking JCS approval. The other members demurred, and the JSPC submitted the issue to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 June 1954.\textsuperscript{55}

The question of personnel strengths for FY 1957 was closely related to the figures set for FY 1956, which were then in a state of uncertainty owing to the crisis in Indochina. On 10 June 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed action on the JMRWP pending a decision by the administration on the question of redeployment from the Far East. After Secretary Wilson tentatively approved strengths for FY 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that these would be used temporarily as the D-day figures in the force tabs for the JMRWP.\textsuperscript{56}

A new draft, prepared on this basis, was completed on 10 September 1954. But the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, after reviewing the mobilization schedules in the force tabs, concluded that they were too ambitious. Deficits in petroleum, tankers, aircraft, and other material, such as had been cited in connection with earlier plans, were now expected to be acute because of the smaller production base that was in prospect by 1957.\textsuperscript{57}

The implications of this conclusion became a matter of dispute in the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. To the Air Force member, it seemed obvious that the Army and Navy should trim down their plans to fit them to the anticipated FY 1957 mobilization base. The representatives of the other Services argued conversely that the base should be expanded to support their planned forces. Unable to reach agreement, the JSPC referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 September 1954.\textsuperscript{58}

Here was the familiar strategic disagreement as it applied specifically to mobilization plans. Should the Services assume a war fought essentially with the forces in being on D-day, in which strategic airpower would predominate and would perhaps determine the outcome? Or should they project a massive buildup, over a period of many months, of land, sea, and air forces, like that carried out in World War II? The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not settle the question and were forced to send it to Secretary Wilson for decision on 25 October 1954. Each of the Service Chiefs argued in support of the stand taken by his representative on the Committee. Admiral Radford now for the first time set forth his separate views, in accordance with a recent directive from the Secretary of Defense prescribing that the Chairman should do so whenever he differed from the other JCS members.\textsuperscript{59} As on many other subjects, his position was close to that of General Twining. War plans, he believed, should emphasize the importance of the forces that existed on D-day or that could be mobilized rapidly thereafter. Accordingly, he recommended approval of Service mobilization schedules extending only through the first six months after D-day.\textsuperscript{60}

Secretary Wilson approved Admiral Radford’s recommendation and ordered
the JMRWP completed on that basis. His decision was announced in directives on 2 November and 9 December 1954, in which he laid down detailed instructions for FY 1957 mobilization planning. At the same time, while thus removing one obstacle to the progress of the JMRWP, he inadvertently introduced another by ordering it completed "in the light of the new NATO military concept."

The Secretary's reference was to a revision of NATO strategy that had recently been endorsed by the NATO Military Committee and was to receive final approval from the North Atlantic Council a few days later. It was based on the assumption that general war would be almost certain to open with an exchange of nuclear attacks that would probably be decisive, even if it did not terminate the conflict.\textsuperscript{62} There was no outright conflict between the text of the NATO document and the draft JMRWP, but it was necessary to insure that the language used in the latter was wholly compatible with the former. On 20 December 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee ordered the draft JMRWP revised as necessary for this purpose.\textsuperscript{63} The resulting restatement of the strategic concept of the JMRWP, approved by JSPC in February 1955, represented a change in phraseology rather than substance, but the effect was to delay the completion of the plan.\textsuperscript{64}

At the same time, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, before revising the force tabs in accord with Secretary Wilson's instructions, awaited a final determination of personnel strengths and force levels for D-day (i.e., the end of FY 1957), in place of those temporarily adopted in July 1954. In December 1954 Secretary Wilson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use the FY 1956 personnel strengths established by the President (originally 2,815,000 men, later raised to 2,850,000) in planning for 1957. Force levels based on these figures, bearing the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were approved by the Secretary of Defense on 18 January 1955.\textsuperscript{65} Thereupon the Joint Strategic Plans Committee completed action on the draft plan on 30 March 1955. On 15 April 1955, the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957 received formal JCS approval.\textsuperscript{66}

The 1955–1956 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

\textbf{U}nder Policy Memorandum 84, a JSCP for 1 July 1955 was scheduled to reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1 November 1954. On 9 July the Joint Strategic Plans Committee directed the Joint Staff to begin developing the plan. In the hope of preventing some of the delays encountered before, it ordered continuing coordination among the three Joint Staff Groups.\textsuperscript{67} But the JSPC was powerless to prevent inter-Service disputes over strategy.

The first draft, completed on 8 September 1954, resembled the 1954–1955 plan in substance.\textsuperscript{68} As soon as it was sent to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, clashing viewpoints again became evident. In the original draft, the strategic concept for the emergency phase of general war had been described in language taken almost verbatim from the 1954–1955 JSCP. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, however, proposed to preface this brief statement with an estimate
of the probable nature and duration of a general war. For this purpose, the members turned to a study recently made for NATO, which embodied the new NATO military concept referred to earlier. It had recently been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 2073/900. But the JSPC members disagreed over its interpretation, though each stated his position, as far as possible, in language taken from JCS 2073/900.

The Army member believed that general war might result either from a massive nuclear assault by the Soviet Union or from escalation of a local clash in which atomic weapons were not used at first. This assumption seemed at variance at least with the spirit of JCS 2073/900, which had virtually ruled out the second contingency. The other Services agreed that general war would unquestionably open with an intensive exchange of nuclear weapons. Whether it was probable that this initial phase would conclude the war, rendering further military operations unnecessary, was a matter of disagreement between the Navy-Marine Corps and the Air Force. The JSPC referred these disputes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 October 1954, asking that the deadline for completing the plan be extended to 1 December.69

The Joint Chiefs of Staff acted immediately. Rejecting the Army view, they sent the JSPC two versions of the disputed portion, one a compromise between the Navy-Marine Corps and the Air Force positions, the other a longer statement consisting of four paragraphs taken almost verbatim from JCS 2073/900. The choice between these versions was left to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused the request for an extended deadline.70

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee selected the longer version for application to the draft JSCP.71 However, since four paragraphs were thought too lengthy for a strategic concept, the Committee, after consultation with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,72 distilled their essence into a shorter statement that the initial phase of war would be characterized by an “intensive exchange of atomic blows,” the results of which would determine the duration and outcome of the subsequent phase.73

By the time this question was disposed of, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had run into another: the cutoff date for the force tabs—that is, the length of time for which deployment and mobilization plans should be projected. The Army and Navy, following Policy Memorandum 84, prepared force tabs extending through D plus 48 months. The Air Force withheld its tabs while its representative argued that they should extend only through D plus 12. The question was the same as that encountered by the JSPC during its work on the JMRWP: whether or not to base war plans on the assumption of a long period of mobilization.

Through the initiative of Lieutenant General Lemuel Mathewson, Director of the Joint Staff, the matter was settled on 26 October 1954 by the Operations Deputies, who authorized a compromise cutoff date of D plus 30 months. Seemingly, therefore, the last obstacle to completion had been surmounted. A second request by the JSPC for extension of the deadline to 1 December was approved by Admiral Radford.74

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One more dispute, however, was to prevent the Joint Strategic Plans Committee from meeting this new submission date. The Air Force member objected to the provision (carried over from the 1954–1955 JSCP) for alternative plans for an offensive through either of two areas of Europe, north central or south-eastern. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had to refer the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 December 1954.\(^7^5\) It was readily settled when General Twining accepted the substance of the other Services’ position.\(^7^6\)

The Joint Logistics Plans Group reviewed the draft and reported on 28 December that, as usual, the strategic planners were straining the limits of logistic feasibility; the plan could not be fully supported. Nevertheless the Joint Strategic Plans Committee published the plan in virtually final form on 21 January 1955, without substantial revision.\(^7^7\) After further coordination and an amendment to reflect the restatement of national policy in NSC 5501, it was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 March. They approved the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1955-1956 on 30 March 1955.\(^7^8\)

**Revision of the Planning Program**

Overhaul of the planning process had been temporarily set aside while the Joint Chiefs of Staff concentrated on the more pressing problem of getting current plans back on schedule. In December 1953 the Joint Strategic Plans Group had drafted a revision of Policy Memorandum 84 that reflected General Everest’s conclusions about the nature of the difficulties involved, but it was never acted upon.\(^7^9\)

In September 1954 the three Groups of the Joint Staff submitted new proposals to improve planning. They recommended stronger coordinating authority for the Director, Joint Staff, and promulgation of a planning manual to prescribe detailed procedures. They did not, however, propose major changes in the plans themselves or in the scheduled dates of submission and dissemination.\(^8^0\)

These proposed changes were rejected by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. At the same time, the JSPC members brought forward various suggestions of their own, including widely divergent proposals regarding the time span to be covered by each plan.\(^8^1\) The results of the discussions within the JSPC were embodied by the Joint Strategic Plans Group in a new report dated 15 December 1954, which noted the following defects in the existing program:

1. The purpose and scope of the three plans were not clearly defined.
2. The JLRSE should not be conceived of as the sole source of research and development guidance; the JSOP and JSCP should also serve this purpose.
3. The three-year period between approval of the JSOP and its assumed M-day (or D-day) did not allow adequate time for procurement of the military equipment necessary under the plan.
4. The ten-year period spanned by the JLRSE was insufficient to furnish long-range guidance.

The report recommended that the JLRSE become effective eight years in the
future and cover a four-year period, giving it a total span of twelve years. Its purpose would be to guide long-range military objectives, policies, and plans (not merely research and development). The JSOP should be oriented toward a D-day four years in the future. The span to be covered by each JSOP and JSCP should be determined separately in the annual preparation of each plan.82

After several revisions, this report was incorporated in a new planning directive approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 July 1955. It fixed the span of the JSOP as three years; the next JSCP (with a D-day of 1 July 1956) was also to cover a three-year period, but subsequent ones only two years. No changes were made in the time schedules, except that the dates for submission and approval of the JSOP were advanced to 1 April and 31 May respectively and an extra two months were allowed for logistic analysis of the draft JSOP before it was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.83

The JCS Planning Program: The First Two Years

The history of joint planning during 1953 and 1954 is largely a story of the malfunctioning of the machinery devised in 1952. The schedule called for the approval and dissemination of the following plans by the end of 1954: two Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, spanning a period from 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans for D-days of 1 July 1956 and 1 July 1957; and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans covering fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956. Instead, the planning process had produced only a JSCP for FY 1955 (more than three months late) and drafts of a JSCP for FY 1956 and of a JMRWP (corresponding to a JSOP) for 1 July 1957, both several months from completion. No JLRSE existed even in draft, and none was in sight within the near future.

Some of the reasons for this unimpressive record should be clear from the foregoing narrative. It was obvious that Policy Memorandum 84 was based on a serious underestimate, stemming perhaps from inexperience, of the length of time required for the administrative routines involved in planning. These included securing concurrence, at each stage of the process, among three different groups or committees and acquiring force tabs and other data from the Services. Better coordination among elements of the JCS organization, if it did not come with experience, might be attained by changes in procedures. Of course, to the extent that the problem involved poor coordination within the individual Services, it was beyond the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, to remedy.

A more fundamental reason, however, lay in the Service disagreements that had produced time-consuming deadlocks in the planning committees. These were another manifestation of the deep-rooted strategic disagreements, running all the way up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, that have been described in previous chapters. Indeed, these conflicts were even sharper at the committee level than among the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was easier for the latter to agree on
broad statements of strategic principles than it was for their subordinates to
decide how such statements should be interpreted and applied.

The long delays resulting from Service differences of opinion laid the Joint
Chiefs of Staff open to allegations of narrow outlook and of Service partiality.
Examples of such criticisms came from the two commissions headed by former
President Herbert Hoover that surveyed the operations of the Federal Govern-
ment in 1948 and 1955. "The Joint Chiefs have not yet mastered the art of
formulating effective, integrated strategic plans or of converting them into eco-
nomical assignments of logistical responsibilities," declared a committee headed
by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, which investigated the Defense Department for the
first Hoover Commission. The principal reasons, implied the committee, were
"the continuance of intense interservice rivalries" and the failure "to elevate
military thinking to a plane above individual service aims and ambitions."84

These words were written in 1948, before the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted
their Joint Program for Planning. Seven years later, another Hoover Commission
made similar criticisms, noting that planning was now better integrated but that
the production of strategic and logistic plans was still being delayed by Service
differences. "Joint planning and guidance," pointed out the Commission's
investigators, "are inadequate except for the emergency use of present forces
and weapons currently in being." They recommended a more complete study to
determine how the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be converted "from a trading post
to an objective group in which the national interest is paramount."85

Improvement in the JCS planning process had been one objective of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953. This improvement, as the
President saw it, had two aspects. First, civilian expertise (scientific, technical,
and economic) should be brought into the operation at an early stage. With this
end in view, he directed closer cooperation between the JCS organization and
other elements of the Department of Defense. Second, it was necessary to have
"plans based on the broadest conception of the over-all national interest rather
than the particular desires of the individual services." The new powers given the
Chairman, to manage the Joint Staff and to approve the choice of officers therefor,
were intended to produce this result.86 "My objective," Mr. Eisenhower later
wrote, "was to take at least one step in divorcing the thinking and the outlook of
the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services and to center
their entire effort on national planning for the over-all common defense of the
nation and the West."87

These provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 6 were amplified in a directive
issued by Secretary Wilson on 26 July 1954, which decreed that "the Joint Staff
work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take priority over all other duties."88
Even more pointedly, another paragraph of the directive read as follows:

Development of strategic and logistic plans will be based on the broadest
conceptions of over-all national interest rather than the special desires of a
particular service. Individuals, military and civilian, having to do with the activi-
ties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall be selected with due regard for their
competency and ability to subordinate special service interests to the over-all
national interest.
The wording of this paragraph suggested that it was intended to apply to the Joint Committees as well as to the Joint Staff. These committees, and not the Joint Staff, were the principal locus of Service disagreements.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these exhortations to consider the overall national interest were beside the point. Men with differing Service backgrounds, approaching the problems of national defense with viewpoints shaped by a lifetime in a particular uniform, inevitably disagreed about the best way to advance the national interest. Unanimity could hardly be expected; even during World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had often disagreed. The rapid postwar changes in military technology, with effects on warfare that had not yet been assessed, and the military and diplomatic complexities of the cold war increased the difficulty of agreement by several orders of magnitude. Rear Admiral T. J. Hedding, USN, who became Deputy Director for Strategic Plans in 1954, described the problem facing his planning officers as follows:

The major problems encountered in the preparation of Joint Strategic Plans do not stem from divergent Service views, as is generally felt, but rather from the confused and fluid conditions of world bi-polarity . . . and the lack of clear and simple objectives. In wartime the military objective is relatively simple, that of winning the war. During peacetime, and particularly in the present, our national objectives are not simple and clear.89

Another stimulus to disagreement was budgetary pressure. That large military spending muted competition, by giving each Service enough to satisfy its own estimate of its needs, had been demonstrated during the Korean War. The acrimonious Service disputes of 1949 and early 1950, which owed much of their intensity to President Truman’s stringent budget ceilings, disappeared during the conflict, but the shrinking budgets of the Eisenhower administration again impelled the Services to compete for their respective shares. As Admiral Carney had pointed out in discussing the delays encountered in preparing the JSOP, Policy Memo 84 had been drafted at a time when the Services were expanding and military budgets were rising; the difficulty of agreeing on attainable mid-range objectives had therefore been underestimated.90

If the Services disagreed irreconcilably over strategic choices and budgetary allocations, it was the responsibility of civilian leadership to choose among the alternatives. Thus the Secretary of Defense was to be brought into the planning process. Already in 1954 his intervention had been necessary before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could complete the Joint Mid-Range War Plan.

Nevertheless it would be misleading to dwell exclusively on the failures of the JCS planning machinery during 1953–1954 or to overlook what was actually accomplished. In JCS 2101/113, and in the strategic concepts written into the 1954–1955 JSCP and its successor for 1955–1956 that was near final approval at the end of 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had set their seal of approval on the strategy that was to prevail throughout the rest of the decade. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps agreed that retaliatory airpower would be given primacy, while the Air Force accepted a need for surface forces to meet contingencies other than all-out nuclear war. There thus emerged a strategic consensus, or “truce on
the grand outlines of strategy. The Ample scope remained for disputes over the relative importance of the various elements of military power and the amount of resources to be allocated to each, but these took place within a broad area of basic agreement. However acrimonious the Service controversies of the 1950's, they never quite reached the pitch of intensity of the disputes of 1949-1950, which led to Congressional intervention and cost several officials their positions.
Continental Air Defense

The danger of a direct assault on the continental United States, regarded as remote by most Americans before World War II, became a matter for active concern as a result of the progress of military technology during that conflict. After the development of the long-range bomber and the nuclear bomb, the nation's safety could no longer be assured by a Navy powerful enough to prevent an enemy troop landing. The threat grew larger with the revelation of the Soviet mastery of nuclear weapons technology in 1949, several years ahead of US expectations, and of the existence of a Soviet bomber (the TU-4, similar to the US B-29) capable of reaching at least some targets in the United States on one-way missions or through refueling en route.

Preparations for meeting this evolving danger were at first made in a piece-meal manner. In 1953, however, certain developments forced the problem to public attention and necessitated a new approach. The Eisenhower administration found itself compelled to come to grips with this problem at the same time that it was subjecting overall military strategy to the New Look.\(^1\)

Plans, Organization, and Forces for Air Defense

Anticipating a growing threat of air attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1948 had set up the Continental United States Defense Planning Group (CUSDPG), the responsibilities of which were indicated by its title.\(^2\) This Group drafted a Basic Defense Plan, JCS 2086/1, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in 1951.\(^3\) It assigned responsibility in general terms, leaving detailed planning to subordinate commanders. Primary responsibility for air defense was assigned to the Air Force, but the other Services were expected to contribute as necessary.

No unified command had been established for continental defense. JCS 2086/1 provided that in case of hostilities all defending forces would come under command of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, but until the moment of attack the defensive forces remained scattered among a number of commands. Within the
zone of the interior, the most important commanders were the Commanding Generals of the Air Defense Command, US Air Force, and of the Antiaircraft Command, US Army. The approaches were guarded by forces assigned to unified commands: CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCNE, and CINCAL. Coordination of US air defenses with those of Canada was essential. The most important coordinating agency was the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which had been established by the two nations in August 1940. It included representatives of the Services of each country, as well as of the US Department of State and The Canadian Department of External Affairs. In 1946, through the initiative of the Board, a Military Cooperation Committee was established for direct working-level coordination between military authorities. It became the medium through which the Air Force commands of the two nations adjusted their plans.

Force levels for continental air defense had been established separately by each Service, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but without reference to any integrated plan. The forces in existence at the end of 1952 are shown in Table 11. The principal component, of course, was supplied by the Air Force, and consisted of a chain of radar stations and control centers backed up by a force of fighter interceptor aircraft. The radar network in the continental United States was made up of 79 stations, so located as to afford approximately one hour’s warning of air attack on important cities or military installations. There were twenty additional stations in outlying regions: ten in Alaska, one each in Greenland and Iceland, and eight in Canada (the last forming part of the PINE TREE network being jointly constructed by the two countries).

These radar stations could detect aircraft at altitudes ranging from 5,000 to 45,000 feet above the terrain. For visual coverage at lower altitudes, the Air Force had organized a volunteer Ground Observer Corps, with a planned strength of 500,000 persons, although it was almost 70 percent short of that goal at the end of 1952.

The radar nets were tied in with 14 control centers, which would direct the air battle in case of attack. The methods and equipment used at these centers were already approaching obsolescence. Radar data was transmitted to the control centers by conventional human telling. Manual methods of operations were used for computing the tracks of hostile aircraft, assigning weapons, and vectoring fighter aircraft.

To distinguish potentially hostile from friendly aircraft, the Air Force restricted authorized air traffic to fixed approach corridors and made use of advance knowledge of flight plans furnished by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In wartime, these methods would be supplemented by rigid control of traffic within the United States and by interrogation of approaching aircraft with special radar equipment (identification, friend or foe, or IFF).

The fighter interceptor force consisted of 45 squadrons (15 wings) of aircraft, of which 39 were based in the continental United States (Table 11). Only 20 of these, however, were equipped with fuel-performance jet aircraft (F-89 and F-94, able to operate day or night in any weather). Thirteen others were provided with day-fighter jets; the other 11 had conventional (piston-engine) aircraft. All were
Table 11—Actual and Projected US Continental-Defense Forces: 1952-1957

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Continental Air Defense

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^a Loki rockets might be available for 10 gun battalions in FY 1958; 2 Talon battalions were planned for the end of FY 1959.

^b One gun battalion was to be converted to Nike by 30 June 1957, plus 2 Skysweeper batteries.

^c One Skysweeper battalion; deployment subject to approval of Icelandic Government, not yet obtained.

^d Thirty-six planned by July 1958.

^e Sixteen planned by July 1958.

^f Nine squadrons and 82 aircraft planned by July 1958.

^g Two squadrons and 6 aircraft planned by July 1958.

^h Two Talos-missile interceptor squadrons planned by June 1958; 5 by June 1959.

^i Northeast Air Command units based partly in Canada, partly in Greenland.

^j Not available for 1953; presumably one fighter-interceptor squadron and one radar station were in service there (as in 1952 and 1954), and totals should be adjusted accordingly.

^k Includes one squadron in the Azores.

^l Not available.

^m Includes Texas Towers, one by June 1956 and 5 by June 1957.

^n Twelve squadrons with 120 aircraft planned by FY 1959.

^o By FY 1958 there were 323 stations planned (266 for Continental United States and 57 for Canada); by 1959, 423 stations.

Sources: NSC 142, 10 Feb 53, for 1952 data; DOD Progress Report to NSC on Status of Military Continental US Defense Programs as of 1 June 1954 for 1953 data; all other information from DOD Progress Report to NSC on Status of Military Continental US Defense Programs as of 15 April 1955.
armed with weapons of World War II vintage (20mm cannon or .50-caliber machine guns). Under an augmentation plan agreed upon by the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, and other responsible commanders, fighter aircraft of the USAF Tactical Air Command, Air Training Command, and Air National Guard, as well as of the Navy and Marine Corps, would, if not otherwise required, be placed at the disposal of the Air Defense Command in an emergency.

The Air Force planned to expand its radar network to 216 stations by FY 1955. Most of these would be within the United States, located along the coasts or in a double perimeter around key installations. Others were programmed for Alaska, Greenland, Iceland, and southern Canada, where they would afford some early warning of aircraft approaching the United States from the northeast or northwest. But even after the entire network was completed, the approach route through the vast and thinly settled north central part of Canada would remain wide open to penetration.

The Air Force also planned to extend its warning system to seaward by placing radar detection equipment aboard airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft of a special type (the RC-121, a modified version of the Lockheed Constellation), which would operate up to 250 miles offshore. The first squadron of ten planes was expected to be in service by 30 September 1954; five more squadrons were to be added by the end of FY 1956. Their operation was to be supplemented by specially equipped radar picket vessels (DERs, converted destroyer escorts) provided by the Navy. Tentative plans (not yet officially approved by the Chief of Naval Operations) called for 25 such ships, in order to maintain 10 on station at all times. Two ships were already operating experimentally at the end of 1952.

The number of control centers was scheduled to increase to 25. Greatly improved equipment, semi-automatic in nature, for transmission of data and for computation of intercept problems, was under development, and was expected to be available for experimental use by 1955.

The FY 1955 goal for the fighter interceptor force was 69 squadrons (57 in the continental United States), to be equipped with all-weather jet aircraft (F-86, F-89, or F-94). Most would be armed with air-to-air rockets, although a guided missile (Falcon) was expected to be in production in limited numbers.

The Army’s contribution to air defense as of 31 December 1952 consisted of 57 battalions of antiaircraft artillery, deployed around the United States according to plans prepared jointly with the Air Force. They were furnished with 40mm, 90mm, or 120mm weapons. Five other battalions were stationed in Alaska. The ultimate goal for the continental United States was 68 battalions before the end of FY 1954. During 1953 the 40mm guns were expected to be replaced by a new, automatic 75mm weapon (Skysweeper). A surface-to-air missile (Nike) was expected to go into service during FY 1954 and to be available by FY 1955 in sufficient numbers to equip 40 battalions.

The Navy treated continental air defense as incidental to its missions of controlling the seas and defending coasts, and had no forces specifically programmed for this task, though it was prepared to contribute fighter aircraft to the Air Defense Command when necessary. The Navy’s principal concern was
with the Soviet submarine fleet, which was not only a serious threat to shipping but was, or soon would be, able to launch guided missiles against land targets. The submarine menace was to be dealt with by combined hunter-killer teams of aircraft and ships, plus defensive measures like convoy escort and control of shipping. Recent technological advances had made it feasible, by using low-frequency sound waves (LOFAR), to detect submarines at distances of several hundred miles. The Navy planned to install a chain of nine LOFAR stations along the Atlantic coast, from Nova Scotia southward. The first five were expected to begin operating during FY 1955.

Recognizing the growing urgency of continental defense, the Navy had established a special task group to test other means of warning against air, missile, or submarine attack. The RC-121 AEW aircraft was a product of Naval research. The Navy was also providing two experimental radar picket vessels for the Air Force, as noted above, and was considering a plan to operate such ships in conjunction with its own shorebased AEW aircraft to provide a combined warning barrier against both air and submarine attack.11

Taken together, the forces available for defense against air attack were far too small. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretary of Defense early in 1953:

The U.S. is today vulnerable to direct attack of serious proportions and it is expected that this threat will reach critical proportions by 1954 or 1955. Our present capability to defend the U.S. is considered to be extremely limited. It has been estimated that 65-85% of atomic bombs launched by the USSR can be delivered on targets in the U.S. The defense against a low level attack by an aggressor force is almost non-existent.12

Legacy of the Truman Administration

By themselves, these warning words by the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well have been ignored or discounted, as others had been. But even before they were written, advice from other sources had drawn the attention of President Truman and his advisers to the subject of air defense. The issue was brought to a head by scientists affiliated with the Lincoln Laboratory, which had been set up by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study this subject for the Air Force. In 1952 some of these scientists, joined with others in an informal Summer Study Group, drew up a report in which they called attention to the progress of Soviet weapons technology and recommended action to raise US defenses to a new level of effectiveness. The most important such step that could be taken in the immediate future, they believed, would be to construct a distant early warning line of radar stations running from Greenland to northwestern Canada, far enough north to afford from two to six hours’ warning of aircraft approaching the US border. It should be backed up by a second line farther south—approximately along the 54th parallel of latitude, where the Canadian Government was already considering a radar chain—that would be used for tracking and intercepting hostile aircraft after their approach had been detected. The
Study Group believed that both lines could be constructed at a cost of $370 million. The members urged that the more northerly line be constructed as soon as possible. Plans should be prepared immediately, they believed, in order that construction could begin when the weather became favorable in the summer of 1953.\(^\text{13}\)

Within the Air Force, these proposals were opposed by some who feared that crash construction of a defensive system would divert funds from other important programs. The report was therefore never officially approved, and its authors turned to the National Security Resources Board to bring their conclusions before the administration.\(^\text{14}\) On 24 September 1952 the Board’s chairman, Mr. Jack Gorrie, summarized the report for the National Security Council. The President thereupon directed the Department of Defense to survey the cost and feasibility of an early warning system.\(^\text{15}\) Three weeks later, after hearing a report by the Department, President Truman instructed Mr. Gorrie and Secretary of Defense Lovett to prepare specific proposals for consideration along with the 1954 budget.\(^\text{16}\)

At the same time, the President and his advisers pursued several other lines of study of the air defense problem, beginning with the reexamination of national security programs undertaken in September 1952 by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security. In connection with this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a detailed description of existing continental defense forces and of the increases planned by the Services. They indicated various ways in which the forces could be further strengthened, at a cost of some $10 billion above the $7 billion cost of existing programs. They recommended that existing programs be completed as rapidly as possible, but that no new ones be approved without further study.\(^\text{17}\)

The final report on security programs, which was sent to President Truman on 19 January 1953, went beyond the cautious conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It asserted flatly that present programs would not provide a minimum acceptable continental defense, and that the nation should consider favorably the expenditure of very substantial additional resources over the next few years for the purpose.\(^\text{18}\) The issue was one for the incoming administration to resolve.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on this report before it was sent to the President, had pointed out that it rated Soviet capabilities higher than they had when they made their recommendations. If the higher appraisal were to be accepted, they agreed, then additional continental defense measures would be needed, but these should not be allowed to jeopardize existing military programs.\(^\text{19}\)

Accurate assessment of Soviet strength was vital to a decision on this grave issue. As early as August 1951, the National Security Council had instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, to prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the continental United States. This study, completed in October 1952, concluded that the Soviet Union could inflict serious but not permanently crippling damage. But the Director of Central Intelligence General Walter Bedell Smith, characterized his report as a limited initial effort—one that
“falls far short of supplying the estimates essential to security planning.” He recommended that the Council authorize him to undertake a more detailed study and to submit proposals for establishment of an agency to produce such appraisals regularly in the future.\textsuperscript{20}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not question the value of such studies, but they believed that the Council’s own staff should be responsible for preparing them. If that body could not do so, they told the Secretary of Defense, then they themselves should be assigned the task.\textsuperscript{21}

President Truman settled the question by choosing a third alternative. On 19 January 1953 he established a Special Evaluation Subcommittee to prepare a revised appraisal of Soviet net capabilities as of 1 July 1955. It was to be under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, USAF, and was to report by 15 May 1953.\textsuperscript{22} The question of responsibility for future such studies was left unsettled.

Another study group appointed by the Truman administration during its last days consisted of a body of consultants chosen by Secretary of Defense Lovett in December 1952 to survey the whole problem of continental defense. It was made up of prominent scientists and engineers in industry and education, under the leadership of Dr. Mervin J. Kelly, President of Bell Telephone Laboratories. The members were asked to submit general recommendations for improved continental defense and specifically to study the possibilities of an improved warning system and its relation to other measures.\textsuperscript{23}

Before going out of office President Truman settled one major issue in this complex area of military planning. Insofar as it was in his power, he committed the Department of Defense to the construction of an early warning system like that recommended by the Lincoln Summer Study Group. He did so against the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who felt that action should be deferred until Dr. Kelly’s group had reported. They pointed out that the feasibility of the proposed system remained to be proved; that it would constitute only one part of a defensive complex that should be considered as a whole; that the estimated construction cost of $1 billion could be spent in other ways that would produce faster improvement; and that a line so far north could not provide unequivocal warning, since it would not be backed up by a continuous tracking capability that could distinguish real from spoof alarms.\textsuperscript{24}

The President announced his decision in NSC 139, issued on 31 December 1952, in the following terms:

The estimated time scale on which the U. S. S. R. may possess sufficient nuclear weapons to deliver heavily destructive attacks against the United States indicates that we should plan to have an effective system of air, sea, and land defenses ready no later than December 31, 1955. Such a system of defenses should include not only military measures, but also should include well organized programs of civilian defense, industrial security, and plans for rapid rehabilitation of vital facilities.

A key element in this system, according to NSC 139, was a radar screen that would afford from three to six hours’ warning. Accordingly, the Department of Defense was to develop and install an early warning line as a matter of high
urgency, and to complete it by 31 December 1955. Funds for developing equipment and for constructing test stations in the Far North had been included in the FY 1953 budget, and tentatively in that for 1954.\textsuperscript{25}

On 12 January 1953 Secretary of Defense Lovett told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans for an effective system of defense. A week later, in one of his last actions, he directed them to submit plans for the establishment and operation of the early warning system, and made the Air Force responsible for conducting the test project.\textsuperscript{26}

### The New Administration Confronts a Dilemma

Considering the circumstances, the Truman administration had gone about as far as could reasonably be expected in launching an accelerated program of continental defense. But the hard decisions—how much money to spend for the purpose, and where the money was to come from—remained for President Truman’s successor. These problems were highly acute for an administration that was committed to reduction of Federal expenditures.

The principal elements of the air defense problem had meanwhile become known to the informed public. That Soviet military power was growing at an unexpected rate and that prominent scientists believed that a real defense against atomic attack was within reach were matters that could not be concealed.\textsuperscript{27} Pressure by public opinion for action in this field might jeopardize the administration’s hopes for defense economy.

The earliest policy pronouncements issued by the National Security Council in 1953 called for increased emphasis on continental defense.\textsuperscript{28} But they also asserted the importance of economy. They cast no light on the crucial question: whether the administration was willing to pay the enormous cost of an effective defense.

It was hardly to be expected that the President would reach a decision without hearing from the Edwards Subcommittee or the Kelly Group. Pending reports from these bodies, the administration allowed the research program for the distant early warning line to proceed. The project required the cooperation of Canada, since it called for two test stations in the northwestern part of that country, with another nearby on the coast of Alaska. US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense obtained informal approval from their Canadian colleagues on 26 January 1953. The formal US approach through diplomatic channels occurred four days later. Canada was asked to allow construction of the two test stations, to participate in the research program, and to authorize surveys to determine sites for permanent installations on Canadian soil. Agreement was received from Ottawa on 27 February 1953.\textsuperscript{29}

The Ad Hoc Study Group under Dr. Kelly turned in its report on 11 May 1953. Its conclusion was that, since no air defense could approach 100 percent effectiveness, “there can be no safety in the atomic age short of the elimination of war.” Accordingly, it stressed the importance of a powerful offensive capability,
which, insofar as it deterred war, constituted a vital, major part of the overall defense system. Nevertheless, asserted the report, it was not only possible but mandatory to improve the existing system substantially, and to bring about an entirely new order of warning capability within two or three years. To this end, the members submitted the following recommendations:

1. Responsibility for continental air defense should be centralized under a single agency with broad authority.
2. There should be a comprehensive plan for air defense.
3. The existing control and warning system should be improved immediately, using available equipment, by closing gaps and by extending it to sea.
4. An early warning line, at a modest distance from US boundaries, was the most rewarding first step toward an improved warning system in being. It should be located as far north as possible while remaining within range of backup facilities for tracking and intercept. A distance of 400-600 miles, which would afford two hours’ warning of the approach of TU-4 aircraft, was suggested. The report noted that the Canadian Government was already investigating the possibility of a radar fence roughly along the 54th parallel (approximately 300 miles north of the US boundary). Such a line would constitute a good start toward the system that would ultimately be needed; hence the United States should cooperate with Canada in installing it. It should be extended into the oceans to insure against being outflanked, and should be tied into the LOFAR submarine detection network.
5. Eventually the warning network should be pushed as far as possible from US borders. Preparations should be made for selecting sites and procuring equipment for a line in the far North, so that construction could begin as soon as results of the Arctic test program justified a decision to proceed.
6. Certain problems required additional research. One of the most important was the need for a fully automatic control system, which would include a ground electronic environment for tracking and recording all flights, plus equipment for rapid transmission and handling of data. Such a system was already under study at the Lincoln Laboratory, and should receive a high priority.  
7. A vigorous civil defense program should be established.

The Evaluation Subcommittee under General Edwards completed its task about the same time. The conclusions of its report, with comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and other agencies, were discussed by the National Security Council on 4 June 1953.

In drafting their report, the members of the Edwards group had limited themselves to assessing the Soviet ability to damage the continental United States and selected installations and forces outside the United States “of major importance to a U. S. air atomic counteroffensive against the USSR during the
initial phases of war." This unauthorized revision of the Subcommittee's terms of reference led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to instruct their representative to refrain from either concurring or nonconcurring in the report.\textsuperscript{33} In their own comments to the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized the report as a valuable contribution but pointed out that it provided only a segment of the data necessary for planning for the overall security of the United States. In particular they did not wish the assumptions made under the limited terms of reference to be construed as representing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the manner in which the USSR would wage a war.\textsuperscript{34}

Both the Special Evaluation Subcommittee and the Ad Hoc Study Group had been appointed by the previous administration. It was perhaps natural for President Eisenhower and his advisers to want the problem to be studied by men of their own selection, in the hope that further analysis and accumulation of data might point more clearly to the proper decision.\textsuperscript{35} Accordingly, in May 1953 the NSC Planning Board established a Continental Defense Committee to prepare a complete report on existing and proposed continental defense programs and their costs, and to recommend necessary changes. Lieutenant General Harold R. Bull, USA (Ret.), a wartime associate of the President, who had served as the CIA representative on the Edwards committee, was appointed chairman.\textsuperscript{36} The Department of Defense was represented by Major General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., USAF, who was appointed with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{37} Other participating agencies were the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence and Security.

The new committee was instructed to report by 15 July 1953. It was to consider the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Study Group and the Special Evaluation Subcommittee. It was also to study organizational arrangements needed to insure (1) action in the field of continental defense, and (2) preparation of periodic evaluations of Soviet net capabilities to injure the United States.

Service and Continental US Defense Planning Group Proposals

While the Council was weighing the relative importance of stronger defenses and lower expenditures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went ahead with the tasks assigned them under NSC 139. On 22 January 1953 they directed the Continental US Defense Planning Group to draft a plan for an early warning system.\textsuperscript{38} They passed to the Services the initial responsibility for preparing defense plans, which were to be submitted in time to be reviewed by the Continental US Defense Planning Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before 1 August 1953.\textsuperscript{39}

The first plan to be completed was that of the Navy. It specified that the Navy and Marine Corps would meet continental defense requirements "within the limitations of available forces and consistent with a continued ability to perform other primary missions." The Navy's principal contribution to air defense would
consist of special barriers at sea to detect the approach of aircraft as well as submarines. These barriers would be formed by Naval aircraft equipped with both airborne early warning and antisubmarine warfare (AEW/ASW) capabilities, operating from shore bases in conjunction with radar picket vessels. Approaching enemy planes would be kept under radar surveillance until they were turned over to shore radar or intercepted by fighter aircraft. It was expected that such barriers could provide a 95 percent probability of detection of aircraft flying between 500 and 30,000 feet.

A series of barriers was proposed in both oceans, ranging outward from near the coasts, under the command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. Activation was a matter for the future, since none of the special AEW/ASW aircraft and only a few DERs were as yet available. Total requirements were estimated at three wings of aircraft (133 planes) and 36 picket ships by 31 December 1955.40

The Air Force plan, submitted on 8 June 1953, was much more far-reaching and detailed. It called for the immediate construction of a radar warning chain across Canada, approximately along the 54th parallel, extending from Labrador westward to British Columbia, then swinging northwestward along the Alcan Highway to connect with the Alaskan radar system. This Southern Canada Line, as it was called, should be extended seaward from Alaska to Hawaii and from Newfoundland to the Azores by means of barriers made up, as in the Navy plan, of AEW aircraft operating with DERs. The Navy would supply the ships; the Air Force would furnish the planes and (through the Commanding General, Air Defense Command) operate the entire system. A total of 90 aircraft (9 squadrons) and 30 ships would be required to achieve 80 percent probability of detection of a single TU-4 aircraft.

A second line, much farther north, should also be constructed if its feasibility were proved. It would run from the north coast of Alaska eastward across the mouth of Hudson Bay to southern Baffin Island. It might later be extended to Greenland and connected with the Atlantic Ocean barrier.

The proposed seaward extensions of the existing radar control and warning system41 were also incorporated into the Air Force plan. Force requirements for this purpose had been reduced slightly: four squadrons of AEW aircraft and 20 radar picket vessels. The difference was to be made up by five specially constructed offshore radar stations (Texas Towers) in shoal waters.

On land, the control and warning network was to be strengthened by adding approximately 30 radar stations to those already programmed. In addition, to provide low-altitude coverage, 325 specially designed radars, of a type then under development, would be required. Until these became available, the Ground Observer Corps would be continued.

Identification of aircraft was to be improved by the acquisition of IFF equipment and of special (Consolan) radio beacon transmitters to guide incoming aircraft along flight corridors. An integrated, semiautomatic control system, linked with radar stations, would also be required; however, the plan did not indicate how much of this system, if any, would be available by 31 December 1955.

The fighter interceptor force would rise to 75 squadrons in the continental United States—almost one-third more than the current objective of 57 squadrons.42
Some of these planes would be armed with a new air-to-air rocket, carrying an atomic warhead, that was expected to be available in small numbers by 1955.

The Air Force also proposed to deploy 20 fixed defense units armed with Talos, a surface-to-air defensive missile developed by the Navy. They would supplement the 110 Army antiaircraft battalions called for in the plan, the composition of which was as follows:

   47  Nike
   20  Loki (a rocket weapon then under development)
   20  Skysweeper
   23  Gun (90mm and 120mm)

In addition, the plan called for 90 gun battalions to be supplied on D-day by National Guard units called to active duty.\(^{43}\)

The Army's continental defense plan set a goal of 150 antiaircraft battalions, of the following compositions:

   61  Nike
   20  Loki
   18  Skysweeper
   51  Gun

All of these would be Regular Army units. Their number would be reduced, however, to the extent that National Guard battalions could be brought up to the desired degree of readiness, that is, capable of going into action with 3-6 hours' warning.\(^{44}\)

The Air Force plan became the basis for the early warning system outlined by the Continental US Defense Planning Group on 30 June 1953. Under the CUSDPG plan, the Southern Canada Line was to be constructed at once. At its extremities, it would be tied in with the existing facilities in Alaska and in Newfoundland-Labrador, which in turn would be connected with seaward extensions. The design of these extensions incorporated some features of the Navy's barrier proposals. Thus force requirements for DERs were stated as 36 vessels, presumably to make full use of all the ships programmed by the Navy. The Air Force would provide AEW aircraft, but the barriers themselves would be under operational control of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. The CUSDPG plan also endorsed the construction of a more northerly line, subject to proof of its feasibility.\(^{45}\)

Taken together, these four plans contained two discrepancies that must be adjusted before they could be fitted together into a comprehensive program. One involved the different antiaircraft force requirements estimated by the Army and the Air Force—150 battalions as against 110. Discussions between these Services, under CUSDPG auspices, failed to eliminate the difference.\(^{46}\)

A broader disagreement was the one between the Navy and the Air Force concerning the composition and operation of early warning lines at sea. The points at issue were as follows:

(1) The Air Force planned two sets of oceanic barriers, one operating within a few hundred miles of the coast, contiguous with the
existing radar system and considered as within the combat zone, in Air Force terminology; the other farther out in the North Atlantic and North Pacific, tied to the proposed early warning line and forming part of the warning zone. The Navy envisioned several sets of barriers at varying distances from shore, all serving the dual purpose of detecting either aircraft or submarines, and each capable of continuous tracking of enemy aircraft until the latter came within range of the shore radar system, so that there was no need to extend the latter to sea.

(2) The Air Force believed that all radar systems, including their extensions to seaward, should be under its operational control. The Navy considered that the command of warning facilities at sea was a Naval responsibility.

(3) The Air Force proposed to furnish AEW planes; the Navy believed that it should supply all forces (aircraft as well as ships) operating on or over the oceans.

(4) The Air Force plan called for 130 early warning aircraft and 50 radar picket ships; that of the Navy, for 133 aircraft and 36 ships.

When the Navy’s continental defense plan first reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vandenberg had noted that it made no provision for extension of the control and warning system and asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff withhold approval until all the Service plans could be examined. Admiral Fechteler, in reply, asserted that his plan would meet all requirements for radar coverage of seaward approaches with smaller forces than the Air Force had called for. General Vandenberg, however, insisted that two separate sets of barriers were needed.

The Continental US Defense Planning Group, after reviewing both plans, supported the Air Force. The members concluded that the Navy proposal to combine air and submarine warning facilities underestimated the probability of a large-scale air attack.

The issue came to the fore when the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the early warning plan drafted by the Continental US Defense Planning Group. Admiral Fechteler generally approved it, and thus in effect agreed that the barriers proposed in the Navy plan should indeed become the seaward extensions of the Southern Canada Line. But he insisted that they should serve both air and submarine defense, and should be under naval command. General Twining removed one point of disagreement when he agreed to yield control of these barriers to CINCLANT and CINCPAC; however, he still believed that his Service must provide the aircraft for them.

During the JCS discussion of the CUSDPG plan, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, agreed with General Twining that the Air Force should furnish aircraft for the sea barriers. It was clear that the matter must go to the Secretary of Defense for resolution. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Continental US Defense Planning Group to draft an appropriate memorandum to the Secretary, asking for a ruling on this question. At the same time, they
scrutinized the plan itself and concluded that the force requirements might be excessive in light of current budgetary pressures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the plan back to the Group with instructions to consider alternative sea barriers that would require smaller forces.\textsuperscript{53}

The revised plan reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July 1953. It computed force requirements for barriers extending from Argentia only 500 miles, or less than halfway to the Azores, and 1,500 miles from Kodiak (about two-thirds of the distance to Hawaii). Another alternative examined was a Pacific line that would run along the Aleutians as far as Adak and thence southward for 600 miles. All these proposals would substantially reduce force requirements; the most economical combination would require only 32 aircraft and 16 vessels. On the other hand, a box-type barrier in the Pacific (examined by the Group at the express direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), in which AEW aircraft would operate along three sides of a rectangle off the coast, would require 84 aircraft and 32 DERs for the Pacific alone. The Group did not recommend a choice among these alternatives.\textsuperscript{54}

On 29 July 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to the Secretary of Defense the dispute over the provision of aircraft, explaining the different operational concepts from which the two Service positions stemmed. Subsequently they discussed the question with Secretaries Wilson and Kyes.\textsuperscript{55} Characteristically, Mr. Wilson, before rendering a decision, asked the Services to indicate the costs of their respective proposals. When these estimates were assembled, those of the Navy proved to be substantially lower for both operation and maintenance. The Air Force argued, however, that the apparent economy of the Navy figures was illusory, since the Navy plan was operationally unsound; it would require AEW aircraft to leave the barrier in order to maintain continuous surveillance of each radar contact.\textsuperscript{56}

It does not appear that the cost figures were ever sent to the Secretary of Defense. The issue was laid aside for the moment and was ultimately settled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of their interpretation of the National Security Council’s later decision on continental defense policy.

The Service disagreements prevented the formulation of a comprehensive plan of the kind requested in January 1953 by Secretary Lovett. On 5 August 1953 CUSDPG sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a draft of such a plan, almost as broad in its provisions as JCS 2086/1, which it was designed to supersede. The outgoing Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on it, and their successors decided two months later to drop it from their agenda.\textsuperscript{57} An integrated plan was eventually to emerge, but it was never formally embodied in a single document.

\textbf{A New Policy for Continental Defense: NSC 159/4}

The basic issue before the administration remained unresolved throughout the summer of 1953. The National Security Council withheld a decision pending the report of the Continental Defense Committee of the Planning Board.
Thus, civil support.

The present continental defense programs are not now adequate either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the continuity of production or the protection of the industrial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan centers. This condition constitutes an unacceptable risk to our nation’s survival. We are convinced that the nation must act now with speed and energy, using such of our resources as are available, to meet the potential threat, even though the threat may not materialize for several years.

The Committee had examined the Service plans, and it endorsed the enlarged force goals proposed therein. Its report classified the programs in these plans according to the degree of their urgency, along with other, nonmilitary measures essential to survival. It assigned the highest priority to the following three programs, which required immediate action:

The Southern Canada early warning system, including its seaward extensions. Seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage, i.e., of the existing radar control and warning system. Emergency plans and preparations to insure continuity of essential functions of government.

Thus, by implication, the Committee approved the Air Force plan for two sets of radar barriers at sea. However, the report took note of the disagreement between the Air Force and the Navy, as well as that between the Army and the Air Force, and assumed that these would be resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a second order of priority, the Committee placed the following:

Completion of the LOFAR submarine detection system. Completion and installation of the experimental semiautomatic “Lincoln Transition System” for data handling and intercept control. “Gap-filler” radars for low-altitude surveillance. Increase of fighter interceptor forces. Improved identification capability. Installation of the northern Canada early warning line (if it proved practicable). Plans and preparations for civil defense. Various other nonmilitary measures: a program for preventing clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons; development of a device to detect fissionable material; processing of cases of “known subversives” for detention in an emergency; dispersal of essential industrial and governmental installations.

Certain other programs, said the Committee, should also receive additional support. These included harbor defense, coastal escorts and antisubmarine patrol, civil defense, and internal security.

These measures would provide an acceptable degree of readiness by about 1956, assuming that the Services reached their goals by 31 December 1955. But
the Committee doubted that the general public understood the nature of the threat clearly enough to support the necessary expenditures. Hence, its report urged efforts to increase public understanding.

The Committee estimated that its recommended programs would cost a total of $34.9 billion by FY 1960. In contrast, expenditures in the FY 1954 budget for continental defense were estimated at $4.3 billion, a figure that, projected through the next six years, would total $25.8 billion. In other words, the additional programs would require $9.1 billion.60

The Joint Chiefs of Staff greeted the Committee report with mixed feelings. Though on record as favoring stronger defenses, they feared that the Council might be stampeded into hasty action that would throw the military establishment out of balance. They told Secretary Wilson that the threat of air attack had been taken into account when existing military programs were devised. Any actions contemplated on the basis of NSC 159, they asserted, should first be evaluated in relation to these programs.

Commenting on the priorities assigned by the Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the value of the early warning system depended upon improved aircraft identification, and hence that the latter program should be placed in the highest category. They urged also that priorities should be used only as a general guide to bring programs into balance, and should not be interpreted so rigidly as to deprive lower ranking programs of necessary funds.61

These were the conclusions of the outgoing JCS group, headed by General Bradley. They were presented to the Council on 6 August 1953, together with the Committee’s report. The Council postponed a decision pending comments by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff. The members decided that these comments should be submitted by 1 September 1953, and should extend to the following specific subjects:

(1) An integrated military program.
(2) The priorities, size, and timing of the various programs.
(3) Security programs, other than continental defense, that might be reduced or eliminated if the critical elements of the continental defense program were adopted.
(4) A review of the entire Air Force program in the light of new weapons developments since this program was planned.
(5) The effect upon the composition of US forces of the projected increases in allied forces.

The Council also directed the Planning Board to revise NSC 159 as necessary to reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the President’s panel of civilian consultants.62

Before these decisions could be carried out, the news of a Soviet thermonuclear test, released on 12 August 1953, altered the problem. It provided a strong argument for those within the administration who favored immediate action on a large scale. The Office of Defense Mobilization became the principal advocate of a crash defense program to be financed by supplemental appropriations during FY 1954.63
Among the general public, also, the intensity of discussion was heightened. "Now that we know that the Soviets have achieved a thermonuclear explosion," wrote two of the scientists who had been associated with the Lincoln project, "the defense of our homes, our cities, and our lives is given a new and awful urgency." Admiral Radford, asked by reporters about the significance of this event, asserted on 26 August 1953 that it had been foreseen and would not change over-all strategic plans, but that it did call for a review of certain programs.

In submitting to the President and the Secretary of Defense their initial recommendations on military strategy, the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed continental air defense along with retaliatory air power as the two "most critical factors in the military aspects of our security." They urged that defenses be strengthened "to a degree which can hold damage to nationally manageable proportions," and cited the deployment of large US forces overseas as evidence of "neglect of our vitals in Continental United States."

These statements suggested that the new Joint Chiefs of Staff might be highly receptive to plans for prompt and drastic increases in continental defense forces. Nevertheless, in their comments prepared in response to the NSC decision of 6 August 1953, they revealed, like their predecessors, a go-slow attitude—a desire to avoid overstress on this one aspect of military security. They emphasized the value (defensive as well as offensive) of strategic airpower, and showed little evidence of increased concern over the recent Soviet weapons test. As they expressed themselves:

In evaluation of our defensive capability, consideration must be given to the threat which our combat-ready forces, both offensive and defensive, pose to an enemy who may contemplate a surprise aggressive move. The combat-ready counterthreat and an effective system of world-wide alliances are significant factors in continental defense . . . . An aggressor nation will be far more deterred by evidence that we have the offensive potential and the mobility capable of dealing it decisive blows than by the excellence of our defenses.

While observing that continental defense could be substantially improved at modest additional cost, they cautioned that it should not be increased beyond the point of diminishing marginal utility. They agreed on the importance of an informed public, but stressed that any program of public education should not generate excessive alarm on the subject.

With these reservations, the new Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they were in general agreement with NSC 159. Concerning the specific subjects raised by the Council, they commented as follows:

(1) The proposals in NSC 159 would add up to an integrated military program that would meet minimum requirements with the least possible adverse effect on other programs.

(2) The priorities and timing of programs in NSC 159 were generally appropriate, except that aircraft identification should be placed in the highest category. The size of the programs would be deter-
mined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after further study, in the light of the total resources available for national security.

(3) No programs could be eliminated if a continental defense program were approved; all were parts of a broad strategic concept for deterring and opposing communist aggression.

(4) The Air Force program had been prepared with full consideration of the impact of new weapons developments. All Service plans would be constantly reviewed in the light of further developments.

(5) Planned increases in Allied forces would be relatively small and would still leave these forces below minimum required levels; hence they would provide no basis for reducing US forces.67

The JCS recommendations apparently influenced NSC 159/3, the revised continental defense paper circulated by the Planning Board on 16 September 1953. The opening paragraph emphasized that continental defense was only one within an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements, each of which had its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America. Nonetheless it was concluded that continental defense, having been neglected in recent years, was clearly inadequate. The draft took note of the Soviet thermonuclear explosion, which was seen as requiring a reevaluation of relative strengths and as placing a premium on improved defenses. The programs recommended in NSC 159 were endorsed by the Planning Board, but, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, aircraft identification was placed in the first category.68

NSC 159/3 considered the problem of continental defense in relation to the budget. It suggested that, in light of what was now known about Soviet weapons technology, some military commitments might be reduced in order to make more money available for continental defense. Otherwise it would be necessary to enlarge the defense budget.

Cost estimates had been revised downward in NSC 159/3. Two alternatives had been considered by the Planning Board, one assuming continuation of the present goal of 57 fighter-interceptor squadrons, the other the 75 squadrons proposed in the Air Force continental defense plan. NSC 159/3 estimated the cost of these alternatives as follows (in billions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
<th>Additional to Develop to Readiness Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>$3.789</td>
<td>$4.389</td>
<td>$7.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>$3.795</td>
<td>$4.554</td>
<td>$8.386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These totals included the costs of development and installations, but not of continuing operations.69

The Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized NSC 159/3 as militarily sound so long as its implementation did not detract from offensive capability. They recommended that it not be approved until they had completed their new look at strategy.70

The Council members discussed NSC 159/3 on 24 September 1953. They
heard the views of the President’s civilian consultants, who generally endorsed the paper but stipulated that increased continental defense expenditures should not be allowed to compromise the policy of budget reduction.\textsuperscript{71} The Council then approved NSC 159/3 with minor amendments, and with the stipulation that the following actions would be taken by the dates indicated:

(1) Before 15 November, a more precise definition by the Department of Defense of the following programs and their phasing, and the identification of the portion of the Defense Department effort and costs related to these programs: (a) seaward extensions of the Southern Canadian early warning system, (b) fighter interceptor forces, (c) antiaircraft forces. [These, as NSC 159/3 had indicated, were programs for which force requirements were still under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff].

(2) Before 1 December, determination by the Council of the manner of financing the recommended integrated programs for continental defense in FY 1954 and future years, in proper relation to the over-all budget and taking into account FY 1955 budget submissions by the departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{72}

The President approved this decision. The amended version of the Planning Board paper, NSC 159/4, was issued on 25 September 1953.\textsuperscript{73}

Continental Defense and the FY 1955 Budget

The military programs approved in NSC 159/4 were drawn from the Service continental defense plans. The Council’s approval was general and did not extend to the force goals proposed in these plans. It was left to the Department of Defense to determine force objectives in connection with the FY 1955 budget.

Planning for this budget had begun on 16 September 1953 with a formal request by Secretary Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for force recommendations.\textsuperscript{74} The proposals forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Services for this purpose departed in some respects from the objectives in the continental defense plans. Thus the Air Force requested an increase of only one wing (three squadrons) in the number of fighter interceptors, which would increase the total of such wings from 28 in FY 1954 to 29 by the end of FY 1955. How many of these would be assigned to the continental United States was not indicated.\textsuperscript{75} On the other hand, the final goal was raised to 27 wings (81 squadrons) for the continental United States, as part of the 137-wing program for FY 1957. The Air Force also proposed two more AEW squadrons for FY 1955.

The Army sought 130 antiaircraft battalions, an increase of 13 over the FY 1954 goal. Of these, 84 would be in the continental United States. These objectives, however, had been computed without reference to the Army’s continental defense plan, and must be raised if the latter were approved.

The Navy proposed to attain its full complement of 36 destroyer-escort picket vessels by the end of 1955, and accordingly sought funds for converting 24 in the FY 1955 budget, since 12 others had already been funded. The Navy also planned to procure the first three squadrons (27 planes) of AEW/ASW aircraft.\textsuperscript{76}
The Service proposals were sent to Secretary Wilson on 2 October 1953 with the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They became the basis for tentative budget estimates that were turned down by the National Security Council on 13 October 1953. The Council’s action had the effect of determining the manner of financing the programs in NSC 159/4. Clearly there was to be no increase in the defense budget, and these programs must be paid for out of savings in other military expenditures. Moreover, it was equally evident that there could now be no thought of meeting all force objectives by 31 December 1955, the target date in the Service continental defense plans.

Meanwhile the Council’s action on NSC 159/4 had imposed a new task on the Joint Chiefs of Staff: preparing a more precise definition of three important programs (seaward extension of the early warning line, fighter interceptors, and antiaircraft forces). In developing the necessary information for the Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to fix on new objectives for these programs for the FY 1955 budget and at the same time to come to grips with the discrepancies among the Service continental defense plans. As Admiral Radford pointed out to his colleagues, NSC 159/4 might be regarded as having settled the important question of whether or not to plan for two separate types of ocean barriers, but the priority between the two types, as forces became available that could be assigned for either purpose, remained to be determined.

For preliminary definitions of the three programs in which the Council was interested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned to the appropriate Services. The replies showed some effect of budgetary pressure. The Navy, in defining the program for the early warning barriers, now proposed to spread the conversion of the remaining 24 radar picket vessels in equal increments over the next four years. On the other hand, the Navy now sought 35 instead of 27 AEW/ASW aircraft for FY 1955, and had raised the ultimate objective to 150, a figure that would suffice to keep 108 planes in operation at all times. These force requirements assumed the full barriers originally proposed by the Continental US Defense Planning Group—from Argentia to the Azores and from Kodiak to Pearl Harbor. The barriers were to operate in close coordination with the existing control and warning network and with its contiguous seaward extensions (to which the Navy had now dropped its opposition).

The Air Force definition of the fighter interceptor program indicated a reduction of the objective to 69 squadrons (23 wings), to be achieved by FY 1958. The FY 1955 goal was 19 wings. Beginning in 1956, these aircraft were to be augmented with pilotless interceptors, or guided missiles.

The Army defined the antiaircraft program as requiring 150 batteries, but set the end of FY 1956 as the target date instead of 31 December 1955. Intermediate goals for 1954 and 1955 were 70 and 107 battalions. The possibility of using National Guard units to meet some of these requirements was still under study.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed these Service proposals, General Twining accepted the Army antiaircraft force figures in return for a promise by the Army that, if possible, up to 50 battalions would be provided from National Guard sources. He also raised no objection to the Navy plans, thus tacitly agreeing that the Navy should furnish its own aircraft for the early warning barriers.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon informed Secretary Wilson on 21 November that they had approved the Service force goals. They estimated the costs of these alternatives as follows (in billions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
<th>FY 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft battalions</td>
<td>$1.265</td>
<td>$1.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter interceptors</td>
<td>1.443</td>
<td>1.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaward extensions</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2.743</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3.178</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff promised Mr. Wilson that they would make every effort to meet the priority schedule in NSC 159/4. But, they warned, continental defense should not take preclusive priority over essential offensive programs.\(^{84}\)

Before this information reached the Secretary, it had become evident that it would be impossible to complete a full report on these programs by 15 November, as the Council had wished. The President therefore authorized a delay in its submission, but at the same time directed the Department of Defense to submit a broader report of progress on all the military programs listed in NSC 159/4 in the two highest priority classes.\(^{85}\)

Preparation of this report also fell to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their draft, sent to Secretary Wilson on 21 November 1953, reflected further changes, partly in response to budget limits. Thus the Army had indicated that it would probably be necessary to cut back the antiaircraft program to 66, 79, and 100 battalions for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956 respectively, although the ultimate goal of 150 battalions was still desired. The existence of an offshore extension of the radar warning and control system was no longer in doubt, but the assignment of forces for the purpose remained a matter of dispute. The Air Force had asked the Navy temporarily to supply DERs, and ultimately to replace these with 16 new ships especially designed for the mission. The Navy, however, had earmarked its DERs for the early warning barriers. It had countered with a proposal to supply four converted Liberty ships (YAGRs) and two lighter-than-air patrol craft in each fiscal year from 1955 through 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet settled the issue, but they had agreed that they themselves would assign DERs as they became available, and that the contiguous radar extension would be given the same emphasis as the early warning system.

The Air Force was also seeking funds in the FY 1955 budget for two AEW squadrons, for all five proposed Texas Towers, and for major elements of other programs, as follows: Consolan homing beacon transmitters for aircraft identification, initial equipment for the Lincoln semi-automatic control system, purchase of 125 of a projected total of 323 low-altitude (gap-filler) radars, and continuation of the Arctic test program. The Navy proposed to complete the procurement of equipment for the LOFAR network.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved all these proposals.\(^{86}\) Admiral Radford summarized them for the National Security Council on 23 November 1953 in a general report of the status of the military programs called for in NSC 159/4.\(^{87}\)

Most of the issues between the Air Force and the Navy had by now been
settled. It was accepted that there would be two sets of radar barriers in ocean waters, one contiguous with the existing control and warning net of the Air Defense Command, the other connected to the early warning system and commanded by CINCLANT and CINCPAC. The Navy would furnish all ships needed for both systems and would be allowed to operate its own aircraft for the early warning barriers. Naval forces operating as part of the extension of the control and warning system would remain under naval command, but would operate under the direction of the Air Defense Command. These agreements were formalized in a memorandum signed by General Twining and Admiral Carney. The sole remaining issue—the number and type of ships to be furnished by the Navy—was relatively minor and could be settled when the vessels became available.

The force objectives approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated in the FY 1955 budget. The Navy received funds for six radar picket ships, four ocean radar station vessels (YAGRs), and 35 AEW/ASW aircraft. The Air Force was authorized 19 fighter wings and two more AEW squadrons, while the approval of its 137-wing goal enabled it to advance to FY 1957 the target date for its full complement of 23 fighter wings. The Air Force budget also provided for the entire Texas Tower program, for 125 gap-filler radars, and for the desired components of the Consolan, or Multiple Corridor, identification system and of the Lincoln control system. The Army was allowed 79 Regular Army antiaircraft battalions for the continental United States.

Military expenditures for continental defense in the FY 1955 budget were estimated in billions of dollars as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft forces</td>
<td>$1.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter interceptor forces</td>
<td>1.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air control and warning system</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaward extension of Southern Canada early warning system</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor defense</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arctic test program</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOFAR system</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Canada early warning system (land portion)</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3.198</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The totals for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 had been $2.422 billion and $2.939 billion, respectively. The increase over 1954 was relatively small, but appears striking when contrasted with the drastic reduction in overall military spending, from $43 billion in FY 1954 to less than $38 billion in FY 1955. This fiscal accomplishment was made possible by the deep cuts in other forces and in personnel strengths that have been described in Chapter 3. In sending the budget to Congress, President Eisenhower drew particular attention to its provision for stronger air defenses.
Canada’s Role in the Early Warning System

All US discussions about the desirability of an early warning system had tacitly assumed that Canada would allow construction of the line on her soil. After the approval of NSC 159/4, however, formal Canadian assent became necessary. To insure Canadian collaboration in the project, the US Government made use of a new working-level liaison agency, the Joint Military Study Group. The establishment of this body had been stipulated by the Canadian Government in agreeing to the Arctic test program proposed by the United States in January 1953. Its mission would be to evaluate the results of the tests and to prepare appropriate recommendations. The United States Government approved this proposal on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff, USAF, was empowered to appoint the chairman and other members of the US delegation.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the CUSDPG early warning plan, they questioned certain parts of it, as described previously, but not the basic proposal for a radar screen across Canada. Accepting this part as being tacitly approved, the Continental US Defense Planning Group recommended on 24 September 1953 that the United States, through the Military Study Group, seek immediate Canadian approval. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and issued the necessary instructions to the US members of the Group.

After considering the recommendations of its scientific advisers, the Military Study Group agreed on 8 October that an early warning line was needed but proposed a location slightly farther north (the 55th, rather than the 54th parallel), in order to afford more warning time and to move the system beyond the area of heavy air traffic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this change. The next step was to approach Canada through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

Discussions in the Board were followed by conversations in Washington between high-level military and diplomatic representatives in both governments. The Canadian spokesmen indicated that they fully accepted the need for a warning line along the 55th parallel and that they had already made preliminary site surveys. Formal agreement was reached on 6 November, when the Canadian Ambassador announced that his government was willing to proceed with the construction of the line, subject to a cost-sharing agreement to be worked out later. He recommended that the two Air Forces select the final locations for the component stations and that the Joint Military Study Group determine specifications for equipment. These proposals were acceptable to the United States. On 8 December 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the necessary instructions to General Twining to initiate cooperation with Canada in these matters.

The Military Study Group recommended on 18 December 1953 that responsibility for selecting equipment be shifted to the two Air Forces, since they would be the ultimate users. The Group set forth the following requirements for the system: a probability of at least 95 percent detection of single aircraft from ground level to 65,000 feet altitude; ability to distinguish between inbound and outbound aircraft, and between one plane and several in tight formation; ability to determine approximate height of targets; and a high reliability of identification.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these suggestions and took note of General Twining's expressed intention to initiate immediate engineering studies, in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Air Force, for selection of equipment.99

The basic decisions concerning the Mid-Canada Line (as it was later called) had now been made. A public announcement was in order, since the construction of the line could not be concealed. A press release drafted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, reviewed and approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff,100 was issued by the two nations on 8 April 1954. It announced that both governments had agreed on the need for a radar system generally to the north of settled territory in Canada and that the task of selecting sites was well advanced.101 The expected date of completion was not indicated in the announcement; however, the two countries hoped to have it in operation by December 1956.102

A Second Look at Continental Defense Plans

The presentation by the Department of Defense to the National Security Council concerning the three programs mentioned in the Council's decision on NSC 159/4, after repeated postponement, was finally submitted on 14 January 1954.103 The Council noted that the Department was still analyzing the costs of continental defense and agreed that, after this process had been completed, NSC 159/4 would be reviewed and revised.104

A revision of NSC 159/4, designated NSC 5408, was circulated by the Planning Board on 11 February 1954. The principal change was that fighter interceptor and antiaircraft forces were now elevated to the highest priority. It was also made clear that increased emphasis on continental defense was not to jeopardize the objective of a balanced budget.105

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found NSC 5408 acceptable.106 The National Security Council adopted it, with minor amendments, on 17 February 1954. The members also voted to require periodic reports of progress on continental defenses beginning in June 1954. The President approved the revised version on 24 February 1954.107

The Council had thus in effect reaffirmed the policy set forth in NSC 159/4. Within a few months, however, the members were forced to reexamine it and to consider the possibility of a more urgent approach to continental defense. Suggestions for such a change came from another consultant to the Council, Mr. Robert C. Sprague. In 1953, as a consequence of Congressional alarm stemming from the Soviet thermonuclear test, Mr. Sprague had been named by the Senate Armed Services Committee to investigate US air defenses.108 After completing his investigation, Mr. Sprague recommended several steps for improvement, including more vigorous research, augmented readiness and armament for fighter aircraft, and improved launching facilities to speed up the rate of fire of Nike missiles.109 Secretary Wilson submitted these suggestions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who found that, insofar as they were practicable they were already in progress or under consideration.110
In May 1954 President Eisenhower asked Mr. Sprague to act as an adviser to the Council, principally to work with the Planning Board in reviewing the progress reports required in connection with NSC 5408. While serving in this capacity, Mr. Sprague found it advisable to revise his earlier report to reflect new and more alarming estimates of Soviet capabilities, which seemed to call for an immediate US response. Working from the assumption that by 1 July 1957 the USSR would be able to strike with jet bombers carrying as many as 80 ten-megaton and 400 sixty-kiloton bombs, Mr. Sprague, in a report on 1 July 1954, recommended that the National Security Council determine the percentage of kill that US defenses must be able to attain in order to hold damage within acceptable limits, and that the Department of Defense then determine the forces and weapons needed to attain this percentage. Meanwhile, he believed, the increased threat should be met by accelerating the expansion of the radar net, the construction of the two early warning lines, and the increase in fighter interceptors and in antiaircraft forces, as well as by some of the measures he had recommended earlier.

At the same meeting, spokesmen for the Services presented summaries of their first semiannual progress reports on continental defense. The Air Force representative touched on the development of the nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, which had slipped so badly that its introduction had been rescheduled for 1958. The potentialities of this weapon (having a kill probability of two, and thus able greatly to increase the proportion of enemy bombers destroyed by a given number of fighter aircraft) impressed Mr. Sprague. In a memorandum written immediately after the meeting, he urged that the development of this weapon be placed ahead of all other programs.

The Council had by then begun considering guidelines for FY 1956 budget planning under NSC 162/2. This fact made it timely to review continental defense policy. The first draft of the guidelines, NSC 5422, was discussed at the 1 July meeting. The National Security Council directed the Department of Defense to study Mr. Sprague’s recommendations and to suggest policy changes, if necessary, at the same time that the Planning Board brought in a revision of NSC 5422.

Secretary Wilson passed the recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who pronounced them generally valid. But, they pointed out, the feasibility of accelerating continental defense programs was a matter to be determined by the Department of Defense in the light of the money, manpower, and production capacity available. They rejected the suggestion of an overriding priority for the atomic rocket, which was only one element of an interdependent defensive complex. Mr. Wilson forwarded these conclusions to the National Security Council with his concurrence.

The Council discussed the subject again on 29 July 1954. Mr. Sprague appeared at this meeting and urged greater speed in constructing the Distant Early Warning Line and its Pacific extension and in procuring low-altitude radars. These programs, he believed, should be substantially completed by July 1957, when most others were scheduled for completion. The National Security Council took no action at the time.
NSC 5422 had called for execution of active and passive continental defense programs, but had attached no special degree of urgency to the subject. When it was rewritten, the special committee that prepared the revision (NSC 5422/1) recommended that the programs in NSC 5408 be speeded up if such action proved feasible. Some members, reflecting Mr. Sprague’s viewpoint, had sought also to include specific target dates for certain programs. They had been opposed by the Defense and JCS spokesmen in the Planning Board.  

When the Council members discussed NSC 5422/1 on 5 August 1954, they adopted a paragraph calling for acceleration of continental defense programs as far as was feasible and operationally desirable, but set no target dates. Thus, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had desired, the Department of Defense was left free to determine what action, if any, should be taken. The Council members called for the next progress report on NSC 5408 by 15 November instead of 15 December—early enough to allow them to order a faster pace of development (if such seemed desirable) in connection with the FY 1956 budget.

Command and Organizational Changes

Considering the importance of continental defense, it was somewhat anomalous that there was no unity of command or coordination of planning for this function below the JCS level. Suggestions for a unified continental defense command had often been made, and were renewed in 1953. The Kelly Group called for a “real centralized authority charged with viewing, as a whole, the defense of the continent against air attack, and seeing to it that the efforts of all Services are in step.” In October 1953, commenting on a suggestion by Admiral Carney that the Continental US Defense Planning Group be absorbed into the Joint Staff, General Ridgway urged upon his colleagues the need of creating an agency that would combine responsibility for both planning and execution in this field—in other words, a joint air defense command.

Rather surprisingly, opposition came from the Air Force, where General Twining adopted as his own the conclusions of a study completed in December 1953. The authors of this study agreed that it was desirable to bring the function under more immediate cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they held that neither of the two established types of JCS command was applicable. A unified command, with the usual component command echelon inserted below the commander, would deprive him of direct operational control of the forces. A specified, or single-Service, command was open to the obvious objection that the mission involved all the Services. The existing arrangement, based on agreements between the Commander, Air Defense Command, and other responsible officers, constituted a satisfactory working solution and should be left unchanged. Better cognizance of the function by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could readily be accomplished through periodic reports rendered by the Air Force.

Admiral Radford emphatically disagreed. He believed that the time had come to place air defense under centralized command. His views were as follows:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by law with responsibilities regarding the establishment of unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security. In an era when enemy capabilities to inflict massive damage on the continental United States by surprise air attack are rapidly increasing, I consider that there is no doubt whatsoever as to the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a suitable "joint" command. I use the word "joint" advisedly because I realize that the terms of reference that may be issued to the commander may not exactly fit the presently agreed definition of a "unified" command. Nevertheless, the command will be composed of forces of each of the services and provide for the coordinated accomplishment of functions of each of the services for the air defense of the United States.

The new command, in his opinion, should be given to a general officer of the Air Force, and should embrace all air and antiaircraft forces regularly assigned to defense of the United States, radar stations within continental US borders, and naval forces assigned to contiguous radar coverage. Early warning facilities should, as presently planned, be under unified commands (CINCAL, CINCNE, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC), but their operation should be responsive to the needs of the joint air defense commander.  

Admiral Radford's colleagues approved these recommendations on 22 January 1954. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee embodied them in a set of terms of reference for the new command, and proposed that the position be given to the Commander, Air Defense Command, US Air Force. On 22 March 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred these plans for comment to the Commander, Air Defense Command, General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, USAF.

Instead of commenting on the JCS proposals, General Chidlaw countered with his own draft, which would confer on him somewhat greater authority. It would allow him to determine when to take command of the augmentation forces from other commands and Services and to exercise authority through subordinate joint commands rather than through Service channels. General Chidlaw admitted that his proposals might appear strange to those unfamiliar with the requirements of the task, which was a functional mission carried out on a geographical basis. He urged, however, that they be approved at once so that he might proceed with the still-unfinished task of drawing up a comprehensive plan for air defense. His plans received the full endorsement of General Twining. 

There followed considerable discussion centering upon General Chidlaw's proposals, to which the other Services objected because of the authority envisioned for the new commander. At length on 16 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a version that gave General Chidlaw essentially what he had sought. It directed the establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) as a joint command (the terms unified and specified were intentionally avoided), for which the Department of the Air Force was to serve as executive agent. The position was to be held by the commander of the existing Air Defense Command, whose headquarters at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, was additionally designated as headquarters of CONAD. Initially, the command was to consist of the Air Defense Command, USAF; the Antiaircraft Command, US
Army; and a Naval command (to be established later) comprising the ships of the contiguous radar systems.

The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) was to exercise operational control over all forces made available for the purpose by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was to prepare, and submit for JCS approval, plans for air defense and for early warning systems and procedures. He would conduct liaison with appropriate US, Canadian, and Mexican authorities. He would assume operational control of augmentation forces when he believed there existed an imminent threat of air attack. CINCONAD would retain this control until he believed the forces could be safely released; however, the parent commanders might appeal the question of release to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Subordinate joint commands were to be superimposed upon the existing Air Force command structure. Each command in the United States, down to air division level was to be additionally designated as a joint headquarters.\(^{131}\)

On 26 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Wilson of their decision. Four days later he approved it and confirmed the appointment of the Air Force as executive agent. Accordingly, by formal directive to the Services on 2 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially established the Continental Air Defense Command, effective 1 September 1954, and appointed General Chidlaw as Commander in Chief.\(^{132}\)

Months before the new command was established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Continental United States Defense Planning Group was no longer needed. On 29 January 1954 they directed that, effective 1 February, the Group would be abolished and its functions and personnel transferred to the Joint Strategic Plans Group.\(^{133}\)

The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee

When the Continental Defense Committee of the NSC Planning Board was appointed in May 1953, it was directed to devise organizational machinery needed to enable the Council to oversee the development of continental defense. In its report, NSC 159, the Committee concluded that the Operations Coordinating Board, the formation of which was pending, could serve as a supervisory body. For periodic evaluation of net Soviet capacity, the Committee recommended the establishment of a permanent subcommittee composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. This suggestion had come from the new Director, Mr. Allen Dulles.\(^{134}\)

When the Committee submitted NSC 159 to the Council, President Eisenhower referred this part of it to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, for further study.\(^{135}\) The outcome of this process was a set of proposals drafted by the Planning Board, based on recommendations from Dr. Flemming's office, that was sent to the Council on 9 April 1954. The Board concluded that continuing action in continental defense could be insured by
requiring responsible agencies to submit semiannual progress reports to the Council. For periodic reappraisal of Soviet capability, most Board members favored the establishment of a standing two-man subcommittee, to which other members would be added as necessary on an ad hoc basis, such as the heads of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. But the JCS adviser, supported by the Defense, Treasury, and FOA members of the Board, believed the Department of Defense should be responsible for preparing such studies.\textsuperscript{136}

The question at issue here had come up in October 1952 without being resolved. Soviet net capability was, of course, the difference between two other quantities, the Soviets’ gross offensive capacity and the defensive strength of the United States. Who should perform the subtraction to derive this difference? One alternative would require highly classified information about US forces and weapons to be disclosed to persons outside the Department of Defense; the other would mean that equally sensitive intelligence information regarding the Soviet Union must be released outside the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly supported the position taken by their adviser in the Board. The establishment of a special committee, they believed, would require detailed operating plans to be divulged to persons having no need to know, and would infringe upon their own responsibilities and those of the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{137}

Before the Council discussed the matter, Admiral Radford and Mr. Allen Dulles attempted to compose their differences in a conference that merely made it clear how far apart they were. The Director of Central Intelligence contended that responsibility for estimates of Soviet capabilities had been conferred upon him by law. No information would be needlessly endangered under his proposal, Mr. Dulles maintained; the subcommittee would require only estimates of the effectiveness of US forces, not details of war plans. Moreover, he feared that appraisals emanating from the Department of Defense might be colored for budgetary or other reasons. Admiral Radford viewed the process of evaluation as a conventional problem in military operational planning. In this view, the Central Intelligence Agency was analogous to the intelligence section of a commander’s staff, and should feed data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the equivalent of an operations section) to be evaluated in relation to US capabilities. Admiral Radford also reminded Mr. Dulles that the Secretary of Defense had his own statutory responsibilities to consider.\textsuperscript{138}

After considering the subject on 13 May 1954, the National Security Council postponed a decision on the question of machinery for evaluation, while approving the Planning Board’s other proposals.\textsuperscript{139} On 9 June 1954 Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles appeared before the Council and set forth their opposing views. President Eisenhower then settled the issue through a compromise. He ordered the establishment, on a trial basis, of the subcommittee sought by Mr. Dulles, but named Admiral Radford as its chairman. The two members were to prepare their own terms of reference and were to be aided by a staff with a director of
their own choosing. The President specified that there was to be no unnecessary disclosure of war plans or of intelligence methods or sources.140

In accord with this decision, Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted terms of reference, modeled on those given the Edwards Subcommittee in 1953, which called for a report covering the period through 1 July 1957 to be submitted by 1 November 1954. The Council approved these terms on 24 June.141

On 4 November 1954 Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted their findings to the Council. The members of that body found no reason to order any change in continental defense programs, but approved the subcommittee's recommendation that a permanent procedure be established to insure a new evaluation at least annually. The nature of this procedure was left for future determination.142

Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line

The Arctic test program was conducted by the Western Electric Company under a contract with the Air Research and Development Command of the US Air Force. By the middle of 1954 the results showed that it was feasible to operate radar warning stations at high latitudes. Engineers of the company, in consultation with US and Canadian Air Force and Navy officers, had selected tentative sites for a line all the way across Canada.143

On the basis of these findings, the US-Canadian Military Study Group on 3 June 1954 recommended the construction of an early line across the more northern portions of North America, in order to keep defenses abreast of expected Soviet technological progress. The members pointed out that the value of this line would be "directly related to the effectiveness with which it is extended to cover flanking approach routes," thus in effect recommending that, like the Mid-Canada Line, it should be thrust out into the oceans.144 On 9 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to seek the agreement of their Canadian colleagues to the construction of the line.145

Meanwhile, on 30 June 1954, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, had notified Admiral Radford that the Canadian Government would construct the Mid-Canada Line at its own expense. Admiral Radford, in reply, promised that the United States would erect the seaward extensions progressively, and told General Foulkes that the question of the far northern line would soon be raised within the Permanent Joint Board.146

In acknowledging this reply, General Foulkes wrote that his Government was already convinced of the need for the northern line, and hence that no Board action was needed. At the same time, he pointed out that, under current plans, all radar lines in eastern Canada—the PINE TREE chain, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Atlantic extension of the latter—would converge on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland, and thus would afford little or no early warning to the important military installations there. He suggested that the northern tip
of the Atlantic barrier might be pushed forward to Greenland (presumably in connection with the construction of the northern line).

Admiral Carney, commenting on this latter proposal, objected that it was impracticable to operate a continuous barrier out of Greenland, and that it would be expensive and wasteful to relocate the Atlantic barrier. His colleagues concurred and instructed the US members of the Military Study Group that, if the subject came up, they should oppose any change in plans for the Atlantic extension but should not object to a study of the possibility of additional sea barriers.

On 2 September 1954 the Canadian Government formally agreed to the establishment of a Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across the most northerly practicable part of North America. The agreement was without prejudice to the extent of Canadian participation and was subject to review after costs and other details had been studied. At the same time, the Canadian note expressed serious concern over the fact that the proposed seaward wing of this line would give insufficient early warning of aircraft approaching from the northeast. It urged study of an alternative route that would allow a greater margin of safety for Labrador and Newfoundland. Five days later, Ottawa submitted a draft of a proposed joint announcement of the agreement, which included a statement that the line would be linked with seaward extensions to be established by the United States on both flanks of the continent.

It was not clear how the Canadian Government had formed the impression that the United States was committed to extension of the northern line. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on the Canadian proposals, warned Secretary Wilson that the United States should not be trapped into accepting this inference. The joint announcement should state merely that portions of the complete warning and control system would be extended to seaward. As for the problem of early warning for Labrador and Newfoundland, they pointed out that "the flexibility afforded by the use of mobile AEW forces, and continued improvement in radar performance will allow wide latitude in selecting the [final] line of radar coverage."

This JCS advice was accepted at higher levels of the US Government. The announcement, released by the two countries on 27 September 1954, had been amended as the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired. But the question of ultimate seaward extension remained. The Military Study Group had recently reaffirmed the "importance and necessity of . . . compatible extensions to any land-based distant early warning line" and had recommended that planning for this purpose begin at once. On 20 September 1954 General Twining told his colleagues that he shared these views; he urged a joint Air Force-Navy study of the feasibility of such extensions. He reported also that he had established, in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Air Force, a committee to define military characteristics for the DEW Line. This committee had recommended that a location study group be established to choose final station sites. General Twining asked that the Navy provide officers to serve on this group.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conclusions of the Military Study Group, but, taking note of reservations expressed by Admiral Carney, they took
care to make it clear that they were not committing themselves to seaward extension of the DEW Line. A firm decision on that question, they indicated, awaited further study. At the same time, they approved the studies recommended by General Twining and directed the Navy to participate.\footnote{155}

The Location Study Group was established with representatives of the Navies and Air Forces of both countries and of appropriate civil departments of the Canadian Government. The members reported their conclusions on 12 November 1954. They recommended a route lying for the most part between the Arctic Circle and latitude $70^\circ$. It extended from northwestern Alaska (Cape Lisburne) along the coast of mainland Canada to the east side of Baffin Island (Cape Dyer), thence across Davis Strait to the west coast of Greenland (Holsteinborg). The western end of the line should be strung southward around Alaska to join the Kodiak-Hawaii barrier already programmed for the Mid-Canada Line. The eastern end would also have to be pushed beyond Holsteinborg (probably by extending it eastward across Greenland, a more practicable alternative than running it south along the coast). It might also be connected with the Argentia-Azores line.\footnote{156}

This plan was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1954, bearing the endorsement of the Military Study Group and of General Twining.\footnote{157} At Admiral Carney’s suggestion, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 January 1955 approved the proposed route only as far as Cape Dyer, as they felt that it might eventually prove better to swing the line southward to northern Labrador, and thus to link it with the Argentia-Azores barrier, than to extend it to Greenland.\footnote{158} They informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee at once of their decision. Shortly thereafter, their Canadian colleagues accepted the plan with the same reservation concerning the eastern terminus of the route.\footnote{159}

The USAF-RCAF Military Characteristics Committee submitted its report on 7 September 1954. It was based on the assumptions that by 1957 the Soviet Union would have enough high-performance jet bombers to conduct “large scale operations with atomic and thermonuclear weapons against all critical target areas in North America,”\footnote{160} and might be in possession of intercontinental missiles by 1965. The Committee therefore specified very high standards for the distant early warning system: a detection capability of 100 percent at altitudes up to 100,000 feet (high enough to detect guided missiles), beginning at 200 feet elevation over land and at water level over the oceans, plus a system reliability of 100 percent. But, recognizing that these goals were beyond the present state of the art, the Committee proposed slightly lower standards to be attained as soon as possible: a 95–98 percent detection probability up to 65,000 feet (maximum altitude for aircraft) and 95 percent system reliability. Even these objectives were not at once attainable, but it was urgently necessary to begin at once, using the best equipment available, in order to install a line by mid-1957.\footnote{161}

General Twining endorsed these proposals, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on them at the moment, possibly for a reason pointed out by General Ridgway: the construction of a line meeting these requirements might be financially infeasible and the costs should first be carefully studied.\footnote{162} Meanwhile the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had proposed certain amendments that, without altering the high detection probability and system reliability percentages, would
amend the statement of desired characteristics to reflect a more realistic acceptance of limitations (such as by specifying maximum practicable ability to identify targets and to indicate position, speed, and direction of flight).  

