Βιβλιοθήκη
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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

BY

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BOOKS I.—V.

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PREFACE.

In the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl’s edition of the Politics in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a nova impressio correctior was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the impressio of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.
Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the Politics as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society and Journal of Philology by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilte in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-
ant of the references to the recently discovered \textit{Constitution of Athens}. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman's, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of \textit{Quaestiones Aristotelicae} I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven Quaestiones are combined, as \textit{Quaestiones criticae collectae}, although the last word \textit{collectae} forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of \textit{Home Life of the Greeks}, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors' initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel's recent work on that subject reached me.
PREFACE.

The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
Oct. 15, 1894.
ON REFERENCES TO THE POLITICS BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS, SECTIONS, PAGES.

The text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight books in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ Η Θ Δ Ζ Ε). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the MSS. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of chapters here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the left hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the Index Aristotelicus to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1581), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolinus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanus (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner's "'vulgo." In this now obsolete arrangement Book i. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book ii., ten, not twelve, Book iii., twelve, not eighteen.

The sections into which Bekker's chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker's pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the Politics by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the right side of the page are these introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book i., 9 in Book ii. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Götting
ON REFERENCES TO THE POLITICS.

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879): Grote in his history always cites the Politics by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the chapter, page, column, and line of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the Politics occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1253 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the Index Aristotelicius 1252*18, 1276*4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the left hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded: (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, not of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the right hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus: (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence δει δε μηδε τοιον ανατείνω διε κρινειν τιν θαλλει χρων upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the Index Aristotelicius would be Πβι, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections: or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879: but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. ii § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, i f.
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CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2: for Ἠτταν ἵσσειον read Ἰσσαίον.
P. 18, note 7, line 5: for ἀδικεῖσθαι read ἀδικεῖσθαι.
P. 56, line 14: for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans*. p. 43, n. 373)
P. 69, note 2, line 3: for ὑμῶν read ὑμῶν
   Ib. line 4: for ἀδικεῖσθαι read ἀδικεῖσθαι
P. 82, line 2: for ἀρωπός read ἀρωπός (cp. below p. 312)
P. 144, text, 1253 a 16, 17: for μὴ δεῖ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὴν φόνον
   read μὴ δεῖ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὴν φόνον
   Ib. commentary, right column, last line: for κεδεικαίρησε read κεδεικαίρησε
P. 146, critical notes, line 3: after ἦλθεν insert ἦδραν)
P. 147, text, 1253 a 3: omit οὐρί
   Ib. critical notes, line 6: transpose
   οὐρί omitted by ΠΙ.Bk
   to precede || 3 οὐρί Με
   That is, the οὐρί omitted by ΠΙ.Bk is in 1253 a 2 before ἀρωπός. Stühr reads ἀρωπός: cp. Addenda p. 663
P. 150, crit. notes, line 5: for Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read Quaest. crit. coll.
   (Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff
   Ib. line 8: dele Ar.
P. 151, crit. notes, line 8: after Quaest. Cr. II. 5 ff., IV. 5 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 336 ff
P. 153, crit. notes, line 4: after Quaest. Cr. II. 7 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f
P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin: for (p. read (p. 6)
P. 157, text, 1254 a 27: for ἐνδικτον read ἐνδικτον
   Ib. crit. notes, line 3: for Dittographia read Dittography
   crit. notes, line 9: after ἐνδικτον read ΓΙ. Bk. Susem. 1.3
P. 160, text, 1254 b 14: omit ιάλ
P. 161, crit. notes, line 1: after ἦλθεν insert ἦλθεν]
P. 176, crit. notes, line 9: after Quaest. Cr. III. 5 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 333 f
P. 178, comm. left column, line 9: for κεκτηθέας read κεκτηθέας
P. 180, crit. notes, line 3: for τὸ read ὑπο
P. 181, text, 1257 a 38: for καλὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ
P. 183, comm. left col. line 8: for 5, read see
   Ib. line 9: for μεραδύβαμον read μεραδύβαμον
P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below: after selling insert and
CORRIGENDA.

P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: after citizens insert a comma
P. 197, text, 159 b 32: for [kal] read kal
P. 200, text, 156 a 30, right margin: remove 9 from line 30 to line 31
Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: for μᾶς read μᾶς
P. 201, text, 156 a 35, right margin: remove 10 from line 35 to line 36
P. 209, To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. 1. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672
P. 213, text, 156 b 31: for kal et read καὶ et
P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: for III. 8 §§ 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 §§ 2,


P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: for Bk. read Bk.¹
P. 233, text, 163 a 2: for ές καὶ read ές καὶ έν,
P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: for I. 1. 126 read I. 1. 141 § 3
P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: for I. 9. 9 read I. 7. 2, 125 b 24 f
P. 235, text, 163 a 29: for προερευνῶντας read προερευνῶντος
P. 235, text, 163 a 11: for δυνάμει read δυνάμει
P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: for II. § 9 read C. II § 9
P. 279, crit. notes, last line: after Ephesus insert op. cit. fol. 180* p. 610, 16 ft.
ed. Hayduck

P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: for evidences read evidence
P. 281, text, 159 b 18: for δὲi δυνάμεως δύναμιν δύναμιν δυνάμεως
P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: read δυνάμεως
P. 287, comm. left col. line 11: for § 8 § 6 read § 7 § 6
P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: for p. 9 read p. 26
P. 299, comm. left col. last line: for Ottfried read Otfried
P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: for τελείων read τέλεων
P. 305, text, 173 b 9: for δυνάμεως read δυνάμεως
Ib. crit. notes, line 7: after Schneider || add δυνάμεως Π¹ Susem.¹² ¶
P. 305, text, 173 b 13: for τι read τι
Ib. text, 173 b 23: for τοιαθῆν' ημῖν εἰρήνως read εἰρήνως τοιαθῆν' ημῖν
P. 312, text, 173 b 6 (bis, line 4 and line 18): for ἀνωπλῶν read ἀνωπλῶν
Ib. crit. notes, line 3: for 6 ἀνωπλῶν ΠΠΠΑρ. read
6 ἀνωπλῶν Ἑλλ. Ald. Bk. Susem.¹³
P. 314, text, 173 b 25, left margin: dele (12)
P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: dele Aristides
P. 326, line 9: for IV. 130 read IV. 180
P. 331, heading, line 13: for II. 7. 1 read II. 8. 1
P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: for βολαίας read βολαίας
P. 359, text, 175 b 17, left margin: dele (9)
P. 362, text, 176 a 5: for φανεροῦ read φανεροῦ
Ib. text, 176 b 10: read δημοκρατία (νόητο γνωρίζεται
P. 363, text, 176 a 13: dele **
and read συμφέροντας in the parenthesis extends from 176 a 10 (νόητο γνωρίζεται συμφέροντας)
Ib. text, 176 a 14: for καὶ read καὶ
Ib. text, 176 a 15: omit <καὶ>
Ib. text, 176 a 16: for τυπώσατος read τυπώσατος
Ib. crit. notes, line 3: after 14 read [σα] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)
Ib. crit. notes, line 4: dele incorrect
Ib. crit. notes, line 5: after Hayduck add Susem.¹⁴
CORRIGENDA.

P. 364, text, 1776 a 26: for τῷ read [τῷ]

CXLIII. 1801, p. 414 ¶

P. 367, text, 1776 b 30: for δόσεπ read δόσεν
P. 370, comm. left col. last line: for δῶνας read δῶνας
P. 380, text, 1784 b 8: for καὶ εἰ read καὶ εἰ
P. 381, crit. notes, line 2: after (corrector) add a semicolon
P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: for VII(v) read VIII(v)
P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: with change of punctuation read ἔτων (ἠδὲς γὰρ...) διαλογία
P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: transpose φαίων to precede ἔχοντα and read
   φαίων ἔχοντα γε τὰ αὐθαίρετα τάθη πελ τῷ νυκτὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ νῆσου.
P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: for ἀρχεῖων read ἀρχεῖων
   Ib. line 23: for τιθύμια read τιθυμία
   Ib. line 26: for ὅ read ὅ
P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευόντως read πιστεύοντας
   Ib. crit. notes, line 10: after right insert a comma and read πιστευόντας Π(fr.

Bk.¹ Susem.¹

P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: for ev read ὅ
P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "
P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευόντως read πιστεύοντας
P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: for dittography read dittography
P. 464, line 44: for 24 read 23
P. 467, line 5 fl.: delete the sentence. Again, one might have imagined...πολεμα.

Not so.

P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: for καὶ read [καὶ]
P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: for πρὸς read [πρὸς]
   Ib. crit. notes, line 2: for ὑπάρχοντα read ὑπάρχων
P. 503, text, 1338 a 16: for ὅδε read ὅδε
P. 511, text, 1330 b 30: for πῶς μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν πῶς
P. 539, text, 1332 a 13: omit καὶ before ἀναγκαῖοι
P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: for 1284 read 1254
P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: for τοῖνον πάσον read πάσον τοῖνον
P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: transpose δημοσιεύτω in precede καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
   Ib. comm. right col. line 17: for correlation read correlative
P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 fl.: for VIII(v). § 10, 7 § 3 read VIII(v). § 10, 7 § 4
P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: for διὰσω reads διὰσω
P. 545, head line: for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40
P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: for κύκλων ἐγγίσκου read ἐγγίσκου κύκλων
P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: for χρόνων ὄραζον read ὄραζον χρόνων
P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: for ἕνα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν ἕνα
INTRODUCTION.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF THE POLITICS.

Aristotle’s Politics has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P² and P¹ (Bekker’s ¹), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Arethinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century¹. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274², by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex³ which we will call Π; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date⁴. This translation⁵ primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P³,⁶,⁷,⁸, one at Milan M⁹, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Aretinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Arethinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

¹ Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1429 at the request of Palla Strozzi: see the evidence for this in Oncken Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1870. 8vo) vol. I. p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetustis translatione Gulielmi de Moerbeke (Leipzig 1872. 8vo) p. xv.
³ Thomas Acquinas twice quotes it in the Summa contra Gentiles, writing probably A.D. 1261—1265. Tr.]
⁴ The best manuscript of this ‘Old Translation’ expressly states it. See Susenmihl op. cit. xxxiv. See also below p. 49 n. 1, p. 71 ff.
⁵ On the date see Susenmihl op. c. xii.
⁶ With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the 'better,' but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides Π the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M⁺ = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund:

P⁺ = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p', those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.'), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P⁺ was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P⁺ the two families are blended, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P⁺, the principal manuscript of this second family; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P⁺; so also of Aretinus' translation and especially of P⁺; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

1 On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 486) upon Plato’s Republic is quoted in a gloss on viii (v). 12, 8, which in all probability (see note 4) proceeds from this archetype: on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly iii. 14 §§ 12, 13 οὐκίων and οὐκίσθα for οὐκίων and οὐκίσθα). Now uncial writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susenohl ἐπ. c. xiv f., xlvii f.

2 Ordinis superioris.

3 Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

4 For the same glosses which in P⁺ can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P⁺, and a similar origin may be proved for others in P⁺ in another way. On the other hand P⁺ has few glosses in common with P⁺, and the number in P⁺ is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susenohl ἐπ. c. viii f., xviii f.
MANUSCRIPTS.

Aristotle's Politics in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class: II².

P² = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's 1b; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink; these are indicated hereafter by (corr.), (corr.²), (corr.³) and p² respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P³ = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P², especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P² than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P³, like P², was last collated by Susemihl.

II. Worse class: II³.

1. First group.

P⁴ = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susemihl.

P⁵ = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthélemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and E. Rohde.

M^b = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for I. c. i—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for I. cc. i—4.

U^b = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for II. cc. i—7; III. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; VI (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for I. cc. i—4.

L^s = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U^b, collated by Patzig for I. i—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books I. ii. and v (viii). from Stahr and Schneider.

C^o denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Aretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

2. Second group.

C^s = Florentinus Castiglionensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. i—4; ii. i—2 § 3; VI (iv). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q^b = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. i—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books II. III. VI (iv).

R^b = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thetatalos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books VII (vii), VIII (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q^b, particularly to the corrections of Q^b in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S^b = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q^b, to which it bears an extraordinary resem-
MANUSCRIPTS.

blance; collated by Bekker for Books i. iv (vii), v (viii), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. i, and for single passages elsewhere.

\( T^b = \) Urbínas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. v (viii), then again by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to \( V^b \) than to \( Q^b \), \( R^b \), \( S^b \).

\( V^b = \) Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thetalsos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. iv (vii), vi (iv), viii (v), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. i. 1—4) are in striking agreement with \( C^a \).

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to \( U^b L^s \), than to the second.