The US Navy had meanwhile conducted its own study of the possibility of extending the DEW Line to seaward by using aircraft and DERs. Its conclusions were that such barriers could be operated with an 80 percent detection capability up to 55,000 feet, with a 95 percent system reliability. In sending these results to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 December 1954, Admiral Carney described them as indicative of what might be accomplished and where improvement was needed. He believed, however, that no decision should be made at that time on final military characteristics for the DEW Line. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should approve characteristics that could be attained by mid-1958: 95–98 percent detection capability at 55,000 feet and 95 percent reliability.

General Twining believed that these suggestions would degrade the capability of the DEW Line. The standards recommended by the Military Characteristics Committee, he urged, should be approved for planning purposes, even though they might later have to be revised in light of what was technologically attainable. He restated his conviction that seaward extensions of the DEW Line, having the same capabilities as the land portion, were needed. He found in NSC 5408 an intent that the United States would provide them.

Admiral Carney was willing to approve the military characteristics submitted by the committee with this recognition of their tentative nature. As for the seaward extensions, he agreed that they were essential but pointed out that ships and aircraft need not necessarily be employed for the purpose; it might be cheaper and more efficient to use the islands lying between North America and Europe.

With this discussion concluded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able on 17 December 1954 to approve the proposed military characteristics (including the changes suggested by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff), subject to possible later amendment. The Canadians subsequently accepted the same version.

These agreements between the military planners of the two countries were paralleled by others at the diplomatic level. By the end of 1954 the two Governments had agreed to go ahead with the construction of the DEW Line. The United States would pay the cost and supervise the process, as the Canadians were doing with the Mid-Canada Line.

Objectives for FY 1956

The Service continental defense programs moved ahead in 1954 faster than expected. Secretary Wilson’s second semi-annual progress report to the National Security Council in November 1954 indicated that the Navy now planned to complete its Pacific air-sea barrier by June 1958, a full year ahead of the original schedule, and to expand the Atlantic LOFAR system and to construct a second such network in the Pacific by March 1958. The Air Force believed that
rockets with atomic warheads would be available before the end of calendar 1957.  

The enlarged objectives proposed by the Services were approved in the FY 1956 budget. Without referring the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson and the President authorized another increase in continental defense spending, offsetting it, as before, by economizing elsewhere in the military establishment. Much of this increase resulted from the decision to construct the DEW Line, for which 50 of the proposed 75 stations were to be funded in FY 1956. But existing programs were also expanded. Thus the Navy obtained approval for three more LOFAR stations in the Atlantic and for seven in the Pacific (extending from British Columbia to Southern California and Pearl Harbor), and for 12 destroyer-escort picket ships—twice the 1955 figure. The Air Force was authorized ten more fighter interceptor squadrons and three of AEW aircraft, while the overall goals for these programs were raised to 70 and 12 squadrons respectively. The Army, still building toward its goal of 150 antiaircraft battalions, was allowed 95 active Army units (52 armed with Nike missiles) and 47 in the National Guard.

For all military continental defense programs, the administration requested the following amounts in billions of dollars for FY 1956: $.938 for the Army, $.399 for the Navy, and $1.982 for the Air Force. President Eisenhower’s budget presentation to Congress laid even more stress on continental defense than that of the previous year. The President cited recent major strides in this field: introduction of Nike missiles, establishment of the new Continental Air Defense Command, and expansion of radar warning facilities. At the same time, he noted that these measures would inevitably mean higher costs.

Continental Defense at the End of 1954

The increase in air defense forces between December 1952 and December 1954 is summarized in Table 11 (pages 113-114). Nearly all forces expanded, with the most important increases taking place in fighter interceptor squadrons and antiaircraft battalions. The results of this growth were not in themselves impressive; in many cases the increases were little or no greater than had been expected in 1952, before the New Look brought greater emphasis on continental defense. More important was the fact that the force goals accepted as final in 1952 had been superseded by others toward which the Services were still building, as shown in Table 11.

The table does not, of course, reflect qualitative improvements. The following were the most significant achieved by early 1955: the nearly complete conversion of fighter squadrons to all-weather jets armed with rockets (the few remaining piston-engine aircraft would be superseded by July 1955); introduction of new radar equipment with higher altitude range; improved equipment and procedures at control centers, pending the completion of the new system developed by the Lincoln Laboratory (now called Semi-Automatic Ground Environment or
SAGE), for which the first two centers were under construction; and the beginning of contiguous seaward radar coverage, making use of AEW aircraft, in both oceans. Further improvements were in the offing, such as the first supersonic all-weather fighter (the F-102); the Nike B antiaircraft missile, with an atomic warhead and a range of 80,000 feet; and another promising missile, Hawk, designed for low altitude defense. These lines of progress had to some degree been offset by slippages, as in the progress of the Falcon air-to-air rocket, which was not expected to be available for another year.\textsuperscript{175}

The new force goals in effect at the end of 1954 were the product of a different approach to the problem. It was now recognized that continental defense constituted a clearcut mission, dependent for its successful accomplishment upon a complex interrelationship of elements of all three Services. In other words, continental defense had emerged as a separate strategic program. The principal step in this development had come in September 1953 with the approval of NSC 159/4, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff described as constituting an integrated military program. The budgets for FYs 1955 and 1956 carried this program into actuality. The establishment of a unified command, CONAD, constituted another recognition of the nature and importance of the continental defense function.

The expansion of continental defense forces and goals during 1953 and 1954 stands in marked contrast to the simultaneous reduction in the overall size of the military establishment—a reduction dictated, in the final analysis, by the desire for economy. This desire, to be sure, had by no means been absent from the administration’s approach to continental defense. The abandonment of the target date of 31 December 1955 established in NSC 139 was doubtless based in large part on budgetary considerations, as was the rejection of proposals for a crash program. But the need to apply more money and effort to this purpose was recognized as clear and compelling. Improvement of continental defense consequently became a cardinal feature of the New Look.

The role of the Eisenhower administration in presiding over the expansion of continental defense forces in 1953 and 1954 was in large part a chronological accident. There is little doubt that Mr. Truman, had he remained in office, would have made similar decisions, as his action in issuing NSC 139 attests. On the other hand, it is certain that emphasis on continental defense was particularly congenial to the mental outlook that produced the New Look, since one aspect of this attitude was a conviction that the nation must look more carefully to the protection of her own vitals. As Admiral Radford said in 1955:

The continental United States is the heartland and the primary source of free world strength. . . . The continental U.S., its industry and institutions, must be reasonably secure as a base of operations against any likely enemy or combination of enemies. . . . The U.S. . . . should emphasize forces for continental defense and instant offensive retaliation plus other forms of military assistance to back up and support our Allies.\textsuperscript{176}

“Forces for continental defense and instant offensive retaliation”—here was the New Look in a nutshell. There was no inconsistency in this dual emphasis; the two sets of forces were complementary—the sword and the shield. Indeed it
could be argued that a stronger defense would increase the deterrent effect of retaliatory airpower, as President Eisenhower asserted early in 1953.\cite{127}

The new emphasis given continental defense in 1953 and 1954 did not owe its inception to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was triggered by pressure applied by civilians associated with the Air Force establishment—pressure that was transmitted to the Services through NSC 139, issued against the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Bradley and his colleagues favored stronger defenses, but they believed that increases should be properly phased with other elements of military strength. In a period of declining military budgets, in prospect even in 1952, the allocation of resources between continental defense and other programs, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a matter for careful professional military judgment.

These views were shared by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff who took office in 1953. "We want to see continental defense programming continue on an orderly basis, with phased increases in forces and facilities," said Admiral Radford in December 1953.\cite{128} Despite their divergent views on other matters, all four of the new JCS members could agree in opposing overemphasis on continental defense: Admiral Radford and General Twining, who probably feared diversion of resources from strategic airpower (since even complementary forces must compete with one another for funds when budgets are limited), as well as General Ridgway and Admiral Carney, the advocates on principle of a balanced military establishment. Insofar as the size of continental defense forces was an issue, it was one that cut across all the Services rather than one that divided one Service from another.\cite{129}

The program adopted by the administration in NSC 159/4 conformed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While providing for general increases in all forces, it left the Department of Defense free to adjust objectives and schedules. How far the administration's decision was actually influenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a question that cannot be answered. Military and economic objectives converged at this point, since an all-out air defense program would be more costly than the phased increases to which Admiral Radford referred.

The question of the command structure for continental defense was left entirely to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford led the way toward an arrangement responsive to the nature of the mission. His leadership in this regard was the more striking in that he had to overcome the opposition of the Air Force, which had primary interest in this field.

Another matter on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed was that the increases attained by the end of 1954 were inadequate. "The present capability of the continental defense system is improving," they told Secretary Wilson in March 1955, "but at this time does not provide an acceptable destruction probability against attacks which the USSR is capable of launching."\cite{130} The warning was similar to that penned by their predecessors two years earlier.

An acceptable destruction probability was the goal of the complex and intricate defense system that had been undertaken in 1953. But already there was a disquieting prospect that this goal might be beyond reach. It was entirely possible that even after everything was finished—after the last vacuum tube had been
slipped into place in the last radar station on the lonely Arctic tundra, and the last of the Lincoln Laboratory's SAGE computers had hummed into watchful activity at the control centers—the entire system might turn out to be no more than a staggeringly expensive technological curiosity, of little or no military value.

This frightening possibility sprang from the unexplored potentialities of the intercontinental ballistic missile, the development of which was as safely predictable by 1954 as anything could be in the realm of military prophecy. Already the Joint Chiefs of Staff had found it necessary to stipulate that the Distant Early Warning Line must incorporate a capacity to detect missiles. But whether it was possible to do so was by no means certain. "Intercontinental ballistic missiles . . . will likely be of such performance that presently feasible warning lines will be ineffective against them," concluded a Navy study of the early warning problem in 1954. And even if they could be detected, how could they be destroyed before impact?

The question opened up an entirely new dimension in the problem of air defense. The military commentator for the New York Times, Hanson W. Baldwin, predicted in November 1954 that the intercontinental missile would mean "the ultimate, and perhaps the final, triumph of the offense at the very time we are strengthening the defense." He saw a massive civil defense program as the only answer to the danger. Such gloomy prophecies of an ultimate weapon might or might not prove to be true. In any case, no better illustration could be cited of the difficulties of military planning in an age of continuing revolutionary technological change.
Mobilization Planning

The task of mobilization planning was inherent in the legally assigned responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparing strategic and logistic plans. Given the nature of the process, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could furnish only general guidance to the Services; it was for the latter to prepare detailed plans for moving their forces to a war footing and to compile lists of the huge numbers of items that would be necessary to carry on hostilities.¹

Allocation of Responsibilities

In the area of mobilization, planning was complicated by the fact that military preparations had to be synchronized with other plans for marshalling the nation’s economic resources in wartime, which was a task for civilian leadership. During the Truman administration, high-level coordination of military and civilian mobilization planning was accomplished through the National Security Resources Board, a cabinet-level committee created by the National Security Act of 1947.² Actual supervision was the task of the Office of Defense Mobilization, established by Executive Order during the Korean War. Within the Department of Defense, the Munitions Board (another product of the 1947 Act, descended from an earlier body, the Army-Navy Munitions Board), an inter-Service committee with a civilian chairman, was responsible for totaling and adjusting the separate Service mobilization requirements as part of its mission of coordinating Service procurement. The Munitions Board also managed the national stockpile of strategic and critical materials, in consultation with appropriate civilian agencies and under guidance from the National Security Resources Board.³

President Eisenhower viewed this wide diffusion of responsibility as undesirable and, soon after his accession, moved to bring mobilization planning under tighter central control. Under Reorganization Plan No. 3, announced on 2 April 1953 and effective on 12 June, the National Security Resources Board was
abolished; its functions were given to an enlarged and strengthened Office of Defense Mobilization, which also took over from the Munitions Board the task of stockpile administration. Soon after, under Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Munitions Board was also abolished and its responsibilities transferred to a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics.

Before 1953 the inadequacies of the JCS planning process, as described in Chapter 4, prevented any regular, orderly flow of guidance to the Services in connection with mobilization planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, however, issued a Joint Mobilization Plan, JCS 1725/47, dating originally from 1950 but often amended thereafter. It was based on the current mid-range war plan (JOWP) described earlier, with a D-day (assumed to coincide with M-day) of 1 July 1952. The Services had used this plan to compute their mobilization requirements for a three-year period, fiscal years 1952 through 1954. But when this process was completed in 1952, the Service estimates added up to a total of $535 billion in hard goods, a figure that, according to the Munitions Board, exceeded by at least $213 billion the anticipated output of these items.

When asked by Secretary of Defense Lovett to scale down this inflated total, the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply discarded the Service estimates and adopted a new approach. Obtaining estimates from the Munitions Board of maximum hard goods delivery capabilities for a three-year war (with D-day advanced to 1 July 1953), the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated this capacity among the Services, and the latter then developed detailed requirements within their fixed limits. This Mobilization Production Program was intended as an interim program pending the completion of the first Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. The same method, working backward from capabilities to requirements, was continued in Secretary Wilson’s administration, under the supervision of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Under the Joint Program for Planning, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan was expected to obviate the need for joint mobilization plans as such. It would indicate the forces expected to be mobilized during the first 48 months of a general war, and would thus become the basis for budgetary decisions necessary to provide an adequate mobilization base by D-day. Service requirements developed in conformity with the JSOP were to be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and tested for feasibility by the Munitions Board. The findings of this test would be applied in preparing mobilization schedules for the related JSCP. The process should have become operative in 1954, in connection with plans for the FY 1956 budget. But its inception was rendered impossible when the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved unable to agree on a JSOP.

The Eisenhower Administration and the Mobilization Base in 1953

Mobilization requirements represented money invested to meet an emergency that might never occur. As such, they constituted a natural target for the economy drive undertaken by the Eisenhower administration as soon as
it took office. "A thorough review of existing [mobilization] plans and programs was initiated during the last half of fiscal year 1953," reported Secretary Wilson, "in order to determine the most effective means for the maintenance of an adequate mobilization base at minimum cost."^9

Under the Truman administration, mobilization plans had stressed expansion of productive potential in preference to the accumulation of large stores of finished goods ready for immediate issue on M-day. The new administration pushed this emphasis a step further. The United States should "increase emphasis on . . . maintenance of defense production plant capacity in the United States, in lieu of large reserve stocks of end-items," declared the National Security Council in the policy statement approved on 31 March 1953. The same recommendation appeared in NSC 149/2 and NSC 153/1, which the Council approved later in 1953.

The application of this policy enabled the administration to recompute at a lower figure the mobilization requirements in the original FY 1954 budget. The smaller requirements were justified on several grounds: that the original ones could not be satisfied "within the time contemplated and within the concept of a reasonable balance between Federal expenditures and revenues"; that slower acquisition of reserve stocks would keep production lines in operation, and thus ready for acceleration in case of need, over a longer span of time; and that, in an age of rapid change, large stocks of equipment were subject to obsolescence. How much money was thus saved was not indicated in available records, but the amount was probably small in comparison with the $5 billion reduction in aircraft procurement funds made in the 1954 budget, as described in Chapter 3.

But even while reducing the projected size of M-day stockpiles, the administration also undertook to narrow the production base available for mobilization. The previous administration had spread military procurement among as many manufacturing plants as possible, to cut losses in case of atomic attack and to maintain a large number of production lines. This practice resulted in higher unit costs of production, and therefore drew the opposition of Secretary Wilson, who undertook to concentrate production in fewer plants in order to reduce costs. Such a course of action had been suggested in April 1953 by General Bradley, in a memorandum prepared at the request of Deputy Secretary Kyes, as one of several ways of reducing the defense budget. The policy of concentrating production meant the cancellation of some contracts, an action that produced some criticism when it became known. In defending the policy, Secretary Wilson charged the previous administration with overexpanding the mobilization base. But he recognized the need for the Federal Government to finance the establishment of certain additional types of productive capacity that were in short supply.

Concentration of production made the mobilization base more vulnerable to attack, and thus ran counter to the stress on continental defense in the New Look. NSC 159, the report of the Continental Defense Committee of the Planning Board, which has been described earlier, recommended a program for continuity of industry among the defense measures to be assigned second priority. NSC 159/4, approved by the National Security Council in September 1953, down-
graded continuity of industry to third priority, and defined it as including dispersion of productive capacity, provision of standby facilities, and stockpiling of finished goods.

The importance of an adequate and well-protected mobilization base was recognized in NSC 162/2, which the National Security Council approved on 29 October 1953. This directive recommended the following actions, characterizing them as a state of limited defense mobilization:

1. Developing and maintaining production plant capacity, dispersed with a view to minimizing destruction by enemy attack and capable of rapid expansion or prompt conversion to essential wartime output.
2. Creating and maintaining minimum essential reserve stocks of selected end-items, so located as to support promptly and effectively the war effort in areas of probable commitment until war production and shipping capacity reaches the required wartime levels.
3. Maintaining stockpiling programs, and providing additional production facilities, for those materials the shortage of which would affect critically essential defense programs; meanwhile reducing the rates of other stockpile materials.\(^{15}\)

The FY 1955 budget, however, revealed no trace of any heightened sense of urgency in mobilization planning. The policies applied to the previous budget—minimum buildup of reserve stocks and concentration of production—were again carried out. The end of the Korean War provided a further opportunity for savings, since materiel in the Korean pipeline could now be counted toward D-day requirements. As in other budgetary programs, the Army was most adversely affected.\(^{16}\)

In formulating and applying these policies, the administration did not consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subject was, after all, close to one in which Secretary Wilson was an acknowledged expert—production planning. But the effects of these decisions, as they were being felt at the end of 1953, were a matter of concern to Admiral Radford and his colleagues. In their appraisal of the anticipated military posture of the free world for 1956–1959, which they prepared for the NSC Planning Board in connection with the 1956 budget, they warned that:

The decreased level of production activity resulting from reduced military expenditures forecast during this period [1956–1959] is expected to narrow the mobilization base in the nine military hard goods fields below that which is considered adequate to support a general war. . . . The sharp reduction in production lines results in extending the already existing long-lead times. A resumption and re-emphasis of an industrial preparedness program in the nine military hard goods fields would significantly improve our mobilization base.\(^{17}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Stockpile Policy

A n essential aspect of mobilization planning was the acquisition and retention of a supply of those vital raw materials that the nation could not
provide out of its own resources in wartime. A program for stockpiling strategic and critical materials, first undertaken in 1939, was given statutory permanence after World War II. A law enacted in 1946 made the Military Departments and the Department of the Interior responsible for determining the kinds and quantities of materials to be acquired. After the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Munitions Board became the medium through which the Services discharged their responsibilities for stockpiling, while the National Security Resources Board played a rather ill-defined supervisory role.

From its inception, the stockpile program suffered from confusion of responsibilities and from pressures exerted by those who wished to see it used as a weapon for foreign economic policy or as a means of assisting domestic producers. At the end of 1952 the goals of this program remained far from attainment. In setting objectives for the stockpile, the Munitions Board relied upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice about the probable nature of a future war. The most important question was the expected duration of the conflict. In 1944 the Army-Navy Munitions Board, looking ahead to a postwar stockpile program, had assumed for the purpose that another war would last five years, or, in other words, that a five years’ supply of each material must be kept on hand. Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff had periodically restated this assumption in advising the Munitions Board.

In December 1952 the Munitions Board routinely asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review their previous guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a reply containing the assumption that a war would be of more than one year’s duration. They did not indicate, however, whether this statement was intended to supersede the five-year assumption. If the latter were no longer valid, then stockpile objectives could be sharply reduced and the program could be regarded as practically complete. The Munitions Board was obliged to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for clarification.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the five-year assumption. General Vandenberg, however, proposed that the stockpile objective be reduced to three years. Current war plans, he pointed out, projected force tabs through only four years, and assumed, moreover, that the allies would be able to shift to the offensive by the second year, thus reducing the enemy’s capability to interfere with allied shipping and production.

Rejecting both of these suggestions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a four-year assumption, partly to bring stockpile policy into harmony with the 48-month mobilization schedules projected in strategic plans, partly in expectation that funds for stockpiling would be reduced. They so advised the Munitions Board on 25 May 1953, while making it clear that they were not attempting to predict the actual duration of a conflict. Shortly thereafter the Office of Defense Mobilization took over administration of the stockpile and adopted the four-year assumption.
The Role of the Office of Defense Mobilization

The enlarged Office of Defense Mobilization established by Reorganization Plan No. 3 was placed under the direction of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming. He inherited the seat on the National Security Council formerly held by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. During 1953 and 1954 Dr. Flemming’s office emerged as an active participant in discussions of national security policy.

To discharge its responsibility for coordinating mobilization plans, the Office of Defense Mobilization in September 1953 drafted a set of guiding assumptions about the probable nature of a future emergency. After being seen and informally approved by Admiral Radford, it was sent to the Planning Board, and thence to the National Security Council on 13 November 1953 as NSC 172.

NSC 172 assumed that there would be continuing tensions, but no war, during 1954 and 1955. If war did occur, it might be without warning and would undoubtedly include nuclear attack on the United States. Nevertheless, US industry, through its adaptability and ingenuity, was expected to survive and to recover sufficiently to meet wartime requirements. The Office of Defense Mobilization thus rejected the possibility of a war so destructive in its early phases as to render useless any plans for mobilization after D-day.

The probable duration of a future war was a matter of disagreement in NSC 172. The ODM representative on the Planning Board recommended an assumption of four years, in line with the most recent JCS stockpile guidance. The Department of Defense believed that this matter should be left to the Council to decide.

When NSC 172 reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they offered no comment on the question of the expected duration of hostilities, but suggested changes in passages that, in their view, seemed to understate the probability of advance warning of attack and to overestimate the amount of damage to to be expected. They recommended that final action on NSC 172 be deferred until they had completed their review of strategy and forces.

Overruling this recommendation, the National Security Council approved the policy statement on 19 November 1953, with the understanding that it would be reviewed early in 1954. In the final version (NSC 172/1), the four-year assumption was approved, but few of the detailed changes sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were adopted.

On 17 March 1954 the Planning Board circulated NSC 5414, a redraft of NSC 172/1 intended to be applicable through FY 1957. It incorporated a decision by President Eisenhower, announced to the Council on 8 January 1954, that, in the event of any aggression requiring an increase in armed strength, the United States would proceed at once to general mobilization. NSC 5414 also included a warning that the Soviet bloc might try to reach its objectives by local aggression requiring either US logistic support or outright intervention. Further, it noted that the USSR might attain an ICBM capability within a decade. These passages had been inserted at the urging of the Office of Defense Mobilization; some of the other members of the Planning Board believed they should be deleted.

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When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed NSC 5414, they took exception to the prediction concerning Soviet ICBM capability. "Intelligence does not support the estimate that the USSR will have a ballistic missile of the necessary range during the period," they told the Secretary of Defense. The Council, however, approved a slightly revised version, NSC 5414/1, that included this portion as well as the warning regarding local aggression. The assumption of a four-year war was retained, but an important exception was made: stockpile requirements were again to be based on a five-year assumption.

This latter action divorced stockpile planning from other aspects of military strategy. It was probably induced by domestic considerations, since its effect would be to increase the requirements for strategic and critical materials and thus to benefit their producers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced that from the military point of view only a four-year stockpile was required. They reaffirmed this opinion in July 1954, in answer to an ODM request for guidance.

Mobilization Planning as an Issue in 1954

The administration’s approach to mobilization planning, as it was exemplified in the budgets for fiscal years 1954 and 1955, was called into question when planning began for FY 1956. The Office of Defense Mobilization took the lead in seeking a policy that would emphasize the need for a large and well-protected mobilization base, regardless of the cost. Representatives of that office reviewed the military forecast contributed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the 1956 budget preparations. They drew the attention of the National Security Council to the JCS remarks about the shrinking mobilization base and urged the expenditure of whatever was necessary to reverse this trend.

NSC 5422, which provided guidelines for FY 1956 budget planning, included an annex in which the Office of Defense Mobilization proposed a set of assumptions to guide national mobilization planning policy. Two of the assumptions were that, in case of war, nuclear weapons would be used against the United States in a manner that would be crippling, but not decisive, and that damage of more than a substantial character would be inflicted upon US industry. Pursuing these assumptions in the direction in which they seemed to lead, the Office of Defense Mobilization questioned the budgetary policies adopted for fiscal years 1954 and 1955. The situation seemed to call for larger, instead of smaller, reserves of end items and for extreme measures to expand and protect industrial capacity—even at the cost of higher outlays.

Probably at the instigation of the same office, the text of NSC 5422 devoted considerably more attention to mobilization than any of the 1953 policy directives. It asserted that the mobilization base was stronger than ever before in peacetime, but warned that, under current plans, available productive capacity would decline and mobilization reserve stocks would deteriorate through
obsolescence. It also noted the geographic concentration of the nation's industrial plant.

But the Planning Board disagreed about what, if anything, should be done to correct these conditions. Some members called for immediate action of the kind suggested in NSC 159/4 and NSC 5408: acquisition of more mobilization reserves and production facilities and creation of new plant capacity in safer areas. Others believed that existing programs were sound and that no action was needed except to protect newly created facilities through dispersal or duplication.\textsuperscript{41}

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in commenting on NSC 5422, opposed the enlargement of the mobilization base, on the grounds that it would be "too costly to be in proper balance with the achievement of other security objectives." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, did not transmit these comments to the Council.\textsuperscript{42}

When the Council discussed NSC 5422, the members showed little interest in mobilization policies that would entail larger costs. President Eisenhower pronounced himself in favor of a sensible dispersal program, apparently meaning the proper geographic distribution of new facilities as they were established, a program that could be carried out gradually at little or no extra expense. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey warned against locating new production capacity in uneconomic areas. Secretary Wilson believed that the objectives of economy and safety could both be met.\textsuperscript{43}

In the next version, NSC 5422/1, the prospective decline in the output of military hard goods under current budgetary policies was shown concretely in terms of dollar values. At the same time, a new demand on US supply capacity after M-day was cited: the requirements of allied nations. Nevertheless, in keeping with the Council's thinking, NSC 5422/1 called for a mobilization policy generally within the framework of NSC 162/2, and thus rejected any crash increases in reserves or production capacity. But it provided that this policy should be related to increases in Soviet capabilities.\textsuperscript{44}

The Council considered NSC 5422/1 on 5 August 1954 and decided that the mobilization section should be rewritten by the Office of Defense Mobilization in collaboration with the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Foreign Operations Administration.\textsuperscript{45} The rest of the paper was amended and approved as NSC 5422/2.\textsuperscript{46}

The revised section on mobilization, completed on 5 October 1954, clearly showed the influence of the Office of Defense Mobilization. It warned that even the reduced output figures expected for FY 1957 were based on optimistic assumptions: maximum output of new weapons and no enemy bomb damage. It drew attention to a fundamental deficiency in all mobilization planning thus far—the absence of joint estimates of requirements, owing to the lack of joint war plans. Until such estimates became available, and until the estimated requirements for support of allies could be added, it would be impossible to make certain that the mobilization base was adequate, as NSC 162/2 declared it must be.

The Office of Defense Mobilization had wished the draft to recognize the need for increased expenditures to meet growing Soviet strength. Accelerated
dispersal of production capacity, faster buildup of reserves, better maintenance of standby production facilities, and studies of current output rates in relation to M-day requirements were called for, in the ODM view. Representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense were satisfied with existing policy.\textsuperscript{47}

The draft was reviewed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, which submitted a split report. The Air Force member supported the Defense-Budget point of view; those from the other Services urged approval of the ODM proposals.\textsuperscript{48}

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted on this report, Admiral Carney suggested some changes in the draft, principally one that would stipulate that any increased expenditures for the mobilization base should be in addition to those needed to support the active forces. This suggestion was approved by General Ridgway and General Twining. The latter reversed the position taken by his representative in the Committee.\textsuperscript{49} Consequently, on 21 October 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a report to the Secretary of Defense that unanimously upheld the ODM view that specific actions to improve the mobilization base were needed.\textsuperscript{50}

Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS comments to the National Security Council on 25 October, although he did not wholly agree with them. "This is a very complicated problem," he wrote, "and I am not in complete agreement with the assumptions that were made nor the conclusions that were drawn from them. A great deal more work will have to be done on this problem."

The Council discussed mobilization policy on 26 October 1954, ranging into related subjects like military strategy in general and the probable extent of bomb damage in case of war. The members finally agreed tentatively to approve the ODM proposals, subject to reconsideration after receipt of the impending report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee\textsuperscript{52} and of a special report on the status of the mobilization base to be prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization.\textsuperscript{53}

The statement approved by the Council was issued as Part III of NSC 5422/2. It recommended that the United States take the following actions:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] Accelerate measures for dispersal to safer areas of important production capacity and, where that is infeasible, provide alternative production sources in safer areas insofar as practicable.
\item[b.] Detect, and remedy, such gaps as exist in the mobilization base and in mobilization reserves, taking into account probable damage to productive capacity from enemy action.
\item[c.] Accelerate measures to maintain, in a condition which will permit rapid reactivation or reconversion to war output, the greatly increased capacity in industrial plants, machine tools, and production equipment built up since Korea.
\item[d.] Undertake on an urgent basis studies to determine whether current military hard goods production ("hot lines") can be maintained at a level which will meet the full-phased post-M-day requirements minus (1) post-M-day production capabilities (obtainable through conversion or reactivation) and (2) mobilization reserves.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{itemize}
After hearing the report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee on 4 November 1954 and the joint DOD-ODM presentation on the status of the mobilization base on 1 December, the National Security Council evidently decided that no immediate action was called for. At the latter meeting, however, the President decided that another presentation would be prepared after completion of an approved military plan (probably a reference to the JMRWP, which was then nearing completion). This second review, said the President, should take into account the wartime logistic needs of allied nations and the possibility of enemy bomb damage—factors essential to a determination of the adequacy of the mobilization base.\textsuperscript{55}

By this time the Council had begun discussion of a policy directive to supersede NSC 162/2. The outcome of this process was NSC 5501, discussed in Chapter 2. Its treatment of mobilization was brief, and was limited to a recommendation for a mobilization base related to an approved war plan, with realistic allowances for bomb damage and for support of the allies.\textsuperscript{56} Whether or not this generalized statement was intended to supersede the approval of specific courses of action in NCS 5422/2 was not indicated.

**Mobilization Policy at the End of 1954**

Within the Department of Defense the NSC decision of 26 October 1954 generated a new directive on military procurement that recognized the importance of dispersal of production facilities.\textsuperscript{57} Secretary Wilson’s directive of 7 December 1954 required the Military Departments to review their procurement plans with the objective of spreading production as widely as possible. He described the rationale for the new policy as follows:

Current and future purchases are to encourage, when not contrary to the public interest, the development of multiple sources of supply as well as geographical dispersal of orders as a precaution against aerial attack. At the same time, experienced management and trained labor groups essential to defense are to be maintained wherever possible. The implementation of these policies should keep a maximum number of plants in military production, thereby providing facilities that can be rapidly accelerated to full capacity on relatively short notice.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus Secretary Wilson reversed his earlier policy of concentrated procurement. The effect of the change could not at once be felt. But some influence of the NSC action of 26 October was immediately apparent in the FY 1956 budget, notably in the allocation of more funds for upkeep of reserve production facilities. On the other hand, money for procurement of end items was again held to a minimum.\textsuperscript{59}

The budget reflected Secretary Wilson’s belief that mobilization goals had nearly been attained. “With the size of the armed forces leveling off and with war reserve goals being reached,” he reported at the end of FY 1955, “demands tend to approximate the replacement rates for worn out and obsolete equipment.” The principal need now was to maintain an effective mobilization base at an economical cost.\textsuperscript{60}

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Secretary Wilson here displayed a complacency that was not shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The mobilization base to support a general war is inadequate," they warned on 18 March 1955. The Army's mobilization reserve stocks would not suffice to meet combined US and allied requirements if war broke out; the Navy's wartime capacity was being reduced by the need to mothball an increasing number of ships, since existing schedules for wartime reactivation were already at the highest possible rate. At the same time, in submitting recommendations for FY 1956 force levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that all US mobilization plans were deficient in that they made no provision to meet the requirements of allies.

Service Approaches to Mobilization: The Joint Mid-Range War Plan

The strategic disagreement among the Services was reflected in joint discussions of mobilization planning. It appeared in connection with the drafting of the Joint Strategic Objectives and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans early in 1953. The Air Force planner on the Joint Strategic Plans Committee assumed that any general war would be fought principally with forces in being on D-day and that strategic airpower would probably be decisive. He therefore wished both plans to assign priority to the development of the forces and resources needed between D-day and D plus six months. The other Service representatives objected that to make no provision for longer range mobilization would be to gamble the nation's safety on a single strategic concept. A year later, the same conflict was apparent when the Joint Logistics Plans Committee discussed the mobilization policy section of NSC 5422/2. The Air Force representative, aligning himself with the Defense-Budget viewpoint, believed that it was useless to spend more money to provide a larger mobilization base.

In all three of these instances, General Twining declined to press the issue raised by his representatives at lower levels. But when the controversy appeared in connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, General Twining took a firm stand and a deadlock resulted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The first draft of the JMRWP was completed in September 1954. By that time the prospective decline in the mobilization base by 1 July 1957 (the D-day assumed in the plan) made it clear that the ambitious mobilization schedules projected by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps could not be carried out. Should these Services adjust their mobilization plans to the smaller base, or should the latter be enlarged? This was the question that could not be settled either by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.

In referring the issue to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth clearly the two contrasting strategic views as they related to mobilization policy. General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and General Shepherd, in line with their advocacy of a flexible strategy, believed that mobilization plans should aim at the establishment of a base broad enough to provide alternative means of
waging war after D-day. General Twining, on the other hand, believed that the mobilization base should emphasize “peacetime combat-ready forces-in-being,” and should not be designed to support a buildup of forces like that carried out in World War II. He asserted, moreover, that the other Services (unlike the Air Force) had unrealistically ignored both the probability of enemy bomb damage and the need to supply the allies, two considerations that would mean a mobilization base even bigger than the one they envisioned.

General Twining found an ally in Admiral Radford, who favored a base no larger than would be needed to support the forces proposed in the JMRWP for deployment during the first six months of war—those needed “to absorb the initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus for such expanded offensives as may be then plainly necessary.” The mobilization base should be adjusted to allow for probable bomb damage, but not for allied support requirements, which could only be estimated after war began. The Services, in Admiral Radford’s view, should be allowed to develop plans extending beyond the first six months, but these plans should not be used as a basis for appropriation requests, except for critical end items with a long procurement lead-time.64

Secretary Wilson’s decision took the form of a comprehensive directive governing Service mobilization planning in general. “The best foreseeable resolution of this problem,” he ruled, “lies generally in consonance with the remarks and recommendations made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The mobilization base sought by the Army and Navy, he pointed out, might be “greater than our present economy can or will support.” Accordingly, he issued the following instructions:

(1) Mobilization requirements were to be predicated upon the assumption of a general war in which nuclear weapons would be used by both sides from the outset.

(2) The date of 1 July 1957 would be assumed as both M-day and D-day.

(3) Each Service would use the forces that it could generate within six months after M-day as the basis for its mobilization planning.

(4) Mobilization plans would assume a total input of a little over 7.8 million personnel by M-day plus six months (including active forces, Reserves, and Selective Service intake). This total was to be allocated as follows: 3.7 million to the Army, 2.1 million to the Navy, 470,000 to the Marine Corps, 1.4 million to the Air Force, and 170,000 to the Coast Guard.

(5) The Department of Defense would prepare recommendations covering allowances for enemy bomb damage and for aid to allies.

(6) The Services would submit recommendations for special allowances regarding long lead-time items that could not be provided within the six-month period after D-day.

(7) The Services would continue to develop mobilization plans extending to D plus 36 months, but would not use them for appropriation requests without the approval of the Secretary of Defense.65
In supplementary instructions on 9 December 1954, Secretary Wilson explained that the M-day-plus-six-months (or D-day-plus-six-months) rule would be used to compute requirements for end items as a basis for appropriation requests in the FY 1957 budget. For this purpose, forces for D plus six months were to be projected through D plus 36 months without increase. Plans governing mobilization production and raw material acquisition, on the other hand, were to be based upon the larger forces available by D plus 24 months, again carried through to D plus 36 months (but no authorization was given to base appropriations requests on these figures). Mobilization plans were to be closely cross-checked with the JMRWP. They were to be completed without allowance for bomb damage or allied aid; subsequently they would be modified when his office furnished guidance concerning these factors.66

If these instructions were carried out the United States would for the first time achieve unified mobilization planning, adjusted to a specific strategic concept (which might or might not prove correct). Service plans would be fitted into a joint war plan that would provide a basis for a clear-cut determination of the adequacy of the mobilization base and, if necessary, for budgetary actions to expand it. The results of this process, however, would not be apparent for another year or so, when the FY 1957 budget was drawn up.

Mobilization Planning and the New Look

Secretary Wilson’s decision on the JMRWP was in agreement with the strategy of the New Look and the assumptions on which it was based. If these assumptions were correct, it was useless to base plans on the expectation that the nation would again be able to summon large numbers of men to the colors and to provide their equipment after the beginning of hostilities, as had happened in World War II. In effect, the same decision (not to prepare for a large post-D-day mobilization) had been made earlier in connection with the budgets for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956, although the motive in these cases was a desire for economy.

Thus from one point of view, the mobilization policy of the administration in 1953 and 1954 could be defended as consistent with a military strategy. But it could be attacked from another direction, on the grounds that it failed to follow out the implications of that strategy. If all future wars were to involve nuclear weapons at the outset, why should any long-range mobilization planning be undertaken at all? The answer to this question, in President Eisenhower’s mind, was that a successful continental defense program would make industrial mobilization feasible even in the atomic age. In a letter to Secretary Wilson on 5 January 1955,67 he listed retaliatory offensive power and continental defense as the most important capabilities to be maintained. “Thus we will assure,” he wrote, “that our industrial capacity can continue throughout a war to produce the gigantic amounts of equipment and supplies required. We can never be defeated so long as our relative superiority in productive capacity is sustained.”68
This belief was not unreasonable in the age before the intercontinental missile. Since no one knew just how far a future war would differ from those of the recent past, it was prudent for the administration to hedge its bets to some extent, instead of staking the nation’s survival on the assumption of a war lasting only a few weeks.

The strategy of the New Look dictated a small rather than a large mobilization base, but there remained room for disagreement over its exact size. Here the requirements of strategy and of economy diverged to some degree. National security seemed to call for the quickest possible completion of inventories of end items, ready for immediate issue in case of attack, and for prompt (and necessarily expensive) measures to disperse production facilities. The Office of Defense Mobilization had drawn this conclusion and had contended for a corresponding course of action, but with only limited success. As in other aspects of military policy, the administration modified the dictates of strategy to hold down expenditures.

In the entire process of mobilization planning during 1953 and 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a surprisingly minor role. The absence of a regular planning program before 1953, and then the Service disagreements that obstructed the preparation of a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, prevented them from fulfilling their mission of laying down a master strategic plan that would guide Service mobilization plans and budgets. In 1955 the Hoover Commission commented adversely on the lack of guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this purpose.69

Despite their differences on strategy, however, the JCS members agreed in expressing concern over the effect of budget decisions on mobilization plans at the end of 1954. They disagreed over what constituted an adequate mobilization base, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were united in the conviction that the United States did not possess one at that time.
Manpower Mobilization: Organization of Reserve Forces

As a strategy that emphasized the importance of the first few months of war, the New Look led naturally to a concern for the size and quality of the Service Reserve forces—the reserves that would be called to the colors on D-day (or M-day) to expand the nation’s fighting forces. If these forces were to be of any value, they must be thoroughly trained during peacetime and kept at the highest peak of effectiveness. “We fully recognize,” said Admiral Radford to the House Appropriations Committee, early in 1954, “the unfeasibility of relying in the future on long periods of time in which to mobilize our available manpower. Therefore, an essential part of the New Look includes plans and studies for attaining an improved state of readiness of our Reserve forces to meet today’s requirements for rapid mobilization.”

Manpower Policy as a Problem

But the administration’s interest in the question of Reserve organization had other sources as well. It was part of a broad interest in military manpower problems—an interest that predated the evolution of the New Look. In one of his campaign speeches, Mr. Eisenhower had promised to appoint a committee to investigate the defense establishment and to extend its mandate to the subject of manpower policy, in order to find the “fairest, most economical way” of meeting the needs of the Services. Some months later, Task Force A of the Solarium project pointed out that manpower was one of the nation’s scarce resources and accordingly had to be wisely managed. Its recommendation for a national manpower policy, to assure trained men for both military and civilian purposes, was repeated in NSC 162/2 and NSC 5501.

The most pressing aspect of the military manpower problem, which confronted the administration as soon as it took office, was the increasing difficulty
of the Services in retaining their hard core of career professionals. In February 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to appoint a committee to investigate the causes of this condition. The President, in announcing Reorganization Plan No. 6, promised a broader study "of the problems of attracting and holding competent career personnel—civilian and military—in the Department of Defense."

This difficulty, while of intense concern to the administration, had little interest for the general public. A more pervasive problem was the feeling of dissatisfaction, shared by many persons from the President downwards, with the operation of the current system for insuring selective military service, and specifically with those features that were intended to supply manpower for the inactive Service Reserve forces. As of the beginning of 1953 this system was embodied in two laws, as follows:

1. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 (PL 51, 82d Congress, 19 June 1951) required all males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for military service. Under the selective service provisions of the law, those over the age of 18 1/2 were liable for induction for two years of active duty and six years’ service with the Reserves. At the same time, the Act, as indicated by its title, provided for the eventual establishment of a system of universal service, in which those who did not enter the active forces would be inducted into a National Security Training Corps for six months, and, on their release, would be obligated for seven and one-half years of Reserve service. The six-month training was to be conducted by the Services, under the supervision of a National Security Training Commission composed of three civilian and two military members.

2. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (PL 476, 82d Congress, 9 July 1952) divided the Service Reserves into three categories: Ready, Standby, and Retired. The first class could be mobilized by Presidential order, the other two only by Congressional action. Inductees released from active duty were automatically assigned to the Ready Reserve (a provision that effectively nullified the size limit of 1,500,000 men placed on this group by another section of the law). After three years of satisfactory participation in training programs, such men might request transfer to the Standby category.

The full effect of these laws had not yet been evaluated, but it was already clear that, taken together, they were both unfair and ineffective in their operation. Only those who were caught by the draft incurred any reserve obligation; others escaped altogether. Thus the men who provided most of the strength of the active forces subsequently had to shoulder the burden of manning the Reserves. In a future crisis, therefore, they would necessarily be called upon again—just as, during the Korean emergency, men who had fought through World War II had had to be recalled to service. The National Security Training Program, if carried out, would in time have distributed the burden of military service in an equitable manner, but its execution was impossible in light of the manpower demands of the active forces during the Korean War.
The nominal strength of the Reserves was misleading; there was no guarantee that those legally obligated for service would enroll in organized units or maintain their proficiency through training. The prospect of transfer to the Standby Reserve provided them an incentive to do so, but at the expense of the effectiveness of the Ready Reserve, which would thus lose its best-trained men. It was becoming evident, moreover, that this incentive was not enough. Large numbers of returning veterans simply ignored their reserve obligation. The total strength of the Reserves (including the National Guard) as of 30 June 1953 is shown in Table 12. Of the total figure of 2,096,033, some 1,749,208, or 80 percent, were nominally members of the Ready Reserve, but only 575,377 were qualified for drill pay status by virtue of participation in training.

The President launched his attack on the deficiencies of the existing Reserve system on 23 July 1953. In announcing appointments to three vacant positions on the National Security Training Commission, he promised to ask the Commission to seek a remedy for a situation that, as he pointed out, “requires our soldier of today also to carry the future national defense burden ahead of the man who has received no training, has done no service, and has assumed no reserve obligation.” True to his promise, on 1 August 1953 he instructed the Commission to prepare a report on the inequities of the current system, the feasibility of operating a training program for nonveteran reservists while continuing induction of men for active service, and the effects of such a training program on the organization of the Reserve forces. He also directed the Office of Defense Mobilization to ascertain whether the manpower pool sufficed to meet simultaneously the needs of the active forces, the Reserves, and the civilian economy.

Proposals for Reform

The report of the National Security Training Commission, submitted on 1 December 1953, documented the hardships worked on many veterans of World War II who had been recalled in the Korean crisis just as they were launching

Table 12—Actual Strength of National Guard and Reserve Forces: 30 June 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,075,825</td>
<td>277,799</td>
<td>798,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>665,571</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>665,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>78,455</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>276,182</td>
<td>35,556</td>
<td>240,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,096,033</td>
<td>313,355</td>
<td>1,782,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

their careers. It urged that the six-month training program proposed in the 1951 law be put into effect, beginning on 1 January 1955 with an initial increment of 100,000 trainees chosen by lot from those who had registered for selective service. Such a program, gradually expanded to become truly universal, would eventually impose a reserve obligation on almost every American male.

The Commission foresaw that, when the entire national manpower supply was subject to recall for military service in time of crisis, mobilization of reservists would have to be carefully regulated to prevent disruption of the economy. Hence, its report urged that the recall of those reservists not needed at once (i.e., the Standby Reserve) be taken out of the hands of the Services and assigned to the Selective Service System, which would conduct the operation on the basis of overall national manpower needs. The size of the Ready Reserve should be closely adjusted to Service mobilization plans, and the men and units in this category should be in a high state of training.\textsuperscript{12}

The substance of this plan had been revealed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 November 1953. At that time, the Commission, while not overlooking the equity argument, had stressed the military value of a large pool of non-veterans with six months’ training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no serious objection to the plan, but Admiral Radford warned that they might be unable to support it if it created an additional demand upon limited funds. The Air Force spokesman (General T. D. White, Vice Chief of Staff, who attended in place of General Twining), though he did not oppose the plan, made it clear that his Service was interested primarily in the provision of trained men for D-day and only secondarily in the mobilization of manpower after war began.\textsuperscript{13}

The Office of Defense Mobilization completed its study of the manpower pool on 18 December 1953.\textsuperscript{14} It corroborated the conclusion of the National Security Training Commission that a six-month reserve training program could be carried out without depleting the supply of men for active service. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Flemming, forwarded the ODM study to the President on 6 January 1954, but recommended that the NSTC training plan be postponed until the National Security Council, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, could determine the proper size and method of organization of the Reserves.\textsuperscript{15} President Eisenhower thereupon directed the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to draw up a new organization plan for Reserve forces.\textsuperscript{16}

On 13 January 1954 Secretary Wilson established a task force to draft the plan. It was headed by Major General Walter W. Wensinger, USMC, and included general and flag officers from each of the other Services and the Coast Guard. On 4 February 1954 he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the task force their recommendations on the subject of Reserve organization.\textsuperscript{17}

In their reply on 5 March 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of having combat-ready reserves in view of the unsettled state of the world. They did not suggest strength figures for these forces, urging only that they be adjusted to joint war plans. The immediately callable portion should be large enough for initial wartime tasks, and its recall should be under Service control. They did not favor, but were willing to accept, civilian control of the
mobilization of the selectively callable. They opposed the inception of any universal training program until the size and composition of the Reserves had been settled.18

The plan submitted by General Wensinger’s task force in March 1954 accepted some of these recommendations. It provided for the replacement of the existing Ready and Standby Reserve classes by others that would serve comparable functions but would be constituted on a different basis. Reservists destined for immediate mobilization, to meet the manpower needs of the Services for the first six months after M-day, would be subject to recall by the Services (under Presidential or Congressional authorization) and would accordingly be styled the Service Callable Reserve. This class would be subdivided into First Line and Auxiliary Reserves, on the basis of the degree of training required of members.

Men who, for any reason, were not eligible for immediate mobilization would comprise the second class, to be known as the Selectively Callable Reserve. Only Congress would have authority to order their recall. Mobilization of men in this group would be on an individual basis, the decision in each case to be made by some suitable civilian agency in consultation with the Services.

The total eight-year military obligation (active and reserve) would be retained. Men emerging from the active forces with less than 21 months’ service therein would spend the remainder of their time in the First Line Reserve. Those with longer periods of active service could transfer to the Auxiliary Reserve after six years of combined active and reserve service. Veterans who had served in combat, however, would be allowed to go directly to the Selectively Callable Reserve if they desired.

The task force recommended a strength of 3,005,894 for the Service Callable Reserve, distributed as follows: 1,692,235 Army; 774,059 Navy; 200,000 Marine Corps; 300,000 Air Force; and 39,600 Coast Guard. The strength of the Selectively Callable Reserve had to be expressed in terms of the desired yield from the selective process, which was 709,751.

These figures had been prepared by the individual Services on the basis of their own mobilization plans and of the roles envisioned therein for their Reserves. For the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, the Service Callable Reserve would serve approximately to double their strength after M-day. The Air Force, on the other hand, planned a relatively small Reserve kept at a state of readiness that would enable it to swing into action within a few weeks. The Air Force and the Army would mobilize most of their reservists in units; the Navy and Marine Corps, which employed units only for training purposes, would call up reservists as individuals.

The task force considered the anomalous position of the National Guard (and Air National Guard), which had to serve two masters, the states and the Federal Government. Its report endorsed the plans of the Army and Air Force to consider the Guard as an integral part of their Service Callable Reserves.

The plan frankly placed military needs ahead of equity, and hence assumed that men with extended active service would continue to constitute the hard core of the Reserves. Nevertheless it provided for use of “non-prior-service” personnel (estimated at 206,150 annually) to fill up the ranks. To this end, the task force
proposed to allow men without active service to enlist directly in the Reserves, to be given 30 days' training before assignment to a unit. If the number of such volunteers proved insufficient, the deficiency should be made up by inducting men through selective service.\(^\text{19}\)

The task force had not attempted to estimate the cost of its plan. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) estimated that it would require $7.6 billion in new obligatory authority during the first year, FY 1955, and slightly less thereafter, for personnel, equipment, and facilities.\(^\text{20}\)

When Secretary Wilson sent the task force report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review,\(^\text{21}\) the Joint Strategic Plans Committee drafted a reply that would have constituted an unqualified endorsement of it.\(^\text{22}\) But most of the JCS members had reservations. Admiral Radford believed that the status of the National Guard needed further study.\(^\text{23}\) General Twining feared that direct enlistment of non-prior-service personnel into the Reserves, by opening a relatively easy way for young men to discharge their military obligation, would jeopardize recruiting for the active forces. He also believed that the strength figures were excessive.\(^\text{24}\) General Ridgway, on the other hand, objected that the plan did not sufficiently emphasize the use of non-prior-service personnel and would therefore perpetuate inequity; moreover, he believed that it should prescribe a uniform training program for Reserve volunteers, to keep them from flowing toward Services with less exacting requirements.\(^\text{25}\) General Shepherd wished the problem of costs to be carefully considered; he feared that the plan might be financed at the expense of the active forces.\(^\text{26}\)

In the light of these reservations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the plan required further analysis. They so advised Secretary Wilson on 9 April 1954, indicating at the same time that they approved most of it. However, they noted that the personnel figures were unilateral in origin, and urged that establishment of strength goals be postponed until the Joint Mid-Range War Plan had been completed.\(^\text{27}\)

On 15 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed an ad hoc committee to study the task force proposals more carefully.\(^\text{28}\) In a report submitted on 28 April, this committee concluded that direct enlistment or induction of non-prior-service personnel into the Reserves would not disrupt Service recruiting efforts if the numbers of such enlistees were carefully regulated by the Secretary of Defense. The training of such recruits should be identical with that given men entering the active forces.

The committee asserted that the Departments of the Army and the Air Force already possessed sufficient authority over the training and administration of the National Guard and Air National Guard. Control over the assignment of personnel thereto, however, was a complex legal question, which should be studied by the Attorney General. The members agreed that the Services should cede the authority to call enlisted men of the Selectively Callable Reserve but should retain control over officers in this category.

Analysis of the cost estimates prepared by the Comptroller's office convinced the committee that they were unrealistic and were based on excessively high
equipment standards. Hence, the task force plan should not be approved until the costs could be restudied.\textsuperscript{29}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions and sent them to Secretary Wilson on 6 May 1954.\textsuperscript{30} The Secretary took no action on them. Plans were already under way to put the task force proposals into effect.

**Evolution of NSC 5420/3**

A plan for reorganizing the Reserves was completed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and sent to the Office of Defense Mobilization on 14 May 1954. It was practically identical with the task force proposals except for small increases in strength objectives (reflecting enlarged requirements expressed by the Air Force). The strength figures were presented as the ultimate, rather than the immediate goal, and as subject to possible revision. The estimated requirements for non-prior-service personnel for the first year had been reduced to 104,800. No cost estimates were included.

The Director of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Flemming, forwarded the plan to the National Security Council, together with one for mobilizing the Selectively Callable Reserve worked out by his office in collaboration with the Departments of Defense and Labor and the Selective Service System. He proposed that the Council determine at once the size and organization of the Reserves, postponing consideration of procurement and training. The combined plans were placed on the Council’s agenda as NSC 5420.\textsuperscript{31}

The Reserve organization plan drew heavy fire from the National Security Training Commission, because its provisions relied too heavily on veterans; from the Department of Labor, because it did not spell out a curriculum for Reserve enlistees; and from the Director of Selective Service, who, though in sympathy with its objectives, believed that these should be sought at once, insofar as possible, by making use of existing legislative authority.\textsuperscript{32} More important were the comments of the Director of Defense Mobilization, who suggested a new method for insuring equity of service. He foresaw that, in future years, as the size of the active forces levelled off and the number of militarily eligible males increased, larger numbers of men would escape military service. The number of non-prior-service personnel to be taken into the Reserves under the Defense Department plan was too small to use up this surplus. Accepting these figures as based on military requirements, he did not suggest enlarging them. Instead, he proposed to run men through the active forces at a faster rate, perhaps by reducing their terms of service.\textsuperscript{33}

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already expressed their views on the substance of NSC 5420 (in the form of the report of General Wensinger’s task force), they directed their comments at these criticisms, with which they disagreed. The NSTC views, they pointed out, contravened the guidance given the task force, which had stressed national security over equity. The remarks of
the Department of Labor impressed them as extending beyond the competence of that agency, while the suggestions of the Director of Selective Service, they said, were unworkable and would disrupt Service programs. While expressing sympathy for Dr. Flemming's objective in seeking to bring more men into the Services, they declined to endorse his proposals, which were based largely on nonmilitary considerations.

When NSC 5420 was discussed by the Council on 17 June 1954, it was again criticized as inequitable. The members referred it to the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization, with instructions to rewrite it so as to assure military service by all eligible men and to include provisions for stronger Federal control of the National Guard.

The result of this effort was NSC 5420/1, sent to the Council on 26 July 1954. This paper laid heavy emphasis on equity of service, which was believed to be essential for public support of a compulsory reserve system. Under NSC 5420/1, all qualified young men would be required to serve in the armed forces, by enlistment or induction. At the same time, the quality of the Reserve forces was to be maintained. The Service Callable Reserve was to consist entirely of men with previous active duty ("prior-service personnel"). Volunteers would be accepted in the Reserves, but they would not be exempt from serving a minimum period (the length of which was not specified) in the active forces.

A key provision in NSC 5420/1 was that the untapped pool of militarily eligible men would be maintained at a constant figure of approximately 750,000 men. Regulation of the level of this reservoir of manpower was apparently conceived of as a device to insure universal service. In other words, so long as the level did not rise above this figure, the outflow of men to the Services, by enlistment or induction, would equal the annual input of men reaching military age; there would be no surplus overflow of men who escaped service altogether.

The drafters of NSC 5420/1 had calculated that, with the stabilization of the active forces at a strength of approximately 3,000,000 men, the manpower pool would rise from its current size of 740,000 to approximately 1,670,000 by the end of FY 1961 unless some controls were applied. Continued decline in Service reenlistment rates would slow down the increase by drawing down more men from the reservoir. Low enlistment rates were undesirable for a number of reasons, and measures should be taken to arrest the decline. Assuming the enlistment rate could be stabilized, there were several ways to run men through the Services at a faster pace and thus to maintain the level of the reservoir. The most desirable methods would be to restrict the number of four-year volunteers (requiring the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to accept inductees) or to pre-release men from the active forces to the Reserves. An alternative—a general reduction in the length of inducted service from 24 to 16 months—was rejected.

Still another possible way of controlling the level of the manpower pool would be to initiate a training program for non-prior-service personnel. A six-month program involving 156,000 men per year from 1955 through 1960, it was believed, would serve the purpose. On completion of their training, these men would be assigned to the Selectively Callable Reserve. But this method involved serious disadvantages. The Services would incur a heavy cost in training these
future reservists and would reap little benefit in return. Moreover, the program would be grossly unfair; it would offer a favored few an opportunity to escape the rigors of a full term of active duty and subsequently, as members of the Selectively Callable Reserve, to avoid the liability for immediate recall.

NSC 5420/1 also proposed to divorce the National Guard from all responsibility to the states, on the grounds that it could not successfully serve two masters. The Guard should become a wholly Federal organization, serving as the principal reserve component of the Army and the Air Force. To provide it with a nucleus of experienced veterans, men with reserve obligations should be assigned to it involuntarily, and the necessary legislative authority should be sought for this purpose. The states should be allowed to raise their own militias to meet their special requirements. The Council approved NSC 5420/1 on 29 July and directed the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to incorporate it into a revised program, with cost estimates.

The revision, NSC 5420/2, was completed in September 1954. In this version, the ceiling on the untapped manpower pool, needed to insure universal service, had been recomputed at 1,000,000 men. Pre-release of personnel or shortening of terms of service were again recommended as methods to maintain this level. The 750,000 figure now appeared as a minimum, to be maintained in order to guarantee the availability of manpower for rapid expansion of the military forces if general war broke out.

The plan to allow non-prior-service personnel to enlist directly in the Reserves, borrowed from NSC 5420, had been reinserted. Such volunteers would, however, remain subject to induction for service with the active forces, and there was no provision for a separate training program for them.

The division of the Service Callable Reserve into two classes was dropped. The length of time that individuals would spend in this category, before being allowed to transfer to the Selectively Callable Reserve, would be determined by the Services under guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. Those in the Service Callable Reserve would be required to participate in training programs. Failure to do so was to be made a punishable offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and might subject offenders to recall to active duty for up to 12 months.

Cost estimates for the program were well below those submitted earlier. For FY 1956 (now the earliest time when the plan could be implemented), $4.5 billion in new obligatory authority would be required. The amount would increase during the next two years, but would drop to $4.0 billion by FY 1959.

The plan to speed up the flow of men through the Services was alarming to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a practice, they told Secretary Wilson on 8 October 1954, was dangerous and expensive and would reduce combat capability. Moreover, it was difficult to reconcile with the concern expressed in NSC 5420/2 over the declining reenlistment rate. The whole question of equity, they believed, should be reconsidered. They opposed the recall of individuals to active duty as a punitive measure. They pointed out that the program, if approved, would require an increase in the budget. Subject to these reservations, and to some
proposed minor changes, they considered NSC 5420/2 as suitable for initiating legislation to improve the readiness of the Reserve forces.\textsuperscript{41}

Officials of OSD then prepared a revision of NSC 5420/2 dated 14 October 1954 and sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a note that it embodied most of the changes suggested by them. The suggestion for pre-releasing personnel from the Services had now been dropped, although the alternative of shorter terms of enlistment was retained. The status of non-prior-service Reserve enlistees was more carefully regulated. At the discretion of the Service concerned, such enlistees might be given initial recruit training and then placed in a Reserve status, remaining exempt from induction for two years’ active service so long as they met training requirements. If they were not assigned to this special Reserve program, they would remain subject to induction. The Secretary of Defense would prescribe quotas and other conditions governing the program.\textsuperscript{42}

This version of NSC 5420/2 was not formally reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was circulated for comment to the Joint Staff. On 26 October 1954 the Director, Lieutenant General Lemuel Mathewson, transmitted a number of criticisms to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “The proposed equity of military service would, if implemented, eventually reduce the combat capability of the armed forces to an unacceptable degree,” wrote General Mathewson. The goal should be equal obligation, not equality in actual service. The provision to allow enlistment directly into Reserve forces was potentially disruptive for the Services. Unless carefully controlled by the Secretary of Defense, it would open an avenue of escape for large numbers of men that would jeopardize the ability of the Air Force and the Navy to continue to operate on a basis of four-year enlistments.\textsuperscript{43}

In another draft completed on 4 November, OSD officials undertook to remove some of these objections. Enlistment in the Reserves was to be allowed only for individuals under the age of 19. Such volunteers would, at the discretion of the Service that they had chosen, incur a total obligation of either eight or ten years. Those who assumed the eight-year obligation would be liable for induction for two years’ active duty, to be followed as usual by six years in the Reserves. The ten-year group would undergo a six-month training period and would then be assigned to Reserve forces for nine and one-half years. Thus, it was hoped, the burden between the two groups would be approximately equal. The number of men entering the Reserves directly would follow quotas set by the Secretary of Defense. If these quotas were not met through volunteers, the Selective Service System would be called upon to induct men as necessary. There was to be no change in periods of enlistment for active service or in the 24-month induction period.

New cost estimates for this program (for pay and training, but excluding new equipment and facilities) were $1.3 billion in new obligatory authority (NOA) and $1.2 billion in expenditures for FY 1956, with increases to $1.5 and $1.4 billion, respectively, by 1959. By contrast, the FY 1955 budget had allocated approximately $700 million for the same purposes.\textsuperscript{44}

The Armed Forces Policy Council approved this program, with some reservations, on 9 November 1954.\textsuperscript{45} The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, submitted their own comments, in which they again stressed the danger that the
program might adversely affect recruitment for the active forces unless carefully regulated by the Secretary of Defense. It should be made clear, they said, that national security took precedence over equity in all plans for military manpower procurement.46

Ignoring these comments, OSD and ODM officials drew up another draft, essentially unchanged except that the means of enforcing training obligations were left for later determination and the pay and training costs had been reestimated at higher figures (beginning with $1.7 billion in NOA and $1.6 billion in expenditures for FY 1956). This version, NSC 5420/3, after adoption by the National Security Council, was to become the basis of the legislation sent to Congress.47

Strength of the Reserve Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended on 9 April 1954 that the size of the Reserves be determined only after completion of the JMRWP. On 14 May 1954 the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Anderson, approved this suggestion and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend strength figures, based on the JMRWP, by 1 July 1954.48

Delay in completion of the JMRWP prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff from meeting this deadline. On 19 August 1954, when they sent Secretary Wilson recommendations for the size and strength of the active forces for FY 1956, they included proposals for the Reserves, prepared by the Services, and suggested that these be used temporarily for planning purposes.49 Mr. Wilson, however, repeated the request for strength figures based on the JMRWP, which he said, would be needed by 15 October 1954 so that the new program could be completed in time for the next Congress.50 Meanwhile, he continued to use the figures in NSC 5420.51

The draft JMRWP that was completed in September 1954 provided a basis for a decision on the size of the Service Callable Reserve. The Service controversy over the mobilization schedules in this plan has been described in an earlier chapter. The Air Force criticized as excessive and infeasible the ultimate objectives set by the other Services. This criticism did not, however, apply to the schedules covering the first six months of hostilities, which were not at issue. Accepting these schedules as drawn up by the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 October 1954 recommended to Secretary Wilson the following strengths for the Service Callable Reserve:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,692,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>756,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>203,822</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>264,000</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that these figures were subject to change, since they themselves had not yet approved the JMRWP.\textsuperscript{52} These strengths were incorporated into the 14 October and 4 November redrafts of NSC 5420/2, along with an estimate of 39,600 for the Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{53} In commenting on the second of these drafts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reminded the Secretary of Defense that the figures had not been validated. Nevertheless they were adopted in NSC 5420/3, where they appeared as an ultimate goal to be achieved by the end of FY 1959, starting from an estimated strength of 2.3 million in FY 1956.\textsuperscript{54}

**National Reserve Plan of 1955**

NSC 5420/3 was presented to the National Security Council on 15 November 1954 by Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, assisted by the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Anderson. The speakers stressed the objective of insuring military service from all qualified young men and explained that the six-month reserve training program was expected to serve this purpose. It was now believed that 100,000 trainees annually would keep the manpower pool at the proper size and thus insure universal service. They placed less emphasis on the other aspect of equity—lessening the burden on men who had served full tours of active duty. However, they indicated that a shorter period of service in the Service Callable Reserve would be required of such men.

Members of the Selectively Callable Reserve would be subject to administrative penalties for nonparticipation in training, but the Uniform Code of Military Justice would not be invoked for the purpose. Details of training would be worked out by the Services.

The program had been projected over a four-year period, and would be reexamined at the end of that time. It was to be accompanied by other actions intended to improve the Reserves: wider dissemination of knowledge of obligations, improvement in training curricula, and better pay for reservists as well as for regulars. These measures, it was hoped, would make the Service Callable Reserve actually ready in the sense of being able to go into action immediately after D-day.

The National Security Council and the President approved the program, subject to later decisions on the budget, with the understanding that it would be continually reviewed in relation to programs for the active forces and for the mobilization base.\textsuperscript{55} On 6 December 1954 Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson discussed the size and cost of the program with the President. They approved a schedule for reaching the planned strength by FY 1959, as well as goals for the number of reservists to be in drill and pay status (beginning with 1.1 million in FY 1956 and rising to 2.2 million by FY 1959).\textsuperscript{56}
The necessary legislation was prepared under the direction of Mr. Burgess’ office. It introduced one improvement over NSC 5420/3: the awkward terms Service Callable and Selectively Callable, used for the principal Reserve categories, were dropped in favor of the existing terms Ready and Standby, respectively.57

Secretary Wilson announced the new Reserve plan to the press on 17 December 1954, relating it to the administration’s military economy program. “Strong Reserve Forces,” he said, “will make it possible to maintain the Active Forces at levels that will impose the least burden on the national economy and still provide for military strength as it may be needed.” Later, however, the Secretary made it clear that cuts in military manpower that had been announced for FY 1956 were not contingent upon Congressional action on the Reserve plan.58

When Congress convened in January 1955, the administration submitted its National Reserve Plan as one part of a larger program for general improvement in military manpower policies. Other parts included extension of authority for induction under selective service (then scheduled to expire on 1 July 1955) and improved career incentives for regulars. In a special message to Congress, President Eisenhower stressed the importance of the Reserve plan as a means of strengthening the nation’s defensive posture, and only secondarily as a way to equalize military obligations.59

All the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in support of the bill, though in terms that reflected their concern with different aspects of the Reserve problem. Admiral Radford emphasized the importance of the provision authorizing quota control of the numbers of men enlisting directly in the Reserves. Admiral Carney and General Twining also stressed this feature, but went so far as to express doubt that it would serve to protect the Services’ attempts to recruit regulars. General Ridgway spoke of the value of the plan in providing trained men for the Reserves and in assuring fulfillment of military obligations by all eligible young men. General Shepherd limited his testimony to a general endorsement.60

But an impressive array of military and civilian testimony in support of the legislation did not prevent Congress from altering it drastically before approving it. The final Reserve Forces Act of 1955 allowed enlistment in the Reserves for men under age 19, but did not authorize induction for this purpose. It specified the duration of training for such men as from three to six months, and authorized pay of $50 per month (the administration had asked $30). It limited their total military obligation to eight years, though at the same time reducing to six years that of men who served two or more years on active duty. The statutory limit of 1.5 million on the Ready Reserve was abolished, but the administration’s strength objective (2.9 million) was written into the law as a new limit, and it was provided that not more than 1.0 million could be called to active duty at one time without Congressional approval. No authority was granted to assign obligated reservists to the National Guard, or to authorize the states to organize separate militias.

Needless to say, these changes in the administration’s plan were owing to political forces having no relation to military objectives: Congressional fears of
constituents' reactions, the established institutional status of the National Guard, and the traditional American hostility to universal military service. The President and the Secretary of Defense regarded the final version of the bill as gravely defective, especially in two respects. Without authority to induct men into the Reserve forces, it was doubtful that the Department of Defense could bring these forces up to their strength goals or achieve the aim of insuring that all qualified men served in one way or another. Moreover, it would be difficult to raise National Guard units to an adequate level of proficiency unless prior-service personnel could be assigned to them. Thus both the military and nonmilitary objectives of the plan—greater effectiveness and more equitable service—had been jeopardized.  

The new Reserve plan reflected the usual desire of the administration to meet two objectives, military and economic. If carried out as planned, it would have enlarged the pool of trained manpower and would in part have offset the effects of reductions in active forces, which were more expensive to maintain, man-for-man, than reservists. Of course, improvement of the Reserve forces required that more money be spent on them, and the administration accepted this necessity. But economy prevailed over military effectiveness when personnel strengths taken from the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, which assumed an M-day of 1 July 1957, became goals that were not to be achieved until FY 1959.

Like most of the military innovations introduced in 1953 and 1954, the reorganization of the Reserves did not originate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its inception can be traced, through the Office of Defense Management and the National Security Training Commission, to the President himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were influential, however, in shaping it in a direction that they desired. They were able to secure the inclusion of provisions to protect the sources of recruitment for active forces and the abandonment of radical proposals that would have in some measure subordinated the quality of military forces to a nonmilitary objective, the equal distribution of obligations.

In the discussion of this plan in its various stages, the continuing disagreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over strategy was less important than another that cut across their membership in a different direction. The difference of opinion was apparent in their comments on the original task force proposals and in their Congressional testimony. General Twining and Admiral Carney, as spokesmen for Services that increasingly thought of themselves as technically oriented, were concerned primarily with protecting their supply of professional specialists. Distribution of the burden of military service was of secondary importance, and they had little interest in proposals to increase the flow of men into the Reserves for this purpose. Admiral Radford generally aligned himself with this view. General Ridgway's outlook on these problems showed evidence of the Army's long-standing advocacy of universal military training, and, perhaps more importantly, of the relatively greater reliance of his Service on Reserve forces.
Missions and Weapons

Unification had been the great goal of the reorganization of the US military establishment at the end of World War II. The National Security Act of 1947 had proclaimed the intent of Congress to provide for the authoritative coordination and unified direction of the Services, their operation under unified control, and their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.\(^1\)

The word unification meant, among other things, an efficient sharing of functions among the Services to insure that none of them wasted resources or energies on a task that was being, or properly should be, performed by some other Service. This goal, which could not be wholly achieved by legislative fiat, was sought by the first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, in discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The outcome was the Key West Agreement, approved by President Truman in 1948, which listed in some detail the functions of each of the Services and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^2\) Unfortunately its provisions were not sufficiently clear or detailed to preclude Service disputes, most notably a controversy between the Navy and the Air Force, concerning responsibilities in the application of air power, that rent the political scene in 1949 and 1950.

Service Roles and Missions under Review

Some believed also that the Key West Agreement, at least as it was applied in practice, was deficient in another way, for it seemed to allow opportunity for the Services to multiply their tasks for their own aggrandizement, in disregard of the principle of unification. The conviction that the Services were engaged in numerous overlapping activities was responsible for a multitude of public complaints about waste and duplication in the military establishment.\(^3\) If this belief were true, it followed that a careful revision of Service missions could generate substantial savings with no loss of combat
strength. President Eisenhower and some of his advisers held this conviction when they took office. "I knew from experience," Mr. Eisenhower later wrote, referring to the time of his accession, "that there was much duplication among the three services in research and development, in procurement, and even in roles and missions—these last always at least partly self-assigned." In line with this belief the new President, in his first State of the Union message, demanded proper coordination of the Services and elimination of duplication of effort. This conviction was reflected in NSC 149/2, in which the National Security Council decided that Service missions would be reviewed as rapidly as possible to reveal any overlapping and to ascertain whether they needed to be changed as a result of changing capabilities, modernization, or more effective planning. But despite the need for haste implied in this statement, no action was taken at once. The question of individual Service responsibilities was entirely ignored in President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 for the Department of Defense, sent to Congress on 30 April 1953.

The committee that drafted this plan had declared that the Secretary of Defense should have authority to clarify the roles and missions of the Services, but it had not indicated in what respects clarification was needed. Its final recommendations dealt with the relationships among the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with the status and powers of the JCS Chairman. Neither the committee's report nor the reorganization plan suggested any changes in Service missions.

The task of reviewing Service roles and missions was given the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of their survey of military problems before they assumed office. When they wrote their findings, they quickly disposed of the view that any change was needed. The existing directive on this subject, they said, was clear and provided reasonable, workable guidance.

The administration accepted this conclusion; nothing more was said about revising Service missions. But since Reorganization Plan No. 6 had altered the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it necessitated amendment of certain parts of the Key West Agreement. To one member of the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff, this routine revision seemed to offer an opportunity to introduce other changes in the Key West Agreement that he considered desirable—changes that would indeed have altered the responsibilities of the Services. General Ridgway, along with his colleagues, had signed the report to the Secretary of Defense, with its statement that no such changes were needed. Nevertheless, in a memorandum circulated to the other JCS members on 14 August 1953, he criticized the Key West Agreement on the grounds that it was ambiguous and inconsistent and that it had failed to integrate the Services into a balanced military team. He submitted a revised draft intended to remedy those defects, which would at the same time have settled several controversies over Service missions, growing out of the Korean War, in a manner favorable to the Army. Thus it would have given the Army the right to establish requirements for aircraft and amphibious vessels to be provided by the other Services; to exercise operational control over tactical air power supporting ground troops; and to
acquire and operate such aircraft as were essential to land operations. His draft received no support from the other JCS members, however, and was soon withdrawn from consideration.

A new version of the Key West Agreement, consonant with Reorganization Plan No. 6, was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953. They approved it with a few suggested changes, which were incorporated in the final directive issued by Secretary Wilson on 1 October 1953.

Army-Air Force Disagreement over Guided Missiles

The administration had thus reaffirmed the adequacy of the Key West Agreement as a guide to Service responsibilities. But no general directive, however carefully written, could be so phrased as to forestall disagreements in its application to specific tasks or capabilities.

Of these disagreements, one arising between the Army and the Air Force received the most intensive and time-consuming attention during 1953–1954. It concerned the responsibility for developing and operating guided missiles. The issue became acute because these weapons were now moving from the drawing board and assembly line to the fighting forces in the field. The Army began deploying its Nike antiaircraft missiles in 1953. About the same time, the Army introduced Corporal, a surface-to-surface missile, as well as Honest John, which was usually included in lists of missile projects, though it was actually a free rocket. In FY 1955 the Navy introduced Terrier (surface-to-air), Regulus (surface-to-surface), and Sparrow (air-to-air) missiles, and the Air Force, Falcon (air-to-air) and Matador (surface-to-surface).

The original Key West Agreement and its 1953 revision made the Army responsible for providing all forces for combat operations on land and the Air Force for supplying close combat and logistical air support, while both Services were required to contribute forces for air defense. There was no basis for conflict over control of the forces needed for these tasks so long as the two Services employed wholly different weapons—the gun and the airplane. But the development of the missile carried the seeds of dissension. Should the new weapon be regarded as a self-propelled artillery shell or as an aircraft without a pilot? Either viewpoint could be defended. In the early years of missile development, projects were readily separable by function, but as the state of the art advanced and the range and maneuverability of missiles increased, it became harder to disentangle functional responsibilities.

The Navy stood somewhat apart from this Army-Air Force dispute. Its special requirements for weapons suitable for launching at sea, either from ships or from carrier-based aircraft, were not contested by the other Services.

The incipient controversy had hardly been visible in 1949, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated missile responsibilities among the Services. The wording of their directive was so broad that it was almost as open to diverse interpretation as the Key West Agreement itself. Missiles were grouped into four general
categories. Two of these—surface-to-surface (SSM) and surface-to-air (SAM)—were open to all three Services. Responsibility for such weapons was laid down on the basis of relationship to existing weapons. Thus missiles that would supplement, extend the capabilities of, or replace artillery were assigned to the Army and Navy, while those that would similarly supplement or extend aircraft were given to the Navy and the Air Force. Missiles of the air-to-surface (ASM) and air-to-air (AAM) types were made the province of the Air Force and the Navy. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified that any missile developed by a Service would be made available to any other Service that could show a need for it. A periodic JCS review of missile projects would forestall any unnecessary duplication.16

In 1951 General Vandenberg had sought to impose narrow limits on the Army’s missile program. He recommended that the Army be restricted to surface-to-surface missiles to be used within the combat zone of opposing armies, which he defined as within 50-75 miles on both sides of the line of contact. In other words, Army missiles would be held to a maximum range of 150 miles. His proposals for surface-to-air (antiaircraft) missiles were even more sweeping. The Air Force, he believed, should have entire responsibility for these, leaving to the Army only predicted-fire weapons; that is, artillery or free rockets. General Collins had objected that these proposals would violate the fundamental command principle that every commander should have control of all the means needed to carry out his mission. He had argued that missiles were more analogous to artillery than to aircraft.17

General Vandenberg’s recommendations had been made in connection with an attempt by the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group (GMIORG), a three-man committee set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1950, to draw up an overall master plan for missile development and production. General Vandenberg had intended his proposals to be reflected in the plan, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on them. Accordingly, the Air Force member of the Group refused to endorse the draft prepared by the other members, arguing that the issues raised by his Chief should be settled first.18 Again the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined to resolve the question. The Army was left free to proceed with its projects.

The conflict had been dormant for over a year when it was stirred to life in January 1953. At that time, the Army asked the Department of Defense for permission to purchase from the Navy some Regulus (surface-to-surface) missiles, to assist in evaluation of a similar Army missile under development (Hermes) and to provide an interim tactical missile capability. The request was passed successively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group. The Army and Navy members of the latter recommended approval. The Air Force member opposed the request on the grounds that his Service was responsible for furnishing all weapons (both manned aircraft and guided missiles) needed both for close combat air support and for interdiction of combat areas. This position appeared even more extreme than that taken by General Vandenberg in 1951; it implied that the Army should be wholly excluded from the development of tactical surface-to-surface missiles.19
The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves could not agree on the question and referred it back to the Secretary of Defense on 3 June 1953. General Collins, supported by Admiral Fechteler, justified the request on the grounds that the Army must have missiles under its own control in order to accomplish its mission. Sensing his vulnerability to charges of wasteful duplication, General Collins argued that the Army's experience with Regulus would provide a basis for evaluating similar missiles under development and perhaps for eliminating some. General Vandenberg supported the position taken by his representative in the Group, and asserted that Regulus, with a maximum range of 500 miles, could in no sense be regarded as an extension of artillery.\textsuperscript{20}

Secretary Wilson referred the problem to his adviser on this subject, Mr. K. T. Keller.\textsuperscript{21} The latter's reply was based wholly on the status of the Regulus program. Since Regulus was not yet ready for issue to operating forces, he decided, it would be premature to authorize the Army to purchase it at that time. If the Army wished to evaluate Regulus, it could do so by participating in the Navy's test program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in this short-range solution, which evaded the basic issue of Service responsibilities.\textsuperscript{22} Presumably Secretary Wilson accepted this advice, although his decision is not documented in available records.

The question of responsibilities had emerged again in May 1953, when the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group drafted a new schedule of missile programs and requirements. The Group's report took note of the Army-Air Force dispute but made no attempt to resolve it. The plan proposed by the Group included outlines of programs submitted unilaterally by each Service, with comments by each member on the programs of the other Services. The Air Force member alleged that these programs reflected a large amount of wasteful duplication—the result, he said, of differing interpretations of the JCS directive, which was itself "out of date and too general in nature." On the question of Service responsibilities, he maintained that the Air Force was responsible for providing the forces needed for air defense and for tactical air support of troops. Apparently he did not interpret this sweeping statement to mean that the Army should at once be directed to drop all work on missiles that might serve these missions. He did, however, claim for his Service the responsibility for stating the requirements for all such forces. On this basis, he felt free to recommend that the Army's Nike program be sharply cut back and reexamined in light of other weapons (i.e., those of the Air Force) that were expected to become available. He also recommended that Hermes, which was expected ultimately to attain a 500-mile range, be discontinued or turned over to the Air Force, which had similar projects under way. Missiles with such a range, he asserted, could be employed for interdiction of enemy land forces, close support of friendly forces, or air defense operations—all of which were Air Force missions.

The Army member rejoined that the Air Force position would eliminate the Army entirely from the development of surface-to-surface missiles except those of the anti-tank, anti-pillbox type. He pointed out that the Nike program had already been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. He denied that Hermes duplicated Air Force projects. While agreeing that wasteful...
duplication should be eliminated, he warned that it was dangerous to cancel any apparently competitive missile programs until the superiority of one to all the others had been demonstrated beyond doubt. He maintained that the Air Force interpretation of missile responsibilities violated the JCS directive on the subject, and that it was inappropriate to attempt to challenge this directive through the medium of the annual report of the Group. In the latter view he was supported by the Navy member, who contended further that all missile programs listed in the draft report were in conformity with JCS guidance.23

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Group’s report on 9 June 1953. Finding themselves unable to agree, they decided to reconsider the subject in a special meeting after each member had submitted a statement of his views on the proper division of missile responsibilities.24

The statement prepared by General Twining receded somewhat from the position taken by his GMIORG representative. He suggested a new method of assigning responsibilities, which would allow the Army to develop surface-to-surface missiles “the employment of which must be closely coordinated and integrated with conventional artillery and the fire and movement of the supported ground forces,” while the Air Force would develop those used to interdict enemy land forces, to isolate the battlefield, and to gain air supremacy. As for antiaircraft missiles, General Twining would allow the Army those needed as organic equipment by Army units for their own defense; however, the Air Force should be responsible for those designed for defense of the United States and other land areas.25

General Collins’ statement quoted from the Key West Agreement and from the National Security Act of 1947 to justify the contention that the Army should control all ground-launched missiles needed primarily for land combat. In a 1949 law that had authorized the Secretary of the Army to procure guided missiles, he found a positive assertion by Congress that such weapons were vital to the Army. Surface-to-surface missiles should be regarded as a logical extension of artillery; the same kind of problems were involved in their use, and the training of operating personnel was similar in both instances. Future battlefields, he predicted, would be poorly defined and would embrace targets many miles behind the enemy’s rear; hence the range of Army missiles could not be arbitrarily restricted. As for surface-to-air missiles, he maintained that these complemented antiaircraft guns and rockets, all of which must be integrated to provide an adequate defense against aircraft.26

The issue was still hanging fire when the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed in August 1953. The special meeting to reconsider the subject was apparently never held; the new JCS members had to grapple with more immediate problems, and the question of missile responsibility dragged into 1954.

Guided Missile Policy at DOD Level

Impetus for resolution of the problem was eventually to come from a higher level. The question of waste and duplication in missile development was of
course of intense interest to Secretary Wilson and his staff. It was discussed by the Armed Forces Policy Council on 16 June 1953. The members agreed that no promising new project should be abandoned, but that every effort should be made to eliminate duplication and that, insofar as possible, a single missile of each type should be standardized for use by all Services. Secretary Wilson directed the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Harold E. Talbott, to organize a study group to analyze the Service missile programs. Secretary Talbott delegated this task to Mr. Trevor Gardner, his Special Assistant for Research and Development.27

Seven months later, on 24 January 1954, Mr. Gardner’s Study Group on Guided Missiles turned in its report. The Group approved all current missile programs, and thus by implication rejected the Air Force charges of wasteful duplication. The report did, however, suggest a number of changes in the overall missile effort, such as reexamination of requirements in light of expected higher-yield atomic weapons and initiation of programs for low-altitude air defense weapons and for an anti-missile missile.28 The Armed Forces Policy Council approved the report and directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) to see that it was carried out.29

A New Division of Missile Responsibilities

None of the Study Group’s recommendations required action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, its report had noted that the unsettled dispute over tactical and air defense weapons had a major bearing on missile programs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Mr. Donald A. Quarles, drew this comment to Admiral Radford’s attention on 18 February 1954.30 Admiral Radford responded that the question was “now in the process of resolution within the Joint Chiefs of Staff”31—a somewhat misleading statement, inasmuch as it implied that a decision might be forthcoming momentarily.

Two months later Mr. Quarles again found it necessary to prod the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Proposed programs, he pointed out, could not be evaluated without considering Service roles and missions. Better coordination between his office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to him to be called for. As an example, he cited recent proposals submitted separately by the Army and the Air Force for a ground-to-air missile with an atomic warhead. “This is a frankly competitive situation in which the two departments, by developing an equipment capability, seek to stake out a claim for a Mission responsibility,” he wrote. “We believe that jurisdictional issues of this kind lead to duplicative development. This would be avoided if the Mission responsibility could be settled first.” He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consult with him before a decision was reached on such potentially competitive projects.32

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a brief reply on 25 June 1954, agreed that it was their responsibility to decide conflicts over mission responsibilities. Any difficulties involving roles and missions in the missile field should be referred to them for advice.33
Meanwhile, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had at last moved to settle the long-standing issue between the Army and the Air Force. On 2 June 1954 they agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to draft a new directive on guided missile responsibilities.\(^{34}\) The three members of this committee (formally appointed on 28 June 1954) were instructed to use the 1949 directive as a point of departure, since it was based on the sound premise that missile responsibility should follow assigned Service functions. But where functions appeared to overlap—where a task might be performed in two or more ways, or a single weapon could accomplish more than one task—assignment of responsibilities must be predicated on additional factors. Here, of course, lay the key problem. The committee was given no guidance in this matter and was left to determine for itself the additional factors to be considered.\(^{35}\)

On 26 July 1954 the ad hoc committee submitted the draft of a new directive on the subject. It left unchanged the responsibilities for air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, which were to remain with the Air Force and the Navy. It proposed to make the Air Force formally responsible for “very long-range surface-to-surface guided missiles of the intercontinental type”—an important matter on which the previous JCS directive had been silent. On the points at issue between the Air Force and the Army, the committee succeeded in narrowing the basis of disagreement but not in eliminating it. The members agreed that the Army should develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against “tactical targets of interest to the ground force commander” (though the Air Force member wished to stipulate that these targets must be on the battlefield). They agreed further that the Air Force would develop surface-to-surface missiles required by its assigned functions, but that it would be most profitable if the Air Force concentrated on manned aircraft rather than on missiles for the task of close support. This concession by the Air Force was matched by the Army member in an agreement that for some time into the future, support from tactical aircraft would be more efficient than that from ground-launched missiles.

The committee failed to find a basis for agreement on antiaircraft missiles. The Army and Navy members suggested that the Army be responsible for missiles employed to defend specific areas or installations, and the Air Force for those that were designed to replace manned fighter interceptors in blanket defense of large areas. The Air Force member wished to restrict the Army to missiles with a maximum horizontal range of 25 nautical miles at expected aircraft flight altitudes (this was the actual range of Nike, which was already in use). He denied that his Service desired to take over the function that had traditionally been performed by the Army antiaircraft units, but admitted that it planned eventually to deploy its own antiaircraft missiles, perhaps eliminating manned interceptors entirely.\(^{36}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff experienced no little difficulty in thrashing out an agreement on the issues left unresolved by the committee.\(^{37}\) An acceptable basis for agreement was finally worked out by a special two-man committee consisting of Generals Charles L. Bolte, USA, and Thomas D. White, USAF. It allowed the Army to develop antiaircraft missiles with horizontal ranges up to 50 nautical miles, which were to be sited for defense of specified geographical areas, cities,
or vital installations, while the Air Force would develop missiles with greater ranges which should be deployed for blanket defense over wide areas. The Army would be allowed surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets within the zone of Army combat operations, a rather elastic phrase that was left conveniently undefined. 38

All these decisions were collected into a draft directive that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense on 9 September 1954. On 13 November 1954 the Acting Secretary, Mr. Anderson, approved it. 39

The Problem of the Medium-Range Missile

The new directive in effect left the Army free to develop tactical missiles of any desired range. It has been pointed out that the Army was thinking in terms of ranges up to 500 miles, on the grounds that in future conflicts the zone of combat operations would embrace targets several hundred miles behind the enemy front. This was about the expected range of Matador, the Air Force missile that was comparable to the Army’s Hermes. At the same time the Air Force had been made responsible for (and had begun developing) missiles with intercontinental ranges—those measured in thousands of miles. But none of the Services had any plans for missiles with ranges intermediate between these two limits. For that reason, the new directive made no assignment of Service responsibility for medium-range missiles. 40

This lacuna in US missile programs received attention as a result of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. In June 1954 Secretary Wilson and Mr. Duncan Sandys, Minister of Supply in Her Majesty’s Government, agreed that the long-standing military collaboration between the two nations should extend to the missile field. They agreed tentatively that technical information on the subject would be interchanged freely and that design and production of missiles would be coordinated so as to produce missiles that would be interchangeable, or at least functionally similar. This agreement was submitted for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved it subject to certain restrictions intended to protect the most sensitive information. On 12 August 1954 the British Government accepted these restrictions and the agreement became effective. 41

One item of the agreement emphasized the special importance of developing both long- and medium-range missiles as soon as possible. With this end in view, the United Kingdom agreed to undertake the development of a weapon in the 1,500-mile range. By implication, the United States would bear principal responsibility for the intercontinental missile.

Calling Admiral Radford’s attention to this part of the agreement, Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles suggested on 12 August 1954 that it would be well to establish a single channel for liaison with the British on the medium-range missile. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the assignment of this task to some one of the Services and also to clarify the responsibility for the
development of missiles of this general type. At present, he pointed out, there seemed to be a number of such projects under way: Corporal, Redstone, Snark, Navaho, and Atlas.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received this communication while they were still debating the general question of missile responsibilities, and they laid it aside until after their new directive had been issued in November. Admittedly that directive, during the final stage of its preparation, might have had written into it a precise definition of responsibilities for medium-range missile development, but an attempt to treat the subject would have raised further inter-Service contention. The extent of the Service differences was revealed when the Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group sought to draft a reply to Mr. Quarles later in November. The Air Force representative interpreted the recent directive as assigning to his Service the responsibility for research on medium-range missiles, and he believed this interpretation should be made explicit by a JCS agreement. The other two members denied this interpretation and believed that it would be premature at that time to make any formal assignment of responsibility for the task. On the question of technical liaison with the British, the Navy member lined up with the Air Force in urging that the latter Service be given this mission. The Army member considered that his Service should be so designated because the success of its Corporal and Redstone programs had given the Army a fund of technical knowledge in the medium-range missile field.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the Air Force should be made responsible for liaison, and so informed Mr. Quarles on 10 December 1954. As for the five projects he had cited, they merely referred him to the outline of responsibilities in their recent directive. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned no responsibility at that time for developing medium-range missiles, omitting all reference to the subject in their reply to the Assistant Secretary.  

This decision was reasonable under the circumstances. To force the issue at that time would have uncovered an irreconcilable difference of professional opinion that could be settled only by a largely arbitrary decision of higher authority. In avoiding this for the present, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff left the door open for future disputes on the subject, brought on a few years later when the Army’s missile research projects strained against the battlefield limitation and forced reconsideration of the division of responsibilities between the Army and Air Force.
Disarmament and Atoms for Peace

The hope of international disarmament in a peaceful world had helped to sustain the morale of the peoples of the United States and other allied nations during World War II. It soon withered, however, in the frigid atmosphere of the cold war. Even a more limited goal—international control of the newly released power of the atom—proved beyond attainment in a world divided into two hostile blocs. Nevertheless, all nations felt obliged to profess interest in arms control, and the subject remained under discussion in the United Nations as well as within the US Government.

In UN debates, the United States adhered to a position laid down in July 1951 in NSC 112, which set forth the following basic principles of US disarmament policy:

1. The first step in any attempt to regulate armaments must be an international agreement embracing at least general principles, if not specific details.
2. International control of atomic energy was not to be considered separately, but must be dealt with in connection with the regulation of conventional armaments.
3. Control of the atom must be based on a plan at least as effective as that approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948, which provided for a control agency with adequate enforcement authority.

On the basis of these principles, NSC 112 proposed a step-by-step program of regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments beginning with a system of disclosure and verification of information. The UN General Assembly had approved these principles in January 1952 and had set up a Disarmament Commission to draft a treaty for the purpose. This Commission met several times in 1952, but made no progress toward its goal. The Soviet Union continued to insist upon its own approach to disarmament, which envisioned immediate prohibition of atomic weapons (but with no means for enforcement) and a percentage reduction in the armed forces of all major powers. The Soviet bloc also seized every opportunity during 1952 to repeat its
unfounded (but nonetheless psychologically effective) charge that the United Nations Command in Korea had resorted to bacteriological warfare.²

Disarmament Opportunities in 1953

President Eisenhower, though he had spent almost all of his adult life in a military uniform, was nonetheless as firmly committed to the goal of arms reduction as was his predecessor. He pledged himself to this objective in his inaugural address. At the moment of his accession, however, there seemed no occasion for new US initiatives in this direction. On 18 February 1953 the National Security Council agreed merely to explore the possibility of submitting some new proposal in the General Assembly when it convened the following September.³

Almost immediately, however, two events brought the subject of arms control to the NSC agenda. The more pressing of these was the death of Josef Stalin, Premier of the Soviet Union, on 4 March 1953. The passing of the aged dictator, who had been a fixture on the international scene for a generation, seemed to open a new opportunity. There was room for hope that he might be succeeded by a leadership genuinely interested in seeking a reduction of international tension and receptive to a new approach to disarmament. In any case, the situation in the Soviet Union was likely to remain fluid for some time, and it was essential for the United States to seize any opportunity to shape developments in a favorable manner.

The administration was quick to recognize the possibilities. On 11 March the National Security Council agreed that Stalin’s death presented “an opportunity for the assertion of world leadership by President Eisenhower in the interests of security, peace, and a higher standard of living for all peoples.” The President’s Special Assistant for Cold War Operations, Mr. C. D. Jackson was directed to draft a suitable speech for this purpose.⁴

The result was President Eisenhower’s address on “The Chance for Peace,” delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953, which was intended to make clear of the nation’s desire for a peaceful world and to create an opportunity for US-Soviet rapprochement on the subject of disarmament and other problems. The President called on the new leadership of the Soviet Union to settle the issues standing in the way of peace, and at the same time to “proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world.” He promised that the United States would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements for limiting armaments and for control of atomic energy. Unfortunately, the President’s appeal brought no response from Moscow.⁵

The second event having an impact on US disarmament policy was a report submitted early in 1953 by a panel of consultants that had been appointed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April 1952. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer served as chairman; other members were Dr. Vannevar Bush, Mr. John S. Dickey,
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson. Their report was an impressive
document: sober, closely reasoned, aptly phrased, and infused with a recogni-
tion at once of the importance of the goal and of the difficulties in the way of its
realization. The members concluded that any attempt to draft detailed blue-
prints of general arms regulation would be dangerous and misleading. They
recommended instead the following:

(1) The United States should adopt a policy of candor toward the
American people, by revealing fully the nature of the dangers
engendered by the atomic arms race.

(2) This policy should be extended to allied nations. The United States
should discuss freely with them the problems and dangers posed
by the use of atomic weapons, in order to strengthen the unity
and cohesion of the non-Soviet world.

(3) Arms regulation was closely related to continental defense; the
two were complementary methods of achieving the goal of safety
against the danger of a surprise knockout blow. Hence, greatly
intensified efforts of continental defense were essential.

(4) Discussion of disarmament in the United Nations should be
minimized, since the practice had now become unproductive and
even misleading.

(5) A real effort should be made to find ways of communicating with
the rulers of the Soviet Union on the range of questions posed by
the arms race. Admittedly, serious negotiation seemed unlikely at
that time, but the lesser act of genuine communication could do
no harm and might have real value.6

These recommendations were approved by the National Security Council on
25 February 1953. The Council’s Senior Staff (soon to be renamed the Planning
Board) was told to suggest ways of translating them into action.7 As a result, the
first two recommendations became the basis of programs approved by the Council
in the next few months. Action on the third recommendation, regarding con-
tinental defense, was already under way, with results that have been described
earlier. The fourth recommendation had to be dropped in the face of pressure
from other nations for continuing UN discussion; the fifth was a matter for
long-range diplomatic activity over a period of time.

Operation Candor and Its Outcome

Following the Council’s direction, the Planning Board on 8 May 1953 out-
lined a course of action for implementing the policy of candor. Its objective
would be “to secure support of the American people for necessary governmental
actions which would rest on an adequate understanding of the realities of the
situation”—a very timely goal if it became necessary to undertake an expensive
continental defense program, as then seemed likely. The Planning Board recom-
mended the release of general information about current and future US and Soviet nuclear capabilities.  

The Board’s plan was submitted for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who generally approved it. Most of the JCS members believed that its execution should be postponed until the panel’s other recommendations had been considered in detail; General Vandenberg, however, wanted it implemented at once.  

The President and the National Security Council decided on 27 May 1953 to proceed immediately with “Operation Candor.” The Psychological Strategy Board, headed by Mr. Jackson, was placed in charge of the program, which was to be initiated with a speech by the President. In succeeding weeks, Mr. Jackson discussed various drafts of a suitable speech with other governmental officials. The Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Major General A. R Luedecke to represent them in these discussions, but made clear that they wished to review the final speech before delivery.  

In the course of the discussions, Operation Candor underwent a change in concept. Instead of a means of rallying the American people to support unpopular measures by disclosing disagreeable facts about nuclear weaponry, it was turned into a kind of seminar designed to instruct the public on the international situation in general. A plan prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board, tentatively approved by the Council on 30 July 1953, called for a series of talks by the President and other officials on various aspects of the cold war. Admiral Radford was scheduled for an address on “The Threat to the United States.”  

A draft of an initial speech for delivery by the President was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 3 September 1953. Entitled “The Safety of the Republic,” it consisted of a general description of the international scene, with emphasis on the alarming nature of the atomic arms race, but it ended with a promise that the United States would maintain military superiority while continuing the search for effective approaches to disarmament. The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the text as too vague in some respects and as implying that the United States would never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.  

These comments became academic when the President discarded this draft and adopted yet another approach. He decided upon an address that would close on a hopeful note instead of dwelling on the terrifying aspects of the current situation. It would call upon those powers that had mastered the technology of atomic fission to contribute radioactive material to be used for constructive purposes—electric power production, medical treatment and research, and the like.  

From this decision emerged Mr. Eisenhower’s proposal for an International Atomic Energy Agency, to be established under United Nations auspices, which would receive contributions of fissionable materials and allocate them among the nations of the world according to need. Details of the plan were worked out by the President in consultations with Mr. Jackson and with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Rear Admiral Lewis L. Strauss. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted and had no opportunity to review the speech in which the plan was unveiled before the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953. The subsequent history of the proposal is described in a later section.
Sharing Information with US Allies

After Operation Candor had been launched, the Planning Board turned its attention to the second of the Oppenheimer panel’s recommendations, for an exchange of information with other nations. The subject was timely in view of the possibility, already under discussion, that NATO’s strategy might be reoriented to emphasize nuclear weapons.

The Planning Board first undertook to define the purpose of the proposed exchange of information—a matter on which the Oppenheimer panel had been somewhat vague. According to a statement tentatively approved by the Board, the objectives would be to facilitate inter-allied defense planning to prevent undue fear and timidity that might hamper US freedom of action in a crisis, and to stimulate cooperation in weapons research and development. This statement was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 1 July 1953.16

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a few changes, but added some comments that went to the heart of the problem raised by the suggested program. “It can be stated almost categorically,” they asserted, “that the rate of leakage to the Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations will be very high.” Hence, any program of disclosure should be carried out slowly and cautiously, with frequent periods of inactivity during which the situation would be carefully assessed. Moreover, it should exclude technical information about atomic weapons and precise figures on the size of the US and Soviet stockpiles.17

Without further reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Planning Board drew up a detailed plan of disclosure of information and sent it to the National Security Council on 23 November 1953. Under this plan, the United States would make available information on the following subjects: effects of weapons; tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons in US plans, and the probable results of their use; Soviet atomic capabilities; techniques of defense against atomic attack; and scientific and technical information on atomic energy in general. The United States would not, however, disseminate information concerning the manufacture or design of weapons, nor reveal its own capabilities or its plans for deployment of atomic weapons. These restrictions seemed to reflect the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, the Board included the JCS warning about the probable rate of leakage of shared knowledge, though at the same time pointing out that the proposed program would exclude the most sensitive information. In any event, said the Board, the United States could not hold back the spread of knowledge of nuclear technology.18

The President and the Council approved the program with some additional restrictions, on 3 December 1953, and designated the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to coordinate it.19 A necessary preliminary was amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which closely restricted the dissemination of information. Legislation for this purpose was prepared by the administration and was passed by Congress, in a slightly altered form, in 1954. It authorized the Department of Defense, with the approval of the President, to enter into agreements for exchange of atomic information with other nations or with regional defense organizations.20
UN Pressure for a Disarmament Program

Although the Oppenheimer panel had recommended that the United States minimize the discussion of disarmament in the United Nations, US representatives in that organization could hardly avoid talking about the subject if others insisted upon doing so. Pressure in the United Nations for continuing study was evidenced by a resolution approved by the General Assembly on 8 April 1953, directing the Disarmament Commission to continue its search for comprehensive and coordinated plans for arms control.21

The administration was compelled to acknowledge this situation. “There is every indication,” remarked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Frank C. Nash, in a memorandum addressed to the Services on 1 September 1953, “that recent events have stimulated undeniable pressures both at home and abroad for additional effort toward realizing an acceptable and effective world disarmament program.” It was essential, he observed, that the United States have a plan ready for submission if and when conditions were ripe. The NSC Planning Board had already voted in favor of a review of basic US disarmament policy.

In the conduct of this review, it was expected that a prominent role would be played by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC), a threeman body appointed in March 1952 to draw up plans and policies relating to arms control, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Nash accordingly instructed the Services to appoint representatives to constitute an ad hoc military subcommittee of the RAC, which would be under the chairmanship of the senior military representative on the RAC staff.22

The Planning Board had meanwhile considered the possibility of a new US proposal on disarmament for the forthcoming General Assembly session, as required by the Council’s decision of 18 February 1953. It concluded that little progress could be expected until basic political questions, such as the status of Germany, of Austria, and of Korea, had been settled between the East and the West. Moreover, concluded the Board, (echoing the Oppenheimer panel’s view), any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament, if they took place at all, would probably occur outside the United Nations. Nevertheless it was advisable for the United States to continue to demonstrate to the world its abiding desire for comprehensive and safeguarded disarmament, especially in light of emotions aroused on the one hand by the peace offensive undertaken by the new Soviet rulers and on the other hand by the Soviet thermonuclear explosion. The Board concluded, therefore, that in the approaching General Assembly the United States should summarize its previous efforts in this field, but should submit no substantive proposals other than to reaffirm in some manner President Eisenhower’s remarks on disarmament in his speech of 16 April.23 The National Security Council adopted these recommendations on 9 September 1953.24

The NSC decision was reflected in the speech of Secretary of State Dulles to the General Assembly on 17 September 1953, in which, echoing the President’s
address of 16 April, he urged that study of disarmament be pressed concurrently with the search for solution of other problems. He cited previous US disarmament proposals but indicated that his country was not inflexibly committed to them and would be glad to consider other plans. The General Assembly embarked upon another futile discussion of the subject, which served only to make clear once again the conflicting positions of the two power blocs.

Nevertheless, the UN session saw two noteworthy developments. The first was a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1953, which directed the Disarmament Commission to establish a subcommittee to conduct further discussions in private. The second was President Eisenhower's address on 8 December 1953, already described, proposing an International Atomic Energy Agency—a substantive proposal of major importance. These two developments dominated discussion of disarmament within the administration during the next few months.

The UN Disarmament Subcommittee

In accord with instructions from the General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission on 19 April 1954 established a subcommittee composed of representatives of the three major Western Powers, the Soviet Union, and Canada, which was directed to meet in London the following month. The US delegation included representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission and two military officers named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Secretary Wilson's request: Colonel W. A. Stevens, USA, and Commander John M. Alford, USN.

In preparation for the meeting, representatives of the State and Defense Departments drafted two position papers outlining proposals to be submitted by the United States. Both were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The first dealt with the relationship between the phases of a comprehensive disarmament program such as that envisioned in NSC 112. It concluded that the establishment of an international control agency under the United Nations must be the first step. The second set forth the status, functions, and method of operations of such an agency.

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could comment on these drafts, they were confronted by a new and significant proposal that originated outside the United States. On 2 April 1954 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, of India, speaking to the Indian Parliament about the dangers of nuclear war, urged that the great powers conclude a standstill agreement to discontinue tests of nuclear weapons at once, pending progress toward elimination of such devices. Six days later India's UN Representative asked the Secretary-General to place this suggestion before the Disarmament Commission.

The administration quickly recognized that the United States could reap a political advantage by accepting this proposal. The impact would be greatest if such an announcement could be made during the opening meeting of the sub-
committee of the Disarmament Commission. On 16 April 1954, therefore, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments on a priority basis. 32

The Joint Chiefs of Staff turned a cold eye on Mr. Nehru’s suggestion. They pointed out to Secretary Wilson on 30 April that acceptance would violate the accepted principle that international control of atomic energy should await the adoption of a comprehensive and enforceable plan. Moreover, acquiescence on this issue would probably lead to pressure for further piecemeal concessions in the same direction. But the heart of their argument was that a test moratorium would bring far-reaching and permanent military disadvantages outweighing any transitory political gain. Their reasoning on this point was as follows:

It is believed that the United States has, at present, an indeterminate advantage over the USSR with respect to the technical status of thermonuclear weapons development. While a moratorium on tests of such weapons might, at first thought, appear to maintain this advantage, a moratorium would not prevent the Soviets from advancing their theoretical studies so as to approach the present stage of development in the United States. The advantage which the United States is believed now to hold might then readily be neutralized should the USSR elect to violate or abrogate the moratorium agreement and conduct proof tests of their theoretical studies. 33

As for the other draft papers that had been sent them for comment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged them to be in conformity with established US policy and therefore acceptable. They went on to add, however, that they opposed any disarmament negotiations. It was, they believed,

most unrealistic . . . to expect that any agreement which might be obtained vis-a-vis the USSR would be other than to the serious disadvantage of the security interests of the United States. The Soviets have a long record of violating the international agreements they have signed. They would use any agreement on disarmament to enhance their own power position with respect to the United States. 34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not explain why they had decided to go on record in opposing negotiations. Apparently, however, they were moved to this action by the opening of the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 and by what they considered overeagerness on the part of the United Kingdom and France to seek a political settlement in Indochina. On 30 April 1954 they had asked the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to prepare a historical summary of previous negotiations with the Soviet Union. This report became the basis for a memorandum that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense on 23 June 1954, in connection with current NSC discussion of basic national security policy. In this memorandum they urged that the United States refrain from attempts to reach agreements with the USSR on disarmament or other issues until the Soviets had demonstrated a basic change of attitude through specific acts, such as release of remaining prisoners from World War II or conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. They urged also that the United States seek to
persuade its allies of the need to confront the Soviets with "unmistakable evidence of an unyielding determination to halt further Communist expansion."  

The question of a test ban came up in the National Security Council on 6 May 1954. The Council directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, to examine the subject. Hearing of this development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Wilson to make certain that their views on the subject were communicated without delay to the President and the National Security Council. On 16 May Deputy Secretary Kyes assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this action had been taken and stated that he agreed with their views.

At a meeting of the National Security Council on 23 June 1954, Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Strauss unanimously recommended that the United States not agree at that time to a moratorium on testing. The Council approved this position.

As matters turned out, the test moratorium never reached the agenda of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, and the United States was spared the embarrassment of publicly opposing it. When the Subcommittee met, the US plan for an international control authority was rejected by the Soviet delegation. With US support, the British and French delegations submitted a planned schedule of arms reduction intended as a compromise between previous Western and Soviet positions; it called for simultaneous agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons and to reduce conventional forces, starting with a freeze on military manpower and expenditures at their 31 December 1953 levels. This plan was also unacceptable to the Soviets. The parent Disarmament Commission, expressing disappointment at the Subcommittee's failure to agree, referred these proposals to the General Assembly, along with India's plea for a nuclear test ban.

When the General Assembly session opened in September 1954, however, it appeared that the Disarmament Subcommittee meeting might not have been wholly fruitless after all. Unexpectedly reversing its position, the Soviet Government now indicated a willingness to accept the Anglo-French plan, and thus to abandon its long-standing insistence on immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons as the first step toward disarmament. The Soviet representative in the Disarmament Subcommittee joined his Western colleagues in sponsoring a resolution, which the General Assembly unanimously approved, asking the Disarmament Commission to reconvene the Subcommittee. This evidence of a more cooperative attitude was to be reinforced to some degree by the position taken by the Soviet Government on President Eisenhower's atoms for peace plan.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

President Eisenhower’s plan for international cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology, as presented to the United Nations on 8 December 1953, was general in nature. A detailed plan of implementation, worked out principally by
representatives of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment in January 1954.42

In evaluating the draft plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that the establishment of the projected International Atomic Energy Agency should not: (1) serve to increase any nation's military capability; (2) result in any decrease in US atomic capability relative to that of the USSR; (3) introduce any departure from the established US policy that international control of atomic energy must be considered in relation to the regulation of other forms of military power; or (4) preclude bilateral or multilateral agreements outside the framework of the new agency. In light of these criteria, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the plan acceptable. Their conclusions were approved by Secretary Wilson.43 A later, slightly revised version was similarly endorsed.44

The United States had already opened negotiations with other major powers looking toward the establishment of the new agency. The Soviet response was discouraging; it amounted to a refusal to cooperate unless the United States first agreed to an immediate ban on all nuclear weapons.45 Nevertheless the United States went ahead with its plans. On 12 August 1954 the National Security Council approved the projected International Atomic Energy Agency as part of a wider scheme for peaceful nuclear collaboration, both multilateral and bilateral, that was intended to take advantage of the liberalizing provisions of the amended Atomic Energy Act (then nearing final passage). Other elements of this plan were a proposal for an international technical conference on atomic energy, to be held under UN auspices, and offers by the United States to assist other nations in nuclear engineering and in the application of atomic energy to biology and medicine.46 The plan had been approved earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.47

The principal features of the US atoms for peace plan were outlined to the UN General Assembly by Secretary Dulles on 23 September 1954. On 5 November the US Representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, described them in detail. The Assembly endorsed them on 4 December 1954 in a resolution that expressed hope for immediate establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and authorized the proposed technical conference. The Soviet Government had meanwhile reconsidered its earlier opposition and now indicated willingness to cooperate in these plans. The Soviet representative in the Assembly voted in favor of the resolution, making the decision unanimous.48

**Toward a New Disarmament Policy**

On 9 September 1953 the National Security Council had voted for a full-dress review of the disarmament policy embodied in NSC 112, to be conducted as a matter of urgency by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.49 More than a year was to elapse before this review was completed. During this interval, the Council devoted some attention to disarmament as an aspect of basic national security policy. NSC 162/2, approved in October 1953, declared that the United States should
“promptly determine what it would accept as an adequate system of armament control . . . and on what basis the United States would be prepared to negotiate to obtain it.” Another paragraph provided that the United States should keep open the possibility of negotiating agreements on arms control or other issues.  

During the policy debates of 1954, which have been described in Chapter 2, disarmament emerged as a major issue. The first draft policy paper of that year, NSC 5422, contained alternative and widely divergent paragraphs on the subject. One of these, presumably reflecting the views of the Department of State, was noteworthy in its suggestion that the United States abandon its demand for a comprehensive disarmament plan and accept a gradual approach, beginning with a prohibition of nuclear weapons alone. The paragraph read as follows:

The U.S. should explore fully the possibility of reaching a practicable arrangement for the limitation of armaments with the USSR. Such an arrangement would be a more certain and economical method of meeting the threat posed by the growing Soviet nuclear capabilities than any other course of action discussed in this paper. The U.S. should therefore continue to reexamine its position on disarmament, especially (1) whether a system of safeguards can be devised entailing less risk for U.S. security than no limitation of armaments and (2) whether the U.S. should be willing to agree to effective nuclear disarmament in the absence of conventional disarmament.

Opposed to this view was another one holding that the question of disarmament should not be treated in NSC 5422, since it was already under separate study, and that the Soviet production of fissionable materials had already proceeded so far that it was doubtful that any safe and enforceable arms control arrangement could be achieved “so long as the Soviet regime and objectives remain substantially as they are today.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not comment on NSC 5422, but there was no doubt that the second of the above versions was closer to their views. On 23 June 1954, as already described, they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the United States eschew all negotiations with the Soviet Union until the Soviets demonstrated a change in methods and objectives. Secretary Wilson apparently made no formal comment on the views expressed in this JCS memorandum. On 24 June, however, Admiral Radford distributed copies of it to members of the National Security Council. The Council rejected the JCS position and voted in favor of negotiations on disarmament, but refused to endorse any immediate reversal in the basic US policy. NSC 5422/2, approved by the Council on 7 August 1954, contained the following carefully qualified paragraph on disarmament:

Despite serious question whether any safe and enforceable system can be achieved in the foreseeable future, the U.S. should nevertheless continue to explore fully the possibility of reaching a practicable arrangement for the limitation of armaments with the USSR. The U.S. should therefore continue to reexamine its position on disarmament, especially (a) whether a promising climate for effective disarmament negotiations can be developed, (b) whether a system of safeguards can be devised entailing less risk for U.S. security than no limitation of armaments, and (c) whether, if a safe and enforceable system for assuring
effective nuclear disarmament, which might be acceptable to the USSR, can be devised, the U. S. would be willing to accept it in the absence of conventional disarmament. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to refuse to accept nuclear disarmament except as part of general disarmament.53

In the drafting of the paper that became NSC 5501, the disagreement between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff became even clearer. In the initial draft, NSC 5440, the Department of State urged the inclusion of a paragraph calling for the use of negotiation as a tactic that would place the Soviet Union on the defensive before the rest of the world if it rejected US proposals. Specifically, in the State Department view, the United States should “put forward and seek agreement on proposals which, if accepted, would reduce the magnitude of the Soviet-Communist threat (such as an acceptable plan for limitation of armaments with adequate safeguards).” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, standing firm on their previously expressed views, believed that it would be not only fruitless, but perhaps even hazardous, to attempt to negotiate any issues, including disarmament, until the Soviets had given evidence of a changed attitude.54 In this instance, the Department of State was overruled. As finally approved, NSC 5501 contained only a brief statement that the United States “should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby.”55 The subject of disarmament was not mentioned.

In thus sidestepping the issue, the National Security Council doubtless wished to await the results of the policy review that it had set in motion in September 1953. By the end of 1954 this process had been completed. The details are obscure, but two divergent positions, upheld respectively by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, had emerged. They agreed on two points: (1) no disarmament plan should rely solely on Soviet good faith, and (2) merely to stand pat on support of the 1948 UN plan for control of atomic energy would involve an unacceptable risk and would be construed as hypocritical by allied countries. Otherwise, they were in total disagreement. The Department of Defense maintained that there was no possibility whatever that the Soviet regime, as it then existed, would agree to a disarmament plan acceptable to the United States. Even an attempt to test Soviet intentions through negotiations would subject the United States to pressure to accept some plan that might jeopardize the nation’s security. Any partial disarmament scheme, limiting the production or stockpiling of atomic weapons, would place the United States at a disadvantage because of the Soviet Union’s larger conventional forces. The United States should therefore continue to insist on a comprehensive and enforceable system, embracing both atomic and conventional weapons, as a preliminary to any action in the field of disarmament. This position was clearly in accord with the expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it may be assumed that they were influential in securing its approval at the departmental level.

The Department of State position was based on the belief that continuing Soviet advances in nuclear capabilities would bring the USSR to effective, if not to actual, atomic parity by approximately 1957–1959. A realistic arms control arrangement, therefore, would actually contribute to US security insofar as it
arrested the dangerous nuclear arms race. While agreeing that Soviet good faith should not be assumed, the State Department was willing to explore the possibility that the Soviets might be genuinely alarmed by the prospect of continuing nuclear weapons competition and would be willing to cooperate in ending the race. The State Department representatives therefore believed that the time had come for a fundamental policy change. They now favored a willingness to proceed toward disarmament by stages, beginning with agreements on the least controversial aspects, in place of the previous US insistence on a comprehensive overall plan. Moreover, they no longer considered that reduction of conventional weapons should necessarily accompany reduction of nuclear arms, although they agreed that the former goal should be aggressively sought.\(^{56}\)

The special committee that had been set up by the Council in September 1953, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was unable to resolve this disagreement.\(^{57}\) The matter therefore went to the National Security Council for resolution on 10 February 1955. The Council resorted to a familiar expedient—a call for more study. The members agreed that the President should appoint an individual of outstanding qualifications as his special representative to make another review of arms control policy on a full-time basis. Pending receipt of his findings, the United States should continue to support the position it had taken in the United Nations, but without prejudice to possible later changes.\(^{58}\)

The outcome of this recommendation was the appointment of Mr. Harold E. Stassen as President Eisenhower’s special assistant on disarmament problems, which was announced to the press on 19 March 1955.\(^{59}\) His appointment set the stage for another try at breaking the long stalemate—one in which the more conciliatory attitude demonstrated by the Soviets in the 1954 General Assembly would be put to the test.

**The JCS Approach to Disarmament**

The question of disarmament did not occupy a major proportion of the time expended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1953–1954. Their principal role was to evaluate proposals originating outside the military establishment. Their comments on these various plans showed no evidence of hostility to disarmament *per se*, such as would be in keeping with a stereotyped view of the “military mind.” They did, however, reveal a constant concern lest the United States compromise its security by advancing hastily into ill-considered and unenforceable disarmament schemes that would place the nation at a disadvantage in dealing with unscrupulous opponents. Such concern was, of course, entirely proper on their part. On several occasions in 1954, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went farther and urged that the United States refuse even to discuss disarmament unless the Soviet Union first gave convincing evidence of a lessened hostility toward the free world.
The administration, guided by a view of the national interest that transcended purely military considerations, rejected this sweeping JCS recommendation. Whatever the chances of real disarmament, the hopes and terrors associated with the subject in the minds of people around the globe made it essential for the United States to eschew any behavior that might make it appear as an obstructionist in the search for an end to the arms race.
Military Assistance

The policy of granting military assistance to friendly nations that was adopted by the United States shortly after World War II had its antecedents in the lend-lease program enacted during that conflict, and, still earlier, in the military training missions sent to various Latin American countries from time to time. More immediately, the policy responded to the shattered condition of much of the world at the end of the war and to the posture of truculent menace adopted by the Soviet Union and reflected in the behavior of communist parties around the globe—notably in Greece, where armed rebellion raged for several years. For the United States to share its resources with war-devastated countries, in order both to rebuild their economies and to strengthen their military defenses, was a move dictated by self-interest as well as humanitarianism.1

By the end of the Truman administration the United States found itself launched upon a comprehensive program of military, economic, and technical aid that included, but was not limited to, the nations that had suffered devastation in World War II. Concern for the safety and stability of the Western Hemisphere had dictated the inclusion of many Latin American countries on the list of recipients of US assistance. Also included were certain of the underdeveloped regions of the globe, where, it was feared, continuing poverty would offer fertile ground for the growth of communist totalitarianism. The continuation of this program under President Truman’s successor established it as a fixed element in US foreign policy for a number of years to come.

The separate aid programs authorized by Congress immediately after World War II had been brought together and given a common legislative basis in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. This law was supplemented by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the first of an annual series of similarly titled statutes. It set up a Mutual Security Agency to supervise both military and economic aid, defined the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and other officials in connection with the program, and specified the conditions under which foreign nations were eligible.2

Administrative machinery to supervise the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) soon took shape. A team of US advisers, usually styled the
“Military Assistance Advisory Group” (MAAG), was accredited to each recipient country. Each was headed by an officer nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These groups, in cooperation with military authorities of their host nations, supervised the dissemination and use of US aid and prepared recommendations concerning further required assistance. On the basis of these recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually prepared force bases to guide the overall program: lists of the numbers of units for which the United States would furnish support, in the form of materiel (end items) and training assistance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also defined general policies to govern the scale of equipment to be supplied to foreign forces. The JCS recommendations, after approval by the Secretary of Defense, were transmitted to the Service Departments, which prepared the detailed lists of military hardware to be supplied each nation and the schedules for the training to be given foreign military nationals under the MDA program.

The initial decisions by the administration regarding the scope of each year's aid program were then submitted to Congress. The exigencies of the legislative schedule generally made it necessary for the administration to go to Congress with a preliminary "one-line" estimate for the entire program before the details had been worked out. The proposed allocation of this total, by area or individual country, would be spelled out during hearings. The successive Mutual Security Acts specified the dollar value of the assistance authorized for each country or group of countries, but actual appropriations were made separately by later legislation. Congress usually took full advantage of the double opportunity this offered to cut back the request submitted by the administration. After the legislative process was completed, allocation of the amounts actually made available could proceed. Fund limitations, whether imposed by the administration or by

Table 13—Status of Mutual Defense Assistance Program Appropriations
Allocated to DOD, FYs 1950–1953: 31 January 1953
($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title*</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I—Europe</td>
<td>$11.2914</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>$9.9579</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II—Near East and Africa</td>
<td>1.2940</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.0630</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III—Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>1.6512</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.4344</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV—Latin America</td>
<td>0.0545</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$14.2911</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$12.5025</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The titles in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 allocating funds to specific geographic areas were dropped from the legislation in 1953 but continued in use in DOD documents.

Source: OMA OASD (ISA) Table, 6 Mar 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 86.
Congress, usually took the form of reduced scales of equipment for recipient nations, not of smaller force bases.

President Eisenhower's reorganization of the Executive Branch during the early months of his administration extended to the machinery of foreign aid. The Mutual Security Agency was renamed the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and was given certain responsibilities in connection with economic and technical assistance that had formerly been the province of the Secretary of State. Mr. Harold E. Stassen was named Director of the FOA. The responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not affected by this change.3

At the beginning of 1953 the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was in its fourth fiscal year. (See Table 13.) Appropriations for the purpose had totaled more that $14 billion, of which almost 80 percent had been allocated to Western Europe—a reflection of the importance of NATO in US policy and strategy.

FY 1954 Program

Initial plans for military assistance for fiscal 1954 were drawn up while President Truman was in office. On 30 October 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense a list of recommended force bases for recipient countries to be used in calculating gross materiel and training requirements for the 1954 program. They included the following countries in their list, grouping them according to a geographic classification set up by the various titles (sections) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

**Title I Western Europe**
- European NATO countries
- West Germany

**Title II Near East**
- Greece
- Turkey
- Iran
- Yugoslavia

**Title III Asia and Pacific**
- Nationalist China (Taiwan)
- Indochina
- Philippines
- Thailand

**Title IV Latin America**
- Argentina
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Cuba
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Mexico
- Peru
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

**Other**
- Austria
- Japan
- Spain
- South Korea

For Title I countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew attention to the force objectives for calendar 1955 under discussion in NATO (as listed in a document then under review, MRC-12). These goals, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should
be used temporarily in planning the FY 1954 MDA program for the NATO countries. The final program would be based on long-range (planning) goals approved by the North Atlantic Council for achievement in calendar 1956. Action by the Council was at that time expected to be taken in December 1952, in connection with the 1952 Annual Review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that if the Council failed to act in time, they would prepare suitable force bases for the FY 1954 MDAP.

For the other nations on the list, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth recommended force bases, consisting principally of major combat forces: army divisions, naval combat vessels, and air force fighter, bomber, and transport squadrons. Determination of supporting forces was left to the Services.

The countries listed under Titles II and III were ones to which the United States was already furnishing military aid. Indochina referred to French forces fighting the Viet Minh rebels in that part of the world, as well as to the three Associated States: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Title IV countries on the JCS list consisted of those assigned missions under the mid-range hemisphere defense plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved in 1951. Four of these nations—Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela—were not yet eligible for aid, since they had not entered into bilateral agreements, as required by law.

In the Other category, the Joint Chiefs of Staff included a group of nations whose participation in the FY 1954 MDA program was a matter of some doubt. Austria was still under four-power occupation and obviously could not contract a bilateral agreement so long as that condition continued. The occupation of Japan had been formally ended by the peace treaty of 1951, but the complex problem of Japanese rearmament had not yet been resolved, and negotiations for a military aid agreement were not to begin for some months. Discussions with Spain had started, but no agreement had yet been forthcoming on the amount of aid to be furnished in return for the base rights being sought by the United States. Materiel assistance to South Korea was currently being supplied under Service budgets; the MDA program provided only for training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied force bases for that country against the contingency that the war in Korea might end in time to allow South Korea to be brought fully into the FY 1954 MDAP.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that they did not intend to imply that the United States should fill all deficiencies in equipment for the recommended forces. Moreover, the capacity of recipient nations to support the indicated forces had not been fully evaluated. Under the criteria laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States would supply equipment to the indicated forces at rates somewhat more austere than the approved scales for equipping US units. Spare parts and ammunition would be provided in the amount of one year’s supply at peacetime rates, plus three months’ supply at NATO or US combat rates. Program adjustments necessitated by fund limitations should take the form of reductions in levels of equipment rather than in the number of units to be equipped. Common-use items, having both military and civilian application,
would not normally be supplied under the MDA program, nor would assistance be furnished to the NATO infrastructure program.\textsuperscript{7}

In approving the JCS recommendations on 26 November 1952, Secretary of Defense Lovett stipulated that the exclusion of infrastructure would be understood to mean that no end items would be provided for that purpose. However, he added, beginning in FY 1954 the US contribution to the NATO infrastructure program, which had formerly been included in the budget for DOD public works, would be transferred to the mutual security budget. The Department of Defense would also, in accordance with a ruling by the Director for Mutual Security, assume responsibility for providing common-use items for support of French forces and their allies in Indochina, and perhaps also for Nationalist China.\textsuperscript{8}

Preparation of the final FY 1954 MDAP by the administration proceeded without further reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his last budget message, President Truman asked Congress for $7.6 billion in new obligational authority for the entire mutual security program, embracing both military and economic-technical aid. This was $1.1 billion above the amount appropriated for the preceding year. The President forecast expenditures of $7.559 billion for mutual security in 1954.\textsuperscript{9}

Mr. Truman did not indicate the distribution of these one-line estimates among the various forms of assistance. On 24 January 1953 Mr. W.J. McNeil, as Acting Secretary of Defense, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that $5.668 billion in new obligational authority had been tentatively earmarked for military assistance. Of this amount, $7.49 billion would be set aside for various special purposes: the NATO infrastructure program, administrative expenses, and shipping charges (packing, crating, handling, and transportation, or PCH&T). Thus $4.919 billion would be available for materiel and training programs for individual countries. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a broad geographic distribution of this sum.\textsuperscript{10}

Replying on 17 February 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that $3.0278 billion be allocated to Western Europe; the rest should be divided almost equally between the Near East and the Far East, with a small amount ($16.2 million) for Latin America.\textsuperscript{11} (See Table 14.)

The JCS recommendations were never put into effect, since Mr. McNeil’s tentative allocation became obsolete when President Truman’s program was discarded by the new administration. It was notable, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed to assign only 61.6 percent of the funds to Europe, as compared with almost 80 percent in previous years. The difference was a measure of Europe’s military and political recovery, to which US aid had materially contributed.

The budget review undertaken by the Eisenhower administration soon after its accession extended to the mutual security program. In analyzing fiscal trends for the National Security Council on 24 February 1953, Mr. Joseph M. Dodge, the new Director of the Bureau of the Budget, forecast mutual security expenditures of $7.4 billion in FY 1954 (slightly below the Truman estimate), with an increase
to $8.0 billion in FY 1955 if current plans were followed. Not until FY 1956 could he foresee a decline, to $6.5 billion, with a further drop to $3.0 billion by FY 1958.12

A week later, Mr. Dodge suggested to the Council that mutual security expenditures be reduced to $5.5 billion in FY 1954 and to $4.0 billion in FY 1955. The Council directed Secretary Wilson and Mr. Stassen to examine the consequences of these reductions.13

If these reductions were made, according to a plan sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Deputy Secretary Kyes on 10 March 1953, $4.3 billion would be allotted for military assistance in FY 1954 and $3.1 billion in FY 1955. These figures would include defense support (economic aid contributing only indirectly to military strength), infrastructure, and administrative costs. For materiel and training programs for individual countries, only $3.5 billion and $2.9 billion, respectively, would be available during the two fiscal years. It appeared that expenditures of these amounts would require no new appropriations, since considerable money remained on hand from previous years. Secretary Kyes asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the effect of these reductions on US national security policies.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 19 March 1953 that the contemplated restrictions would make it impossible for the United States to meet the commitments it had made to other countries. Moreover, failure to appropriate any new

Table 14—Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds: FY 1954
($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Near East and Africa</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Asia and Pacific</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS recommendation, 17 February 1953</td>
<td>$4.9190</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$3.0278</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>$.9029</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>$.9721</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>$.0162</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS recommendation, 1 May 1953 ........</td>
<td>$3.2890</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$1.9012</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>$.6027</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>$.7766</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>$.0085</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower administration program ....</td>
<td>$3.5422</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$2.1121</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>$.3974</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>1.0139</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>$.0188</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional appropriations ..........</td>
<td>$3.1800</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$1.8600</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>$.2700</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.0350</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>$.0150</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD allocations, 7 August 1953 .......</td>
<td>$2.9207</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$1.6342</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>$.3377</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>$.9287</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>$.0201</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes NATO infrastructure, shipping, and administration.

bIncludes Spain and Yugoslavia.

cSpain included with Europe; Yugoslavia with Near East and Africa.

dIncludes NATO infrastructure, shipping, and administration.

funds for FYs 1954 or 1955 would have serious effects in later years. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the proposed limits militarily unacceptable. Secretary Wilson sent these views to the National Security Council without comment.\textsuperscript{15}

Both the Director for Mutual Security and the Department of State had also submitted unfavorable assessments of the effects of the proposed reductions.\textsuperscript{16} On 25 March 1953 the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their objections to the proposed limits on the mutual security program before the National Security Council. Without abandoning the goal of economy, the Council then rejected the drastic fiscal limits that had been proposed, both for the mutual security program and for US defense expenditures.\textsuperscript{17}

A month later the Council approved NSC 149/2, which endorsed the mutual security program as indispensable and set forth expenditure targets considerably less restrictive than those considered earlier. The guiding principles of the program, according to this document, should include: qualitative improvement of weapons; reduction of the need for assistance, by means of suitable foreign economic policies (greater reliance on private capital and on offshore procurement, and expansion of trade); and a leveling off of the size of NATO forces, with an improvement in their combat capability to be obtained by distributing to them a portion of the US stockpile of critical end items. The new aid policy would also be more selective than before, concentrating on the nations considered most important.

Expenditure goals laid down in NSC 149/2 for the mutual security program were $6.3 billion for FY 1954 and $6.5 billion for FY 1955. For 1954, not over $5.8 billion in new obligational authority would be requested: $3.925 billion for the MDA program proper (end items and training for individual countries), $1.625 billion for defense support and for economic and technical assistance, and $250 million for a special new weapons program to be controlled by the President. After FY 1955, according to NSC 149/2, it was expected that both expenditures and appropriations would gradually decline to about $3–$4 billion annually—enough to provide for maintenance and replacement costs.\textsuperscript{18}

Deputy Secretary Kyes told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 April 1953 that the actual amount to be requested for the FY 1954 MDA program would be $3.922 billion, of which $633 million would be earmarked for NATO infrastructure, administration, and other special purposes, leaving $3.289 billion available for individual country programs. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a division by geographic area.\textsuperscript{19} In reply, they recommended $1,901.2 million for Western Europe (including Spain), $776.6 million for the Far East, $602.7 million for the Near East and Yugoslavia, and $8.5 million for Latin America. Within a considerably lower total figure, the proportional allotments did not differ greatly from those in the JCS recommendations of 17 February 1953, standing at somewhat under 60 percent for Europe, 23 percent for the Far East, 18 percent for the Near East, and a negligible amount for Latin America.\textsuperscript{20}

Influences other than the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were apparent in the apportionment that the administration finally used in presenting the program to Congress. The request for new obligational authority was broken down
as follows: $2,112.1 million to Europe (60 percent), $1,013.9 million to the Far East (28 percent), $397.4 million to the Middle East (11 percent), and $18.8 million for Latin America (less than 1 percent). These amounts totaled $3,542.2 million. Another $482.3 million for infrastructure and other special purposes brought the total for the MDA program to $4,024.5 million.

A sum of $995 million was proposed for so-called mutual defense financing. It included a special $400 million program for the forces of France and the three Associated States in Indochina, $300 million for defense support and economic assistance to Europe, $95 million for defense support in Taiwan and Indochina, and $200 million to finance military production for NATO in the United Kingdom and France. The special weapons program referred to in NSC 149/2 added another $250 million; it was intended to finance nonnuclear weapons for NATO, under authorization by the President, after completion of SHAPE requirements studies. Economic and technical assistance programs amounting to $559.2 million brought the total request to $5,828.7 million, slightly over the target set in NSC 149/2.21

President Eisenhower sent this program to Congress on 5 May 1953, accompanied by a special message stressing its importance and terming it the result of “a careful determination of our essential needs.” Seeking to forestall criticism of the size of the request, the President declared unequivocally that “this amount of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our Nation’s ultimate security in the world than would an even greater amount spent merely to increase the size of our own military forces in being.”22

Despite the President’s plea, however, Congress appropriated only $4,531.5 million in new funds. Of this amount, $3,180 million was allotted for the MDA program, of which $1,035 million was earmarked for the Far East. For Western Europe, the amount was $1,860 million, one-half of which was to go to the European Defense Community or its member nations. (See Table 14.) A sum of $874 million was allowed for mutual defense financing; it included the full $400 million asked by the administration for the Indochina war. The special weapons program was cut to $50 million, while economic and technical assistance totaled $427.5 million.23

The funds appropriated by Congress for the MDA program had to be adjusted by the Department of Defense to allow for shipping and administrative costs and for the NATO infrastructure program. These deductions were partially offset by reappropriation of unobligated funds from earlier years that Congress had included in the 1953 legislation. The net amount available for materiel and training programs was $2,920.7 million. On 7 August 1953 Assistant Secretary Nash sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following geographic breakdown of this amount: $1,634.2 million for Europe; $337.7 million for the Near East; $928.7 million for Asia and the Pacific; and $20.1 million for Latin America.

Mr. Nash asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit revised force bases, reflecting this fund allocation, to be used by the Military Departments in preparing final country programs. He directed them to include West Germany, on the assumption that that nation would become eligible during fiscal 1954, but not
South Korea, for which, as before, only limited training assistance would be provided under MDAP.24

The force bases that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 13 August 1953 were characterized by them as the optimum obtainable to support current US strategy. Their recommendations for Western Europe were based on the provisional 1954 objectives that had been approved by the North Atlantic Council in April 1953,25 with some changes, principally in naval and air force units. Otherwise the JCS recommendations differed in detail, but not significantly in substance, from those submitted on 30 October 1952. Objectives for Japan had been sharply reduced, in recognition of the political impossibility of a large rearmament effort in that nation in 1954, and South Korea was omitted, as directed. The only other major reductions were in Yugoslav and Spanish ground forces. There were no large increases except in Nationalist Chinese naval strength, from 53 to 82 vessels.26

FY 1955 Program

Planning for fiscal 1955 had meanwhile been under way for some months. Acting Secretary Kyes on 20 April 1953 had sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a set of assumptions to be followed in drawing up force bases and other guidance for the 1955 program. The most important instruction was that, beginning in FY 1955, the United States would supply equipment only for those units that the recipient nations could thereafter maintain without further assistance. Exceptions might be made for Greece, Turkey, Nationalist China, and Indochina. Other assumptions were that the wars in Korea and Indochina would continue at approximately their present levels, the European Defense Community Treaty would be ratified by 1 September 1953, and the Diet of Japan would authorize an expansion of that nation's forces early in 1954.27

Replying on 8 July 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended force bases for FY 1955 generally somewhat larger than those that they were to submit a month later for FY 1954. Their recommendations for the NATO nations they characterized as temporary and subject to change in light of later action by the North Atlantic Council, which had not yet adopted objectives for 1955. Moreover, warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their proposed NATO force bases were insufficient to meet requirements; they represented only the best current US military estimate of the land forces that each country would have in being by 1956 and of air and naval forces by 1957.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff again included South Korea in their list, since it now appeared that hostilities in that country would soon end. Additional Middle Eastern countries, not theretofore granted military aid, were also on their list: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The inclusion of these countries reflected a new plan for Middle Eastern collective security being prepared by the Eisenhower administration.28
In preparing their guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had modified Mr. Kyes' restriction on support of forces that could not be maintained without further US aid. To appraise the ability and willingness of other countries to maintain forces, they pointed out, was beyond their purview. Furthermore, in order to protect investments already made, they believed that it would be advisable to provide as much aid as was necessary to maintain the effectiveness of all those forces equipped under previous programs. Their proposed FY 1955 force bases had been drawn up in accordance with this belief.\(^\text{29}\)

Secretary Wilson approved the JCS recommendations on 5 August 1953, subject to a few changes.\(^\text{30}\) Subsequently, on 20 January 1954, at his request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed for inclusion certain additional units, as recommended by MAAGs in various countries, that constituted exceptions to the guidelines that had been laid down for 1955.\(^\text{31}\)

A preliminary budget estimate for the FY 1955 MDA program was prepared in the Department of Defense and submitted to the National Security Council on 13 October 1953, along with an initial estimate for the US military budget. As described in an earlier chapter, the Council demurred at the size of these projected figures and directed that revised estimates be submitted on 29 October.\(^\text{32}\) At the latter meeting, the Council noted a report by Mr. Stassen that it had been possible to reduce estimated FY 1955 military aid expenditures to $4.5 billion, or $500 million less than previously expected.\(^\text{33}\)

By January 1954 the administration had decided to ask Congress for $3,510 million in new obligational authority for the mutual security program for FY 1955. This was a reduction of nearly 40 percent from the request made the previous year, for the FY 1954 program; in fact, it was a full $1 billion below the sum actually appropriated for FY 1954. Of the $3,510 million contemplated for FY 1955, $2,500 million would be for military assistance, divided as follows:\(^\text{34}\)

| MDA materiel and training programs, NATO infrastructure, administration and shipping costs | $1,541.8 |
| Contributions to NATO operating costs | 8.2 |
| Common use programs for Taiwan, Indochina, and Yugoslavia | 75.0 |
| Defense production, United Kingdom and France | 75.0 |
| Indochina force support | 800.0 |

In the Department of Defense, the $1,541.8 million figure was tentatively distributed so as to allow $1,144.5 million for materiel and training programs. On 26 January 1954 Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide new force bases adjusted to this amount.\(^\text{35}\)

In a reply on 5 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested only slight reductions in the force bases they had listed on 8 July 1953, leaving it to the Services to make the necessary economies in country programs. They recommended that $511.2 million, or almost half the total, be allocated to the Far East and most of the remainder to Europe (see Table 15). Although the Secretary had asked them
Table 15—JCS Recommendation on Allocation of FY 1955 Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds: 5 March 1954
($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe(^a)</td>
<td>$474.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East(^b)</td>
<td>150.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>511.2</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,144.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Includes Spain and Yugoslavia.

\(^b\) Greece, Turkey, Iran.

Source: JCS 2099/359, 26 Feb 54.

to provide force bases for Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had declined to do so. Among Middle Eastern countries, only Greece, Turkey, and Iran should receive military assistance at present, they believed. They pointed out that money appropriated for a larger Middle Eastern aid program in FY 1954 had not yet been obligated. They did follow Secretary Wilson’s guidance, however, in adding Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua as prospective Latin American recipients.\(^36\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that, in their opinion, the ceiling of $1,144.5 million for materiel and training programs was too restrictive. An additional $355 million should be provided, for the NATO countries, Yugoslavia, and Japan. They also drew attention to the possibility of emergency requirements arising from the situation in Indochina and recommended that a special reserve fund be established for this.\(^37\) Secretary Wilson made no formal reply to these recommendations.

President Eisenhower had meanwhile included the $3,510 million appropriation request in the budget that he sent to Congress on 21 January 1954.\(^38\) As the legislative deliberations began, the administration made a token reduction in the total request but increased to $2,748.4 million the portion assigned to military purposes. Of this figure, $1,580 million would be for the MDA program, NATO infrastructure, and administration—an increase of $435.5 million that bettered the additional $355 million the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended.

To simplify administration of the program, it was proposed that MDAP funds be appropriated in a lump sum, not allocated by geographic area. However, the Secretary of Defense, under the proposed legislation, would insure that the equipment, materials, and services furnished to each area would not exceed in value the total of the funds previously made available plus the following amounts: $617.5 million for Europe; $181.2 million for the Near East, Africa, and South Asia; $538.6 million for the Far East and Pacific; and $13 million for Latin America.\(^39\)

When Congress demurred at accepting this program, President Eisenhower sent a special message in which he stressed its importance and at the same time
reduced the request by less than 2 percent, to $3,448.2 million.\textsuperscript{40} His plea met with some success. The final appropriation, though less than he had asked, was larger than some of the figures that had been discussed in Congress. An initial reduction was applied in the authorizing legislation, the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The final appropriations act provided $2,210.8 million for military and $570.7 million for economic and technical aid. Of the former, $1,192.7 was for MDA and related purposes (including $100 million earmarked for NATO infrastructure) and $1,018.1 for supporting programs, direct and indirect. The area limitations proposed by the administration were approved.\textsuperscript{41}

Within OSD, the available funds were allocated without further referral to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Service Departments were directed to adjust their programs to fit the reduced amount, using the force goals and criteria already laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and making use of the estimated $450 million worth of assets available as a result of the cease-fire in Indochina. Reporting this action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1954, Vice Admiral Davis, deputy to Assistant Secretary Nash, informed them that the funds available had been reduced still further by the need to set aside reserves for various purposes, principally to cover possible losses resulting from more stringent fund obligation requirements that had been written into another recent law.\textsuperscript{42} As soon as the exact amount of available funds became known, he said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be asked to recommend the forces that should be supported with them.\textsuperscript{43} It does not appear, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ever further consulted regarding the disposition of the FY 1955 aid funds.

Military Assistance and the New Look

The administration's action in reducing the funds requested for foreign aid in the FY 1955 budget was in accordance with national policy as set forth in NSC 162/2. In that document, approved in October 1953, the National Security Council conceded that military and economic aid was needed but urged policies that would stimulate international trade and economic progress and thereby reduce the requirement for US assistance. Other provisions of NSC 162/2 indicated that military and economic aid should be applied more selectively, with preference given to key nations best able to use it. In Western Europe, the nations designated were the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; in the Far East, Japan; in the Middle East, Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps Iran.\textsuperscript{44}

A more careful—and, by implication, a more limited—application of military assistance was also contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when setting forth the basic strategy of the New Look, in JCS 2101/113 in December 1953. "U.S. foreign aid should be meted out to our allies with discrimination," they said, "in order to help them to generate and maintain reasonable and attainable military forces which can best complement the U.S. contribution."\textsuperscript{45} A fiscal forecast accompanying JCS 2101/113 indicated that the amount of new funds available for
the MDA program was expected to level off at $2 billion per year starting in FY 1955, with expenditures declining to the same amount by FY 1958.46

Later in December the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to appoint a special committee to study the military assistance program and develop recommendations for the period through FY 1958.47 The instructions given the new committee set forth its mission as follows:

To re-examine the present mutual defense assistance programs and to recommend the amount and distribution by countries of MDA funds required for fiscal years 1955 through 1958 to provide allied force bases which will effectively support the strategy visualized in JCS 2101/113.

The members were to assume that the funds available for military assistance would decline by FY 1958 to a level that would suffice only to maintain the forces of certain countries essential to US strategy. They were not, however, to be bound by the fiscal estimates in JCS 2101/113. They were to review the FY 1955 force levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 July 1953. They were also to study existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to ascertain whether changes were needed.48

The committee submitted its report on 26 March 1954. In JCS 2099/368 the members set forth in detail their recommended force bases, for each of the four years, FY 1955 through FY 1958, for the following countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title I</th>
<th>Title III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Nationalist China (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Indochina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Germany</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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</table>
The committee recommended force goals for FY 1955 differing in a few details from those proposed earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1953 and March 1954. For most countries, the 1955 figures were projected through 1958 without change, since the committee’s program was intended after FY 1955 to provide only qualitative improvements, in the form of modernized equipment, maintenance, war reserves of ammunition, and training. Force increases between 1955 and 1958 were recommended, however, for the following nations: West Germany and Japan, which were just beginning their military buildup; Pakistan, on which the administration was now focusing its hopes for the establishment of a Middle Eastern defensive alliance; and Yugoslavia, which would need additional ground forces if it was to defend the Ljubljana gateway into northern Italy against Soviet-satellite attack for an appreciable period.

In its funding recommendations the committee accepted as fixed the FY 1955 ceiling of $1,144 million imposed earlier by Secretary Wilson. For FY 1956, the members proposed an extraordinarily large increase to $2,981.2 million, principally for the benefit of West Germany and Japan. (See Table 16). Thereafter, costs would decline sharply, to $2,255.5 million and $1,655.0 million for FYs 1957 and 1958, according to the Navy-Air Force view. The Army and Marine Corps members favored an additional $200 million in FY 1957 and $300 million in FY

### Table 16—Recommendations for Mutual Defense Assistance Program Funds: FYs 1955–1958

($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Asia and Pacific</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special committee recommendation, 26 March 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1955</td>
<td>$1.1440</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$0.4742</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>$0.1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1956</td>
<td>2.9812</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.2046</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>0.4424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1957</td>
<td>2.2555</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.6712</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>0.4665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1958</td>
<td>1.6550</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.2762</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.4286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS recommendation, 17 June 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1955</td>
<td>1.1440</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.4742</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>0.1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1956</td>
<td>2.8876</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.1110</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>0.4424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1957</td>
<td>2.1938</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.6095</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>0.4665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1958</td>
<td>1.6133</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.2345</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.4286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Includes Spain and Yugoslavia.

*b* Excludes $200 million recommended by Army for war-reserve equipment.

*c* Excludes $300 million recommended by Army for war-reserve equipment.

*d* Excludes $197 million recommended by Army for Turkey and Pakistan, FYs 1956–1958.

*Sources: JCS 2099/368, 26 Mar 54 (original and amended versions).*
1958 to pay for war reserve stocks of critical items of ground combat equipment, under US control, at strategic points in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East. The Navy and Air Force members of the committee objected that the US Services did not yet have adequate war reserves for their own use; they noted, also, that the entire question of wartime assistance to allies was receiving separate study.

The committee stressed that all of the cost estimates were at minimum levels and probably lower than desirable. The recommended force levels had been based on austere programs aimed at the best estimate of reasonable and attainable forces which can be maintained over a period of time. They did not represent the current military requirements to meet the threat. Moreover, warned the committee, any new multilateral defense arrangements, like those for the Middle East or the Pacific that were then under consideration, might require major changes in cost estimates. A further assumption underlying the committee's program was that the buildup of West German and Japanese forces would be completed by 1958. If this assumption proved erroneous, said the committee, additional funds would have to be provided after 1958 for those countries.49

During preliminary consideration of the committee report, Admiral Carney objected to the proposal for increased aid to Yugoslavia, on grounds that he termed other than purely military. He pointed to the continuing possibility of a Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union, particularly if Tito should pass from the scene. Also, Yugoslavia's intransigence in her quarrel with Italy over the status of Trieste should be taken into account, as well as the adverse Italian reaction that might be expected if US military aid shipments to Yugoslavia were enlarged. On 10 May 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to return JCS 2099/368 to the special committee for revision. It should contemplate no increase in Yugoslav force bases, and no provision for reserves of war equipment should be included.50

As the work of revision proceeded, the special committee received an additional assignment: to study ways of building flexibility into the military aid program. Resulting from an NSC decision of 4 February 1954, to be described in more detail later, this task delayed the submission until June.51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report, with some additional changes, on 16 June. Its cost estimates for fiscal years 1956 through 1958 were $2,887.6 million, $2,193.8 million, and $1,613.3 million, respectively. (See Table 16). With regard to Yugoslavia it was recommended that military assistance be subjected to close scrutiny at yearly intervals and the amount increased or decreased according to the politico-military conditions prevailing at that time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the approved report to Secretary Wilson on 17 June 1954, recommending that it be considered as an initial estimate of minimum requirements for military assistance for fiscal years 1955 through 1958.52
Plans for FY 1956

Even before JCS 2099/368 received final approval, it had furnished a basis for planning the MDA program for FY 1956. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up tentative guidelines for this program and sent them to Secretary Wilson on 19 May 1954. They adopted the 1956 force bases in JCS 2099/368 with a few changes. The proposed increase for Yugoslavia was eliminated and three additional countries were included: Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iraq. South Korea was listed, but Austria was omitted. The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendations on 15 July 1954.53

The subsequent development of the FY 1956 military assistance budget, during the last half of 1954, proceeded without further reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.54 The FY 1956 budget, sent to Congress by President Eisenhower on January 1955, called for $3,530 million in new obligational authority for the mutual security program—slightly more than the amount that had been requested for FY 1955. But whereas the budget for that year had allocated $2,500 million for military purposes, the corresponding 1956 request was only $2,030 million, of which $1,400 million would be for the MDA program, infrastructure, and administrative costs, and $630 million for direct forces support.55 In contrast, as already pointed out, the four-year program that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent to Secretary Wilson in June 1954 had called for $2,887.6 million in military assistance for FY 1956. It was clear that the goal of economy had been placed ahead of the JCS estimates of military needs.

Flexibility in Military Assistance: NSC 5434/1

During 1953 and much of 1954, massive adjustments within the military assistance program had been made to meet the Indochina crisis. Money and supplies were diverted from various programs and placed at the disposal of the French forces in Vietnam. It was probably the hope of averting such disruptive changes in the future that led the National Security Council, on 4 February 1954, to call for a report on “a flexible program of providing U.S. military assistance to foreign nations in accordance with the availability of end items and relative priority among recipient nations.” The report was to be prepared by the Department of Defense in cooperation with the Foreign Operations Administration and the Bureau of the Budget.56

Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes referred this decision to Mr. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, instructing him to prepare a draft report that would take account of the current JCS review of the military assistance program.57 While awaiting the receipt of this report, administration officials proceeded to institute some changes in the cumbersome procedures involved in carrying out the MDAP. In March 1954, at the direction of the President, Mr. Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, appointed a committee consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Under
Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Foreign Operations, with himself as chairman. The members agreed to recommend that the Department of Defense have more autonomy in administering military aid. Appropriated funds should be allocated to the Department by the President, not by the Director of Foreign Operations. The latter official should continue to coordinate military assistance with other forms of aid, but should not supervise or direct it. These recommendations were subsequently put into effect by an Executive Order issued on 6 November 1954.

On 8 June 1954 Assistant Secretary Hensel asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make available by 15 June the results of their review of the MDAP, since the Planning Board was about to undertake the study called for by the Council on 4 February. The JCS special committee on military assistance thereupon amended its report, JCS 2099/368, to include a consideration of the objective of flexibility. The members noted that their proposed four-year program was designed to provide the minimum forces necessary to support the strategy set forth in JCS 2101/113, on the assumption “that present international tensions and threats remain approximately the same.” No program based on minimum requirements, they concluded, could be “sufficiently flexible to provide for significant changes in world conditions or emergency requirements of any magnitude.” Deletion of items approved for one program to meet an emergency requirement in some other area might serve as a fiscal stopgap, but the original requirements would remain valid and must eventually be met. The best way of attaining flexibility, according to the committee, would be to provide a contingency fund.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated these conclusions in the report on military assistance requirements for FYs 1955–1958 that they sent to the Secretary of Defense on 17 June 1954. The proposal for a contingency fund was one that they had already made to the Secretary on 5 March in connection with their recommendations for the FY 1955 MDAP, as noted earlier. Also, in submitting proposals for FY 1956 on 19 May 1954, they had protested against the diversion of funds from other programs for the war in Indochina, calling it a practice that “has had the effect of hindering the achievement of our world-wide long-range strategic objectives.”

In replying on 15 July 1954 to the JCS memorandum of 19 May, Secretary Wilson undertook to try to avoid abrupt changes in MDA programs. But he rejected the suggestion of a contingency fund, believing that Congress would never approve the provision of money for other than immediately citable needs. In the future, said the Secretary, requirements for Indochina would be met by giving them first priority in the development of the MDA program and, if necessary, by asking for a deficiency appropriation. The cessation of the Indochinese hostilities, however, rendered these expedients unnecessary.

The JCS projection of MDAP requirements on a four-year basis was given consideration in a study of the problem of flexibility in military assistance that was completed in July 1954, presumably by personnel in the office of Assistant Secretary Hensel. This study reviewed in detail the administrative and legislative procedures involved in the MDA program. It was noted that the worldwide program amounted to the sum of individual country programs, which were
based upon a number of screenings of requirements estimated for each country. The MAAGs, the US area commanders, the Military Departments, and the Department of Defense all reviewed each country program to eliminate excessive requests. The Foreign Operations Administration, the Department of State, and the Bureau of the Budget reviewed the overall program for compatibility with economic, fiscal, and foreign policy. Further revisions were often made necessary by Congressional fund reductions. Additional disruptive changes occurred when it became necessary to divert materiel from one country to another to meet changed conditions. Moreover, priority directives governing deliveries to recipient countries, established by the Department of Defense on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “have not always been in consonance with current world conditions,” it was asserted.

To make the program more responsive to changing requirements, it was recommended that the force bases submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for FYs 1955–1958 be approved as the basis for a long-range program. Deficiencies remaining in the equipment of these forces, after careful screening, should be developed and accepted as a master mutual defense assistance program, to be implemented in annual increments. All assets of the worldwide program should be regarded as a pool, from which deliveries could be made according to priorities that would be revised as necessary in response to changing world conditions. Thus equipment could be readily diverted from one area or country to another. Admittedly, however, only a limited and temporary degree of flexibility would be gained, since the diversions would eventually have to be replaced.

Turning to other aspects of the problem, the authors of the study noted that transfers of aid between countries had been rendered difficult by the practice of making appropriations by geographic area. The legislation then before Congress, providing for a lump-sum appropriation for the entire MDAP, was expected to obviate this difficulty. It was pointed out also that the insertion of the Foreign Operations Administration between the Department of Defense and the President, together with the excessive degree of supervision exercised by the Director of FOA over the MDAP, caused unnecessary complication. Funds apportioned for military assistance had sometimes been diverted to other types of aid. The proposals agreed upon by the ad hoc committee headed by Mr. Dodge would simplify this situation. It was recommended that funds be assigned directly to the Secretary of Defense, as early in each fiscal year as practicable, and not be subsequently withdrawn except to meet extreme emergencies. The President should withhold a reserve (amounting to from 10 to 25 percent of the total of MDA funds) to meet such unforeseen needs.

Secretary Wilson forwarded the study and the accompanying recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 July 1954. He noted that the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Departments of the Army and Air Force had concurred. The Foreign Operations Administration had taken exception to the proposals to restrict the transfer of funds between military and nonmilitary programs, and the Department of the Navy considered that the objective of flexibility could be attained by procedural changes less drastic than those proposed in the study.65
In comments they provided the Secretary of Defense on 11 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed doubt that the proposed changes in programming and distribution would result in overall benefit to the military aspects of the program. They stressed that the desired end-product was combat effective units, tailored to the particular conditions in each country. In their view, the pooling procedure implied a deemphasis of carefully devised individual country programs. The flexibility that it provided would be at the expense of orderly progress toward planned military objectives.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the expected simplification of procedures to be largely illusory; the annual increments of the worldwide program, like the separate country programs currently used for programming, would still have to be reviewed and adjusted to comply with congressional ceilings. While concurring in principle with the reservation of a portion of MDAP funds for contingency purposes, they believed that this reserve should be under control of the Secretary of Defense and not subject to encroachment by other agencies concerned with foreign aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a number of amendments and additions to the wording of the proposed procedures that would have changed their thrust considerably. 66

The Secretary’s response to these JCS views is not indicated in available records. It seems likely, however, that the JCS opposition was influential in causing the study to be laid aside. In its original form, it never reached the agenda of the National Security Council, and the objective of flexibility was ultimately sought by other methods involving less drastic changes. Meanwhile Congress made its own contribution to the goal in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which ordered the Foreign Operations Administration abolished, effective 30 June 1955.

In a memorandum to the President on 30 August 1954, the Special Assistant for National Security, Mr. Robert Cutler, described the problem of flexibility as embracing two aspects. One was the need for organization and procedures that would simplify the administration of military assistance; this need would be met by the forthcoming executive order, already described. The other was for periodic reviews of the MDA program to keep it responsive to changing needs. He urged that the Planning Board be directed to devise a method of conducting these reviews. On 2 September the National Security Council noted that President Eisenhower had approved these suggestions. 67

The basis for such a method already existed in the form of regular status reports on the mutual security program that were prepared semiannually for the Council by the Department of Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration. The Planning Board, in its study of the problem (NSC 5434), recommended that these reports be modified to include information concerning the following: current force goals for recipient nations, priorities governing allocation of end items, unexpended funds, and delivery rates in relation to program objectives. Such reports, under the plan suggested by the Board, would be screened by a special committee representing the Departments of State and Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration. This committee would draw attention to any disparities between plans and objectives or to other matters indicating a
need for program changes. Its findings would be reviewed by the Planning Board and would then go to the Council for decision. Also, a current statement of priorities for the allocation of military end items was to be submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Council for consideration and recommendation to the President.68

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed NSC 5434, they took exception only to the provision regarding the statement of priorities. They believed that the Secretary of Defense should have authority to implement this statement without prior approval by the Council or the President, and that NSC 5434 should therefore be reworded to specify merely that he would report his suggested priorities.69 The Council, however, disregarded this suggestion when it approved the Planning Board study in an amended form, NSC 5434/1, on 14 October. The only change made by the Council was to delete the proposal for a special committee, leaving the Planning Board solely responsible for reviewing the status reports and for recommending changes. The procedures incorporated into NSC 5434/1, allowing for frequent review and adjustment of the MDA program, might be expected to meet the need for flexibility that had been cited in the NSC decision of 4 February.70

Allocation of military materiel was at that time governed by a statement of priorities that had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in August 1952. It assigned first priority to forces fighting in Korea and was now hopelessly out of date.71 At the suggestion of General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had adopted an amended version in August 1954. It specified that US military equipment would be allocated in the following order:

First priority, US and allied forces engaged in active combat operations short of general war.

Second priority, US forces deployed or being maintained in readiness for immediate combat operations on the outbreak of hostilities; forces designated for defense of the continental United States and Canada.

Third priority, US forces maintained in a state of operational readiness for deployment by D plus 30 days; forces of other NATO countries, and those of West Germany, scheduled for deployment by D plus 30; forces of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Yugoslavia; Spanish air defense forces; UN forces deployed in the Far East Command.

Fourth priority, US forces designated for deployment between D plus 30 days and D plus 6 months; all MDA programs not included in previous priority classes.

Fifth priority, other US forces.

It was specified, however, that the word priority was to be interpreted to mean an indication of relative importance; it was not to be used in an exclusive and final sense.72

Secretary Wilson approved this new statement on 29 October 1954. On 6 December, in accordance with NSC 5434/1, he circulated it to the National Security Council with a note that it had been concurred in by the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration.73
Military Assistance in Wartime

The military assistance program was not designed to carry recipient nations through a major war. JCS guidance for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, specified that the United States would furnish at most a three months' supply, at wartime consumption rates, of end items, spare parts, and ammunition for other nations. But it was obvious that in another major conflict, as in World War II, allied countries would be forced to draw on US resources. The JCS planning program, as outlined in Memorandum of Policy 84, authorized the inclusion of allied requirements in the mobilization preparations to be made under the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

On 19 February 1953 Secretary Wilson had pointed out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the question of wartime military aid required some advance thought. He asked them to prepare a study of the means of providing such assistance and of the changes in the existing MDA program that would be required to adapt it to war.74

For reasons not indicated in available sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on this request for some months. In November 1953 General Ridgway brought up a somewhat different aspect of the subject. There should be, he declared, an orderly national planning procedure for deciding upon the amount of US assistance to be rendered in wartime and the resulting adjustments needed before D-day in the US mobilization base.75

The outline of such a procedure, based on General Ridgway's suggestions, was submitted by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in February 1954. The basic consideration, accepted by the Committee on the basis of available estimates of wartime requirements and production, was that it would be impossible for the United States to meet all the logistic deficiencies of its allies after D-day. It was not feasible, politically or economically, either to enlarge stockpiles of end items or to broaden the production base to the degree required. It followed, therefore, that the allies must expand their own mobilization bases, under plans carefully coordinated with those of the United States. For the development of such plans, the first requirement was to determine the magnitude of the requirements. The Committee proposed that the Military Departments prepare lists of combat critical items, in amounts needed to support the forces listed in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, together with estimates of available supplies (present and programmed) of those items from all sources, US and foreign. These lists would be reviewed successively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The latter would determine the maximum extent of US assistance to be rendered after D-day. It would then be possible to determine how much the other nations would need to expand their mobilization bases in peacetime. MDAP assistance would be made available to finance this expansion, under agreements to be worked out with the allies.76

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan on 26 February 1954 and submitted it to Secretary Wilson. At the same time, they directed the Services to prepare the necessary lists of critical equipment and send them to the MAAGs and
the commanders of appropriate unified commands, who would prepare estimates of foreign wartime production rates for those items.77

On 4 March 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a study responsive to Secretary Wilson's request of 19 February 1953. The Committee pointed out that the organization of NATO's supply system, for both peace and war, was then under intensive examination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SHAPE, and that until these studies were completed it would be impossible to make firm recommendations on wartime assistance. Meanwhile, the Committee submitted some broad and general proposals regarding responsibilities for the wartime program, which amounted to continuation of the existing allocation of duties among the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments. However, it was not practicable, according to the Committee, to determine in advance how the MDA program should be modified after D-day, because the situation in wartime would be wholly different. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent these conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 16 March.78

Although Secretary Wilson did not reply to either of these JCS proposals, some of his actions reflected their influence. On 20 August 1954 he urged upon the Secretary of State the importance of coordinated US-allied mobilization planning and suggested a diplomatic approach to other nations for the development of the necessary plans. "In such an approach," he wrote, "it should be made clear to our allies that the United States would be hard pressed to satisfy its own estimated post D-day requirements and that their national plans must be based on maximum utilization of their indigenous industrial potential and resources."79

On 5 August the National Security Council had adopted NSC 5422/2, which, in affirming a need for military assistance, declared that the United States should "determine the extent to which the national interest requires that post D-day military aid requirements of our allies be included in national security programs."80 When Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations on this matter,81 they replied on 5 October 1954 that they did not believe valid recommendations could be developed until the Military Services had compiled lists of requirements for and supplies of critical items, in accordance with the JCS memorandum of 26 February 1954. At present, they reported, preparation of these lists was proceeding on the basis of information being sent in by the unified commands and the MAAGs. Secretary Wilson accepted this reply.82

The process set in motion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1954 had not been completed when the year drew to a close. In December 1954, when Secretary Wilson laid down guidance for FY 1957 mobilization planning in connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, he was obliged to instruct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ignore wartime requirements of allies in completing the plan. Modifications would be made later after the extent of US assistance to be furnished after D-day had been determined.83
The Far East: Korea

At the beginning of 1953 the war in Korea, pitting the forces of the United Nations Command against the armies of North Korea and Communist China was in its third year. Since the middle of 1951 the battle line had been stabilized near the 38th parallel, the political boundary between North and South Korea. The armies struggled inconclusively to improve their positions while their representatives negotiated for an armistice. After dragging on for months without result, these negotiations were suspended in 1952 and then resumed early in 1953. The resumption reflected, in part, a changed situation, including the new administration in the United States and a relaxation of rigidity in the communist world following the death of Josef Stalin.

The Korean Armistice and Associated Problems

Several more months of haggling ensued before the war was finally ended by an Armistice Agreement that took effect on 27 July 1953. Under its terms, the military commanders of the two armies recognized the existing front as a demarcation line and agreed to withdraw their forces two kilometers therefrom. A Military Armistice Commission and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were established to ensure observance of these terms. A supplementary agreement dealt at length with the exchange of prisoners of war, one of the major issues involved in the negotiations.

This agreement was not intended as a permanent settlement. By one of its provisions, the military commanders agreed to recommend to their governments that a political conference be held within three months, “to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”

Because the agreement had been almost two years in preparation, the United States had had time to prepare for the problems that it would bring. Two policy
papers, NSC 154/1 and NSC 157/1, adopted by the National Security Council on 2 July 1953, looked ahead to the postarmistice situation in the Far East. The first of these set forth a course of action to be followed pending a fundamental review and reassessment of US policy in Asia. The basic assumption was that the conclusion of an armistice would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned either its basic objectives or its willingness to pursue them by armed force. It followed that the United States should continue to withhold recognition from the Peking regime and to oppose its admission to the United Nations. UN military strength in Korea was to be maintained, and an effort would be made to induce other countries to bear a larger share of the military burden. The Republic of Korea would receive continuing military and economic assistance, and would be given security guarantees similar to those already extended to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

The other Council directive, NSC 157/1, laid down the US objective in the political settlement that was expected to follow the end of the war. This goal was a unified and neutralized Korea, oriented toward the West, under a government substantially unchanged from that of the existing Republic of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed this objective, arguing that it would be better to give vigorous support to the Republic of Korea, in the hope eventually of creating a united Korea not committed to neutralization. The National Security Council, however, rejected the JCS views. As finally adopted, NSC 157/1 included a statement that the loss of the US military position in Korea resulting from neutralization would not be critical, and that it was doubtful whether Korea should be defended in case of general war.

But even while declaring a neutralized Korea desirable, the Eisenhower administration hedged its bets by concluding a mutual defense treaty with the government of President Syngman Rhee of South Korea. This treaty resulted from a trip to Korea by Secretary Dulles in August 1953, intended to win Rhee’s support for the armistice. Rhee, the strong-willed patriarch of his country, whose patriotism had been tested by years of exile while Japan ruled his homeland, had hoped that the war begun by the communists would end in the liberation of the North from totalitarian rule. An arrangement that left his country in its divided state seemed to him (and to many other South Koreans) a poor recompense for the loss of thousands of Korean lives.

There was real danger that his dissatisfaction might find vent in some rash action. Shortly before the armistice, Rhee had almost upset the delicate negotiations over prisoner repatriation by ordering the release of thousands of North Korean captives who did not wish to return to communist rule. His public statements made no secret of his desire ultimately to reunite his country, by force if necessary. In the months to come, apprehension engendered by Rhee’s intractable and impetuous nature was to loom large in the deliberations of President Eisenhower and his advisers. Though nominally a US ally, and utterly dependent on the United States, Rhee scorned the role of puppet, pursuing his own vision of his nation’s goals.

The mutual defense treaty that was initialled (though not yet formally signed) by the two countries in August 1953 offered the South Korean President the
prospect of a permanent US alliance, since it was to remain in force indefinitely unless terminated by one of the parties. It stipulated that both nations would act to meet the common danger if either were attacked, and that the United States might station forces in South Korea as determined by mutual agreement. Such a treaty was incompatible with a neutralized Korea, but it could serve as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the communists over the future of the country. If no settlement were reached, the treaty would afford an opportunity for the United States to retain forces in Korea as part of its military position in the Far East.

In a joint statement announcing the conclusion of the treaty, Secretary Dulles indicated further support for President Rhee’s objectives. He promised that at the forthcoming political conference the United States would seek the peaceful unification of Korea under a free government. If it became clear, after the conference had been in session for 90 days, that this goal was beyond reach, then both nations would “be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference” and would consult further regarding Korea’s unification. President Rhee, on his part, agreed to leave his country’s armed forces under the UN Command until the mutual defense treaty became effective and to make no attempt to unite Korea by military means while the conference was in session.

Political Impasse

The Armistice Agreement had called for a political conference by 27 October 1953, but its terms left room for disagreement over the nature and scope of the conference. In the weeks that followed the end of hostilities, this disagreement wrecked any chances that might have existed for a political settlement in Korea. The communist nations contended for a roundtable conference at which all Far Eastern issues would be discussed. The United States, supported somewhat reluctantly by its allies, sought a smaller meeting with an agenda limited to the subject of Korea. These positions could not be compromised, and the year closed with no conference in prospect.

During the fruitless debates on this matter, the United States and South Korea formally signed their mutual defense treaty on 1 October 1953. In announcing this action, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the treaty could not become effective until approved by the US Senate, and tactfully reminded South Korea of its promise, made two months earlier, to leave its forces under UN control. He added that the treaty would not be construed as prejudicing or predetermining a settlement of the Korean problem.

Faced with the prospect of a continuing stalemate in Korea, the United States had to recast its plans. The immediate question was: what would Syngman Rhee do? He had forewarned rash action for the duration of the conference, but suppose no conference was to take place? As early as 3 September 1953, Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash notified the National Security Council that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed guidance to
cover the possibility that the hot-headed South Korean leader might order his forces to march northward in a crusade to reunite the divided nation under his sway.\textsuperscript{11}

The NSC Planning Board accordingly drafted NSC 167, which suggested courses of action applicable to this contingency.\textsuperscript{12} The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they reviewed this paper, remarked that there was no wholly satisfactory response to such a development, and that every effort should therefore be made to prevent it. Emphatically rejecting one suggested alternative — that the United States actually cooperate with Rhee in an attack — they proposed the following actions, which represented a combination of the other alternatives in NSC 167:

1. Inform Rhee that, if he renewed hostilities, UN forces would offer no support, all economic aid would cease, and the UN Commander would take all measures necessary to avoid the involvement of his forces (but no threat of withdrawal should be made).
2. Make attempts to obtain, overtly or covertly, advance knowledge of Rhee’s intention to take such action, and to prevent his orders from being issued or from reaching commanders in the field (going so far, if necessary, as seizing and detaining key South Korean officials).
3. Take measures to reduce the probability that field commanders would obey such orders.
4. If the Rhee government nonetheless did launch an attack, end all economic and military assistance, evacuate US civilians, and notify the Communist powers that the UN forces would abide by the armistice (but would defend themselves if attacked).\textsuperscript{13}

On 29 October 1953 the Council approved these recommendations as an interim position, pending a revision of NSC 167 by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Council also decided upon two other actions:

1. If Rhee inquired about the possibility of a UN withdrawal from Korea, he was to be told merely that, if he failed to cooperate, the UN Commander would decide his own course of action.
2. Every effort was to be made to obtain from Rhee a commitment not to take unilateral military action; if he refused to give it, then the United States would take the position that it would act independently, without disclosing to him its intentions.