\( W^b = \) Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. viii (vi), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. i. 1—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by \( P^q = \) Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

\[^1\] Nor is \( P^q \) now quoted under \( II^p \) \( III^p \) or \( II^q \) in the critical notes of this edition.
manuscript now contains only Bk. viii (v), from c. 6 § 9 onwards, Bk. vii (vi), Bk. iv (vii), and Bk. v (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides Γ Mº P³.².³.⁴ Ar., are:

for i. 1—4: Pº Cº Q Mº Q b R b S b T b U b V b W b L² Ald.
  i. 4—6 § 8: Q Mº S b T b.
  i. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end): Q S b T b.
ii. 1, 2: Cº Q b T b U b.
ii. 3—7 § 21: Q b T b U b.
ii. 8—iii. 2 § 3: Q b T b.
iii. 2 § 3: Q b T b U b.
iii. 2 § 3—14 § 1: Q b T b.
iii. 14 §§ 2—10: Q b T b U b.
iii. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end): Q b T b.
iv (vii): Pº S b V b.
v (viii): Pº S b T b.

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthelemy St Hilaire.

II denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,

II' that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including Γ,

II'' that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding P³,

II'' that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (i.e. all the mss. known except Γ Mº P³ P³ P³ P³), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas.³.².³ denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

¹ For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl l.c. pp. v—xxviii.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Götting’s time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P 1-2-3-4-5 and of a few leaves of M 5, which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P 1-2-3 M 5 and almost completely P 4-5, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P 5 (Bekker’s I 0) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the textus receptus. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II 1, the consensus of the mss. of the first family, viz. I, M 5, P 1: failing that, upon P 1-2. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus’ extract (Ecl. eth. ii. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch πεπανευρεῖάς, etc. 1

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

Sepulveda. Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.
Camot. The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.
Vettori (Victorius). First edition of the Politics; Florence, 1552. 4; a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori’s own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori 1, Vettori 2.
Camerarius. Politicorum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.
Zwinger. Edition of the Politics; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori’s 2nd ed.

1 Further particulars in Susemihl’s larger edition as quoted above, p. xlv ff. References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.
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Montecatino. Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the Politics; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. 1), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, ii. p. v.
Giphanius (Van Giffen). Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work: wanting the whole of Bk. V (VIII). and Bk. IV (VII), from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
Scaliger. See Scaligeriana published by Oncken in Eos i. 1864. 410 ff.
Reiske and Gurlitt. In the addenda to Schneider's edition, ii. 471 ff.
J. G. Schlosser. German translation of the Politics and Oeconomics; Lübeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
Garve. A German translation of the Politics edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
J. G. Schneider. Edition of the Politics; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
Götting. Edition of the Politics; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist. (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. De loco quodam Arist. (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings Opuscul. ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
A. Stahr. Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
Lindau. German translation (Oel in, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
Bojesen. *Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles’s Døger om Staten; Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Sorøer Programmes).*

Nicks. *De Aristotelis Politicorum libris; Bonn, 1851.* 8 (Degree dissertation).


Bassow. *Observationes criticae in Aristotelis,* Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik; Weimar, 1864.* 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristotelicae,* Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik,* Weimar, 1862. 4.


Schütz. Gymn.-Programmes: *De fundamentis republicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt,* 1. II.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p.; III. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.


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Chandler. Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions; London, 1866.
Madvig. Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.

Bücheler. In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my Quaestiones criticæ; Greifswald, 1867. 4.
Vahlen. Aristotelische Anfänge II.; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in Philol. Anzeiger v. 1872. 673—676; and an article on ii. 5, 1264 a 1, in the Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn. xx., 1870. 828—830.
Polemaar. Degree dissertation; Tirocinia critica in Arist. Politica; Leyden, 1873. 8.
Triebel. In communications with me by letter.
Diebitsch. Degree diss., De rerum conexu in Arist. libri de re pub.; Breslau, 1875. 8.
Heitland. Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.; Cambridge, 1876. 8.
Bender. Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen; Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.
Freudenthal. In communications with me by letter.
Postgate. Notes on the text and matter of the Politics; Cambridge, 1877. 8.
Von Kirchmann. German translation with notes; Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).
Tegge. In oral communications to me.
J. Cook Wilson. Article in the Journal of Phil. x. 1881. 80—86.

52 p.
II. The Compilation and Subsequent History of the Treatise.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the *Poetics* he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, εἰρητικὸν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδοσιμένοις λόγοις ἱκανόν, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely *On Poets*. Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, ‘histories’ of plants and animals. But not the *Poetics*, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up “our Aristotle,” to use Grote’s phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle’s own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle’s master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master’s

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1 [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper On the composition of Aristotle’s Politics in Verhandlungen der xxx. Philologen-Versammlung, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the *Poetics* (Greek and German), edited by Susemihl (Leipzig, 1874, ed. 2) 1—6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* ii ii chap. 3, 126—138, which should be compared.] See also *Jahrbücher f. Phil.* XIII. 1871, 122—124; *Burian’s Jahresbericht* xvii. 1879, 251—254; and Zeller On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching in *Hermes* XLI. 1876, 84—98.

2 15 § 12, 1454 b 17: see note (268) to Susemihl’s edition of the *Poetics*.

3 276 D: ἔστω τι οὐκ αὑτόσημα οὐκ αὑταρ- ξόμενον, εἰς τὸ λήθη γὰρ ἐὰν ἔστω, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταύτῳ ἄρσιν μενοντι, 278 A: ἀλλὰ τὸ δι’ ἄντι αὐτῶν τοῦ δικτύστου εἰδέναι ὑπόμαιναι γεγονέναι.
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death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the Physics in his possession 1. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the Metaphysics 2, and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the Prior and Posterior Analytics in writings of his own bearing the same titles 3: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the Physics and Ethics of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils; they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the Nicomachean Ethics 4; the latter part of Politics IV (VII). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of De Soph. Elench. are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the Politics appears as πολιτική ἀκρόασις 5, while φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις is still the title borne by the Physics in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove 6.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

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1 See Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften 12. Eudemos wrote to Theophrastos to enquire concerning the reading of a passage in the Physics, Theophrætan γράμματος Εὐδόμων περὶ των αὐτοῦ τῆς θεωρητικῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν καθ’ τὸ πέπτυμα βηθοῦν: "ἔτερ ὲν" φησίν ἐκτέταλαι κελεύον με γράφαν καὶ ἀποτελέσαι ἑκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἦν ἐγώ ὡς ζωτικός, ἢ μικρὸν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τὸν ἀσαφέον τοῦ ὅπερ ἦρε- μῶν καθʼ τὸν ἀκρόασιν μόνον." Simplicius Comm. in Arist. Phys. 231 a 21, Schol. in Arist. (Brandis), 404 b 11 ff.

2 Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the Metaphysics 483, 19 ed. Bonitz: καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἄλλους ἔδει σωτάτεσθαι, καὶ λοιπὸν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀρισ- τοτέλους σωτήτατα...οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ Εὐδόμου εκχώρισται.

3 Alexander, Schol. in Arist. 158 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and Simplicius 60. 509 a 61; see Zeller II ii 71.

4 Staatslehre des Arist. I, 60 (1).

5 Diog. Laert. v. 24.

6 See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Sussemlb Jhrbr. für Phil. Chit. 1871, 122—124.
first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be either that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side⁴, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the Posterior with the Prior Analytics, or the third book of the Psychology with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle⁵. If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopaedia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation⁶, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero⁷. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

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¹ As in the Metaphysics, K cc. 1—7 = B.P.E; A cc. 1—5; M cc. 4, 5 = A c. 9.
² In the Physics, II. vii. Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, are other instances only less striking than those named.
³ So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XXIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastus' library contains a gross exaggeration: see now Burstein's Jahrb. IX. 338; XVI. 253 f.
⁴ n. 5; Diels Doxographi Graeci 187 f., 215 ff., Zeller op. c. II ii 138—144.

arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years
the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained
the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where
a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. vii of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and in some measure in the Poetics; or where
excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the Physics in the
latter part of Bk. xi (K) of the Metaphysics and in part of what is now
Bk. v (A) of the same work.

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfac-
torily to interpret the present condition of the Politics, where traces of
its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations,
glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of
execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet
the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the
finest details, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based
upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand. There is only one

(vol. iv of the Berlin ed.) 25 b 42 f, 81 a
27 f., 404 b 38 f.; Zeller op. c. 11 ii 50 ff.
139 nn. (1), (2), 111 i 620 ff.; Heitz Die
verlorenen Schriften 1—53.
1 See Susseh's ed. of the Poetics,
pp. 3—6.
2 The hypotheses above noticed may
thus be recapitulated. Aristotle did not
himself publish his scientific works. They
may have been edited primarily
(i) from Aristotle's own drafts as
revised after his lectures for the use of his
pupils: supplemented by the use, as
(ii) subsidiary sources, of
(a) Aristotle's own sketches, prepared for
use at his lectures:
(b) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or
without supplements of their own):
(c) passages from works by his pupils:
(d) additions by editors: very rarely
(e) excerpts from his own works.
3 Sober criticism will not be deterred
from attributing the plan to Aristotle
simply because at the beginning of Bk.
iii there is no δὲ in the received text to
correspond to a preceding μὲν οὖν, or beca,
cause a connecting δὲ is sought in vain
in ii at the opening of Bk. ii, and should
at least be altered to γὰρ, if this opening
and the close of Bk. i are to be kept side
by side. Such twofold transitions from
one book to another are found in the
Nicomachean Ethics between iv and v,
vii and viii, ix and x; while between
viii and ix Grant has good ground for
suspecting the words περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ὅπως
ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁποίου ἐλπίσθοι δὲ ὑπὸ ἐλπίδος 
1163 b 27. [On the

transition from Metaph. vi (R) to vii (Z)
see Bonitz ii 294–4.

4 That the work in its present shape is
as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of
Krohn Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften
1 29 ff. (Brandleburg 1872. 4), and Pole-
nar Tirocinia critica in Aristotelis Po-
litica (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense
they are not far wrong; cp. the introduc-
tion to my edition of the Poetics, 4 n. (1).
They suppose the compiler or compilers
to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's
own composition before them, which they
arranged and pieced together for them-
selves into a whole full of contradictions
by borrowing from the writings of Theo-
phrastos and other Peripatetics, or, as
Polenaar thinks, by additions of their
own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest
almost entirely on misapprehensions; and
this is partly true of Krohn's, while others
do not in the remotest degree suffice
to establish such sweeping assertions.
Krohn does indeed allow that the first
book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he
infers that it was originally an independ-
ent work, not reflecting that, when taken
in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage
proves just the opposite; that further the
first chapter has no sense except as an
introduction to the whole of the Politics,
of which we have also an express anticipa-
tion at the commencement of c. 3,
where there is no trace of a change by
another editor. The greater part of
Bk. ii, in which only "isolated pillars"
of Aristotle's structure have been left,
passage of any length, IV (vii). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work. Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated; and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 n. 4. The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, Ἱεράς Σαῦρεις: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on iii. 14. 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (vii) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Niesburh (Kem. Alterth. 578 Isler) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (viii) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (iv), of which c. 15 together with VII (vi), 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (v) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, Ἱερός Σαῦρος: comp. nn. on iii. 14. 9 (624) and VIII (v) 11. 9 (172α). There are some resemblances to the Ἀρεπαγικάκαι of Isocrates: see on iii. 3 § 2, 3, 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 20, IV (vii). 4 § 5, VI (iv). 9 § 7, VII (vi). 5 § 10, VIII (v). 1 § 2. Yet Spengel's assertion "totum Isocratis Areopagicum in usum suum Aristotelis vertit, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt" (Aristotelicae Studia iii. 29) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in Philol. Anzeiger v. 1873, 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (viii) is that ἔνθεωρετίον, ἔνθεωρετικόν are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings.—Ἅνθεωρετικόν only in the Problems, ἔνθεωρετίον only in the dialogue On Philosophy,—whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

1 But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see notes on IV (vii). 1 § 2 f., § 15. Another well-written chapter is VI (iv). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of "the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Suspimil loc. cit. p. 679.

2 To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polenaar lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard mere unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Suspimil loc. cit. 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:
same topic; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous lacunae of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether. The right order has often been disturbed. The two grossest instances are that Books vii and viii should come before Bk. iv, and Bk. vi before Bk. v (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us). No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient. For to all appearance

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11. §§ 8–14.

III. 17 §§ 3, 4.

IV (vii). 2 § 3–4; § 1, 10 §§ 1–9.

V (viii). 7 §§ 13, 14.

VI (iv). 5 §§ 1–2.

VII (vii). 2 §§ 7 ( τρα... βασιλεια), 3 §§ 9–3 §§ 6.

VIII (v). 6 §§ 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5–10, 12 §§ 1–6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7–18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 §§ 18; III. 14 § 15, 15 §§ 11; VI (iv). 7 §§ 5, 14 §§ 5.

On VI (iv). 14 §§ 11–15 see below p. 65 n. (1).

Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon IV (vii). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (vii). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and n. on IV (vii). 13 §§ 8 (881).