The Secretaries of State and Defense were directed to draft a message informing the UN Commander of these interim decisions. At the same time, the Planning Board was requested to prepare a new statement of policy toward Korea. On 31 October, the requisite message was sent to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (General John E. Hull, USA, who was also Commander in Chief, US Far East Command), informing him of these decisions.\textsuperscript{14}

The revision of NSC 167, drafted in accordance with the Council’s decision, was circulated on 2 November 1953 as NSC 167/1. Among other new provisions, it suggested that the UN Command take military measures, if necessary, to block offensive action by Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.\textsuperscript{15}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed NSC 167/1 with certain reservations.\textsuperscript{16} The
Council tentatively approved it on 5 November after incorporating minor changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make it clear that any actions taken by the United States would be on behalf of the United Nations. Other changes sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were left for discussion between the State and Defense Departments.\(^\text{17}\)

On 6 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with State Department representatives and reached agreement concerning their two remaining objections to NSC 167/1. The more important one involved the possibility of renewed hostilities with the communists. NSC 167/1 had recommended that, in case of unilateral action by Rhee, the communists be warned that UN forces would not support South Korea but would defend themselves if attacked, and moreover, that the UN counteraction would not be confined to Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out that this latter statement would commit UN forces to an attack on China if the communists, while reacting to South Korean action, became engaged in any way with UN forces. The conferees agreed to delete this portion of NSC 167/1. In turn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped their other objection, which, upon examination, could be regarded as involving phraseology rather than substance.\(^\text{18}\) Following these actions, the President approved the amended paper as NSC 167/2.\(^\text{19}\)

The provisions of NSC 167/2 were written into NSC 170, a new Korean policy statement drafted by the Planning Board. In this paper, the desirability of a unified and neutral Korea under an independent and representative government, was reaffirmed, as well as the US determination to defend Korea against any attack.\(^\text{20}\)

The prospect of a neutral Korea was no more palatable to the new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1953 than it had been to their predecessors a few months earlier. In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 17 November, they argued that, at the least, neutralization should not operate to deny the United States the right to assist Korea in developing the forces needed to defend herself.\(^\text{21}\) The National Security Council approved NSC 170 on 19 November, but, in deference to the JCS view, stipulated that the United States should be allowed to provide economic and military aid to Korea as part of any settlement.\(^\text{22}\)

### Relations with Syngman Rhee

To approach the South Korean President, asking him for a promise to continue observing the armistice and warning him of dire consequences if he should fail to do so, was a task that was considered too delicate for the ordinary channels of diplomacy. The mission was assigned to Vice President Richard M. Nixon, who would journey to Seoul to deliver a personal letter from President Eisenhower.

As finally drafted, this letter, though diplomatically worded, made it clear that the United States would not violate the armistice directly or indirectly, or connive at any violation by South Korea. It warned that, should such a violation
occur, the sole US concern would be to insure the safety of the forces of the UN Command. Moreover, President Eisenhower could not conscientiously ask the Senate to consent to the mutual defense treaty, or the Congress to appropriate funds for Korean relief, unless he had explicit confirmation that Rhee’s government contemplated no new military ventures.

Secretary of State Dulles, in instructions prepared for the Vice President, asked Mr. Nixon to discuss frankly with Rhee his inflammatory public statements threatening a crusade to liberate North Korea. At the same time, the Vice President was to assure Rhee of the US desire to see Korea united by peaceful means and to assist in economic reconstruction of the country.23

In a three-day trip to South Korea (12–15 November 1953),24 the Vice President obtained assurances from President Rhee that were regarded as satisfactory.25 A month later, on 16 December 1953, Rhee publicly promised to allow any Korean peace conference a period of 90 days to unify his country before taking action.26 He thus removed the danger that he might use the continuing political deadlock as a pretext for aggression. These assurances were regarded by the administration as justifying the ratification of the mutual defense treaty. Accordingly, the treaty was sent to the US Senate and ratified in February 1954.27

Planning for Possible Action against the Communists

While keeping a wary eye on Syngman Rhee, the United States could not ignore the possibility of renewed hostilities with the communists. This contingency had been considered even before the armistice was concluded. In May 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the National Security Council that, if the armistice negotiations broke down, the United States should not limit its actions to Korea but should conduct air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria, accompanied by a “coordinated offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea.” The Council noted and discussed these recommendations but took no formal action.28

On the day the armistice was signed, the United States and the fifteen other nations participating in the defense of South Korea issued a public warning against any breach of the armistice. The consequences of such a violation, according to the statement, “would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”29

When the National Security Council discussed Korean policy on 29 October 1953, as described above, the members directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assistance of the State Department, to review their plans for dealing with new communist aggression.30 The Joint Strategic Plans Committee initiated this review, but proved unable to agree. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members believed that the broad plan of May 1953 for a coordinated offensive should be retained, with specific provision for employment of nuclear weapons for the purpose. The Air Force member believed that this plan should be discarded in
favor of a massive strategic and tactical nuclear attack against the territories of North Korea and Communist China.\textsuperscript{31}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the Air Force view. In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 27 November 1953, they noted that the kind of offensive envisioned in the earlier plan would require from nine to twelve months to build up the necessary forces. Moreover, if the communists attacked again, the objective should be not merely to repel the invaders but to "create conditions which will lead to a unified, independent Korea aligned with the West." For this purpose, there should be large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria, and North Korea, employing nuclear weapons, to be followed by land, sea, and air attacks to destroy hostile forces in Korea. These tasks, they pointed out, could be carried out at once with available forces. But certain preparatory actions would be necessary beforehand, notably an authorization by the President to use nuclear weapons at once.\textsuperscript{32}

Since the National Security Council had directed that the Department of State be consulted, Assistant Secretary Nash discussed this memorandum with Secretary Dulles on 2 December 1953. Mr. Dulles was dubious of the feasibility of destroying communist capabilities by "scattering a few A bombs around." He would prefer operations of more limited scope, specifically intended to cripple forces operating in Korea, though not necessarily limited to targets in that country.\textsuperscript{33}

At a meeting of the Council the following day, Admiral Radford presented the JCS proposals. Secretary Dulles objected that the military operations they contemplated would probably touch off Soviet intervention and would not be supported by other nations. He suggested more restricted alternatives, such as a naval blockade of China or a seizure of Hainan Island. The Council directed Secretary Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to compose their differences and prepare a new statement.\textsuperscript{34}

Accordingly, on 18 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense a new statement that obviously reflected the views of the Secretary of State. It proposed a nuclear air offensive limited to targets that were located in Korea or that contributed directly to operations in that country, with other operations against enemy forces in Korea.\textsuperscript{35} This statement was revised again after consultation with the Department of State. In this form it was approved by the National Security Council on 8 January 1954, with the proviso that it be reviewed periodically.\textsuperscript{36} Thus US policy contemplated nuclear (but not necessarily general) war to defend Korea.

The Question of US Redeployment

The Korean War had tied down a major portion of US combat forces. At the time of the armistice, seven of the Army's 20 divisions were in Korea and another in Japan. One of the three Marine divisions was in Korea; another was
shipped to Japan soon afterwards, in accordance with a decision made before the armistice. The requirements of the Far Eastern Theater thus constituted the principal reason for the dangerous overextension of US military forces that was stressed in the report written by the new group of Joint Chief’s of Staff shortly before assuming office in mid-August 1953.

To remove US troops immediately after the armistice, while the situation remained uncertain, was out of the question. On 11 August 1953 the Commander in Chief US Far East Command (CINCFE), General Mark W. Clark, USA recommended that no major US forces be withdrawn from Korea until a political settlement had been reached. However, he asked permission to return to Japan the 24th Infantry Division, which had been sent to Korea as a reinforcement during the final month of hostilities, and to retain its equipment in Korea for issue to the ROK Army. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved this request, considering it inadvisable to weaken US strength in Korea at that time. They instructed General Clark that plans should be based on the assumption that there would be no substantial redeployment of US forces before 1 July 1954.

Three months later General Clark’s successor, General John E. Hull, again asked permission to move the 24th Division. General Ridgway endorsed the request. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it in principle, but, fearing that any weakening of US forces in Korea would increase the difficulty of controlling Syngman Rhee, ordered the movement postponed to allow time to judge Rhee’s reaction to current US efforts to restrain him.

General Ridgway had meanwhile urged upon his colleagues a general regrouping of forces in the Far East. The existing deployment, he asserted, was “strategically faulty for peace, faulty for resumption of full scale operations in the Korean area, and dangerous in the event of general war.” Forces should be redeployed in accordance with an overall strategic plan (which did not then exist) intended to guide the conduct of hostilities in Korea if war broke out anew. But, he added, any withdrawal of forces from Korea should be accompanied by an announcement that the United States fully intended to defend South Korea if necessity arose.

After considering a JSSC report on the subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 17 November 1953 that reflected General Ridgway’s views. “The continued deployment of U.S. forces in Korea on the present scale,” they declared, “is faulty to the point of involving serious risk.” Since the stalemate in Korea seemed likely to continue indefinitely, US forces in the Far East should be redeployed with a view to maintaining readiness for either renewed hostilities in Korea or general war with the Soviet bloc. They noted that redeployment of US forces had received general approval in NSC 162/2. But, they continued, it would be a political defeat for the UN countries to withdraw their forces without a corresponding action by the communists. They therefore recommended that an agreement be sought for a phased withdrawal on both sides, under terms that would allow the United States to retain an enlarged military advisory group in South Korea. The objective (subject to consultation with the UN allies) should be to reduce UN forces to one corps of three divisions (two US plus one composite UN division), with tactical
air and naval units. This reduction should be accompanied by a proclamation of
US determination to defend Korea. It might be followed by other withdrawals
after initial results had been appraised.\textsuperscript{46}

The JCS recommendations were reflected in NSC 170/1, in which the rede-
ployment of US forces from Korea at the earliest feasible date was approved in
principle.\textsuperscript{47} Several weeks later, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved their
New Look strategy directive, JCS 2101/113, they assumed that the deployment of
major US forces in Korea would be terminated in the near future.\textsuperscript{48}

The specific question—how many divisions to remove from Korea, and how
soon—came before the National Security Council on 3 December 1953. The
members decided that two divisions should be withdrawn about 1 March 1954;
then, if the stalemate continued, the United States would seek the consent of its
UN allies for a further reduction to the three-division limit proposed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{49}

The execution of this decision was a delicate matter in view of the state of
relations with Syngman Rhee at that moment. Within the administration, it was
regarded as a matter for very sensitive handling. The President referred it to the
Operations Coordinating Board for careful coordination of its timing and
implementation.\textsuperscript{50} Subsequently, in discussions between OCB and the Secretary
of Defense, it was agreed that the withdrawal of the two divisions would not be
carried out or publicly announced until Rhee had been notified of the plan.\textsuperscript{51}
Admiral Radford, who was planning a trip to the Far East, was appointed to bear
the tidings.\textsuperscript{52} Before his departure, Admiral Radford collaborated with the other
JCS members and with Secretary Dulles in drafting a statement on the impend-
ing redeployment to be issued by the President.\textsuperscript{53}

On 26 December 1953, after Admiral Radford had reached Seoul and had an
opportunity to inform the South Korean leader of the decision,\textsuperscript{54} President Eisen-
hower announced that two divisions would soon be withdrawn from Korea and
returned to the United States. At the same time, however, he made it clear that
the United States would resist any new aggression in Korea and would retain
appropriate military forces in the Far East.\textsuperscript{55}

The Department of the Army drew up a redeployment schedule that did not
square with this announcement. Under its plan, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved and submitted to Secretary Wilson on 31 December, two divisions (the
24th and 25th) would be withdrawn from Korea before the end of FY 1954, but
neither would return to the continental United States; the first would go to
Japan, the second to Hawaii. One regimental combat team would return to the
United States during this period; two National Guard divisions (40th and 45th)
would follow it during the first quarter of FY 1955.\textsuperscript{56}

Secretary Wilson on 13 January 1954 approved the shift of the 24th Division
to Japan but vetoed the rest of this plan, insisting that two divisions must return
to continental United States before the end of the fiscal year. He suggested that
the two National Guard divisions be selected for this purpose and released to
state control.\textsuperscript{57}

Since the Army plan now had to be revised, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a
suggestion by General Ridgway that a general plan of redeployment, embracing
all the Services, be drawn up.\textsuperscript{58} Meanwhile the Army agreed to carry out Secretary Wilson's suggestion that the 40th and 45th Divisions be brought home and released to their respective states.\textsuperscript{59}

The Services submitted their tentative redeployment schedules shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{60} The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent them to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for study. They also obtained the advice of CINCFE on these plans and on various problems involved in redeployment, such as the disposition of UN units and the proper size of the final, residual US forces in Korea.\textsuperscript{61}

On 1 April 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a comprehensive plan drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and sent it to Secretary Wilson. It called for the withdrawal of the following forces from the Far East:

\textbf{Army}: Four divisions (in addition to the 40th and 45th) to be redeployed from Korea by December 1954. One would be the 24th, already scheduled for transfer to Japan. Of the remaining three, one would go to Hawaii and the other two to the continental United States.

\textbf{Navy}: One battleship, two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, and two patrol aircraft squadrons to be withdrawn from the Western Pacific by 10 April 1954; twelve additional destroyers by 1 July 1954. (Their future disposition was not specified.)

\textbf{Marine Corps}: One division to be returned to the zone of the interior between July and September 1955.

\textbf{Air Force}: One troop carrier wing (medium) to be returned to the ZI by September 1954; rotation of one SAC fighter wing to the Far East to be discontinued by June 1954; two fighter bomber, one light bomber, and one and one-third fighter interceptor wings to be returned to the United States between July 1954 and June 1955, subject to further review; three medium bomber wings to be withdrawn to the United States to be re-equipped with jet aircraft (date unspecified); offsetting the effects of this latter move, one SAC bomber wing, with atomic capability, to be maintained on rotation to the Far East.

This plan would reduce US ground strength in Korea to the desired goal of two divisions (one Army and one Marine). The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that it be approved promptly in order that the Army and Navy might regroup their forces to adjust to the drastic manpower reductions scheduled for those Services. At the same time, they tendered advice to Secretary Wilson on certain related matters, some of which, they admitted, were beyond the purview of the military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged an effort to induce other UN nations to retain their present forces in Korea. Discussions of this subject, they believed, should be conducted directly with the governments involved, not in the UN organization, which included many neutralist or hostile countries. If the others insisted upon removing their forces, their withdrawals should be carefully phased with US redeployment. The Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC) should retain command of all US, UN, and South Korean forces. Should President Rhee
refuse to accept such an arrangement, it would be better to withdraw US forces entirely, they believed, than to accept a separate command for South Korean troops.\textsuperscript{62}

By the time this plan reached Secretary Wilson, the situation in the Far East had materially altered. The developing crisis in Indochina made it unsafe to withdraw major US forces from the periphery of Asia. On 6 April 1954, Mr. Wilson told the National Security Council that he was deferring all major redeployments from Korea until 1 June 1954.\textsuperscript{63} The following day he formally notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries of this decision. All redeployment of US forces from the Far East would be suspended, with the exception of the two National Guard divisions already ordered returned to the United States and of minor Naval forces (one battleship and four destroyers). Planning for future withdrawals would continue, but no announcements would be made.\textsuperscript{64} Subsequently, at the request of General Twining, Secretary Wilson modified this decision to authorize the withdrawal of one medium bomber wing.\textsuperscript{65}

The situation was no better on 1 June 1954. At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretary that the approved redeployments had been or were being effected, but they recommended that no others be scheduled. The deteriorating international situation and the need to support US diplomacy during the Geneva Conference, they declared, made it necessary to retain existing forces in the Far East for an indeterminate time.\textsuperscript{66}

**Strengthening South Korea’s Forces**

A complete withdrawal of US units from South Korea would be possible if that country’s own forces were strong enough to defend the nation alone. Such a level of military strength was, of course, beyond South Korea’s capabilities. But a more limited objective—to provide the Republic of Korea with the maximum strength attainable with its limited population and resources—was a long-established US goal. Its accomplishment depended upon aid from the United States, which was thus in a position to prescribe the limits of South Korea’s military expansion.

In 1952, while the Korean War was still in progress, President Truman had approved a modest increase in the ROK Army from 10 to 12 divisions; he had withheld decision on a recommendation by General Clark for a further increase to 20 divisions. President Eisenhower, soon after his accession, successively raised the ceiling to 14 divisions, then to 16, and finally, in May 1953, to the full 20, leaving it to General Clark’s discretion to activate the last four. He also authorized smaller increases in the other services. The ROK personnel ceilings approved by President Eisenhower were 655,00 for the Army, 10,000 for the Navy, 23,500 for the Marine Corps, and 9,000 for the Air Force—a total of 697,500.\textsuperscript{67}

When Secretary Dulles visited Seoul in August 1953, he was accompanied by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, who discussed South Korea’s military
needs with Admiral Sohn Won Il, Minister of Defense in the Rhee government. Admiral Sohn presented a plan for a major increase in his country’s forces. He wished the last four ROK divisions to be activated immediately and all 20 to be reorganized and reequipped to provide them with the same firepower as US divisions. The South Korean Air Force, under his plan, would be expanded from a single fighter wing (three squadrons) to six wings of fighter-bombers and two of light bombers, with supporting units; the US Air Force would turn over all its aircraft, equipment, and installations in Korea. The ROK Navy would acquire 31 more ships: 16 destroyer escorts, six destroyers, four minesweepers, and five auxiliaries, plus enough landing craft for lifting a full division.

Privately considering these goals utterly impractical, Secretary Stevens agreed to transmit them to his superiors in Washington. The administration, however, took no immediate action. 68

Indeed, there was at the time some doubt whether it would be feasible to reach the approved goal of 20 divisions. General Ridgway pointed out several difficulties to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was insufficient equipment available in Korea for the last four divisions, and the Armistice Agreement forbade the importation of war material except on a replacement basis; hence the only source would be equipment left behind by departing US units. Moreover, the requirements of the expanding Japanese National Safety Force must be considered. General Ridgway noted that the 20-division goal had been approved while the war was still in progress and that it should now be reexamined. Meanwhile, he suggested, CINCFE should be directed to organize cadres for the final four ROK divisions. 69 The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once approved these suggestions and sent the necessary instructions to CINCFE. 70

After considering a study of the problem by their planning committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 6 October 1953 that the 20-division objective was valid. They authorized CINCFE to equip two additional ROK divisions, at his discretion, when equipment from departing US units became available. The remaining two divisions were to be maintained on a cadre basis until the question of redeployment of US forces had been determined.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected any increase in the other ROK services except the Navy. They approved a recommendation by COMNAVFE and CINCFE that the personnel ceiling of the ROK Navy be raised to 15,000 and its ship strength by 27 vessels; 16 landing craft, two destroyer escorts, four smaller escort vessels, and five auxiliaries. This increase would bring the ROK Navy to a total of 83 ships, as compared with its current strength of 56. Since this recommended increase required the approval of higher authority, the Joint Chiefs of staff passed it to Secretary Wilson on 6 October 1953 and received his approval on 24 November. 71

In October 1953 Defense Minister Sohn, in two letters to Secretary Wilson, sought approval of the larger force goals presented to Secretary Stevens two months earlier. For some reason, it was not until 23 December 1953 that Secretary Wilson referred this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. At the same time he sent a temporizing reply to Admiral Sohn, assuring him that the United States was very interested in strengthening the ROK forces but referring
tactfully to problems involved in maintaining the complex equipment that would be required to expand the Navy and the Air Force.\textsuperscript{72}

Admiral Sohn then turned to Admiral Radford, with whom he had established a cordial relationship during the latter’s recent visit to Korea. In a letter on 6 January 1954, he voiced the hope that the United States would give speedy and favorable consideration to his recent request to Secretary Wilson. Admiral Radford replied noncommittally on 18 January that the request was still under study.\textsuperscript{73}

The decision to bring home the 40th and 45th Divisions promised to release enough equipment to bring the ROK Army up to its full authorized strength. On 15 February 1954, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a request by General Hull to use the equipment left by these departing units for the last two South Korean divisions.\textsuperscript{74} The formation of these divisions was announced publicly on 28 February 1954.\textsuperscript{75}

But the realization of this goal no longer satisfied South Korea’s rulers. On 22 January 1954 Prime Minister Paik Too Chin, in a letter to Secretary Stevens, had asked for aid in organizing no less than 15–20 additional divisions, making no secret of the fact that these were wanted for attack rather than for defense. At the same time, he cited this proposed expansion in his nation’s Army to justify the earlier requests for increases in the Air Force and Navy.\textsuperscript{76}

This audacious proposal was discussed by the National Security Council on 17 February 1954. President Eisenhower asked the Department of Defense to study it.\textsuperscript{77} Acting Secretary Anderson accordingly directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider it in their study, not yet completed, of the request submitted by Admiral Sohn in October 1953.\textsuperscript{78}

As a result of this study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded on 31 March 1954 that all plans for further expansion of ROK forces should be rejected. Forces larger than those already planned, they observed, could not be maintained by South Korean manpower and economic resources, and could only be supplied by depleting US reserves of equipment. Instead of enlargement, they recommended some qualitative improvements within approved manpower ceilings. The reorganization of the ROK Army into a field army on the US model, with army and corps headquarters, which was already under way, should continue. The Navy would be adequate when its authorized goal was reached; the Marine Corps should be reorganized and consolidated into a division in place of various smaller units. They rejected a suggestion by CINCFE that the ROK Air Force be given an additional fighter bomber wing; instead, they proposed that its existing wing be reequipped with jet fighters (in place of obsolete, propeller-driven F-51s) and that an effective tactical control organization be established.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also suggested that, subject to further study, it might prove feasible to establish a reserve program for the South Korean Armed Forces. Such a program, they pointed out, might eventually justify reductions in the active forces of the nation.\textsuperscript{79}

Secretary Wilson sent these conclusions to the National Security Council. He approved the JCS views on the proper size of the ROK forces; if there were to be further expansion, he pointed out, it must be justified on political rather than military grounds. He added, however, that the suggestions for qualitative
improvements and for a reserve program required further study of costs and other problems involved.\textsuperscript{80}

President Eisenhower had already advised Syngman Rhee that the request for additional Army divisions would probably be rejected. In a message on 20 March 1954, he expressed the tentative conclusion that it would “dangerously overtax the human and material resources of your country.”\textsuperscript{81}

President Rhee nevertheless found in this message some hope that his request would ultimately be approved. He renewed it in a letter to Admiral Radford on 1 April 1954. If his Army were doubled in strength and given commensurate air and naval support, he asserted, all UN forces in Korea could be withdrawn and South Korean forces could take full responsibility for defending the nation. He suggested that General James A. Van Fleet, former commander of the US Eighth Army, be dispatched to Korea to supervise the training of the new divisions. Admiral Radford referred this letter to the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{82}

The Council discussed the subject on 13 April 1954. The members seized upon the proposed visit of General Van Fleet, adapting it to a different purpose. They decided that he should go to South Korea to determine the proper size and composition of that country’s armed forces and the possibility of establishing a reserve program. Pending receipt of his findings, they tentatively approved the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 March.\textsuperscript{83}

Accordingly, on 26 April Secretary Wilson issued formal instructions to General Van Fleet for the conduct of a survey of US military assistance programs in the Far East. Besides visiting South Korea for the specific purposes mentioned above, he would also survey Japan and Nationalist China, and other countries that might be indicated later. He should project his recommendations through FY 1957.\textsuperscript{84} General Van Fleet undertook the mission as a special representative of the President, with personal rank of ambassador.

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had meanwhile studied the possibility of a reserve program for the Republic of Korea and had tentatively decided on 15 April that it was impracticable, because the Republic of Korea lacked the necessary manpower (especially officers) and equipment.\textsuperscript{85} The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, told Secretary Wilson on 23 April 1954 that they would make no comments on the proposed reserve program until after General Van Fleet returned.\textsuperscript{86}

The Geneva Conference and its Aftermath

The search for a political settlement of the status of Korea was temporarily abandoned after the collapse of negotiations for a conference in December 1953. A renewed effort in 1954 owed its origin to developments in Europe. In January and February 1954 the foreign ministers of the Big Four met in Berlin to consider questions related to Germany and Austria. During the conference, Foreign Minister Molotov of the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to present anew the Soviet suggestion for a round-table conference, to include Communist
China, for discussion of Far Eastern problems. The developing crisis in Indochina, which by now far overshadowed the Korean problem, made this suggestion a timely one. The other three nations accepted the Soviet proposal, and the conference was scheduled for 26 April 1954 in Geneva, Switzerland.87

It was necessary to win President Rhee's assent to participate in this new search for a Korean solution. In the course of correspondence with President Eisenhower, the South Korean leader asked for assurances that the United States did not intend to allow the conference to drag on beyond the 90-day deadline that he had laid down in his previous statements.88 On 19 April he announced that he had received satisfactory assurances and would participate in the Geneva Conference. Rhee added the hope that if and when the conference had failed, the United States would “join with us in employing other means to drive the enemy from our land.”89

Of several position papers for the conference sent them for review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on only two. A plan for Korean unification, providing for internationally supervised elections for a constituent body that would draft a new constitution, was considered acceptable by them.90 Of more immediate interest, from the JCS viewpoint, was a joint State-Defense paper calling for withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, under international supervision, within 12 months after a new government was set up. This plan was to be introduced only after agreement on unification had been reached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this paper subject to certain changes. If no agreement could be reached on unification, they believed, the United States should not only abstain from introducing any proposal to withdraw foreign forces, but should decline to consider the subject at all. If allied countries strenuously objected to such a stance, they should be told, as a last resort, that the United States was willing to discuss with them the question of force withdrawals after the conference.91

The Geneva Conference is best remembered for the agreement on Indochina that it produced, as described in the next chapter. The discussions on Korea were fruitless. The communist powers urged immediate unification by fusion of the existing governments of North and South Korea, to be followed by elections, which were to be free of outside interference. When this plan was rejected by the Western Powers, the communists suggested another under which elections would be supervised by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established by the Armistice Agreement. The ineffectiveness of this body had already been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States and its allies. Agreement thus proved impossible, and negotiations on the Korean issue were broken off.92

With this development, there emerged once again the vexing question of Syngman Rhee's intentions. This matter was already under study in the administration. General Ridgway had passed to his colleagues a suggestion by CINCFE that the United States seek from Rhee, before the Mutual Defense Treaty formally took effect, a commitment to leave his forces under UN command.93 The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this suggestion and referred it to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn submitted it to the Secretary of State with his concurrence on 5 June 1954.94

Secretary Dulles disapproved the proposal, fearing that a request to Rhee for
such a pledge might be countered with a demand for compensating concessions.\textsuperscript{95} But he was very much aware of the problem. A few days earlier he had asked Secretary Wilson to consider what action the United Nations Command should take if Rhee actually did withdraw his forces from its control. He offered the amateur suggestion that logistic support of ROK forces be terminated. What was needed, he believed, was something dramatic to emphasize the consequences of such a withdrawal for the South Korean forces.\textsuperscript{96}

Referring this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson passed along to Mr. Dulles, as an interim reply, a lengthy analysis of the political and military situation in South Korea transmitted by CINCFE on 11 June 1954. General Hull feared that President Rhee would take the position that he had cooperated with the United States in seeking to unify Korea through negotiation and that the United States was therefore obligated to support him in unifying the country by force. Although he would probably not take drastic unilateral action without first consulting the United States, he was unlikely to accept indefinitely the division of Korea. It would be desirable to divert his attention from a possible attack on North Korea to more constructive, long-range developments, such as an alliance among the noncommunist nations of Asia. As for the possibility that Rhee might pull his forces out of the UN Command, General Hull reported that contingency plans had been prepared for this event. An appropriate response by the United States, he believed, would be to speed the withdrawal of US forces. General Hull therefore recommended that the decision to suspend redeployment be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{97}

On 21 July 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their reply to Secretary Dulles' letter of 7 June. They saw no need for dramatic measures, believing that Rhee had already been made aware of the serious consequences of unilateral action. They agreed with CINCFE's analysis of the situation and his forecast of Rhee's probable actions. They remained convinced that it would be desirable to seek a commitment from Rhee before the Mutual Defense Treaty went into effect.\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{President Rhee's Visit to the United States}

By the time these comments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff were available, the administration had decided upon a different approach. President Rhee was to be invited to the United States for an official visit. President Eisenhower announced on 14 July 1954 that the South Korean President would come to Washington on 26 July.\textsuperscript{99} While he did not elaborate on the purpose of the visit, there can be little doubt that the invitation had stemmed from a desire to conciliate Rhee and to dissuade him from any action injurious to US interests.

In preparation for a general discussion of US-South Korean military problems, Acting Secretary Anderson on 16 July asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their advice on the following subjects: (1) the question of redeployment of US forces from Korea; (2) the augmentation of the forces of South Korea; and (3) the
relation between the UN Command and ROK forces.\textsuperscript{100} Replying on 22 July, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff proffered the following advice:

1. The FY 1956 ceilings for US forces approved on 15 July 1954 \textsuperscript{101} would
require withdrawal of some forces from the Far East. Therefore, the
redeployment schedule that they had submitted on 1 April 1954 should
be approved.

2. As they had stated earlier, currently authorized force goals were ade-
quate and were the largest that the Republic of Korea could support.

3. Their views on command relationships had been set forth in connection
with their redeployment plan. The UN Commander should retain full
command over all forces, including those of South Korea, so long as he
was responsible for the security of that nation. An attempt should be
made to induce Rhee to reaffirm his agreement to leave his forces under
UN Command; he should be told that US support and assistance for his
forces would be withdrawn if he removed them.\textsuperscript{102}

How far these recommendations entered into the discussions between the
two Presidents is unknown. In any case, the talks apparently had little immedi-
ate result. Publicly, at least, President Rhee made no promises during his four-
day visit in Washington. Indeed, in addressing a joint session of Congress on
28 July, he asked the United States to furnish air and naval support for an
invasion of the Chinese mainland by an army of two million South Korean and
Nationalist Chinese troops, though he later partially retracted this request with
an explanation that he did not wish the United States to go to war immediately
with Communist China.\textsuperscript{103} The communiqué issued by the two Presidents on 30
July said merely that they had had a fruitful and cordial exchange of views; it
reaffirmed their intention to achieve a unified, democratic, and independent
Korea.\textsuperscript{104} The actual results of the visit did not become evident until later, after
continued discussions at lower levels.

Resumption of US Redeployment

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 22 July 1954 that the United
States resume the withdrawal of its forces from Korea, the crisis in Indo-
china had eased. The Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems had pro-
duced an armistice agreement that ended the war between French forces and
communist rebels in Vietnam and thus removed the immediate danger of a wider
conflict in the Far East.\textsuperscript{105}

In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries on
26 July 1954, Mr. Wilson suggested that the troop movements recommended in
the JCS redeployment plan of 1 April 1954 be completed by the end of the year.
At the same time, he proposed to modify this plan by leaving both Marine
divisions in the Far East. The First would remain in Korea; the Third would shift
from Japan to Okinawa (except for one of its regimental combat teams, which would move to Hawaii).\textsuperscript{106}

Secretary Wilson’s plan was approved by the Armed Forces Policy Council on 27 July. At the same time, the Policy Council approved minor changes in the Air Force redeployment plan; only one medium bombardment wing was to be withdrawn, and the SAC fighter wing was to be maintained on rotation. The number of ships to be withdrawn was not specified; the conferees decided only that four attack carriers (CVAs), with appropriate supporting vessels, would be maintained in Far Eastern waters.\textsuperscript{107}

Secretary Wilson submitted these plans to the National Security Council on 28 July 1954. The Council approved them subject to appropriate diplomatic preparations by the Secretary of State, and with the requirement that the timing and announcement of the various movements would be coordinated between the State and Defense Departments.\textsuperscript{108}

On 12 August Mr. Wilson informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries that other countries had been notified and that the NSC decision should now be carried out.\textsuperscript{109} The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly drafted a schedule for completing the redeployment of Army divisions by the end of calendar year 1954 and of Air Force units by the end of FY 1955, and sent it to the Services and CINCFE for action. At the same time, they again requested, and this time obtained, Secretary Wilson’s approval to terminate the rotation of the SAC fighter wing in the Far East.\textsuperscript{110}

Once these movements had been completed, only two US division—one Army, the other Marine—would remain in Korea. Thus the objective set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1953 would be reached. A UN presence would be maintained by the composite British Commonwealth division, which still remained in Korea, and by minor units from other nations.\textsuperscript{111} The air wing attached to the First Marine Division, plus nine Air Force combat and three troop carrier wings, would provide tactical air support.\textsuperscript{112}

In a directive to General Hull on 6 October 1954, redefining his responsibilities as CINCFE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized him to adjust the size of US forces in Japan and Okinawa as redeployments were carried out. However, any movement from Japan of RCTs or larger units would require advance notification to them.\textsuperscript{113} At the same time, they also issued new instructions to him as CINCUNC (replacing those transmitted on 10 July 1951). CINCUNC’s new mission was to comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to maintain his forces in a state of combat readiness.\textsuperscript{114}

Before the redeployment plan had been fully executed, however, Secretary Wilson modified it further. On 9 December 1954 he ordered the First Marine Division brought home from Korea and replaced by one of the two Army divisions in Japan. This decision seems to have been the Secretary’s own, and was apparently not referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. The intention, according to an explanation released later, was to free the First Marine Division from its static, defensive mission in Korea and to add its strength to the mobile strategic reserve based in the United States.\textsuperscript{115} The result would be a net reduc-
tion of US strength in the Far East; there would remain three Army divisions, plus one Marine division, less one of its component RCTs.

Secretary Wilson wished this decision carried out as promptly as the transportation available in the Pacific allowed. At the same time, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider possible further withdrawals from Korea and Japan, in the light of prospective reductions in overall Army and Marine Corps strength.\textsuperscript{116}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim reply on 31 December 1954. They agreed that the time had come to appraise the results of the redeployments accomplished thus far, in the light of the possibility, which had been foreseen a year earlier, of reducing forces in Korea below the initial two-division goal. They promised to make such an appraisal and to submit their findings. As for immediate plans, they recommended that the First Marine Air Wing be withdrawn from Korea along with the First Division and its component units divided among Japan, Hawaii, and the continental United States. To offset this loss in tactical air power, they recommended that one of the two fighter bomber wings divided for withdrawal in 1955 be retained in the Far East at least to the end of the calendar year. Secretary Wilson approved these recommendations.\textsuperscript{117}

Earlier, on 29 December 1954, Secretary Wilson, in discussing projected force levels for FYs 1956 and 1957, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend one or more deployment plans for the same period.\textsuperscript{118} The resulting plan adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the Secretary on 11 January 1955 called for a reduction of Army forces in the Far East to only two divisions by FY 1956, in keeping with the smaller size planned for the Army. It envisioned minor reductions in Air Force units there, and suggested that one of the Navy’s four attack aircraft carriers might be withdrawn. Secretary Wilson approved the plan with the stipulation that any movement of forces necessary to put it into effect would require his advance authorization in each instance.\textsuperscript{119}

### South Korean Force Levels

The question of the ultimate size of South Korea’s armed forces had been left in abeyance pending General Van Fleet’s survey of that nation’s military needs and resources. The General’s mission took him to Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines as well as to Korea. He returned to Washington on 15 July 1954.\textsuperscript{120}

Meanwhile, on 29 June, General Hull submitted his own proposals. He recommended that the ROK Army be reorganized into 30 divisions, of which nine would be active and 21 reserve, and that the strength of each division be reduced from 15,000 to 10,000. He also recommended the establishment of Air Force and Navy reserve organizations, and repeated his earlier proposal that the Air Force be expanded to two fighter wings.\textsuperscript{121}

General Van Fleet’s recommendations, submitted on 23 July 1954, duplicated some of those of CINCFE. He called for an Army composed of both regular and
reserve divisions, totaling 30 in number, and for the creation of Navy and Air Force reserves. However, under his plan, 24 Army divisions would be on a regular basis and only six reserve. The increase from 20 to 24 active divisions would take up the slack left by the impending departure of four US divisions. He recommended some reduction in the strength of divisional artillery and the elimination of some support units. The ROK Air Force, he believed, should be allowed a somewhat larger personnel ceiling (15,000), and its conversion to jet aircraft should be accelerated. He saw no need for changes in the force goals already established for the ROK Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{122}

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee reviewed both sets of proposals and drafted a different version that included some features from each. The members approved CINCFE’s plans for the Army, rejected his proposal to double the fighter strength of the Air Force, and recommended new personnel ceilings totaling 718,500 men, as compared with the currently authorized 702,500.\textsuperscript{123}

Insofar as these proposals called for the establishment of reserve forces for the Republic of Korea, they were compatible with the JCS recommendations submitted on 31 March 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, however, opposed any enlargement of South Korean active forces beyond the goals already approved by the administration.

President Rhee’s visit to Washington in July 1954 afforded an opportunity for a review of these goals, and of the proposals of CINCFE and of General Van Fleet, by officials of both nations. Admiral Sohn and high ranking officers of the ROK Army and Air Force, who accompanied Rhee, conferred with Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, Generals Hull and Van Fleet, and other military and civilian representatives of the Services and of the Department of Defense. The South Korean Ambassador to the United States, You Chan Yang, took part in these conferences, as did representatives of the Department of State.\textsuperscript{124} Out of the discussions there emerged a plan for an expansion and reorganization of the ROK military establishment, adopted as part of an agreement that was not limited to military questions but embraced the major points at issue between the two governments.

The terms of this agreement were recorded in an Agreed Minute drawn up by the US participants after the conversations. The Republic of Korea agreed to “cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea,” and thus in effect foreswore resort to violence for this purpose. Moreover, South Korean forces were to remain “under the operational control of the UN Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea.” This was the pledge that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long been seeking.

On its part, the United States promised to defend South Korea in case of unprovoked attack; to support Korean unification by all peaceful means; and to provide economic and military assistance for FY 1955 up to a maximum of $700 million, or more than $100 million above the amount previously planned. The United States would also support a strengthened military establishment for South Korea, including a reserve system, and would retain in Korea, for an unspecified period, the equivalent of one UN corps with supporting units.
Personnel ceilings for the ROK forces for FY 1955 were established as follows: 661,000 for the Army, 15,000 for the Navy, 27,500 for the Marine Corps, and 16,500 for the Air Force—a total of 720,000. Minor adjustments within this total might be made by the South Korean government after discussions with CINCUNC.

After FY 1955, these strengths would be reduced as trained men, released from active service, became available to activate the reserve system. A goal of ten reserve divisions was established, to be attained by the end of calendar 1955. The United States would assist in training and organizing them, under plans to be worked out by CINCUNC. There was no mention of reserve organizations for the other services. General Van Fleet’s recommendations for reduction in artillery and support units were to be carried out.

The ROK Navy was to continue building toward its approved goal of 79 vessels. The United States would furnish ships on loan if necessary. There was to be no expansion of the ROK Air Force, but the United States would equip it with jet aircraft by the end of FY 1956. Finally, the entire South Korean military budget was to be subject to continuing joint review by the Republic of Korea and by CINCUNC in order to produce the most effective forces at minimum cost.

The Agreed Minute was accepted by the National Security Council on 9 September 1954 and President Eisenhower approved it the following day. Secretary Wilson then sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries, pointing out that it represented the US understanding of the agreements reached and had yet to be approved by the Government of South Korea. The US position, he explained, was that all the agreements constituted a single package; if South Korea failed to sign the Agreed Minute, the United States would not be obligated to provide any specific amount of aid or to support any particular force goals. Plans for augmenting the ROK forces along the lines indicated in the Agreed Minute were to be prepared, but were not to be executed until South Korea had signed it. At the same time, he referred General Van Fleet’s report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

Repeating on 3 November 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the Agreed Minute incorporated desirable features of both the Van Fleet report and the CINCFE plan. If accepted by the Republic of Korea, it would constitute a reasonable basis for augmenting that nation’s forces during 1955. The establishment of reserve forces and the modernization of the Navy and Air Force, they believed, were especially commendable elements of the plan. On 4 November they instructed CINCFE to draw up plans for carrying out the provisions of the Agreed Minute.

Relations with South Korea at the End of 1954

The last word had not yet been said, however; the Agreed Minute had still to be approved by President Rhee. That he would do so was by no means certain. The aged Korean leader, along with many of his countrymen, remained
dissatisfied with the prospects for unification. Their concern was exacerbated by the psychological effects of US troop withdrawals and by a feeling that the United States was providing too little aid to South Korea and too much to Korea’s erstwhile master, Japan, which, with US assistance, was regaining its economic and military strength. “Relations between the U. S. and the ROK have worsened substantially since President Rhee’s return to Seoul from the U. S. in August,” reported a working group of the Operations Coordinating Board in October 1954. This deterioration was reflected principally in strident anti-American propaganda emanating from South Korea’s government. It took a more serious turn when the Republic of Korea refused to make South Korean currency available to the UN Command to meet local requirements, except at a grossly overvalued rate of exchange.\textsuperscript{132}

US Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs submitted the text of the Agreed Minute to President Rhee in October. Rhee asked changes in wording that would eliminate the commitment to peaceful means in pursuing unification, but was told that the United States would accept no substantive changes, whereupon he agreed to give the matter further study.\textsuperscript{133}

Fearing that Rhee’s final decision might be unfavorable, Ambassador Briggs consulted with General Hull and with Mr. Tyler Wood, representative of the Foreign Operations Administration. They drew up a tentative list of measures designed to apply increasing pressure to the Rhee government to insure its cooperation. This program, which General Hull referred to General Ridgway on 8 November, would begin with suspension of economic aid and extend to removal of all US and UN military forces, including the military advisory group. General Ridgway referred the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{134}

Fortunately, the alarm passed; the Government of South Korea accepted the Agreed Minute. The text was initialed by representatives of both nations in Seoul on 17 November 1954, while at the same time the Mutual Defense Treaty was placed in effect by the exchange of instruments of ratification in Washington. In the final text, the reference to peaceful means was deleted, but in a formal note, accepted by South Korea, the United States made clear its commitment to this approach. The currency controversy was disposed of, since the Agreed Minute fixed an acceptable rate of exchange.

On 18 November 1954 Acting Secretary Anderson officially notified the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Agreed Minute had been signed and that its provisions regarding South Korean force goals were to be carried out.\textsuperscript{135}

The one remaining question was: would the South Korean government live up to the terms of this agreement? The answer seemed to be affirmative, as the Operations Coordinating Board, on the basis of six weeks’ observation, reported at the end of the year. The Board foresaw that friction with South Korea would probably continue, principally over the question of unification. But the danger of violent or intemperate action by President Rhee no longer loomed so large as it once had.\textsuperscript{136}

Now, at the end of 1954, the United States had apparently passed the most difficult period in its relations with its unpredictable ally. The continuing uncer-
tainty with regard to President Rhee’s possible actions had magnified the problem of liquidating the Korean War. Other complications were introduced by the inability to reach formal agreement with the communists on the future status of Korea and the new crisis that arose in Asia in 1954. Only after it had become evident that the de facto settlement created by the Armistice Agreement was likely to endure indefinitely was it safe to undertake a large-scale withdrawal of US forces from the Far East.

Such a withdrawal had been sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it did not yield the result they desired. They had pointed out in 1953 that US forces were stretched too thin and could only recover freedom of action if regrouped to provide a mobile strategic reserve. But instead of using for this purpose the forces brought home from the Far East, the administration applied them toward a reduction in the size of the military establishment. The five Army divisions returning from Korea under the redeployment plans approved in 1954 would produce a total of twelve divisions stationed in the Western Hemisphere by the end of FY 1955, as compared with seven two years earlier. On paper, this was an impressive addition, but it meant little, if any, increase in effective strength, since three of the twelve divisions would be little more than cadres for recruit training and two others would be static divisions with their component units scattered among several locations. The means for creating a strategic reserve were therefore not available, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out to Secretary Wilson early in 1955. The goal of flexibility, proclaimed as one of the objectives of the New Look, had yet to be attained.
The Korean War was by no means the only Far Eastern problem that confronted the Eisenhower administration at the moment of its accession. A host of difficulties, largely the legacy of World War II, was visible in that part of the globe. Japan, long the dominant power of the region, had collapsed in 1945. Four years later the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, burdened by its own ineptitude and exhausted after years of struggle with the Japanese invaders, was driven to refuge in Taiwan by the advancing armies of the Chinese Communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Communist China and the Soviet Union now loomed as the most powerful nations of the Far East.

At the same time, the nations of Western Europe were losing their influence in Asia. Already the Dutch had departed from Indonesia and the British from Burma. The United Kingdom retained a foothold in Malaya, as did France in Indochina, but both nations were struggling with rebellious communist movements aimed at their expulsion.

The maintenance of a balance of power in the Far East depended on US forces, which had moved westward across the Pacific in World War II, forcing the Japanese back within the borders of their own islands. American forces now stood guard in Japan and Okinawa, no longer by right of conquest but under agreement with the former enemy. The Republic of the Philippines provided another locus of US military power; the United States had retained base rights in the new nation after granting it independence in 1946. The gap between Okinawa and the Philippines was partly filled by the friendly Chinese Nationalist regime that controlled Taiwan. Farther south (beyond the sprawling territories of the Republic of Indonesia, which had a neutralist government), the Commonwealth nations of Australia and New Zealand constituted stable, dependable allies, linked to the United States by the ANZUS Treaty of 1951.

President Truman and his administration had become convinced that the United States had an essential interest in this chain of islands off the Asian coast. This conviction had been affirmed in 1951 in NSC 48/5, which dealt with Far Eastern policy. The long-range US goals in Asia proclaimed in this directive were to develop the region economically, to insure its political stability, and to
prevent its domination by the communist powers. Toward this end, the United States would provide assistance to friendly nations and would resist the hostile Chinese Communist regime in Peking, politically, diplomatically, and, if necessary, militarily. The Nationalist regime of President Chiang Kai-shek would be recognized as the only legitimate Chinese government. Ultimately, according to NSC 48/5, it was hoped that the existing rulers of mainland China could be detached from their alliance with the Soviet Union or replaced by others less hostile toward the West.2

US Far Eastern Policy, 1953–1954

The US stake in Asia concerned President Eisenhower no less than his predecessor. One of his first actions, announced on 2 February 1953, was the removal of restrictions on Chinese Nationalist attacks against the communist-held mainland, an action described in more detail below. A comprehensive review of Far Eastern policy was an early matter for NSC attention in the new administration.

In preparation for this review, the Planning Board drafted NSC 148, a revised statement of Far Eastern policy. NSC 148 was noteworthy for its statement that the United States should retain its “off-shore defense positions (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa [Taiwan], Philippines, Australia and New Zealand), even at the grave risk of general war.” This statement went beyond NSC 48/5, which had stated only that the United States should maintain the security of these positions. The commitment to defend Taiwan was separately affirmed in NSC 146, drafted at the same time, which dealt with Nationalist China.3

NSC 148 contained estimates of the cost of the aid programs needed to attain US Far Eastern objectives. For FY 1953 the figure was $1.277 billion, as compared with $1.292 billion in FY 1951 and $1.200 billion in FY 1952. For FY 1954 the estimate was far higher: $1.385 billion exclusive of South Korea, which would require from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion, depending on various alternative courses of military action then under consideration. Alarmed at these prospective costs, the National Security Council voted on 8 April 1953 to defer action on NSC 148 pending review of the figures.4 Thereafter NSC 148 disappeared from the NSC agenda, and more than a year was to elapse before the Council again discussed Far Eastern policy as a whole. The subject received some attention in NSC 162/2, which reaffirmed the importance of the “off-shore island chain” and warned against any major withdrawal of forces from either the Far East or Europe.

NSC 146, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved,5 was also considered briefly by the Council on 8 April 1953 and deferred for later action.6 In slightly amended form, as NSC 146/2, it was adopted by the National Security Council on 5 November 1953.7 NSC 146/2 stated that the United States would defend Taiwan at the risk of war. It provided also that the United States would continue to develop the military capabilities of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, for defensive purposes and for such offensive actions as might be in the US interest.
Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

Nationalist raids against communist territory and commerce were to be encouraged, but US forces were not to be committed for the purpose. Covert assistance would be furnished the Nationalists in their liaison with and logistical support of guerrillas on the mainland. 8

On the same date, 5 November 1953, the Council also approved NSC 166/1, dealing with Communist China. In this policy paper, two possible courses of action toward the Peking regime were considered and rejected: an attempt to win friendship by concessions, and military action by US forces, or by those of the Nationalists with US support. The selected alternative was a policy of restraining military action by Communist China, using armed force if necessary, while seeking to reduce that nation's relative power in various ways, as by providing military and economic aid to other nations or perhaps by promoting collective defense arrangements. In approving NSC 166/1, the Council adopted an amendment suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make clear the US commitment to support Nationalist China. 9

The National Security Council had approved NSC 146/2 despite the misgivings of some members over the volume and cost of aid envisioned for the Chinese Nationalists in current and projected mutual defense assistance programs. The Council was torn between a desire to assist Chiang Kai-shek's forces and an urge to reduce the amount of money spent on military assistance. Following further discussion of these alternatives, the National Security Council on 4 February 1954 asked the Department of Defense to review the missions envisioned for the Nationalists. At the same time, the Council called on the Department to suggest ways of developing a position of military strength in the Far East. 10

This request was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replied on 9 April 1954. They pointed out that the creation of a strong position required the formulation of a comprehensive policy that would view the Far East as a single strategic entity. They recommended a pooling of the strength of the noncommunist countries in a regional defense arrangement, with an integrated military command, which would be supported by the United States and possibly other Western nations. Until such an organization could be established, bilateral or multilateral treaties among noncommunist Asian nations should be encouraged.

In any regional organization, Japan must play a key role, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They therefore recommended that the United States provide continuing assistance in developing Japanese armed forces, which were increasing very slowly, and that US influence be exerted to induce other Asian nations to overcome their fear of a rearmed Japan. 11

This memorandum was placed on the NSC agenda as NSC 5416. Adopting a suggestion by Secretary Wilson, the Council referred it to the Planning Board for a comprehensive statement of policy on the subject. 12 There it was pigeonholed and eventually laid aside, apparently because the attention of the Council was absorbed by the Indochina crisis that developed in the spring of 1954.

This crisis is described in more detail below. It ended on 21 July 1954 with an agreement under which France lost her foothold in Southeast Asia. This radical alteration in the Far Eastern political and military situation spurred the National
Security Council to a new reexamination of policies for that part of the globe. On 22 July the NSC members called on the Planning Board for a report on the subject.\(^\text{13}\)

In reply, the Board circulated NSC 5429, which suggested a security treaty linking the Southeast Asian countries with the Western Powers, Australia, and New Zealand—a plan that was already under consideration and was soon to eventuate in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This arrangement, according to NSC 5429, should be tied in with another embracing the Philippines, Japan, Nationalist China, and South Korea.

On the crucial issue of Communist China, the Planning Board submitted four alternative lines of action in NSC 5429, leaving it to the Council to choose among them. They ranged from an attempt to placate the Peking government to a militant policy that would barely stop short of overt attack.\(^\text{14}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized NSC 5429 on the grounds that it did not constitute that comprehensive policy, embracing the Far East as a strategic entity, for which they had argued in their memorandum of 9 April 1954.\(^\text{15}\) The Council nevertheless adopted it, with some changes, as NSC 5429/2. The members voted for an intermediate course of action toward Communist China that called for the United States to reduce that nation’s power in Asia “even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking war.” Any overt act of belligerency on the part of China would be resisted forcibly. In case of covert invasion or subversion, according to NSC 5429/2, the United States might decide to intervene with military force if requested by a legitimate local government, but any such decision would be preceded by a request for Congressional approval. These decisions were temporary, pending review of policy toward Communist China within approximately a month.\(^\text{16}\)

Meanwhile, as described earlier, General James A. Van Fleet had completed his mission to the Far East. On his return, in addition to making recommendations concerning the individual countries that he had visited, he submitted conclusions on the Far East as a whole. His general view was alarming. Communist China, he predicted, would regard its victory at the Geneva Conference as but a first installment, and would press on toward its objective of controlling all Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and ultimately all of Southeast Asia. Only vigorous US leadership, he felt sure, could reverse the declining fortunes of noncommunist Asia.

Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff a few months earlier, General Van Fleet saw noncommunist Asia as virtually indefensible except through collective security. He endorsed the JCS proposal for a comprehensive security pact. He recommended that the two US commands having responsibilities for Asia, CINCFE and CINCPAC, be merged, and that a central office be created, analogous to the US mission to NATO, to provide liaison with the proposed Asian alliance.\(^\text{17}\)

The National Security Council reviewed these recommendations on 28 October 1954, but apparently gave them little consideration. The Council tentatively approved a recommendation by Secretary of State Dulles that US policy in the Far East be guided by a desire to avoid offering provocation to Communist China and that the United States conclude a mutual defense treaty with National-
ist China under terms that would scrupulously avoid any encouragement to Chiang to attack the mainland. This decision, which was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, amounted to a rejection of the more positive measures recommended in General Van Fleet’s report.18

On 2 November the Council reaffirmed this decision and directed the Planning Board to submit a revised statement of Far Eastern policy. The ultimate result of this action was NSC 5429/5, which the Council adopted on 21 December 1954, except for a few paragraphs that were left for later action.19 The general posture defined in this paper—a willingness to defend the nation’s vital interests “at the risk of but without being provocative of war”—reflected the cautious approach that had been recommended by Secretary Dulles. The United States would continue to protect the offshore island chain, and would retain forces in the Far East as evidence of its intention to do so. NSC 5429/5 specified also that the United States would continue to support the Chinese Nationalists, but it laid down careful qualifications regarding the conditions under which the United States would defend Taiwan or would reply to hostile actions against US ships in waters around Taiwan. The principal innovation in NSC 5429/5 was a statement that the United States would act to prevent Indonesia from falling into hostile hands. Thus, in effect, Indonesia was incorporated into the offshore island chain.

The Indochina Crisis

The National Security Council had made it clear, in the policy papers adopted in 1953 and 1954, that the United States would fight to maintain its position in the Western Pacific. Whether it would do so to maintain a foothold for itself, or for its allies, on the mainland of Asia was a question that had to be faced by the Council in connection with the Indochina crisis of 1954. The war scare engendered by this crisis had passed away by the end of the year, but while it lasted it profoundly affected discussions of national policy, strategy, and force levels by the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The danger of a conflict in Indochina grew out of a revolt against French rule in Vietnam that had begun in 1946. French forces, aided by those loyal to the native Vietnamese government, sought without success to put down the rebellious Viet Minh (communist) guerrillas. By the end of 1952 the military situation appeared stalemate. In reality, the chances of French victory were declining, as the French people slackened in their willingness to continue the long struggle.20

The United States viewed sympathetically the French attempt to prevent Vietnam from falling under communist rule. NSC 124/2, approved by the National Security Council and the President in June 1952, provided that the United States would furnish military assistance to French and loyal Vietnamese forces, but would not commit its own forces unless Communist China entered the struggle. In that case, the United States would intervene with naval and air forces, provided it could obtain the approval of its major allies or of the United Nations.21
President Eisenhower continued this policy of aid without involvement. Throughout 1953 and early 1954, his administration provided additional aid in the form of cash or military equipment—principally aircraft, for which the French forces had a particular need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these grants of assistance, though usually with some reluctance inspired by evidence of the ineptitude of French commanders in using their material resources. Simultaneously the administration pressed the French Government to improve its political strategy by making it clear to the people of Indochina that the French objective was self-government for the region rather than restoration of colonial rule.

Neither aid nor exhortation sufficed to prevent the French military position from deteriorating. In November 1953 French forces seized an isolated position at Dien Bien Phu, in northwestern Vietnam, confident that, in case of necessity, it could be supplied by air. Soon it became apparent that the French command had seriously miscalculated. The occupying troops were invested by Viet Minh forces equipped with effective antiaircraft artillery. The outpost soon assumed a political and psychological importance far beyond its military value. Meanwhile, morale in the French homeland sagged further; voices were heard demanding negotiations to end the war.

The problem of the weakening of French resolve was considered in NSC 5405, which the National Security Council approved on 14 January 1954.22 In this paper, the Council declared that, from the US viewpoint, there was no satisfactory alternative to French military victory, and that the United States should make every effort to prevent France from ending the war on terms inconsistent with US objectives. Negotiations for a ceasefire would be highly undesirable, according to NSC 5405, until the French military position had improved. If France did enter into discussions with her enemies, the United States should insist on being consulted.23

On 25 January 1954 a conference of the foreign ministers of the three major Western Powers and the Soviet Union opened in Berlin. Out of this meeting came an agreement to hold a conference on Far Eastern problems at Geneva to begin on 26 April. There was no doubt that the agenda of this conference would include Indochina. Unless the French military situation could be retrieved, the outcome of the conference might prove disastrous to the US position in Asia.

NSC 124/2 and NSC 5404 had contained provisions to meet the possibility that the United States might participate in the defense of Indochina, but only as a consequence of overt Chinese intervention. That the Viet Minh might alone prove strong enough to force a French withdrawal, and that the United States might be compelled to act with its own forces to prevent such a contingency, had been considered as early as June 1953. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had prepared a report that stressed the harmful consequences of the loss of Indochina and recommended that any US intervention, if it were undertaken, should be on a scale large enough to insure success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken no action on this report except to note its contents, but its conclusions were considered by the Planning Board in December 1953 in connection with the development of NSC 177, the paper that became NSC 5405.

The Council considered the possibility of US intervention on 8 January 1954.
Admiral Radford suggested a strike by US aircraft if the French faced defeat at Dien Bien Phu. President Eisenhower left open the possibility of such action, but he ruled out any use of US ground forces. In the end, the Council took no action except to instruct the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to consider means of aiding the French short of outright military intervention. The ultimate result, after several weeks of discussion, was another transfusion of US aid in the form of aircraft and, still later, of maintenance personnel.

In preparation for the Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military advice on the situation in Indochina. They replied that there was no acceptable alternative to continuation of the war until a satisfactory settlement could be obtained. They recommended that the Council consider the possibility of US military intervention, alone or in concert with other nations.

The National Security Council discussed this recommendation on 25 March 1954. President Eisenhower laid down four conditions that must be met before he would approve any US military action in Indochina. There must be, he said: (1) a request for help from the Associated States of Indochina; (2) approval by the United Nations; (3) cooperation of major US allies; and (4) prior Congressional approval. The Council directed the Planning Board to prepare a report on the possibility of US intervention.

On 31 March, as the situation grew more critical at Dien Bien Phu, Admiral Radford asked his JCS colleagues whether they favored an immediate offer of assistance by US Naval Air and/or Air Force units. They all were opposed and Admiral Radford, alone, supported such an offer. Several days later, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the Marine Corps elaborated their positions. General Ridgway was emphatic in his opposition, largely on the grounds that such intervention would greatly increase the risk of general war. Admiral Carney and General Shepherd doubted that such assistance to the French would be decisive. General Twining would give qualified support to US naval and air intervention provided that the French granted sovereignty to the Associated States, trained and organized indigenous forces under indigenous leadership, accepted US command of air and naval elements under a French theater commander, and accepted US leadership in troop training and in the use of combat forces. Since it appeared unlikely that General Twining’s conditions would be met, Admiral Radford remained the only JCS member to favor US air and naval intervention in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, when the NSC Planning Board submitted its report, it did not attempt to answer the question of whether or not to intervene. It merely recommended that the Council render a prompt decision, and set forth various actions to be taken if intervention were decided upon: consultation with Congress, preparations for mobilization, and establishment of a regional military and political alliance linking the Western Big Three with the independent countries of Southeast Asia. When the Council discussed this report on 6 April 1954, the members evidenced a reluctance to face the crucial question of military intervention. Secretary Dulles reported that he had found little support for such a step on the part of allied nations. The discussion swung to the proposal for a regional alliance, which was already beginning to appear as an alternative to military
intervention as a means of strengthening the West's bargaining position. In the end, the Council decided that the United States should press this project while seeking to obtain British support for US objectives in the Far East.²⁷

During the next few weeks it became evident that the United Kingdom would not cooperate in military action in Vietnam, at least until an effort had been made to settle the conflict at Geneva. Discussions between Secretary Dulles and the British Government, and conversations in London between Admiral Radford and the British Chiefs of Staff, made this clear. Thus, one of the conditions for US intervention, as defined by President Eisenhower, did not obtain. Secretary Dulles so informed Congressional leaders on 5 May, and the issue was thus settled for all intents and purposes.

The opening of the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 did not at once end the fighting. Hostilities continued even after the defenders of Dien Bien Phu capitulated on 7 May. Three months of bargaining elapsed before a settlement emerged, embodied in a set of agreements signed on 21 July 1954. Under its terms, the hostile forces in Vietnam were to be regrouped on either side of a demarcation line running along the 17th parallel—Viet Minh forces to the north, those of the French Union to the south. There was to be a general election in 1956 to choose a government for the entire country. Cambodia and Laos, which had also been the scene of hostilities, were included in the settlement. International commissions were to supervise the execution of the agreements.²⁸ With these agreements, the Indochina crisis of 1954 receded into history. It was not apparent at the time that the settlement had laid the groundwork for greater difficulties in Vietnam in later years.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

In voting tentative approval on 6 April 1954 for a regional security organization in Southeast Asia, the National Security Council had planned that it would include the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Associated States of Indochina—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—had also been envisioned as potential members, but their participation became impossible under the terms of the Geneva settlement.

The projected organization took shape as a result of Anglo-American cooperation. In June 1954 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred in Washington with President Eisenhower. The conferees agreed that they would press forward with plans for collective defense in Southeast Asia regardless of the outcome of the Geneva Conference, which was still in progress. Immediately after this meeting, the two governments established a Joint Study Group on Southeast Asia. The US membership was headed by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. The Department of Defense provided representatives, but none were drawn from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁹

In six meetings held between 7 and 17 July, the members of this group agreed
on most of the provisions of a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia. There was some disagreement between the two parties over the membership of the proposed organization. The British team urged that, before the treaty was negotiated, an attempt should be made to obtain the participation, or at least the acquiescence, of the members of the so-called "Colombo Plan"—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. The US view was that the organization should be brought into being as soon as possible and that any attempt to obtain the cooperation of these nations would only delay its inception.^[30]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the draft security treaty, although they pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the organization envisioned therein would not meet the need for a larger Asian alliance such as they had recommended in their memorandum of 9 April. They warned that the United States should make no commitment to provide military or economic assistance to the organization or to deploy forces in support of it. They suggested also that the Japanese Government be kept informed of the negotiations.^[31]

Details of the proposed new organization were worked out in a conference held in Manila in September. The prospective list of members was enlarged to take in Pakistan, which accepted an invitation to attend, but the other Colombo Plan members were not included. The final Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed on 8 September 1954, was essentially similar to the original US draft. The signatories were the Western Big Three, Australia, New Zealand, and three purely Asian nations: Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. The parties pledged themselves to maintain and develop their capacity "to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without." They agreed that, in case of armed attack in the treaty area, each member would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." If the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of any member were threatened in any way other than by armed attack, the parties would consult on the measures to be taken. The treaty area was defined as including Southeast Asia, the entire territory of the Asian signatories, and the Southwest Pacific south of latitude 21 degrees, 30 minutes north, a boundary that excluded Taiwan and Hong Kong. A council was to be established to consider ways of implementing the treaty. A protocol stipulated that the treaty provisions relating to action in case of armed attack or other threat would be applicable also to Cambodia, Laos, and the southern half of Vietnam. By a separate Pacific Charter, signed at the same time, the eight member nations proclaimed their intention to resist any attempt "to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity" and to cooperate in economic, social, and cultural matters.^[32]

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization created by the Manila Pact fell short of the wider Asian regional defense arrangement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had desired. Whether or not it would turn out to be the nucleus of a more comprehensive organization remained to be determined by future events.
Taiwan: Chiang Kai-shek’s Forces Unleashed

The island of Taiwan, lying approximately 100 miles off the coast of China, had provided a refuge for Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces when they fled the mainland after their defeat in 1949. The retention of this island in friendly hands was a matter of great concern to the United States. Shortly after the Korean War broke out, President Truman had ordered the US Seventh Fleet to take Taiwan under its protection, and at the same time to prevent Chiang’s forces from launching attacks against the mainland.

By the beginning of 1953 Chiang’s shattered forces had been reorganized and, with US assistance, had grown much stronger. The survival of the Nationalist regime no longer seemed precarious. Some of President Eisenhower’s supporters contended that President Truman’s order served as a mantle of protection for the communists. They urged that the Nationalist forces be unleashed and left free to strike against the mainland as opportunity offered.

Giving heed to these opinions, President Eisenhower lost no time in amending the 1950 order. On 2 February 1953, in his State of the Union address, he declared that there was “no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists.” Therefore, he announced, he was issuing instructions “that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China.” But, he added, “this order implies no aggressive intent on our part.”

It soon became clear, however, that the new administration had no intention of supporting any adventurist policy on the part of Chiang. The US Ambassador in Taiwan, Mr. Karl Rankin, in notifying Chiang in advance of the President’s impending announcement, asked for and received an oral promise that the Nationalists would undertake no significant attacks on communist territory without consulting the United States, through the chief of the US MAAG in Taipei. The National Security Council decided on 8 April 1953 that CINCPAC should be instructed to obtain a formal written promise on this matter, and that delivery of jet aircraft en route to Taiwan under the mutual aid program would be suspended until Chiang complied. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated the Council’s action and had already instructed CINCPAC to cooperate with the Ambassador in seeking the necessary assurance.

On 23 April 1953 Ambassador Rankin received a note verbale containing the required promise. The Nationalist Government agreed to consult the United States before undertaking any offensive operations against the Chinese mainland that would “radically alter the pattern or tempo of the operations hitherto undertaken.” The meaning of the latter phrase was to be determined jointly by the head of the US MAAG and the Chief of the Nationalist General Staff, General Chow Chih-jou. Five days later General Vandenberg, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the National Security Council that, in light of this promise, aircraft shipments to Taiwan had been resumed.

These actions left Chiang Kai-shek almost as securely leashed as before. His only gain, if such it was, had been to move from a blanket prohibition against
offensive action to a requirement to obtain US permission in advance of any such step.

Military Aid for the Republic of China

The Nationalist forces were relatively small in comparison to those actually or potentially available to the Chinese Communists, but they were of considerable value in view of the general military weakness of noncommunist Asia. Recognizing this fact, President Truman, with approval of Congress, had initiated a program of military assistance to Chiang's government and had dispatched a Military Assistance Advisory Group to the island.  

At the beginning of 1953 Chiang Kai-shek had at his disposal an army made up of 28 infantry divisions and four armored groups (12 battalions); a navy of 86 vessels; a marine corps of two brigades; and an air force consisting of four groups of fighter bombers, two of bombers, and two of transport aircraft, plus one photographic reconnaissance squadron (a total of 8\textsuperscript{1/3} groups, or 25 squadrons). The strength of these forces totalled approximately 478,400 men, of which 375,000 were in the Army. These figures did not include the Combined Service Force, a unified logistics command, nor did it include guerrillas and irregulars. The entire military establishment was under the direction of the Ministry of National Defense, which had its own joint military staff headed by General Chow Chih-jou.  

The Nationalist forces were in process of being reorganized, consolidated, and reequipped to make them more formidable even though somewhat smaller. The US mutual defense assistance program for Nationalist China was designed to facilitate this process. As a basis for the MDA program for FY 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953 recommended 21 infantry divisions (291,000 men), 82 ships, and an air force of the same size as then existing (25 squadrons) but including six squadrons of fighter aircraft in place of an equivalent number of bombers. For FY 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the addition of ten more vessels (patrol craft) for the navy and a squadron of all-weather interceptors for the air force. The Nationalists' own force objectives for FY 1954, which included units not receiving MDAP support, were a 340,000-man army and a navy of 206 vessels, of which 112 would be small landing craft (LCM/LCVP).  

NSC 146, the policy statement on Nationalist China drafted by the Planning Board in March 1953, specified that military aid to the Nationalists would continue beyond FY 1954. A revised version, NSC 146/1, set forth in some detail the objectives of the assistance program. The intention was to develop forces that would be able to undertake more effective raids against the Communist mainland; would continue to represent a threat to Communist China and add significantly to the strategic reserves potentially available to the free world in the Far East; would have an increased capability for the defense of Taiwan; and, if provided with US air, naval, and logistic support, would be able to initiate large-scale
amphibious operations. By implication, then, these were the missions envisioned for Nationalist forces in US strategy. The costs of the aid program were estimated in NSC 146/1 at $427.4 million, $345.8 million, and $311.7 million for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956 respectively—a total of over a billion dollars, as compared with only $578.6 million for fiscal years 1951 through 1953.41

These cost figures drew attack when the National Security Council discussed NSC 146/1 on 5 November 1953. Members of the Council, who less than a month earlier had demurred at the projected size of the US military budget, were in no mood to accept without question the idea of placing such sums at the disposal of a foreign government. Some doubted that Chiang’s forces were of any value. President Eisenhower believed that it was desirable to strengthen the Nationalists’ air and naval forces, but he criticized the existing aid program as based on the fixed D-day concept discarded by his administration.42

Although the Council adopted NSC 146/1 (in a somewhat amended version, NSC 146/2), it did so with the stipulation that the Department of Defense would review the Taiwan aid program.43 Secretary Wilson accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit new recommendations for Nationalist force levels.44

The Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the matter over the next two months. They consulted CINCPAC, Admiral Felix B. Stump, and Major General William C. Chase, USA, Chief of the MAAG on Taiwan, and considered two reports by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee.45 Contrary to the hopes of the members of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a larger, and hence a more expensive, aid program was needed for Nationalist China. They so advised Secretary Wilson on 18 January 1954. For the Nationalist army, they proposed that the MDAP force basis be increased to 357,000 by inclusion of various higher headquarters and technical services. They recommended 212 ships (including small landing craft) for the navy and an increase to three brigades for the marine corps. All these objectives should be achieved by the end of FY 1955 (or FY 1956 at the latest). For the air force, they recommended an additional squadron of all-weather fighters during FY 1956 (producing a total of 26 squadrons and 562 aircraft) and complete modernization, with jets and modern transports, by the end of FY 1957.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that the administration might be unwilling to allocate the funds necessary to support these forces. In that case, they recommended, the missions envisioned for the Nationalists in NSC 146/2 should be revised to adapt them to whatever forces could be supported with the money that was available.46

In transmitting the JCS proposals to the National Security Council, Secretary Wilson explained that tentative guidelines for the FY 1955 and FY 1956 military aid programs made it unlikely that money would be available to meet the JCS goals for Nationalist China. He urged a review of the missions of Nationalist forces.47 The Council accordingly decided on 4 February 1954 that the Department of Defense should review the relevant paragraph of NSC 146/2 and reconsider Nationalist force levels.48 Referring this decision to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 February, Secretary Wilson suggested that they consider the possibility of
a stretch-out of their proposed force goals or a diversion of money from other programs.49

The review of Chinese Nationalist force goals was accomplished as part of a broad reexamination of the entire MDA program in light of the New Look. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1953 had appointed an ad hoc committee to make this reexamination. In a report submitted on 26 March 1954, embracing recommendations for the MDA program through FY 1958, the committee proposed that the FY 1954 goals for Nationalist China, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953 for the MDA program, be projected through FY 1958 with only minor changes. An aid program tied to these objectives, with a scale of equipment for Nationalist forces somewhat lower than originally planned, would cost $494.9 million for the four years 1955-1958, according to the committee’s estimate.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the committee’s recommendations for Nationalist China and included them without change in an amended version of the report that they sent to the Secretary of Defense, with their approval, on 17 June 1954.51 Earlier, on 19 May, they had adopted the committee’s proposed Nationalist force bases in their recommendations for the FY 1956 MDA program, which Secretary Wilson approved on 15 July 1954.52

On 27 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson a memorandum intended as the basis for an official response to the Council’s request of 4 February 1954 for a review of Nationalist force levels. They characterized the ad hoc committee’s program for Nationalist China as the best attainable under the circumstances, but asserted that the larger forces they had recommended in January 1954 were essential for accomplishment of the missions stated in NSC 146/2. They opposed any change in these missions or any diversion of funds from other programs.53

Before the Secretary of Defense acted on these recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to evaluate two other proposals regarding the size of Nationalist forces. Both had been devised by the Nationalist Government, and both called for increases. In 1953 the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei had drafted a proposal referred to as the “Kai Plan,” which was intended to enable Nationalist forces to undertake limited offensives against the mainland. It called for an army of 41 divisions, an air force of 33 squadrons, and a navy strengthened by the addition of 118 landing craft. All these objectives were to be achieved by the end of calendar year 1955, at a cost (according to the Nationalists’ own estimate) of $1.344 billion, over and above the aid program already requested for FY 1955.

Admiral Radford had seen this plan when he visited Taiwan in December 1953. The following month Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh sent him a revised copy, asking that it be passed on to President Eisenhower.54 Another copy was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Chase, who pronounced it completely infeasible because of its cost and of the inflationary effects it would have on Taiwan’s economy. Admiral Stump concurred in this judgment.55

Pending execution of this plan, the Nationalists proposed to reorganize their
28-division army into 24 divisions. They asked the United States to provide support for all of these units, although the current MDA program was based on only 21 divisions. Foreign Minister Yeh, seeking Admiral Radford’s approval of this extra assistance, justified the request on the grounds that to reduce the army below 24 divisions would adversely affect morale, since it would create an impression that the Nationalist Government had abandoned hope of returning to the mainland. The 24 divisions would be maintained at only 82 percent of authorized strength, he continued, and hence there would be little or no increase in manpower as compared with the 21 divisions currently projected.

Admiral Radford referred the request to the Office of Military Assistance in OSD. The reply prepared in that office was to the effect that no funds were available to equip three more divisions. The head of the office, Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, in returning this answer, pointed out that the 24 divisions need not have full equipment, and he urged that the plan be approved. But General Chase, whom Admiral Radford consulted, believed it was tactically unsound to distribute 21 sets of divisional equipment among 24 divisions. He had already told Chiang, he said, that he was agreeable to the 24-division plan provided that no additional US aid was required.

Admiral Radford then sent a tactful reply to Foreign Minister Yeh, expressing interest in the plan but noting General Chase’s reservations. He suggested that it and the more ambitious Kai Plan be submitted to General Van Fleet, who would visit Taiwan in the near future.

These exchanges had consumed the first half of 1954. In mid-July the 24-division reorganization scheme and the Kai Plan were formally referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee pointed out that both envisioned forces larger than those thought necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to Nationalist forces under NSC 146/2. No consideration should be given to the support of Nationalist forces larger than those recommended in March 1954 by the JCS ad hoc committee on military assistance.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these conclusions on 17 September. Without formally consulting Secretary Wilson, they informed Admiral Stump and General Chase that they had noted the two plans and contemplated no changes in the approved force bases for FYs 1955 and 1956.

General Van Fleet had meanwhile completed his survey of Chinese Nationalist military forces and submitted proposals of his own. He recommended 24 divisions, but suggested that half of them be skeletonized during peacetime. He proposed that the Nationalist navy be limited to 83 ships and the air force be reduced to 14 squadrons. In his view, Nationalist China and other noncommunist nations of Asia should rely on the United States to furnish most of the naval and air forces in the Far East.

Secretary Wilson had as yet taken no official action on Chinese Nationalist force levels, except to approve those that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended as part of the FY 1956 MDA program. On 21 September 1954 he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff again to review Nationalist objectives in light of General Van Fleet’s conclusions. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to comply for some months, and there was no further discussion of the subject during 1954.
The attention of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
drawn to a dangerous situation developing in the Taiwan Strait, which was to
occupy much of their attention in the succeeding months.

Threat to the Offshore Islands

When Chiang Kai-shek and his forces withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, they
were able to retain control of three small groups of islands lying within a
few miles of the mainland. These were the Tachen, the Matsu, and the Quemoy
(also called Kinmen or Chinmen) Islands. The first of these lies approximately
200 miles north of Taiwan’s northern tip; the other two are located in the Taiwan
Strait, opposite the west coast of Taiwan. Collectively, they were often referred
to as the offshore islands.66 Despite their minuscule size (the largest, Quemoy, is
about 11 miles long), their proximity to the mainland made them useful for
intelligence collection, for radar installations, and for launching raids against the
mainland.67

These islands were not under US protection. In 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Department of State had agreed that the United States would encourage
the Nationalists to defend them, but would not commit its own forces for the
purpose.68 This policy was not altered by President Eisenhower’s decision of 2
February 1953 regarding the Taiwan Strait, and was, in fact, made explicit in
NSC 146/2. On the other hand, another small archipelago, the Penghu (or
Pescadores), approximately 30 miles west of Taiwan, was considered essential to
the security of Taiwan, according to NSC 146/2, and would be defended by the
United States.69

Admiral Radford, while serving as CINCPAC, had sought without success to
persuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the offshore islands were integral to
Taiwan’s defense. He continued to put forth this view after he became Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His colleagues, however, would go so far only as to
agree that these islands were important to US security and to include in the US
aid program enough landing and patrol craft to enable Chiang to strengthen
their defenses.70

The Nationalist Government also desired the United States to extend its
protection to the offshore islands. In March and April 1954 the Nationalist Minis-
try of National Defense warned of a possible attack on these islands and asked
the United States to assist in their defense if necessary.71 The administration
took no action at that time, but the matter reached the agenda of the National
Security Council on 27 May, when the Director of Central Intelligence declared
that the Tachens were in danger of attack. President Eisenhower authorized
elements of the US Seventh Fleet during their regular patrol of Taiwanese waters,
to pay friendly visits to these islands.72

As 1954 advanced, the threat to the offshore islands assumed more substance.
In August 1954, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai of Communist China declared that
Taiwan should be liberated as an exercise of China’s sovereignty.73 It could be
assumed that liberation would be preceded by an attack on the islands near the mainland. On 24 August Secretary of State Dulles declared that the United States would be justified in defending some of the offshore islands. He did not indicate which ones he had in mind.\textsuperscript{74}

Exactly what the United States should do if the offshore islands were attacked became an issue in the National Security Council on 18 August 1954. The members called on the Department of Defense for a report on this question.\textsuperscript{75} Acting Secretary Anderson referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn passed it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.\textsuperscript{76}

In a report submitted on 31 August, the Committee concluded that the offshore islands were not essential to the defense of Taiwan but that the political and psychological effects of their loss would be highly detrimental to the US strategic position. The members therefore urged that the United States aid the Nationalists to prevent the loss of certain selected offshore islands, which they did not name. This recommendation was approved by Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, and General Twining, with the stipulation that any US assistance in defending the islands should be limited to air and naval action. It was opposed by General Ridgway, who believed that the islands were militarily unimportant to the United States and that the political and psychological considerations were beyond the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These views were sent to Secretary Wilson on 7 September 1954.\textsuperscript{77}

On the following day the issue assumed immediate relevance. Communist artillery on the mainland began shelling the Quemoy Islands. For a time it was feared that an invasion might be impending. Secretary Dulles, then in Manila to assist in the conclusion of the Southeast Asia Treaty, cabled his view that Quemoy should be defended if possible and asked the advice of the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{78}

As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon for another report, which they submitted on 11 September. Once again they split. The majority (including General Shepherd in this instance) believed that Quemoy, though not essential to the defense of Taiwan, should and could be defended with US air and naval help, provided the responsible US commander were given freedom of action to strike when and where necessary. General Ridgway denied any military value to Quemoy, and warned that a successful defense would require US troops—at least a full division.\textsuperscript{79}

Admiral Radford presented the views of the JCS members to the National Security Council on 12 September at a meeting held in Denver, where the President was vacationing. Secretary Dulles was present, having returned from Manila. Perhaps as a result of his discussions with other representatives at Manila, he now threw his weight against military action. Instead, the Secretary suggested that the offshore islands be neutralized under a UN declaration, and that the United States explore this possibility with Nationalist China and other friendly powers. President Eisenhower favored this suggestion and asked him to investigate its possibility.\textsuperscript{80} On 6 October 1954 Secretary Dulles reported to the Council that the neutralization plan appeared feasible.\textsuperscript{81}
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China

The principal obstacle to neutralization of the offshore islands was likely to be the objection of the Chinese Nationalists, to whom such a step would probably appear as a retreat in the face of communist aggression. But it was possible that the United States might win Chiang Kai-shek’s consent by offering at the same time to enter into a mutual defense treaty. The Nationalist Government had been seeking such a pact since the conclusion of a similar one between the United States and South Korea in August 1953. Secretary of State Dulles had opposed it, however, on the grounds that it might involve the United States in hostilities with Communist China.82

The offer of a mutual defense treaty as a quid pro quo for Chiang’s acceptance of the neutralization proposal was suggested by President Eisenhower. Reporting this fact to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Dulles indicated his impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already approved the conclusion of such a treaty. However, when Secretary Wilson sought their advice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 13 October that, from a military viewpoint, the status quo in relations with the Nationalists was preferable to a formal security pact.83

This advice was not taken; the administration proceeded with plans for a mutual security treaty. The subject came up for discussion in the National Security Council on 28 October 1954. Secretary Dulles presented his views with regard to the treaty and its relation to US strategic policy in the Far East. He pointed out that the US intention had always been to defend the nation’s interests without provoking war. “We want peace,” he said, “so long as this does not involve the sacrifice of our vital interests or fundamental moral principles.” The actions taken by the United States since 1951, he continued, reflected this general approach: the conclusion of defensive treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; the termination of the Korean War; and the acceptance of the Geneva settlement in Indochina as the alternative to unilateral US intervention. Turning to US policy toward the two Chinas, he found it essentially sound but in need of some revision. He therefore submitted the following specific recommendations:

1. The United States should conclude a mutual security treaty with the Nationalists, covering Taiwan and the Pescadores but not the offshore islands. Such a treaty would provide a sounder legal basis for the US commitment to defend Taiwan, which now rested solely upon President Truman’s 1950 order to the Seventh Fleet.

2. This treaty should be strictly defensive in nature. “It would not be consistent with our basic policy of non-provocation of war,” said Mr. Dulles, “were the United States to commit itself to the defense of Formosa, thus making it a ‘privileged sanctuary,’ while it was used, directly or indirectly, for offensive operations against the Chics.”

3. The immediate threat to the offshore islands should be referred to the United Nations, without prejudice to the question of the ultimate disposition of these islands.84
The Secretary’s emphasis on the defensive nature of the treaty aroused the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were present at the meeting. Despite their opposition, the President tentatively approved Mr. Dulles’ recommendations, subject to reconsideration at a special meeting on 2 November, at which time the JCS views would receive a fuller hearing.85

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at least the majority of them, viewed this action as an ill-considered alteration of the policy embodied in NSC 162/2—a policy, they recalled, that had sought to recapture for the United States the initiative in the struggle with the communist world. They foresaw disastrous effects on the morale of the Nationalist forces if hopes of returning to the mainland were thwarted by the proposed treaty. Over the next few days, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerted themselves in preparing for the next NSC meeting, at which they hoped for a reversal of the President’s decision.86

In the end, their effort failed. The National Security Council heard the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 November 1954, then reaffirmed the decision of 28 October.87 This action was in keeping with others taken by the Council about the same time, when the members rebuffed the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a more forcefully worded statement of basic national security policy.88

A draft of the mutual security treaty was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 10 November. By its terms, each nation would agree that an armed attack on the territories of either party would endanger its own peace and safety. The territories of the Republic of China were defined as including Taiwan, the Penghu, and such other territories as might be determined by mutual agreement. By an attached exchange of notes, the Nationalists would agree that any use of force on their part, other than emergency defensive action, would be a matter of joint agreement. In other words, the United States would be consulted before any offensive was launched.89

The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered no objection to the treaty except for one article that specified that US forces stationed in and around Taiwan would be for purposes of defense. Feeling that such language would amount to an invitation to the communists to seize the offshore islands, they preferred to say “for the purposes of this treaty.”90

Before these comments could reach the Department of State, Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh, who had come to Washington for the purpose, signed the treaty on 2 December 1954. The final text was identical with that sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff.91 Nonetheless, Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS views to the Department of State on 20 December.92 Secretary Dulles, in a reply on 5 January 1955, apologized for the premature signature of the treaty; he had thought that the Department of Defense had already given informal approval. However, he felt that no harm had been done; the phrase questioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be construed to provide as much latitude as was required in deploying US forces.93
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait

The substance of the NSC decisions of 28 October and 2 November 1954 was written into NSC 5429/5, which provided that the United States would seek to preserve the status of the offshore islands through UN action and would encourage the Nationalists to defend these islands (even to the extent of providing military assistance for the purpose), but would not commit US forces. No assistance or encouragement was to be given the Nationalists to engage in offensive actions, "except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President."

The same provision appeared in NSC 5441, a revised policy paper on Nationalist China prepared by the Planning Board in December 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found NSC 5441 acceptable. Before the Council could act on it, however, a new alarm arose that called for another reconsideration of policy.

On 10 January 1955, Communist Chinese bombers struck heavily at the Tachen Islands and inflicted severe damage. The Nationalists at once proposed to attack the mainland in reprisal. Theretofore the US commanders in the theater—CINCPAC and the Chief of the MAAG—could have authorized such action, but under NSC 5429/5 the request had to be referred to the President. Admiral Stump forwarded it with his endorsement and with a recommendation that Chiang’s forces be granted more leeway in case of future attacks from the mainland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation, and the President showed himself sympathetic to it.

The National Security Council considered the matter on 13 January 1955. The members adopted a carefully worded revision of the relevant paragraph of NSC 5429/5 that would allow the Nationalists more freedom without granting them carte blanche to assume the offensive. It specified that the United States should not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President [but should] agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U. S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu].

At the same time, the Council incorporated a similar statement into NSC 5441, then adopted it as NSC 5503.

The Council did not specify who was to determine whether a proposed Nationalist action met the new criteria. Doubtless with the approval of the President, Admiral Carney invested Admiral Stump with this authority. By that time the planned retaliation for the attack of 10 January 1955 had lost all value.

The new policy was soon put to the test. On 18 January the Chinese Communists, after a preliminary air and artillery assault, landed troops on
Ichiang, an islet west of the Tachens. The small garrison there was soon overwhelmed. Nationalist forces struck back with air attacks against ships in nearby mainland ports. At the same time, however, the Nationalists foresaw that they would be unable by their own efforts to prevent the communists from moving on to seize the Tachens. They asked the United States to lend assistance from the Seventh Fleet to defend those islands.

The National Security Council rejected this plea on 21 January 1955. The members decided that the United States would not defend the Tachen Islands, but would assist the Nationalists in evacuating and redeploying the garrison there. At the same time, in an important change of policy, the Council decided that Quemoy and Matsu would be defended against attacks that were believed to presage an assault upon Taiwan and the Penghu. The President would seek Congressional approval for this policy in the form of a joint resolution granting him freedom of action in defending Taiwan and the Penghu. The Council reaffirmed the conviction that the entire question of the offshore islands should be turned over to the United Nations.99

A resolution drafted in accord with the Council’s decision was sent to Congress on 24 January 1955. It would authorize the President

to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [Penghu] against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It was to expire when the President determined that the peace and security of the area were reasonably assured. In sending the resolution to Congress, Mr. Eisenhower warned of the possibility of an attack on Taiwan in the near future, but at the same time hinted at the impending evacuation of the Tachens. The United States, he said, should be ready to assist Chiang Kai-shek’s government to redeploy and consolidate its forces, some of which were scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons.100

Congressional action was swift. The House of Representatives approved the resolution on 24 January and the Senate on 28 January.101 Two weeks later, with the protection and assistance of the US Seventh Fleet, the Tachen garrison, consisting of both guerrillas and regulars, was evacuated, and the islands were promptly seized by communist forces.102

In succeeding weeks the crisis eased. The threat to Quemoy and Matsu failed to materialize, and the President had no occasion to use the authority granted him by the Congressional resolution. Meanwhile the UN Security Council, at US instigation, sought to arrange a formal cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait—an effort that was opposed by the Soviet Union and was contemptuously rejected by Communist China.103
The Problem of Japanese Rearmament

The state of war between the United States and Japan had been ended by a peace treaty signed on 8 September 1951. At the same time, the two nations concluded a mutual security treaty by which the United States received permission to retain forces in Japan and promised in return to defend that nation.104

The mutual security treaty underscored the strategic importance of Japan in US thinking. In NSC 125/2, approved on 7 August 1952, the National Security Council declared that the United States would fight to prevent Japanese territory from passing into hostile hands. The general objective of US policy toward Japan, according to NSC 125/2, was to create a stable, prosperous nation capable ultimately of defending itself.105

In approving NSC 125/2, President Truman directed the appropriate departments to prepare a program for carrying it out. A draft of this program was circulated on 30 March 1953. After endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and revision by the National Security Council, it was approved in June as NSC 125/6.106 It set forth various actions intended to strengthen Japan’s attachment to the Western alliance, such as assistance for Japanese trade relations and removal of sources of friction between Japan and other countries. Action along these lines was undertaken by the Eisenhower administration during the next few months.107

Another action called for in NSC 125/6—one that had behind it a history of interdepartmental controversy—was the return of the Amami Islands, in the northern part of the Ryukyu chain, to Japanese rule. The treaty of peace with Japan had authorized the United States to administer the Ryukyus pending the establishment of a UN trusteeship, which did not materialize. The Department of State had adopted the position that the United States should hand back the Amamis, which had especially close ties with Japan, as a gesture of good will. The Department of Defense opposed this plan on the grounds that US security interests required retention of all the Ryukyus in US hands.108 The National Security Council tentatively adopted the State Department recommendation on 25 June 1953, with a stipulation for a subsequent review before implementation, which, however, was never held. Secretary of State Dulles visited Tokyo in August 1953 and announced the decision.109

As finally stated in NSC 125/6, the US intention to relinquish civil administration over the Amami group was “subject to agreement with Japan on U. S. military rights in this group.” The desired rights were defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include unlimited access to the islands and freedom to construct any military installations considered essential to defense of the US base at Okinawa.110 In the formal transfer agreement, signed on 24 December 1953, Japan recognized that the Amami Islands bore a unique relationship to Far Eastern defense and agreed to give consideration to those requirements that the United States believed necessary to preserve, strengthen and facilitate the defense of the remaining islands of the Ryukyu group.111

Actions such as these could be expected to exert favorable influence on
Japanese public and official opinion and thus to contribute toward the US objective of a Japan friendly to the West. But another objective of US policy, affirmed in both NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, was far more difficult to attain. This was the creation of a Japanese capacity for self-defense. The obstacle to attainment of this objective was in large part a US creation. In the early days of the postwar occupation of Japan, the United States had given its blessing to a new Japanese constitution intended to forestall permanently any revival of militarism. It provided that Japan would "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation" and that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."¹¹²

The harsh light of the cold war soon revealed the unwisdom of this sweeping renunciation. Interpreted strictly, the Japanese constitution presented the United States with the choice of retaining its forces in Japan indefinitely or abandoning that nation to the tender mercies of her Soviet and Chinese Communist neighbors. To amend these provisions, in the state of Japanese public opinion after World War II, was out of the question. It was necessary to find a loophole in the constitution as written. However unequivocal the language of that document, it could hardly be construed as forbidding the maintenance of forces needed to maintain order inside the country. The creation of land and sea forces disguised as police was a subterfuge that had already been used by the Soviet Union in her East German satellite.

With US assistance, Japan's pro-Western government established a National Police Reserve, with a strength of 75,000 men. In 1952, the organization was renamed National Safety Force; it was enlarged to 110,000 men, and a Maritime, or Coastal, Safety Force was established, 7,500 strong. Both were placed under the direction of a newly created National Safety Agency. The United States supplied equipment on a loan basis, since Japan had not yet established her eligibility for grants of military assistance.¹¹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that the nascent Japanese forces would be expanded to enable Japan to assume a rightful share of her own defense responsibilities, and that Japan would soon be made eligible for US military aid. In submitting recommendations in October 1952 for the FY 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a Japanese ground force of 300,000 men in ten divisions, a naval force of 75 vessels and 12 antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and an air force of 27 squadrons.¹¹⁴ The ten-division goal was written into NSC 125/2. The US objectives had not, however, been formally discussed with the Japanese Government.

The air force question was particularly sensitive, since it would be difficult to argue that aircraft were needed for internal security. In October 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to CINCFE, General Mark W. Clark, that the time had come to approach the government of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida regarding the establishment of a Japanese air force. General Clark concurred after consulting Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.¹¹⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then drafted instructions to General Clark to discuss with the Japanese Government the general subject of Japanese rearmament, and specifically the question of an air force. On 9 January 1953 they submitted these
instructions to the Secretary of Defense for approval.\textsuperscript{116} The Secretary in turn passed them to the Department of State for coordination. Soon after the change of administration, the Secretary of State asked that the JCS instructions be amended to authorize General Clark, in conjunction with the Ambassador, to introduce the subject of a formal military assistance agreement if the occasion appeared propitious. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the amended instructions to General Clark on 10 March 1953.\textsuperscript{117}

Several months passed before General Clark and Ambassador John M. Allison, who replaced Ambassador Murphy in May 1953, judged it propitious to approach the Japanese Government. The political climate in the country was unfavorable to rearmament. Elections to the Diet in April 1953 had strengthened the parties opposed to such a course.\textsuperscript{118} Two months later, when the Director of the National Safety Agency, Mr. Tokutaro Kimura, admitted that he was considering a five-year plan to increase the National Safety Force to 200,000 men, so much criticism ensued that Mr. Kimura was constrained to insist that he had been misquoted by the press.\textsuperscript{119}

The military assistance agreement proved the least difficult of the matters in question. Negotiations for this purpose formally began in Tokyo on 15 July 1953, after the Japanese Government asked and received assurances that such an agreement would not require Japan to send troops abroad or to subordinate economic stability to rearmament.\textsuperscript{120} Meanwhile General Clark had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Deputy Director of the National Safety Agency had tentatively agreed to discuss the question of Japanese air defense. But General Clark believed it inadvisable at that time to bring up the question of a separate air force.\textsuperscript{121}

While awaiting the outcome of negotiations in Tokyo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began a study of ultimate force goals for Japan. In May 1953 Secretary Wilson asked them for recommendations on this matter, and also for comment on the possibility of an early increase in the National Safety Force beyond its authorized strength of four divisions—a matter of immediate importance in planning the FY 1954 mutual security program.\textsuperscript{122} Dealing first with the second of these requests, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a split report on 29 June. The Army member recommended that the United States seek an increase in the National Safety Force to six divisions in FY 1954. The other members thought that this question should be considered only in connection with overall Japanese force goals.\textsuperscript{123}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought the advice of General Clark, whose reply gave his assessment that the present Japanese Government was weak and evasive concerning its responsibilities for defense. He believed, and the Ambassador agreed, that it might accept a small increase in FY 1954, but warned that the decision would be based on local considerations and political intangibles.\textsuperscript{124} The Joint Chiefs of Staff left the matter in abeyance and turned to the problem of the Japanese military establishment as a whole.

Massive increases in the infant Japanese military services had meanwhile been proposed by US planners. On 25 May 1953, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted a plan designed to convert the Coastal Safety Force into an effective
navy in all but name. He recommended a fleet of four light aircraft carriers, three antiaircraft cruisers, 105 destroyers or destroyer escorts, 50 large minesweepers, and unspecified numbers of small minesweeping and patrol craft and of coastal submarines for training, plus 10 ASW patrol squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Several weeks later, CINCFE proposed that the National Safety Force be increased to 348,000 men in 15 divisions, plus a reserve of approximately 73,000. This increase would be accompanied by a major reorganization; the divisions, then organized on a US model with an authorized strength of 15,200, would be cut back to 12,022 each and streamlined to fit them for their defensive mission.

Recommendations drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 August 1953, endorsed both of these plans for the existing safety forces. At the same time, the Committee recommended an Air Safety Force of 36 squadrons (771 aircraft), to be composed of 27 squadrons of fighters, fighter bombers, and light bombers; three of tactical reconnaissance aircraft; and six of transports. The objective for the ground force should be reached by 1 October 1956; the goals for the other services by the end of FY 1960. The question of an immediate increase in the National Safety Force was unimportant, in the Committee’s view. The US objective should be to induce the Japanese to commit themselves to the ultimate goals listed in the JSPC report.

While this report was on the JCS agenda, Secretary of State Dulles made his trip to Tokyo, in the course of which he undertook to induce the Japanese Government to adopt a faster pace of rearmament. According to press reports, he pointed to South Korea, where the government had set its sights on a force of 20 divisions although its population was less than a quarter of Japan’s. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, insisted that it was impossible at that time for Japan to raise more than four divisions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took account of Mr. Dulles’ fruitless appeal when they reviewed the JSPC proposals. Since the Japanese were unable or unwilling at that time to move beyond four divisions, was it desirable for the United States to press for an ultimate goal of 15 divisions instead of ten? Another troubling aspect of the JSPC report was the inclusion of cruisers and carriers in the Coastal Safety Force. What effect would this have upon opinion in neighboring countries with memories of recent Japanese aggression?

In sending the JSPC report to CINCFE for review on 14 August 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked particularly for his comment on these two matters. At the same time, they stressed that Japanese force goals must be realistic in terms of costs and support capabilities. Pending their final decision, they authorized CINCFE to use, as planning targets, their earlier figures for land and air forces (ten divisions and 27 squadrons), and for the naval force, 279 ships of various types, plus 8,000 tons of small craft and seven patrol squadrons.

Two months later General John E. Hull, USA, who had replaced General Clark as CINCFE, gave his views. He endorsed the goals for the land and air forces, which he believed could be attained by 1958. He opposed inclusion of carriers or cruisers in the naval force, but recommended addition of several types not included in the JSPC report (LSTs, minelayers, and supply ships), as
well as allowance for variation in the relative numbers of destroyers and destroyer escorts. These goals, he believed, represented the minimum required to defend Japan after US forces were withdrawn.\textsuperscript{130}

The Japanese Government had meanwhile been proceeding with its own plans for expanding it forces. The political climate for rearmament improved in September 1953, when Prime Minister Yoshida and the leader of the second largest pro-Western party, Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, announced that they had reached agreement that Japan’s forces should be strengthened and that legislative authority should be sought (without a constitutional amendment) for the maintenance of forces for defense against external as well as internal attack.\textsuperscript{131}

The National Safety Agency plan, the existence of which had been injudiciously revealed to the press a few months earlier, was made available to CINCFE in September 1953 before the Japanese Government officially approved it.\textsuperscript{132} Under this plan, the National Safety Force would rise to a uniformed strength of 200,000 men, consisting of ten divisions (of two different sizes, containing 12,000 and 9,000 men respectively), an airborne regiment, and tank and artillery groups, plus an antiaircraft force of 13,000 men. The Coastal Safety Force would consist of 188 vessels—including 18 frigates and 50 small landing craft lent by the United States in 1952—totalling 141,200 tons, with a manpower strength of 35,500. No cruisers or carriers were envisioned for this force. The Air Safety Force, with a complement of 39,560 men, would include 695 combat and transport aircraft (including 139 ASW patrol planes) and 624 others: helicopters, trainers, and light reconnaissance and liaison. The number of units was not specified. The total uniformed strength would be 275,060 personnel.

All targets were to be reached by 31 March 1959, which would be the end of the Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 1958. During the first year (1954), the National Safety Force would increase to 130,000 and the Coastal Safety Force to 17,000, and the air force would be established with 9,320 men, though it would not acquire combat aircraft in appreciable numbers until 1955.

The total cost of the program was estimated at 1,382.9 billion yen (approximately $3.7 billion at current exchange rates).\textsuperscript{133} Of this amount, Japan would contribute 837 billion yen; the rest, it was assumed, would be provided by the United States under the MDA program. The total share paid by the United States, however, would be increased as a result of a substantial indirect US contribution. An administrative agreement between the United States and Japan, signed in 1952 to supplement the mutual security treaty, had provided that Japan would furnish facilities, areas and rights of way needed by US forces in that country (compensating owners and suppliers as necessary), and would also make a direct contribution of Japanese currency in the amount of $155 million for the purchase of transportation and other services and supplies by US forces.\textsuperscript{134} The Japanese plan assumed that Japan’s contribution under this agreement would be sharply reduced from the current figure of 62 billion yen.\textsuperscript{135}

From a US viewpoint, two objections to the National Safety Agency plan (perhaps somewhat contradictory) could be envisioned. The force goals were far too low—the total manpower was below that recommended in 1952 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the National Safety Force alone—and the costs to the United
States would be considerable. Anticipating US resistance, Prime Minister Yoshida in October 1953 sent a special envoy, Mr. Hayato Ikeda, a former Minister of Finance, to Washington to discuss the plan with administration officials.

In the course of these discussions, Mr. Ikeda explained that the plan was based on the assumption that US air and naval forces would remain in Japan indefinitely. It could not be put into execution without US assistance, he continued, but no amendment of the Japanese constitution would be required. Members of the Joint Staff, who participated in the talks, criticized the plan as inadequate. Mr. Ikeda indicated in reply that larger force goals would require very careful preparation of public opinion, as well as additional US assistance.136

In the end, the conferees agreed only that stronger Japanese defense forces were called for and that US assistance for this purpose would be necessary. Specific agreement on details was postponed pending further discussions to be held in Tokyo. The United States also undertook to withdraw its forces from Japan "as the Japanese forces develop the capability to defend their country."137

During the Washington discussions, Secretary Wilson had sent a resume of the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking their opinion whether, if carried out, it would permit the complete withdrawal of US forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 24 November 1953 that it would at best allow only a partial withdrawal.138

During a tour of the Far East Command in October 1953, General Ridgway received from Prime Minister Yoshida a full copy of the plan, with a letter indicating that the government now planned some increase in the stated objectives. General Ridgway left the plan with General Hull, who, after studying it, decided that it was inadequate. In December 1953 General Ridgway sent the plan and the Yoshida letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that they be studied by a JCS committee.139

Some indication of the size of the increases that the Prime Minister had in mind emerged early in December 1953, when Ambassador Allison began negotiations in Tokyo aimed at reaching agreement in connection with the formulation of the Japanese budget for the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1954. The Japanese were now thinking of a Coastal Safety Force of 150,000 tons and an air force of 1,500 planes. They expected to spend between 87 and 92 billion yen for their armed forces—an impressive increase over the 61.4 billion in the current year. A planned contribution of 57 billion yen to US forces under the terms of the administrative agreement would bring the total defense budget to 144–149 billion yen.

Ambassador Allison advised the State Department that he considered it useless to try to persuade the Japanese to accept the ultimate force goals that the United States desired. Rather the objective should be to obtain the largest possible increases in the immediate future. He suggested that the United States press for additions of 50,000 men to the National Safety Force during each of the next two fiscal years, instead of the 20,000 called for under the Japanese plan. Alternatively, the United States might accept increases of 30,000 in JFY 1954 and 40,000 in JFY 1955 in exchange for an agreement to enter into arrangements for combined planning. General Hull concurred in this opinion.140
The Japanese five-year plan, the views of Ambassador Allison and General Hull, and the Japanese attitude as revealed during negotiations were considered by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in the revised recommendations on Japanese force levels that they submitted on 17 December 1953. The JSPC members modified their earlier proposals in the direction suggested by General Hull in October. As for the current negotiations, they recommended adoption of the smaller personnel increases mentioned by Mr. Allison, but urged larger air and naval goals. They recommended that ships for the Maritime Safety Force be constructed in Japan as far as possible, with US financial assistance if necessary. (The original Japanese plan had called for the addition of 27,800 tons of naval strength during JFY 1954, with 20,750 tons to be supplied by the United States and only 7,050 tons constructed in Japan.) However, for training purposes, they suggested that the United States provide eight vessels on loan: two destroyers, two destroyer escorts, one submarine, and three minesweepers.\(^{141}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the JSPC recommendations on 21 December 1953 and forwarded them to the Secretary of Defense.\(^{142}\) On 29 December Assistant Secretary Nash notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they had been approved. He enclosed a copy of the State Department’s instructions to Ambassador Allison directing him and General Hull to press the negotiations to a conclusion, obtaining the best possible Japanese program for the coming year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once notified CINCFE of the approved force goals.\(^{143}\)

These goals may be recapitulated as follows:

National Safety Force: 348,000 men in 15 divisions and 40 AAA battalions, plus a reserve of 57,400 men for combat and 15,456 for service units (total 72,856).

Coastal Safety Force: 30 destroyers, 75 destroyer escorts (with allowance, however, for variations in the relative numbers of these two), 50 large mine-sweepers, 4 minelayers, 2 LSTs, 3 “supply mother” ships; a large number of small ASW, minesweeping, and patrol craft; a small number of submarines for training purposes; all in addition to the 18 frigates and 50 LSSLs already transferred under the 1952 agreement; plus 10 ASW patrol squadrons (120 aircraft).

Air Safety Force: 36 squadrons with 771 aircraft as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter-interceptor</td>
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<td>225</td>
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<tr>
<td>All-weather interceptor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter-bomber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light-bomber</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>Tactical-reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
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The Air Safety Force was also to include a radar surveillance and control system. No recommendations had been made concerning the personnel strength of either this or the Coastal Safety Force.
Agreements with Japan during 1954

As Ambassador Allison had recommended, the United States made no effort at that time to induce the Japanese Government to commit itself to these targets. Japanese planners continued to be guided by their five-year plan, which was modified from time to time. The immediate focus of US attention was the JFY 1954 defense program.

When negotiations on this subject were concluded, the United States found itself obliged to accept considerably less than it had hoped for. By an understanding reached in January 1954, and completed by an exchange of notes on 6 April 1954, it was agreed that the National Safety Force would increase to 130,000 men and six divisions by 31 March 1955, exactly as called for in the Japanese five-year plan. In addition, a reserve force of 15,000 was to be established. The 1954 objective for the Coastal Safety Force was set at 16,000 men, and the United States agreed to provide ASW aircraft for its air arm. The Air Safety Force would be activated during 1954, with an initial complement of 6,000 men and a headquarters and training schools.

In settling for less than a full loaf, the United States bowed to the exigencies of the Japanese budgetary situation. Prime Minister Yoshida considered it essential to hold the budget below a trillion yen in order to combat inflation. He succeeded in doing so by a very narrow margin even while increasing defense spending. The final budget called for 137.3 billion yen in defense appropriations—lower than Ambassador Allison’s earlier forecast, though larger than the amount for JFY 1953. Of this sum, 78.8 billion was for Japan’s own forces and 58.5 billion for her contribution to US forces. The United States had agreed that Japan’s payment under the administrative agreement would be reduced by $7 million. At exchange rates then prevailing, this amounted to 2.5 billion yen, and would result in a payment of 53.3 billion yen as compared with the current figure of 55.8 billion. Various other Japanese contributions would bring the total to 55.8 billion.

Negotiations for a mutual security agreement were successfully concluded on 8 March 1954. The United States agreed to provide military assistance, while Japan promised to develop her military strength as fully as possible, with due regard for her economic stability. Anticipating the agreement, the United States had allotted $80.7 million to Japan in the FY 1954 mutual security program. A Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, was established, headed by Major General Gerald J. Higgins, USA, who was nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommendation of General Ridgway.

Besides furnishing grant aid, the United States also agreed on 14 May 1954 to lend Japan two destroyers and two destroyer escorts for a five-year period. This agreement was a disappointment to the Japanese Government, which had asked for an outright grant, rather than a loan, of 17 vessels.

A possibly hopeful augury for the future, from the US point of view, could be discerned in the willingness of the Japanese Diet to sanction the military expansion plans of the Yoshida government. A law passed by the Diet on 2 June 1954 put the Japanese military forces on a more secure legal basis. The Safety Forces
were renamed Self-Defense Forces, and the creation of an Air Self-Defense Force was approved. The government’s manpower objectives for JFY 1954 were written into law as authorized strengths of the respective forces. The National Safety Agency became the National Defense Agency. A Joint Staff Council—a counterpart of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff—was established. 152

There can be little doubt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were disappointed with the outcome of the negotiations. 153 They had regarded the early rearment of Japan as an integral part of the strategy of the New Look. In April 1954 they made it clear that Japanese military self-sufficiency was essential to the establishment of a position of strength in the Far East. At the rate of increase provided in Japan’s 1954 budget, there was no foreseeable prospect that Japan would be able to stand on her own feet for a long time.

Japanese Force Objectives for 1955

From a US viewpoint, the Japanese had promised disappointingly little for 1954, but their performance was to prove even less adequate. An economic recession forced the government to cut back military expenditures to 132.8 billion yen, 4.5 billion below the budget estimate. 154 Announcing this decision on 20 July 1954, Mr. Kimura, head of the National Defense Agency, commented on the disappointing US response to Japan’s request for ships, which, he declared, would make it necessary to revise the planned balance of forces. 155

At the same time, several developments foreclosed any hope that Japanese public opinion could be induced to support the scale of rearment desired by the United States. In March 1954 a Japanese fisherman became a casualty of radioactive fallout from US hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean. The psychological impact in Japan was extreme, in view of that country’s experience with atomic bombing in World War II. Political trends also took a turn for the worse. Prime Minister Yoshida’s administration ran into increasing opposition, partly inspired by his alleged partiality toward the United States. In deference to his critics, he found it advisable to postpone a visit to the United States that he had scheduled for June 1954. 156

The ad hoc committee on mutual aid appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to which reference has already been made, drafted a long-range program early in 1954 that included the Japanese force objectives the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended in December 1953. The committee proposed to spread the attainment over a four-year period, FYs 1955–1958, at an estimated cost of $2,026.5 million. This program was included in the amended version of the committee report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense on 17 June 1954. 157 For FY 1956, the goals in this program were six divisions, 220 ships, and 12 air squadrons. However, in submitting recommendations for the FY 1956 MDA program on 19 May 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased to 240 the number of recommended Japanese ships. The increase was principally in patrol craft and minesweepers. 158
Whether or not these American plans would be favorably received in Tokyo was uncertain. But there was no doubt of the intention of the Japanese Government to continue the buildup of its forces. A news despatch from Tokyo in October 1954 reported that the National Defense Agency planned to increase the Ground Force by 20,000 and to double the Air Force in JFY 1955. The Agency’s tentative budget request for this purpose, according to this account, would be 95.2 billion yen, an increase of 16.4 billion over the 1954 budget, but Japanese officials hoped that most or all of this increase would be offset by a reduction in Japan’s support payments to US forces.\(^\text{159}\)

Secretary Wilson had already asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest 1955 force goals for Japan for use in forthcoming negotiations with that country.\(^\text{160}\) Before they could reply, the situation was altered by Prime Minister Yoshida’s decision to make his planned visit to the United States in November 1954. It was expected that he would bring up the subject of US support for expansion of Japanese forces in 1955.

Preparations for this probability brought out a disagreement between the State and Defense Departments. The former believed that the United States should agree to underwrite the entire increase in Japan’s 1955 defense budget, by accepting an equivalent reduction in Japanese support payments. The Department of Defense recommended that the United States, before accepting any such reduction, should first insist upon at least a partial restoration of the cut in Japan’s 1954 defense budget, which represented a failure to comply fully with the terms of the April 1954 agreement.\(^\text{161}\)

The Defense position received firm support from CINCFE in a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 November 1954. General Hull had seen the tentative Japanese defense budget for 1955, and he characterized it as inadequate and excessively dependent upon US assistance. Instead of footing the entire bill for Japanese force increases, the United States should provide Japan with an incentive to enlarge its own contribution. One method of doing so, he suggested, would be to fix a base amount and then offer to reduce the Japanese support payment by half the difference between this figure and the appropriation. For example, since the tentative budget figure was 95.2 billion yen, the base might be 90 billion, producing a reduction of 2.6 billion—approximately the same amount as the previous year—in the support payment. A minimum acceptable base would be 76.3 billion yen, the amount of Japan’s contribution to her own defense in JFY 1954: in other words, the 78.8 billion in the budget less a 2.5 billion reduction in the support payment.\(^\text{162}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Hull’s suggested cost-sharing formula in their recommendations to Secretary Wilson in connection with Prime Minister Yoshida’s visit. They urged that any US budgetary support be conditioned upon fulfillment of the April 1954 agreement and also upon Japan’s agreement to acquire land necessary to expand the runways at US air bases in Japan, a matter on which General Hull had reported failure to receive satisfaction from the Japanese Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no recommendations for JFY 1955 force objectives, merely reaffirming the ultimate goals in their recommendations of 21 December 1953.\(^\text{163}\) Subsequently, at General
Ridgway's suggestion, they recommended a base figure of 85 billion yen for computing the US share of the Japanese budget.  

By the time the JCS views reached Secretary Wilson, Premier Yoshida had already arrived in the United States. Apparently there was little or no discussion of the JFY 1955 defense budget during his three-day visit, which ended on 10 November 1954. The only visible result was a US promise to continue economic aid to Japan. It was not until 10 December 1954 that Secretary Wilson forwarded to the Secretary of State the JCS recommendations on the forthcoming Japanese budget, presumably for use in negotiations that were about to begin in Tokyo.

Ambassador Allison, in a message to Washington on 15 December, confirmed that the Japanese National Defense Agency was seeking 95.2 billion yen for the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1955, and that the Agency hoped that the United States would accept a reduction in support payments large enough to keep the total military budget from exceeding the JFY 1954 figure of 137.3 billion. The Ambassador approved General Hull's base figure formula but doubted that Japan would accept a 90-billion-yen base. Alternatively, he suggested either 78.8 billion, the amount of the 1954 NDA appropriation, or 73.8 billion, derived by assuming that the 50–50 formula had been in effect in JFY 1954 (the United States had then accepted a reduction of 2.5 billion, or half the difference between 78.8 and 73.8). He recommended also that the United States press for restoration of the 4.5 billion cut from the 1954 budget—a valuable bargaining point even though it was probably unattainable.

After obtaining the concurrence of the Department of Defense, Secretary Dulles approved Ambassador Allison's proposed approach to the negotiations but instructed him to use a base figure no lower than 85 billion yen (the amount recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff). But a preliminary conversation with the Minister of Finance convinced Ambassador Allison that this figure was unrealistic. The Minister stressed that the budget must again be held below a trillion yen and that problems of unemployment, housing, and the effects of a flood in 1953 would require more money for welfare measures.

Political developments in Japan had meanwhile complicated the problem. Prime Minister Yoshida resigned early in December 1954 and was replaced byIchiro Hatoyama, who, as the price of his confirmation, promised to hold new elections early in 1955. Probably owing to the resulting uncertainty, formal negotiations on the defense budget were postponed for several weeks. When Admiral Radford visited Tokyo early in January 1955, he apparently did not discuss the subject extensively.

Not until 2 February 1955 did Ambassador Allison and General Hull formally present the initial US negotiating position. The United States would share all expenses above 90 billion yen if the Japanese Government would appropriate the 95.2 billion requested by the National Defense Agency. The Japanese made no formal reply at the moment, but unofficial indications convinced the Ambassador that neither this government nor any other that might emerge from the elections (which had been set for 27 February) would accept this position. Even
the minimum 85-billion yen base seemed unlikely to be attained, in his view, and he therefore recommended that it be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{172}

This recommendation was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who agreed on 25 March 1955 that the 85 billion figure was unrealistic and that 76.3 billion, the lowest figure mentioned by General Hull, should be regarded as the new US minimum.\textsuperscript{173} Presumably this conclusion was relayed to the Ambassador, but it apparently had no effect upon the outcome of the negotiations. Settlement was to be reached on a wholly different basis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted thereafter.

The negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult; some weeks of hard bargaining were necessary.\textsuperscript{174} The US position was weakened by the fact that in 1954 the United States had itself urged upon Japan the importance of deflation and a balanced budget.\textsuperscript{175} When an agreement was finally concluded, the United States yielded on nearly every point. The final defense budget adopted by the Hatoyama Government totalled 132.8 billion yen (about $369 million). The portion for Japan's own forces was 86.8 billion yen, or $241 million. This was 8 billion yen above the previous budget, and sufficed to provide 20,000 more men for the Ground Self-Defense Force, 8,700 additional tons of shipping, and about 200 aircraft, of which approximately 40 would be of combat types. But the United States agreed to accept a reduction of approximately 17.8 billion yen—$49 million—in the amount payable under the administrative agreement. In other words, the United States would provide budgetary support amounting to more than twice the size of the budget increase. The base figure formula for splitting the increase had been discarded. The amount of the Japanese payment for this purpose would be $106 million, or 38 billion yen. Japan agreed, however, to pay the United States 8 billion yen ($22 million) in compensation for the costs of extending air base runways and renting certain facilities that the US forces required.\textsuperscript{176}

The force goals in the JFY 1955 budget were adjusted to a revised version of the NDA five-year plan that became necessary when the Agency failed to obtain the full amount of its budget request. The completion date for the plan was moved back to 31 March 1962 (the end of the Japanese fiscal year 1961) and the strength objectives for all the armed forces were reduced somewhat. The new goals were: for the Ground Force, 180,000 men in six divisions and four regimental combat teams; for the Maritime Force, 33,548 men, with 203 ships totalling 120,700 tons; for the Air Force, 42,985 men (including a 7,000-man antiaircraft component, formerly envisioned as part of the Ground Force) and 1,284 aircraft.\textsuperscript{177}

As a part of the overall agreement for JFY 1955, the United States agreed to supply approximately $42 million to Japan in mutual defense assistance for the coming fiscal year, and in addition, to furnish two squadrons of F-86 aircraft and two destroyer escorts.\textsuperscript{178} Earlier, on 18 January 1955, the United States had agreed to lend Japan one submarine and seven minesweepers under the terms of the 1954 loan agreement.\textsuperscript{179}

Viewing the outcome of the negotiations, the United States could have little grounds for satisfaction. Perhaps the only gain was the fact that the JFY 1955 defense budget showed an increase as compared with 1954. In other words, the
momentum of Japanese rearmament, however inadequate in US eyes, had at least not been lost.

US Far Eastern Policy in Perspective

Cautious is the word that characterizes the Far Eastern policy of the Eisenhower administration in its first two years. All the administration’s major decisions fitted this characterization: the continuation of restrictions on military action by Nationalist China, the refusal to pledge force to defend Chinese Nationalist holdings near the mainland, the acceptance of communist victory in Indochina when the political conditions for military intervention were unfavorable, and the acquiescence in the slow pace of rearmament decided upon by Japan’s leaders. The same approach had been adopted toward South Korea, in the restraints placed on Syngman Rhee, as described earlier.

The administration’s essentially defensive approach led it to accept the prospect of some territorial gains by communist forces. As a military man, President Eisenhower was doubtless alert to the danger of trying to hold an exposed forward position without prospect of adequate support or reinforcement. In Indochina in 1954, and in the Taiwan Strait in 1955, the administration prudently withdrew to more tenable positions. But the Southeast Asia pact, the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, and the Congressional resolution on Taiwan attested to US determination not to be budged from its second lines of defense.

The treaty with the Chinese Nationalists placed the United States in formal alliance with all the members of the vital offshore island chain. The agreements with these nations, together with the newly created Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, formed a network of relationships that in some degree answered the purpose of the more comprehensive Asian-Pacific alliance recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement—a kind of Far Eastern NATO—had been endorsed by General Van Fleet, but the administration had shown little interest in it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently saw eye to eye with the administration except for a period during the latter part of 1954 when policy toward China was under review. On this occasion, Admiral Radford, the principal JCS advocate of a more militant policy (who had unsuccessfully urged intervention in Indochina a few months earlier), was able to carry most of his colleagues with him in recommending that the United States defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands. On this issue, as on many others, General Ridgway stood in opposition to his colleagues. He found a powerful ally in Secretary Dulles, whose counsel of restraint was heeded by the National Security Council. It is noteworthy, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were united in wanting to avoid involvement in a land war in Asia; even the proponents of intervention envisioned the use of air and naval forces alone.
Western Europe, 1953

The experience of World War II convinced many Americans that the fate of their nation was inextricably intertwined with that of Western Europe. This conviction, combined with alarm over the defenseless state of the European democracies after the war, led the United States to cooperate in 1949 in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was intended to deter or repel any attack from the east. The original members of NATO were twelve: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two other countries, Greece and Turkey, joined NATO in 1952. During the first three years of its existence, NATO evolved its governing political structure and its machinery for military collaboration and set up an integrated command headed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).^1

The defense plans of NATO were based upon the assumption that its forces would make a stand as far to the east as possible in order to defend the territory of all the NATO members and the resources of West Germany. The United States recognized this forward strategy as an optimum objective.^2

To provide forces to sustain this strategy required the member nations to mount a sizable rearmament effort while carrying on the rebuilding of their war-damaged economies. At a meeting held in Lisbon in February 1952 the North Atlantic Council had set its sights on a force of nearly 100 divisions, backed up with appropriate naval and air forces, to be reached over a period of several years. These forces were to be contributed by the twelve original members, since Greece and Turkey had not yet been admitted to NATO. The force schedules adopted at the Lisbon meeting are tabulated in Table 17.

The confrontation between East and West had led the erstwhile allies of World War II to set aside their wartime conviction that Germany must thereafter be kept disarmed. The Soviet Union organized the German Democratic Republic in its occupation zone and created an army, navy, and air force in the guise of police forces. The Western Powers, in turn, laid plans to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany, which had been created by fusion of the US, British, and
Table 17—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council at Lisbon: February 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army Divisions</th>
<th>Navy Ships</th>
<th>Air Force Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952, firm commitmenta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>$^{62/3}_{5}$</td>
<td>$^{7}_{19/3}$</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 30 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 180 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953, provisional goal$^d$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>$^{5}_{2}$</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>$^{30}_{2/3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 30 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 180 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954, planning goal$^d$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>$^{6}_{2}$</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>$^{33}_{2/3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 30 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 180 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond 1954, militarily desirable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>$^{6}_{3}$</td>
<td>$^{39}_{1/3}$</td>
<td>$^{46}_{1/3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beyond M-day plus 30 days</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-day plus 180 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Excludes Greece and Turkey, which had acceded to NATO just before the Lisbon meeting, as well as West Germany.
b Fraction refers to regiments or regimental combat teams.
c Not available.
d The proposed 1953 and 1954 goals for West Germany used at Lisbon have been omitted from this table.
e The total includes 2 divisions for M-day plus 30 days not allocated by country.
f The total of 126-2/3 to 136-2/3 includes 20 to 30 divisions beyond M-day plus 30 days.
g Includes 294 aircraft not allocated by country.

Source: Off of NAT Affairs, OASD(ISA), Outline of NATO Force Goals as Accepted at the Lisbon Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, February 23, 1952, n. d., CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 14.
French occupation zones. At Lisbon, the North Atlantic Council approved force goals for West Germany of an army of six divisions and an air force of 579 aircraft by the end of 1953, both of which were expected to double in size within a year, plus a navy of 229 vessels by 1954.  

**Plans for a European Defense Community**

To guard against the possibility of a resurgence of militarism in a rearmed West Germany, the nations of Western Europe drafted a plan for an international army in which German forces would comprise only one element. This plan was embodied in a treaty signed in May 1952 by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The signatories agreed to establish a European Defense Community (EDC), which would have its own army, composed of division-size units retaining their national identities but under an integrated high command. This army was to be placed at the disposal of NATO, and its organization, equipment, and training were to be supervised by SACEUR. A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty bound the NATO members to defend the territory of the EDC countries.  

In agreeing to the EDC treaty, however, the leaders of the signatory countries outpaced the support of public and parliamentary opinion. None of the six nations had ratified the treaty by the end of 1952. The principal obstacle was France, where opponents were numerous and vocal, inspired largely by traditional apprehensions about Germany.  

This delay in establishing EDC impaired NATO’s prospects. It was symptomatic of a general slackening of military effort in Europe that became evident in 1952. The sense of urgency that had prevailed a few years earlier had dissipated. To an increasing degree, rearmament was subordinated to other objectives.  

At the end of 1952 the M-day goals set at the Lisbon meeting had been substantially achieved insofar as they involved ground and naval forces. But there was a shortage of approximately 10 percent in the number of aircraft (3,661 as compared with a goal of 4,067), and of 15 percent in the number of divisions expected to be available by M plus 30 days (45 divisions instead of 53 2/3). In the light of declining public and official support for rearmament in European countries, the prospects for making up these shortfalls appeared uncertain at best, and the chance of reaching the much more ambitious long-range goals set at Lisbon seemed even less.  

One reason (or rationalization) for complacency was particularly significant for future developments on both sides of the Atlantic. Early in 1953, General Bradley told a Congressional committee that the slowdown in Europe’s defense efforts could be partially attributed to the dangerous hope that nuclear weapons alone would suffice to win a war.
President Eisenhower's European Policy

General Eisenhower's tour of duty as SACEUR, along with his earlier experience in leading the reconquest of Europe in World War II, had left him keenly aware of the importance of Western Europe to the safety of the United States. As an ardent partisan of European unity, he observed with dismay, at the moment of his accession, the faltering prospects for ratification of the EDC treaty, which he regarded as a vital step toward military and political cooperation. Even before he took office, he directed two of his appointees—John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and Harold E. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security—to tour Europe to survey political trends and to ascertain requirements for US assistance. In his earliest speeches after taking office, President Eisenhower stressed the importance of the political and economic unity of Western Europe and promised that the United States would try to further these goals.

The new administration's commitment to Atlantic solidarity was stressed in policy statements adopted in 1953 by the National Security Council. NSC 153/1 asserted a need to support and strengthen the NATO countries and to extend economic and military aid to free nations. NSC 162/2 contained a statement that the United States could not meet its defense needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the support of allies. Another portion of NSC 162/2 drew attention to the importance, psychological as well as military, of the presence of US troops in Europe.

Not long after his accession, the new President received a letter from the Permanent US Representative in the North Atlantic Council, Mr. William H. Draper, who was seriously concerned about the prospects for NATO. "The military requirements in land, sea, and air forces for adequate NATO defense," wrote Ambassador Draper on 8 March 1953, "are so far above the presently foreseeable buildup that the need for some alternative solution is sure to be raised in the North Atlantic Council during the next few months." He forwarded a lengthy analysis prepared by his staff, which considered and rejected two possibilities: (1) to continue pursuit of the Lisbon goals, in the face of evidence that they were unattainable; and (2) to redefine NATO's mission to fit available forces—i.e., to reduce the size of the area to be defended. Only one alternative was left: to find some other strategy or force structure, or both, that could fulfill the mission at a lower cost. Ambassador Draper suggested that such a solution might be found by "a top level evaluation of our overall strategy," to be carried out by "a few of our best and most experienced civilian and military brains."

President Eisenhower, in replying to the Ambassador's letter, indicated doubt that NATO's immediate plans could be significantly altered. Warning of the temptation to seek new and cheap solutions, he continued:

I quite agree with you that new weapons and new methods may—in the long run—bring about some fundamental changes that will tend to outmode what we are now trying to do. But what we are presently trying to do seems to me to be absolutely essential to the meeting of the immediate threat . . . . I am quite
sure that the adoption, at this moment, of a different defense policy could not lessen the need for the very modest number of military units that we are now striving to produce in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{15}

Ambassador Draper’s letter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who submitted an interim reply on 20 May 1953. They indicated that the President’s reply constituted an appropriate statement of current NATO policy and that they would study the problem further.\textsuperscript{16} Another aspect of the problem of European defense that required attention was the possibility that the EDC treaty might not be ratified. It was essential to consider other ways of bringing West Germany into the Atlantic coalition. On 14 January 1953 Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, General Bradley’s deputy in the NATO Standing Group, urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest alternatives.\textsuperscript{17} After discussing the matter with Secretary Dulles and examining two reports by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,\textsuperscript{18} the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Admiral Davis on 20 March 1953 that it was the responsibility of the political elements of the government to determine the method by which West Germany was to be rearmed. At the same time, they stressed that a German contribution to Western defense was needed as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Revision of NATO Force Goals, April 1953}

One of the decisions reached by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February 1952 had been that NATO’s force requirements would be reviewed each year. This annual review soon evolved into something resembling an international budget planning process. It was set in motion by the International Staff of the NATO Secretariat, which circulated a questionnaire to member governments asking information about their defense plans and the forces that they expected to make available to NATO. At the same time, NATO commanders submitted estimates of their requirements. The International Staff, assisted by the Annual Review Committee of the North Atlantic Council, then drafted preliminary force objectives, harmonizing requirements with availabilities as nearly as possible, and circulated these proposals to member governments for comment. The final decision on force goals for the ensuing two or three years was the prerogative of the North Atlantic Council. These decisions were rendered in ministerial meetings of the Council—gatherings of cabinet-level representatives, as distinct from the delegates who sat in Paris in permanent session.\textsuperscript{20}

The 1952 Annual Review was not complete when the year ended, and the North Atlantic Council therefore scheduled a ministerial meeting for April 1953 at which force goals would be approved.\textsuperscript{21} Thus the Eisenhower administration, even before completing its review of the US military budget for FY 1954, had to decide in time for this meeting how many forces it was willing to promise to NATO. At the same time, it was necessary to prepare comments on the tentative force goals proposed by the International Staff.
Initial US recommendations regarding NATO’s force objectives had been drafted by a special ad hoc annual review committee established by the Secretary of Defense (later given standing status as the Defense Annual Review Team, or DART). Membership of the committee included representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Following review and comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposals drafted by the committee had been approved in October 1952 as the initial US negotiating position in connection with the 1952 Annual Review. The US proposals, along with those of other countries, were considered by the International Staff in drafting force goals for submission to the Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had another opportunity to influence the process through the guidance they issued to the US Representative in the Standing Group, who proffered military advice to the International Staff during the process.

The proposals drawn up by the International Staff were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 23 March 1953. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, although the final US position on the Annual Review was still under development, it appeared that the recommendations of the International Staff "are generally in accord with U. S. estimates of forces feasible of accomplishment under existing political and economic limitations." The force goals, though too low, nevertheless represented progress toward requirements.22

The administration’s final recommendations, covering calendar years 1953 and 1954, differed in some respects from those drafted by the International Staff.23 The principal difference concerned the US aircraft contribution, which the International Staff proposed to boost to 1,628 by December 1954. The United States had already indicated that it might not be able to meet the Lisbon goal of 1,515 planes, because of a lag in production of medium bombers.24 The administration accordingly proposed 1,510 aircraft, although even this figure was dependent upon the ending of hostilities in Korea and on the continuation of the 143-wing Air Force program, which was then in doubt.25

Another incipient disagreement involved the size of the US Army contribution. At Lisbon, the Council had asked for six full US divisions (with two additional regiments or regimental combat teams) by 1954. Since this was an M-day figure, all six divisions must be in place before hostilities began. Five (four infantry and one armored) were already in Europe; the sixth, under plans prepared in 1952, was to be another armored division from the strategic reserve in the United States when the hostilities in Korea ended. But by early 1953, budgetary limitations cast doubt on the advisability of sending this unit.26

To default on this goal, which represented an appreciable proportion of the total US troop strength in NATO, would set a very poor example for the other member countries. Secretary Wilson’s Assistant for International Security Affairs, Frank C. Nash, therefore urged that the United States provisionally accept the six-division figure subject to further study of the policy problems involved.27 The administration accepted this recommendation.

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Paris between 23 and 25 April 1953. The US delegation included Secretaries Dulles, Wilson, and Humphrey; Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security; and General Bradley, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council approved force goals that varied somewhat from both the US proposals and those of the International Staff. More important, the approved force goals represented a retreat from the Lisbon objectives. In army strength, the big reduction was in the goals for M plus 30 days—the forces to be put in the field after hostilities began. Newly added Greek and Turkish forces brought the totals well above the Lisbon figures, but these forces would be needed to defend their homelands. The Council overrode US objections and approved a goal of 1,628 aircraft for 1954; however, the overall aircraft totals for both 1953 and 1954 were at least 15 percent below the Lisbon goals even after the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. Thus the Council bowed to political and economic realities. Naval objectives were also reduced, although the reduction was offset, on paper at least, by introducing a new category of forces—those earmarked for NATO but remaining under national command. (See Table 18.) The Council made no effort to plan beyond 1954.

On the advice of General Bradley and General Ridgway, the United States accepted the Council's decisions, including the 1954 aircraft goal. To do otherwise,

### Table 18—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council: April 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>1953 Firm Commitment</th>
<th>1954 Provisional Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>M-day Plus 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army divisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>6/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Canada</td>
<td>24/3</td>
<td>49/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>23/3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>53/3</td>
<td>97/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy ships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO command</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National command</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ships</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>2,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Canada</td>
<td>4,004</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>5,422</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Fractions refer to regiments or regimental combat teams.

*b* Breakdown by country not available; figures include Turkey but not Greece, for which force goals were under study.

*c* Not available.

Source: JCS 2073/581, 10 Jun 53.
as Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the meeting, "might well have resulted in a setback in European defense plans of serious proportions." Moreover, the 1953 review would provide an opportunity to reconsider the provisional 1954 objectives.\cite{30}

The lower force goals approved by the Council were in harmony with the Eisenhower administration's concept of planning for the long haul, which meant levelling off forces at or near their current strengths. To introduce this concept into NATO planning was a declared objective of administration policy. NSC 149, which the National Security Council had approved in March 1953, had recommended decreased emphasis on "expansion of NATO forces to previously projected goals by early fixed target dates."\cite{31} Speaking to the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Wilson explained the long haul objectives, which, he said, demanded a reasonably stabilized level of effort and of defense expenditures. He urged the other countries to follow the US lead by revising their defense plans so as to spread expenditures over a longer period, without lowering their military capabilities. Such revisions should, he said, take into account "new weapons and methods of defense which may also produce, in many instances, desirable economies."\cite{32}

These suggestions must have been congenial to many of the other NATO governments, some of which were already proceeding in these directions. The communiqué issued after the meeting described the Council’s acceptance of this viewpoint in terms that could have been (and perhaps were) written by Secretary Wilson himself: "It was agreed that the development of sound national economies and the increase of military forces should be pursued concurrently."\cite{33} The Council also approved a resolution calling attention to the paramount importance of the establishment of the European Defense Community.\cite{34}

Reorganization, Military and Civilian

The first few months of the Eisenhower administration saw important changes in NATO's high command and in the US machinery for liaison with the Organization. When the new President decided upon a wholesale replacement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he selected two appointees from NATO posts: General Ridgway (SACEUR) to be Chief of Staff, US Army, and Admiral Carney, then Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINC-SOUTH), as Chief of Naval Operations. General Ridgway was replaced as SACEUR by his Chief of Staff, General Alfred M. Grunther, while Admiral Carney traded positions with the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fechteler.\cite{35}

Before his departure from SHAPE, General Ridgway set in motion a major alteration in NATO's command structure: the establishment of a separate command for the central theater, paralleling those already established for northern and southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Hitherto SACEUR had exercised direct command in the center. Under General Ridgway's plan, the new position

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of Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Center (CINCCENTER) would be conferred upon Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin of France, who at that time commanded the land forces in that theater. At the same time, General Ridgway proposed to grant some command authority to SACEUR’s Air Deputy (whose role thus far had been essentially that of a staff adviser), while continuing to allow theater commanders to control their own air power through component commanders.

General Ridgway’s original plan provided that CINCCENTER would wear a second hat as commander of the land forces in his theater. At the suggestion of British and French officers with whom he discussed his plan, he modified it to provide a separate component command for the ground forces. But he rejected a suggestion by General Vandenberg, made when the plan was submitted informally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Air Deputy be given command over all NATO air forces; such a step, he felt, would in effect create a second Supreme Allied Commander. On 12 February 1953 General Ridgway submitted his revised plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.36

General Bradley discussed the plan with President Eisenhower, who approved it, subject at first to the reinserion, for reasons of economy, of the original provision to combine the two commands, CINCCENTER and COMLANDCENT.37 But when the British member of the Standing Group held out for separation of these two, the President yielded on the issue.38 The Standing Group approved the plan on 5 June and the Military Committee on 30 June.39 On 19 August 1953, Marshal Juin formally assumed his new position as CINCCENTER. In an accompanying reshuffle, General Lauris Norstad, USAF, formerly commander of Allied Air Forces in Central Europe, assumed the position of Air Deputy to SACEUR40

When General Ridgway became Chief of Staff, US Army, his predecessor, General J. Lawton Collins, was appointed the US representative in both the NATO Military Committee and the Standing Group. Therefore General Bradley had performed these duties while serving as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, but President Eisenhower wanted the Chairman kept free of such commitments in order to concentrate on his JCS duties.41 In his new capacity, General Collins was directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was authorized to attend JCS meetings at which NATO matters were discussed. He was also to serve as principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense at ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council.42

The principal civilian contact between the administration and NATO headquarters in Paris had been the office of the US Special Representative in Europe, who served as the permanent US member of the Council and was responsible to the Director for Mutual Security. This position was abolished by Reorganization Plan No. 7, effective 1 August 1953. Liaison with NATO was henceforth to be channeled through a newly established United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, responsible to the Secretary of State.43

The new mission included representatives of the Department of Defense, Department of the Treasury, and Foreign Operations Administration (formerly
Mutual Security Agency). Its head was authorized to obtain military advice from the Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR), or from other officers designated by the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. John C. Hughes was named to head the mission, while Mr. Tracy S. Voorhees became the Defense Representative.\textsuperscript{44}

**The New Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO Problems**

In a letter to the President on 5 June 1953, the outgoing Special Representative in Europe, Mr. Draper, again urged a reevaluation of NATO strategy. In his view, two questions called for study by the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff: (1) whether the countries of NATO could and would be willing and able to provide military forces that would suffice to deter or defeat aggression; and (2) whether the best possible use was being made of the military forces already available.\textsuperscript{45}

The President passed this letter to the incoming Joint Chiefs of Staff,\textsuperscript{46} who in turn referred it to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee while they went about their more pressing task of reassessing overall US strategy. When they reported their conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 8 August 1953, they made no direct mention of NATO. But they were clearly thinking of US commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty when they warned that their suggested redeployment of US forces “would involve a change in basic foreign policy of fundamental and far-reaching implications.” General Ridgway elaborated on these implications when the National Security Council discussed the JCS conclusions on 27 August 1953. A general withdrawal of US forces to the Western Hemisphere, he declared, would be a catastrophe. He admitted that US forces were overextended but argued that the remedy for this condition was to enlarge and strengthen the forces in the continental United States. General Ridgway also warned that any revelation that the United States was considering withdrawal from Europe would have highly damaging repercussions in NATO.\textsuperscript{47}

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had meanwhile drafted a reply to Mr. Draper’s letter that offered little hope of a major reduction in force requirements. Political considerations, the Committee pointed out, made it impossible to contemplate reducing the area to be defended by NATO forces, while tentative studies by SACEUR suggested that the introduction of nuclear weapons, insofar as it affected the size of forces, would if anything increase them, principally because more aircraft would be needed. The Committee concluded that the resources presently available “are being put to the best use and are being invested in the best weapons, and the employment of forces is being planned under the best strategy.” The members could only recommend that the United States spur the wavering members of NATO to greater efforts and push for early German rearmament.\textsuperscript{48}

General Ridgway and Admiral Carney approved the Committee’s report,\textsuperscript{49} but General Twining challenged it on several points. He believed that the Euro-
pean nations were already close to their maximum defense expenditures and that it was unrealistic to suppose that US pressure could induce them to spend more, especially when the United States was itself economizing. If current force requirements were unattainable, then the present strategy, upon which they were based, could not be described as the best. General Twining did not prescribe a solution for these difficulties; he merely suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff withhold recommendations on NATO strategy pending further study.50

In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a middle course. In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson on 11 September, they expressed their general agreement with those parts of Mr. Draper’s letter that were within the purview of the military, and set forth the following additional comments, in which they endorsed current NATO strategic plans while recognizing a need for reexamination:

- a. The retention of NATO Europe as U.S. allies in opposing extension of Soviet-led Communist aggression (by either armed force or subversion) continues to be of vital importance to the military security of the United States.
- b. There is at present no justification, on a military basis, for any lessening of the efforts of NATO European nations to increase their defensive capabilities.
- c. It is impracticable, within the present framework of NATO strategic planning, to reduce substantially the area to be defended in Western Europe.
- d. The early availability of combat effective German units and of German productive capacity is essential.
- e. The resources presently being made available for NATO European defense are currently being utilized so as to conform to sound strategic and tactical plans for Western European defense insofar as is politically possible.
- f. These plans and the resources and weapons for their implementation are under continuing review and analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine:
  (1) What, if any, changes to strengthen our strategic concepts need be made, and
  (2) What, if any, alterations need be made in the allocations of resources to new weapons and to the various types of forces, which would enhance the overall effectiveness of our military force structure.
- g. The increasing Soviet atomic capability and the tendency of our NATO European allies to waver in the pursuit of NATO objectives accentuate the urgency of the time element in gaining Allied objectives in the cold war.51

The first of these conclusions was perhaps the most important. The new Joint Chiefs of Staff had now set their seal of approval upon the view that the freedom of Western Europe was essential to the safety of the United States. In this regard, they saw eye to eye with their predecessors.

Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the German Problem

To some extent, the lessened willingness of the European nations to expand their defense efforts in 1952 resulted from a hope that the cold war could be
liquidated, or at least some of its causes removed, through negotiation. That
hope was stimulated by the accession of Premier Malenkov in the Soviet Union,
whose regime seemed to wear a less forbidding aspect than that of the Stalin era.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, whose anticommunism
was beyond question, was among those who urged that the intentions of the
Malenkov government be tested in negotiations. President Eisenhower remained
somewhat skeptical of the chances for success but was willing to cooperate with
his British and French allies in opening diplomatic conversations with the
Soviets.52

Among the many points of contention between the East and West, the status
of Germany stood high on the list. Unable to agree, after their victory in World
War II, on the disposition of their common enemy, the Western Powers and the
Soviet Union had gone their separate ways in administering their occupation
zones. Eight years after World War II had ended, Eastern and Western troops
still faced one another across the line that separated East and West Germany.
The willingness of the Malenkov regime to end the cold war could be ascer-
tained from its attitude toward the German problem. In July 1953 the govern-
ments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agreed to invite the
Soviet Union to attend a conference to discuss the future of Germany and of
Austria, which also remained under four-power occupation.53

This development required reevaluation of US policy toward the European
Defense Community. If the German Federal Republic were to be replaced by, or
absorbed into, a new regime representing both Germanies, the status of treaties
to which it was a party would be thrown into doubt. Moreover, it was not likely
that the Soviet Union would agree to a settlement that would leave Germany
free to join a military coalition directed against the communist world.
The National Security Council had already foreseen this problem. In a speech
on 16 April 1953,54 President Eisenhower had urged settlement of outstanding
issues between East and West, and specifically those relating to Germany and
Austria. Discussing the possible results of this speech on 28 April, the Council
directed the Planning Board to prepare a report on US policy toward Germany.55
The Department of State thereupon prepared several successive drafts that were
discussed by the Board.56 At the same time, another draft was prepared in OSD
and was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 July 1953.57 There were no major
differences in viewpoint between the State and Defense Departments. Both
agreed that a united, democratic Germany was desirable; that it should be ori-
ented toward the West, politically if not militarily; and that, pending German
unification, it was important to proceed with the military and political integra-
tion of West Germany into Western Europe.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Defense draft on 30 July 1953. They
told Secretary Wilson that the reunification of Germany—provided that it was
rearmed and oriented toward the West—would be so advantageous that it should
for the moment take precedence over the immediate objective, i.e., the creation
of the European Defense Community. But, they warned, the negotiations for
German unification should not “be prolonged so as to delay unduly nor to lead

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to an impasse which would defer indefinitely the attainment of an adequate German contribution in military forces and armaments.58

The Planning Board combined the State and Defense drafts into a single paper, which was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff59 and, with some changes, was adopted by the National Security Council on 13 August 1953, as NSC 160/1. The declared objective of US policy in this paper was the integration of Germany—preferably the whole country, or, failing that, the Federal Republic—with the West. The United States should promptly develop a plan for reunification of Germany under democratic rule. Meanwhile, it should continue to press for Franco-German rapprochement and for the ratification of EDC, and should continue to do so after the failure of any four-power talks (a forecast that was to prove accurate). If the ratification of the EDC treaty did not appear imminent within a reasonable period, other possible courses of action should be considered, including bilateral discussions of rearmmament with the West German government.60

Looking toward the approaching four-power negotiations, the Department of State began drafting its proposals covering the means of reunifying Germany, the nature of restrictions to be placed on German armed forces, and the kind of guarantees needed to insure against German aggression. Position papers on these topics were evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being militarily acceptable.61

At the request of Assistant Secretary Nash, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also discussed the military problems that would be presented by German unification. There would remain a need, they said, for a German force of about the size contemplated in the EDC plan: 12 divisions, 1,300 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels. As this force came into being, US and UK occupation forces could be withdrawn and redeployed to other parts of Europe, provided that the Soviet Union offered compensatory concessions. If a reunited Germany were aligned with the West, it would greatly strengthen NATO’s position; a more forward strategy could be adopted, they believed, within two years after full-scale German reararmament began. If it were not so aligned, then NATO’s present strategy would become infeasible and must be revised.62

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to evaluate two proposals for the demilitarization of Central Europe as part of an all-embracing European security system to accompany German reunification. One proposal, put forth by the Belgian Government, called for a demilitarized zone consisting of that part of Germany between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse; the other, submitted by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the German Federal Republic, envisioned a zone extending from the Elbe all the way to the Vistula and southward to Trieste. Under both plans, the demilitarized zone would be kept free of all troops, and occupation forces would be withdrawn from all of Germany, although EDC forces would be allowed to remain.63

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered both proposals acceptable, subject to (1) a firm and acceptable definition of the demilitarized zone that would avoid future controversy, and (2) a plan for a buildup of German forces in phase with removal
of allied occupation troops. The Adenauer proposal was preferable to them, probably because it included a provision that Soviet forces would withdraw from all the East European countries. The Belgian plan, under which the USSR would remove its troops only from Germany and Poland, represented approximately the lower limit of military acceptability. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff added a warning: "Any agreement which would preclude Germany from rearming and aligning itself with the West would be militarily unacceptable."^64

The difficulty that the Western Powers encountered in bringing the Soviet Union to the conference table quickly dampened the hope that the cold war could be ended in the near future. The Soviets sought a conference that would discuss Asian as well as European problems and would include Communist China among the participants. After diplomatic exchanges covering a period of several months, the four major powers finally agreed in December 1953 to convene a conference of foreign ministers in Berlin early in the following year. The Western Powers agreed that the Soviet Union would at that time be free to state its views concerning the desirability of a later conference including Communist China.^65

Spain and the Western Alliance

The addition of six German divisions to NATO's forces by the end of 1953, which the North Atlantic Council had hopefully projected at its 1952 Lisbon meeting, failed to take place because of the continuing delay in the establishment of the European Defense Community. But this disappointment was in some degree offset by arrangements made between the United States and Spain in 1953, which offered hope of an improvement in the overall defensive position of Western Europe.

The strategic importance of Spain followed from her commanding position at the entrance to the Mediterranean, her long common borders with two NATO members (France and Portugal), and her possession of a mountainous northern barrier along which allied forces might rally if driven out of France.^66 Although Spain's value to Western defense was obvious, her inclusion in NATO was politically and psychologically impossible. The nation was under the dictatorial rule of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who had seized power through a civil war with the aid of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Although Franco had kept his nation neutral during World War II, he was widely believed to be sympathetic to the aims and methods of the Axis Powers during that conflict. After the war, the moral obloquy surrounding the Franco regime made it unthinkable for the members of NATO to ally themselves formally with Spain.

The US military assistance program, however, offered a way of making Spain a de facto partner in Western defense without concluding a formal alliance. The United States could supply aid in return for the right to station air and naval forces on Spanish soil and in Spanish waters. The resulting improvement in Spain's forces would represent a gain for the West, since it could be assumed
that Spain would fight on the side of her European neighbors if war broke out. Moreover, the arrangement could take the form of a bilateral mutual assistance agreement having the status of an executive agreement, which need not be submitted to the US Senate.

The decision to develop Spain's military potential in the interests of European collective security was made by President Truman in 1951. Congress promptly approved the policy and appropriated $125 million for military, economic, and technical assistance for Spain for fiscal years 1952 and 1953.

Negotiations between the United States and Spain, involving base rights in exchange for material aid, began in 1952. But progress proved to be slow. The Spanish negotiators asked that the United States commit itself to supply substantial assistance over a period of several years. Their insistence brought the discussion to an impasse early in 1953. The Department of State referred the matter to the National Security Council.

The cost of an aid program that, it was believed, would satisfy the Spaniards was estimated at $465 million. When the Council and the President considered the matter on 13 May 1953, they directed the Secretary of Defense to determine whether base rights in Spain were important enough to justify these costs. If he decided in the affirmative, he would so advise the Secretary of State, who would proceed with the negotiations after discussion with appropriate Congressional committees.

Secretary Wilson reported on 19 May 1953 that, in his opinion, air and naval facilities in Spain were of urgent importance to US security. Apparently he did not formally consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff before reaching this decision. The Council noted his report on 20 May 1953.

Negotiations were then resumed and culminated in three agreements signed on 26 September 1953, under which the United States was authorized to develop and use military facilities in Spain, the location and nature of which were to be determined later in return for military, economic, and technical assistance. The amount of this aid was not stipulated in the agreements. The United States had, however, informally promised (subject to Congressional approval) to supply the full $465 million (of which $350 million would be for military assistance) over the next four years.

For the first increment of military assistance, a total of $141 million was available from appropriations for FY 1954 and prior years. On 17 September, just before the agreements were signed, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a division of these funds among the Services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on 17 November 1953 that Spain's air defense forces should be given priority in the allocation of US aid. Next in order of importance were the ground forces destined for immediate wartime deployment to the Pyrenees and the naval and other forces that would be needed to protect naval bases and ports. In line with this decision, they told Secretary Wilson on 13 January 1954 that $56.4 million, approximately 40 percent of the available funds, should be allocated to the Air Force MDA Program for Spain. The remainder should be evenly divided between the Army and Navy. They proposed that the United States provide support for one Spanish infantry division, two AAA
regiments, and three interceptor (day) fighter squadrons; for construction of four coastal minesweepers; and for modernization of 18 other vessels (destroyers, gunboats, minesweepers, and minelayers). The Secretary of Defense approved these recommendations on 18 February.\(^77\)

Administration of the agreements with Spain involved political complications that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had faced even before the negotiations were concluded. The tasks involved in the MDA Program—determination of requirements for Spanish forces and supervision of the distribution of US materiel—could be carried out by a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), as in other countries. The nucleus of this organization already existed in the form of a Joint US Military Group (JUSMG), established to develop initial requirements and to advise the US negotiators. JUSMG was headed by an officer nominated by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, who had served as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the Spanish negotiations.

But there remained the task of overseeing the construction of the US bases to be established in Spain. Administrative simplicity would be served by assigning this responsibility to the MAAG, as General Vandenberg recommended in January 1953. On the other hand, elsewhere in Europe base construction was a responsibility of USCINCEUR, who headed a command for which the Chief of Staff, Army, was the executive agent. General Collins urged that USCINCEUR’s authority in this field be extended to Spain. USCINCEUR, however, wore another hat as SACEUR, and hence his involvement in Spain might offend the other members of NATO. The Department of State therefore interposed an objection to the Collins recommendation.\(^78\)

Somewhat reluctantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the view of the Department of State and agreed that the MAAG should be responsible for base construction. They incorporated this decision into terms of reference for the MAAG that they submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 22 April 1953. In effect, this arrangement would assign the responsibility to the Air Force, which would continue to serve as executive agent for the Spanish aid program and to nominate the chief of the MAAG. The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that this assignment of functions should be temporary; USCINCEUR should be made responsible for supervising both the MDA program and the construction of bases as soon as the political situation would permit.\(^79\)

Secretary Wilson approved this plan in principle,\(^80\) but it was later modified in that two separate organizations were established: a Military Assistance Advisory Group for the MDA Program and a Joint United States Military Group to supervise construction. Both were to be headed by the same Air Force officer.\(^81\) Establishment of the two groups was announced by the Department of the Air Force on 6 November 1953.\(^82\)
The 1953 NATO Annual Review

The NATO force goals that the North Atlantic Council had approved in April 1953 were scheduled to be revised later in the year in connection with the 1953 Annual Review. In laying down instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, Secretary of Defense Wilson made it clear that economy was to be a major goal and that the transition to long haul planning was expected to be completed. The object, he said in a memorandum of 8 June 1953, must be to obtain a proper balance between required military support of U. S. and allied forces in Europe and the need for economies in the money and manpower that must be allotted to that effort. Achievement of such a balance should permit completion of agreed force goals ... and a retention of these units in Europe on a stable basis for an extended period of time.83

But the budget reductions planned by the administration cast doubt on the possibility even of reaching agreed force goals. On 16 July 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary that, although the Army could meet its 1953 objectives, it would be unable to enlarge its NATO forces before 1956, and even then would remain one division short of the M-plus-30-days goal of eight full divisions. The prospective Air Force shortfall was even greater. That Service—hardest hit by the reductions in the FY 1954 budget—now promised only 794 and 885 aircraft for 1953 and 1954, respectively, and foresaw an actual decline to 871 in 1956. The Navy, by cutting back its shore establishment and support units, would be able to meet its 1954 goals: 426 ships for D-day and 735 by D plus 180 days, with 319 and 514 of these totals, respectively, under NATO command.84

The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security indicated to Secretary Wilson their alarm over any downward revision in US goals. Mr. Wilson accordingly discussed the problem with officials of the Army and the Air Force. As a result of these discussions, the Army agreed to make a maximum effort to meet the M-plus-30-days goal of eight complete divisions by 1954. This figure, however, would include the additional armored division that had at first been planned as part of the M-day complement. The Air Force discovered that, with the Korean War ended, its approved 1953 and 1954 goals could be met, with some adjustment of types within the total.85

These decisions appeared in the final recommendations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson on 13 August 1953 for transmission to the International Staff. The Army now projected eight divisions by M plus 30 days. The Air Force promised 1,628 aircraft, but with a larger proportion of noncombat aircraft than originally planned, three wings of troop carriers being substituted for two of fighter bombers. Moreover, 466 aircraft, or almost a third of the total, were to be based in the United States, although some of them would be maintained on rotation to Europe.86

For NATO as a whole, the Defense Annual Review Team recommended that the force goals adopted in April 1953 be postponed or abandoned. Thus, under its proposals, ground force objectives would be reduced to $47\frac{2}{3}$ M-day divi-
sions for 1954, with an increase to 60 by 1956. For naval forces under NATO command, the suggested goal was 699, to be reached by 1956, in contrast with the 1954 figure of 732 approved by the Council in April. Aircraft strength for 1954 was to be cut to 6,767; it would rise to 8,494 by 1956, but of these 2,469 would be under national command. The Review Team admitted that its proposed 1956 forces were too small to meet requirements, but it defended them as representing “the probable maximum in conventional forces which can be achieved by NATO nations under present political and economic conditions.” These proposals were endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^{87}\)

To some degree, the effects of these reductions in numerical strength might be counterbalanced by improved weapons that were becoming available. Notable among these was the new 280-mm cannon, capable of firing nuclear as well as conventional ammunition, developed by the US Army. General Ridgway, before he left SACEUR, had asked that five battalions of 280-mm artillery be assigned to Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this request after obtaining assurance from the Department of State that there would be no official objections from European governments and no adverse effects on public opinion if these weapons were deployed.\(^{88}\)

The North Atlantic Council had scheduled a ministerial meeting for December 1953 to take action on the 1953 Annual Review. In preparation for the meeting, Secretary Wilson on 30 September asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the current strategic concept and to suggest revisions to adapt it to the forces considered realistically feasible by 1956. He forwarded proposals submitted by the United Kingdom, the substance of which was that NATO should accept the virtual impossibility of major increases and concentrate on maintaining the minimum force needed to deter aggression.\(^{89}\)

Secretary Wilson’s request was passed to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which, in a report dated 16 October 1953, revealed a difference of opinion concerning the feasibility of the forward strategy. The Army and Navy members believed that such a strategy could be implemented if force goals were met and if NATO forces were given an integrated atomic capability. The Air Force member contended that such a strategy “could not be successfully implemented under conditions which presently obtain.” All the JSPC members agreed, however, that it was essential to pursue the attainment of stated force requirements pending a reevaluation of NATO strategy.\(^{90}\)

Without attempting to settle the issue that had divided the Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Wilson on 22 October 1953 that time did not permit a complete reappraisal of NATO strategy. The 1953 Annual Review should therefore be considered an interim process pending a thorough study of force requirements in relation to new weapons, which should be undertaken by the Standing Group before the 1954 Review.\(^{91}\)

The British proposals were studied by a State-Defense working group that included Assistant Secretary Nash and an adviser designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel W.R. Goodrich, USA.\(^{92}\) The members of this body decided that the British views were compatible with those of the United States and should be discussed further by the two governments. However, like the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, they believed that a full reassessment of NATO strategy should be deferred until the following year. Their conclusions were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be suitable, with minor corrections as a basis for discussion with the United Kingdom.

On 10 December 1953 President Eisenhower and the National Security Council discussed the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council. They agreed that the Department of State would conduct confidential discussions with allied governments regarding the redeployment of US forces, but that no public statement would be made on this subject without the President’s approval, and that there would be no public discussion of the effects of new weapons on strategy or deployment.

Secretaries Dulles, Wilson, and Humphrey again headed the US delegation to the North Atlantic Council when it met in Paris between 14-16 December 1953. None of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended; the principal military representative was General Collins.

The Secretary of State used the meeting as an opportunity to proclaim publicly the importance that the United States attached to the EDC treaty. In his view, as explained at a news conference, EDC was primarily valuable for its political importance. He saw it as a means of insuring harmony between France and Germany and thus of ending the suicidal strife that had plagued Europe for so long. “In essence, that is the European policy which we are trying to cooperate with, and we earnestly hope that that policy will be brought to a successful conclusion,” he said. “If, contrary to our hopes and beliefs, it should not happen that way,” continued Secretary Dulles, in what was to become another of his memorable phrases, “it would force from the United States an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policies.”

At the meeting, the Council reduced the goals it had approved eight months earlier and abandoned those established at Lisbon in 1952. (See Table 19.) Objectives for land forces for 1954 were cut to 47\(\frac{2}{3}\) M-day divisions (of which 18 were Greek and Turkish), with a further reduction to 47 for 1956. A US aircraft contribution of 1,628 was approved for 1954 but the overall total was reduced to 6,728 aircraft. Only in naval forces did the Council anticipate that the earlier 1954 goal would be substantially achieved.

Secretary Wilson, in a statement before the Council, implied some doubt that the United States would be able to meet its obligation of eight Army divisions by M plus 30 days; he promised only that his country would try to do so as far as practicable. On the other hand, he announced that the Air Force now planned to station more aircraft in Europe than expected, and to send two Matador missile squadrons to Europe in 1954 and two more in 1955.

The Secretary again stressed the long haul. “We should get accustomed to thinking in long-range terms,” he said. “We still have many unresolved questions in our relations with the Soviets, and this condition seems likely to continue for an extended period of time.” More significantly, he sought to lay the groundwork for a redirection of NATO strategy. The administration, he declared, planned to seek legislative authorization to provide other countries with information about nuclear weapons. “In order that NATO military plans may reflect
Table 19—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council: December 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>1954 Firm Commitment</th>
<th>1955 Provisional Goal</th>
<th>1956 Planning Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>M-day Plus 30 Days</td>
<td>M-day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{8}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$41\frac{2}{3}$</td>
<td>$93\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>$47\frac{2}{3}$</td>
<td>$102\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined NATO and national command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ships</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>1,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squadrons and aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>1,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrions</td>
<td>$270\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>5,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total squadrons</td>
<td>$347\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>6,728</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>7,382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a \) Fractions refer to regiments and regimental combat teams.

\( ^b \) Not available.

these new capabilities to the fullest extent possible," he continued, "effective procedures for their use must be devised promptly. . . . New weapons are always costly, but they will result in a greater military potential for all of NATO." 100

Secretary Wilson's views seemed to be reflected in a lengthy resolution enacted by the Council to guide the 1954 Annual Review. One section of this resolution agreed that "it will be necessary for member countries to support over a long period of time forces which, by their balance, quality, and efficiency of armament, will be a major factor in deterring aggression." Another directed that the 1954 Review would be based on the assumption that, from 1955 through 1957, defense expenditures would be at approximately the present level. Most important was the following portion of the resolution, which invited the NATO Military Committee:

(a) To keep under continuous review, within the framework of the agreed strategic concept, the size and nature of the forces required to defend the NATO area, taking account of developments in military technology, Soviet capabilities, and the overall strategic situation, in order to provide general guidance to NATO defense planning;
(b) To press on with their reassessment of the most effective pattern of military strength for the next few years within the resources which it is anticipated may be made available.101

The substance of this resolution was reported to the press in the communique released after the meeting, which noted that the 1953 goals had been substantially met. At the same time, the announcement made it clear that NATO had been wholly converted to the long haul concept, as the latter was interpreted by the Eisenhower administration. "The Atlantic Community," it was asserted, "must . . . be prepared to keep in being over a period of years forces and weapons . . . which member countries can afford while at the same time maintaining and strengthening their economic and social structures."102

By the terms of its resolution, the North Atlantic Council set NATO along the path that the administration was already taking in connection with US strategy. A reassessment of force structure in the light of limited available resources and of the progress of military technology was the process that had led to the New Look. It was not difficult to forecast that the outcome of the NATO review would be similar. Occurring largely in 1954, the developments that followed from the Council's action are treated in the next chapter.
Western Europe, 1954

In 1953 the Western Powers had initiated diplomatic approaches that, if successful, would result in a liquidation of the major European problems left over from World War II—the status of Germany and Austria—and, perhaps, lead to a settlement of the cold war. The United States had participated in these actions with a reluctance that stemmed from doubts of the sincerity of the Soviets’ professed desire for peace. Diplomatic exchanges between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers had eventuated in an agreement to hold a conference of foreign ministers to discuss Germany and Austria.

The Berlin Conference

The opening of the conference was set for 25 January 1954 in Berlin. Before it began, disputes over the precise locations for the meeting augured poorly for the prospects of success. It was finally agreed to alternate the meeting site between the Western and Eastern sectors of the divided city.¹

On the appointed day, Secretary of State Dulles and the Foreign Ministers of the other three major powers—Georges Bidault of France, Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov of the Soviet Union—assembled in the former German capital. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been invited to send an observer but had declined, asking only that they be kept informed of developments of interest to them.²

Hopes for agreement did not long survive the opening of the meeting. On the key issue, the unification of Germany, the Western Powers proposed free elections, to be followed by a national convention and the formation of a German government. Rejecting this plan, Foreign Minister Molotov urged immediate establishment of an all-German government through fusion of the existing regimes in East and West Germany, with elections to follow later. He insisted that the new state must be peace-loving and must not enter any coalition or
military alliance. He also put forth a plan for a fifty-year collective security treaty, admittedly intended as a substitute for the EDC treaty. The West found it unacceptable.

When the conferees realized that agreement on Germany was impossible, they turned to Austria, with no better results. The Soviet Union sought conditions in any Austrian settlement that, to Western eyes, looked like pretexts for indefinitely maintaining Soviet troops in that country.

The sole accomplishment of the meeting was an agreement to hold another conference at Geneva to discuss Far Eastern problems. It was this Geneva Conference that finally ended the war in Indochina, as described in Chapter 12.3

The outcome of the Berlin Conference removed all doubt that the division of Europe into hostile Eastern and Western blocs would continue for the foreseeable future. Plainly it was necessary for the Western allies to continue their efforts to strengthen NATO and to rearm West Germany.

Launching NATO's New Approach

The North Atlantic Council in December 1953 had virtually abandoned any hope of a massive increase in forces and had ordered a review of strategy and force structure that would take account of advancing weapons technology. It was reasonable to conclude that one result of this restudy would be a decision to incorporate tactical nuclear weapons into NATO's strategic planning. Such a decision would require revision of the tight US legal restrictions on the dissemination of knowledge of nuclear weapons and their effects. Secretary Wilson had promised the Council in December that these restrictions would be relaxed. The promise was carried out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which authorized the President and the Secretary of Defense to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements for exchange of nuclear information with other nuclear nations.4

But the introduction of nuclear weapons into the NATO arsenal would raise a number of difficult questions. For example, who would control the use of the new weapons? Would SACEUR be allowed to order their use? If so, would he do so on receipt of intelligence warning of probable attack, or must he wait for overt action by an enemy? Or would he be required to refer the question to his civilian superiors in the North Atlantic Council, with a consequent delay that might be fatal?

Another prospective difficulty was the possible effect on public opinion in Europe. Knowledge that NATO planned to conduct nuclear warfare on land must inevitably leak out. The result might be a public outcry that governments could not ignore.

At a special ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 23 April 1954, held in connection with the Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems, Secretary of State Dulles made a statement that was clearly intended to prepare the leaders of the European NATO countries to accept a nuclear strategy. He stressed the great disparity in conventional military strength between the West
and the Soviet bloc. Nuclear weapons, he asserted, provided the only opportunity to close this gap and constituted the sole justification for NATO's recent decision to level off the buildup in numerical strength. To abjure the use of these weapons, continued Secretary Dulles, would amount to self-imposed military inferiority, which would invite war instead of deterring it. The forces of NATO must be free to regard nuclear weapons as conventional and to use them as military advantage dictated. The Council took no formal action on the matter at that time.\(^5\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already been brought face to face with some of the difficulties inherent in a nuclear strategy. Early in 1954, the French and Italian members of the Military Committee commented on the probability that US troops in NATO would eventually be extensively armed with nuclear weapons and that the conventional component of NATO's forces would by itself become too weak to offer effective resistance to an invader. When that day arrived, they pointed out, the other members of NATO would lie wholly at the mercy of the United States, which retained in its own hands the power to decide when or whether to use nuclear arms.\(^6\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to study this matter. Reporting on 27 May 1954, the Committee members observed that "the problem consists of a number of related components which should be viewed as a whole in seeking a basis for the timely application of the combined Allied military resources, particularly tactical atomic resources, with the greatest effectiveness." To provide such a basis, it would be necessary for the United States and the other NATO nations, before hostilities began, to work out agreements covering the following subjects:

1. US operating rights in foreign territories (i.e., the right to use bases for units equipped with nuclear weapons; authority for overflights by aircraft or missiles carrying nuclear weapons; authority for introduction and movement of US atomic units intended to support NATO).
2. Exchange of nuclear information between the United States and its allies.
3. The kind of measures to be taken after a warning (before overt attack).
4. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

The United States should at once seek a comprehensive agreement, according to the Committee, under which all necessary US operating rights would be "granted by the single decision by which each NATO Government commits its armed forces to action." Moreover, NATO commanders should be authorized in advance to carry out in full the provisions of approved defense plans, without reference to higher authority.\(^7\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these conclusions and sent them to the Secretary of Defense on 11 June 1954.\(^8\) Mr. Wilson took no immediate action.

The strategic review ordered by the North Atlantic Council in December 1953 awaited the conclusion of studies of FY 1957 force requirements by the major NATO commanders: SACEUR and his naval counterpart, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and the separate command for the English Channel. These studies were completed in July 1954.\(^9\) Although they cannot
now be located, it appears that the studies concluded that nuclear weapons would inevitably be used in any future war; that the initial phase of such a conflict would in large measure be decisive; and that war plans must be amended to reflect these facts.10 General Collins, the US representative in the Standing Group, sent these studies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating that they would become the basis of a draft report on NATO strategy to be prepared by the Standing Group. Comments by the three Standing Group member nations would be incorporated into a revised version of this report, which General Collins hoped would be ready for circulation to the Military Representatives Committee by 1 October. Thence it would go to the Military Committee, which was expected to act on it by the end of November.11

The Standing Group draft, SG 241/3, was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 August 1954. This paper was based on a forecast that a future war would probably be decided in the first few days or weeks by an intensive exchange of nuclear weapons. The conclusion followed that NATO, instead of planning to mobilize maximum strength after D-day, should concentrate on maintaining combat-ready forces in being, equipped with nuclear arms. General Collins, in forwarding it, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he himself had drafted several of the paragraphs. He had followed as far as possible the language of the JCS memorandum of 11 June 1954 to the Secretary of Defense regarding the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, which has been described above.12

Meanwhile Secretary Wilson had decided it was time to take up with Secretary Dulles the issues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised in that memorandum. On 16 August he sent a copy to the Secretary of State, noting that considerable psychological conditioning of the other NATO countries would be needed to obtain the kind of agreements the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired. The new approach studies recently prepared by the NATO commanders might lay the basis for a suitable approach, since they showed “the absolute necessity for ‘normalized’ use of atomic weapons in the defense of Western Europe.”13

On 26 August 1954 Acting Secretary Anderson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their recommendations were under discussion. But, he continued, JCS action on SG 241/3 was a necessary prerequisite to negotiations with other countries.14 In other words, the United States must be equipped with an expert opinion from its highest military authorities that the immediate use of nuclear weapons in war was essential to the defense of Europe.

Collapse of the European Defense Community

Just at this juncture, plans were disrupted by the final repudiation of the European Defense Community, on which so many hopes had been pinned. The consequences of this development were serious, and potentially disastrous, for Western politico-military cooperation.

Ostensibly, the EDC treaty had made progress early in 1954. Three signatories—the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany—ratified it.15 The North
Atlantic Council, in its ministerial meeting in April 1954, welcomed these developments and again affirmed the importance of EDC. 16

But these ratifications would count for nothing unless France could be induced to follow suit. In that country, opposition appeared to intensify as time went on. None of the successive French governments that held office during 1953 had ventured to submit the treaty to the National Assembly. The prospect of diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union provided one pretext for postponement, since EDC would become unnecessary if an East-West accommodation could be reached. But the failure of the Berlin Conference did nothing to placate French opponents of the treaty, who included a number of influential men in the Assembly and elsewhere in public life. Notable among these was General Charles de Gaulle, not then in power but possessed of considerable personal prestige. A particularly startling development was criticism of EDC by Marshal Juin on 30 March 1954—criticism that cost the Marshal his position with the French Army, though not his NATO post as CINCCENTER. 17

In part, French objection to the EDC treaty was based on the fact that it ran for 50 years, while the North Atlantic Pact would expire after 20 years. Thus as early as 1969, US and British forces might depart the Continent, leaving an unwilling France in an unequal partnership with a dominant Germany. This prospect seemed to justify French requests for additional guarantees from the United States and United Kingdom. On 13 April 1954 the United Kingdom signed an agreement pledging close cooperation with the EDC signatories. Simultaneously the British government publicly declared it had no intention to withdraw from the Continent so long as European security was threatened from any direction and that it regarded NATO as of indefinite duration. President Eisenhower gave a similar guarantee on 16 April 1954. 18

The President's statement—like that made by Secretary Dulles in Paris four months earlier—indicated the great importance the administration attached to EDC. This interest was shared by Congress, which attempted to apply leverage through its control of foreign aid funds. The Mutual Security Act of 1953 had specified that 50 percent of the equipment and materials made available to European countries should go to the European Defense Community or to countries which become members thereof. 19 The corresponding Act of 1954 provided that aid programmed for EDC signatories for FYS 1954 and 1955 was to be delivered only to those that had ratified the treaty and were participating in "collective defense programs in a manner satisfactory to the United States as determined by the President." 20

The endless reshuffling of French governments brought Pierre Mendes-France to the premiership in June 1954. His publicly expressed attitude toward EDC was ambiguous. After an abortive effort to draft a compromise that would satisfy both the proponents and the foes of the treaty, he laid before the French Assembly a new set of proposals to water down the effectiveness of EDC by allowing members a limited right of veto. This action not only failed to appease the critics at home but alarmed the other prospective member countries. 21

During these months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never wavered in their conviction that German military and economic strength was an essential compo-
ment of an adequate European defensive alignment. The new JCS members believed this as emphatically as the old. Even General Twining, the principal opponent of a land-based strategy, shared this conviction, or at least acquiesced in it. The New Look increased the importance of the German contribution, since troops from that country might take up the slack if US forces were to be withdrawn. In their New Look strategy paper, JCS 2101/113, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that "the full German potential for creating and maintaining military forces must be utilized." Early in 1954, in appraising the prospects for the remainder of the decade, they declared: "A satisfactory Free World military posture will be dependent in large measure on . . . the early establishment of German and Japanese forces . . . . Positive measures should be taken in order to attain at an early date a German military contribution to the Free World military posture, preferably through ratification of EDC; otherwise by alternative means."  