Besides the end of Bk. vii and the beginning of IV (vii) see II. 7 §§ 10–13 = 7 §§ 18–21, III. 12 §§ 7–10 = 16 §§ 10–13; IV (vii). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; VIII (v). 1 § 1; 7 §§ 1, 10 §§ 14 = 10 §§ 25.

2 See particularly I. 8 §§ 3, 10 §§ 1, 12 §§ 1–2, 12 §§ 6, 6 §§ 3, 11 §§ 5.

III. 3 §§ 2, 12 §§ 6, 13 §§ 3, 6, 16 §§ 2; IV (vii). 11 §§ 2, 12 §§ 11, 14 §§ 7; V (vii). 7 §§ 15; VI (iv). 8 §§ 7, 8, 10 §§ 3, 11 §§ 1, 12 §§ 5; VIII (vi). 4 §§ 1, 8 §§ 24; VIII (v). 1 §§ 7, 7 §§ 9, 10 §§ 25, 13 §§ 11, 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: 'necem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare sagerit' Göttinger severingly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. ixi.

4 The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489); and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1449). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scaino da Salo Quinquaginta Quaestiones ad octo libros de republica (Rome 1777), Conring, Barthélemy St Hilaire, Spengel Über die Politik Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. Arist. Studien 11. 44 ff. (Munich 1862), Nickes De Arist. Politicorum libris (Bonn 1851), Brandis in his history Griech. Röm. Philos. 11 ii 1666 ff., 1770 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Wollmann in the Rhenishisches Museum (New Series) 11. 1842. 321–354, Forchhammer in Philologus XVI. 1861. 50–68, Bendixen in Philiologus XIII. 1828. 364 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in Der alte Staat der Aristoteles (Hamburg 1868. 410), by Krohn op. cit. 30, and Diebitsch De rerum conexu in Arist. libris de re publica (Breslau 1873).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Conring; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. He was followed by Spengel and even by Wollmann, but was opposed not merely by Bendixen, Forchhammer, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even by Hildenbrand Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie 1 (Leipzig 1860) 371 f., and by Zeller op. cit. 11 ii 572 f. n. (3), although they have accepted the first transposition, Hildenbrand under certain conditions and Zeller unreservedly. See below p. 88 n. 2.

6 See Jahrbücher für Philologie xcix. 1869. 592–610, cit. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraphs in the text.
even the epitome in Stobaeus\(^1\) presents the traditional arrangement\(^2\); and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Areios Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas\(^3\). Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said\(^4\), the text of the Politics has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see\(^5\), in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a Politics in the Alexandrian library attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos\(^6\); consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle’s writings in Diogenes of Laertes\(^7\) and in the Anonymus of Ménage\(^8\). The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippus of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library\(^9\). Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian Politics\(^10\); even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise\(^11\). And it is

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4. See p. 13 n. 4.
5. See p. 47 ff.
6. Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: *op. c. II ii 678 (1).
7. V. 24: *πολιτική διαφορά* [def. 1] (for the ms. ένα σκοιδεν* Θεουρέας* 6–6. Cp. Usener *Analpha Theophrastos* 16 Leipzig 1848: Zeller *op. c. II i 579 (1); Susenholz’ critical edition of the *Politics XIIII n. (73).*
8. πολιτική διαφορά* ή (so the Ambrosian ms. discovered by Rose: see Berlin Aristotle v. 1467, No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave K, which Zeller *op. c. II ii 76 ed. 2 had conjectured to be a mistake for H. Rose suggests that the Anonymus was Hesychios of Mileitus, fl. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy’s catalogue the work occurs as No. 32, *liber de regimine civilitatem et nominat utilitium tractatius* VIII (Berlin Aris. vol. v. p. 1471).
9. See the Introduction to my edition of the *Politics* (ed. 2) 19 ff.
11. See my third ed. of the *Politics XIX* note #; *End. Eth. VII. 2 1238 b 5 ff.* should be compared with *Pol. IV (VII), 13 §§ 5–7; End. Eth. VIII. 3 1248 b 26 ff., 1249 a 12, with Pol. IV (VII), 13 §§ 7.* Compare further *End. Eth. IIII. 2 1231 b 38–1232 a 5* with *Pol. I. 9 §§ 2 1257 a 6–10; End. Eth. III. 11 1227 b 19–23* with *Pol. IV (VIII), 13 §§ 3 1334 b 26–38; *End. Eth. VII. 10 1342 b 8 f.* with *Pol. IIII. 6 §§ 3–5 1278 b 21–30, exp. 21 f., 25 f.* See also Zeller in *Hermes* XV. 1886. 553–556, who compares *End. Eth. IIII. 1 1218 b 32 ff.* with *Pol. IV*
highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—100 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippus and Apollion of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal, while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero. It is true he did not use it directly and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; its traces of use are extremely scanty, and it is in

(vii. l. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 271; and Eud. Eth. l. 1, 1219 a 33 with Pol. iv (vii.) 8, 5, 1328 a 25.

1 See Strabo l.c., Plutarch l.c.

2 Pohlenz op. cit. p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

3 De fin. v. 4, 11, ad Quint. fratr. iii. 5, 1, De leg. iii. 6, 14, De rep. l. c. 25 (comp. Pol. iii. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 §§ 2, 1, 2 §§ 9), c. 26 (cp. Pol. iii. 1 §§ 1, 6 §§ 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. Pol. iii. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 §§ 3), c. 29 (cp. Pol. vi. (iv.) c. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (op. c. 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation ad Quint. fr.

4 See Zeller op. c. ii p 151 n. 6.

5 So Zeller l.c. Whether the author of the Magna Moralia in 1, 4, 1164 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with Politics iv (vii.) 13, 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

6 Cp. ad Att. iv. 4 §§ 1, 8 a § 2, ad Qu. fr. ii. 4 §§ 3, 111. 4 §§ 5, 6.

7 Alexander of Aphrodisias On the Metaphysics 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz): Eubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, Ἐνακέψις τῶν ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτελοῦς ἐν δεύτερῳ τῶν πολιτείων παρὰ τὸν Ἡρακλῆσιον ἀνατρεπμένων ed. Mat. Script. nov. coll. Vat. ii. 677 ff.: Julian Letter to The-
GENERAL ESTIMATE.

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the Politics of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke; on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work.

III. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

At the time when the Politics was first made known to medieval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it ‘the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science’. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar’s acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher’s systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman’s shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increases the improbability of Krohn’s assertion mentioned p. 15 n. above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that Pol. iii. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastos. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

3 See above p. 1.

2 That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d’Aristote 303 f., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition vi no. (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in Rh. Mii. XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus died 1280.]

3 On this subject generally see Oncken l. c. 1. 64—86. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Ceresme: cp. Roscher in the Zeitschrift f. d. Staatwissensch. XIX. 1863. 305 ff.

4 Zeller op. c. II ii 753 f. Compare Bradley’s admirable exposition in Hel lenica (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland’s translation of Bks. I. III. IV (vii) p. 15 (London 1877. 8), ‘Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally sublimis foris sidera vertice, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature’. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant Aristotle 117 ff.

5 Zeller op. c. II ii 707, 708.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief; so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own\(^1\) and Plato's\(^2\) cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers\(^3\).

The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

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Comp. also III. 4. 8 n. (475), VI (IV). 3. 7 n. (1158). To this list may be added Phales II. 7, 13 § 12, Hippodamios II. 8, Thimbrón or Thibron, IV (VII). 14. 17 and perhaps Telecles VI (IV). 14. 4. n. (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see n. on IV (VII). 14. 16 (911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper "Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato" in the Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte Staatswissensch. IX. 1853. 115—182.

2. Laws I. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cp. on the latter passage n. on II. 6. 17 (319), on the former Hildenbrand op. cit. 358 n. (2).

DEPENDENCE ON PLATO.

21 evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the Republic and the Laws; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them. Further, the Laws proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the Republic of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

1 I may refer to the notes on
1. 13. 16 (127) IV (vii). 6. 5 (774).
11. 5. 2 (153) IV (vii). 10. 13 (838).
11. 5. 7 (128) IV (vii). 12. 2 (859).
11. 5. 15 (166) IV (vii). 15. 10 (936).
12. 5. 6 (192) IV (vii). 16. 1 (937).
12. 6. 10 (208) IV (vii). 16. 13 (944).
12. 7. 6 (336 b) IV (vii). 16. 15 (946).
12. 9. 5 (385) V (viii). 5. 4 (1074).
11. 9. 23 (535) V (viii). 5. 5 (1023).
also to Thirout études sur Aristote 109 ff.
(Paris 1866. 8), Van der Rest Platon et
Aristote 453 ff. (Bruxelles 1866. 8).
2 Zeller op. c. II 7 83 (Eng. tr. Plato p. 493). More precise details are given
in Steinhart introductions to Plato's Works
v. 238 ff., Susemkohl Plut. Phil. II. 226 ff.
3 Reference may be permitted to the
notes on the following passages:
EIk. I. 2 § 1 n. (1); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8
(84); 9 § 18 (42); 10 §§ 4, 5 (98); 11 § 6
(102); 13 § 12 (121), 13 § 16 (127);
EIk. II. 2 §§ 1, 2 (153), 5 § 10 (167),
5 § 17 (168), 5 §§ 19-24 (172); 6 § 5
(192), 6 § 6 (201), 6 § 9 (206 b) (207).
6 § 5 (151); 8 § 21 (273) (274), 8 § 25
(277); 9 § 2 (279), 9 § 8 (283) (288).
9 § 11 (295 b), 9 § 13 (297), 9 § 10 (316).
9 § 25 (350), 9 § 27 (353), 9 § 31 (342).
9 § 34 (344).
EIk. III. 3 § 9 (460); 4 § 18 (499).
7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (673).
16 § 11 (657).
EIk. IV (VII). 6 § 5 (274); 7 § 2 (781).
10 § 13 (828); 12 § 2 (829), 12 § 3 (860).
12 § 8 (866) (867); 14 § 13 (907); 14 § 14
(908); 15 § 10 (936); 16 § 1 (937), 16
§ 12 (944), 16 § 14 (945), 16 § 15 (946).
16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950), 17 § 5 (959).
EIk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1006), 4 § 7
(1014), 4 § 9 (1015) (1016), 5 § 3 (1022).
6 § 2 (1064), 6 § 9 (1074); 7 § 9 (1075).
EIk. VI (IV). 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 3
(1139) (1140).
EIk. VII (VI). 2 § 3 (1391).
EIk. VIII (V). 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10
(1724) (1725), 11 § 11 (1727), 11 § 12
(1729); 13 § 8 (1752), 13 § 9 (1754).
the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognizes in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages; hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting. Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

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1 I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff Aus Kydathen 47—54 (Berlin 1880, 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

2 Comp. on 1. 2. 4 note (11), 1. 2. 6 n. (19 b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, op.c. 110—113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

3 See the notes on 1. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).
CONTRAST TO PLATO.

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato\textsuperscript{1}, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular\textsuperscript{2}. By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premises, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

IV. ECONOMIC (OIKONOMIKH)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH\textsuperscript{3}.

The opening chapters, Bk. i. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village\textsuperscript{4}. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important\textsuperscript{5} that man, and

\textsuperscript{1} See the notes on i. 1 § 2, 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{2} See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—26 and note on II. 2. 2 (131).

\textsuperscript{3} On this and the following sections comp. Susenhol's op. cit. On the composition of the Politics 17—29.

\textsuperscript{4} Mommens's account in the History of Rome, i c. 3. p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877. 8), may be compared.

\textsuperscript{5} Van der Rest op. c. 371. That from this proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (op. c. II. 29 f.) maintains, is undeniable: yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 35) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, ἀνθρώπου, is either exalted above humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion;
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properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being
destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual com-
bination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own
spontaneous act, quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out
of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to de-
velope them.

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the
theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (οἰκονομικὸν
cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this
ture of the account of slavery c. 4 ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to
custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase,
or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted
by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes,
Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all
slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named
theory was many centuries in advance of the age; and beyond all doubt
its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the
possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time.
Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it
did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him,
that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle
deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as
when Aristotle wrote it.

1 Hildenbrand op. cit. 393 f., Oncken
op. cit. ii. 18 ff. Comp. n. on I. 2, 15
(28 b).

2 Post. c. 4 §§ 1—6.

3 See on I. 3 § 9 n. (46). 6 § 8 (54).

4 Even in the time of the Roman em-
pire voices like Seneca's remained un-
supported. The whole order of ancient
society was once for all established on
the basis of slavery, and even Christianity,
although it contained in itself the prin-
ciple which must lead to its extinction,
could make no alteration for the time
being. The primitive Christian Church
may have indirectly prepared for the
abolition of slavery (see Lecky History of
Rationalism ii. 248 ff.), but it was directly
hostile to such a change. See for proof
and elucidation of this statement L.
Schiller Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der
Sklaverei 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847, 4) and
Oncken op. cit. ii. 60—74. It should be
remembered that even now all the traces
of slavery have not as yet disappeared
amongst Christian nations, one of the
most important having only been de-
stroyed by the recent civil war in North
America; that serfdom was but lately
abolished in Russia, and the last rem-
nants of it in Germany were not removed
until the present century. [If the status
of slavery is not tolerated openly in Chris-
tendom, there is much analogy to it in the
position of uncivilized tribes in relation
to European peoples in colonial settle-
ments, e.g. that of the South-African
natives to the Boers, under the guise
of indenture. But the system of labour
recruiting in the Western Pacific for
Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that
no irregularities occur, and the coolie
traffic generally (whether in English,
French, or Spanish possessions) have
equally the effect of placing ignorant and
unprotected natives entirely at the mercy
of their employers, and that, too, in a
strange country. H. W. J.]

5 So Hildenbrand rightly thinks op. c.
405.
difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect; that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved. ‘The thought that slavery is incompatible with the dignity of man’ has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet ‘the thought of the universality of man’s dignity’. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave’s soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature’s freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs. Yet in all fairness it ought to

1 See on 1. 4 § 7, 5 § 8, 6 § 9 n. (45).
2 Hildenbrand op. cit. 424 f.
3 6 § 3, 5 § 8 n. (58), 6 § 9 n. (56), 5 § 10 n. (57).
4 Comp. the notes on 1. 6 § 9 (56), and 6 § 3 (50).
5 Compare also the notes on 1. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.
6 See the notes on 1. 5 § 8 (43) and 5 § 9 (45).
7 Comp. the notes on 1. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (54).
be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better\textsuperscript{1}, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify servitude or slavery by similar fallacies\textsuperscript{2}. Nay more, Aristotle’s arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him\textsuperscript{4}.

The more general discussions on production and property\textsuperscript{4} which follow the investigation into slavery, i. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it ‘in a fairly systematic manner’\textsuperscript{3}, but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly\textsuperscript{4}. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (i. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole\textsuperscript{7}.

\textsuperscript{1} Oncken op. cit. ii. 73 f.
\textsuperscript{2} Oncken op. cit. ii. 38.
\textsuperscript{3} On this subject see some remarks of Lang, op. c. 60, and Bradley op. c. 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on i. 5. 10 (47) and iii. 5. 7 (51 f).
\textsuperscript{4} \{Both are included under \textit{χρηματιστική}. The Greek \textit{kτήσις} and the German \textit{Erwerb} more properly mean \textit{‘Acquisition’}, Plato indeed, \textit{Soph.} 219 c, d, opposes \textit{kτήσις} to \textit{πόρισμα}, classing all the ‘arts’ under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. \textit{‘Production’}; that is, production of wealth. \textit{Tr.}\}
\textsuperscript{5} As Teichmüller asserts \textit{Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudänomie} 148 (St Petersburg 1859. 8).
\textsuperscript{6} Zeller op. c. 11 ii 693.
\textsuperscript{7} See on i. 12. 1 n. (107).
However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. ‘The axiom ‘that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures ‘of the earth, we also hold to be true’; and the proposition, which Aristotel is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man’s relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing: in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsman who wanders without a home; nor does he bring it into inseparable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture. Agriculture moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades, and ‘the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsman, the hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and with even less trouble than they do: thus the notion of individual labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background in Aristotle’s view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a further natural species of production standing on the same footing with the former species.’

Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

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1 op. cit. II. 75—114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.
2 Cp. also on VII (VI). 4. 11 n. (422).
3 See IV (VII). 9 §§ 3. 4 οὔτε βάσανον βλεψιν οὔτε ἀγοραὶ δεῖ τὴν τῶν πολίτων... αἰῶνες δεῖ γεωργός εἶναι, ἣ 8 ἅναγκαιον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς σοφοὺς ἢ βαρβάρους [ὁ] περιοικον: 10 §§ 9—13: further Exc. III. on Dk. 1 and n. (282) on II. 9. 4.
plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated, but the whole discussion is evidence how acutely Aristotle has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to add. Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

1 See on 1. 8. 7 n. (71) and 1. 9. 8 n. (84).  
2 Van der Rest op. c. p. 382.
him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital. He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself, but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it. The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual.

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1 See on I. 9. 8 n. (82).
2 See on I. 9. 8 n. (84).
3 But see on the other hand the note on I. 9. 11 (87).
4 Cp. on I. 9. 11 n. (88).
5 Comp. the notes on I. 9 § 13 (90), § 18 (93).
understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, that second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the forces of nature. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aristotle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, is not a producer at all, but consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aristotle took of money it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age, he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that the free community of antiquity was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is here (t. 11 §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a knowledge of the market. Consequently the separation which Aristotle has made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

1 Cp. n. on I. 9. 18 (93).  
2 Cp. nn. on I. 10 §§ 4, 5.  
3 Comp. Lecky sp. c. II. 277—289.  

Lang sp. c. 59. [See however Cunningham Christian Opinion on Usury pp. 26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]
essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he
insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he
mentions the πολιτικός who controls the finances of a state as well as the
οἰκονόμος who manages the property of a household, and that too in a
way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the proce-
dure in both cases are completely similar'; I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3,
11 § 11. With this agrees the decided irony1 with which he speaks of
those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial
devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state
coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great
revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with
'perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life
'and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a
'circle of several families (I. 9, 5). What changes then are to be antici-
pated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when
'intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in
'a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of
'each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenable-
'ness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly
'manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire
into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar
view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which
he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature
to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain
extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one
hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and
not merely one of degree, between the virtue (ἁρμονία) of the man, the
woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own
subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue2, as soon as the question
is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which
commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere
quantitative variation than to really distinct species3—to say nothing of
the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that
of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only
defect which this enquiry displays4.

1 Strangely misunderstood by Oncken
L.c. II. 115, who in consequence unjustly
accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradic-
tion here. While admitting that many
states need such devices, Aristotle does
not thereby imply that he thinks this a
proof of the excellence of such states.
2 On the way in which Aristotle dis-
tinguishes intellectual from moral excel-
ence see on I. 13, 6 n. (114).
3 Van der Rest op.c. 378. Comp. also
n.n. on I. 13 § 7 (114 b) and on §§ 11—13
(120—122).
4 See the n.n. on I. 13, 12.
V. The Review of Preceding Theories and Approved Constitutions.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle’s own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, III. 15 § 2, VI (iv). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable¹ that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phales, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses² of many of the positive features of Aristotle’s own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato’s Republic ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed ‘the philosopher’s practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human nature and of political and domestic life.’ Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well-meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism³ have disclosed very little that will

¹ If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (676) and (1130); also Hildenbrand op. c. 351 f., Zeller op. c. 11 und 677.
² See II. 5 §§ 7 n. (268), § 15 n. (166), § 17 n. (168), § 25 n. (183); 6 §§ 7 ff. n. (607), §§ 10—14 nn. (209—211); §§ 15—19 nn. (216—219), § 22 n. (230); 7 §§ 5 nn. (234—236), § 6 l. nn. (236 b, 237 b); 9 §§ 2 n. (279), § 5 n. (285); 14 n. (300), § 18 n. (313), § 30 n. (339), § 31 n. (341); 10 §§ 8 n. (356); § 9 n. (368); 11 §§ 3 n. (381), § 4 n. (385), § 6 n. (388).§ 7 n. (391), § 10 n. (393), § 15: 12 §§ 5 n. (413).
³ Zeller op. c. 11 und 697 f.
⁴ The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich De judicio ab Aristotele de re publica Platonica facta (Halle 1868, 8). Amongst the modern similar attempts have been partially made by Câmerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pinzger De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit (Leipzig 1822, 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.
CRITICISM OF EARLIER THEORIES.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's Laws. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phææas, 7 § 6 ff, Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the Laws disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character. The refutation of

1 See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (141) (151): § 8 (144), § 10 (160), § 16 (167), §§ 20-23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).
2 See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 10 (170), § 24 (179), § 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187) (189): also on 5 § 22 (177), 6 § 5 (193).
3 See Zeller Plat. Studien 203 ff. (Tübingen 1829. 8).
4 Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest op. c. 108 ff., 121 ff., 221 ff., 338 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5. 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10-15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.
5 See on II. 6. 5.
6 See on II. 5 § 7 n. (168), § 15 n. (169), 7 § 6 n. (236 b). How Van der Rest op.c. 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.
7 It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Bröcker Politicorum, quae docuerunt Plato et Aristotelis, disquisition et comparatio (Leipzig 1824. 8), Orges Comparativo Platonis et Aristotelis librorum de republica (Berlin 1843. 8), Pierson Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Anschauung vom Staate in der Rhein. Mus. XIII. 1858, 1-48, 269-247, Rassow Die Republik des Plato und der erste Staat des Aristoteles (Weimar 1866. 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the Republic, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the Laws and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212): 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b): 9 § 5 (285): IV (VII). 16 § 15.
8 See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7 (205).
Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance.

We may admit then with Oncken* that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view: and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it. However much to the purpose the

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* See the Excursus II on Hippodamus at the end of Bk. II.

* See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.
objections which he brings against Hippodamios with regard to his division of the civic body; they are defective from the jurist’s point of view; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as ipso facto disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions; indeed apart from it we should know next to

1 Compare the notes on II. § 2 (258), § 9 (264), § 24 (276); but on the other hand II. § 13 n. (268).
2 See the notes on II. §§ (258), § 15 (268).
3 Trierer Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfasungs geschichte 99 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavours to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. Here I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. lxxi f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert Studien zur altspartanischen Geschichte pp. 86—109 (Göttingen 1872. 8) endeavoured to show that on the contrary Ephoros made use of the Politics of Aristotle. Frick in the Jahrb. für Philol. cv. 1873 p. 647 made reply to him that Ephoros’ work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said to 355; for all that follows was added by Demophilos, the son of Ephoros, probably after his father’s death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his Politics as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Müller Fragm. hist. Gr. ii p. 131. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Müller on the authority of Meier, Rose Aristotelis pseudographus p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the Polieides did not appear until the period between the years 318 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1863. 8.) p. 247 sq. Arist. frg. p. 243 in the Paris edition of Aristotle, rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true author, but only that the work was first published after his death with additions by the editor. For the genuineness of the groundwork at least has been sufficiently made out by Heitz and by Bergk Zur Aristotelischen Politik der Athenen (On a fragment of the Politics found lately, treating of Athens), in the Rhein. Mus. xxxvi. 1881. 87—115: cp. Susemihl in Burstein’s Jahrbücher, xxx. 1882. 20—23. If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be completely refuted. But leaving the correctness of these dates an open question, it is not very probable, to say the least, that Aristotle should have published thus early a work like the Polieides based upon such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken op.c. ii p. 326 ff. by the help of fragments of this work which we still possess on the Polity of Lacedaemon, has tried to prove that Aristotle, quite independently of Ephoros, was the first to investigate Spartan constitutional history in true scientific spirit; that he probably visited Sparta himself for this purpose and drew information there from living oral tradition. The difficulties in connexion with this hypothesis are patent, and with reference to Crete at any rate the coincidence between Aristotle and Ephoros is of such a kind that in accordance with the line of argument above Aristotle must have used either Ephoros or his authority: see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (354), 354, § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible: see the notes on II. 9 § 17 (310); 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359); viii (v), 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2 (1502), 11 § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771), and compare Rose op. cit. 398, 490. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephoros was Aristotle’s only authority.
nothing of the Carthaginian constitution: moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master. On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and

here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephoros in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on II. 6. 17, II. 9. 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephoros, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized: see on II. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (368); VI (iv), IV § 15 (1301).

3 In spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Triebel æd. cit. p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history. In our time while at the same time he would fail to persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement? Why should not a part of the mischief discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not noticeable until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and banefulness? And the procedure which Triebel commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on II. 9. 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Triebel and others—that the readiness of the Spartan epochs and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Fülleborn in a note to Garve's translation II p. 248 says most sensibly: "Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history; and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind." But should not this consideration be extended to other cases? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the changes, should we directly and hesitantly pronounce these later authorities right? See the notes on II. 9 § 14 (299, 300), § 15 (303).

4 Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself II. 9 § 34 (ep.-note). See further the notes on II. 9 § 5 (484), II 11 (193 b), § 20 (318), § 33 (324), § 98 (330), § 17 (332), § 31 (341).
CRITICISM OF EXISTING CONSTITUTIONS.

Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle's model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato's.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon's as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book.¹

VI. THE LEADING PROPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle's own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked,² our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former³ and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others.⁴ More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cc. 1,

¹ See further the notes on II. 13 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).
² P. 21.
⁴ Hidenbrand, op. c. 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II: the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive 'solution of the problem'—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I—'whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.'
2: the essential identity of a state c. 3; the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, firstly, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτείαι). As we are told in Bk. 1., the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ἄρθρα πολιτείαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβολαὶ) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολиτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider secondly a series of difficult problems (ἀποστολαὶ). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13. From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

1 The subdivisions of VIII. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

(A) First main division: cc. 1—5
   (a) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
   (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
   (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.