It was becoming increasingly clear that the time had come to think of alternative means. On 22 June 1954 Secretary Wilson reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that planning along this line had been recommended in NSC 160/1. "It is understood," he wrote, "that this requirement had been suspended by the President in view of the delicacy of the matter but that such a suspension is not now interpreted as precluding planning within the Defense and State Departments." He accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views.  

The JCS reply listed only two possible alternatives: (1) full NATO membership for West Germany; or (2) independent rearming of that country by the United States and the United Kingdom. The former course was preferable; the threat of the latter might be used to induce France to ratify the EDC treaty or to accept Germany in NATO. If neither could be attained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, then the United States should reappraise its basic policy toward Western Europe and NATO.  

The Departments of Defense and State discussed the JCS views over the next few weeks but reached no conclusions. They also considered ways in which the US and British Governments might undertake to rearm Germany on their own initiative if the French Parliament failed to ratify EDC at its current session.  

A similar process of reexamination was under way in London. A possibility under consideration by the British Government was that France might be induced to accept West Germany in NATO if some of the restrictions on German arms and armament written into the EDC treaty were transferred to NATO.  

The French Assembly opened debate on the EDC treaty, at long last, on 28 August 1954. By that time, there was little doubt about the outcome. The end came two days later, when the Assembly voted to adjourn debate on this subject sine die. The European Defense Community was dead—and also, it seemed at the time, the bright dream of Franco-German military and political reconciliation.
Effects on US Policy

President Eisenhower lost no time in characterizing the failure of the EDC project as a serious setback for the West. Secretary Dulles, in a press release on 31 August 1954, spoke of it as a saddening event, which imposed on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies. At the same time, however, he indicated that the US reaction would be temperate and that the reappraisal might not be so agonizing as he had indicated earlier. As he said:

We need not feel that the European idea is dead . . . . There is still much on which to build, and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered action of our own . . . . [The] tragedy would be compounded if the United States was . . . led to conclude that it must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. . . . we shall be governed by the realization that we cannot in isolation find safety for ourselves.

The Secretary concluded with a call for a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council to discuss alternatives to EDC.

Within the administration, plans to meet the new situation were developed on two levels. At the higher one, the National Security Council reviewed basic policy toward Western Europe and adopted a statement on the subject on 24 September 1954. The Council recommended that the United States seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by bringing about a restoration of its sovereignty, its admission to NATO, and the beginning of its rearmament. Other objectives should be to seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe and to foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe. The Secretary of State was asked to report by 28 October 1954 whether or not he considered these objectives attainable; if he did not, others would be considered.

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff were discussing the French action as it affected military strategy. On 10 September Deputy Secretary Anderson asked them to reappraise US military policy in Western Europe and to indicate the adjustments in US and NATO military plans that would be needed under varying degrees of French opposition to, or noncooperation with, alternative plans to rearm Germany. A week earlier he had asked them to submit by 15 October a comprehensive plan for West German rearmament, adaptable to any political framework that might ultimately be agreed upon.

Before they could comply with these requests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves obligated to provide Secretary Dulles with an authoritative opinion on West Germany’s military value. The Secretary of State was preparing for a trip to Bonn and London on 16 September, as part of the diplomatic efforts then under way to repair the damage done by the French Assembly. On 15 September 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a statement, the substance of which was conveyed in the following sentences:

A German contribution is essential. The United States should seek a German contribution . . . . preferably with the concurrence of the French and British but if this cannot be obtained we should be willing to go as far as making a bilateral
agreement with the Germans. . . . A really sound defense of Europe depends on an adequate contribution from both Germany and France as well as the smaller nations. Failure to obtain French cooperation for a German contribution at this time will therefore require a basic change in NATO commitments and structure but this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible arrangements with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.  

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had by then drafted a tentative reappraisal of military policy in Europe. The Committee upheld the validity of the basic premise of US strategy in Europe, the assumption that collective defense was essential in order to deny Western Europe to the Soviets. An optimum defense required collaboration of both France and Germany, but if it became necessary to choose between them, the latter, with its larger military potential, was to be preferred. The best method of integrating West Germany into European defense would be to admit her to NATO, but any politically acceptable solution that would produce a German army of about twelve divisions could be suitable. If France remained obdurate, the United States and other allies should proceed independently to rearm Germany. Should France go so far as to withdraw from NATO, a forward defense of West Germany should be organized, with lines of communication based on the ports of the Low Countries. If a majority of NATO countries would not support German rearmament, the United States and the United Kingdom should rearm their occupation zones in cooperation. The Committee concluded, however, with words of caution: 

It would be futile and injudicious for the United States to undertake the unilateral rearmament of West Germany. Only as a last resort and in recognition of a complete bankruptcy of our European policy should the United States withdraw her forces from Europe and adopt a peripheral strategy.

What to do in case of French noncooperation was considered in more detail by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The substance of the Committee’s report was that the degree of adjustment in strategy would depend on the nature and intensity of French opposition. Under the worst conceivable case—French withdrawal from NATO and adoption of all possible means of obstruction short of open hostility—US policy toward NATO would have to be completely reappraised.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent these two reports back to the Committees to be combined into one. The result was a split in the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The Navy and the Air Force members supported the view of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee that the United States should if necessary proceed with German rearmament, in concert with other NATO nations, in the face of French disapproval. The Army member believed that a tenable defensive position in Western Europe was all but impossible without France, and that there was consequently no alternative to persistence in the attempt to enlist French cooperation.

Discarding the abortive efforts of the Committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 September 1954 referred the Secretary of Defense to their statement of 15 September, which had emphasized the importance of both France and West Germany while suggesting the possibility of a bilateral agreement with the latter.
They suggested that, if the support of other NATO nations could be obtained, it might be possible to reorient NATO strategy to make greater use of naval and air bases in the United Kingdom and Spain, while rearming West Germany with no restrictions on the size of her armed forces or her rate of war production. If other countries would not agree, a joint rearmament of the British and US zones should be undertaken. The possibility that the United Kingdom might not cooperate was not considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said nothing about the possibility of withdrawal from Europe.\textsuperscript{41}

Secretary Wilson sent these conclusions to the National Security Council with his approval.\textsuperscript{42} By that time, however, the outlines of a solution to the Franco-German problem were beginning to emerge. The eventual admission of West Germany to NATO, with the assent of France, obviated any need for the revision in US policy and strategy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested.

\section*{Evolution of the New Approach}

The defeat of the EDC treaty jeopardized the Standing Group’s schedule for processing SG 241/3, the draft report on NATO strategy. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this paper on 3 September 1954, Admiral Radford pointed out that it assumed the existence of German forces and therefore could not be evaluated until the status of West Germany had been settled. Evidently agreeing with him, his colleagues took no formal action at that time.\textsuperscript{43}

But action could not be put off indefinitely. The Standing Group was scheduled to meet in Paris with the Council on 15 September 1954 for preliminary discussion of SG 241/3 and the commanders’ capabilities studies. Representatives of the State and Defense Departments, discussing plans for this meeting, agreed that General Collins, as Chairman of the Standing Group, should announce that the review of strategy was not yet complete but that there could be no doubt of the need to reach approved force goals or to obtain a German contribution. Then, donning his other hat as the US representative in the Group, General Collins would report that, although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to reserve formal comment on SG 241/3 until after the German question had been settled, the United States would not object to the informal circulation of a revised version to the Military Representatives Committee.\textsuperscript{44} The Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of this State-Defense agreement on 10 September, while agreeing that it did not relieve them of their responsibility for taking an official position on SG 241/3.\textsuperscript{45}

General Collins followed his instructions at the joint Standing Group-Council meeting on 15 September. In answer to questions, he gave as his opinion that a final version of SG 241/3, with definitive conclusions on NATO strategy and forces, could be ready for submission to the Council in December if the German question could be settled by 15 November.\textsuperscript{46}

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee studied SG 241/3 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted a split report on 10 September 1954. The Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps members believed that it overemphasized the probable effectiveness of nuclear weapons and misrepresented the conclusions of the capabilities studies. This contention was denied by the Air Force member, who commented incidentally that a German army, though politically and psychologically valuable, was not militarily essential for the defense of Western Europe.47

Instead of acting on the JSPPC report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 September 1954 approved a revised version of SG 241/3 and sent it to the Secretary of Defense as a statement of their views (necessarily a tentative one, since the status of Germany was still unsettled). Apparently they did not significantly alter the original SG 241/3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the principal assumption, that nuclear weapons would inevitably be used in war, and the resulting conclusion, that NATO plans should stress forces in being.48

Secretary Wilson sent this paper to Secretary Dulles on 27 September 1954 and recommended that it be used as a basis for developing a US position, in preparation for the next Council meeting, on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. He proposed to recall General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander, to obtain his views on the subject.49

The State Department approved the JCS paper subject to several minor changes and to the right to make further suggestions later if it so desired.50 The Standing Group then drafted another version, IPT 178/15, that incorporated the comments of the French and British Chiefs of Staff. General Collins sent this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 October 1954, expressing the opinion that its differences from the JCS draft were matters of wording rather than substance.51 The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no immediate action, perhaps awaiting developments on the German problem, which was nearing solution.

On 6 October 1954 General Gruenther conferred in Washington with representatives of the Defense and State Departments. The conferees agreed that the United States should seek to develop a nuclear capability in the NATO alliance. Accordingly, at the December Council meeting the United States should push for approval of a final version of SG 241/3, which would commit NATO to a nuclear strategy. There should be no effort at that time to induce the other members to commit themselves to the use of nuclear weapons in war or to grant operating rights for nuclear-armed US forces. But the United States should draft a formal agreement for sharing nuclear information, under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and submit it to the North Atlantic Council, in order to get it before Congress as early as possible in 1955.52

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum of 11 June 1954, had argued the immediate necessity of obtaining precisely the kind of commitments from other countries that were ruled out under the agreement reached at this conference. It was therefore with some reluctance that they approved this agreement. They did so because they accepted the governing influence of political considerations in this matter.53

Armed with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries Wilson and Dulles, accompanied by Admiral Radford and General Collins, submitted their plans to the President on 3 November 1954. They summarized the content
of the revised Standing Group strategy paper (IPT 178/15), emphasizing its conclusion that Soviet aggression could be deterred or defeated only if nuclear weapons could be used immediately in case of hostilities. They believed that the current political climate made it unwise to press the North Atlantic Council to authorize the use of these weapons. But the Council's approval of IPT 178/15 was a necessary first step. To obtain this approval, they explained, it would be necessary for the United States to promise its allies that its forces in NATO would be fully equipped with atomic weapons. If other countries raised objections, the United States should be ready to assure them that it had no thought of preventive war and that it was willing to explore bona fide disarmament proposals. A formal agreement for release of nuclear information should be presented at the meeting, but the question of US operating rights was not to be raised until later.

The effect of the new nuclear strategic concept on force structure was not yet clear, the advisers told the President, but there was little hope that it would reduce costs. It might require a considerable change in the Military Assistance Program (for example, to finance stronger air defense), and the administration should be ready to assure other countries that it would attempt to persuade Congress to accept these changes.

President Eisenhower approved these proposals and agreed to consult with Congress as necessary to carry them out. Admiral Radford entered one caveat: the United States should not give the impression that it was willing to assume the entire burden of reequipping the forces of NATO nations to fit the new strategic concept. The President made it clear that no such action was intended; all that was contemplated was a reorientation of military assistance to develop the kind of forces that would be needed.54

West Germany Joins NATO

By the time these decisions were made, the Western Powers had at last accomplished what had for a time appeared impossible; they had settled the delicate German question in a way that satisfied everyone. The hero of this success story was Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Her Majesty's Government. His solution was to bring West Germany into NATO with accompanying restrictions modeled after those in EDC.

The key to this solution was provided by the Brussels Treaty, signed in March 1948 by France, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux countries. It had established a Western European Union for mutual defense and politico-economic cooperation, which had become the nucleus for the NATO alliance established the next year. In French eyes the Brussels Treaty combined some of the advantages of the EDC and the North Atlantic Treaty; like the former, it had a duration of 50 years, and like the latter, it included the United Kingdom. To enlarge the Western European Union to admit West Germany—and Italy as
well, in order to complete the absorption of the old EDC—would thus establish Franco-German cooperation on a basis that omitted some of the objectionable features (as France saw them) of the EDC. All the members of the Union could accept restrictions on their military forces that would keep West Germany from feeling that it had been singled out for invidious treatment. At the same time, a Germany thus subjected to suitable controls became, for France, an acceptable member of NATO.

The outlines of this solution were worked out by Anthony Eden, with assistance from Secretary Dulles, in a hasty tour of European capitals in September 1954. The first result of this activity was an agreement by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, plus the six signatories of the EDC treaty, to meet in London on 28 September 1954 to discuss the details of the projected settlement.55

On 21 September Mr. Hensel officially notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this conference would be held. He forwarded some proposals made by Premier Mendes-France concerning limitations on German arms production and other matters.56 The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 22 September that they would agree to any politically feasible arrangement that resulted in a German military establishment about as large as that envisioned under EDC, but they warned that German arms production should not be too narrowly restricted. Any US guarantee given the revised Brussels Treaty Organization, they felt, should be general in nature, like that given by President Eisenhower to EDC in April 1954; there should be no promise to maintain any specific minimum force.57

Meeting in London between 28 September and 3 October 1954, the representatives of the nine nations agreed that West Germany and Italy would be invited to accede to the Brussels Treaty and that the former would be offered membership in NATO at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The signatories of the Brussels Treaty would contribute forces to NATO as requested by that organization; the size of these forces was not to be increased without unanimous consent of all signatories. Production of armaments by the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization was to be internationally supervised. The United Kingdom promised to maintain, on the mainland of Europe, its present strength (four divisions plus a tactical air force), or whatever SACEUR regarded as the equivalent, and never to withdraw these forces without the consent of a majority of members of the Western European Union.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared their intention to liquidate the last vestiges of the occupation regime in West Germany as soon as the necessary instruments could be drafted for the purpose. On its part, West Germany promised to observe the principles of the UN Charter and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact. It also foresaw recourse to force in reuniting its territories and agreed never to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons.

The rearmament of West Germany was to be regulated by proposals to be drawn up later and approved by the North Atlantic Council. The size and gen-
eral character of the German NATO contingent would follow the provisions of the EDC treaty.

All forces of NATO countries stationed on the continent of Europe were to be placed under SACEUR except those exempted by NATO as suitable for national command. The national contingents under SACEUR were to be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency. SACEUR was given increased authority to regulate the arrangements for logistic support of his forces.58

A special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris between 19 and 23 October 1954, put the finishing touches on this complex arrangement. The Council approved protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty that (1) invited the Federal Republic of Germany to accede, (2) formally ended the occupation regime, and (3) decreed that the maximum size of the forces to be placed under SACEUR by France and Germany would be the same as in the EDC treaty. Appropriate protocols to the Brussels Treaty were also adopted. A lengthy resolution adopted by the Council spelled out details of SACEUR’s extended authority in the field of logistics.59

It remained only to have these protocols ratified by the national parliaments. There was to be one more flurry of alarm in this connection in December 1954, when a preliminary vote in the French Assembly suggested that that body might yet reject them. But the fears proved groundless; the protocols were approved on a final vote.60

This happy outcome obviated the need for any agonizing reappraisal of US policy. On 28 October 1954 the National Security Council accepted the German problem as settled and decided to require no further discussion of European policy.61

The results also gave relevance to the plan for German rearmament that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to Mr. Anderson’s request, submitted on 13 October 1954. They proposed a West German military force of the following size and composition: an army of 12 divisions, organized into one field army and four corps with supporting elements, all to follow US models; a navy comprised of 311 vessels (motor torpedo boats, escort and harbor patrol ships, minesweepers, minelayers, and landing craft), with an air arm of 30 (to be increased later to 200) aircraft; and an air force with 1,326 aircraft (600 fighter-bombers, 108 fighter-reconnaissance, 450 day-fighters, 72 all-weather fighters, and 96 transports). The totals in each case were identical with those proposed under the EDC treaty. The rearmament and training of these forces, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be undertaken as soon as possible. Overall training responsibility was to be assigned to USCINCEUR, who might further delegate it to his component commanders and to a military assistance advisory group to be established for Germany. Detailed schedules of training and action and lists of required facilities, prepared by the US Services, were included with the JCS plans.62

Despite the JCS desire for haste, some weeks were still to elapse before the plan could be put into effect. The final political settlement left it to the North Atlantic Council to regulate German rearmament. On 28 December 1954, after the Council had gone on record with a statement stressing the need for West
German forces, Assistant Secretary Hensel approved the JCS proposals for planning purposes. Secretary Wilson had already approved a JCS recommendation for the establishment of a MAAG for West Germany, to be headed by an Army General.

Approval of the New Approach

After the political stalemate was broken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to take official action on IPT 178/15, the draft paper on NATO strategy. They completed their review of it on 5 November 1954. They considered that it was in harmony with their guidance, although in certain passages they preferred the wording that they had suggested earlier in their redraft of SG 241/3.

After undergoing approval by the Military Representatives Committee, IPT 178/15, now retitled MC 48, was placed on the agenda for a meeting of the Military Committee on 22 November. The US Representative in the Standing Group, in sending MC 48 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured them that its provisions reflected a general acceptance of their comments on IPT 178/15; he recommended approval.

Since General Collins had recently been given a new assignment as President Eisenhower’s special representative in South Vietnam, Admiral Radford planned to represent the United States at the 22 November meeting of the Military Committee, which was to be held in Washington. Possibly for that reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared no written comments on MC 48. Before the meeting, Admiral Radford received formal instructions from Mr. Hensel’s office. He was directed to uphold the general policy approved by the President on 3 November, while avoiding, insofar as possible, any discussion of political complications.

The committee met as scheduled and approved MC 48, with a few changes that Admiral Radford considered acceptable in the light of US guidance. The way was thus clear for the paper to go to the North Atlantic Council for final action.

The disposition of MC 48 was the principal item on the agenda for the ministerial meeting of the Council scheduled for December 1954. There seemed no prospect of major changes in force goals, but it was certain that any reconsideration of this subject would involve downward revisions. Thus for 1955, country submissions tabulated by the International Staff added up to 44 army divisions for M-day, 99 for M plus 30 days, and 6,894 aircraft—figures that were appreciably smaller than the provisional 1955 goals adopted in December 1953. The United States recommended figures that were in some cases slightly higher (e.g., 102 \( \frac{2}{3} \) divisions by M plus 30 days and 6,991 aircraft), though still below the earlier objectives.

For its part, the United States, despite the economy program being carried out by the administration, was able to promise NATO slightly higher naval and air forces than had been planned earlier and to maintain Army strength in
Europe at substantially its existing level. In October 1954, a long-standing dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over the status of the border territory of Trieste was settled, and it became possible to withdraw the US and British occupation troops there. President Eisenhower thereupon directed that the US force, which totaled one regiment, or one-third of a division, be returned to the United States, except for a small contingent that was to be shifted to Austria. The US commitment to NATO, in which the Trieste occupation force had been counted, was accordingly reduced to $5^{2/3}$ divisions on M-day and $8^{2/3}$ on M plus 30 days. The administration believed that this loss in manpower would be effectively offset by the new weapons being deployed to Europe: 280-mm artillery with nuclear capability and Corporal guided missiles and Honest John rockets, both of which were becoming available.

In preparation for the ministerial meeting, Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Radford met with the President on 8 December 1954 and discussed the prospects for MC 48. They agreed that, regardless of the Council’s decision, the United States must retain the freedom to use nuclear weapons if its own forces were threatened, and that it would be injudicious to push the Council toward any specific commitment other than that implicit in the approval of MC 48. The President expressed the conviction that, upon reflection, the other NATO governments would realize that the power to order use of nuclear weapons could not be held exclusively by the Council and that the Supreme Allied Commander must be left some latitude to make the decision in an emergency.

When the North Atlantic Council convened, Admiral Radford attended in place of General Collins, while Deputy Secretary Anderson represented Secretary Wilson. Already it had become known to the press that the principal question to be decided at the meeting was the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Certain preparatory actions had been taken by the United States to obtain a favorable decision. General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander, in briefings given the Permanent Council Representatives and the Military Committee, had asserted that nuclear weapons were essential for executing the forward strategy. The United States had submitted to the Permanent Council the draft of an agreement for sharing of information concerning these weapons.

With the way thus prepared, the Council approved MC 48 on 17 December 1954. In doing so, however, the members made it clear that they were not thereby surrendering the right of their governments to determine whether or not nuclear weapons would actually be used. The United States accepted this reservation; in fact, the US delegation assisted those of France and the United Kingdom in drafting the resolution on this subject, which was also approved in advance by Admiral Radford and General Gruenther. It read as follows:

The Council approves the report MC 48 as a basis for defense planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.

Turning to force goals, the Council, as expected, approved the smaller objectives proposed by the International Staff for the next three years. (See Table 20.)
Table 20—Force Goals Approved by North Atlantic Council: December 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>1955 Firm Commitment</th>
<th>1956 Provisional Goal</th>
<th>1957 Planning Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>M-day plus 30 Days</td>
<td>M-day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>a (\frac{5}{3})</td>
<td>8(\frac{2}{3})</td>
<td>5(\frac{2}{3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>38(\frac{1}{3})</td>
<td>90(\frac{1}{3})</td>
<td>37(\frac{1}{3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National command b</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ships</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squadrons and aircraft c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Squadrons</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrons</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>5,294</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>5,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total squadrons</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>e 6,924</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>7,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\frac{5}{3}\), \(\frac{2}{3}\), and \(\frac{1}{3}\) refer to regiments and regimental combat teams.

Breakdown by country not available.

Included both NATO and national command forces.

Not available.

Source gives total as 6,894, presumably a typographical error.

At the same time, the Council was confronted by a report from the Secretary-General that even the firm goals for 1954 had not been met; ground forces, for example, were one and one-third divisions short of the M-day objective.\textsuperscript{80} (See Table 21.) Taking note of this fact, and of the abandonment of the 1955 and 1956 objectives approved a year earlier, the Council noted that it would be necessary for some countries (which were not specified) "to allocate resources for defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>31 December 1952</th>
<th>31 December 1953</th>
<th>31 December 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-day 30 Days</td>
<td>M-day 30 Days</td>
<td>M-day 30 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>52/3</td>
<td>62/3</td>
<td>52/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Canada</td>
<td>192/3</td>
<td>381/3</td>
<td>232/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>171/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>461/3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Canada</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ships</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Canada</td>
<td>2,901</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>3,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>4,069</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>4,801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Fractions refer to regiments or regimental combat teams.
\textsuperscript{b} Not available

at a higher level than currently indicated." The Council also declared that, with the approval of MC 48, a German force contribution had become of even greater importance for the successful implementation of NATO strategy.81

When the Council closed its meeting on 18 December, it had set NATO firmly along the path taken a year earlier by the Eisenhower administration in the United States. NATO had its own New Look—or new approach, to use a term favored by Secretary Wilson. Secretary of State Dulles was enthusiastic in his praise of the Council's action. In his view, it showed "for the first time the means of developing a forward strategy which could be relied on to protect Western Europe from invasion." But he made it clear that the decision was only for the purposes of planning and preparation and that the governments had not handed over to the military their responsibilities for deciding when plans should be executed.82

Certain implications of the Council's action had yet to be faced. For example, should a crisis arise, it might be difficult to maintain the distinction between planning and execution. Was it realistic to allow a military commander to make plans for the use of nuclear weapons and then, when a showdown seemed imminent, to forbid him to carry them out? But even if no such crisis occurred, the adoption of the new strategy was sure to have some impact on public opinion, and thus, eventually, on the policies of member governments in Europe. These effects were to come to light in the months that followed.

NATO's Accomplishments, 1953–1954

At the beginning of 1953 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so hopefully launched less than four years earlier, seemed almost at dead center. The problem that it faced was identical with the one that, in the view of the Eisenhower administration, confronted the United States. The elements of the problem were the rising cost of military establishments, the pressure of demands for government expenditures for other purposes (or for lower taxes), the overwhelming numerical superiority of the communist countries in conventional military forces, and the unwillingness of Western governments to urge upon their citizens the need to bear a heavier burden of military costs. No doubt it would have been extremely difficult for any set of US Government leaders to galvanize the European NATO countries to the effort needed to meet the Lisbon force goals. The Eisenhower administration, committed to a general reduction in US forces, was in no position even to make the attempt.

Given this situation, there was no alternative to striking out in a new direction—trying a new approach that would make better use of the money and manpower that the NATO powers were willing to contribute. The advance of nuclear technology, spawning both the enormously destructive hydrogen bomb and the smaller weapons available for tactical use, pointed the direction that was to be taken by both the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Civilian as well as military leadership was active in drawing NATO toward
its new strategic concept. SACEUR apparently formulated the concept in his 1954 requirements studies. Secretaries Wilson and Dulles laid the groundwork for its approval by their remarks to the North Atlantic Council in December 1953 and April 1954.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not played a major role in initiating the concept, they interposed no objection to it. At a lower level, the Army member of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, during the discussion of the 1955—1956 JSCP that was under development in 1954, had in effect urged the rejection of the basic assumption in MC 48: that general war would begin with a nuclear exchange and should not be expected to grow out of a clash between conventional forces. But General Ridgway did not press the issue and joined his colleagues in approving the paper. Criticism of MC 48 from high-level Army sources was not to appear for several years. The reason is perhaps to be found in the fact that a coherent Army doctrine of limited war, as a contingency requiring special preparation in US and NATO defense plans, was only beginning to emerge.

Another major development in Western European defense during 1953—1954 was the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic alliance. This was an impressive accomplishment, especially in the light of the circumstances in which it took place. The political framework of EDC that had been painstakingly constructed through months of negotiation was swept away in an instant and had to be rebuilt, on a more substantial foundation, in a few weeks’ time. The principal credit for the outcome accrued to the British Government. The United States contributed by supporting the British initiative and, in a purely negative way, by avoiding any hasty or ill-conceived word or deed that might have split NATO beyond repair.

Such influence as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in this situation was exerted in the direction of moderation, and thus perhaps contributed to the successful settlement. Neither the old nor the new Joint Chiefs of Staff had ever wavered in their conviction of the need to bring German power and productive capacity into the Western alliance. If forced to choose between France and Germany (a contingency that might well have arisen in September 1954), they would have chosen Germany, because it was more populous, more productive, more stable politically, and potentially stronger on the battlefield. Nevertheless they made it clear that they wished to avoid such a painful choice at almost any cost. Nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever give serious consideration, even in the darkest days after the failure of EDC, to a withdrawal of US forces from the Continent. Thus they demonstrated their full commitment to the principle of collective security.
The Middle East

A major conviction underlying President Truman's foreign policy was that the Middle East was of cardinal importance to the security of the United States and the other Western nations. The military assistance program launched by the Truman administration stemmed in part from a desire to keep this region out of Soviet hands. Greece, the victim of a communist-inspired civil war, and Turkey, upon which the Soviet Union had made intermittent demands for territorial concessions, received aid in 1947. Three years later assistance was extended to Iran, which had been subjected to constant threats since the failure of the Soviets to retain a foothold in that country at the end of World War II. The inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO in 1952 offered hope of further strengthening of the security of the region and lessened the danger that NATO's right flank might be turned by a Soviet breakthrough into the Mediterranean.

US Interests in the Middle East in 1952

It seemed obvious that the security of the Middle East could be greatly enhanced if the individual nations could be induced to cooperate in some sort of regional defense association analogous to NATO. The Truman administration had entertained the hope of establishing a Middle East Defense Organization, beginning with a framework consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, into which the other Middle Eastern countries would be fitted. The establishment of such an organization had been declared a goal of US policy in NSC 129/1, which the President approved in April 1952.

The creation of such an organization, however, faced formidable political obstacles. Middle Eastern governments, with a few exceptions, were highly unstable and uncertain of their bases of support. Their policies necessarily reflected a profound hostility toward the West that was felt by many peoples throughout the region, particularly those of Arabic origin. This feeling, which
had deep historical roots, had recently been reinforced by the establishment of the state of Israel, which enjoyed at least the moral support of the Western powers. The creation of this new nation had been attended by the flight of numerous Arabic refugees from areas that passed under Israeli rule. The plight of these unfortunates enhanced the resentment stemming from Israel’s victory in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.

Compounding the difficulty of establishing the Middle East Defense Organization were two bitter disputes in which the United Kingdom was involved—one with Egypt, the other with Iran. The points at issue in the British-Egyptian controversy were the status of the Sudan, formerly ruled jointly by the two nations but now claimed by Egypt, and the future of the important military base at Suez, which the British considered vital to defense of the Canal. The presence of British troops at this base, allowed by the terms of the treaty granting Egypt independence, had become a major irritant. The United Kingdom was willing to remove its troops, but only if given suitable guarantees that the base and its facilities would be maintained in operating condition and would be made available for use in time of war. British insistence on these points had led to increased tension, which erupted into violent anti-Western riots in Cairo early in 1952. Several months later, the inept government of King Farouk was overthrown by a military junta headed by General Mohammed Naguib. It was not immediately apparent what effect this development would have upon the prospects for settlement.

In Iran, the bone of contention was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company without compensation, a step decreed in 1951 by the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Though not himself a communist, Mossadegh enjoyed the support of communists as well as of extreme nationalists. His seizure of the British-owned oil installations had cut production to a trickle and deprived Iran of the oil revenues that were vital to her economy. The United States sought in vain to mediate the dispute, which grew steadily more acrimonious. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Kingdom were severed in October 1952. Iran’s attitude toward the United States also became less friendly, although the United States continued to maintain an ambassador in Tehran. The US military aid program was not formally ended; the MAAG remained in Iran, as did the separate military missions to the Iranian Army and the Gendarmerie.³

These disputes were the more serious for the United States in that US national policy and strategy recognized the Middle East as primarily a British sphere of operations. Under the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan of 1952, defense of the region was left to Turkish and British troops, plus whatever forces might be furnished by the Arab states. There were no provisions for deploying US troops to the Middle East. British plans were based on the concept of the inner ring, a natural defense line near the Mediterranean coast, running along the Taurus Mountains in southern Turkey, then curving southward through Aleppo to the Jordan Rift and the Gulf of Aqaba. Retention of this line would make it possible to hold the Cairo-Suez area and to support Turkey. The British also planned if possible to hold the Persian Gulf oil areas in isolation.⁴
The long British disputes with Egypt and Iran, together with the general military and economic weakness of the United Kingdom, seemed to point toward a larger role for the United States in the Middle East. NSC 129/1 had included a statement that the United States should take an increased share of responsibility toward the area,concerting its actions as far as possible with the United Kingdom, and, where appropriate, with France and Turkey as well.\(^5\)

A prerequisite to the enlargement of the US role was a careful study of the military problems inherent in Middle Eastern defense—an estimate of what was needed in comparison with what was available. At the request of the Department of State,\(^6\) the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared an estimate that was presented orally by General Bradley on 18 November 1952 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the JCS view, a forward defense, along a line running from southeastern Turkey along the Zagros Mountains to the mouth of the Persian Gulf, would require 19 divisions, 1,200 combat aircraft, and eight destroyers with supporting escort vessels and minesweepers. There were available, however, only 12 divisions: ten Turkish, one British (stationed in Egypt), and the equivalent of a division in smaller units from Jordan and Iraq. The deficiency in combat aircraft was even greater. Only the 136 aircraft of the British Middle East Air Force could be counted on, although they could be increased to approximately 250 by D plus four months, and carrier-based aircraft could provide some support. Naval forces were adequate except for a deficiency in coastal minesweepers. Under the most optimistic assumptions, it appeared that the D-day deficit could be reduced to one division and 580 aircraft by 1955.\(^7\)

These estimates were preliminary and subject to revision in the light of further study. In October 1952, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had been instructed to make a careful determination of the requirements for a forward defense of the Middle East (one that would embrace more territory than the British inner ring plan) and of the prospects for retaining access in wartime to some of the oil resources of the region.\(^8\) The JSPC report completing this study did not appear until a full year had passed.

The British were willing—perhaps eager—to see the United States shoulder part of the burden. In 1952 the British Chiefs of Staff had suggested to their US counterparts a combined study of the defense of the Persian Gulf oil regions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 6 February that, in their view, such a study should be a part of a larger one dealing with the entire Middle East. As soon as they had completed their own exploratory studies of this subject, they said, they would approach their British colleagues with a view to a combined planning effort.\(^9\)

To gain the support of Middle Eastern countries for Western objectives the chief means available appeared to be effective use of the US mutual security program. When the FY 1954 budget was under discussion in the latter part of 1952, representatives of the Department of State expressed the conviction that a program of grant military assistance to those countries (other than Turkey and Iran, which were already recipients) was necessary to attain US objectives. The Department recommended a sum of $100 million to be allocated to the Arab states, Israel, and Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when asked for comment
on this proposal, endorsed it on 5 November 1952, while pointing out that the urgency of the Department of State request had precluded careful consideration.\textsuperscript{10} In a separate memorandum, they set forth the military rationale for their views. The Middle East, they pointed out, was of strategic military importance. US aid should be used to secure military rights and facilities, to improve indigenous forces, and to strengthen internal security and political stability. Authorization of the program should not await the completion of regional defense plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed. They cautioned that US aid should be designed to draw recipients closer together without stimulating adverse reactions in neighboring countries—a consideration that applied particularly to the question of assistance to Israel and Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended also that the $100 million not be provided by diversion from other programs.\textsuperscript{11}

Whether this recommendation was approved for inclusion in the FY 1954 budget is not indicated in available records. President Truman, in asking Congress for $7.6 billion in new obligational authority for the mutual security program for FY 1954, gave no regional breakdown of the total.

### Middle East Defense and the Problem of Egypt

Plans for the establishment of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization had recognized the cardinal importance of Egypt, the most important and influential of the Arab nations. Unless Egypt could be persuaded to fall into line, her Arabic neighbors were not likely to associate themselves with the West.

In common with most revolutionary governments, the Naguib regime in Egypt displayed strongly nationalist tendencies. Nonetheless its attitude toward the United Kingdom proved more moderate than might have been expected. By the end of 1952 agreement was near on one of the points at issue, the status of the Sudan. A formal settlement, giving the Sudanese the right to determine their own future, was signed on 12 February 1953.\textsuperscript{12}

The Suez base question was more complex and had aroused powerful emotions in both countries. Nevertheless there seemed hope that it too might be liquidated by the new regime in the near future. Soon after his accession, General Naguib indicated that, when this dispute was settled, he would be willing to participate in the Middle East Defense Organization. In return, he asked for US economic and military assistance. Encouraged by this attitude, the United States began discussing an aid program. Following conversations with the US military attache in Cairo, Egyptian officials drew up a list of items of military equipment that they desired. Meanwhile the US and British governments agreed to prepare and present to Egypt a package settlement that would include a grant of US assistance. Reporting these developments on 21 November 1952, the Department of State asked the Department of Defense to undertake a study of the problems involved in preparing a program of military aid for Egypt.\textsuperscript{13}

Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster at once instructed the Departments of the Army and the Air Force to select, from the list prepared by the
Egyptians, items totalling $10 million in value that might be made available for shipment by approximately 1 March 1953. At the same time, he requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the advisability of going ahead with this emergency aid program for Egypt and to prepare the broader study for which the Department of State had asked.\textsuperscript{14}

Replying on 16 December 1952 to the immediate question raised by Mr. Foster, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that the emergency program would divert funds needed for other countries, would have little military value in light of the weakness of Egypt’s forces, and would probably generate similar requests from other Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, recognizing the strategic importance of Egypt and the elements of urgency in the Egyptian situation, they concluded that the plan would be justified if the Department of State considered it politically essential and if Egypt were required to reimburse the United States insofar as possible.\textsuperscript{15}

Deputy Secretary Foster transmitted these views to the Department of State, with his endorsement, on 29 December 1952. In fact, the Department of State had already gone on record with an opinion that military assistance to Egypt was indispensable for the settlement of the dispute with the United Kingdom, and had agreed that the program for Egypt should be a combination of reimbursable and grant assistance.\textsuperscript{16}

The administration accepted the desirability of immediate assistance to Egypt and upheld this view during discussions with the British Government, which took place in London between 31 December 1952 and 7 January 1953. The US position was that immediate approval of Egypt’s plea for military aid would maintain Naguib’s confidence in the Western Powers and would create a favorable climate for subsequent tripartite talks. The British believed that assistance should be offered only as a bargaining counter during negotiations. They feared that arms furnished Egypt might be turned against British forces if the dispute were not settled; also, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they foresaw pressure from other Arab governments and from Israel for similar assistance.

On other matters, the two governments found their views in harmony. The United States approved a British memorandum on Middle Eastern strategy, which had been reviewed informally by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the conference. The strategic concept set forth in this document called for resistance to Soviet invasion “at the earliest possible moment on the frontiers between Iraq and Persia.” British plans envisioned deployment along this line of one British and two Iraqi divisions, plus two brigades of the Arab Legion, on D-day, with seven more divisions—British, New Zealand, Australian, and South African—by D plus 12 months. The projected deployment of aircraft was 192 on D-day and 294 by D plus six months.

The British paper also specified that the Suez base was essential for the defense of the Middle East and must be available for use in wartime. Moreover, support of the base would require certain facilities—ports, transportation, communications, and labor supply—that were to be found only in Egypt. Therefore, any settlement with Egypt must include provision for Egyptian membership in the Middle East Defense Organization.
The two parties agreed that the Organization should include, besides the United States, United Kingdom, and Egypt, the following countries: Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The last five had already indicated willingness to cooperate. Participation of Pakistan would also be desirable. The tasks of the organization would be to draw up defense plans, to assist member states in training their forces, and to coordinate requests by Middle Eastern members for arms and equipment from Western countries. Organizational machinery would initially be limited to a planning group and a military representatives committee; a full command structure might evolve later.

The settlement to be offered Egypt would comprise phased withdrawal of British forces, Egyptian control of the Suez base area, maintenance of base facilities in operating condition, participation of Egypt in the Middle East Defense Organization and military and economic assistance from the United States. On the issue of base maintenance, three options were drafted, to allow flexibility in the negotiations. The most desirable, from the US-British viewpoint, would limit Egypt's responsibility to overall supervision of the base; the United Kingdom would perform active maintenance and would be allowed to station up to 7,000 Army and RAF personnel in Egypt for this purpose. Under this plan, it was expected that the base could be maintained in condition for immediate use on D-day. A second alternative would yield to the Egyptians the responsibility for maintenance, with a smaller (but unspecified) number of British supervisory and technical personnel remaining to assist—an arrangement that would require a 60-day reactivation period before the base would be serviceable. Both of these options would include a joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense organization, with some RAF fighter squadrons stationed in Egypt. The least satisfactory option, to be accepted as a last resort, called for complete British withdrawal from the base, subject to the right to make periodic inspections.\(^\text{17}\)

These agreements had still to be approved at the highest level of government. President Truman considered one aspect of the Egyptian problem on 7 January 1953. Following discussions with the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security, the President decided not to declare Egypt eligible for grant military assistance at that time. Whether or not he was influenced by British opposition in this matter is not indicated in available sources. The decision did not rule out the possibility of reimbursable aid; in fact, the President approved the making of allocations to Egypt on that basis.\(^\text{18}\)

The US-British agreements were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1953.\(^\text{19}\) On 12 February they told the Secretary of Defense that they concurred in the agreed positions and supported the US view concerning the immediate release of military aid to Egypt. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew attention to the proposal to include Pakistan in the Middle East Defense Organization. Pakistan and Turkey, they pointed out, appeared to be the only Middle Eastern countries that could provide forces strong enough to be of major significance in case of global war. They recognized, however, that any announcement of Pakistan's proposed membership might create critical problems with respect to India, in view of the bitter Indo-Pakistani disagreement over the status of Kashmir.
Such problems would have military as well as political implications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore asked to be given an opportunity to make further comment whenever it was proposed to approach Pakistan formally regarding the Middle East Defense Organization.\(^{20}\)

Earlier, on 23 January 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent the Secretary of Defense their comments concerning the problems involved in preparing a program of military aid for Egypt, which the State Department had requested on 21 November 1952. They pointed out that a Middle East Defense Organization could not be established without the voluntary and wholehearted cooperation of the Arab nations, and that the key to such cooperation was Egypt. But the question of aid to Egypt was only one part of the general problem of Middle Eastern defense—a problem that should be attacked in two steps. The first step would be to grant token allocations of military aid in order to create a politico-military climate favorable to a defense organization. The emergency aid program under consideration for Egypt and the larger $100 million program projected for the Middle East as a whole in FY 1954 could both be regarded as parts of this first phase. After suitable conditions had been created, the United States could move toward integrated military assistance for the entire region, tied to a comprehensive plan and a collective defense arrangement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that any aid program for the Middle East would be beset with problems stemming from the mutual jealousies and hostilities of the countries of that region. Aid to one nation would invite demands from others, which it might not be in the US interest to approve. In particular, Israel could be expected to ask assistance to offset that given her Arab neighbors. It would be unwise to supply assistance to Israel; to do so would undermine efforts to win the cooperation of the Arabs. But Israel would be entitled to guarantees that US aid would not be misused by the Arab states for aggressive purposes.\(^{21}\)

Second Thoughts on the Middle East Defense Organization

The Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the related problem of a defense organization were among the issues that President Eisenhower inherited on his accession. In Middle Eastern policy, as in other matters, the new administration eventually struck out in a different direction, but only after careful consideration, avoiding a hasty or abrupt policy change.

At first it appeared that the President intended to proceed with the emergency aid program for Egypt. Partially reversing a decision by his predecessor, he authorized training assistance (on a non-reimbursable basis) for Egypt under the MDAP.\(^{22}\) But he went no farther in that direction, and the program was eventually laid aside.

President Eisenhower also gave general approval to the package deal with Egypt that had been drawn up at the London conference.\(^{23}\) He confirmed this approval in discussions with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who came to
Washington in March 1953. The President did not, however, agree to the British suggestion for a joint US-UK approach to Egypt, which he feared might offend Naguib. The United Kingdom accordingly opened negotiations on its own, while the President merely indicated to the Egyptian Government his desire for an early settlement. But this approach failed; Egypt refused to meet the British conditions for troop withdrawal, and the negotiations broke down. The efforts of the United States to mediate proved futile, and the year closed with no agreement in sight.\(^{24}\)

Again moving to carry out a tentative decision reached earlier, the new administration proceeded with the $100 million Middle Eastern aid program that had been proposed. Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this program would be included in the $3,289 million that had been authorized for the FY 1954 MDAP in NSC 149/2. Two weeks later Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend force bases to guide the allocation of the $100 million.\(^{25}\)

In preparing their recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had first to determine which countries should be included. They decided that the program should embrace Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Ethiopia, and so advised the Secretary of Defense on 23 June. The first two countries on this list, for which the largest force bases were proposed, would presumably receive most of the money, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no recommendations as to how it should be divided. For Pakistan, they recommended four infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 15 naval vessels, and a composite air squadron. Recommendations for Egypt were a training center, two infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 27 ships, and a fighter squadron. Infantry units of division size were proposed for Ethiopia, Iraq, and Jordan, and smaller ones for the other countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended light naval forces for Ethiopia, Iraq, and Syria, and a composite air squadron for Saudi Arabia. Contingent force bases for Israel, to be included in the program if necessary to obtain Congressional approval, consisted of one infantry division and 26 vessels.\(^{26}\)

In including Ethiopia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recommending the continuation of an aid program that had already been approved. Ethiopia had not been considered a candidate for membership in the Middle East Defense Organization, but the United States had sought permission to continue operating military facilities in Eritrea, which was about to pass from British to Ethiopian sovereignty. Ethiopia in return had asked sufficient military aid to equip one division. Funds for this purpose (approximately $5 million) were available from prior appropriations for Title II countries, and the Department of State supported the Ethiopian request. In the light of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 April 1953 had added their endorsement, reversing the opposition that they had expressed a year earlier.\(^{27}\)

On 17 August 1953 Secretary Wilson approved the force bases recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the new Middle Eastern program.\(^{28}\) But before the money was allocated, the entire US policy toward the Middle East, and the related question of military aid, came under reexamination.
The stimulus for this redirection of policy was a three-week observation tour of the Middle East undertaken by Secretary of State Dulles in May 1953. On his return, the Secretary rendered a public report of his findings in a radio and television address on 1 June 1953. It was high time, he said, that the United States paid greater attention to the Near East and South Asia. He summarized the situation in each country, indicating the many problems faced by the peoples of those regions as their societies moved into the modern age. On the subject of collective defense, Secretary Dulles made the following highly significant remarks:

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

The Secretary did not indicate the nations that he regarded as constituting the northern tier. When he presented his views to the National Security Council on 1 June, he identified them as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. He told his fellow members that the United States should concentrate upon building a defense upon these nations, and that the proposed Middle East Defense Organization, centered upon Egypt and the other Arab states, was not a realistic basis for present planning.

The Council took no immediate action on Secretary Dulles' remarks, but several weeks later the members and the President approved a revised Middle Eastern policy paper, NSC 155/1, that made no mention of the Middle East Defense Organization and thus by implication downgraded its importance as a policy objective. The course of action outlined in NSC 155/1 called for the United States to take the lead in bringing the countries of the area into an organization in which the Western powers would participate. It would first be necessary, however, to create the political basis for such an organization. When its establishment became feasible, the United States should, according to NSC 155/1, seek to secure the participation of any Asian and African states that could "contribute to the security and stability of the Near East." Meanwhile, the United States should develop secretly plans for the defense of the area with the United Kingdom, Turkey, and such others as may be desirable. Military assistance to certain key states was also desirable, but it should be limited to those "who are most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and who are geographically located to stand in the way of possible Soviet aggression. In this regard, special consideration should be given to Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan." The influence of Secretary Dulles' views seemed apparent in this passage.
Before NSC 155/1 was approved, the Secretary of State had sought the op-
inion of the Department of Defense concerning the feasibility a defense organiza-
tion in the Middle East. His own view, expressed in a letter to Secretary Wilson
on 26 June, was that it was unrealistic to continue to act on the tacit assumption
that the Arab nations would eventually cooperate with the West. It would be
better, he believed, to develop plans for Middle Eastern defense through informal,
unpublicized arrangements, such as those currently in effect for consultation
between NATO's Southern Europe command and the UK Middle East Land
Forces. 34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 11 August 1953 that they still considered
that the participation of the Arab states in a defense organization was essential.
But in view of the obstacles to Arab cooperation—the continuing stalemate
between the United Kingdom and Egypt, the discouraging results of exploratory
approaches to other Arab states, and the lack of progress toward a settlement
between the Arabs and Israel—they agreed that existing arrangements for infor-
mal planning were "the most suitable that are feasible of achievement at this
time." These arrangements currently took two forms: (1) the discussions involv-
ing CINCSOUTH, to which Secretary Dulles had referred; and (2) planning
within the JCS organization, looking toward eventual integration of US plans
with those of the United Kingdom, Turkey, and other powers, as appropriate. 35

Acting Secretary Kyes sent these views to Secretary Dulles with his concurrence
on 26 August. 36 It was clear, therefore, that the Department of Defense
was not bound to the concept of a formal organization and was willing to
consider other arrangements.

The President and the Council moved a step closer to the northern tier
concept (and away from the Middle East Defense Organization) in October 1953
when they approved NSC 162/2, which dealt with overall US national security
policy. The relevant paragraph in NSC 162/2 read as follows:

In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to
assure during peace time for the United States and its allies the resources
(especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the
Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan, and if possible,
Iran, and assist in achieving stability in the Middle East by political actions and
limited military and economic assistance, and technical assistance, to other coun-
tries in the area. 37

The Iranian Crisis and Its Resolution

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ecretary Dulles had included Iran among the foundation stones of his pro-
posed new defensive wall, but there was no hope of Iran's participation so
long as the regime of Prime Minister Mossadegh continued on its present course.
Indeed, there was danger that Mossadegh might drift into alliance, implicit or
explicit, with the communist powers. Such a development would extend Soviet
power to the shores of the Persian Gulf, place the Iranian oil resources at the
disposal of the USSR, and open Turkey and Iraq to invasion from the east.

What course of action should the United States pursue in Iran? The Shah,
Mohammed Reza Pahlevari, was a man of moderate views and pro-Western sympathies, but his powers were limited. Military intervention by the Western Powers might prove hazardous in light of a 1921 treaty of friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union, under which each party promised never to allow the presence in its territory of forces hostile to the other signatory.

The Truman administration had determined that the independence of Iran was of critical importance to the United States, and had so stated in NSC 136/1, approved in November 1952. All possible influence was to be exerted to keep Iran from falling under communist control. The United States would continue to seek a settlement of the oil controversy. When agreement was reached, the United States would assist Iran in restarting production and in finding markets, and would provide interim budgetary assistance if necessary. Current programs of military, economic, and technical assistance would be continued in the hope that they might help to maintain stability. Plans would be developed "for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arrangements which may be developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove feasible."

Should the communists seize power in any part of Iran, according to NSC 136/1, the United States should assist a noncommunist government, with military support if necessary. Plans should be developed at once, in concert with the United Kingdom and perhaps others, for specific measures to take in such an eventuality. If events moved so swiftly that no non-communist government had opportunity to request aid, the US position would be determined in the light of the situation at the time. Every attempt would be made to develop localized centers of resistance and to harass, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.38

To draw up the contingency plans referred to in NSC 136/1, an ad hoc committee representing the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency was established. The Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated Colonel E. A. Montgomery, USMC, to serve on this committee.39

Military courses of action to cope with a communist seizure of power in all or part of Iran had been drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff even before NSC 136/1 was approved. They included shows of force by aircraft flights over Iran, if requested by a friendly government there, and various steps to prevent extension of communist power beyond Iran’s borders: additional arms aid to Middle Eastern countries, deployment of USAF units to southern Turkey, and deployment of one US division (reinforced), with supporting air and naval forces, to the vicinity of Basra, Iraq, at the head of the Persian Gulf.40

Following the approval of NSC 136/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that plans should be developed to carry out these courses of action. CINCSAC and CINCNELM should prepare plans for conducting shows of force, using SAC aircraft from the United Kingdom or North Africa, or carrier aircraft from the Mediterranean. Recommendation of units to be deployed to southern Turkey or to the Basra area should be submitted by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and CINCNELM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves would keep under continuous review the question of providing additional military aid to other Middle East countries.41
Proposals responsive to this JCS decision were received by mid-April. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved them in June 1953, but they advised the Secretary of Defense that any further detailed military planning should await the discussions with the British Government that had been called for in NSC 136/1.42 The prospect that contingency plans might soon have to be implemented had meanwhile been enhanced by developments in Iran during the first half of 1953. The situation grew worse; the economic decline continued and gave rise to political strains. The coalition of nationalists and communists that supported Mossadegh began to crack. The Prime Minister, in response, turned increasingly to dictatorial methods. In so doing, he brought the crisis to a head and forced a showdown with the Shah.

Early in August the Prime Minister announced a plan to dissolve the parliament (Majlis). He obtained an endorsement of this decision by means of a plebiscite. When he announced the dissolution, the Shah dismissed him and appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi in his stead. But Mossadegh defied this order, with apparent success. The Shah, seemingly the loser in the struggle, fled to Rome.

The reversal of fortunes was sudden and violent. On 18-19 August elements loyal to the Shah rose in revolt and overthrew the Mossadegh regime. General Zahedi, who had been in hiding, emerged and took over the government. Mossadegh was imprisoned on 20 August. Several days later the Shah returned in triumph. Finding the treasury almost bankrupt, the new government at once asked for and received emergency financial assistance from the United States.43

The turn of events in Iran came just a few days after Admiral Radford and his newly appointed colleagues had assumed office. The news of the uprising reached Washington early on the morning of 19 August.44 At that time, a favorable outcome was by no means assured; there might ensue a long struggle in which, as foreseen in NSC 136/1, a friendly government in Iran might ask for help in resisting violence from the communists and their nationalist allies. The courses of action contemplated thus far by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a show of force in the air and a strengthening of the will of Iran’s neighbors—would hardly suffice to meet such a situation.

Foreseeing a need for possible US military action, Admiral Radford instructed the Joint Staff to consider the subject at once.45 The Joint Staff accordingly drew up a list of forces that might be made available for action in Iran or in the Persian Gulf within periods of time ranging from a week to two months. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed this list on 20 August and instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare a study of courses of action in support of a noncommunist Iranian government.46

On 25 August the JSPC submitted a revised list of available units and recommended that CINCNELM be instructed to prepare a plan for deploying forces to Iran to restore order and to protect oil producing facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation and sent the necessary instructions to CINCNELM on 26 August 1953.47

CINCNELM’s draft plan was forwarded less than three weeks later.48 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it early in December, subject to certain amendments,
and the final version was disseminated in March 1954 as CINCNELM Oplan 207-54, "A U.S. Joint Plan for Operations in the Middle East."\(^4\) It provided that Air Force and Marine units from Europe and the Mediterranean would seize and secure Abadan and Tehran within the first seven days; thereafter the main ground forces would be airlifted to these areas to assist in maintaining law and order. These ground forces might consist of an Army division from Europe or the Third Marine Division diverted from FECOM. The stabilization of the situation in Iran under the control of the Zahedi regime, however, removed implementation of this plan from active consideration.

With the installation of a friendly regime in Tehran, it became possible for the first time to contemplate the incorporation of Iran into a collective defense arrangement. The fact was recognized in NSC 175, which the Planning Board submitted to the National Security Council in December 1953. The Board foresaw that Iran might be willing to enter into military cooperation within a year or two if the oil controversy were settled soon and a pro-Western government continued in power. A long-range program of improving Iran’s armed forces was recommended, related to the progress made toward effective regional defense plans.

In an appended staff study, the Planning Board discussed Iran’s military security and other problems facing the country. It was noted that Iran constituted a blocking position from which to oppose any Soviet move toward Turkey, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, or the Suez Canal, and that it would provide valuable bases for attacks against the Soviet Union in case of war. Discussing prospects for regional defense, the Board concluded that Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan were capable of contributing significant forces if provided with equipment from outside sources. The judgment of the US Ambassador to Iran was cited that cooperation of Iran and Iraq in regional defense would depend upon the receipt of firm commitments from the United States to provide military aid.\(^5\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered NSC 175 acceptable subject to several changes. At the same time, they pointed out that the authors of the staff study had underemphasized the difficulty of the problems involved in defending Iran. That nation’s own forces were not strong enough alone to block a Soviet move against Turkey or Pakistan, and the mountainous terrain and lack of communications in the Middle East would make it extremely difficult to support Iran. As for the prospects for regional association, political and religious differences might make it difficult for Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran to cooperate, while Iraq would probably maintain a position of benevolent neutrality. Turkey’s commitments to NATO, moreover, would inhibit the diversion of her forces to assist Iran. Pakistan’s armed forces were of limited effectiveness for any purpose other than defense of the homeland. The Iranian forces were weak, and their improvement would require considerable time.\(^6\)

The National Security Council adopted NSC 175 on 30 December 1953 with minor changes, including most of those recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the members instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider their comments on the difficulties of regional defense cooperation, apparently
believing them somewhat exaggerated. Following approval by the President, NSC 175 was disseminated early in January 1954 as NSC 5402. After considering the Council's instructions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that, in their opinion, the comments that they had expressed earlier had "served their purpose in highlighting the difficulties which can be expected to be encountered in forming an effective Middle East Regional Defense Organization." Accordingly, they did not propose to forward a revised version. The Secretary accepted this decision.

The Zagros Mountain Line Concept

The outcome in Iran seemed likely to influence the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their determination of a strategic concept for the Middle East and its oil reserves—a matter that had been under study by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee since October 1952. A forward defense, along a line running through Turkey and Iran, would become more practicable if Iranian troops could be counted on to man some of the bastions. Needless to say, such a strategic concept would dovetail neatly with Secretary Dulles' suggested association of the northern nations.

Developments in Pakistan also were relevant to the JCS studies of Middle Eastern defense. General Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, became convinced of the need to establish a defense line running from his country through Iran into Turkey, with support from Iraq—an arrangement that would require a degree of military cooperation among the four nations concerned. He expressed this view to US officials and to representatives of the Turkish General Staff. In September 1953 General Khan visited the United States at the invitation of the Secretary of the Army. On this trip, he renewed an earlier suggestion that the United States enter into bilateral military cooperation with Pakistan, and indicated that his country was willing to offer the use of military bases.

It was not difficult to foresee that the United States would accept this offer. On 7 October 1953, soon after General Ayub's visit to Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the Joint Strategic Plans Committee a new assignment: to reexamine the US military position with regard to security arrangements for the Middle East (including the Middle East Defense Organization) and to submit comments and recommendations, with particular reference to the possible alignment of Pakistan with other countries in Middle Eastern defense.

On 13 October 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff received from the Committee the study of Middle Eastern defense that had been in preparation for a full year. The purpose of this study, JCS 1887/70, was to develop a strategic concept and an estimate of force requirements (1) for a defense of the Middle East in mid-1956 as far to the north and east as practicable, and (2) for defending and holding at least one oil-producing complex in time of war. The Committee made the assumption
that Turkish forces would succeed in defending their eastern flank, in the vicinity of Lake Van, and would block all ground approaches through eastern Turkey into Syria and Iraq. The Committee then examined three possible defensive concepts, as follows:

I. To defend along the high ground in northwestern Iran, from a point on the Turkish-Iranian border just north of Lake Urmia eastward along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea (the Elburz Mountains), then curving southward to the Great Salt Desert in north central Iran. This was the northernmost line of defense that could be considered practicable.

II. To defend along the line of the Zagros Mountains, extending from a point near the junction of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran to the head of the Persian Gulf. This was similar to, though somewhat shorter than, the defense line envisioned in the JCS briefing presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in November 1952. It constituted the southernmost natural boundary that would provide protection for all the Middle Eastern oil region.

III. To concentrate forces around Mosul-Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basra, maximizing the enemy’s difficulties in crossing the Zagros Mountains by ground delaying action and air interdiction, and undertaking mobile operations to destroy Soviet forces debouching into the Tigris-Euphrates valley.

The Committee noted that the defense of Pakistan would be desirable in any case, in order to pose a threat to the flank of Soviet forces attacking into Iran and to bar the gate to the Indian subcontinent. However, the protection of Pakistan was not essential to the defense of the Middle East, and hence the Committee did not go into the matter in detail.

Assessing the method of defense and the force requirements under each concept, the JSPC members concluded that Concept II—the Zagros Mountain line—was the best, and that Concept III should be retained as an alternative. Concept I seemed impracticable owing to political complications and the difficulties of providing logistic support.

Force requirements for Concept II were estimated at four divisions and 1,100 aircraft on D-day, rising to 10 divisions and 1,250 aircraft by D plus 60 days. Naval requirements were one destroyer squadron, 20 escort vessels, 25 mine-sweepers, one antisubmarine patrol squadron, and various auxiliaries.

The Committee studied the prospects for holding each of the four major oil complexes of the Middle East, located respectively in the vicinity of Mosul-Kirkuk (Iraq), Abadan (Iran), Kuwait, and Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar. Any one of these was capable of exporting enough crude petroleum to eliminate or substantially to reduce the allied wartime deficit, which was estimated at approximately 677,000 barrels per day for the first six months of hostilities. In each case, the critical factor would be adequate air power. “Successful air operations,” the Committee pointed out, “can drastically restrict the freedom of action of enemy ground forces practically anywhere in the Middle East, where major enemy
forces can not be concealed from aerial observation during daylight hours." The members concluded that the most advantageous course would be to defend the Kuwait complex, which produced 800,000 barrels per day. Its defense would require $6\frac{1}{3}$ divisions. If these forces were not available, the next best course would be to retain Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar, which could be held with $4\frac{1}{3}$ divisions and had a daily output of 663,000 barrels.

These conclusions had the unanimous support of all the members of the Committee. But the question of the further disposition of the Committee's report was a matter of dispute. The Army member of the JSPC believed that the report was not fully responsive to all JCS requirements. He felt that certain matters required further study, notably the indigenous military potential of the Middle East and the cost to the United States of developing the forces of the countries of that region. The members of the other Services believed that the report, when approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would provide a suitable basis for immediately initiating combined planning studies with British and Turkish planners.57

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in effect adopted the Army position that further study was needed before entering into bilateral or trilateral talks. On 2 November they sent JCS 1887/70 to CINCNELM, Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, asking him to submit his comments on it and his recommendations concerning the position to be upheld when the United States entered into staff talks with the United Kingdom and Turkey. At the same time, they instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare a study of US military objectives in the Middle East and of specific areas in that region that were of critical importance to the United States.58

Two days later the Committee completed its study of Middle Eastern regional defense and of the role of Pakistan, in accordance with the JCS instructions of 7 October. In this report, the JSPC members gave a strong boost to the northern tier concept. The security of the Middle East, they concluded, was at least initially dependent upon an effective arrangement for cooperation among Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. In view of recent developments in the area, as well as the evident infeasibility of the Middle East Defense Organization, the United States would be justified in encouraging these four countries to initiate efforts to form a planning association for coordinated defense of the Middle East.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this report on 13 November, but in the views that they transmitted to the Secretary of Defense the next day they stated the conclusion in less positive terms. They suggested merely that the time might be propitious for encouraging an association among the four northern nations. Such an arrangement, they continued,

would visualize an association of indigenous forces under an indigenous command advantageously located with relation to the current threat. It would also provide for the evolutionary growth of a defense organization which could logically develop in time to include other Middle East countries, India and Afghanistan. Not only would the foundation be laid in a strategic area, but there would be no dependence upon a satisfactory resolution of the Anglo-Egyptian and Arab-Israeli differences.

They recognized that India and Afghanistan would object strenuously to

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such an organization if direct US military aid to Pakistan were involved. But, they believed, a satisfactory solution could be found if some method of indirect aid could be devised. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that these views be transmitted to the Secretary of State.\(^{60}\)

Further evolution of a strategic concept for the Middle East awaited recommendations from CINCNELM, which were transmitted on 22 January 1954. While Admiral Wright accepted the JCS concept—to defend along the Zagros Mountains—as militarily desirable, he doubted that it could be implemented even by 1956, owing to the potential political difficulties and the length of time required to develop indigenous forces. As a practical alternative, he pointed to British plans for combining defense of the inner ring with a forward strategy under which the Taurus Mountain line would be extended eastward through southern Turkey to Mosul, Iraq. “This is an approach which could be implemented with some degree of success,” wrote Admiral Wright. If combined with another plan to hold the Dhahran-Bahrein-Qatar oil complex, it would provide an acceptable alternative until the time when a defense along the Zagros line would become feasible. He recommended further that the United States develop a military aid program for the Middle East as soon as possible and determine what US forces it was prepared to contribute to Middle Eastern defense before entering into talks with the British and Turks.

These comments had been coordinated with USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCUSAFE, who generally agreed with CINCNELM’s views. USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, however, stressed the danger that would result if any forces were diverted from NATO to defend the Middle East. CINCUSAFE drew attention to the political and logistic difficulties involved in any Middle Eastern defense and recommended exploration of the feasibility of an initial buildup of air forces in Greece, Turkey, Crete, and Cyprus, using existing SHAPE airfields in those areas. All these comments, including those of CINCNELM, were referred to the JSPC for study.\(^{61}\)

On 18 March 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted its report on critical objectives and areas in the Middle East, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 November 1953. This report constituted a warning that allied capabilities in the Middle East were insufficient. In the amended form in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it on 6 April, the JSPC report set forth the following areas to be defended: (1) the NATO right flank, (2) air base sites, (3) the Turkish Straits, (4) the Eastern Mediterranean, (5) the Cairo-Suez-Aden area, (6) the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-producing areas. All these objectives could be secured if the allies could retain Turkey and hold the Zagros Mountain line. But there was at present no prospect of doing so, except perhaps through exploitation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the allies would not be able to export oil from any Middle Eastern oil complex in the face of significant interference.

Consideration of these facts pointed to an immediate need to: (1) develop plans for the defense of the area with the United Kingdom, Turkey, and possibly other nations, as prescribed in NSC 155/1; (2) develop US plans to provide naval and air support to British and Egyptian forces in defense of the Cairo-Suez area;
(3) continue to develop US plans to provide naval and air support, including atomic operations, to defend Turkey and other important base areas; (4) seek the development of an arrangement for defense of the Persian Gulf oil areas, making maximum use of indigenous forces; and (5) seek to obtain transit and base rights in the Middle East, where required. In the long run, the object should be to "encourage the development of a regional defense organization capable of conducting the ground defense of the line of the Zagros Mountains utilizing indigenous ground forces."  

With this action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Zagros Mountain concept proposed earlier by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. The regional defense organization mentioned in the JCS decision, which would provide a politico-military basis for defense along the Zagros line, could hardly be other than Secretary Dulles's association of the northern tier states. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted CINCNELM's view that the Zagros strategy could not be implemented at that time, although they had not approved CINCNELM's recommended alternative. The implication was that it would be the task of the proposed trilateral staff talks to devise an alternative or to find a way of implementing the Zagros plan.

This implication was accepted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee when it reviewed Admiral Wright's comments on JCS 1887/70. The members concluded that the time had come to approach the United Kingdom and Turkey to draw up plans for defense of the Zagros Mountain passes and of other critical areas. CINCNELM should be designated to represent the United States at these talks. The Committee offered no comment on Admiral Wright's suggestion for an alternative plan.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these views. On 21 June 1954 they notified the British Chiefs of Staff that they believed that it would be profitable to make military planning studies at that time for defense of the Middle East. They recommended that these studies be carried out in two phases. The first would be US-UK-Turkish discussions to determine a concept of operations for a defense along the Zagros line, with estimates of required forces and recommendations for making up deficits. Plans should also be developed to secure Turkey's south and east flanks. The second phase would be a bilateral US-UK study of a concept of operations and estimates for a defense "so far to the north and east as to secure the Cairo-Suez-Aden areas, at least one major oil producing complex preferably in the Persian Gulf area, and the Turkish south flank." CINCNELM would be authorized to make arrangements with British and Turkish authorities for the conduct of these discussions.

### Military Assistance to the Middle East

Further determination of a strategy for the Middle East awaited a reply from the British Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile, however, the allocation of FY 1954...
funds for Middle Eastern military assistance provided an opportunity to advance US strategic objectives in this region.

The administration had requested $100 million for a Middle Eastern MDA Program, but Congress had allowed only $30 million. Initial plans for allocating the Congressional appropriation were made at a conference in Cairo on 28–29 August, attended by US diplomatic representatives in the Middle East and by officials of the Departments of State and Defense. The conferees agreed that $10 million should go to Iraq, where the government appeared alert to the Soviet threat and was planning to expand its forces. An equal amount was proposed for Syria, not for any military reason but in order to induce that country to cooperate in resettling Palestinian refugees. Saudi Arabia, which had been tentatively promised aid in return for base rights at Dhahran, should receive $5 million. The remaining $5 million should be used to initiate small programs for Jordan and Lebanon and to finance infrastructure projects for Israel (airport and harbor facilities that would be militarily useful without being provocative to Israel’s neighbors).

The conferees recognized that the meager sum authorized by Congress would not meet all requirements. For example, it might be desirable to furnish additional aid to Iran to encourage the new Zahedi regime, and to initiate aid to Pakistan, whose government was already giving evidence of its cooperative attitude. Moreover, relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom had taken a turn for the better; if an early agreement were forthcoming, the US promise of aid to Egypt must be redeemed. To meet these additional requirements, the conferees suggested use of a special reserve of $50 million that had been set aside from the FY 1953 appropriation for Title II countries.

Secretary Dulles sent these conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 8 September 1953, urging that the Department of Defense act promptly to allocate the $30 million as recommended at the conference. After further study, the Department of State also recommended that money be allocated for Egypt and Pakistan. OSD representatives thereupon tentatively agreed, with the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget and the Foreign Operations Administration, that an additional $50 million in FY 1953 funds would be made available. Of this amount, approximately $25 million would be set aside for Egypt and $15-$25 million for Pakistan.

These plans had been shaped primarily by political rather than military considerations. On 16 October 1953, Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations concerning the allocation of up to $80 million in aid to the Middle East. He also sought their advice regarding the advisability of a Presidential declaration that Iraq, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Pakistan were eligible for military assistance.

After study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 11 December. They affirmed that it was desirable to encourage Pakistan’s closer alignment with the West by granting aid, accepting the likelihood of an adverse reaction in India. They recommended that Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iraq be declared eligible for grant military assistance. Conversely, they thought it would serve no useful military purpose to include Syria, Israel, and Jordan at that time, since allocation to
these three nations from the limited funds available would dissipate the military effort beyond the point of profitable returns.

Gauging the importance of Middle Eastern requirements against others in the worldwide MDAP effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against the transfer of any funds to supplement the $30 million currently appropriated for military aid in the Middle East. "The transfer of funds, already inadequate for the support of vital military programs, to a purpose of lesser military value is considered inadvisable." Limiting the first-phase program for the Middle East to the $30 million immediately available, they recommended the following apportionment, which necessarily involved a marked reduction in the $25 million tentatively allocated to Egypt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Allocation ($ millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff closed their reply of 11 December to the Secretary of Defense with a reference to the memorandum of 14 November 1953 in which they had indicated interest in a US undertaking to encourage Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and possibly Iraq in the formation of a planning association for the defense of the Middle East. Should that policy line be formally adopted, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff may consider additional funds necessary to develop the defense capabilities of these four countries in implementation of this proposal."

Assistant Secretary Nash forwarded the JCS recommendations to the Department of State on 4 January 1954. He noted that they represented the desirable military point of view.

However, for reasons as previously outlined by the Department of State, it is recognized that a sum of approximately $50 million, in addition to the $30 million appropriated . . . , will be required to implement effectively the political aspects of the first phase military aid to the Middle East.

Accordingly, he proposed the following distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Allocation ($ millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$25.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
As compared to the JCS recommendations, this would restore the amounts previously considered for Egypt and Pakistan and notably increase the allocations to Iraq and Iran. The omission of Jordan, Syria, and Israel, however, accorded with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Nash had read the political guidance from the Department of State as already committing the United States to encouraging erection of a northern tier defense organization. His proposed distribution, he said, placed emphasis on implementation of the concept. He recommended that Lebanon and Iraq be declared eligible for grant aid; a similar recommendation regarding Pakistan had already been made.\(^{68}\)

The distribution proposed by Mr. Nash was modified by later developments. Iran and Ethiopia had already established their eligibility, and the tentative allocations made to them were confirmed.\(^{69}\) Of the five possible recipients of the remaining $60.5 million, Saudi Arabia was dropped from consideration in January 1954 when its government declined an offer to conclude a military assistance agreement. The money earmarked for that country accordingly became available for other requirements.\(^{70}\)

On 26 January 1954 Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that programs for Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt would be initiated in FY 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that no FY 1955 funds be used for those countries. The ceiling of $1,144.5 million that had been set for the worldwide MDAP, they pointed out, was not sufficient to meet other, higher priority requirements; moreover, the money set aside for the Middle East from FY 1953 and FY 1954 appropriations had not yet been obligated.\(^{71}\)

Secretary Wilson accepted this recommendation with respect to FY 1955, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did include Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt in the list of countries for which they prepared force bases to guide MDA programming in the following year, FY 1956.\(^{72}\)

The Role of Pakistan

That a large share of funds for the Middle Eastern MDA Program would go to Pakistan was a matter that was not in doubt at the beginning of 1954. US officials had been quick to appreciate the military value of cooperation with that country. As early as November 1953 it was a matter of public knowledge that the United States was considering an agreement along the lines suggested by the Pakistanis, involving base rights in exchange for US aid.\(^{73}\)

Pakistan had also begun conversations with Turkey with a view to military cooperation. The outcome was an agreement signed by the two nations on 2 April providing for an exchange of military information and a study of the possibilities of joint defense, as well as cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. From the US viewpoint, this linking of hands by the two countries at the ends of the northern tier was a happy development. Particularly significant was a provision in the agreement allowing adherence by other countries whose participation might be thought useful.\(^{74}\)
On 19 February 1954 Acting Secretary of Defense Kyes directed the Military Departments to organize a joint military survey team to proceed to Pakistan and study that country’s requirements. The mission of the team might be extended to include Egypt and Iraq, he indicated if the political climate in those countries proved favorable. Brigadier General Harry F. Meyers, USA, was appointed to head the team.

On 25 February President Eisenhower publicly announced that Pakistan had asked for grant military assistance and that the request would be approved subject to conclusion of a bilateral agreement. He stressed that the purposes of US aid would be to strengthen the defense of the Middle East and to foster cooperation among the states of that area. At the same time, the President assured Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India that the aid program for Pakistan was in no way directed against India and that a request from his country for similar assistance would be considered favorably.

The decision to aid Pakistan was made formal by the President and the National Security Council on 4 March 1954 in NSC 5409. According to this paper, the United States should “encourage Pakistan’s participation in any defense association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States,” and should “give special consideration to Pakistan in providing military assistance . . . in view of Pakistan’s attitude and key position among the countries of South Asia with respect to military collaboration with the West.” A financial appendix to NSC 5409 indicated that $20 million had been tentatively earmarked for aid to Pakistan, to be expended in equal amounts in fiscal years 1955 and 1956.

The Joint Military Survey Team returned from Pakistan and submitted its findings on 18 May 1954. The members recommended an aid program totaling $29.5 million, to be financed out of the $80 million already earmarked for the Middle East. The tentative OSD allocation for Pakistan had allowed only $20 million, but there was now available the $5 million that had been proposed for Saudi Arabia and the $500,000 for Lebanon. The Department of State had recommended that no aid be granted the latter country until a decision was reached concerning assistance to its larger neighbor, Syria. The rest of the additional funds for Pakistan, under the Survey Team plan, would be provided by reducing Egypt’s share to $21 million.

The program recommended by the Survey Team would support four infantry divisions, one armored brigade, 12 ships, and six air squadrons: three fighter bombers, one fighter interceptor, one light bomber, and one transport. Forces of this size, it was believed, could deter or successfully delay a Soviet attack on the scale to be expected during a global war. They would not, however, enable Pakistan to contribute to the defense of areas beyond its borders.

The force bases proposed by the Survey Team differed in some details from those that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended in June 1953, which had called for 15 ships and only one air squadron. On 17 June 1954 Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine their recommendations in light of the Survey Team report.

Force bases for Pakistan had already come under JCS reconsideration, in connection with the four-year projection of MDAP requirements drafted by a
special JCS committee and submitted during March 1954. This survey had proposed four infantry divisions, an armored brigade, 14 ships, and four air squadrons for Pakistan, all to be achieved by FY 1958. But when the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the report for revision to reduce the force bases proposed for Yugoslavia, the Army member of the special committee had wished to apply part of the resulting savings to increase Pakistan’s objectives to seven infantry and two armored divisions. The representatives of the other Services had objected that the force requirements for Pakistan were unrelated to the size of the Yugoslav program. This divergency was still unresolved on 17 June, when the Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the Joint Military Survey Team Report on Pakistan.81

In their reply on 28 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the forces proposed for Pakistan in the Survey Team report, after amending it to add an armored division, over and above the armored brigade that had been recommended in the report. The activation of this additional division had been given the highest priority by the Pakistani Government, and the Survey Team had commented that Pakistan’s economy could support it. In its report, however, the Team had not gone beyond the earlier JCS recommendation of one armored brigade.82

The larger force bases recommended for Pakistan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved at higher levels in the Department of Defense, together with the amount of money called for in the Survey Team report, $29.5 million. A bilateral agreement of the type required by US law had been signed on 19 May 1954.83

Foundation of the Northern Tier Defense Line

Pakistan thus joined her neighbors, Iran and Turkey, as a participant in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Shortly before, Iraq, the fourth member of the northern tier, had also decided to participate, apparently on its own initiative. Breaking away from the neutralist policy followed by most of the Arab nations, Iraq’s Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhl al-Jamali announced in February 1954 that he would ask assistance from the West. A bilateral aid agreement between the United States and Iraq was signed on 21 April 1954.84 OSD officials earmarked $10.9 million for Iraq as the first step in a four-year program expected to total roughly $33 million. Its size was related to the force bases of two infantry divisions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended in connection with the FY 1956 MDAP.85

NSC 5428, a new Middle Eastern policy paper approved by the President in July 1954, committed the United States explicitly to the northern tier concept. The recent pact between Turkey and Pakistan was viewed as the first step toward the creation of an organization of northern tier nations. Adherence of Iran and Iraq could be anticipated if their political climates continued to improve. NSC 5428 specified that military assistance would be channeled primarily to those four countries and, when appropriate, to Egypt. Moreover, Egypt should
be assured that it was an object of continuing interest and should be allowed to
join in regional defense plans if its government so requested. The participation
of other Arab states was to be neither encouraged nor discouraged. Politi-
co-military conversations with the United Kingdom regarding the development of
the northern tier concept should be conducted in the near future. In these
conversations, the United States should emphasize that the proposed regional
arrangement would be wholly indigenous, with no formal links to the collective
defense organization of the Western Powers except through Turkey.86

Soon after the adoption of NSC 5428, the prospects for a northern tier defense
association improved further when Iran’s long dispute with the United King-
dom was settled. Under an agreement announced on 5 August 1954, an interna-
tional consortium of oil companies would produce and distribute Iranian oil.
Iran would receive 50 percent of the profits from these operations, and would
pay compensation to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.87

Another encouraging development took place in December 1954, when Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi paid a state visit to President Eisenhower. On this
occasion, the Shah announced that Iran had decided to abandon its traditional
neutrality and to cooperate with the nations of the free world. US officials
replied by expressing a hope that Iran would join Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq in a
defense association and by promising continued assistance in developing Iran’s
forces to enable them to assist in the defense of the Zagros line.88

Following the Shah’s visit, the NSC Planning Board drew up a revised
statement of policy toward Iran that was approved by the President and the
Council in January 1955 as NSC 5504. This paper recommended that the United
States assist in developing Iran’s armed forces to enable them to make a useful
contribution to Middle East defense—an objective that would admittedly “require
a long-term program involving U.S. expenditures substantially in excess of
present levels.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff had endorsed NSC 5504, but had
warned that any increase in the Iranian program must be carefully weighed
against other claims on the limited MDAP funds available and should await a
more careful definition of Iran’s military role after completion of the forthcoming
US-UK-Turkish staff talks.89

The controversy between the United Kingdom and Egypt was also resolved
in 1954. This development was in part the result of a change of government in
Cairo. President Naguib was ousted and was succeeded by Colonel Gamal Abdel
Nasser, who, at this stage of his career, showed himself to be reasonable and
willing to compromise. A settlement, announced in July and formally signed on
19 October, required the United Kingdom to remove its troops from Egypt
within 20 months but allowed British civilian technicians to remain in order to
keep the Suez installations in working order. British forces would be allowed to
use the base in the event of an armed attack by an outside power on any of the
Arab states or on Turkey.90

Officials in Washington were destined to disappointment however, in their
hopes that this settlement would be followed by Egypt’s military cooperation
with the West. President Eisenhower made the necessary determination that
Egypt was eligible for military assistance. The State Department opened negotiations for a bilateral agreement with Egypt, and preparations were begun to send a survey team to that country. But these plans lapsed when the Government of Egypt decided not to accept US aid. Egyptian officials declared that the political situation in their country made it impossible for them to sign an agreement of the type that was required by US legislation.

Adoption of a strategy tied to the northern tier concept awaited the conclusion of trilateral talks, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested to their British colleagues on 21 June 1954. In the period July through early November, the US and British Chiefs of Staff negotiated back and forth over the procedures for the talks and discussed the possibility of widening the talks to include additional northern-tier countries. In the end they agreed to begin informal talks on a tripartite basis to address operational planning only.

On 17 November 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Admiral John H. Cassidy, who had replaced Admiral Wright as CINCNEWM, to initiate arrangements for talks with representatives of the United Kingdom and Turkey. As guidance for the forthcoming discussions, they drew attention to the JCS decision of 6 April 1954 regarding critical US objectives in the Middle East. Late in December Admiral Cassidy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the first meeting would be held in London on 18 January 1955.

The stage was now set for the development of a realistic military strategy for the Middle East. The futile effort to build a defense around Egypt had been abandoned. A strategy tied to the northern tier would take advantage of the excellent defense terrain along the southwestern boundary of the Soviet Union and of the willingness of the countries of that region to cooperate with a minimum of prodding from the West. The preparations made during 1954 were soon to eventuate in the Baghdad Pact and its attendant military organization—visible results of a process set in motion by Secretary of State Dulles in the spring of 1953.
Latin America

Following World War II, the energies and resources of the United States were absorbed primarily in efforts to repair the war-damaged economies of nations in Western Europe and the Far East and in erecting alliances and maintaining the military strength to counter threats to the security of the free world. These purposes kept the attention of US policy-makers focused for the most part on areas well removed from the Western Hemisphere, as they looked to the containment of communist aggression at such critical points as Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and Berlin. In these circumstances, hemisphere defense, though in an ultimate sense vital to US security, was a goal pursued with less urgency and with a lesser commitment of resources.

Latin America and US Security

The development of collective security arrangements for the defense of the Western Hemisphere nevertheless remained a US policy objective, building on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Material progress toward this goal remained slight, however, so long as the US program of grant military aid encompassed only the NATO and Far Eastern countries that seemed directly menaced by communist expansion. Once the initial US policy of making surplus World War II equipment available to Latin America had run out, the nations to the south generally found themselves lacking sufficient dollars to purchase arms in the United States. They turned increasingly to European suppliers, who offered attractive credit terms and barter arrangements. This practice ran counter to the US desire to see the equipment of the armed forces of the Western Hemisphere nations standardized along US lines. Moreover, it lessened the effectiveness of the military training missions that the United States continued to provide to various South and Central American countries.
In support of the policy on military collaboration with Latin America con-
tained in NSC 56/2, which President Truman had approved in May 1950, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff early in 1951 drew up a mid-range plan for hemisphere
defense, with an assumed D-day of 1 July 1954. The plan provided that each
nation would defend its own territory and, if capable, would also contribute
forces to guard bases and lines of communication that were essential to the
security of South and Central America as a whole. Eleven Latin American nations
would be asked to contribute to these common defensive tasks: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. The forces required from these nations consisted of
infantry units of regimental or smaller size, light naval patrol vessels plus a few
cruisers and destroyers, and squadrons of fighter, bomber or reconnaissance
aircraft. The plan recognized that the nations in question could not be expected
to meet these requirements without US assistance.\(^2\)

Accepting this concept, the Truman administration undertook to initiate a
modest program of grant military aid to the nations named in the JCS plan. The
Congress endorsed the decision by making provision for Latin American coun-
tries in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. During 1952 negotiations for bilateral
MDA agreements were opened with ten of the eleven Latin nations that had
been assigned tasks in the JCS hemisphere defense plan. The exception was
Argentina, where the long-standing differences between the United States and
the government of President Juan Peron precluded military collaboration. Argen-
tina was included, however, in the forward planning; the Joint Chiefs of Staff
listed it among the countries for which they recommended force bases for the FY
1954 MDAP.\(^3\)

The opening of negotiations excited the anti-US feelings prevalent in some
quarters in the countries involved. The guarantees sought by the United States
in return for its assistance were assailed as infringements upon national
sovereignty. Only in Mexico, however, was the opposition strong enough to
prevent the conclusion of an agreement, though the negotiations with Venezue-
la were suspended for other reasons. The United States signed bilateral agree-
ments with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay during
1952, and actual shipments of aid were begun. An agreement with the Domini-
can Republic was concluded in March 1953.\(^4\)

The texts of these bilateral agreements were virtually identical. Their major
provisions included the commitment by the United States in Article I to furnish
military equipment and services that were to be used exclusively for hemisphere
defense. The other contracting government undertook to make the full contribu-
tion to the defensive strength of the free world permitted by its resources and to
facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of
strategic raw materials. Article VIII, intended by the United States to discourage
trade with the communist bloc, specified that the Latin American signatory
would cooperate in “measures designed to control trade with nations which
threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere.”\(^5\)
New Developments in 1953

These beginning moves toward the erection of a more effective collective defense for the hemisphere were in train when the new administration took office in Washington in January 1953. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had a ready sympathy for the feeling existing in the Latin countries that their problems and interests had been receiving less than their deserved attention from the United States. He suspected, as well, that some resentment had been engendered by a tendency on the part of US officials to take the supporting role of the Latin American nations for granted and to assume that they would automatically stand by the United States on critical world issues. Besides seeking to strengthen US relations with the other American Republics through various exercises in personal diplomacy, the new President selected his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, as his adviser on Latin America problems and sent him on a fact-finding tour. On his return in November 1953, Dr. Eisenhower submitted a number of recommendations that were later to have an influence on US policy.6

Earlier, on 18 March 1953, the new President and the National Security Council had adopted the first general policy directive for Latin America, NSC 144/1, comparable to those written for other regions of the globe.7 They approved the following objectives: maintenance of hemisphere solidarity; orderly political and economic development of Latin America; collective defense against external aggression, through the development of indigenous military forces and bases; reduction or elimination of internal communist subversion; adequate production of raw materials essential to US security; and support by Latin America for collective action in defense of other parts of the free world. These objectives would be sought in various ways: by making full use of the Organization of American States, avoiding any appearance of unilateral US action; by evidencing greater consideration of Latin American problems at high levels of government; and by stimulating the economic development of the Latin countries through loans, expansion of trade, and direct assistance. In the military sphere, NSC 144/1 recommended continuance of measures already under way: combined planning through the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Joint Mexican-US and Brazil-US Military Commissions, provision of training assistance to Latin American countries, and continued attempts to standardize the organization, training, doctrine, and equipment of military forces along US lines.