(B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
   (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
   (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀποστολαὶ): cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8

The comparative merit of constitutions: cc. 9—13

(α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9

(β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11

(γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.
LEADING PRINCIPLES.

This is followed by the inference (β) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (ἀρχαρχεῖα) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (καθώσι). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author's essential independence of Plato¹, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles ², he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life³, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

¹ Spengel Uber Arist. Pol. 15 n. 18, Henkel, op. cit. 80, n. 12, Oncken op. c. 1165 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the conceit of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato 'nothing was so certain as that the Demos 'meant the sovereignty of folly, and the 'rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.' But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle's own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange exegesis.

² For this reason Oncken's assertion l. c. 173, that the exposition given 11 §§ 15, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles' time, is not correct.

³ Whether Trendelenburg in Natur-
external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion¹, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses; but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is ‘far too well-trained a realist,’ to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force². He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders³; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit of the true statesman who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

¹ Demosth. Fals. leg. 135: ὥσ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον ἄντικαμηστὸν πράγμα πάντων ἄντικαμηστὸν, ἡσυχὴ ἐν δαίμονι προτόμα ἀκατάστατον, ἡσυχὴ τῆς κυρίας ὑποκειμενος.
² Oncken op. c. II. 168.
³ Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. vi. 39. 1: also Pericles ib. II. 40, Otanes in Herod. iii. 80 s. fin.
the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the
body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence
can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected
through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical
point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can
be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3)
which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the
public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a
truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of
the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more dis-
putable than on that of public life, where the weak and woe of each
individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees
further than all the intelligence of the experts. Plato is of quite
another opinion (Laws iii. 700 E ff.), and "nothing is easier than by
resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of
mere cyphers": but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the
poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in
order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with
which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be
matched. Spengel is undoubtedly right: these chapters (iii. cc. 9—
13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere
in the work, doctrines "which deserve to be written in letters of gold."

This section ends with the remark (iii. 11. 20) that all this does not
as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that
those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In
other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its
complete form that of the degenerate varieties, is not yet decided. We

1 See however the notes on iii. 11 § 2
(565 b), 15 § 8 (647).
2 Yet on the other hand see Sphyn. 194.
3 Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. Memor. III. 7 in the
case of the popular assembly (Vettori).
4 Oncken ii. 169 f. 'What,' he rightly
adds, 'would have become of the Ger-
man drama of Lessing, Goethe, and
Schiller, had its fate rested solely with
the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolai
down to the romantic school?' It is
however a mistake to suppose that the
further step from this "passive" popular
sovereignty to the "active sovereignty,
which finds expression in the self-govern-
ment of the Demos by the Demos" was
also taken by Aristotle, "when he rec-
ognized Polity as a form of government
on an equality with Monarchy and Aris-
tocrcy" (Oncken ii. 169, 239 f.). For
(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as
standing on an equality with the other
two forms of government, vi (iv). 8 1;
and (2) no greater rights are granted to
the people in a Polity than in an aristo-
cracy or a moderate democracy, vi (iv).
14. §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made
the assertion (ii. 174) that Aristotle in-
variably subordinated to the law and the
popular decree the wisdom and virtue of
even the best individual citizen, he must
surely have forgotten the substance of
iii. c. 13, c. 17 §§ 5—8.
5 Arist. Stud. ii. p. 54 (646).
6 In general the result of the preceding
statements is that Democracy is pref-
erable to Oligarchy, and the latter prefer-
able to a Tyranny; but whether and how
far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank
before an unrestrained democracy has not
yet been decided.
naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser\(^1\) was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays\(^2\) declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion προί βασιλείας, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13\(^3\), there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays’ view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in cc. 13 § 11 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in c. 11 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context\(^4\). On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands\(^5\), might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: ‘If however an individual man is superior to all the citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law as absolute king and ruler.’ The question of c. 11 § 20 noticed above\(^6\) would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From c. 11 § 8 it would

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2 In the note to his translation, p. 171.
3 Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, φᾶτε γὰρ πῶς ὁ δῆσων πολέμων μιᾶς εἶναι ταύτης τ. e. βασιλείας (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there mentioned. But surely it is enough that in c. 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the best constitution and the corrupt forms.
4 Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.
5 As Conring saw.
6 P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 3.
follow, in contradiction to Aristotle’s view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—Are the best ‘laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the ‘majority?’—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at II § 20; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete. There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (II § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, II § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable, but in such works as those of Aristotle’s which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted.

1 See the note on III. 11. 8 (369).
2 τὸν τὸν νομοθέτη νομοθετήσαν, βουλευόμενον τίθενται τοῖς ὀρθοτάτοις νόμοις, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βασιλέων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλείων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ἰδοινος μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ εἶπα τοῦ ἱμίμοον κείμενοι νόμοις, ἐκεῖν τὸν ἅψιν...πληθυντὸ γε φανερῶ ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τῆς πολιτείας κείμεθαι τῶν νόμων, II. § 20.
3 See Thurot’s excellent and convincing analysis Etudes 47 ff., from which Susenohl should not have expressed partial dissent in Philologus XXIX. 113—15 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (599). Compare also Susenohl Compar. der Arist. Pol. 23 ff. (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be rescinded) and in part Spengel Arist. Stud. III. 24.

* See again the note on III. 13. 12.
5 Cp. the note on III. 11. 7.
6 See on III. 13. 12 ff. (599).
in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (Πολιτεία)\(^1\); as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy\(^2\).

VII. Monarchy and the Best State.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. III cc. 14—17, the second Bk. IV and V (in the old order VII, VIII), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective; but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

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\(^1\) See the note last quoted.

\(^2\) See vi (iv). 2, 3 with \textit{nn.} (1136, 1137). If this premise be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.
produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phoenician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind. It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in Polity (Πολιτεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

1 Spengel Arist. Stud. II. 57: "Basileia is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation; and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various ἀποφάσεις the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government. Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel put the question Ueb. Arist. Pol. 16—Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the discussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of. This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminent-ly best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 3).

2 And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

3 See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (612).

4 See Henkel 29, c. 95, n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§9, 10 with n. (1665).
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than to base it exclusively upon personal merits\(^1\), so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions\(^2\). This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. viii (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind\(^3\). It may be surprising that the philosopher’s relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle’s is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (πόλις) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (ἐθνός), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, iv (vii). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world\(^4\). But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

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\(^1\) See the n. on III. 13. 9; also VI (iv). 2. 2, VIII (v). 1 § 11 with n. (1503), to §§ 36, 37 n. (1708).

\(^2\) Henkel op. c. 86.

\(^3\) So Hegel Gesch. d. Phil. II. 401, Hildbrand op. c. 436. Recently Oncken (op. c. 1. 16 ff., 188 ff., 2. 26 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the Politics. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrik Litt. Centralbl. 1879 coll. 1177–1179; Henkel op. c. 89 n. (19); 97 n. (36); Bradley op. c. 179, 238 ff.; Susseh in the Jahrb. f. Philol. CIIL. 1877. 133–139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Burnand’s philol. Jahrb. III. (1874–5). 370 ff.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 § 15 (623); 17 § 5 (678): VI (iv). 11 § 19 (1703). The last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partisan, made by Bernays Phikion, pp. 40–42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz Antiagon von Karyote 1881, 185 ff. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Burnand’s Jahrb. XXX. 1882. 11. 15 ff. Compare also Hug Deismotheres as a political thinker (Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum 1. 51–103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (Deutsche Litteraturzeitung 1882, col. 1081 ff.) has already somewhat modified his position: see Jahrb. I. c. 18 ff., where I have also explained why the passage IV (vii). 2. 11 (cp. the note) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

\(^4\) Cp. the note there (782).
of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the Polities, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development. He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever in this process.' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on. Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period; that the same development of mental culture, of social and military organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. 'And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of development through which the political world of Hellas passed.'

The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

1 Onken II. 169, cp. 137 f.
2 Cp. the notes on III. 14, § 12 (627), 15 §§ 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).
3 Henkel op. c. 94. But certainly this description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Onken's remarks. Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.
4 Henkel op. c. 96 f.
form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order
but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who
would investigate wherein the best constitution consists must first
determine what is the best life'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of
the state the one serves as an aid to the other. And this circumstance
loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by
Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even
then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh
and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the
first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to
where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be
sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as
was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this
written work. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second
preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and
the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is
more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of
the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer
is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is
settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle. To the
genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really funda-
mental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of
it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when de-
scribing his ideal, iv (vii). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same
time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much
more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole
practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows, as in the
Ethics and Metaphysics, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of
practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one
living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation
of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards
the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim.

1 In the text both versions will be
found at the commencement of Book IV
(vii).
2 Cp. in particular Spengel Ueb. Arist.
Pol. 17 ff., Arist. Stud. II. 60 (603 b) ff.,
and Susemihl in the Jahrb. f. Philol.
xcix. 1869. 604 ff.
3 See the notes on iv (vii). 1 § 2. 10
4 See the notes on iv (vii). 2 §§ 3—6,
§ 11 (725). § 76 (729); 3 § 3. § 6 (741),
5 IV (vii). 15 §§ 8—10, v (viiii). c. 3,
c. 5 § 4, with nn. (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14.
Cp. the notes on iv (vii). 14 § 8 (903),
15 § 2 (921): v (viiii). 2 § 1 (977): also on
viii. 8 § 5 (901, 902). § 10 (1032), and
Excurus i upon Bk. v (viiii).
6 See the passages quoted by Zeller II
ii 614 n. 1.
7 Cp. Exc. i at the end of Bk. v (viiii).
THE BEST STATE.

is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (viii), it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided. We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. ii, but also in Bk. iii. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy. And Aristotle's many previous intimations do not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller op. c. ii ii 676 f., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel Ueb. die Pol. des Arist. 8 foll.

1 See the notes on iv (vii). 1 § 10 (765); 2 § 6 (717); 3 § 3 (756), §§ 8—10. 
2 Cp. the note on v (viii). 7, 1 (1081). Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: residuum huius operis in grecio nondum invent. Of older scholars Coëtivy in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hildenbrand (op. c. 445 foll.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency in the 13th, 14th, 15 with n. (116)—cp. ii. 9 §§ 5, 6 n. (285)—11. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 n. (368),
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taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle’s ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction. Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned in (vii). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a ‘cathartic’ effect, in (vii). 7. 3 ff. In this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle’s ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, in (vii). 15. 9, in (vii). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

IV (vii). 5 §§ 2; 10 §§ 10, 8 14; 16 §§ 12;
17 §§ 12—cp. 17 §§ 5 §§ 7; V (viii). 3 §§ 10—
cp. 7 §§ 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note
on V (viii). 2 § 2 (679). On 11. 6 §§ 14,
III. 3 §§ 6 foll. see below.

1 See IV (vii). 14 § 8 foll. n. (903),
15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted
on p. 48 n. 5.

2 See V (viii). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exch. 1
at the end of Bk. V (viii).

3 See V (viii). 5 §§ 4—7 with nn.
(1024-5-7); § 15 foll. nn. (1044, 1045);
6 §§ 1 ff. nn. (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 §§ 3 ff.
nn. (1085-7, 1093, 1104-5-9): also the
Excerptus 1, II, III, IV at the end of Bk.
V (viii).

4 Zeller op. cit. II ii 737 should be cor-
rected by this.

5 Cp. V (viii). 6 § 9 with n. (1073); also
nn. on 7 §§ 4 and Exchusus V at the
end of Bk. V (viii).

6 See the Introduction to my edition of
the Poetics pp. 8 ff., 15, 64 ff.
'scientific education was intended to follow'. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (viii). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (viii). 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction: but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (viii). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato, intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course; and this would furnish the solution of the riddle. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (vii). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory: in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman; if moreover scientific activity

1 Zeller op. c. II 737 n. 4.
2 See note on II. 5. 25 (181), iv (vii). 17. 15 (970).
3 No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.
4 This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections op. c. II 204 ff., 218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much: see Exe. 1 at the end of II. v (vii).
5 See the note on iv (vii). 3. 8 (743).
6 See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468), § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5: 18 § 1.
is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, ι. 5. 25. 1

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete; this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised ι. 13. 15 (cp. ι. 9 §§ 5, 6) 3, is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education 4, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (vii). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (παιδευόμενοι), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent 5. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasion for the young, IV (vii). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pauson with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (viii). 5. 21 8. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring 9; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (e.g. ταμβοί) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking...
EDUCATION IN THE BEST STATE.

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parties of adults are to be countenanced, iv (vii). 17. 12. Inspectors for the women (γυναικομόρους) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, vi (iv). 15. 13, vii (vi). 8. 23; they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy. We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; ii. 6. 10 ff., iv (vii). 16. § 15, § 17.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, iv (vii). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato's Laws, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, iv (vii). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised iv (vii). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt σωματεία; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage; also the consideration of the question postponed in ii. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, ii. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent.