With regard specifically to hemisphere defense and US military assistance, NSC 144/1 contained the following paragraphs:

11. The United States should encourage acceptance of the concept that each of the Latin American states is responsible for maximizing its contribution to:
   a. The internal security of its own territory.
   b. The defense of its own territory . . . .
   c. The allied defense effort, including participation in combined operations within the hemisphere and support of collective actions in other theaters by forces beyond the requirements of hemisphere security.
12. In support of the courses of action in paragraph 11, the United States should provide military assistance to Latin America consistent with the
agreed plans of the Inter-American Defense Board and other bilateral or multilateral military agreements to which the United States is a party. US military assistance should be designed to reduce to a minimum the diversion of US forces for the maintenance of hemisphere security; and in determining the type of military assistance to be provided each nation, consideration should be given to its role in hemisphere defense.

In approving NSC 144/1, President Eisenhower stipulated that his approval did not extend to any specific program of military or economic assistance for Latin America. These programs would be subject to review in the light of the relative importance of programs for that region as opposed to others, and of the general objective of balancing the Federal budget. The implication that funds for Latin American assistance might be reduced was borne out when the administration asked only $18.8 million for Western Hemisphere nations in the MDAP budget for FY 1954—considerably less than had been sought in previous years, though significantly more than the $8.5 million recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As usual Congress applied a further reduction and appropriated only $15 million.

NSC 144/1 prescribed that the United States should assume primary responsibility for military operations in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean Sea, with particular attention to the air and sea approaches to the Panama Canal. “At the appropriate time,” it read, the United States “should seek from other American states acceptance of US military control of the defense of these areas.” In this connection the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1953 considered the question of command arrangements and concluded that only the basic principles could be developed at that time. Application of the principles must await the completion of agreements between the United States and the other countries. These agreements should provide that forces contributed by Latin American states for use in hemisphere defense, outside their national boundaries and in areas of responsibility of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would have their own unit commanders but would serve under overall US command. They would provide liaison officers for duty with the staff of the appropriate US commander. “Except as may be specifically agreed otherwise, Latin American officers should not exercise overall command or command of United States forces.”

In September 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a revised mid-term war plan for the Western Hemisphere that was intended also to serve as an emergency, or capabilities, plan. They adjusted the D-day to 1 July 1956 to conform to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan then in preparation, made revisions in estimates of force requirements, and assigned a mission to an additional country, Haiti, which was called upon to patrol its own territorial waters and thus to assist in the defense of the Windward Passage. Several months later, when Haiti submitted a request for US aid (after having been refused on previous occasions), the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that it be approved in order to enable that country to play the role envisioned for it in the new war plan. The administration accepted this recommendation.
Communist Foothold in Guatemala

The JCS hemisphere defense plans were aimed at meeting the kind of external attacks that were deemed within Soviet capabilities: submarine attacks, raids by minor forces, mining of harbors, or covert action aimed at sabotage and the creation of internal disorder. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor other agencies of government had prepared plans to cover the possibility that the communists might seize control of any part of Latin America without the benefit of direct foreign intervention.

But this was precisely the possibility that was becoming a reality at the beginning of 1953. The locale of this development was Guatemala, where Jacobo Arbenz Guzman had taken office as President in March 1951. Though Arbenz, a military officer, was not a communist himself, his attitude toward communism was ambiguous, to say the least. That he enjoyed the support of the Communist Party was beyond doubt. In return, he extended a benevolent toleration that enabled the communists increasingly to move into positions of leadership in various sectors of Guatemalan society, beginning with the labor movement. Stronger evidence of the hold of the communists over official policy appeared in April 1953, when they were able to induce the Arbenz government to withdraw from an association of the Central American States, charging that a proposal to study the influence of communism in the area constituted interference in the domestic affairs of Guatemala.

President Eisenhower, as he later wrote, found the Guatemalan problem waiting for him when he entered the White House. It was one of the matters that he and the Council attempted to deal with by drawing up the policy statement that appeared in March as NSC 144/1. Two of the provisions of that document were that the United States should encourage "individual and collective action against internal subversive activities by communists and other anti-US elements," and should seek to promote the development of "responsible, democratic labor leadership in Latin America capable of taking the initiative away from communists." It seemed doubtful, however, that such general prescriptions could succeed in arresting, much less in reversing, the drift toward complete communist rule in Guatemala.

Should the communists consolidate their control over that country, it would be necessary to look toward the possibility that they might seek to expand, particularly at the expense of their less populous neighbors to the south—El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On 9 April 1953, Secretary of State Dulles suggested to Secretary Wilson that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to assign hemisphere defense missions to these three nations in order to qualify them for military aid and thus to stiffen their willingness to resist pressure from Guatemala. He promised that his Department would support a request to Congress for any necessary extra funds.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively decided that it would be impossible to develop missions of significant military value for these nations. Before transmitting this conclusion to the Secretary of Defense, however, they decided to consult the Department of State to ascertain the urgency of the political considera-
tions involved in this issue. Following these consultations the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, presumably at the urging of the State Department, to develop a mission for Nicaragua but not for the two smaller countries. Accordingly, on 7 July 1953 they concluded that Nicaragua’s mission should be to contribute one infantry battalion to the Caribbean Mobile Reserve. They directed that this designation be included in the next revision of the mid-term war plan for defense of Latin America.

Some weeks later the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency advised Secretary Wilson that there was an over-riding requirement for inclusion of El Salvador and Honduras in the military aid program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon developed missions for these two nations calling for one infantry battalion apiece. They advised Secretary Wilson to concur in a joint recommendation with Secretary Dulles that the President find El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua eligible for aid. President Eisenhower issued a declaration to this effect on 9 December 1953.

It was as important to keep weapons out of the hands of the Guatemalan forces as it was to make them available to Guatemala’s vulnerable neighbors. The Guatemalan government, not yet fully committed to a pro-communist foreign policy and still maintaining diplomatic relations with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere, had made a number of efforts to purchase US military equipment, most recently in October 1953. In each case, the US reply was that Guatemala was not eligible to purchase military equipment from the Department of Defense. Purchases from commercial arms suppliers were blocked by refusal to issue export licenses.

Outcome of the Guatemalan Crisis

During 1953 the communists in Guatemala continued to make progress. By the beginning of 1954 they had gained virtual control of one of the departments as a result of their penetration of the agencies concerned with agrarian reform, and they were making considerable headway in others. Their success was aided by the ineptitude of the noncommunist parties of both left and right. The officer corps remained the principal center of anticommunist sentiment, but President Arbenz was exerting himself to insure the loyalty of its members by according various economic benefits and other favors.

The Inter-American Conference, the supreme governing body of the Organization of American States, held its tenth session in Caracas, Venezuela, during March 1954. The United States used the occasion to mobilize support against communism, in the face of Guatemalan opposition to including the subject on the agenda. With some difficulty, the US delegation succeeded in obtaining the approval of a Declaration of Solidarity, which condemned “the activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs,” and declared that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to
this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States." It was recommended that special attention be given by each of the American governments to "measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement."23 Such measures would at best prevent the spread of the communist infection; they could not remove its source.

In the weeks after the Caracas Conference, the situation in Guatemala moved toward a climax. Early in May, employees of the United Fruit Company in neighboring Honduras went on strike. Unrest spread rapidly, and within a few days the strike had become general. There was reason to believe that Guatemalan communists were busily exploiting the strike, if indeed they had not instigated it. Moreover, intelligence pointed to the possibility that Guatemala might take advantage of the situation to attack Honduras, covertly or openly.24

Another alarming development followed soon after. On 17 May 1954 the Department of State announced that an important consignment of weapons, shipped from a communist bloc port, had recently reached Guatemala. The Foreign Minister of Guatemala subsequently confirmed this action and defended it on the grounds that the United States had committed an act of aggression by refusing to sell weapons to his nation.25

The immediate US response to these events was to speed the dispatch of military assistance to Guatemala's neighbors. Nicaragua's eligibility for US aid had been established when a bilateral agreement was signed on 23 April 1954.26 A negotiating team went to Honduras on 15 May; an agreement was signed five days later. Arms shipments to both countries began before the end of the month.

If Guatemala actually attacked Honduras, the United States would be obligated to come to the defense of the victim in accordance with Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. Secretary of State Dulles told the National Security Council on 13 May that the United States should be prepared for a possible request from Honduras for such support.27 On 27 May the President approved NSC 5419/1, which declared that the United States should respond favorably to any request from an OAS member for aid against an attack from Guatemala, and should take steps to insure that other OAS members were prepared for collective action. At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was stipulated that the United States would take unilateral action only as a last resort. The Council also noted that the President had authorized the US Navy to halt, on the high seas off the Guatemalan coast, vessels suspected of carrying munitions of war destined for Guatemala.28

To prepare contingency plans for action in support of the Inter-American Treaty was a JCS responsibility. CINCARIB had drawn up Oplan 3-53, which provided for dispatch of a joint task force, drawn from the forces under his command or from the Western Hemisphere Reserve, to protect the oil fields of Venezuela and the nearby Dutch and British island possessions (Curaçao, Aruba, and Trinidad). The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 29 June 1954 that this plan should be modified for application to Central America, making use of an Army
or Marine RCT in addition to the forces already listed. On the following day they instructed CINCARIB, through the Chief of Staff, US Army, to draw up a detailed plan along these lines.  

By the time these actions were taken, the crisis in Guatemala was well on its way to solution. Elements hostile to the Arbenz regime had gathered across the border in Honduras under the leadership of an exile, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Fearing an invasion from these forces, Arbenz and his communist supporters turned increasingly to dictatorial and terrorist methods to insure internal security. On 18 June, the forces of Colonel Castillo Armas crossed the border. They enjoyed material assistance as well as moral support from the United States. At one point, President Eisenhower, notified that the invaders had lost two of the three aircraft in their air force, agreed that the United States would replace these losses in order to prevent the invasion from collapsing.

A brief civil war ensued, during which the Guatemalan government appealed for aid to the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The latter organization agreed to send a team to investigate the situation, but before it could do so, the Arbenz regime had collapsed owing to the refusal of Army leaders to support it. Arbenz and his principal followers fled; power passed into the hands of another military leader who negotiated a settlement with the insurgents. On 8 July 1954, Castillo Armas became the head of a new governing junta.

The United States lost no time in extending diplomatic recognition to the new regime and in lending more tangible support. Secretary Dulles announced that the United States would provide economic assistance in order to alleviate the basic conditions that had provided Guatemalan communists with their opportunities. Guatemala was also declared eligible for reimbursable military aid.

A Revised Latin American Policy: NSC 5432/1

The close call of the Guatemalan affair pointed the way to a revision of US policy to avoid similar developments in the future. In this connection, renewed attention was given to the report of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, which had suggested a number of ways of promoting economic progress in Latin America. If successful, these measures could be expected to lessen the willingness of the peoples of that region to turn toward Marxist totalitarianism.

In August 1954 the NSC Planning Board drafted NSC 5432, a revised statement of Latin American policy, in which the influence of the recent Guatemalan crisis was apparent. "Realizing the increasing importance of helping Latin America to reverse those trends which offer opportunities for Communist penetration," declared the Board in NSC 5432, "the US should give greater emphasis than heretofore to its Latin American programs in order to safeguard and strengthen the security of the Hemisphere." To assist the stability and economic development of the Latin nations, the United States should adopt long-range measures to stimulate trade, aid the financing of economic development projects, and
expand its program of technical cooperation in Latin America—all measures that had been included among Dr. Eisenhower’s recommendations. “Individual and collective action against Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion or intervention in any American state” should be encouraged through consultation, exchange of information, and other means. In military matters, the Board recommended renewed efforts to promote standardization of Latin American forces along US lines, by offering more favorable terms for purchase of weapons (including credit) as well as faster deliveries, possibly through assigning higher priorities to the American Republics. It was suggested also that increased numbers of Latin military personnel undergo training in US Armed Forces schools.\(^{33}\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception to some of these proposals when they gave NSC 5432 their general endorsement. They opposed adjustment of priorities to accelerate delivery of equipment to Latin American recipients. Priorities, they pointed out, should be determined solely by world-wide strategic requirements and not used as an administrative device to speed deliveries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor increasing the quotas of Latin personnel at US military schools, which were already operating at maximum capacity.\(^{34}\)

On 2 September 1954 the National Security Council and the President adopted an amended version, NSC 5432/1, which deleted the suggestion of higher priorities for Latin America but retained the proposal for larger training quotas.\(^{35}\) A new provision called for fostering closer relations between Latin American and US military personnel. The purpose was to increase the understanding of, and orientation toward, US objectives on the part of the Latin American military, recognizing that the military establishments of most Latin American states played influential role in government.

NSC 5432/1 sanctioned the continuation of grant military aid to Latin America, repeating the provisions of NSC 144/1 on this subject without change. The current recipients of US assistance included the two recently approved Central American countries, Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as the eight nations established as eligible in 1952 or 1953: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The participation of El Salvador and Haiti had been approved, but those countries had not signed bilateral agreements by the end of 1954.

The administration decided that the new noncommunist government of Guatemala should also be included in the MDA program. Stressing the great importance of this move, Secretary of State Dulles on 27 October 1954 requested that necessary actions within the responsibility of the Department of Defense be taken promptly. In passing this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November, Secretary Wilson wrote: “It is apparent that political considerations will dictate the initiation of a military assistance program for Guatemala.” Already he had directed the Chairman of the US Delegation to the IADB to organize and conduct a survey of Guatemala’s military needs and capabilities.\(^{36}\)

Reporting on 26 November, the survey team recommended that the United States supply assistance to Guatemala in the form of material for one infantry battalion, with supporting ordnance, signal, and transport units. Up to four propeller-driven fighter aircraft should be furnished, under reimbursable aid,
since established policy forbade grant aid to air forces of nations too small to support complete air units.\textsuperscript{37}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1954 approved the proposed infantry battalion but not the support units, which they regarded as unnecessary and out of line with what was provided for other Central American countries. They noted that Guatemala had already obtained three F-51 fighter aircraft under reimbursable aid. Pointing out to Secretary Wilson that the tasks Guatemala’s military forces could perform in furtherance of hemisphere defense were of negligible value, they repeated his observation that the recommendations were being dictated by overriding political considerations. The JCS conclusions were forwarded to the Department of State, but it was not until 18 June 1955 that a bilateral agreement was signed that made Guatemala eligible for grant aid.\textsuperscript{38}

For the nations already participating in the military assistance program, the force bases proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1952 were accepted as valid throughout 1953 and 1954, with minor amendments. The most important change, involving a matter of policy, related to Colombia. Alone among the nations of Latin America, Colombia had contributed forces, consisting of a battalion of infantry, to the UN Command in Korea. In October 1954, when this unit was about to return home, Colombian authorities asked that it be allowed to retain the equipment that had been furnished by the United States. Although established policy forbade such retention, General Ridgway recommended that the request be approved for political and psychological as well as military reasons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred and recommended that the battalion be added to the Colombian MDAP force bases. Secretary Wilson approved the JCS recommendations, with the stipulation that his decision was not to be considered as setting a precedent in connection with other withdrawals from Korea.\textsuperscript{39}

In the course of the military assistance program for Latin America from its inception through 30 September 1954 a total of $110.4 million in grant aid had been furnished. Nearly half this sum, however, represented the value assigned to certain World War II lend-lease ships whose title had been transferred to Brazil. Through FY 1954, and as projected for later years, the military aid funds allotted to Latin America constituted less than 1 percent of the annual worldwide program.\textsuperscript{40}

The increased assistance to Latin America being contemplated by the Eisenhower administration under the provisions of NSC 5432/1 lay mainly in the economic and technical fields. Nevertheless, the entire Latin American MDA program was also under scrutiny at the end of 1954. The State Department had suggested the possibility of another approach to Argentina, and requests for additional aid had been received from Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. On 10 December 1954 Secretary Wilson asked the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning these questions. At the same time, he directed them to conduct a general reappraisal of military objectives and programs in Latin America with special regard to the effect of new and increased programs in the area on the world-wide MDA program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not completed this study when the year drew to a close.\textsuperscript{41}
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA  Anti-aircraft artillery
AAM  Air-to-air missile
AEW  Airborne early warning
AFPC Armed Forces Policy Council
AFSWP Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
ASD  Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASM  Air-to-surface missile
ASW  Antisubmarine warfare
CINCAL  Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCARIB  Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CINCCENTER  Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Center (NATO)
CINCFE  Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT  Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCNE  Commander in Chief, Northeast
CINCNELM  Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCONAD  Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC  Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINSOUTH  Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (NATO)
CINCUNC  Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCSAFE  Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR  Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
CJCS  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMLANDCENT  Commander, Land Forces, Center (NATO)
COMNAVFE  Commander, US Naval Forces, Far East
CONAD  Continental Air Defense Command
CUSDPG  Continental United States Defense Planning Group
CVA  Attack aircraft carrier
DART  Defense Annual Review Team
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence
DER  Radar picket escort ship
DEW  Distant early warning
DJS  Director, Joint Staff
**List of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOA</td>
<td>Foreign Operations Administration</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMIORG</td>
<td>Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Defense Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification, friend or foe</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFY</td>
<td>Japanese Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<td>JLPC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Plans Committee</td>
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<td>JLRSE</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate</td>
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<td>JMRWP</td>
<td>Joint Mid-Range War Plan</td>
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<td>JOEWP</td>
<td>Joint Outline Emergency War Plan</td>
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<td>JOWP</td>
<td>Joint Outline War Plan</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<td>JSPC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans Committee</td>
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<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Committee</td>
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<td>JUSMG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOFAR</td>
<td>Low-frequency acquisition and ranging</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance</td>
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<td>MDAP</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Program</td>
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<td>MEDO</td>
<td>Middle East Defense Organization</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Memorandum of Policy</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defense Agency (Japan)</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Safety Agency (Japan)</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSRB</td>
<td>National Security Resources Board</td>
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<td>NSTC</td>
<td>National Security Training Commission</td>
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<td>OCB</td>
<td>Operations Coordinating Board</td>
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<td>ODM</td>
<td>Office of Defense Mobilization</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCH&amp;T</td>
<td>Packing, crating, handling, and transportation</td>
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<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Canada-US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Psychological Strategy Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>RBCOS</td>
<td>Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental combat team</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)</td>
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<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Semi-automatic ground environment</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNIE</td>
<td>Special National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRE</td>
<td>Special Representative in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Surface-to-surface missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USRO</td>
<td>United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAGR</td>
<td>Miscellaneous auxiliary ship radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZI</td>
<td>Zone of the interior</td>
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</table>
Notes

Chapter 1. Basic National Security Policy, 1953

1. This chapter considers the New Look in relation to national policy and military strategy. Its effects on the size and structure of the US Armed Services are discussed more fully in Ch. 3, although of course the two aspects cannot be wholly separated.

2. The policy decisions of the Truman administration were embodied in the following papers: NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48; NSC 68 and 68/1 through 68/4, Apr-Dec 50; NSC 114/1 through 114/3, Jul 51-Jun 52; NSC 135/3, 25 Sep 52. Their contents are conveniently summarized in JCS Hist Div, “Positions and Actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to Basic National Security Policy, September 1947 to March 1956,” 4 Apr 56, pp. 1-28 (hereafter cited as “Positions and Actions of the JCS”). For actual and planned Service force levels as of the end of 1952, see Table 2.


4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Re-examination of Programs for National Security,” 10 Nov 52, JCS 2101/79, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 22. This memo dealt with programs for “offensive striking power” and “general military reserve.” By another, dated 20 Nov 52, the JCS discussed continental defense programs. See Ch. 5.


8. These figures include troop carrier groups, which were usually counted as wings and, beginning in 1953, were actually so designated. See Ch. 3. For the time period of this volume, the fiscal year used by the US Government ran from 1 July to 30 June. Hence FY 1954 covered the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954.


10. Except for the last one, all the quotations are from a speech on 25 Sep 52 devoted entirely to national defense. The exception is from one given on 16 Sep 52. For texts of these speeches, see NY Times, 26 Sep 52, 12; 17 Sep 52, 24. Mr. Eisenhower’s own statement of his views on defense planning (at least as they had evolved later) will be found in his book, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (1963), pp. 446-451.

Special attention should be drawn to the article by Glenn H. Snyder, “The ‘New Look’ of 1953,” in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (1962) (hereafter cited as Snyder, “New Look”). It covers much the same ground as this chapter. Based principally on interviews with military and civilian officials who held office in 1953, Snyder’s work is thorough and generally accurate, but since he did not have access to the classified documents, his account needs correction at certain points. A comprehensive collection of contemporary newspaper and magazine articles tracing the evolution of the New Look, insofar as it became known to the press, will be found in W. Barton Leach, The New Look (Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1954).


13. Ltr, Dodge to Humphrey, 13 Feb 53, and reply, Humphrey to Dodge, 16 Feb 53. Ltr to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, “Review of Basic National Security Policies,” 18 Feb 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 24. Illustrative of Mr. Eisenhower’s concern for economy was his action in inviting these
officials to participate in the deliberations of the National Security Council; Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 131-132, 447.


18. For the reorganization of the Council in March 1953, see *Public Papers, Eisenhower*, 1953, pp. 120-121, and Exec. Order 10483, 2 Sep 53, which created the Operations Coordinating Board.

19. NSC Action Nos. 701, 29 Jan 53, and 705, 4 Feb 53.


25. Memo, DepSecDef to SecA et al., 9 Mar 53, JCS 1800/200, 10 Mar 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 40. Under the Truman budget, Army expenditures would be $15.3 billion, Navy $12.0 billion, and Air Force $17.5 billion, with the rest interdepartmental (see Ch. 3). Hence Mr. Kyes’s allocation would have the most adverse effect upon the Air Force.

Various documents relating to force level planning and budgeting in 1953 and 1954 are summarized in *JCS Hist Div*, “Summary of Policy and Budgetary Considerations Relating to Force Levels for Fiscal Years 1955-1957.”


29. NSC Action No. 752, 25 Mar 53.


31. These consultants represented business, education, labor, and the press. Their names were announced on 11 Mar 53 in a press release stating that they would consult with the Council on “general terms relating to its policies and programs.” *NY Times*, 12 Mar 53, 22. (See also the White House announcement of 23 Mar 53, placing this announcement in context as part of a series of measures intended to “strengthen and improve the operations of the National Security Council,” in *Public Papers, Eisenhower*, 1953, pp. 120-122.) Except for mention of their presence at the 31 Mar meeting, available sources do not indicate their relations with the Council.

32. NSC 149, 3 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25. The official NSC record does not mention the 31 Mar meeting; the numbered sequence of formal actions runs from No. 754, 25 Mar, to No. 755, 3 Apr.

33. The process by which the Council’s reduced expenditure figures were reached is described in Ch. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in it.

34. NSC Action No. 776, 28 Apr 53. NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.

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35. The basis for the selection of these objectives is described in Ch. 3.
36. Service strengths as of 28 Feb 53 were: Army, 1,495,000; Navy, 802,936; Marine Corps, 242,300;
Air Force, 965,425. See Ch. 3.
38. Ibid., pp. 306-316.
39. See Ch. 3 for details of the reduced budget.
40. The Navy had 1,116 active ships on 31 Dec 52 and was authorized 1,130 for the end of FY 53.
See Ch. 3.
41. Previously the Air Force had been building toward a goal of 143 wings. See Ch. 3.
44. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Restatement of Basic National Security Policy,” 5 Jun 53, JCS 2101/93;
46. See James Burnham, Containment or Liberation (1952), which argues the case for the latter alternative.
47. NY Times, 28 Aug 52, 12.
50. The actual instructions given the task forces have not been found. The summary given here is from Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, “Project Solarium,” 22 Jul 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 27.
According to Snyder, “New Look,” p. 408, and Murphy, “The Eisenhower Shift,” p. 232, the instructions were drafted by a committee headed by one of the President’s informal advisers, LTG James H. Doolittle, USAF (Ret.), then a vice president of Shell Oil Co.
56. NSC Action No. 868, 30 Jul 53, recorded the decision to prepare a new statement but did not indicate the Council’s views on the direction of policy, which have to be inferred from the guidelines furnished the Special Committee of the Planning Board. The latter may be seen in the attachment to Memo, Secy, AFPC, to SecA et al., “Solarium” Decision of the Armed Forces Policy Council, July 28, 1953,” 17 Aug 53, JCS 2101/100, 24 Aug 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 28.
59. With the exception of the Commandant, USMC, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, whose statutory four-year term would not expire until 31 Dec 1955.
60. NY Times, 8 May 53, 1.
63. Ibid., 7, 8, and 9 Dec 52 (p. 1 in each case). Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 96.
65. Text of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in NY Times, 1 May 53, 8. The President’s message transmitting the plan to Congress is in Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 225-238.
69. This meeting is described in Snyder, “New Look,” p. 413, and in Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (1956), pp. 266-267. Snyder’s account is the more complete, and is

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presumably based on interviews with several of those who were present. Neither mentions the date, but it can be fixed within a few days. The NY Times, 13 Jul 53, 3, recorded the arrival of Ridgway and Radford in Washington on 12 July 1953 for “top-level briefing and conferences,” and reported that Carney was scheduled to arrive the next day.


71. Snyder, “New Look,” pp. 413-414, gives an account, presumably accurate, of the members working together in a conference room near the Chairman’s office, with no assistants except a single aide who provided pencils, paper, and coffee.

72. Radford, Soldier, p. 267. Ridgway’s recollection was that most of the month was occupied by these trips, which according to his account, were undertaken in accord with specific oral instructions given by the President.

73. “Defense Progress—A Team Responsibility,” Rpt of Secretaries’ Conference, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., 23-26 Jul 53, OCJCS File 337 (19 Feb 54), Quaintico Conference 23-26 July, 1953. According to Snyder “New Look,” p. 413, the President told the Joint Chiefs of Staff during this conference that he wanted only unanimous recommendations from them, not “split” papers. This statement does not appear in the brief summary of the President’s address in the report cited here.


75. Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef, 8 Aug 53, JCS Hist. Div. Files. The summary of this report in Snyder, “New Look,” p. 414, is generally accurate. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 268-269, describes the conclusions that he himself reached as a result of this study, but not those submitted collectively to the Secretary of Defense.

76. This interpretation was given later by ADM Radford. See Memo for Record by R[obert] C[uttle], 1 Sep 53, recording an interview in which Radford furnished supplementary comments on the 8 Aug report, JCS Hist. Div. Files.

77. Radford and Ridgway were sworn in on 15 August 1953 and Carney on 17 August. NY Times, 16 Aug 53, 1; 18 Aug 53, 10. GEN Bradley, the outgoing Chairman, attended his last NSC meeting on 13 August 1953 and received appreciative tributes from Secretary Wilson and other Council members. NSC Action No. 879, 13 Aug 53.


79. Memo by R[obert] C[uttle], “August 27/53 NSC Meeting,” 1 Sep 53, JCS Hist. Div. Files. The official record of this meeting is brief and not very informative, except that it adds that the President characterized the concept as a “crystallized and clarified statement of this Administration’s understanding of our national security objectives since World War II.” NSC Action No. 889, 27 Aug 53. (For further documentation of the 27 August 1953 NSC meeting and consideration of the report of the JCS appointees, see Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs (1984), pp. 443-457.)

80. NSC Action No. 898, 9 Sep 53.


83. JCS 2101/105, 3 Oct 53, same file.


87. JCS 2101/107, 23 Oct 53, same file. The wording to which the JSSC objected had resulted from partial incorporation of one of the changes in NSC 162 suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


91. This ruling by the President is not mentioned in the official record of the meeting. ADM Carney cited it to his colleagues on 18 Jan 54, pointing out that some staff officers appeared to be unaware of the President's pronouncement. A JCS Info Memo was subsequently circulated to clarify the matter. Memo, CNO to JCS, "Interpretation of the phrase 'offensive striking power' as appearing in NSC 162/2—Basic National Security Policy," 18 Jan 54; SM-49-54 to ADM Radford, GEN Twinning, and GEN Ridgway, 21 Jan 54; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 33. JCS Info Memo 922, 10 Feb 54, same file, sec 35.

92. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, same file, sec 31.

93. The words "unacceptable damage" had been inserted on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSC 162, in the corresponding paragraph, had spoken of "destruction" of the Soviet system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception to the "false impression that air power can destroy the Soviet system."

94. See below, Ch. 3.

95. As of 13 Oct 53, the Council had approved a provision in NSC 162 that the United States "should use special weapons whenever they are required by the national security." This was less emphatic than the final statement on the subject in NSC 162/2, and was evidently weaker than ADM Radford wished. (Note, however, that JCS strategic plans all assumed immediate use of nuclear weapons on the outbreak of general war; see below, Ch. 4.)

96. This account of the 13 Oct 53 NSC meeting is from Snyder, "New Look," pp. 426-427. The official account merely states that Wilson and McNeil presented preliminary budget estimates, based on JCS force levels, and that the Council directed them to submit new estimates "reviewed and coordinated" in the light of the discussion. It records Radford's presence at the meeting, but does not indicate what part he played. (NSC Action No. 930, 13 Oct 53.) Snyder's account is corroborated to some extent by the SecDef directive of 16 Oct 53, described below, which authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to base their plans on the assumption of immediate use of nuclear weapons.

97. Memo, SecDef to CJOCS, 16 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30. The discussions with SecDef that preceded the issuance of this directive are referred to in CM-33-53 to JCS, 16 Oct 53, JCS 2101/108, 26 Oct 53, same file.

98. See below, Ch. 5.

99. These figures were based on the expected numbers of men in the 18-20 age bracket over the next few years, and on the assumption that Congress would continue to authorize selective service, although the current law was then scheduled to expire at the end of FY 55. See ADM Radford's testimony on this point before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 Jun 56, in Hearings, Study of Airpower, S. Com on Armed Services, 84th Cong, 2d sess, vol. II, p. 1449.

100. JCS 2101/108, 26 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30. Besides LTG Everest, the committee consisted of one rear admiral; one major general, USA; two brigadier generals, USAF and USMC; one captain, USN; two colonels, USAF and USMC; and one lieutenant colonel, USA.

101. The committee's report ascribed these estimates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. According to Snyder, "New Look," p. 441, they came originally from the Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget, all of which furnished economists who worked with the committee.

102. According to GEN Ridgway's later testimony, the dollar limit accounted for the use of manpower totals well below Secretary Wilson's upper limit of 3,000,000. Speaking of the 2,815,000 figure eventually agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, "We could have had a substantially higher figure... had the dollar ceiling been higher." Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, p. 610 (hereafter cited as H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957).


104. CSAFM 87-53 to JCS, 2 Dec 53, same file, sec 32.

105. JCS 2101/112, 7 Dec 53; Memo, CMC to JCS, "JCS 2101/111," 5 Dec 53, Ser 0007A33953; same file.

106. ADM Carney spoke of "extensive discussions" that had already taken place, in JCS 2101/112, 7 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32. Other evidence of the JCS debate is furnished by a redraft of part of the Everest Committee Report prepared at ADM Radford's behest; SM-1895-53 to CJOCS, 7 Dec 53, same file.

107. According to Snyder, "New Look," p. 442. Secretary Wilson authorized this strength after being told by ADM Radford that it would enable the JCS to reach agreement.
108. Service personnel strengths as of 31 Dec 53 were as follows: Army, 1,481,177; Navy, 765,269; Marine Corps, 243,800; Air Force, 912,537; total 3,402,783. Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jul-31 Dec 1953 (1954), p. 52.

109. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.

110. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Strategy and Posture,” 9 Dec 53, JCS 2101/113, same file. The cover sheet of JCS 2101/113 indicates that the memo was actually forwarded on 11 Dec 53.

111. NSC Action No. 987, 16 Dec 53. For the revised budget and its related FY 55 force levels, see Ch. 3.

112. Speech before the National Press Club, 14 Dec 53. Radford, “Collected Writings”, vol. I, pp. 34, 37-38. This speech is discussed further in the next section.


117. See Ch. 3.


119. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

120. This view was implicit in ADM Radford’s remarks to the Council on 13 Oct about the potential for economy through use of atomic weapons, and in his remarks on 14 Dec 53 (see page 35) that new weapons would counterbalance force reductions. A clearer statement of it was given by the President in his 1954 State of the Union message. The use of tactical nuclear weapons, he said, “creates new relationships between men and materials”; these, in turn, “permit economies in the use of men.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (1960), p. 11. See also a similar statement by Secretary Wilson, in H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 2.

121. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 296.

122. Ibid., pp. 290-291.


125. In his 1956 testimony, Ridgway described the “stated assumptions” underlying the New Look program as follows: “that there would be no substantial deterioration in the world situation, as well as a whole lot of others relating to Western Europe, Korea, and the Far East, and the growth of the Japanese force.” H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, p. 610. His memory played him false in convincing him that these assumptions were “stated.” True, one of them—the establishment of a Japanese force—had been stipulated by the Army members of the Everett Committee as a condition of their acceptance of a 14-division army, but this stipulation had been left out of JCS 2101/113. Evidently Ridgway also understood some of the politico-military actions recommended in JCS 2101/113 as “assumptions” in the traditional military sense. (Snyder, “New Look,” pp. 442-443, 453, 514-515.)

126. The CNO stated his view on this matter in a radio interview on 27 Nov 53; NY Times, 28 Nov 53, 8. Ironically, in his comments on the Everett Committee report, ADM Carney had turned this argument against the Air Force in the following passage: “The stressing of quality rather than quantity is particularly important in the field of military aviation . . . . The tremendously increased yields becoming available from weapons makes it possible to deliver equivalent fire power with fewer airplanes and fewer weapons . . . . There does not appear to be any military justification for a constant increase in the numbers of airplanes designed solely for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction”; JCS 2101/112, 7 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.


128. Ibid., p. 45.

129. Secretary Wilson’s use of this phrase to a Congressional committee in May 1953 has been mentioned earlier. Senator Taft had called for a “new look” at the Truman military program on 6 April (NY Times, 7 Apr 53, 21). Numerous other examples could be cited from contemporary press accounts.

131. For examples of statements on the subject, see President Eisenhower's State of the Union message to Congress on 7 Jan 54 and his message accompanying the FY 55 budget on 21 Jan 54, both in Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 10-11, 117-119; also Secretary Wilson's statement opening House hearings on the FY 1955 budget, 15 Mar 54, H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 2-14. For an excellent summary of statements by Administration leaders describing the new strategy, see Snyder, "New Look," pp. 463-485.

132. For example, NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, had spoken of the need to "develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary," while NSC 135/3, 25 Sep 52, had set forth the objective of developing and sustaining "for as long as may be necessary" the military strength needed to prevent or win a war. Note also President Truman's prediction in his last budget message that after 1954, military expenditures would decline to "the level required to keep our armed forces in a state of readiness" (see Ch. 3).


134. President Eisenhower later commented that "the tag 'New Look' probably suggested to many minds a picture of a far more radical change in the composition of our armed forces than was truly the case." Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 449. In a press conference on 17 Mar 54, the President remarked, "I just don't like this expression [New Look] because it doesn't mean much to me." Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1954, p. 330. As Snyder points out ("New Look," pp. 485, 495), public statements by administration spokesmen alternately stressed or minimized the novelty of the New Look, depending on whether the speakers wished to present it as a radical improvement upon the strategy of the previous administration or as a natural evolution to meet changed conditions.


136. President Eisenhower, in his messages to Congress in Jan 54 on the State of the Union and the FY 55 budget, and Secretary Wilson, before the House Appropriations Committee (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 2-14), had referred in general terms to the possible use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression, but neither spoke of "instant" or "massive" retaliation. ADM Radford's remark in his speech of 14 Dec 53 before the National Press Club about preparation for "retaliatory and counteroffensive blows," was equally broad and, in its context, did not carry the impact of Secretary Dulles's words.

137. Prominent critics of Secretary Dulles's speech included Messrs. Chester Bowles, Dean Acheson, and Adlai E. Stevenson. Mr. Dulles replied in a press conference on 16 March 1954 and in an article in Foreign Affairs (Apr 54), from which the quoted sentence is taken. These criticisms, and the Secretary's replies, are reprinted in Herbert L. Marx, Jr., ed., Defense and National Security (1955), pp. 64-103. The controversy in the press and in Congress is amply documented in Leach, New Look. General summaries may be found in Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1953 (1955), pp. 357-364, 370-372, and The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (1955), pp. 52-58, which are particularly informative on the diplomatic repercussions of the prospective redeployment of US forces.


139. See, for example, the statements by Messrs. Stevenson and Bowles, in Marx, Defense and National Security, pp. 80-81, 86-87.

Chapter 2. Basic National Security Policy, 1954

3. The Indochina crisis of 1954 is described more fully in Ch. 12.
6. Record of Mtg, NSC PB, 26 Apr 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 15. Other members were the State, Defense, Treasury, and FOA members of the Planning Board and the CIA adviser.
7. Record of Mtg, Special Com on Guidelines, NSC PB, 5 May 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 15.
10. The Office of Defense Mobilization, created in 1950, had been enlarged in 1953 and given broad new powers to supervise all mobilization planning, military and civilian. At that time it absorbed the functions of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director, ODM, assumed the seat on the National Security Council previously held by the Chairman, NSRB. See Ch. 6.
12. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, same file, sec 40. The number NSC 5422 was assigned according to a new system adopted by the Council in 1954, under which NSC papers were given four-digit numbers beginning with the last two digits of the current year.
14. JCS 2101/140, 23 Jun 54; JCS 2101/142, 29 Jun 54; same file, sec 41.
15. Dec On JCS 2101/139, 29 Jun 54, same file, sec 40.
18. NSC Action Nos. 1165 and 1169, 24 Jun and 1 Jul 54.
20. NSC 5422/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43. The revision was prepared by a special subcommittee that included the JCS Adviser.
23. NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, same file, sec 44. The section dealing with mobilization was later issued separately. See Ch. 6.
24. The earliest known evidence of this decision is furnished by an agenda showing that the Planning Board was scheduled to review NSC 162/2 on 29 Sep 54. (NSC Tentative Agenda for 6 Sep-1 Oct 54, 8 Sep 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 16). The first formal Council action in this regard was a decision of 22 Oct 54 that each member and adviser would submit a statement of recommended policy changes for consideration in advance of the meeting of 18 Nov 54; NSC Action No. 1251, 22 Oct 54.
26. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Basic United States Security Policy,” 3 Nov 54, JCS 2101/167, same file, sec 47. Before receiving the SecDef memo of 18 Oct 54, the JCS had directed JSSC to draft a statement of views for submission to NSC. JSSC produced two successive drafts during October; both were rejected, for reasons not indicated in available records. (JCS 2101/160, 18 Oct 54, same file, sec 46. JCS 2101/163, 26 Oct 54, same file, sec 47.) The version finally approved and dispatched was a shorter draft submitted by GEN Ridgway.
28. JCS 2101/170, 12 Nov 54, same file.
31. JCS 2101/173, 21 Nov 54, same file.
34. NSC Action No. 1272, 24 Nov 54.
35. NSC Action No. 1279, 3 Dec 54.
36. NSC Action No. 1286, 9 Dec 54. For details of the President’s decision on manpower, see Ch. 3.
37. NSC 5440, 13 Dec 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48. It had been drafted by a special committee that included the JCS Adviser. Record of Mtg. NSC PB, 24 Nov 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 16A.
Chapter 3. Force Levels and Personnel Strengths

3. Budget of the US, FY 1954, pp. M6, M14, 562. The figures exclude funds for stockpiling, atomic energy, and mutual security. Marine Corps funds are of course included under the Navy.
5. The process by which the revised FY 1954 budget was formulated was described by Secy Wilson, DepSecDef Kyess, and ASD(Comptroller) McNeil, during H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, especially pp. 317, 387-391, 403-404, 426. A shorter description by SecDef is found in Hearings, Study of Airpower, S. Com on Armed Services, 84th Cong, 2d sess, vol. II, pp. 1630-1637 (hereafter cited as Study of Airpower). See also Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan 1-Jun 30, 1953 (1953), pp. 4-6.
7. The manpower limits in NSC 149/2 took the place of the force level goals originally approved by the Council on 31 Mar 53. An earlier draft (NSC 149/1) had provided for the full reduction of 250,000 in FY 1954 that Secretary Wilson had at first planned. The personnel figures in NSC 149/2 excluded officer candidates (US Military Academy cadets, US Naval Academy midshipmen, and Naval aviation cadets). NSC 149/2 said nothing about Air Force strength for FY 1954, but by separate action, Secretary Wilson established a limit of 960,000.
9. Statements by GEN Vandenberg in S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 317-318, 341. According to GEN Vandenberg, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 27 April and discussed the proposed expenditure revisions, but could take no action. No record of this JCS meeting has been found.
11. NY Times, 8 May 53, 1.
13. Ibid., p. 415.
14. Ibid. See Table 5 for a Service breakdown of the revised FY 1953 authorized strength.
15. For this operation as carried out in the Air Force, see S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1954, pp. 319, 341-342. The procedure in the other Services was undoubtedly similar.
18. See Table 10.
21. JCS 1800/202, 14 Apr 53; JCS 1800/204, 26 May 53; same file.
26. See Ch. 5.
27. AFPC Advice of Action, "Budget—Force Levels for FY 1955," 16 Sep 53, JCS 1800/206, 17 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), consisting of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense, was created by statute to advise the Secretary on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.
29. The units so designated included engineer, reconnaissance, artillery, missile, and various other battalions in the Army and Marine Corps, and specialized air squadrons of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force (transport, weather, reconnaissance, target-towing, refueling, air rescue, etc.).
31. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff later pointed out, this proposal represented a speed-up in reaching the 120-wing goal, attainment of which was at that time set for FY 1956. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955," 2 Oct 53, JCS 1800/211, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43.
32. Three of the fighter squadrons (to be assigned to the Tactical Air Command) would be obtained by redeployment from overseas and thus represented no increase in overall military strength. See Ch. 5.
33. See Tables 1 and 5.
34. JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43. The "actual" FY 1953 force-level figures in this report are the source of those given in Table 8.
36. The phrase was used by ADM Radford in a speech on 2 Dec 1953; Radford, "Collected Writings," vol. I, pp. 24-25.
37. No record of Secretary Wilson's approval of the JCS recommendations has been found. The record of the NSC meeting of 13 Oct 53, however, describes the budget estimates presented at that time as based on major combat forces proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (NSC Action No. 930, 13 Oct 53.) On 8 October, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of the personnel strengths and supporting forces sought by the Services (which were not covered by the JCS recommendations) in preparing the budget, although he noted that there were "possibilities for great savings in this area." At the same time, he ruled that the budget would not include any costs of expanding the Air Force to 137 wings. (Memos, SecDef to ASD(Comptroller), "Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1955" and "Basis of Preliminary Budget Estimate for FY '55," both dated 8 Oct 53, JCS 1800/212, 10 Oct 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43.)
38. "Estimated New Obligational Authority and Expenditures for Fiscal 1955, Based on JCS Force Recommendations of 2 October 1953," 9 Oct 53, OCJCS File, New Look Documents. The gross requirement for obligatory authority was $40.650 billion; the smaller figure was arrived at by deducting $5.377 billion available from prior years. The expenditure estimate was broken down by Service as follows: Air Force, $17.5 billion; Army, $12.9 billion; Navy, $12.0 billion; interdepartmental, $600 million.
40. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 30.
42. Memo, ASD (M&P) to AsstSecA (M&RF), AsstSecN (Manpower), and AsstSecAF (Management), "FY 1955 Manpower Programs, Guidance and Instructions for Review of," 23 Oct 53, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 17.
43. As compared with the currently authorized FY 1954 strengths (see Table 5), the Army would lose 140,000, the Navy 75,066, and the Marine Corps 23,021, or almost exactly 10 percent in each case. The Air Force would increase by 10,000.
44. NY Times, 26 Nov 53, 27.
pp. 449-450. The plan was not officially submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, but, according to Snyder ("New Look," p. 446), was discussed by them on several occasions, and was defended by Radford.

47. Memos, SecDef to each Service Secretary, "Fiscal Year 1955 Personnel Strength," 4 Dec 53, OCJCS File, 111 Budget 1953.


49. Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN, and SecAF, "Budgetary Military Strengths for FY 1955," 11 Dec 53; Memos, ASD (M&P) to each Service Secretary, "Budgetary Military Strength for Fiscal Year 1955," 11 Dec 53; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 44.

50. These are the figures released during budget hearings early in 1954. They exclude 2,000 USMA cadets and 6,900 USNA midshipmen and Naval aviation cadets. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 117; H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1955, p. 51; H. Hrgs, DN Appropriations for 1955, p. 44.) The date of their adoption is unknown, but it is assumed they had been decided upon in time to serve as the basis for the FY 1955 budget that was approved by NSC on 16 Dec 53.

The Army strength was increased early in 1954 to absorb 8,700 1954 ROTC graduates who had been promised active duty. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 265, 270; S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 55, 60, 404-405.)

51. For the revised 1954 objectives, see Table 5, taken from H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 117.

52. See GEN Ridgway's testimony in 1955 and 1956 that the Army's FY 1955 figure was set by "extrapolating backward" from the New Look goals for 1957. (H. Hrgs, DA Appropriations for 1956, p. 78; H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 599-600.) See also the statements by administration officials, cited later on in this chapter, relating the 1955 strengths to the New Look.

Snyder, "New Look," pp. 451, 455, refers to Service strength figures for 1955 and 1956, "prepared by Admiral Radford and General Everest, with assistance from the Office of the Comptroller," which were submitted to Secretary Wilson on 9 Dec 53. No such documents have been found in connection with this study. Ridgway's 1956 testimony, cited here, makes it clear that the final 1955 figures were not discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before being approved.

53. According to Snyder, "New Look," p. 455, the final 1955 Army figure can be ascribed to the President's belief that a reduction of only 10 percent did not fully reflect the effects of the Korean truce. The statement is plausible but is not directly corroborated by evidence examined for this volume. In a news conference on 2 Dec 53, President Eisenhower was asked for his views on the proposed 10 percent cut, which had been discussed in the press. He declined to specify any desirable percentage reduction but asserted that the Armistice offered opportunities for "savings all the way along the line." (Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, p. 809.)


55. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1955 (1954), p. M42 (hereafter cited as Budget of the US, FY 1954). Of the planned expenditures, $3.198 billion was for continental defense (see Ch. 5).

56. NSC Action No. 987, 16 Dec 53.


58. 1955 force goals from H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 116. The Air Force later discovered that it could organize 121 wings within its allotted manpower strength (see Table 6).

59. For the increases in continental-defense forces under the the 1955 budget, see Ch. 5.


62. Ibid., p. 120.

63. This was the interpretation placed by GEN Ridgway upon President Eisenhower's statement of 7 Jan 54. (Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 288-289.)

64. See the Secretary of Defense's statements to the House Appropriations Committee, 24 Jan 1956, contrasting the actions of the JCS in connection with the budgets for 1955 and for 1956. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 128-129.) The misunderstanding between Secretary Wilson and GEN Ridgway over the extent of the latter's "acceptance" of JCS 2101/113 and of the FY 1955 budget is conveniently summarized in Snyder, "New Look," pp. 486-491.

65. This testimony is described more fully in Ch. 1.

66. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 138. For ADM Radford's unqualified statement that the New Look program had the full endorsement of all JCS members, see ibid., p. 119.

69. S. Hrsgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 43-44.
70. See Ch. 1. In the Congressional hearings, the principal critic was Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, whose questioning of witnesses elicited admissions that the effect of the reduced 1955 Army strength would not be offset by better weapons or by improvements in mobility. See H. Hrsgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, pp. 106-108; H. Hrsgs, DA Appropriations for 1955, pp. 38-40, 53-61.
71. See Table 10.
74. The Service programs submitted in response to JCS directive of 17 Dec 53 appeared as JCS 1800/213 (Marine Corps), JCS 1800/214 (Navy), JCS 1800/215 (Army), and JCS 1800/216 (Air Force); dated 2, 10, 11 and 11 Mar 54; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 45.
75. JCS 1800/221, 29 Apr 54, same file, BP pt 5.
76. JCS 1849/123, 29 Jun 54 (par 4), CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.
78. NY Times, 27 Apr 54, 1. See also ibid., 10 May 54, 1, for a report that the administration was considering an increase in the FY 1955 defense budget.
79. JCS 2101/135, 8 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39. General Shepherd, by a separate memo, supported the requested increase in Marine Corps strength. (JCS 2101/137, 15 Jun 54, same file, sec 40.)
80. JCS 1849/123, 29 Jun 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.
81. The Army figure represented a rounding off of the FY 1955 budgetary strength (1,164,000, including USMA cadets) after modification to include 8,700 ROTC graduates. It is not clear why officer candidates should have been included in the Army’s figure but not in that for the Navy. Sources do not always indicate whether or not personnel strengths under discussion include cadets and midshipmen.
82. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Recommended Basis for Guidelines for the Preparation of Service Budgets for FY 1956,” 1 Jul 54, JCS 1800/222, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.
83. N/H of JCS 1800/222, 15 Jul 54, same file.
85. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956,” 19 Aug 54, JCS 1849/125, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21. See Table 7 for actual force levels as of 30 Jun 54.
87. Lt, Dir BOB to SecDef, 23 Jul 54, JCS 1800/223, 5 Aug 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.
88. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956,” 19 Aug 54, JCS 1849/125; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, same subj, 17 Sep 54, JCS 1849/127, 20 Sep 54; CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21.
89. SM-840-54 to JSPC, 23 Sep 54, same file, sec 22.
90. JCS 1849/130, 27 Sep 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 22. The date of the meeting is not indicated.
93. NY Times, 1 Dec 54, 1.
94. The amount of the FY 1956 estimates presented at this meeting is not indicated in the official record, but they must have been close to the figures submitted on 9 December by Secretary Wilson, which called for $34.275 billion in new obligatory authority, almost $4 billion over the FY 1955 budget. (NSC Action No. 1287, 9 Dec 54.)
95. NSC Action No. 1280, 3 Dec 54.
96. NY Times, 8 Dec 54, 23.
98. N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.
99. JCS 1800/225, 30 Nov 54, same file. In separate correspondence, ADM Carney defended the Navy’s proposed increase as necessary to meet additional commitments for continental defense, antisubmarine warfare, and antarctic exploration, as well as to maintain current readiness levels and to continue existing deployments. (JCS 1800/227, 8 Dec 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.)
100. Memo for ADM Radford, signed "W" (probably COL Leroy H. Watson, USAF, Exec to CJCS), 2 Feb 55; Memo for ADM Radford (unsigned but evidently prepared by COL Watson or someone else on ADM Radford's staff), 3 Feb 55 (giving chronology of events in connection with JCS 1800/225); OCJCS File, 111 Budget 1955. N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.

101. Tabulation entitled "Personnel Strengths," 8 Dec 54 (listing end FY 1955 and FY 1956 figures "approved on December 8/54"), Encl to informal memo, "Bob" [Cutler] to "Raddy" [Radford], n. d., indicated the figures were being sent to allow Radford and Wilson to verify them before the NSC meeting of 9 December. (OCJCS Files, 111 Budget 1954.) The 1955 figures coincide with those announced to NSC on 9 December, except that the Navy-Marine Corps strength is given as 877,000 and the total as 2,947,000. It is impossible to say whether this difference results from error or from a change made between 8 and 9 December. For FY 1956, the tabulation shows figures identical with those in JCS 2101/113 except that separate figures are not given for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

102. NSC Action No. 1286, 9 Dec 54. During the subsequent JCS consideration the combined Navy-Marine Corps figure of 870,000 was listed as 665,000 Navy and 205,000 Marine Corps.

103. On the impact of the decision when it became known, see an article in Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 18 Dec 54, p. 453, which characterized it as a "surprising last-minute military budget reversal" and as puzzling to "legislative leaders at the Capitol" in view of Wilson's recent statements. GEN Ridgway later testified that Army budget estimates for FY 1956, based on the strength approved earlier (1,173,000), were practically complete and had to be extensively revised when the President announced the reduction; H. Hrgs., DA Appropriations for 1956, pp. 25-26.


105. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Years 1955, 1956 and 1957," 9 Dec 54, JCS 1800/228, 9 Dec 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47. These figures excluded cadets and midshipmen.

106. Statement by SecDef to House Appropriations Committee, 31 Jan 56; H. Hrgs., DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 128-129. Secretary Wilson described the Service positions as follows: "The Air Force was completely satisfied with their personnel ceiling and had no objection at all. The Navy and the Marine Corps would have liked to have a few more people. The Army wanted to have a much bigger force, as expressed by General Ridgway." His statement, which apparently telescopes the two Presidential decisions, does not indicate the date of this second decision, nor is it clear whether or not a second meeting was held at the White House for the purpose. In his book, Mandate for Change, pp. 452-453, Mr. Eisenhower describes an "important" meeting held in his office "in early December 1954," attended by Secretary Wilson, Deputy Secretary Anderson, and all the Joint Chiefs of Staff except Radford, at which he explained his views on defense and heard objections from General Ridgway. Perhaps the revised manpower limit was authorized at this meeting, although the account does not indicate what decisions, if any, were reached.

Secretary Wilson's recollection, in the statement cited here, was that he had received "split" papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding FY 1956 strengths. He was probably referring to JCS 1800/225, which actually dealt with FY 1957.

107. NSC Action No. 1293, 5 Jan 55.


112. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Force and Manning Levels," 29 Dec 54, JCS 1800/230, 30 Dec 54, same file. The request for alternative deployments was justified on the basis of the "rapidly changing international situation"—presumably a reference to the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, described in Ch. 12.

113. The two static divisions would have Manning levels ranging from 70 percent to 79 percent, as compared with 88 to 100 percent for the mobile divisions and only 40 percent or less (excluding trainees) for the training divisions.

114. The number of attack carriers, however, remained unchanged: 15 in each fiscal year.


117. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and
Manning Levels,” 18 Mar 55, JCS 1800/237, same file, sec 51. For the views of the Army and Marine Corps on the question of transport capacity, see JCS 1800/235, 22 Jan 55, same file, sec 50.

118. NSC Action No. 1287, 9 Dec 54.


120. Secretary Wilson had touched on this point in testifying on the FY 1955 budget. In view of limitations on transport capacity, he said, “there is not much use in having more men on active duty than you could move by the time you could move them by calling in your Reserves.” H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 63.

121. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955 (1959), pp. 2-6 (hereafter cited as Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955). This letter was in reply to one from Secretary Wilson on 3 Jan 55. “I have found so much value in the views underlying your decisions as to the personnel strengths of the armed services,” Mr. Wilson had written, “that I wonder if you would give me the gist of them in written form.” (Ibid., p. 6.) In his reply, the President announced that he was directing the release of both letters in the interest of an informed citizenry.


126. See Table 10. Secretary Wilson later impounded the extra Marine Corps appropriation. (NY Times, 15 Jul 55, 1.)


130. Discussed in Ch. 2.

131. JCS 1800/237, 18 Mar 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 6. The figures on amphibious vessels and lift capacity are drawn from JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55, same file, sec 49.


133. See Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 4-5, 17, where the two phrases are treated as synonymous.

134. "Views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on Major Forces and Manning Level Planning Goals for Fiscal Year 1957," n.d., Encl E to N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47. This statement was prepared pursuant to a JCS agreement on 15 Dec 54 regarding the disposition of the recommendations in JCS 1800/225, which had been overtaken by the Secretary of Defense directive of 9 December 1954 on force levels (JCS 1800/228); each JCS member was to submit views to be published with the notice that JCS 1800/225 was being withdrawn from consideration (SM-1075-54 to JCS, 16 Dec 54, same file). The five statements comprise the several enclosures to N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55. In Encls B and D, ADM Carney and GEN Shepherd merely affirmed their support of the Navy and Marine Corps strengths proposed in JCS 1801/225. In Encl A, GEN Ridgway summarized the arguments he had presented to the Secretary of Defense on 8 December 1954, as already recounted. GEN Twining’s views were in Encl C.

135. N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.

136. The letter to the Secretary of Defense, 27 June 1955, is printed in full in Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 323-332. Even before the appearance of his book, GEN Ridgway had presented his case in a series of six articles, "My Battles in War and Peace," published in the Saturday Evening Post between 21 January and 25 February 1956. The controversial statements made in the first two articles, treating his service as Chief of Staff, led the House Committee on Appropriations, in hearings on the FY 1957 budget, to question GEN Ridgway extensively about the origins of the New Look and the extent to which it reflected the views of the JCS. (H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1957, pp. 559 ff.)
Chapter 4. Strategic Planning, 1953-1954

1. National Security Act of 1947 (PL 253, 80th Cong, 26 Jul 47). Statements identical in substance, differing only in grammatical form, were contained in the 1949 amendments to the Act (PL 216, 81st Cong, 10 Aug 49).
2. JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3.
3. JCS 2089, 2 Dec 49, same file, sec 1.
4. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52, same file, sec 3. The intended purposes and interrelationships of the three plans were explained in detail by JSPC in JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, same file.
5. PL 416, 82d Cong, 28 Jun 52.
6. Since the JLRSE was not, strictly speaking, a plan, it would be noted, rather than approved, by the JCS.
7. The chart on p. 92 (based on the more detailed ones enclosed with JCS 2089/3 and JCS MOP 84) illustrates how the planning process was intended to operate insofar as the JSOP and the JSCP were concerned. The two plans would not fall into phase with one another before 1956. The JSCP to be approved on 1 January of that year would reflect capabilities determined by the FY 1956 budget, which would be based on the first JSOP to be issued on 1 July 1953.
8. JCS 2143/6, 7 Dec 50, CCS 381 (1-26-50) BP pt 1. JCS 1844/126, 2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP pt 6.
9. Dec On JCS 1725/47, 20 Jan 50, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) BP pt 1B.
10. JCS 1920/5, 19 Dec 49; N/H of JCS 1920/5, 13 Feb 51; CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP pt 3.
11. Dec On JCS 2089/3, 21 Jul 52; JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3.
13. Dec On JCS 1725/192, 11 Sep 52, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 50. Under the original schedule, the JSOP would not have been due until 1 May 1953.
15. This point was made by JSPC in the body of the report from which JCS MOP 84 was derived, but it was not stated among the formal conclusions that the JCS subsequently approved; JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3.
16. The JSCP directives were: for the JSCP, JSPC 877/219/D, 5 Aug 52, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3; for the JSOP, JSPC 887/19/D, 5 Aug 52, superseded by JSPC 887/22/D, 18 Sep 52, same file; for JLRSE, JSPC 895/6/D, 5 Aug 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 64.
17. JSPC 887/25, 13 Feb 53; JSPC 877/245, 2 Mar 53; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 1.
20. As the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, RADM C.R. Brown, USN, later expressed it: "Each Service's anxiety over its own interests was such that, during the development of the short-range plan, many problems were introduced which really belonged in the mid-range plan." Presentation by RADM Brown, "Development of the Joint Strategic Plan [sic]," 11 Feb 54, JCS Hist Div File, 1954-1955 Speeches, Lectures, Statements.
21. JCS 1844/151, 14 Aug 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 3. The JSOC had already begun work on a JSCP for 1 Jul 54; SPGM-361-53 to JIG, 3 Aug 53; same file, sec 8.
22. Two additional minor issues in the draft were: (1) whether the JSCP should include excerpts from NATO plans (as desired by the Army, Navy and Marine Corps) to assist US commanders in drafting their supporting plans; and (2) whether plans for support to allied nations after D-day should specify priority to European nations (a proposal advanced by the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps).
23. JLPC 447/18, 26 Jun 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 3. This report treated "The Logistic Implications of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for a War Beginning on or after 1 July 1953"; it was separate from the Joint Logistic Plan associated with the JSCP. The JLPC completed work on the Joint Logistic Plan in September. (Corrig to JLPC 447/23, 14 Sep 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 9.)
24. SM-1609-53 to JSPC, JLPC, and JIC, 10 Sep 53, same file.
27. SPGM-325-53 to JSPC, 15 May 53, same file, sec 6. The question of responsibility for providing early-warning aircraft was currently under dispute between the Navy and the Air Force in connection with continental defense plans. See Ch. 5.
30. JSPC 895/7, 30 Jul 53, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 69.
32. JSPC 895/9, 13 Aug 53, same file.
34. DM-60-53 to JCS, 12 Oct 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 9.
35. Ibid.
36. JCS 2089/7, 12 Oct 53, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 9.
38. JCS 2089/8, 12 Nov 53, same file.
40. SPGM-390-53 to JSPC, 27 Nov 53, same file.
41. JCS 2089/9, 27 Jan 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 11.
42. JCS 2089/10, 8 Feb 54, same file.
43. DM-10-54 to JCS, 9 Feb 54, same file.
44. JCS 2089/11, 11 Feb 54; SM-133-54 to JSPC, JLPC, and JIC, 11 Feb 54; same file.
45. JSPC 895/11, 1 Feb 54, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 70.
46. SPSM-5-54 to JSPC, 26 Feb 54; N/H of JSPC 895/11, 3 Mar 54; same file. Memo, DepDir for Strategic Plans to DJS, “Status of the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE),” 9 Mar 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 12.
47. DM-75-53 to JCS, 16 Dec 53; SM-1937-53 to JCS, 17 Dec 53; same file, sec 10.
49. DM-77-53 to JCS, 28 Dec 53; SM-1960-3 to VADM M. B. Gardner et al., 30 Dec 53; CM-19-54 to Gardner et al., 12 Jan 54; same file.
50. Dec on JCS 1844/151, 13 Jan 54, same file, BP pt 3.
51. The JCS decided to include excerpts from NATO plans in the JSCP. In doing so, they overrode the advice of the Director, Joint Staff, who had believed that their inclusion was inconsistent with flexibility. The JCS declined to specify preference for European nations in support to allies after D-day.
52. JSPC 877/262, 13 Feb 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 11. JCS 1844/155, 22 Mar 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 12.
53. Dec on JCS 1844/155, 2 Apr 54, same file. JCS 1844/156, 14 Apr 54; SM-374-54 to CSA et al., 27 Apr 54; same file, BP pt 5. Substantive discussion of the guidance for general war has been deleted because the plan remains classified.
54. JSPC 887/29, 11 May 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 13.
55. JCS 2143/28, 1 Jun 54, same file.
56. SM-688-54 to JCS, 23 Jul 54; Memo, DJS to JCS, “Development of the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 28 Jul 54; Dec on JCS 2143/29, 30 Jul 54; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 15 pt 1. N/H of JCS 2089/11, 30 Jul 54, same file, sec 11. The decisions made with regard to force levels are treated in Ch. 3.
57. JSPC 887/30, 10 Sep 54; N/H of JSPC 887/30, 23 Sep 54; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 16. The administration’s decisions concerning the size of the mobilization production base are described in Ch. 6.
58. JCS 2143/31, 25 Sep 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 6.
59. DOD Directive 5158.1, 26 Jul 54; JCS 1478/50, 30 Jul 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46. The purpose of the directive was to implement and amplify Reorganization Plan No. 6 insofar as the latter affected the JCS. Some of its other provisions are discussed later in this chapter.
60. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 25 Oct 54, JCS 2143/31, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 17. The idea of using the D plus 6 months schedules as the basis for a decision can be credited to the Air Force planner in the JSPC, who had characterized them as providing “an acceptable starting basis for proceeding with the mobilization planning cycles.” However, the long statement of Air Force views in the memo to the Secretary of Defense did not incorporate this particular suggestion, merely arguing the case for plans that would stress the “initial atomic phase” of war.
61. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., “Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 2 Nov 54, JCS 2143/33, 3 Nov 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 17. Memos, SecDef to SecA et al., “Additional Guidance on Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July1957” and “Explanatory Notes for and Procedure in connection
with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957;” 9 Dec 54, JCS 2143/34, 10 Dec 54, same file, sec 18. See Ch. 6 for a further account of the content of these directives. The “new NATO military concept” was introduced in one of the 9 December memos, in a passing reference to actions that must be taken before the 2 November directive could be implemented.

62. This new approach strategy is described further in Ch. 14.
63. JSPC 887/33/D, 20 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.
64. PM-30-55 to JSSC, 17 Feb 55, same file, sec 19.
65. Discussed in Ch. 3.
66. JCS 2143/35, 30 Mar 55; Dec On JCS 2143/35, 15 Apr 55; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 8A.
68. JSCP 877/266, 8 Sep 54, same file, BP pt 6A.
69. JCS 1844/172, 12 Oct 54, same file, sec 16.
70. Dec On JCS 1844/172, 14 Oct 54, same file.
71. N/H of JSPC 877/266, 19 Oct 54, same file, BP pt 6A.
72. SPSM-34-54 to JSPC, 18 Nov 54, same file, sec 17.
73. N/H of JSPC 977/266, 3 Jan 55, same file, BP pt 6A.
75. JCS 1844/173, 3 Dec 54, same file, sec 18.
76. CSAFM-257-54 to JCS, 14 Dec 54; Dec On JCS 1844/173, 21 Dec 54; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.
77. JLPC 447/40, 28 Dec 54; JSPC 877/277, 21 Jan 55; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 7.
78. SPGM-14-55 to JSPC, 3 Feb 55, same file, sec 19. JCS 1844/178, 2 Mar 55; Dec On JCS 1844/178, 30 Mar 55; same file, BP pt 8.
79. JSPC 947/4, 18 Dec 53; withdrawn by N/H of JSPC 947/4, 5 Jan 54; same file, sec 10.
80. JSPC 947/7, 16 Sep 54, same file, sec 18.
81. JSPC 947/8/D, 8 Oct 54, same file, sec 16. SPSM-30-54 to JSPC, 20 Oct 54; SPSM-33-54 to JSPC, 8 Nov 54; same file, sec 17. JSPC 947/9/D, 30 Nov 54; JSPC 947/10, 3 Dec 54; same file, sec 18.
82. JSPC 947/11, 15 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.
83. JSPC 947/12, 22 Apr 55; JSPC 947/14, 10 Jun 55; same file, sec 22. JCS 2089/12, 13 Jul 55; Dec On JCS 2089/12, 27 Jul 55; same file, sec 23. JCS MOP 84 (1st Rev), 27 Jul 55, same file, sec 24.
84. Committee on the National Security Organization, National Security Organization, A Report with Recommendations, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1949), pp. 3, 37-38. Elsewhere, however, the committee showed awareness that the problem might be deeper; note its reference to “sincere and deeply held differences over strategic theory and tactical method” that “cannot and should not be removed by fiat” (p. 53).
90. JCS 2089/10, 8 Feb 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 11.

Chapter 5. Continental Air Defense

1. The problem of continental air defense was the subject of extensive public discussion in 1953 and 1954 (as well as in subsequent years), and the principal steps taken by the administration became a matter of general knowledge. This fact has furnished students of political science with an opportunity to study the subject as a case history in strategic decision-making. Two such descriptions of the process are: Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, pp. 326-341, and Steven R. Rivkin, “The Decision-Making Process for National Defense Policy”
(unpublished honors thesis, Harvard University, 1958), pp. 115-170. While these writers have been misled in some respects by lack of access to classified documents, their accounts are accurate in the main, and both are useful as guides to contemporary newspaper and magazine articles illustrative of the climate of national opinion within which the administration’s decisions took shape. For general summaries of the evolution of continental defense from the end of World War II, see North American Air Defense Command, “Seventeen Years of Air Defense” (Historical Reference Paper No. 9, 1 Jun 1963), and Anonymous, “Air Defense of North America,” Air Force Magazine, Aug 57, pp. 251-259.


3. JCS 2086/1, 5 Apr 50; Dec On JCS 2086/1, 29 Oct 51; same file, BP pt 1A.

4. The commander with responsibilities to the southward, CINCARIIB, played no role in continental air defense planning, since the possibility of attack from the south was discounted.

5. For the establishment of this Board, and for some information about its status after World War II, see Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, United States Army in World War II (1959), pp. 22-26, 334-338, 374-375. For the Board’s membership in 1952, see US Government Organization Manual, 1952-53, p. 557. The Chairman of the US delegation in 1952 was MG Guy H. Henry, USA (Ret.); the Air Force was represented by MG Robert L. Walsh, the Director of CUSDPC.


8. The normal complement of a fighter-interceptor squadron was 25 planes.

9. In tabulations of AA forces, Skysweeper units were not classified as gun battalions (see Table 11).

10. The original version of the Nike was later referred to as Nike-Ajax, to distinguish it from more advanced models (Nike-Hercules, Nike-Zeus).


15. NSC Action No. 673, 24 Sep 52.

16. NSC Action No. 678, 14 Oct 52.


22. NSC Action No. 699, 16 Jan 53. NSC 140, 19 Jan 53, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 10. LTG Edwards was at that time Commandant of the Air University, though scheduled for retirement in a few weeks. The JCS named the Director, CUSDPG, as their representative, and appointed officers to provide working level liaison between the subcommittee and the Services. (SM-139-53 to ExecSecy, NSC, 26 Jan 53; SM-149-53 to Dir CUSDPG, 26 Jan 53; same file.) Other members represented the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

23. The appointment of this ad hoc study group and its initial membership were announced in Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Ad Hoc Study Group on Continental Defense," 4 Dec 52, JCS 1902/38, 8 Dec 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 10. The group's secretary was MG James McCormack, Jr., USAF, who later headed Task Force B of the Solarium project.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Early Warning System," 22 Dec 52, JCS 1899/22, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

25. NSC 139, 31 Dec 52, same file, sec 4. The basic decision had actually been reached in November 1952 when it was agreed that the Air Force would contract with the Western Electric Company (a subsidiary of the Bell System) to construct the line, and that part of the work would be subcontracted to the Lincoln Laboratory. (Ltr, SecDef to C.F. Craig, President, American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 1 Dec 52, same file, sec 3.)


27. On the discussion of continental defense during the early part of 1953, see Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 330-332, 336-337, and Rivkin, Decision-Making Process, pp. 137, 142-143, and newspaper references cited in these works. The columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop played a major role in stimulating discussion (see references in Huntington, loc. cit., and the Alsops' later account of the controversy in their book, The Reporter's Trade, pp. 59-63). The report of the "Oppenheimer Panel" in the spring of 1953, which recommended stronger continental defense and a policy of "candor" concerning the dangers of atomic warfare, also served as a stimulus when its contents became generally known. See Ch. 9.

28. NSC 149, 3 Apr 53; NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25. NSC 153/1, 10 Jun 53; same file, sec 26.

29. Ltr, ActgSecState to Canadian Amb, 30 Jan 53, JCS 1899/31, 6 May 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 5. Ltr, Canadian Amb to SecState, 27 Feb 53, JCS 1899/28, 3 Apr 53, same file, sec 4. All three of the proposed test sites were north of the Arctic Circle.

30. This was the system later referred to as the "Lincoln Transitional System," and still later as SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment).

31. A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense by the Ad Hoc Study Group on Continental Defense, 11 May 53, CCS 373.24 (9-8-49) BP pt 2. The letter of transmittal to SecDef (referring to an earlier presentation to Deputy SecDef Kyes) is dated 11 May 53. An unclassified summary of the recommendations was released later (see NY Times, 4 Jun 53, 4). The report was apparently never transmitted to the National Security Council.

32. NSC Action No. 804, 5 Jun 53. The Evaluation Subcommittee's report was disseminated as NSC 140/1, 19 May 53, OASD(ISA) Retired Files.

33. JCS 1902/43, 12 May 53; SM-974-53 to Dir, CUSDHG, 13 May 53; CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 12. MG Robert M. Webster, USAF, had by then succeeded MG Walsh as Dir, CUSDHG, and hence as the JCS representative on the Subcommittee.


35. On the use of study groups as a means of delaying or evading a choice between policy objectives, and the application of this device to the continental defense problem in 1953, see Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 289-290, 330. As he observes, the report of the Lincoln Summer Study Group "received such extensive consideration that it almost became a classic case of a proposal which was studied to death." The reported alignment in the administration for and against enlarged air defense is indicated in ibid., p. 331, where it is asserted that Vice President Nixon, Secretary Dulles, and Harold Stassen (Mutual Security Administrator) were in favor, while Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson and Budget Director Dodge were opposed.


37. SM-1109-53 to JCS, 2 Jun 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 24. A Department of Defense committee was established to advise General Smith, and the JCS named the Deputy Director, CUSDHG, to represent them on this group. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecA et al., "Establishment of Department of Defense Committee . . . .," 4 Jun 53, JCS 1902/47, 12 Jun 53; Memo, DJS to SecDef, "NSC Planning Board Committee on Continental Defense," 12 Jun 53, JCS 1902/47; CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 12.

38. SM-124-53 to CUSDHG, 22 Jan 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

39. SM-511-53 to CSA et al., 11 Mar 53, JCS 1899/26, same file. It was expected that the plans would
subsequently be updated each year and projected to a readiness date in harmony with the D-day of the applicable JSP.


41. These were later informally designated by the convenient phrase, “seaward extensions of contiguous radar coverage,” as distinct from “seaward extensions of the early warning system.”

42. The plan did not indicate the number of squadrons to be deployed in other areas (Alaska, Canada, Greenland, or Iceland).


46. JCS 1899/43, 22 Jul 53, same file.

47. JCS 1899/30, 30 Apr 53, same file, sec 5.


49. JCS 1899/33, 29 May 53, same file.


51. JCS 1899/41, 13 Jul 53, same file.


53. SM-1364-53 to CUSDPI, 15 Jul 53, same file, sec 6. For a statement by GEN Twining of his somewhat different impression of the tenor of the JCS agreement on the subject, see JCS 1899/48, 27 Jul 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 7.

54. JCS 1899/42, 20 Jul 53, same file, sec 6. GEN Twining, in his position cited in the previous note, had pointed out that the box barrier had already been rejected by the Air Force owing to its excessive force requirements.


56. JCS 1899/59, 17 Sep 53; JCS 1899/60, 18 Sep 53; same file.


58. NSC Action No. 846, 9 Jul 53. On 23 July Mr. Cutler, with the President’s approval, told the Council that continental defense would be discussed on 6 August but that no action would be taken until both the consultants and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff had tendered their advice. (NSC Action No. 855, 23 Jul 53.)

59. The quotation is from paragraph 11 of p. 4 of the “Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President” that constituted the introductory portion of NSC 159.


62. NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53.


66. See Ch. 1.

68. One nonmilitary program (detection of fissionable material) was also raised to this classification. The lowest ranking programs were now divided into two categories, one to be "strengthened and further developed," the other (which included harbor defense and coastal antisubmarine patrol) to be "continued generally along present lines."

69. NSC 159/3, 16 Sep 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 27.


71. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC "Continental Defense," 25 Sep 53, same file, sec 28. The group of consultants was headed by James B. Black, President, Pacific Gas and Electric Co.; the other members were Dr. Alan Gregg (Vice President, Rockefeller Foundation), David J. McDonald (President, United Steel Workers of America), Arthur W. Page (former Vice President, American Telephone and Telegraph Co.), and Dr. James Phinney Baxter III (President, Williams College); Memo, SpecAsst to Pres (Cutler) to CJCS, 17 Sep 53, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense, 1953.

72. NSC Action No. 915, 24 Sep 53.

73. NSC 159/4, 25 Sep 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 28. The cost estimates in NSC 159/3 were omitted from NSC 159/4. Subsequent directives in 1953 (NSC 162/2 and JCS 2101/113) contributed nothing to the decision on continental defense, which they merely listed in routine fashion as one of the "requirements" of an adequate military posture. (Secondary writers, probably misled by informants relying on memory, have sometimes dated the key decision on continental defense in Oct 1953, in connection with the Council's action on NSC 162/2; see, e.g., Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 334, 338.)

74. See Ch. 3.

75. The Air Force also proposed to redeploy three wings (9 squadrons) of day fighters of the Tactical Air Force to the United States as part of a reduction of its overseas tactical forces. These would become part of the augmentation forces to be placed at the disposal of Air Defense Command in case of emergency, and thus represented a potential accession to continental air defense strength. Subsequent Air Force tabulations of continental defense forces sometimes included day fighter units of the Tactical Air Force. They have been disregarded in this study.

76. JCS 1800/209, 24 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 43. The Army and Navy had included these objectives in the preliminary requests sent to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in March 1953; the Air Force had at that time proposed even larger forces, as part of an abortive plan to expand to 153 wings. The JSFC had disagreed over the Air Force proposals and over the Navy's acquisition of AEW/ASW aircraft, which could be interpreted as infringing upon Air Force responsibilities. (JCS 1800/199, 6 Mar 53, same file, sec 40.)


80. JCS 1899/74, 13 Nov 53, same file, sec 30. Six DERs were already in commission, and six more had been funded in the FY 1954 budget.

81. JCS 1899/77, 17 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 30. All units were to be deployed within continental United States; the number proposed for assignment to nearby regions (Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland) was not indicated.

82. This slippage resulted from lagging production of Nike ground control equipment, rather than from budget ceilings; JCS 1899/82, 21 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 31.

83. JCS 1899/75, 17 Nov 53, same file, sec 30.

84. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Continental Defense—NSC 159/4," 21 Nov 53, JCS 1899/82, same file, sec 31. This memo replaced another sent three days earlier, in which the JCS had drawn Mr. Wilson's attention to the disagreement (not yet settled) between the Army and the Air Force over the number of antiaircraft battalions. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Continental Defense—NSC 159/4," 18 Nov 53, JCS 1899/78, same file, sec 30.)

85. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Continental Defense—NSC 159/4," 3 Nov 53, JCS 1899/72, 5 Nov 53, same file, sec 29. The programs (nine in number) may here be recapitulated as follows: in category 1, Southern Canada early warning system (including seaward extensions), extension of contiguous radar coverage, and methods of aircraft identification; in category 2, Northern Canada early warning line, semiautomatic control system, gap-filler radars, LOFAR system, fighter interceptors, and anti-aircraft forces.


88. JCS 1899/97, 15 Jan 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 34.
89. Final FY 1955 budget objectives are as indicated in JCS 1899/92, 1899/93, and 1899/94, 7 Jan 54, (forwarded to JCS by Army, Air Force, and Navy respectively, in reply to SecDef request for more detailed "definition" of the three programs mentioned in the Council's action on NSC 159/4), same file, sec 33; and in OSD, "Department of Defense Progress Report to National Security Council on Status of Military Continental U.S. Defense Programs as of 1 June 1954," 25 Jun 54 (copy in JCS PB Adv File, NSC 5408—Progress Reports; cited hereafter as DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54). The tabulation of 30 Jun 55 objectives in Table 11 reflects later changes (e.g., an increase in fighter interceptors to 58 squadrons, or 19 1/2 wings), as well as the effect of previous budgetary actions, such as DERs authorized in earlier years.

90. Figures from NSC 5408, 3 Feb 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 37. The various programs are readily identifiable with individual Services except the seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage, which presumably includes expenditures by both Air Force and Navy. Requests for new obligatory authority apparently totalled $2.373 billion. The exact figures were not declassified, but Mr. Wilson told the House Appropriations Committee that "close to 10 percent" of DOD expenditures in FY 1955 would be for continental defense. H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1955, p. 86.

91. See Table 6.
93. Ltr, Canadian Amb to SecState, 27 Feb 53, JCS 1899/28, 3 Apr 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.
95. JCS 1899/64, 24 Sep 53; Dec On JCS 1899/64, 26 Sep 53, same file, sec 7. SM-1655-53 to CSAF, 26 Sep 53, same file, sec 8.
97. For the 6 November 1953 meeting, see correspondence reproduced in JCS 1899/81, 20 Nov 53, same file. GEN Ridgway represented the JCS at this meeting. For an earlier discussion on 20 October 1953, at which ADM Radford was present, see Memo, COL Leroy H. Watson, Jr., USAF (Exec to CJCS) to CSA, 4 Nov 53, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense, 1953. The Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, LTG Charles Foulkes, attended both meetings.
98. Dec On JCS 1899/81, 9 Dec 53; SM-1914-53 to CSAF, 9 Dec 53; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.
99. JCS 1899/95, 7 Jan 54; Dec On JCS 1899/95, 8 Jan 54; same file.
100. CM-76-54 to Secy JCS, 1 Apr 54; SM-293-54 to JCS, 2 Apr 54; OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jan-May 54).
103. In preparing the final presentation, Secretary Wilson asked JCS for additional detailed information, in a format prescribed by the NSC Staff. (Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Continental Defense," 21 Dec 53, JCS 1899/90, 23 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 33.) The JCS relayed the Service replies to SecDef on 11 January 1954. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Continental Defense," 11 Jan 54, JCS 1899/96, same file, sec 34.)
104. NSC Action No. 1010, 14 Jan 54.
105. NSC 5408, 3 Feb 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 37.
106. They agreed on 15 February 1954 that, instead of sending Secy Wilson their comments on NSC 5408 in the usual fashion, they would merely ask their Special Assistant for NSA Affairs to request the Planning Board to make one minor change (concerning the recommendations for improved identification procedures). (Dec On JCS 1899/105, 15 Feb 54, same file.) This change was among those approved by the Council on 17 February 1954.
108. NY Times, 11 Oct 53, 1. Mr. Sprague headed an electronics manufacturing company in Massachusetts, a state represented in the Senate by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. Leverett Saltonstall.
109. No copy of Mr. Sprague's report has been found. A summary of his oral presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 16-17 January 1954 (at which ADM Radford and Secy Wilson were present) is given in Memo for Record, encd to CM-55-54 to JCS, "Mr. Sprague's Report . . . ," 11 Feb 54, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jan-May 54).
110. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Certain Recommendations re Continental Defense," 11 May 54, JCS 1899/112, 14 May 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 40. Neither the memo nor its enclosure identified the source of these "certain recommendations," but the JSPC recognized them as emanating from Mr.
Sprague’s report. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Recommendations Regarding Continental Defense,” 10 Jan 54, JCS 1899/116, same file, sec 41.)

111. Memo, SpecAsst to Pres (Cutler) to SecDef, “Progress Reports on Continental Defense (NSC 5408),” 22 May 54, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jan-May 54).

112. In contrast, the CIA in October 1952 had credited the USSR with not more than 100 bombs of approximately 20 kilotons each. (“Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the Continental US,” 6 Oct 52, JCS 1902/34, 28 Oct 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 9.) Even the intelligence estimate used in the preparation of NSC 5422 had forecast a Soviet stockpile totalling the equivalent of only 25 megatons by 1957. (NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54 (para 2, p. 2), CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40; data repeated in NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54 (App A, para 2, p. 13), same file, sec 44.)

113. Mr. Sprague’s assumptions and recommendations (though not his complete report) were enclosed with Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, “Continental Defense,” 1 Jul 54, JCS 1899/129, 9 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 42. The substance of this report had been presented orally to Sen. Saltonstall and several other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 June 1954. ADM Radford, who was present, took exception to some of Mr. Sprague’s assumptions, pointing out that they were based on information that had not been fully evaluated. In an obvious attempt to dissuade the Senators from hasty action, he urged that the continental defense program be kept in balance with others and pointed out that the principal obstacle to faster progress was not money, but trained manpower. (Memo, CJCS to SecDef, “Briefing of a Select Group of the Senate Armed Services Committee by Mr. Robert C. Sprague,” 23 Jun 54, OCJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jun-Dec 54).)


115. NSC Action No. 1166, 1 Jul 54.


118. For a summary of Mr. Sprague’s recommendations on 29 July 1954, see his subsequent Rpt, Sprague to NSC, “Continental Defense,” 24 Nov 54, JCS 1899/176, 7 Dec 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 53. The program target dates in effect as of mid-1954 are indicated in DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54. The reason for Mr. Sprague’s concern about the early warning line is not apparent; its completion had already been set for December 1956. The Pacific extension would not be completed before July 1959, since the Navy proposed to assign its first DERs and AEW/ASW aircraft to the Atlantic barrier. The Air Force planned to budget for the last of its gap-filler radars in FY 1957.

119. NSC Action No. 1187, 29 Jul 54.

120. NSC 5422/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43.

121. NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, same file, sec 44. The President ruled that this paragraph would apply also to the rocket with atomic warhead, even though the latter was not mentioned in NSC 5408.

122. NSC Action No. 1194, 5 Aug 54.


125. JCS 1899/89, 16 Dec 53, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 45.

126. CM-47-54 to JCS, 15 Jan 54, same file.

127. JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 46.

128. JCS 1899/106, 12 Mar 54; Dec On JCS 1899/106, 22 Mar 54; SM-245-54 to CSAF, 22 Mar 54; SM-246-54 to CSA and CNO, 22 Mar 54; same file, sec 47. A split within JSPC over the wording of the draft foreshadowed later Service disagreements over the authority to be given to the new commander. The Army member sought to spell out in some detail the limits of this authority. The JCS rejected this attempt and voted for a broad and general statement of functions.

129. JCS 1899/115, 28 May 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 48.

130. The discussion can be followed in JCS 1899/122, 22 Jun 54 (setting forth views of CNO), and in the following, all in the same file, sec 49: JCS 1899/124, 24 Jun 54 (views of CSA); JCS 1899/126, 26 Jun 54 (appointment of ad hoc committee to review the draft); JCS 1899/128, 1 Jul 54 (report of ad hoc committee); SM-621-54 to OpsDeps, 6 Jul 54, and SM-639-54 to JCS, 14 Jul 54 (recording tentative agreements reached as of those dates). Even the title of the new command became a matter of dispute; GEN Chidlaw suggested “US Air Defense Command (USAD),” but ADM Carney objected that this would imply worldwide responsibilities, and instead recommended “Continental US Air Defense Command” (CONAD), which was later adopted.

131. JCS 1899/133, 19 Jul 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 49.

Concerning NSC, would agreement the file, JCS, "Organizational Arrangements for Continental Defense," 19 Mar 54, same file, sec 38.

NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53.


Memo for Record, 5 May 54 (unsigned; apparently prepared in office of GEN Gerhart), recording conference between Radford and Dulles, same date; JCS PB Adv File, NSC 5408—Correspondence Regarding Through, December 1955. The discussion ended inconclusively, with an agreement that ADM Radford would refer the matter back to JCS and SecDef and that a delay would be sought in discussion of the problem by NSC. Whether further discussion took place is unknown. At the request of the SecDef, however, the NSC on 6 May postponed consideration of the subject until its next meeting. (NSC Action No. 1108, 6 May 54.)

NSC Action No. 1113, 13 May 54.

NSC Action No. 1150, 9 Jun 54.

NSC 5423, 23 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 42. NSC Action No. 1164, 24 Jun 54.

NSC Action No. 1260, 4 Nov 54. No copy of the Subcommittee’s report has been found.

DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54, p. 17.

JCS 1899/125, 29 Jun 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

Dec On JCS 1899/125, 9 Jul 54; SM-630-54 to Chm, US Sec, PJBD, 9 Jul 54; same file.

Ltr, Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to CJCS, 30 Jun 54, and reply, 8 Jul 54, JCS 1899/134, 21 Jul 54, same file.

Ltr, Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff to CJCS, 14 Jul 54, JCS 1899/134, 21 Jul 54, same file.

JCS 1899/137, 29 Jul 54, same file.

SM-685-54 to Chm, US Sec, MSG, 2 Aug 54; CSAFM-160-54 to JCS, 30 Jul 54; same file.

Canadian Embassy Note No. 580, 2 Sep 54, JCS 1899/149, 15 Sep 54, same file. The Canadian note confirmed oral statements made to US representatives on 20 Aug 54.

Canadian Embassy, "Draft Text of a Possible Joint Announcement ... Concerning the Distant Early Warning Line," 7 Sep 54, JCS 1899/152, 17 Sep 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.


Text of joint press release in OJCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jun-Dec 54). NY Times, 28 Sep 54, 1. As the announcement pointed out, the agreement covered only the need for the line; the precise location and the responsibilities for construction and for financing remained to be worked out.

JCS 1899/156, 22 Sep 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 9.

Memo, CNO to JCS, "Canada-United States Early Warning Systems," 5 Oct 54, Ser 000100P60; Dec On JCS 1899/156, 7 Oct 54; SM-882-54 to CNO and CSAF, 7 Oct 54; same file.

First Report of the Location Study Group, Distant Early Warning (DEW) Group, 12 Nov 54, JCS 1899/179, 30 Dec 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 10.

JCS 1899/179, 30 Dec 54, same file.


SM-30-55 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 14 Jan 55, JCS 1899/179; N/H of JCS 1899/179, 8 Mar 55; same file.

Emphasis supplied.

Rpt of USAF-RCAF Military Characteristics Committee DEW Group, 7 Sep 54, JCS 1899/157, 29 Sep 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 9.


JCS 1899/177, 17 Dec 54, same file.

JCS 1899/175, 6 Dec 54, same file.

JCS 1899/177, 17 Dec 54, same file.

JCS 1899/178, 17 Dec 54, same file.

SM-1081-54 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 17 Dec 54, JCS 1899/177, same file.

further amendment was processed. (SM-160-55 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 2 Mar 55, JCS 1899/190; N/H of JCS 1899/190, 20 Apr 55; same file.)

169. *NY Times*, 20 Nov 54, 1. The JCS were not consulted in the preparation of this press release or in the negotiations that preceded it. See draft of release (with earlier version transmitted by Canadian Embassy), with attached memo for ADM Radford from [COL] C.E. H[utchin], of his staff, 15 Nov 54, indicating it was being sent for information only, in OC/JCS File 381 Continental Defense (Jun-Dec 54).

170. These highlights from the DOD Progress Report of 1 Nov 54 (not found) were summarized in a report by Mr. Sprague on 24 Nov 54. (Rpt, Sprague to NSC, "Continental Defense," 24 Nov 54, JCS 1899/176, 7 Dec 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 53.)

171. Mr. Wilson did of course ask the JCS to recommend major forces for FY 1956, but not specifically those for continental defense. For the manner in which the FY 1956 budget was finally settled, see Ch. 3.


173. Figures furnished by DOD to House Appropriations Committee, printed in H. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations for 1956, pp. 394-395. They are described, rather ambiguously, as the amounts "programmed" for continental defense; the context suggests that they refer to new obligatory authority rather than expenditures. The same source gives $2.373 billion for FY 1955 ($903 billion for Army, $2.22 billion for Navy, and $1.248 billion for Air Force). This total figure should be compared with the $3.198 billion given earlier in this chapter for continental defense items in the FY 1955 budget, taken from NSC 5408; the latter figure is clearly identified as an expenditure estimate.


175. DOD Progress Rpt, 15 Apr 55.

176. N/H of JCS 1800/225, 6 Apr 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.


181. JCS 1899/175, 6 Dec 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 9.

182. *NY Times*, 24 Nov 54, 10.

Chapter 6. Mobilization Planning

1. "Mobilization planning" is used in this chapter in its usual sense, as relating mainly to the provision of materiel for wartime use, rather than to the special problems of mobilizing manpower, which are considered in Ch. 7.

2. The Chairman of the Board at that time was Mr. Jack Gorrie; other members were the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.


6. Encl to CM-18-53 to ADM Radford et al., 27 Jul 53, OJCJS File 370.01 (1953-56). JCS 1725/192, 9 Sep 52, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 50. SM-2281-52 to Chm Munitions Bd, 1 Oct 52, JCS 1725/196, same file, sec 52. SM-2775-52 to Chm Munitions Bd, 5 Dec 52, JCS 1725/201, same file, sec 54. As explained
more fully in Ch. 4, in adopting this program the JCS advanced to 1 January 1953 the deadline for submission of the draft JSOP.

7. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan-30 Jun 53, p. 44.

8. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52; JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 3.


11. NSC 149, 3 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.


22. JCS 626/16, 27 Apr 53, same file.


29. The original ODM draft had proposed to assume a five-year war. The reason for the change is not indicated in available sources.


31. NSC Action No. 963, 19 Nov 53. NSC 172/1, 20 Nov 53, CCS 004.04 (11-1-46) sec 64.

32. NSC Action No. 1004, 8 Jan 54. The decision was rendered during a discussion of possible new hostilities in Korea.

33. NSC 5414, 17 Mar 54, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 68.


35. NSC Action No. 1100, 29 Apr 54. NSC 5414/1, 30 Apr 54, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 70.

36. The influence of nonmilitary considerations in shaping stockpile policy during 1953-1954 is described in Snyder, Stockpiling Strategic Materials, pp. 191-223. They stemmed largely from the
The NSC policy directives drafted in 1954, NSC 5422/2 and NSC 5501, said nothing about the stockpile program except to recommend that it not be manipulated for the purpose of assisting underdeveloped nations.

37. Memo, ODM to JCS, 12 Mar 54, JCS 626/18, 19 Mar 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “National Stockpile Program,” 9 Jul 54, JCS 626/20; CCS 400.23 (12-15-43) sec 8.


39. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, same file, sec 40.

40. ODM representatives had participated actively in the drafting of NSC 5422. See Record of Mtg, NSC PB, 9 Jun 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 15A, at which the Board discussed drafts prepared by ODM and others.

41. NSC 5422, Sec IV, paragraphs 34-44. The support for the two views is not indicated, but the positions are those that, in connection with NSC 5422/2, were later to be upheld by the ODM, on the one hand, and the DOD and BOB on the other.

42. JCS 2101/139, 19 Jun 54; Dec On JCS 2101/139, 29 Jun 54; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40.


44. NSC 5422/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 43. As recounted in Ch. 2, the JCS reviewed NSC 5422/1 but suggested no changes.

45. NSC Action No. 1194, 5 Aug 54.

46. NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 44.


52. Discussed in Ch. 5.


54. The phraseology of these proposals (more concise than in the original ODM draft) had been suggested by ADM Carney and recommended by the JCS in Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Guidelines for Mobilization,” 21 Oct 54, JCS 2101/162, same file, sec 46.

55. NSC Action No. 1277, 1 Dec 54.

56. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 50.

57. DOD Directive 3005.3, 7 Dec 54, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) sec 72.

58. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 55, p. 34.


60. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 55, p. 34.


63. For full discussion, see Ch. 4.


65. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., “Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 2 Nov 54, JCS 2143/33, 3 Nov 54, same file.

66. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., “Additional Guidance on Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 9 Dec 54; Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., “Explanatory Notes for and Procedure in Connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” 9 Dec 54; encls to JCS 2143/34, 10 Dec 54, same file.

67. Treated more fully in Ch. 3.
Chapter 7. Manpower Mobilization: Organization of Reserve Forces


2. NY Times, 26 Sep 52, 12. The promise found fulfillment in the appointment of the Rockefeller Committee, which, however, confined its attention to organizational matters, its report giving birth to Reorganization Plan No. 6, already described.


10. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 514-515. New appointees were Mr. Julius Ochs Adler (Chairman), Mr. Warren Atherton, and Dr. Karl T. Compton. The two incumbents were LTG Raymond S. McLain, USA (Ret.) and ADM Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN (Ret.).

11. The President’s letters to the Chairman, NSTC and the Dir, ODM, both dated 1 August 1953, are reproduced in NSTC, 20th Century Mintumen, A Report to the President on a Reserve Forces Training Program, 1 Dec 53, and in ODM, Manpower Resources for National Security, 6 Jan 54.

12. NSTC, 20th Century Mintumen.


14. The study had been conducted by a "Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security," headed by Mr. Lawrence A. Appley, President of the American Management Association.

15. ODM, Manpower Resources for National Security.

16. See summary of letter from Pres to Dr. Flemming, 8 Jan 54 in Rpt to SecDef by Task Force on Reserve Mobilization Requirements, Mar 54, p. 5, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) BP pt 2.

17. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 4 Feb 54, JCS 1849/110, 5 Feb 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 17.

18. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Study on Reserve Forces," 5 Mar 54, JCS 1849/111, same file, sec 18. The clumsy expressions "immediately callable reserve" and "selectively callable reserve" were not original with the JCS; they had been used by the Director, ODM, in his report to the President on 6 January 1954.


22. JCS 1849/113, 19 Mar 54, same file.

23. CM-72-54 to GEN Twining et al., 22 Mar 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 18.
24. CSAFM-65-54 to JCS, 23 Mar 54, same file.
29. JCS 1849/117, 30 Apr 54, same file, sec 19.
   The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed (as had the ad hoc committee) over proposals to allocate
   non-prior-service personnel among the Services. The Air Force and Marine Corps endorsed the
   Army view that this procedure should employ the same quality standards then in force for distribution
   of other inductees; the Navy objected that it would thus be forced to take too many men in the
   lowest mental group. The Navy position was ultimately rejected.
32. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements," 2 Jun 54, JCS 1849/120,
   4 Jun 54, same file. The NSTC also objected to the cumbersome terms "Service Callable Reserve"
   and "Selectively Callable Reserve," and suggested that these categories be designated by the existing
   terms, "Ready" and "Standby" Reserve. This suggestion was ultimately adopted in the administra-
   tion's proposed legislation.
33. Memo, Dir, ODM to Spec Asst to the Pres, Robert Cutler, "Department of Defense Report on
   Reserve Mobilization Requirements," 9 Jun 54, JCS 1849/122, 10 Jun 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45)
   sec 20.
34. In making this comment the JCS apparently were thinking of a proposal by the Director of
   Selective Service that a little-known provision in the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
   allowing release of men from active duty if they volunteered for service in an organized reserve
   unit, be employed to begin at once a training program for non-prior-service personnel.
35. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements," 15 Jun 54, JCS 1849/121, CCS
   320.2 (5-1-45) sec 20.
36. NSC Action No. 1161, 17 Jun 54.
37. The reasoning on this point was not clearly stated in NSC 5420/1, but was made explicit later in
   NSC 5420/2.
38. NSC 5420/1, 26 Jul 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21. The JCS decided that no comment on NSC
   5420/1 was necessary. (Memo, ExecSecy, JCS, to Secy JCS, 27 Jul 54, same file.)
39. NSC Action No. 1188, 29 Jul 54.
41. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Manpower Programs—Reserve Mobilization Requirements
   (NSC 5420/2)," 8 Oct 54, JCS 1849/132, same file, sec 23.
42. Memo, Dep ASD (M&P), to Secy, JCS, [20 Oct 54], CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 23.
43. DM-64-54 to DepASD(M&P), 26 Oct 54, same file.
44. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB, "Reserve Mobilization Requirements," 5 Nov 54; Memo,
   SecDef to JCS, "Reserve Forces Program (NSC 5420/2 of November 4, 1954)," 9 Nov 54, JCS 1849/135,
   9 Nov 54; same file.
45. AFPC Advice of Action, "Military Manpower Programs (NSC 5420/2)," 10 Nov 54, JCS 1849/138,
   18 Nov 54, same file, sec 24.
46. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reserve Forces Program (NSC 5420/2 of 4 November 1954)," 12 Nov
   54, JCS 1849/136, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 24.
47. NSC 5420/3, 12 Nov 54, JCS 1849/137, 12 Nov 54, same file. NSC 5420/3 was originally regarded
   as a summary interim statement pending a complete revision of NSC 5420/2 (which, however, was
   never prepared). The Secretary of Defense on 22 December 1954 acknowledged the JCS comments
   on the 4 November 1954 version of NSC 5420/2 and undertook to include some of their suggested
   corrections in the next revision. He rejected the JCS view that equity should be subordinated to
   national security, however, pointing out that the NSC decision of 17 June 1954 had assigned equal
   importance to the two factors. (N/H of JCS 1849/136, 27 Dec 54, same file.)
48. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956," 15 May 54, JCS
   1849/118, 19 May 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 19.
49. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956," 19 Aug 54, JCS 1849/125,
   CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21. The reserve force proposals totaled 3,516,334 men; there was no indication
   how many of these would be needed for initial mobilization requirements, i. e., for the Service
   Callable Reserve.
50. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956," 17 Sep 54, JCS
   1849/127, 20 Sep 54, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21.
51. These figures (3,055,894 for the Service Callable Reserve 759,751 for the Selectively Callable Reserve) appeared in the first draft of NSC 5420/2, prepared in September 1954.

52. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Minimum ‘Service Callable Reserve’ Force Mobilization Requirements,” 13 Oct 54, JCS 1849/133, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 23. The figures did not quite conform to the definition of the Service Callable Reserve as forces to be available by D plus 6 months, since 124,426 men of the Army Reserve would be mobilized during D plus 7 months and D plus 8 months, and 4,742 of the Marine Corps Reserve between D plus 6 and D plus 12 months. These minor discrepancies, however, were ignored. The Army planned to mobilize 37 divisions, 18 regiments, 143 AA battalions, and 158 FA battalions; the Air Force would call up 51 major combat wings. Navy and Marine Corps reservists would be called as individuals.

53. The JCS had made no recommendations concerning the Selectively Callable Reserve. For this category, NSC 5420/2 repeated the earlier estimate of 759,751 (excluding the Coast Guard). NSC 5420/3 contained no strength estimates for this component.

54. The figures were subsequently reduced slightly to a total of approximately 2,910,000 (excluding the Coast Guard), as the result of a reduction of the Navy goal to 623,000, which was only partly offset by increases in the Marine Corps and Air Force. The estimated FY 1956 beginning strength presumably represented the expected strength of the existing “Ready Reserve” after it had been screened to eliminate those not available for prompt recall. The nominal strength of this component, which had stood at 2,096,033 as of 30 June 1953, increased to 2,211,541 on 30 June 1954 and to 2,705,359 a year later. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan-30 Jun 55, pp. 68-69.


57. The text of the legislation proposed to Congress is printed in H. Hrgs, Sundry Legislation, 1955, pp. 1244-1250.


61. The final law was PL 305, 84th Cong, 9 Aug 55. President Eisenhower signed it, but at the same time criticized it and indicated his intention to ask prompt amendment to remedy the two deficiencies. See NY Times, 10 Aug 55, 1. For the DOD position, see Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan-30 Jun 55, pp. 21-22. The provision of major interest to most members of the JCS—quota control by the Secretary of Defense over Reserve enlistees—was included in the law.

62. By early 1955 the reduction of Army strength had left that Service dependent upon its Reserves to meet its wartime commitment to NATO (17 divisions by D plus six months). (Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels,” 18 Mar 55, JCS 1800/237, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 51.)

Chapter 8. Missions and Weapons

1. These phrases appeared in the “Declaration of Policy” (Section 2) of the Act (PL 253, 80th Cong, 26 Jul 47) and in the 1949 Amendments (PL 216, 81st Cong, 10 Aug 49).

2. The Key West Agreement may be found in JCS 1478/23, 26 Apr 48, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 8, and in various unclassified sources.


6. NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.

7. Discussed more fully in Ch. 1.


10. Reorganization Plan No. 6 removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the command line, which would now run from the Secretary of Defense through the Service Secretaries to the unified and specified commands. Service Departments designated by the Secretary of Defense, rather than military Chiefs named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would henceforth serve as executive agents for
these commands. Revision of the Key West Agreement to reflect these provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 6 had begun under the old Chiefs, who had appointed a committee of four officers to work with the Secretary of Defense in this task. (Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, “Revision of the Key West Agreement,” 2 Jul 53, JCS 1977/17, 8 Jul 53; SM-1285-53 to SecDef, 3 Jul 53; CCS 337 (4-2-49).)

11. JCS 1478/44, 29 Aug 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. The Service mission questions arising from the Korean War had not yet reached the JCS agenda. They are treated in volume VI of this series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956.

12. N/H of JCS 1478/44, 3 Sep 53, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 42. GEN Twining was the only JCS member to place on record his view of GEN Ridgway’s proposal; he believed that the Key West Agreement was a “sound, workable document” requiring no change. (CSAFM-22-53 to JCS, 1 Sep 53, same file.)


14. Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan-30 Jun 54, p. 4; 1 Jan-30 Jun 55, pp. 5-6.

15. The relevant passages, in both the 1948 Agreement and the 1953 revision, are Sec IV, paragraphs, A1, A2, and A6 (Army), and Sec VI, paragraphs, A5 and A7 (Air Force).

16. JCS 1620/12, 17 Nov 49, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 3.

17. JCS 1620/42, 30 Oct 51; JCS 1620/44, 13 Nov 51; same file, sec 7.

18. JCS 1620/46, 5 Dec 51, same file, BP pt 2.

Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, “Army Procurement of Regulus Guided Missiles and Auxiliary Equipments,” 19 Jan 53, JCS 1620/71, 23 Jan 53; JCS 1620/72, 28 Apr 53; CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 10. A subsidiary disagreement concerned the status and capability of Regulus as compared with Matador, the Air Force’s tactical SSM that was also under development. The Army and Navy members of GMIORG contended that Regulus was better, cheaper, and in a more advanced state of development. The Air Force member denied these assertions, though he maintained that they were irrelevant to the principal issues, which was that of Service responsibility for the missions involved.


21. Mr. Keller held the position of Director of Guided Missiles in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The position was abolished on 12 November 1953, as part of a reorganization in which authority to approve missile programs was delegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. (Memo, SecDef to SecA, SecN, and SecAF, “Administration of Guided Missile Programs,” 12 Nov 53, JCS 1620/82, 15 Dec 53, same file.)


24. For the decision at this 9 June 1953 meeting, see Memo, DJS to CJCS, “Guided Missiles,” 17 Jun 53 (summarizing the meeting for GEN Bradley, who was evidently not present) CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 10, and JCS 1620/77, 6 Aug 53, same file, sec 11. ADM Fechteler had already placed his views on record; he upheld the position taken by the Navy member of the GMIORG and recommended that the JCS approve all the Service programs, for planning purposes, as the best estimates then available. (JCS 1620/74, 29 May 53, and Memo, CNO to JCS, “JCS 1620/74; Suggested Revisions to,” 9 Jun 53, Ser 00025P51, same file, sec 10.)

25. JCS 1620/75, 22 Jun 53, same file.


28. “Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs,” p. 34 (citing the Study Group report from DOD sources; no copy has been found in JCS records). The Study Group did not consider long-range missiles, but established for this purpose a separate Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, headed by the well-known mathematician, Dr. John Von Neumann. This group reviewed the three long-range missile programs then under way in the Air Force (Snark and Navaho, both of the “pilotless aircraft” type, and Atlas, a truly ballistic missile). It recommended that all phases of the Atlas program be centralized under the direction of a single development group and be accelerated with
the objective of providing an operational long-range missile within six to eight years. (“Recommendations of the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee,” 10 Feb 54, RWO08-4, encl to Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, “Report Entitled Recommendations . . .,” 10 Mar 54, OCJCS File 471 (Guided Missiles) (1954) (summarized in “Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs,” pp. 34-35). These proposals led to the establishment of the Western Development Division of the Air Research and Development Command on 1 July 1954, and ultimately to the successful production of Atlas, the first US intercontinental ballistic missile. See Ernest G. Schwiebert, A History of the U. S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles (1964, 1965), especially pp. 71-73, 75-76, 78 ff.


30. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, 18 Feb 54, JCS 1620/85, 5 Mar 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 11.

31. CM-61-54 to ASD(R&D), 24 Feb 54, JCS 1620/85, 5 Mar 54, same file.

32. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, “Research and Development vs. Roles and Missions,” 16 Apr 54, JCS 1620/86, 27 Apr 54, same file.


34. CM-96-54 to GEN Twining et al., 7 Jun 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 12.


36. JCS 1620/91, 26 Jul 54, same file.

37. The course of the JCS consideration may be traced through the following documents: SM-737-54 to JCS, 19 Aug 54; SM-712-54 to Ad Hoc Com, 21 Aug 54; JCS 1620/94, 25 Aug 54; CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 12.

38. JCS 1620/95, 30 Aug 54, same file.

39. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Assignment of Responsibilities for Guided Missiles,” 9 Sep 54, JCS 1620/95; N/H of JCS 1620/95, 18 Nov 54; same file.

40. The absence of missiles with a medium range (i. e., up to 3,500 miles) had been noted by the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, which had recommended that the Air Force develop such a project. “Chronology, Missile and Satellite Programs,” p. 35.


42. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, “Roles and Missions—Ballistic Missiles,” 12 Aug 54, JCS 1620/93, 23 Aug 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 12. Mr. Quarles’ memo implied more confusion than actually existed in the five projects that he cited. Corporal and Redstone (both Army missiles) had ranges of only 75 and 150 miles respectively, while the other three were Air Force weapons with “intercontinental” ranges.

43. JCS 1620/101, 29 Nov 54, CCS 334 Guided Missiles Cmte (1-16-45) sec 13.


Chapter 9. Disarmament and Atoms for Peace

1. NSC 112, 6 Jul 51, JCS PB Adv Files. For a summary of the arms-control debate after World War II and of the role of the JCS therein, see JCS Hist Div, “Extended Chronology of Significant Events Relating to Disarmament” (Revised Version), 18 Jan 60, pp. 1-16 (hereafter cited as “Disarmament Chronology”).


3. NSC Action No. 717, 18 Feb 53.

4. NSC Action No. 734, 11 Mar 53.
5. Text of the President’s speech in Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179-188. For the reaction in Moscow and elsewhere, see Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1953, pp. 130-132. There is no evidence that the speech was submitted to the JCS for review.


7. NSC Action No. 725, 25 Feb 53.

8. NSC 151, 8 May 53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 43.


10. NSC Action No. 799, 27 May 53.

11. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, “NSC 151, Armaments and American Policy,” 4 Jan 53; SM-1125-53 to GEN Lueddecke, 4 Jun 53; Memo, Chief AF SWAT to DJS, “Summary of Action to Date Regarding Recommendation 1 of NSC 151 (the Policy of Candor),” 17 Aug 53; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 44.


15. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, pp. 185-186; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 252. Both sources make it clear that the idea originated with the President himself.


23. NSC 112/1, 1 Sep 53, same file.

24. NSC Action Nos. 899-a, 899-b, 9 Sep 53.

25. Dept of State Bulletin, (28 Sep 53), pp. 403-408. The substance of Mr. Dulles’s speech had been approved in advance by the Council; NSC Action No. 909, 17 Sep 53.


28. Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Defense Representation at Disarmament Conference,” 29 Apr 54, and Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 3 May 54, encls to JCS 1731/99, 13 May 54; Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 11 May 54; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47.


31. Extracts from Mr. Nehru’s speech of 2 April 1954, and the letter from India’s UN Representative to the Secretary-General dated 8 April 1954, are printed in Disarmament and Security, A Collection of Documents, 1919-55, S. Com on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, pp. 246-249.

32. Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Request for Recommendations on a Proposal for a Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear Weapons,” 16 Apr 54, JCS 1731/94, 20 Apr 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47.


34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Methods of Implementing and Enforcing the Disarmament Programme . . . (DAC D-3d),” 3 May 54, JCS 1731/96; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Relationship Between Principal Aspects of a Comprehensive Program for Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of all
Armed Forces and Armaments (DAC D-9/3)," 3 May 54, JCS 1731/97; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47. The quoted passage occurs in both documents.

35. JCS 2101/136, 9 Jun 54, and Dec On, 23 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 39. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Negotiations with the Soviet Bloc," 23 Jun 54, JCS 2101/136, same file, sec 41. This memo has been quoted in Chapter 2, and is discussed again later in this chapter.

36. NSC Action No. 1106, 6 May 54.

37. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Proposal for a Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear Weapons," 10 May 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47.

38. N/H of JCS 1731/98, 21 May 54, same file.

39. NSC Action No. 1162, 23 Jun 54.


42. JCS 1731/86, 15 Jan 54, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 46. An earlier draft was already under study following referral by Memo, ASD(ISIA) to JCS, "Implementation of the President’s December 8th Speech," 30 Dec 53, JCS 1731/84, 31 Dec 53, same file, sec 45.

43. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Suggested Basis for . . . the President’s Proposal, 'Atomic Power for Peace'," 20 Jan 54, JCS 1731/88; N/H of JCS 1731/88, 4 Feb 54; same file, sec 46.

44. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "International Atomic Energy Agency," 18 Feb 54, JCS 1731/89, 19 Feb 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Feb 54, JCS 1731/90; N/H of JCS 1731/90, 12 Mar 54; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 47. This version, further amended in the light of comments from Canada and the United Kingdom, was submitted to the Soviet Union on 19 March 1954. (Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "International Atomic Energy Agency," 23 Mar 54, JCS 1731/91, 29 Mar 54, same file.)


46. NSC Action No. 1202, 12 Aug 54. NSC 5431/1, 13 Aug 54, JCS PB Adv Files.


49. NSC Action No. 899-c, 9 Sep 53.

50. NSC 1622/2, pars. 14c, 42b.

51. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 40. The disputed paragraphs were No. 13 in one version, No. 10 in the other.


53. NSC 5422/2 (par 8), 7 Aug 54, same file, sec 44.

54. NSC 5440 (par 47), 13 Dec 54, same file, sec 48.

55. NSC 5501 (par 49), 7 Jan 55, same file, sec 50.


57. The final positions of Defense and State, as set forth in draft memos for NSC dated 25 January and 7 February 1955 respectively, appear as attachments to Memo, Asst to SecDef (Atomic Energy) to SecA et al., "Review of NSC 112," 25 Feb 55, same file, sec 50.

58. NSC Action No. 1328, 10 Feb 55.

Chapter 10. Military Assistance

1. A convenient summary of the evolution of the US military assistance program can be found in Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Practices* (1965), pp. 3-10.
2. These two laws were PL 329, 81st Cong, 6 Oct 49, and PL 165, 82d Cong, 10 Oct 51. Besides grant military aid, Congress also authorized contracts for the sale of military equipment to nations able to pay for it. The amount of such reimbursable aid was small during 1953-54, and the subject has been disregarded in this chapter.

4. See Ch. 16.
5. See Ch. 12.
6. See Ch. 13.
8. Memo, SecDef to JCS, “MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954,” 26 Nov 52, JCS 2099/259, 2 Dec 52, same file, sec 84.

17. NSC Action No. 747, 18 Mar 53.
18. NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.


23. The two pieces of legislation involved in this Congressional action were the Mutual Security Act of 1953 (PL 118, 83d Cong, 16 Jul 53), and the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, 1954 (PL 218, 83d Cong, 7 Aug 53). The amounts listed are as given in the latter Act.

25. See Ch. 13.
28. See Ch. 15.
32. NSC Action No. 930, 13 Oct 53; discussed more fully in Ch. 1. The amount of the FY 1955 MDAP estimate is not indicated in available records. A preliminary estimate of $4.77 billion (whether new obligational authority or expenditures is not clear) is mentioned in JCS 2099/350, 29 Jan 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 104. It is not certain, however, that this was the one presented to the NSC on 13 October 1953.
33. NSC Action No. 945-c, 29 Oct 53.
34. Memo, Dir, FOA, to ASD(ISA) et al., "FY 1955 Mutual Security Program—Guidelines and Assumptions for Preparation of the Program to be Submitted to the Congress," 11 Jan 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 102.
36. The policy considerations underlying these additions to the Latin American program are discussed in Ch. 16.
42. This was the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955 (PL 663, 83d Cong, 26 Aug 54). The relevant portion was Section 1311.
44. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 31.
45. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, same file, sec 32.
46. An earlier draft of the paper contained a more extensive analysis of prospective MDA funds and made clear that the estimates with JCS 2101/113 did not include the cost of equipping Japanese or Korean Forces. JCS 2101/111, 30 Nov 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32, BP pt 10.
47. SM-1954-53 to MG Paul D. Adams, USA, RADM Victor D. Long, USN, and BG John J. O'Hara, USAF, 24 Dec 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 102. A Marine Corps member (BG Thomas A. Wornham) was added later. Those appointed were, in fact, the senior Service members of another committee that had been in existence for several years, though still referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee on Programs for Military Assistance.
50. JCS 2099/376, 12 May 54; SM-449-54 to MG Paul D. Adams et al., 12 May 54; same file, sec 111.
51. JCS 2099/382, 9 Jun 54, same file, sec 113. Corrig to JCS 2099/368, 11 Jun 54, and 3d Corrig to JCS 2099/368, 14 Jan 54, same file, BP pt 19.
54. Mr. Stassen presented budget estimates for the FY 1956 mutual security program to the National Security Council early in December (NSC Action No. 1280-c, 3 Dec 54). The amounts are not indicated, but they were probably close to, or perhaps identical with, those presented to Congress the following month.
56. NSC Action No. 1029-c, 4 Feb 54.
57. Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS and ASD(ISA), "A Flexible Program of Providing U. S. Military Assistance to Foreign Nations (NSC Action No. 1029-c)," 1 Mar 54, JCS 2099/365, 8 Mar 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 108.
59. Executive Order 10575, 6 Nov 54.
61. 3d Corrig to JCS 2099/368, 14 Jun 54, same file, BP pt 19.
68. NSC 5434, 28 Sep 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 120.
69. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Procedures for Periodic NSC Review of Military Assistance Program (NSC 5434),” 5 Oct 54, JCS 2099/424, same file, sec 121.
70. NSC Action No. 1241, 14 Oct 54. NSC 5434/1, 18 Oct 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 121.
73. N/H of JCS 2099/409, 1 Nov 54, same file. NSC 5439, 10 Dec 54, JCS 2099/445, 14 Dec 54, same file, sec 124.
75. JCS 2099/328, 24 Nov 53, same file, sec 100.
76. JCS 2099/356, 17 Feb 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 106.
77. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Post-D-Day Military Aid to Allies,” 26 Feb 54, JCS 2099/356; SM-182-54 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 26 Feb 54; same file, sec 107.
79. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 20 Aug 54, JCS 2099/410, 25 Aug 54, same file, sec 118. Supporting materials make it clear that this letter owed its origin partly to the JCS memos of 26 February and 16 March 54 and partly to the recent appointment of a NATO Defense Production Committee, which provided a timely opportunity to raise the subject.
80. NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, JCS 2101/151, 13 Aug 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 44.
82. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Post-D-Day Military Aid Requirements of Allies,” 5 Oct 54, JCS 2099/420, same file, sec 121. Though not directly stated, SecDef acceptance was implicit in Memo, Dep ASD(S&L) to DJS, same subj, 21 Oct 54, same file.
83. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., “Explanatory Notes for and Procedure in Connection with the Joint Mid-Range Plan for 1 July 1957,” 9 Dec 54, JCS 2143/34, 10 Dec 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 18.

Chapter 11. The Far East: Korea

2. NSC Action Nos. 833, 834, 2 Jul 53.
3. NSC 154/1, 7 Jul 53; JCS PB Adv files.
4. NSC 157/1, 7 Jul 53; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NSC 157, U. S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice,” 30 Jun 53, JCS 1776/381, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 132.

399
7. Ibid., pp. 203-204.
12. No copy of NSC 167 was found in JCS files. It was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 1776/397, 23 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) BP pt 8, with a note that all copies were to be destroyed when NSC action was completed. A State Department draft, on which NSC 167 may have been based, appears as enc1 to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB, “United States Courses of Action in the Event of Breakdown of the Political Conference on Korea,” 5 Oct 53, same file, sec 137. (NSC 167, 22 Oct 53, with omission of Annex D, is printed in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea (1984), pp. 1546-1557.)
14. NSC Action Nos. 949-a, 949-b, 949-c, 949-f, 29 Oct 53. The nature of the courses of action approved at this meeting is not indicated in the official record but appears in the message of 31 October 1953. (Msg, JCS 951671 to CINCFE, 31 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139.) The typed original of this message bears the notation “Approved by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Wilson, and the JCS.”
15. Draft, “Courses of Action in Korea,” 2 Nov 53, JCS 1776/401, 3 Nov 53 (later circulated as NSC 167/1); N/H of JCS 1776/401, 4 Nov 53; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139. (NSC 167/1, 2 Nov 53, with deletions is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XV, Korea, pp. 1583-1584.)
17. NSC Action No. 954, 5 Nov 53.
18. N/H of JCS 1776/401, 9 Nov 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139.
20. NSC 170, 9 Nov 53 (with Annex A, containing some of the more sensitive provisions, given separate distribution), JCS PB Adv files.
23. Ltrs; SecState to Vice Pres, 4 Nov 53; Pres to Rhee, 4 Nov 53; JCS 1776/403, 10 Nov 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 140.
25. A draft for a later letter from the President to Rhee, dated 19 March 1954, referred to a letter from Rhee dated 16 November 1953 and to Rhee’s statements to Nixon, on the basis of which the US President had recommended ratification of the mutual defense treaty, OCJCS File 091 Korea (Jan-Apr 54). This reference was omitted from the letter when sent as Msg, State 748 to Seoul, 20 Mar 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 147.
29. The text of this “Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice,” as published in the *Treaties and Other International Acts Series*, No. 2781 (Dept of State Publication 5179), may be found in CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 134.
30. NSC Action No. 949-d, 29 Oct 53.
31. JCS 1776/405, 14 Nov 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 140.
32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “U. S. Courses of Action in Korea,” 27 Nov 53, Dec On JCS 1776/405, same file, sec 142.
34. NSC Action Nos. 972-a, 972-b, 3 Dec 53. For the substance of Mr. Dulles’s statements, see JCS 1776/415, 16 Dec 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 143.
36. NSC Action No. 1004, 8 Jan 54. The history of the JCS memo of 18 December 1953 is summarized in JCS 1776/426, 25 Jan 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 145. Following consultation with State Dept officials, the JCS sent a revised version to the Secretary of Defense on 7 January 1954; this file is the paper approved by NSC on 8 January. It was subsequently withdrawn and is not found in JCS files. It is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pp. 1700-1703.

37. The US Army divisions in Korea at the time of the armistice were the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry (the last two National Guard) and the 1st Marine Division; the 1st Cavalry Division was in Japan. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War (1966), pp. 57, 202, 472. For the movement of the 3rd Marine Division to Japan in August 1953, see NY Times, 16 Aug 53, 3; AFPC Advice of Action, "Korea—Status of Combat Units," 28 Jul 53, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 18; Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines (Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Hq, USMC, 1960), pp. 366-368.

38. Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef, 8 Aug 53, OCJCS File, New Look Documents. For full discussion, see Ch. 1.


40. Msg, JCS 946025 to CINCEFE, 14 Aug 53, same file.

41. Msg, JCS 946220 to CINCEFE, 17 Aug 53, same file.

42. Msg, CINCUNC CX 65855 to DEPTAR, 5 Nov 53, DA IN 18993, same file, sec 140.

43. Memo by CSA, "Redeployment of 24th Infantry Division from Korea to Japan," [5 Nov 53], CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 140.

44. Msg, DA 952121 to CINCUNC, 6 Nov 53, same file.

45. JCS 1776/396, 23 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 139.


47. NSC 170/1, 20 Nov 53, JCS 1776/411, 27 Nov 53, same file, sec 142.

48. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.

49. NSC Action No. 972-d, 3 Dec 53.


51. Memo for Record, Asst to SecDef (Special Ops), "Redeployment of Two U. S. Divisions from Korea," 18 Dec 53, same file.

52. Memo, Spec Asst to Pres (Cutler) to Chm, OCB, 17 Dec 53, OCJCS File 091 Korea (1953).

53. See Memo, CJCS to SecState, 11 Dec 53; Memo, SecState to SecDef and CJCS, 17 Dec 53; Memo, DCSA (Plans and Research) to SecDef, 18 Dec 53; Memo, CNO to SecDef, 18 Dec 53; same file.

54. Radford conferred with Rhee on 24 December 1953 and presumably gave this information at that time, although there was no public indication of the nature of the discussion. (NY Times, 25 Dec 53, 4.)

55. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 860-861. The information that the two divisions would be brought back to the United States was apparently added by the President himself; it was not in any of the preliminary drafts.


57. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Redeployment of Army Units from Korea," 13 Jan 54, JCS 1776/420, 19 Jan 54, same file, sec 144.


60. See JCS 2147/93, 29 Jan 54, JCS 2147/95, 3 Feb 54, and JCS 2147/96, 5 Feb 54, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force plans, respectively, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 19.

61. SM-158-54 to JSFC, 18 Feb 54; Msg, JCS 957207 to CINCFE, 17 Feb 54; Msg, CINCUNC CX 67284 to DEPTAR, 4 Mar 54, DA IN 42416; same file.

62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East—Western Pacific Area," 1 Apr 54, JCS 2147/103, same file, sec 20.

63. NSC Action No. 1087-d, 6 Apr 54.

64. Memo, SecDef to Secya et al., "Redeployments of U. S. Forces from the Korea and the Far East," 7 Apr 54, JCS 1776/456, 9 Apr 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 150.


67. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 210-214, 340-345, 357-361, 439-441. As of 31 July 1953, the actual strength of ROK ground forces (including ROK Marine Corps personnel under operational control of the US Army) totaled 590,911 (ibid., p. 513). Comparable figures for the other ROK Services have not been found.


70. SM-1538-53 to JSPC and JLPC, 21 Aug 53; Msg, JCS 946437 to CINCFE, 20 Aug 53; same file.


73. Ltr, CJCS to MinDef ROK, 18 Jan 54, and Ltr, MinDef ROK to CJCS, 6 Jan 54, JCS 1776/424, 22 Jan 54, same file, sec 144.

74. Msg, CGAFFE FM 903994 to DEPTAR, 6 Feb 54, DA IN 37728; Memo by CSA, “Development of Republic of Korea Army,” [12 Feb 54]; Msg, JCS 957040 to CINCFE, 15 Feb 54; same file, sec 145.

75. NY Times, 1 Mar 54, 5.

76. Ltr, Prime Minister Paik to SecA, 22 Jan 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 144.

77. NSC Action No. 1043, 17 Feb 54.


81. Msg, State 748 to Seoul, 20 Mar 54, same file, sec 147. This message was a reply to one from Rhee to President Eisenhower, which asked US aid in reunifying Korea by force if necessary—a request that Eisenhower emphatically rejected.

82. CM-82-54 to SecState and SecDef, 9 Apr 54, JCS PB Adv File, NSC 170—U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea.

83. NSC Action No. 1092, 13 Apr 54.

84. Ltr, SecDef to Van Fleet, 26 Apr 54, JCS 1776/464, 3 May 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 152.

85. JCS 1776/458, 15 Apr 54, same file, sec 150.


88. Msg, Seoul 991 to SecState, 8 Apr 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 149.

89. NY Times, 19 Apr 54, 1, 3.


93. Msg, CINCFE C-68127 to DEPTAR, 23 May 54, DA IN 60398, JCS 1776/468, 26 May 54; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 152.

94. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reaffirmation of President Rhee’s Commitment to Leave ROK Forces Under the United Nations Command,” 26 May 54, JCS 1776/468; N/H of JCS 1776/468, 10 Jun 54; same file.

95. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 18 Jun 54, JCS 1776/474, 28 Jun 54, same file, sec 153.

96. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 7 Jun 54, JCS 1776/470, 23 Jun 54, same file, sec 152.
97. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Possible Unilateral Action by President Rhee . . . .," 22 Jun 54, and Ltr, SecDef to SecState, same date, JCS 1776/470, 23 Jun 54; Msg, CINCFE to DEPTAR, C-68364, 11 Jun 54, DA IN 6586; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 152.

98. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible Withdrawal of ROK Forces from UN Command," 21 Jul 54, JCS 1776/475, same file, sec 154.


101. See Ch. 3.


103. NY Times, 29 Jul 54, 1, 2; 31 Jul 54, 2.


106. Memo, SecDef to SecA et al., "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East—Western Pacific Area," 26 Jul 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.


110. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Redeployment from the Far East—Western Pacific Area," 26 Aug 54, JCS 2147/112; Msg, JCS 966825 to CINCFE, 26 Aug 54, and SM-756-54 to CSA et al., 26 Aug 54, JCS 2147/112; N/H of JCS 2147/112, 10 Sep 54; same file, sec 22.

111. For UN units remaining in Korea, see NY Times, 19 Aug 54, 1 (news story announcing the forthcoming withdrawal of 4 US Army divisions).

112. The USAF units that would remain in Korea after the planned redeployment are listed in AFPC Advice of Action, "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East—Western Pacific Areas," 30 Jul 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46.

113. Msg. JCS 968907 to CINCFE, 6 Oct 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 158.

114. Msg. JCS 968900 to CINCFE, 6 Oct 54, same file.

115. NY Times, 21 Dec 54, 1. The withdrawal of this division and an accompanying explanation were announced in connection with the decisions on FY 1956 personnel strengths, which are discussed in Ch. 3.


119. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U. S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 11 Jan 55, JCS 1800/234; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55; same file, sec 49.

120. NY Times, 16 Jul 54, 38.


122. Report of Ambassador James A. Van Fleet, "Korea," 23 Jul 54; same file. (Later issued as Ch. IX of the complete Van Fleet Report, a copy of which is in CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) BP pt 2.)

123. JCS 1776/491, 26 Aug 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 156.


125. This figure apparently represented the established goal of 83, less four vessels transferred to the ROK Coast Guard; see JCS 1776/477, 14 Jul 54 (App C, paragraph 2a), CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) BP pt 8.


127. NSC Action No. 1217, 9 Sep 54.
Chapter 12. The Far East: Indochina, Taiwan, Japan

1. As used in NSC policy papers, the “Far East” embraced China, Japan, Southeast Asia (Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, Thailand, and Burma), and the island nations of the Western Pacific (Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand). It excluded India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, which, with Afghanistan and Nepal, were collectively referred to as “South Asia.”

2. NSC 48/5, 17 May 51, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 14.


4. NSC Action No. 758, 8 Apr 53.


6. NSC Action No. 760-b, 8 Apr 53.

7. NSC Action No. 953, 5 Nov 53.


10. NSC Action No. 1029, 4 Feb 54. The events leading to this decision are treated in greater detail later in this chapter.


12. NSC 5416, 10 Apr 54, same file. NSC Action No. 1091, 13 Apr 54.


14. NSC 5429, 4 Aug 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 77.


17. “Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East 26 April-7 August 1954,” 30 Sep 54, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) BP pt 2. Reports on the individual countries, submitted separately, were incorporated as chapters in the final report. That dealing with South Korea has been described in Ch. 11; the ones for Taiwan and Japan are described later in this chapter.

18. This decision and the JCS position in connection therewith is treated more fully later in this chapter.
19. NSC Action Nos. 1292, 21 Dec 54; 1295, 5 Jan 55. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 90. The evolution of NSC 5429/5 is described in JCS Hist Div, "History of the Formosan Situation," 15 Sep 55, pp. 259-264; hereafter cited as "History, Formosan Situation."

20. Except where other sources are cited, this section of the chapter is drawn entirely from JCS Hist Div, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident, 1940-1954 (1971). Chapters I-X of this detailed study trace the Vietnamese war from its beginnings through 1952; Chapters XI-XIII narrate developments in 1953 and early 1954 to the eve of the settlement at Geneva, which is described in Chapters XIV and XV.


22. NSC Action No. 1011, 14 Jan 54.


24. NSC Action No. 1005-d, 8 Jan 54.

25. NSC Action No. 1074, 25 Mar 54.

26. Memo JCS to SecDef, "Indochina Situation," 31 Mar 54; Memo, CSA to CJCS et al., 2 Apr 54; Memo, CNO to CJCS et al., "U.S. Intervention in Indochina," 2 Apr 54; Memo, CSAF to CJCS et al., "Indochina Situation," 2 Apr 54; Memo, CMC to CJCS et al., 2 Apr 54; OCJCS File, 091 Indochina (Apr 54).

27. NSC Action No. 1086, 6 Apr 54.

28. Besides the account of the Geneva settlement in "History of the Indochina Incident," Ch. XV (extremely thorough in describing the US position during the negotiations), mention should be made of Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, which gives a concise but comprehensive summary of the international diplomacy involved (pp. 238-249) and a convenient resume of the terms of the armistice agreements (pp. 249-254).


34. Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 16-17.

35. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 134, 139-140. NSC Action No. 760-a, 8 Apr 53.

36. The contents of this note are summarized in Msg, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 120814Z Sep 54, readdressed CINCPAC to CNO as 122151Z Sep 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 15.

37. NSC Action No. 774, 28 Apr 53.


41. NSC 146/1, 28 Oct 53, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 11.

42. This discussion is summarized in Encl B to JCS 1966/76, 10 Dec 53, same file, sec 12.

43. NSC Action No. 953, 5 Nov 53.


45. The evolution of the JCS recommendations on Nationalist Chinese force levels is summarized in "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 169-175.


48. NSC Action No. 1029, 4 Feb 54.

49. Memo, SecDef to JCS, ASD(Comptroller), and ASD(ISA), "Reconsideration of the Chinese Nationalist Force Levels . . . ," 12 Feb 54, JCS 1966/81, 15 Feb 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 13.
50. JCS 2099/368, 26 Mar 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt 19 (pp. 2738, 2755, and 2763 describe the aid program proposed for Taiwan). The committee’s report is treated in full in Ch. 10.


54. Ltr, Yeh to CJCJS, 4 Jan 54, OCJCS File, 091 China (Jan-Aug 54).


57. Ltr, Yeh to CJCJS, 23 Mar 54, OCJCS File, 091 China (Jan-Aug 54).

58. Memo, VADM Davis to CJCS, 9 Apr 54, w/encl, Memo, COL James G. Anding (Dep Dir, OMA) to VADM Davis, “Comments on MDA Program for NGRC,” 9 Apr 54, same file.

59. Msg, JCS 959864 to CHMAAG Formosa, 13 Apr 54; Msg, CHMAAG Formosa MG 6891 to DEPTAR (for ADM Radford), 16 Apr 54; same file.

60. Ltr, CJCJS to Yeh, 4 May 54, same file.

61. JCS 1966/84, 20 Jul 54; JCS 1966/83, 14 Jul 54; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 14.


63. Dec On JCS 1966/86, 17 Sep 54; Msg, JCS 967938 to CINCPAC and CHMAAG Formosa, 17 Sep 54, JCS 1966/86; same file.

64. “Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, 26 April - 7 August 1954,” Ch. X, “Formosa,” CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) BP pt 2 (hereafter cited as “Rpt of Van Fleet Mission”). The final report was dated 30 September 1954; Chapter X had been issued earlier under the date 25 August 1954, but was apparently not available to, or at least was not considered by, the JCS in preparing JCS 1966/86, cited in the previous note.


66. These small islands must of course be distinguished from the “offshore island chain” referred to in NSC policy papers, which meant those major islands considered essential to US security, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

67. A convenient description of these islands can be found in “History of the Formosan Situation,” pp. 10-11.

68. Ibid., pp. 146-147.

69. NSC 146/2, 6 Nov 53, JCS 1966/74, 12 Nov 53, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 12.


71. Ibid., pp. 183-184.

72. NSC Action No. 1136, 27 May 54. The official report of this action spoke of the Tachens as constituting “an integral part of the defense of Formosa.” This statement was amended a week later; the words “closely related to” were substituted for the phrase “an integral part of.” NSC Action No. 1146, 3 Jun 54.

73. NY Times, 14 Aug 54, 1.

74. Ibid., 25 Aug 54, 1.

75. NSC Action 1206-f, 18 Aug 54.


77. JCS 2118/69, 31 Aug 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “U.S. Policy Regarding Offshore Islands Held by Chinese Nationalist Forces—NSC Action 1206-f,” 2 Sep 54 (forwarded 7 Sep 54), JCS 2118/69; CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 22. GEN Shepherd did not express an opinion.


80. “History of the Formosan Situation,” pp. 222-223. The record of actions taken at this NSC meeting (Nos. 1223, 1224, and 1225) was later withdrawn and was not located.

81. NSC Action No. 1234, 6 Oct 54.

83. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Oct 54, OCJCS File 091 China (Oct-Dec 54). JCS 1966/91, 22 Oct 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 15.

84. A copy of the paper read by Mr. Dulles on 28 October 54 is found in OCJCS File 091 China (Oct-Dec 54). Although it bears no signature, title, or date, its identity is indicated by its content and by references to the NSC meeting of 28 Oct 54 found in other documents.

85. NSC Action No. 1258, 28 Oct 54.

86. "History of the Formosan Situation," pp. 242-246. Memo, JSSC to JCS, "United States Policies in Relation to China (ChiNats and ChiComs)." 29 Oct 54; Aide Memoire by CNO, 29 Oct 54; Memo, Actg CSAF to CJCS, 29 Oct 54; Memo, CMC to JCS, "Paper Read by Secretary of State Dulles at NSC Meeting 28 October 1954," 29 Oct 54; Memo, "Comments by Admiral Arthur Radford . . . on a Report by the Secretary of State on U.S. Policies in Relation to China," 29 Oct 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 29 Oct 54; OCJCS File 091 China (Oct-Dec 54). The impression created by the documentary record is one of almost feverish activity. The documents speak of a JCS meeting with Secretary Dulles scheduled for 29 October, but JCS files do not indicate whether it was actually held. (For a record of this 29 October 1954 meeting, see Memo, of Conversation by COL A.J. Goodpaster, printed in Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, China and Japan (1985), pp. 814-816.)

87. NSC Actions Nos. 1259-b, 1259-c, 2 Nov 54.

88. See Ch. 2.


92. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 20 Dec 54, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 16.

93. N/H of JCS 2118/73, 24 Jan 55, same file.


96. NSC Action No. 1302, 13 Jan 55. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54 (with revised p. 5), JCS 1992/429, 27 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 90.

97. NSC Action No. 1301, 13 Jan 55, NSC 5503, 15 Jan 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 17.


99. NSC Action No. 1312, 21 Jan 55.

100. The text of the resolution is found in NY Times, 25 Jan 55, 3. For the President’s accompanying message, see Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 207-211.

101. NY Times, 26 Jan 55, 1; 29 Jan 55, 1.


104. For these treaties, see Dept of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, III, 1952, part 3, pp. 3169-3191, 3329-3332.

105. NSC 125/2, 7 Aug 52, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 14.


111. Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, IV, 1953, part 2, pp. 2912-2917, 2935, 2938-2939.


114. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Program for Fiscal Year 1954," 30 Oct 52, JCS 2099/242, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 83. Nearly identical goals had been adopted as early as December 1951. (Memo, JCS to

115. Msg, JCS 920166 to CINCFE, 3 Oct 52, JCS 1380/150, 3 Oct 52; Msg, CINCFE CX 58128 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 31 Oct 52, DA IN 20234; CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 31.


120. NY Times, 1 Jul 53, 3; 15 Jul 53, 4.

121. Msg, CINCFE CX 63468 to DEPTAR (for JCS) 3 Jul 53, DA IN 283875, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 34.


123. JCS 1380/166, 29 Jun 53, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 33.

124. Msg, JCS 942915 to CINCFE, 2 Jul 53; Msg, CINCFE CX 63528 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 7 Jul 53, DA IN 284872; Msg, CINCFE CX 63843 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 20 Jul 53; same file, sec 34.

125. JCS 1380/161, 27 May 53, same file, sec 33.


127. JCS 1380/169 1 Aug 53, same file, sec 35.

128. NY Times, 10 Aug 53, 1.


132. Msg, CINCFE CX 65264 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 30 Sep 53, DA IN 9127, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36.

133. The value of the yen in 1953 was approximately $0.0027, i.e., there were roughly 370 yen per dollar.

134. For the administrative agreement of 28 February 1952, see Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, III, 1952, part 3, pp. 3341-3362. The provisions cited in the text were contained in Article XXV.

135. At prevailing exchange rates, $155 million amounted to approximately 57 billion yen, but various other contributions made by Japan in JFY 1953 raised the total to 62.0 billion for that year. See breakdown of Japanese defense appropriations attached to Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS, 6 Apr 55, OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957), and budget tabulation in Tab H to “Rpt of Van Fleet Mission,” Ch. XI, “Japan.”

136. Details of this discussion are summarized in Msg, DA 951151 to CINCFE, 24 Oct 53, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 36.

137. For text of joint statement released 30 October 1953, see Dept of State Bulletin, (9 Nov 53), pp. 637-638.


139. JCS 1380/175, 18 Dec 53, same file, sec 37.

140. Msgs; Tokyo 1415 to State, 7 Dec 53, DA IN 26970; Tokyo 1433 to State, 9 Dec 53, DA IN 27436; CINCFE C-66419 to DEPTAR (for JCS), 9 Dec 53, DA IN 27302; CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 37.

141. JCS 1380/176, 17 Dec 53, same file.


143. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, “Japanese Defense Forces,” 29 Dec 53, JCS 1380/177, 6 Jan 54; Msg, JCS 954933 to CINCFE, 29 Dec 53; CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 37. The JCS, in this message, reduced to seven the number of ships recommended for loan to the Japanese in JFY 1954, eliminating one of the three minesweepers.

144. General Van Fleet, after returning from his mission to Japan in mid-1954, reported that the Japanese plan had been revised in March 1954 and now called for a ground force of approximately 200,000 by the end of JFY 1957, organized into 6 divisions and 4 RCTs, plus a naval force of 217 ships (156,000 tons) and an air force of 35 squadrons. “Rpt of Van Fleet Mission,” Ch. XI, “Japan,” pp. II-4, II-8, II-10.

145. The text of the agreement on Japanese force goals for 1954 has not been found, but its
substance is reported in OCB Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, 27 Oct 54, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 18; also in JCS 1380/194, 29 Oct 54, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 41.

146. *NY Times*, 9 Jan 54, 3; 10 Jan 54, 1; 5 Mar 54, 4. "Rpt of Van Fleet Mission," Ch. XI, "Japan," Tab H. In dollar amounts, the total defense budget was approximately $381 million, with $220 million for the Japanese forces (the value of the yen having risen slightly to $0.0028, or 357 per dollar).

147. This agreement was made by an exchange of notes on 6 April 1954, which was released to the public. (Dept of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements*, V, 1954, part 1, pp. 742-748.)


149. OCB Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, 27 Oct 54, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 18.


153. No evidence of JCS reaction has been found in available records.

154. Msg, Tokyo 1403 to State, 15 Dec 54, DA IN 105364, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.


157. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programs for FY 1955-1958 Which Will Support U.S. Military Strategy," 17 Jun 54, JCS 2099/368, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 114. Minor changes were made by the committee in the Japanese air force objectives that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, and the total number of naval vessels, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not specified in their December 1953 recommendations, was set at 421.


162. Msg, CINCFE-C-70136 to DEPTAR, 1 Nov 54, DA IN 95631, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.


164. N/H of JCS 1380/194, 10 Nov 54; N/H of JCS 1380/196, 10 Nov 54; same file.

165. *NY Times*, 8 Nov 54, 1; *Public Papers, Eisenhower*, 1954, pp. 1042-1044.

166. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Dec 54, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 42. N/H of JCS 1380/194, 14 Dec 54, same file, sec 41.

167. Msg, Tokyo 1403 to State, 15 Dec 54, DA IN 105364; GEN Hull associated himself with these views in Msg, CINCFE to DEPTAR, 71040, 7 Jan 55, DA IN 109481; CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.

168. Msg, State 1271 to Tokyo, 24 Dec 54, DA IN 107303, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 42.

169. Msg, Tokyo 1555 to State, 31 Dec 54, DA IN 108406, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 19.

170. *NY Times*, 7 Dec 54, 1; 10 Dec 54, 1.

171. Ibid., 5 Jan 55, 3. The only official account of Admiral Radford's visit that has been found in the records examined for this study is in Msg, Tokyo 1605 to State, 6 Jan 55, OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957). It describes a courtesy call by Admiral Radford, General Hull, and Ambassador Allison on Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. Their discussion dealt chiefly with the status of war criminals.

172. Memo, Dep ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Japanese Defense Force Budget for Japan Fiscal Year 1955," 8 Mar 55, JCS 1380/201, 10 Mar 55, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 43. The position of ASD(ISA) was then held by Mr. H. Struve Hensel, who was at that time in Tokyo attempting to induce the Japanese to spend more for defense. (NY *Times*, 6 Mar 55, 1).


174. For evidence of the extent of disagreement, see NY *Times*, 6 Mar 55, 1; 4 Apr 55, 1.

175. This fact had been noted in Ltr, Actg AsstSecState(FE) to ASD(ISA), 28 Feb 55, JCS 1380/201, 10 Mar 55, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) sec 43.
176. The budget figures are taken from *NY Times*, 19 Apr 55, 4, and OCB “Progress Report on U. S. Policy Toward Japan (NSC 5516/1),” 19 Oct 55, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 21. The force and personnel objectives are from the Progress Report and from Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS, 6 Apr 55, OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957). The date of the agreement is not indicated. The *NY Times* reported that the JFY 1955 budget would be used in future years as the “base figure” in Japanese rearmament planning; the reporter, Robert Trumbull, understood this to mean a promise that future defense budgets would not be allowed to fall below the 1955 amount. However, the term “base figure” as used in US discussions had not been so interpreted.

177. Ltr, Japanese Amb to CJCS, 6 Apr 55, (enclosing tables showing revised force plan and projected JFY 1955 budget as well as those of earlier years for comparison), OCJCS File 091 Japan (1953-May 1957).

178. *NY Times*, 20 Apr 55, 3.


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2. JCS 2143/6, 7 Dec 50, CCS 381 (1-26-50) BP pt 1. JCS 1844/126, 2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP pt 6. JCS 1844/156, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 5.


7. Compare Table 17 with Table 21. (Greek and Turkish forces in Table 21 should be excluded in this comparison since they were not counted in the Lisbon goals.)

8. *NY Times*, 10 Jan 53, 1.


14. Ltr, Amb William H. Draper, Jr., to Pres, 8 Mar 53, JCS 2073/550, 7 Apr 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 211.


17. JCS 2124/79, 15 Jan 53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 14.

18. JCS 2124/83, 19 Feb 53, same file, and JCS 2124/84, 6 Mar 53, same file, sec 15. The first of these refers to discussions on 28 January 1953 by the JCS with SecState, Director of Mutual Security, and Director of Central Intelligence.


20. The origin and general nature of the Annual Review are described in Ismay, *NATO*, pp. 89-97.


23. The US proposals and those of the International Staff can be found tabulated in Memo, Dir, Off of Nat Affairs, OASD(ISA) "U.S. Position on 1953 and 1954 NATO Force Goals for the 1952 Annual Review," 11 Apr 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 214. The extent to which the final US position was shaped by JCS recommendations cannot be determined from the evidence available.

24. "Outline of NATO Force Goals as Accepted at the Lisbon Meeting . . . .", n. d., Off of Nat Affairs, OASD(ISA), CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 14.

26. Ibid.
27. Memo, Nash to SecDef, “United States Forces Assigned or Earmarked for NATO,” 6 Apr 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 211. Mr. Nash’s original title, “Assistant to the Secretary” was changed to “Assistant Secretary” under the President’s Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. He and his successor, Mr. H. Struve Hersel, were the principal channel of JCS contact with OSD in the discussion of NATO matters during this period.
30. Ibid.
31. NSC 149, 3 Apr 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 25.
34. Ibid., pp. 674-675.
35. NY Times, 13 May 53, 1; 26 May 53, 12.
36. The evolution of this plan may be traced in Memo for Record, Secy, JCS, “Proposed Reorganization of SACEUR’s Center Command,” 15 Jan 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 196, and Memo, SACEUR to JCS, “Command Structure, Allied Command Europe,” 12 Feb 53, same file, sec 201. GEN Ridgway wrote that his predecessor, GEN Eisenhower, during the latter part of his tenure as SACEUR, had been preparing to recommend substantially the same organizational changes.
39. JCS 1868/462, 8 Jun 53, same file, sec 222. JCS 1868/464, 3 Jul 53, same file, sec 225. The decision had been announced publicly on 9 June; NY Times, 10 Jun 53, 14.
45. Ltr, Draper to Pres, 5 Jun 53, JCS 2073/597, 7 Jul 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 226. A copy of a new and broader study of NATO’s problems (military, political, and economic) was transmitted with this letter and can be found in JCS PB Adv Files, NSC 5433/1—Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe.
47. Memo, ADM Radford, GEN Ridgway, ADM Carney, and GEN Twining to SecDef, 8 Aug 53; Memo by R[obert] C[urtier], “August 27/53 NSC Meeting,” 1 Sep 53; OCJCS File, New Look Documents.
48. JCS 2073/630, 24 Aug 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 234.
50. JCS 2073/633, 31 Aug 53, same file, sec 236.
51. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Certain European Issues Affecting the United States,” 11 Sep 53, JCS 2073/634, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 238.
53. Ibid., pp. 186-188.
54. Treated more fully in Ch. 9.
55. NSC Action No. 777, 28 Apr 53.
56. For these drafts, see the several Memos, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC PB, 29 May, 24 Jun, 6 Jul, and 27 Jul 53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 15 and 16.
60. NSC Action No. 881, 13 Aug 53. NSC 160/1, 17 Aug 53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt 2A.
63. Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Proposed European Security System,” 23 Sep 53, JCS 2124/107, 23 Sep 53, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 19. A map showing the extent of the proposed demilitarized zone appears as appendix to JCS 2124/108, 24 Sep 53, same file.
66. JCS 1844/126, 2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) PB pt 6.
67. NSC 72/6, 27 Jun 51, CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 5.
68. Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1952; Mutual Security Act of 1952; Supplementary Appropriation Act, 1953; PLs 249, 400, and 547; 82d Cong; 31 Oct 51, 20 Jun 52, and 15 Jul 52.
69. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1952, pp. 95, 421-422.
71. NSC Action No. 786, 13 May 53.
74. NSC Staff Study, “U. S. Policy Toward Spain” (paragraph 46), part of NSC 5418/1, 9 Jun 54, CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 16.
76. JCS 1821/95, 29 Sep 53; Dec On JCS 1821/96, 17 Nov 53; CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 14.
77. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Mutual Defense Assistance Programs for Spain,” 13 Jan 54, JCS 2099/342; N/H of JCS 2099/342, 26 Feb 54; CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 102.
78. These considerations may be followed through JCS 1821/88, 30 Jan 53; JCS 1821/89, 26 Feb 53; JCS 1821/90, 3 Mar 53; CCS 092 Spain (4-19-46) sec 13.
82. AF GO No. 43, 6 Nov 53, same file.

The Army, in listing its goals, set forth its ultimate objectives (to be achieved at an unspecified time after M-day) as 16 ½ divisions for 1953 and 17 ½ by 1954. Hence General Ridgway’s statement in December 1954 that the Army was obligated to NATO for 17 divisions; see Ch. 4.


89. Memo, SecDef to CJCS "U. S. Guidance for the 1953 Annual Review," 30 Sep 53, JCS 2073/658, 6 Oct 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 242. The memo refers to a meeting on 25 September 1953 attended by CJCS, SecState, and others, at which ADM Radford undertook to secure the JCS views on NATO strategy.

90. JCS 2073/671, 16 Oct 53, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 245.


95. NSC Action Nos. 977, 981, 10 Dec 53.


97. NY Times, 15 Dec 53, 14. Secretary Dulles also used the words "agonizing reappraisal" in his formal statement during the NAC meeting; USRO/DART, "Report on NATO 1953 Annual Review and Resulting Problems Affecting the 1954 Annual Review (The Blue Book)." 15 Feb 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP Pt 29 (hereafter cited as 1953 Blue Book).

98. 1953 Blue Book, Pt I, secs B and D, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-42) BP pt 29.

99. Although Secretary Wilson gave no figures, his reference apparently was to the fact that the Air Force now proposed to retain only 346 aircraft in the United States instead of the 466 expected earlier. His statement to the Council was largely based on material supplied him by Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Estimates of NATO Forces 1954-1957," 27 Nov 53, JCS 2073/711, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 252.

100. Text of the SecDef statement to NAC, 15 Dec 53, is in OCJCS File 092.2 NATO (Aug-Dec 53); also in 1953 Blue Book, Pt I, sec C.


102. Text in Ismay, NATO, pp. 197-199.

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2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Military Participation in Berlin Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 1954," 7 Jan 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 12 Jan 54; CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec 11.
4. PL 703, 83d Cong, 30 Aug 54.
6. These comments are summarized in JCS 2073/823, 27 May 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 283.
7. JCS 2073/823, 27 May 54, same file.
9. For receipt of the SACLANT, SACEUR, and CHANCOM studies by JCS, see JCS 2073/843, 6 Jul 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 288; JCS 2073/848, 20 Jul 54, and JCS 2073/850, 21 Jul 54, same file, sec 289.
10. This was the gist of the SACEUR study as reported in the press; NY Times, 25 Jul 54, 1; 14 Aug 54. 2. See also Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (1962), pp. 105-109, for a summary of this study, and for excerpts from public statements by NATO commanders (some dating back to 1952) indicating that they foresaw eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons.

11. JCS 2073/848, 20 Jul 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 289.

12. JCS 2073/869, 17 Aug 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 293. The draft, SG 241/3, cannot now be located. Its general tenor may be inferred from GEN Collins’s statements and from the following: JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297; OASD(ISA), Transcript of State-Defense Conference with SACEUR on New Approach Atomic Planning, 6 Oct 54, same file, BP pt 2.

13. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Aug 54, JCS 2073/870, 19 Aug 54, same file, sec 294. The designation “New Approach” (corresponding to the New Look in connection with US strategy) seems to have originated with Secretary Wilson, but apparently never passed into general use.


16. For text of communiqué of meeting of 23 Apr 54, see Ismay, NATO, pp. 199-200.


22. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.


24. Memo, SecDef to JCS, “EDC Alternative Planning,” 22 Jun 54, JCS 2124/118, 22 Jun 54, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 22.


26. Ltrs, Dir, Off of Foreign Mil Affairs, OASD(ISA), to DepUSecState, 8 Jul and 16 Aug 54; Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS, “EDC Alternative Planning,” 17 Aug 54, JCS 2124/121, 18 Aug 54; same file.

27. DepASD(ISA) sent this proposal to the JCS on 24 Aug 54, but they took no action on it; JCS 2124/123, 25 Aug 54, same file.


31. NSC Action No. 1227, 24 Sep 54, NSC 5433/1, 25 Sep 54; copy in files of JCS PB Adv, where the earlier version, NSC 5433, 16 Sep 54, containing the dissenting views of the JCS Adviser, is also to be found. For the JCS comments on NSC 5433, see Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Immediate United States Policy toward Europe—NSC 5433,” 22 Sep 54, JCS 2124/132, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 25.

32. SM-788-4 to JSSC, 3 Sep 54, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 23.

33. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, “Strategic Issues Confronting the U. S. in Europe,” 10 Sep 54, JCS 2124/126, 10 Sep 54, same file.

34. Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, “Military Program for the Rearmament of West Germany,” 2 Sep 54, JCS 2124/127, 7 Sep 54, same file.


36. “JCS Agreed Statement Submitted to the Secretary of Defense as of Possible Use to the Secretary of State,” 15 Sep 54, encl to Note to Control Div, 17 Sep 54, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 24. JCS 2124/135, 22 Sep 54, same file, sec 25.

37. JCS 2124/127, 14 Sep 54, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 23.

38. JCS 2124/129, 16 Sep 54, same file.

39. SM-823-4 to JSSC, JSPC, and JLPC, 17 Sep 54, same file, sec 24.

40. JCS 2124/133, 22 Sep 54, same file, sec 25.

41. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Strategic Issues Confronting the U. S. in Europe,” 22 Sep 54, JCS 2124/135, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 25.


43. CM-110-54 to JCS, 7 Sep 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 296.

44. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, “Use of Atomic Weapons,” 13 Sep 54, JCS 2073/891, 15 Sep 54, same file, sec 298.
45. N'H of JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297.
46. Msg, Paris POLTO 434 to State, 16 Sep 54, summarizes developments at this meeting; same file, sec 298.
47. JCS 2073/887, 10 Sep 54, same file, sec 297.
48. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NATO Capabilities Studies,” 24 Sep 54, JCS 2073/900, same file, sec 300. The enclosed SG 241/3 (JCS Revision) was titled “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.” Since the original version of SG 241/3 is not available, the full effect of the JCS revision cannot be determined.
49. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 27 Sep 54, JCS 2073/908, 6 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 302.
50. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS and US Rep, Standing Group, “Report to the North Atlantic Council on NATO Capabilities Studies,” 11 Oct 54, JCS 2073/918, 14 Oct 54, same file, sec 305.
51. JCS 2073/909, 7 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 303. No copy of IPT 178/15 appears in the records, but the differences between it and SG 241/3 (JCS Revision) are indicated in detail in JCS 2073/930, 2 Nov 54, same file, sec 309. Subsequent changes in IPT 178/15 can be traced by means of JCS 2073/951, 19 Nov 54, same file, sec 313, and JCS 2073/965, 30 Nov 54, same file, sec 315.
52. OASD(ISA) Transcript of State-Defense Conference with SACEUR on New Approach Atomic Planning, 6 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) BP pt 32. The Defense participants included Mr. Hensel, ASD(ISA), his Deputy, VADM Davis, and the principal assistant of CJCS, RADM G. W. Anderson, Jr.
53. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, “U. S. Action on NATO Capabilities Studies . . . in Support of NATO Forces,” 8 Oct 54, JCS 2073/917, 12 Oct 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 304. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 22 Oct 54, JCS 2073/921, same file, sec 308.
54. Memo, Staff Secy, White House to SecState, SecDef, and CJCS, 4 Nov 54, and Memo, SecState and SecDef to Pres, “Recommended U. S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy,” 3 Nov 54, JCS 2073/942, 8 Nov 54; Msg, DEF 970612 to USNMR Paris, 6 Nov 54; CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 310.
56. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, “Preparation for the 9-Power Conference in London,” 21 Sep 54, JCS 2124/131, 21 Sep 54, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 24.
61. NSC Action No. 1255, 28 Oct 54.
62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Program for the Rearmament of West Germany,” 13 Oct 54, JCS 2124/142, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 28.
63. N'H of JCS 2124/142, 31 Dec 54, same file, sec 27.
65. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Report to the North Atlantic Council on NATO Capabilities Studies,” 5 Nov 54, JCS 2073/930, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 310.
66. JCS 2073/951, 19 Nov 54, same file, sec 313.
67. NSC Action No. 1259, 2 Nov 54, NY Times, 4 Nov 54, 7.
68. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to CJCS, “Position for Military Committee Meeting,” 19 Nov 54, OCJCS File 092.2 NATO (Aug-Dec 54).
69. JCS 2073/965, 30 Nov 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 315.
70. NATO Document MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years,” [Nov 54], NATO files. MC 48 has not been declassified and substantive discussion of the document has been deleted from this volume.
71. Recommendations prepared by the International Staff (subsequently adopted by NAC) and the US recommendations are tabulated in the “1954 Blue Book,” 2 Jan 55, Pt I-B, OSD Subregister (hereafter cited as 1954 Blue Book). The JCS had endorsed the US recommendations, with certain comments. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NATO Forces for 1955-1958,” 3 Dec 54, JCS 2073/968, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 316). For the initial recommendations submitted earlier by JCS, see 415
Notes to Pages 317–328

72. Stebbins, United States in World Affairs, 1954, p. 188.
73. NSC Action No. 1261, 9 Nov 54.
74. 1954 Blue Book, Pt II, sec M.
75. Memo, Staff Secy, White House to SecState, SecDef, and CJCS, 8 Dec 54, OCJCS File 092.2 NATO (Aug-Dec 54). The memo summarizes the principal views and actions of the President on the matters considered at the meeting at 1400 on 8 December.
76. NY Times, 14 Dec 54, 11; 16 Dec 54, 1.
77. Ibid., 14 Dec 54, 1; 15 Dec 54, 8; 16 Dec 54, 11.
79. Msg, USRO Paris, DEFTO 363, to OSD, 17 Dec 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 319.
80. See extracts from the Secretary-General’s report, 10 Dec 54, in 1954 Blue Book, Pt I-C-5.
81. The Council’s resolution covering the subjects is reproduced in 1954 Blue Book, Pt I-A.
83. See Ch. 4.
84. For an example of this criticism, see James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (1958), p. 152. For the evolution of the Army doctrine of limited war, see Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 345-347.

Chapter 15. The Middle East

1. In this chapter “Middle East” refers to that part of the world extending from Egypt and Turkey eastward through Iran as was the practice in JCS documents of the period. Eventually Pakistan was included in the JCS consideration of Middle East strategy. This JCS usage was at variance with that of the NSC and the Department of State, which applied the designation “Near East” to the Arab States and Israel. In addition, in discussions of the MDA program, Greece was sometimes considered a Near Eastern country; it was listed with Turkey and Iran in Title II of the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952.
2. NSC 129/1, 24 Apr 52, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) BP. NSC 129/1 used the term “Middle East Command,” but it was later concluded that this might imply an arrangement imposed from the outside. Hence the designation “Middle East Defense Organization” was adopted to avoid possible offense to the governments of the region.
4. JCS 1844/126, 2 Jul 52, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) BP pt 6. For the meaning of “inner ring” as used in British planning, see JCS 1844/156, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 5.
5. NSC 129/1, 24 Apr 52, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) BP.
6. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Nov 52, JCS 1714/44, 12 Nov 52, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7.
10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Increased Aid for the Middle East Area,” 5 Nov 52, JCS 1887/60, same file, sec 12.
11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Assistance to the Middle East,” 5 Nov 52, JCS 2099/253, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 83.
13. Ltr, DepSecState to SecDef, 21 Nov 52, JCS 2105/50, 4 Dec 52, CCS 337 (2-20-50) sec 5.
14. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, “Military Aid for Egypt,” 3 Dec 52, JCS 2105/30, 4 Dec 52, same file.
16. Ltrs, DepSecDef to SecState, 29 Dec 52, SecState to SecDef, 11 Dec 52, JCS 2105/32, 12 Jan 53, same file, sec 6.
23. NSC Action No. 722, 24 Feb 53.
24. A rather full account of these negotiations is given in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 150-159.
31. Secretary Dulles did not mention Afghanistan, which, despite its strategic location (separating the Soviet Union from West Pakistan, with a long common border with Iran), was never seriously considered for membership in a northern tier defensive organization. Presumably Afghanistan was excluded owing to its military and economic weakness and its unfriendly relations with Pakistan.
32. NSC Action No. 801, 1 Jun 53.
33. NSC Action No. 843, 9 Jul 53. NSC 155/1, 14 Jul 53, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 15. The JCS had endorsed the new statement as written. (Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NSC 155, US Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East,” 23 Jun 53, Dec On JCS 1887/66, same file.)
38. NSC 136/1, 20 Nov 52, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 8.
39. Memo, Actg SecDef to JCS, “Iran,” 22 Jan 53; SM-137-53 to Dir, Exec Off of SecDef, 23 Jan 53; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 8. Terms of reference for the JCS representative on the ad hoc committee were approved later. (Dec On JCS 1714/50, 19 Jun 53, same file.)
42. JCS 1714/47, 6 Apr 53; JCS 1714/48, 16 Apr 53; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Iran,” 19 Jun 53, JCS 1714/49; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7.
43. Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 213-216. NY Times, 17, 20, and 23 Aug, 2 and 6 Sep 53 (p. 1 in each case). In subsequent years, a number of accounts have indicated clandestine US encouragement, support, and direction of the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh. See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (1975), pp. 249-250, and Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup, the Struggle for the Control of Iran (1979). Roosevelt recounts a meeting on 25 June 1953 where the Secretary of State approved support for an effort to overthrow Mossadegh. Among those listed as attending were Secretary of Defense Wilson and a military aide, but no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Official records reveal no indication of JCS involvement in these activities.
44. Msg, CIA to JCS et al., 191545Z Aug 53, DA IN 298139, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 9.
47. Msg, JCS 946859 to CINCMEIA et al., 26 Aug 53, JCS 1714/51, same file.
48. JCS 1714/52, 22 Sep 53, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 9. CINCMEIA Oplan 207-53 (Draft), 9 Sep 53, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) BP pt 1B.
49. Dec On JCS 1714/55, 9 Dec 53; N/H of JCS 1714/55, 23 Mar 54; same file, sec 10. CINCMEIA Oplan 207-54, 1 Feb 54, same file, BP pt 2.
50. NSC 175, 21 Dec 53, JCS 1714/53, 22 Dec 53, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 11.
51. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 175—United States Policy Toward Iran," 29 Dec 53, JCS 1714/57, same file. Whether the Secretary of Defense formally expressed an opinion on these JCS views is not indicated in available records.
52. NSC Action No. 998, 30 Dec 53. NSC 5402, 2 Jan 54, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 11.
53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Annex to NSC 175, U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 29 Jan 54, JCS 1714/59, same file, sec 12.
54. JCS 1887/73, 4 Nov 53, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 16.
55. Study of "United States Policy with Respect to Pakistan," 23 Sep 53, apparently prepared by Joint Staff for ADM Radford in connection with Ayub visit; Memo, Henry A. Byroade to SecState, 30 Sep 53; OCJCS File 091 Pakistan 1953-55.
57. JCS 1887/70, 13 Oct 53, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) BP pt 1A.
58. SM-1765-53 to CINCELM, 2 Nov 53; SM-1767-53 to JSPC, 2 Nov 53; same file, sec 16.
59. JCS 1887/73, 4 Nov 53, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 16.
60. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Security Arrangements for the Middle East," 14 Nov 53, JCS 1887/73, same file, sec 17. No evidence has been found that the Secretary of Defense took any formal action on the JCS views.
61. JCS 1887/74, 12 Feb 54, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 17.
62. JCS 1887/75, 18 Mar 54; Dec On JCS 1887/75, 6 Apr 54, same file.
63. JCS 1887/80, 27 May 54, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 18.
64. SM-571-54 to RB COS, 12 Jun 54, JCS 1887/80, same file. The JSPC had proposed that US-UK discussions precede the trilateral talks—a suggestion that was later made by the British Chiefs of Staff.
68. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to SecState, 4 Jan 54, JCS 2099/343, 8 Jan 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 102. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to SecState, 27 Nov 53, same file, sec 100.
70. OCB Progress Report on NSC 155/1, 16 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (3-3-46) sec 16.
72. The FY 1955 MDAP contained no funds for Middle Eastern countries other than Greece, Turkey, and Iran; Joint Military Survey Team Rpt on Pakistan. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956," 19 May 54, JCS 2099/274, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 112.
73. NY Times, 2 Nov 53, 2; 17 Nov 53, 1.
75. Memo, Actg SecDef to SecA, SecN, and SecAF, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for the Middle East," 19 Feb 54, JCS 2099/360, 3 Mar 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 108.
76. Joint Military Survey Team Rpt on Pakistan.
86. NSC Action No. 1184, 22 Jul 54. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, JCS 1887/86, 30 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (3-4-46) BP pt 1. The JCS had indicated their concurrence with NSC 5428 in Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 13 Jul 54, JCS 1887/84, same file, sec 16.
88. NSC 5504, 15 Jan 55, JCS 1714/79, 19 Jan 55, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 15.
89. Ibid. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Policy Toward Iran," 7 Jan 55, JCS 1714/78, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 15.
92. N/H of JCS 2105/37, 14 Sep 54, same file. OCB Progress Report on NSC 5428, 10 Mar 55, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 18.
94. SM-997-54 to CINCNELM, 17 Nov 54, JCS 1887/93; Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 281631Z Dec 54; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 19.

Chapter 16. Latin America

5. For a typical example, see the bilateral agreement signed with Ecuador on 20 Feb 52, in Dept of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, III, 1952, part 3, pp. 4162-4167.
9. See Table 14.
10. NSC 144/1, 18 Mar 53, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 14.
16. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 9 Apr 53, JCS 2099/286, 6 May 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 90.
25. NY Times, 18 May 54, 1; 22 May 54, 1.
27. NSC Action No. 1122-b, 13 May 54.
30. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 435-436. There is a considerable body of evidence (though it has not been officially confirmed) that the US role in the affair was not limited to this action and that the Central Intelligence Agency assisted from the outset in planning and conducting the invasion of the Castillo Armas forces. See, for example: David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (1964), pp. 165-183, which gives a lengthy and detailed account, citing partial corroborating in the form of testimony before a Senate subcommittee in 1961, given by the man who was the US Ambassador to Guatemala in 1954; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (1982), pp. 133-143 and 161-168, which relies upon interviews with former CIA officials who were involved in the sources examined in the preparation of this volume furnish no evidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took any part in the invasion planning.
34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5432)," 31 Aug 54, JCS 1976/119, same file.
35. NSC Action No. 1209, 2 Sep 54. NSC 5432/1, 3 Sep 54, JCS 1976/121, 13 Sep 54, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec 22.
40. OCB Progress Report on NSC 5432/1, 27 Dec 54, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec
23. For comparison of the MDAP funds committed to Latin America with the much larger allotments made to other areas, see Ch. 10.

41. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Military Assistance Programs for Latin America," 10 Dec 54, JCS 2099/446, 16 Dec 54, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 124.
Bibliographic Note

This volume is based primarily upon official documents contained in the Joint Master Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in files maintained by the Office of the Chairman, JCS. Both the Joint Master Files and the Chairman’s files are comprehensive and well organized. They contain not only documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also those of the Secretary of Defense, his office, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. Both sets of files for the years 1953–1954 have been reviewed for declassification and transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration where they are deposited in the Military Reference Branch as Records Group 218, Records of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not all documents in those files have been declassified.

The Joint Master Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 1953–1954 are organized under a Dewey decimal, chronological system adopted during World War II and continued through 1958. This system employs such designations as CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 40 and CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 23. (CCS, a file designation assigned early in World War II and continued into the 1950s, refers to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the US members during and immediately after World War II.) The files of the Office of the Chairman for the period of the volume (those of both General Bradley and Admiral Radford) also use a Dewey decimal system with a separate set of files for each chairman.

The NATO documents furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953–1954 were not included in the Joint Master Files, but were maintained separately in the JCS Subregistry. After several years, the Subregistry routinely destroyed them. Copies of the destroyed documents were still available, however, through the US Central Registry maintained by the Department of the Army. The Central Registry has since destroyed all NATO documents for the years 1953–1955, though some are available on microfilm. NATO documents of the period not on microfilm are retained in the files of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, without declassification.

Although source material for this volume was found primarily in the JCS file collections, research also extended to the records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military Services. Another valuable source was the reference collection of the JCS Historical Division and various special historical studies prepared by the Division. Congressional hearings and other Congressional documents of the period were useful in tracing the ultimate outcome of various issues that concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the footnote citations of the volume, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited in the same footnote, all those in a
Bibliographic Note

single sentence are to be found in the file location given at the end of that sentence. The term "same file," rather than "ibid," was the style prescribed at the time of writing for repeated, successive references to a long file designation. Some documents are cited without file designations. These include types that were widely distributed and that may be located without resort to JCS files, such as DOD Directives, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Records of NSC Action.
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