1 Zeller, op. cit. ii II 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.
2 See the notes there.
3 The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on iv (vii). 16. 15.
4 See the notes there; also ii. 7. 5 with n. (256).
5 Cp. the notes on ii. 6. 15, iv (vii).
10. II.
6 Cp. the note on iv (vii). 5. 2.
7 Cp. the notes there.
8 Cp. n. on ii. 10. 9 (368).
9 Cp. the note there, (378).
10 Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.
Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five\(^1\) nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates\(^2\). Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability\(^3\). Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour\(^4\), and in respect of a public education from their seventh year\(^6\), all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves\(^6\). But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, iv (vii). 9. 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age\(^7\). The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order\(^8\). Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour: a pro-
hibition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free.

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, iv (vii). 6. 1 ff., as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, iv (vii). 9. 7. The messes (σχολική) are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta, at once common meals and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall. All boards of officials have their messes, each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the rangers and field-patrols in the country. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate. In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed with their twenty-first year, they are also per-

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mitted to attend drinking-parties and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in ii. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, iii. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in iv (vii). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark viii (v). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, iv (vii). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the Laws, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

VIII. The Pathology of the Existing Constitutions.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. iv. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the
description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (ἀλλοιωτικοί) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (τῶν πλείων πόλεων); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (ἐν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies, Polity (Πολιτεία), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny. The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it; and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word; just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly be by

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1. See note on VI (IV). 2. 4.
2. See the note on VI (IV). 1. 4 (1116).
3. See the notes on VI (IV). 3 § 1, § 2.
4. 4 (1154); § 8; 4 § 1, § 4 (1164), §§ 5, 6, § 8 (1176); § 12 (1182); § 13 (1185) § 15 (1187); § 17 (1189), §§ 19, 20.
Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (Πολιτεία) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents Πολιτεία in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 12: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v; while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text4. If it is right

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1 See the note there, (1314).
2 Hildenbrand 37. p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in vi (iv), cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book v of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book vi. Zeller on the other hand 57, 11 275 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to interface questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books iv and v of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles: in the (old) Book vi he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the Jährl. J. Phil. c. 1910, 345—346, 349 f. why
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it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, vii (vi), 4, 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion. Two of the others, vii (vi), 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds. But the fourth, vii (vi), 5, 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. vi (iv) and the first seven chapters of Bk. vii (vi)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. vii (vi), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of different constitutions, vii (vi), 1, 3 f. Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. vii (vi) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in vi (iv), c. 16: but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there vi (iv), 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, vi (iv), 15. § 22. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution; the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on vi (iv), 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

1 See the note there (1144).

2 Only in the latter passage the δη which follows must be changed into δή, or else the whole of the following clause ποιλ δη τα δήμαρχα...Μέγας έξαρχη...exanced.

3 See the note there, and Spengel Über die Politik 36 ff.

4 In that case the change of δη into δή, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

5 See the note on vi (iv), 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, ib. c. II. 253, thinks these seven chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

6 E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on oligarchical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1148) at the end of Bk. vii (vi).

7 Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on vi (iv), 15. 1 (1143).

8 Oncken l. c. complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Attic
proposed this book, vii (vi), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book viii (v) it will be sufficient to refer to the Analysis; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the Commentary.² It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman.² In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, viii (v), 11. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (τιμαρία) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown³, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks⁴, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in iii. 5. 9 ff., iv (vii). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook ἄμα τι πέρι τεκίων et τι λοιπόν, οδ χείρων ἐκπειράσμαθα in the announcement of the contents vii (vi). 1. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν συμφέροντα τρόπων ἀποδούναι πρὸς ἐκάστην, but in reverse order. That the whole book is "a regular medley of 'mixed elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never stood in the same original connexion' is therefore (see p. 59 n. 2) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on viii (vi). 1. 2 (1379 b).

² [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]
³ Cp. Hildenbrand op. c. 469--486; Zeller op. c. ii ii 750; Oncken op. c. ii. 241--252; Henkel op. c. 91: Van der Rest op. c. 519 ff.
⁴ In Die aristotelische Einheilung der Verfassungsformen 12 ff (St. Petersburg 1859. 8). Compare the review by Susemihl Jahrb. f. Philol. ciii. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.
⁵ op. c. ii ii 690, 705 foll., 749.
in various ways depend upon them: vi (iv). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; vii (vi). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; cp. iii. 12 § 7 f.; iv (vii). cc. 8, 9; vi (iv). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller\(^1\) himself quite rightly observes, the word ‘city’ or ‘state’ (πόλις) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (III. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (III c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see vi (iv). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements\(^2\) without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (III. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated vi (iv). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

\(^1\) L. c. 14 ff.
\(^2\) See the note on vi (iv). 7. 4 (1238).
in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored VIII (v) 7. 1. In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence, while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III. 7. 4, comp. IV (vi) 13. 7 foll. This is just what Aristotle censors in Sparta, II. 3. 9 f., IV (vii) 14 § 15 ff. (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Polities. But on the other hand how should Polities be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, v (viii) 1. 4; to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Polities. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, VI (iv) 4 §§ 5, 6; while in VIII (v) 7 §§ 5—9, VI (iv) 7 § 4, 8 §§ 3 ff. Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, VI (iv) 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in VII (vi) 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

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1 See note there, and on VIII (v) 7. 6 (1560).
2 See the note on III. 7. 3 (536).
3 See the note on III. 7. 4 (538).
5 VI (iv) 7 §§ 4, 11, VIII (v) 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In II. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.
6 It is a strange misconception of Oncken's op. c. II. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in VI (iv) 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.
7 See the notes on VI (iv) 4 §§ 4 (1164); 7 §§ 4 (1238): VII (vi) 27 (1402): VIII (v) 7. 6 (1569).
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amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments. It is surprising how Teichmüller could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts), and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

1 Comp. Oncken op. c. II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a democracy from a polity.

2 op. c. 18 f.

3 op. c. 20 f.

4 See n. on II. 10. 13.

5 See n. on VI (IV). 11. 21 (1305).
their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class; but Aristotle is the first thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here. He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, Πολιτεία. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance.

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher’s political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a polity to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship, vi (iv). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, vi (iv). 15 § 19 f., is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, vi (iv). 14 § 10, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

1 See n. on vi (iv). 11. 9.
2 Oncken ϕ. c. II. p. 225.
3 Oncken ϕ. c. II. 227, 228.
4 See the note on vi (iv). 15. 21.
5 See n. on vi (iv). 9. 5 (1255).
thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Polities. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master’s work? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, vit (iv) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Polities in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle, and there is all the more reason to hold, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his Politeia is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, iii. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in viii (vi). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like Politeia. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction vii (vi), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; viii (v). 8. 15 ff; 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken has well said: “Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate the poor for the service of watching over them. It was

1 The practical proposals in vi (iv) 14 §§ 11—15, which Krohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

2 As Oncken thinks op. c. ii. 239.

3 Nor can it be inferred from the following words in vi (iv). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

4 With Oncken op. c. 11. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in vi. 4 on p. 41.

5 op. c. ii. 259, 260.
"the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even
an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian
spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings
it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes att-
tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the
heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the
national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle
watched the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling
like an all-powerful monarch; few there were whose observation traces
the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the
idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed,
described1 Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever
did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only
homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment
escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom-
age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take
as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand-
ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no
healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state."

IX. DATE OF THE WORK AND ITS ASSumed CONNEXION WITH THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

"There are notices in the Politics of the Sacred War, viii. (v). 4, 7,
"as of something in the past; of Phalaecus' expedition to Crete, which
"took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)², as a recent event,
"ενεκε τῶν πλήθων ἔγινεν διατήρησαν εἰς τὴν νύμφην, II. 10. 16: lastly, of
"the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), viii. (v). 10. 16"³, without any
"intimation that it had but very lately happened.⁴" On the other hand
the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333⁵.
The Politics as a whole must have been written later than the Nicom-
achian Ethics, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4; III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1;
IV (vii). 13 §§ 5, 7; VI (iv). 11. 3", and earlier than the Poetics which is
announced as to follow in v (viii.) 7. 3⁷.

1 In his Constitution of Athens in the Politeia: see above, p. 35 n. 3.
2 Diod. xvi. 62.
3 Cp. the note there (1673).
4 Zeller, op. cit. II ii 154 n. (4).
5 See the note there (376).
6 See m. on these passages.
7 Cp. the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics, p. 11 f. Heite' objection (in
Die verlorenen Schriften 99 ff.) there mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the
meantime been answered in detail by
Nahlen Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. LXXVII. 1874. 393—398: he has made it
tolerably certain that the chapter on
"dadhaires in question, which is now lost,
It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the Ethics, and yet that work itself calls the theory developed in it not Ethics but Politics, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the Poetics and Rhetoric. For the intermediate expression of the Rhetoric (i. 4, 5, 1359 b 10 E), ἕ περι τὰ ἡθεὶ πολιτικῆς, is here our guide, by making Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense appear as parts of Politics in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the Magna Moralia at the commencement of his work, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the Ethics that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks Le. p. 8 still retain their force.

1 Comp. the notes on Br. II. 4 § 4 (140); § §§ 1-4 (153), § 14 (164); § 6 § 15 (212), § 18 (220); 10 § 8 (369).

Br. III. 4 § 8 (471), § 9 (478):

Br. IV (VIII). 13 § 14 (873), § 8 (881);
14 § 6 (899):

Br. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (903), § 11 (1000);
5 § 4 (1074), § 15 (1074); 6 § 14 (1079):

Br. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124–5); 2 § 3 (1140), § 8 (1143); 4 § 31 (1194), 1198), § 23 (1199–1221), § 24 (1203), § 25 (1204); 6 § 4 (1228); 7 § 1 (1330 b); 9 § 9 (1362); 14 § 3 (1391), § 9 (1392), § 10 (1334); 13 § 13 (1337), § 14 (1338); 15 § 16 (1360), § 19 (1369), § 21 (1371):

Br. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1 (1450):

Br. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504);
3 § 4 (1511); 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1659), § 6 (1657); 11 § 6 (1731); 12 § 11 (1757), § 14 (1777).

2 See however the notes on IV (VIII). 13 §§ 5, 7 (876, 879, 881); and n. (1287) on VI (IV). 11. 3 in regard to the citations there.

L. 2. 3 1094 a 24 f.
L. 2. 3 1095 a 2.
L. 4. 1 1095 a 14 f.;
Cp. I. 13. 2. 1102 a 7 ff.
VII. 11. 1. 1152 b 1 f.

4 Post. 6. 16. 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. note 71 to my edition of this work). Rhet. 1.
A. 2. 7. 1356 a 26 sqq.

Brandis op. c. II ii 1335 n. certainly expounds his words differently; but see Zeller op. c. II ii 608 n.

5—2
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

To regard the Ethics and Politics however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct. Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the Ethics appended that introduction to the Politics now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows: "Since then previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its kind). Let us begin then with our discussion."

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark: "there is no coherence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the Politics, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out." The opening of the Politics is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the Ethics: the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end; nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unimpeached virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the Ethics to the Politics. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

1 So recently by Nikes for example.
2 Nic. Eth. X. 9 §§ 22, 23 et al. 12 f. παραδεξότας αυτόν τον προτέρους ἀνερετητόν τῷ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, ἀπότομον ἐκκενδροθέτουσα μέλλων βέλτιον ἔργον, καὶ δεξιόν διὰ πολίτειας, ὡς τις εἰς δόσμαν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπους φιλοσοφία τελειοθετημένην πρὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνεωθημένην εἰς μὴ τῷ περὶ τῶν προγενεστέρων παραδεξομένων ἐπιλέχθη, εἰς τὰ τῶν συμφέροντα πολιτείαν ἠθικήν τῷ ποιεῖται καὶ φύλεται τὰ πόλεως καὶ τὰ ποιεῖται τῶν πολιτείων, καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, αἱ μὲν καλῶς καὶ δὲ τοῦχαι τοιαύται θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τοιούτων τὰ ἄν μέλλων συνωθομές καὶ τῶν πολιτείας ἄριστης, καὶ τῶν ἐκάστης γεφυρίας, καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ θεωρίας χρησίμης. Λέγουμεν ἀνθρώποι.
3 In his translation of the Politics i. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.
to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book\(^1\), making what is contained in Bk. viii (v) come next, and then developing the contents of iv (vii), v (viii), and lastly of vi (iv) and vii (vi). What must be understood by a ‘comparison of constitutions’ we see clearly from x 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this ‘comparison’\(^2\). That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue; and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down “the theory of the constitution generally”? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words καὶ διὸς δὴ περὶ πολιτείας contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from καὶ ποιὰ πολιτεία διάρρηκτη onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover “method in his madness.”

That in spite of their close connexion\(^3\) the Ethics and the Politics are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

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\(^{1}\) For the interpretation which Niches, l.c. pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,— “Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing "a commencement dealing with other matters,"”—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

\(^{2}\) ὁμιλητικὰ (καὶ ὁ σφαίρα) μὴν εἶναι τὸ καμιθμένα καὶ εὐπαραγωγίτης τὸν εὐ-δοκιμάσθαι τῶν νόμων, and τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαῖ, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.

\(^{3}\) This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Niches l.c. 25 f. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the earlier attempts he is on the whole successful.

\(^{4}\) As Zeller observes op. c. ii ii 164 f. n. (1).
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. iv (vii), from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' ἐτρέφει...σοφολογεῖ, has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the Prior or Pure and Posterior or Applied Analytics, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller and Walter have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality: but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant. Yet practical insight (φωνήρας), without which there is no moral virtue, can be materially promoted by Ethics, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

1 See above, p. 15 n. 1.
2 Cp. the note there (769).
3 Cp. Zeller op. cit. 11 ii 104 f. 1, 182, 627 n. 3; Oneken op. c. 1 164 ff.
4 Cp. 11 ii 176—183.
5 Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft 337—554 (Jena 1874, 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.
7 Nic. Eth. 1. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. 9. 10 1100a 1 ff.; 11. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff.; 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 36—b 18; x. 9—x. 10 (Beck): cp. Pol. iv (vii). 13. 11 f., Nic. Eth. 11. 6 §§ 4—8, § 13 1106 a 26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; 11. c. 9. Comp. also Walter op. c. 151—161 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter 11. 7.
8 Cp. manus. in 1. 5. 9 (11); 13. 6 (112).
9 Nic. Eth. 1. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff.; 1. 3. 7 1095 a 10 ff.; 1. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, v1. 177 1141 b 31 ff. Comp. Walter op. c. 151, 400 ff.
10 As Zeller thinks, op. c. 11 ii 628 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the Nic. Eth. adduced by Zeller, vi. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Rassow.
CONNEXION WITH THE ETHICS.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of πολιτική consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle III. 1. 1; VI (IV). c. 1; VII (VI). 5. 1; IV (VII). 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory III. 8. 1 (cp. VI [IV]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur.

[X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above*, has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation De praesiditis emendandi Aristotelis Politica*. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susenbühl, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed. To begin with, William of Moerbeke’s ignorance of Greek was something deplorable*. He renders περὶ τῶν ἀποφορμακῶν περὶ κτλ., de pronunciatis de optima civitate; πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις απαίδευτοι: έπιτίθεναι praesertit; ενδομένα praefectum populi esse; evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as τὰ στρατιά τῶν περιμάχουσι bona quae circa res bellicas. But mere ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in 11. 12. 8, he made Ολυμπιάσιον an accusative after τῶν νικήσαντος qui vict Olimpiasem; at any rate he gives super testa for

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1 Comp. in. on III. 8. 1 (542); III. 13. 13 (601); VI (IV). 15. 4 (1350); see also III. 2 §§ 1–3.

2 [Here Prof. Susenbühl's own Introduction ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible.]

3 Berlin, 1881. 8.

4 Susenbühl however in the large critical edition (1872) p. XXXIII f. had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsistencies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1879, e.g. p. 204 n. 1, 310 n. 2.

5 Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger Bacon writes "ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca de quo praesumit, et ideo omnia transfert falsa et corrupta scientiam Latinorum." Cp. Jourdain Recherches p. 67.

6 Busse op. cit. p. 36 f. Space permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

7 p. 9. The best ms. gives Olimpiasem.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

 Ion dōmata in v (viii). 3. 9—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ autem in ἐστι γὰρ iii. 9. 18, ἦσος γὰρ iv (vii). 17. 13, δει γὰρ v (viii). 1. 2, γάρ igitur, iii. 7. 5; δι' enim i. 2. 1, οὖν enim i. 8. 6, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ et etiam, καὶ τοι et quidem. Sometimes he omits particles (μὲν, γὰρ, δὲ, οὖν); sometimes, e.g. ii. 5. 9 δικαίως et iustē, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in ii. 3. 7 φιλότητα φιλεῖν fratreulem aut contribulam, etc. He is careless of the order of words; thus ii. 4. 6 καὶ γενόθαυμ ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων ἔνα et ambos fieri unum ex duobus existentibus; iv (vii). 3. 8 κυρίων καὶ et dominios (i.e. κυρίον). His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἀριστοκρατική, ὀλεγαρχεική by the nouns aristocraticia, oligarchia.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in vii (v). 6. 3 ἐν ὑπὸ (for ἐνθα) in thos, which he took for a proper name; iii. ii. 3 κρίς, (for κρίνωσι, so M4) Kries; ii. 9. 30 φιλίτια (so M4) amicabilitia; v (viii). 1 § 4 M2 αὐτὸς ipsorum (he has read the compendium αὐτῶν); 6 § 9 M4 δ οὗτος (for αὐτός) id ipsum. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the Politics. Take for instance viii (v). 1. 3: P4 gives ἄνφος ὡς, ἔτι οὕτως, with space for one letter; M4 has slurred over this defect of the archetyp by putting et; not so William: from the immediately preceding ἐκ τῷ ἰσος ὁτιοῦ ὄντας he derives inaequales in quocunque existentes. Similarly with natura for δόμαs in iv (vii). i. 4 (from the adjoining φῶς), alia quidem esse eadem for τὸ πάντως μετείχα vi (iv). 4. 25 (from the following τῆλα μὲν εἶναι τατητά), see also iii. 16 § 5 universale borrowed from c. 15 § 4 τῷ καθόλου, iv (vii). i § 4 quae circa prudential se habent, neque enim beatificant, iv (vii). i § 1 si ad vatum oportet adiipisci positionem borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέουν εἰ χρή τοικῶν καὶ εὔχηνι; etc. Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M4 though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In iv (vii). 14. 22 Γ has the same hiatus as M4 has now, through the homocotucleon  ὀποδοῦκεν, σχολικοῦκεν. William does what he can

1 p. 12. 2 p. 11. 3 p. 30. 4 pp. 29, 30. 5 pp 14, 27. 6 p. 9. 7 pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna at v (viii), 5. 17, where ἐκ... is all that stands in M4 of ἄρσηων. 8 Basse pp. 15—20.
to conceal this by translating ἔνεκεν τάξεως καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης gratia ordinis et pacis, as if he had read τάξεως. In vi (iv). 4. 11 M* gives τῶν ἀδικών ἦ instead of τῶν ἀδικών ἦ; so too Γ, for William renders <minus> quam to make sense. Similarly v (viii). 6. 11 M* has ἦπτομο for ἦπτομο; William sequentur; which must be his attempt to make sense out of ἦπτομο.¹

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in π. 9. 20 διηγαγομένων αὐτῶν ἡ ἡγείαζον καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς regere populum se iros (he read αὐτῶν) ogebant reges, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see vii (vi). 7 § 5 προ- σκείσθαι apportion, 8 § 1 διμήνταί dividere etc.; and for the converse π. 7 § 6 διείς estendatur, 8 § 5 γράφει scribatur, vii (v). 8. 9 πορευ- λοφέων comprehendantur, etc.² Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Τ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. π. 5. 8 εἰπέρ ὑμῖν iam quidem et dictis <creditur>, π. 9. 3 κεκτη- μένως περὶ ὁλου (so M* for περὶ ὅλου) possidentibus <praedias> circa dominus, etc.³ Yet additions may be due to glosses, like videro fugientem praelio, (?) ἀπάναθε μάχην νομοί in the margin of P*, etc.⁴ Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: π. 9. 1 oûte πόρρῳ ἕκενης neque longe <posita>; π. 8. 13 οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἐκεί νόμος, τὸ κρίμαν ἔξω καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσχεν de iudicio habet lex iudicandi dignificans, though here one might suppose he had τὸ κρίμαν ἔξω before him:⁵ π. 11 § 14 ἐκαστον ἀποτελεσκαὶ τῶν αὐτῶν unum quamque perfectur ab eisdem: c. π. § 15 τῶν πλούσων, atē τι τοῦ δήμου μερός ἐκπερσὰντον τοιαύτα τοιαύτα τοιαυτά parum partem emitentes super urbes, suggested perhaps by τοιαύτα τοιαύτα in vii (vi). 5. 9:⁶ π. 3. § 2 εἰπέρ οὖν δημοκρατοῦντα iuxtime iudicis iustit in democratiam versae fuerant quaedam: 13 § 2 oikou habetur: vii (viii). 16. 14 πρὸς τὸν ἀποκεφαλιῶν τῶν ἐλπισίων τῆς εἰρήνης τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν ad deorum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt cum qui de generatione honorem (as if ταῖς ἐλπισίων were read).⁷

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π* I. ε. Γ P* M) than P*, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

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¹ pp. 21—23: Γ may have had ei- πτομο, but this is less probable.
² pp. 34—36.
³ p. 32.
⁴ p. 34.
⁵ p. 41.
⁶ pp. 24, 43.
⁷ p. 41.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

M², but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P⁴ derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family.

These conclusions however are by no means warranted. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P¹ or of M³. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P³ only; once in conjunction with P⁴ only: 3 times with P¹ (or its corrections) only; once with Aretinus only; 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing. Whereas the correct reading is due to P¹ alone 11 times, to P⁴ in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar, P⁴ margin, P³) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrius or Aretinus could

from v (VIII). 8. 2—a passage where the second family P² exhibits an hiatus—

P¹ M

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Susenihi's large critical edition (1872) p. XIX: "minum autem est in eis "verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis coor" dicibus omissa hic liber (P⁴) cum paucis "alii et vetusta translatione servavit, "cum alii illis interdum accuratus cum "hac assentire aut alias eiusdem sensus "voce quam illas hic ille offerre, ut "propensum facile fias ad credendum hos "in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti-"quior, sed ex ipsa translatone Latina "esse huiusm." 3 With what follows compare Susenihi Politica tertium edita (1882) Preface pp. VIII—XVIII.

1 P⁴ alone gives 1258 b 40 Χαρίτωνος 1260 a 4 άρχόντων καί, 1260 b 41 άς άι ή, 1260 b 2 b' άδο, 1271 a 20 κάυ, 1276 a 33 αίμος ή, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αυτοκράτωρ, 1337 a 42 έκα δέ, 1336 a 34 αυτοκράτωρος, 35 κατά, 1296 a 8 ανατό-"μεσιν, b 8 πλεοῦν. 1320 b 9 τήν Τακτο-"μον άρχιν, 15 τήν αυτήν άρχιν, 1331 a 12 οπλιτήν, 1393 a 24 έγγον έν (οι έγγο-"ν;), 1331 a 2 χρημάτων: P⁴ 1348 a 5 παρά, 1260 a 25 εισάγοντοι, 1240 a 2 έδον έτι δέ, 1321 b 29 τά omitted, 1322 b 36 προσεκίθαις (δ), 1326 b 39 καὶ omitted: P⁴ 1259 b 28 δέ; P⁴ 1265 a 16 παρά, 1272 b 29 καὶ αίτ: P⁴ (corrector) 1278 b 22 παρά: Γ Αρ. 1289 b 38 πολέ-"μον; Γ Αρ. 1336 a 5 δέ: Γ Άρ. 1393 b 31 τά: Γ Άλδινοι P⁴ (corrector) 1337 a 33 τά: Γ Αρ. P⁴ (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 σύ-"ματοι: Γ Άρ. 1254 a 10 απόλος (άπολος άλος M² P⁴, άλος cel).

2 Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 οκτώ-"μενοι, 1262 b 22 τοις φίλασι, 1274 b 20 (απότεινεις οι αποτίνειτε;), 1280 a 29 τα-"λάτων may be mentioned.
COMPARATIVE WORTH OF THE MANUSCRIPTS. 75

easily make for themselves\(^1\). In 4, or perhaps 5, places P\(^4\) has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M\(^4\) or to P\(^6\) alone\(^4\). From P\(^4\) and from Aretnius unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P\(^4\), but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts\(^6\).

Further it must be noticed that while M\(^4\) \(\Gamma\) are often found alone supporting a variant against P\(^1\), M\(^4\) P\(^1\) are less frequently (the number of such cases being about \(\frac{9}{4}\)) alone in agreement against \(\Gamma\), and it is very seldom indeed that P\(^1\) \(\Gamma\) alone support any reading against M\(^4\). What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that \(\Gamma\) and M\(^4\) go back to one common archetype, and P\(^1\) to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P\(^4\) P\(^6\)): only the immediate ancestor of M\(^4\) had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with \(\Gamma\) or the authorities from which it is derived\(^4\). The genuine readings of the family P\(^1\) will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M\(^4\) \(\Gamma\)), sometimes in the other (of P\(^1\) and of the corrections in P\(^4\) P\(^6\)): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.

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1 P\(^1\) alone 1259 a 13 ἔλαιονγελον, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr\(^1\)), b 4 ἐκείνες corr.\(^1\) (πὰ κατέχειν), 1286 b 17 με- 


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2 P\(^4\) 1253 a 25 καὶ omitted after φόνοι, 1270 b 38 εἴρης, 1235 a 29 ἀυτὸ ὅτι (corr\(^1\)), 1339 a 14 ἔλαιον: perhaps 1338 b 33 ἀνάμειγμα τῆς νεότητος.

3 1267 b 33 τὰ L\(^4\), U\(^b\) (corr.); 1274 b 20 τὶ πταλεῖον: L\(^4\); 1275 b 39 τοῦτο L\(^4\), Aldine and M\(^4\) (1st hand); 1331 a 24 θεὸς P\(^4\) Ar., 1205 a 28 ἢ L\(^4\) C\(^e\) Ar., 1317 a 12 τὸ R\(^b\) Ar., 1302 b 39 τὸ ποτὸν R\(^3\).

4 For proof of this see (beside the criti-
Few of the readings common to Μ⁸ P¹ or of those common to Γ Μ⁸ have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P¹ to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or Μ⁸, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13. 15 ταυτάς γὰρ δὲ διόκειν ἢ διόκειν (διοκοῦσιν having been omitted in the archetype of II¹): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P¹, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P¹ διακόπτωσι is a trifle nearer right than Μ⁸ διακούσιν Will. ministrant¹.

All existing manuscripts of the Politics, when compared even with those of the Ethics, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ Μ⁸, other things being equal, in preference to P¹ sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of II¹, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P¹ against Γ Μ⁸. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects II¹ is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in P¹: in such cases it is seldom II¹ that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is II¹ that is mutilated². Yet as a general rule II¹ should be followed in preference to P¹.

Coming now to Busse's view about P¹, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (viii), 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P¹</th>
<th>William</th>
<th>P⁸</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>πρὸς ἀκριβείαν</td>
<td>ad perfectionem</td>
<td>πρὸς τὸ τέλεον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰρημένως</td>
<td>dictis</td>
<td>ἱβεικεῖαι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 6 ἐνεκέν</td>
<td>gratia</td>
<td>χάριν (Bekk.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν</td>
<td>ipsius quidem enim</td>
<td>αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φίλον</td>
<td>amicorum</td>
<td>τῶν φίλων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 3 § 1 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἐν τῇ de musica autem</td>
<td>περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3 τέλος</td>
<td>finaliter</td>
<td>τελευταῖον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὅτι δὲ ποιοῦντας</td>
<td>quod facientes oportet τι ποιοῦντας ἢ (Bekk.)³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

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¹ Quoted by Busse p. 45.
² The manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics show an equally perplexing discrepancy between Κ⁶ Μ⁸ and Λ⁶ Ω⁶ in some parts of the treatise, Κ⁶ Ω⁶ and Λ⁶ Μ⁸ in others.
³ Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 136 a 34, b 18, 1326 a 10, 1307 b 32 f. Susenblih 98. c. viii.
the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P:\ 1330 a 32 χρησιμον for χρησιμον δια c. c.; 1333 b 2 δια καλε χρησιμον for καλε χρησιμον δια (Πι omit δια); 1335 b 23 παράκοπουας for παρακοπουας; 1336 b 5 γιρ του for του γιρ, 1339 a 16 χαριν for ενεκα, 1340 a 8 διλον for φανερον; 1342 a 6 απασις for πασις; 1309 a 18 ου for μη. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P and M against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 λευσμονοις Mα P4 deficientes William, 1318 b 31 τιμηματων τας μειζονες υπω omitted by Mα P4 translated by Will; 1326 b 4 μεν τοις Mα P1,5 Ald., τοις μεν Πι; 1332 b 1 μεταβαλειν Mα P1,5 μεταβαλε盛 Πι; 1334 b 2 τε untranslated by Will, τε P1,3; 1335 a 16 τοις c. c. τοις Mα P4; 1337 a 18 βελτιων Mα P4 Ar., βελτιων c. c. optimus Will.; 1319 b 24 και τα P1,3 and in the margin of P4, κατα c. c. in Will.; 27 αι προτερα Πι P4 and the corrector of P4, αι προτερα Πι; 1322 a 22 τοις ειρημενοι Mα and P4,5 (1st hand), της ειρημενης c. c. dicta Will.; 1306 a 22 ειρημενοι ceteri, ειρημενοι Mα, ειρημενοι Πα manus incription Will.; 1313 b 2 φρονημα Πι P1,3 Rb, φρονηματα τε αισιας ισατειας Will.; 1316 a 32 τοις c. c. τοις P1,5 Ar., in M α hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 δα δικαιουνται και παλακεισε αυτα απολαθωντας c. c., indigent iustitia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written απολαθωνται; but P4 has διεναιοι....οι αριστα δοκουντες...απολαθωνται. Or again, 1311 b 7 δια το εις το σωμα αισχυναι (αισχυναι Μα P4 αισχυνονται Πα); proferea quod aliqui monstarchum in corpus versciendum fecerunt would have suggested αισχυναι, not αισχυναι which is what we find in P4. So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt οπληθυνυ μεν of 1321 a 12, William's armativum would have suggested οπληθυνκαι or οπληθυνται, not οπληθυντοι which is the reading of P4. Far more probable is the fact here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading αφεμενω ου seems to have come down in P4 as well as in P4: it is at least unlikely that William's respicientes suggested it. Even in viii (v) 8, 2, the passage which Busse thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that παραδοθυνη should supersede υπεισοδοθυνη.

1 Consensus codicum.
2 Bekker, who took P4 of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P4; in some cases even, e.g., 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16f., 34 f., where Mα P4 have a better reading. See p. 76.
Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the Politics, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books, but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. 11 §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. 1, was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, εἰς ὅς τε ἐπικυκλώται μὲν τῶν ἑργασιῶν ὅπως ἔλαχιστον τόχης, βεναικυκλώται δέ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λυόμεναι μᾶλιστα, δωλικώταται δὲ ὅπον τῶν σώματος πλεί- στοι χρήσις, ἀγεννώταται δέ ὅπου ἔλαχιστον προσδεί ἀραιής, and the context. Picart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τῶ σῶματι μόνῳ χρήσιμων (I. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστική could not be excluded from the ἑργασία of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before εἰς ὅς τε ἐπικυκλώται κτλ, are, περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἐρημηί καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμων μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἑργασίας, φορτίκων δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστική, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ; or, which is the same thing, if the sentence περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν be transposed to follow ἀραιής.

The argument too runs on better to the next sentence εἰς ὅς ἐκτὸς ἐνιὸς γεγραμμένα κτλ, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into "details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, "but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is "referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written "upon them."
(2) Bk. 1. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thuot, "that after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does not say one word of the ἀρετή διανοητική which properly belong to it, while speaking three times, ll. 15, 17, 20, of ἡθική ἀρετή in the same sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who commands ought to have ἡθική ἀρετή in perfection, he says that the work belongs to him who directs it and that reason (λόγος) is a directing faculty; this reflection evidently applies to the ἀρετή διανοητική of the λόγον ἰχνος, elsewhere called φρόνησις, iii. 4. 17, and not to the ἡθική ἀρετή of the ἀλογον."

He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, ἀλογον τῶν...ἔργον to follow ἐπιβάλλει αὐτῶς: to omit ἡθική in line 20, and change ἡθική to διανοητική in l. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ἡθική be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνησις inseparably involves ἡθική ἀρετή, Nic. Eth. vi. 13 §§ 2, 4, 6 (cp. ib. 12 § 6, ἐπι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν); so l. 20 ἡθική may stand. The diatomic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, ὁ δοῦλος δέως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, and Pol. iii. 4. §§ 17, 18, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχαίος ἢδος ἀρετή μόνη, τὰς γὰρ ἀλλὰς ἔχειν ἀναγκαίον ἐναι κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀρχαίον δὲ γε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθίας with the notes.

(3) ll. 4—4, ἐκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον...μην νεωτέραν. "It is singular that Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers more obedient" (Thurot). He therefore suggests that ll. 4—4 should follow κοινωνίαν in ll. 5—24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that ἀφορίζει φιλία must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show συμβαίνων ἀνάγκη τούναντιν ὁν προσήκει τοῦ ὅρθως καμάνους νόμους αὐτῶς γίνεσθαι, the application to the agricultural class would come in appositely to point this reversal of the effect intended."

(4) ll. 6 § 3 τιλήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, τοιαύτα δὲ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion περὶ παιδείας to be extraneous to the main political subject of the Republic. Moreover

1 Etudes sur Aristote 18, 19. Comp. also Sussemihl Quaest. Crit. vi. 9—11.
in line 37 he exchanges the construction with περὶ for a new one οἷεὶ δὲν...πεπλήρωκε. The clause καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φιλάκεων should come amongst the subjects (περὶ ὅλην πάμπαν) on which Socrates in the Republic has touched, and therefore in § 1 after κτήσεως 1364 b 30\(^1\).

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (περὶ ὅλην πάμπαν). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) ii. 7 § 1, οἷ οἷεὶ δὲν ἰδοντῶν αἰς δὲ ἕνωσόφων καὶ πολιτικών. Gipha- nius (Van Giffen)\(^2\) comparing c. 12 § 1, ἐννοεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἑκοινώσας πρά- ἔως πολιτικῶν οὐδ’ ἑκιστανόν, ἀλλ’ διεπεσαν ἰδοντεῖν τὸν βιο... οἷοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγονός...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοῦ, proposed to omit ἕνωσόφων καὶ. Spengel\(^3\) simply transposed these words before ἰδοντῶν.

(6) ii. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

\[\text{ἐπὶ τὸν κτήσεως καὶ τὸν τινόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τινὸς, πολιτικῶν \& πεπλήρωκεν \& καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φιλάκεων.}\]

\[\text{ἔστι μὲν οἷον τὰς συμφερόντων τὸ τάς συμφερόντων εἰς τις...}\]

\[\text{ἔστι μὲν οἷον τὰς συμφερόντων τὸ τάς συμφερόντων εἰς τις...}\]

\[\text{καὶ γὰρ ἀν οἱ χαρίστητε...}\]

\[\text{καὶ γὰρ ἀν οἱ χαρίστητε...}\]

\[\text{καὶ γὰρ ἀν οἱ χαρίστητε...}\]

\[\text{καὶ γὰρ ἀν οἱ χαρίστητε...}\]

1 Compare Victorius Comm. p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adingit autem in extremo disputasse etiam illic. Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publice: hoc enim coniungit debet cum iis quae nunc repetit facienti-


DISLOCATIONS.

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οἱ δὲ χαίρεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἵσαι ὑθεὶν καὶ διὰ τὰ αὐθαίρετα, οὐ μόνον τὰ λαοῦσαι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικήσαι, ὅπως εἰς ἑαυτούν ἀδικήσαι διὰ τὰ τιμῶν τῆς οὐσίας, ὅτε καὶ ὑποδοῦται διὰ τὸ μίγον ἡ πεινή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁποῖος χαίρωσι καὶ καί ἐπιθυμῶσιν διὰ γάρ μεῖζω ἐξωσι σὺν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν τιτυχής λατρείαν ἀδικήσουν, οὐ τούτοι διὰ ταύτης μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνεοι ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐναρώται τοῖς ἀνείποις ὑδονάς. τὸν ἀν. τοὺς τρόφους; τοὺς μὲν οὐδὰ χριστέω, καὶ ἐγκατεστήσαν, τοὺς δὲ σωφρονίσαν, τρότον δ’, εἰ τυχεί δύνασαι δι’ αὐτῶν χαίρειν, όσο νὰ ἐπιζητήσει εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, εἰ γὰρ ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων δεῖναι. διπλα ἄκος γιὰ τὰ μέγατα διὰ τὰς νευροδολάς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, ἀν θανανθοῦσιν οὐχ ἴδη μὴ μικρός (διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαί μεγάλαι, ἐν ἀποκεκύριγμα τοῦ αν αἰτητής τοῖς ὑποδοῦτος ἀλλ’ ὑποδοῦτος: ὅτε πρὸς τὰς μυκρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικοῦ μόνον ὑποτοσ τῆς Φιλίλου πολιτείας. 7 §§ 10—13.

It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14 ἐπὶ, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices, must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὡμοὶ οὗτοι δὲ βελτιστοὶ δύναται σχολαζεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀναχρημονεῖν, μη μόνον

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἰδιωτεύοντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βελτιωτον δ’, εἰ καὶ προετο τὴν ἀποφαν τῶν ἐπιμαχόν

§ νομοθετής, ἀλλὰ ἀρχοντων ἐπὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς συνθήκης. “If he was “forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made “provision for poor men in office.” Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: “at all events he should not have allowed these “high offices to be virtually put up for sale.”

III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολεμεῖσθαι συμφέρει, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολεμεῖν, πολεμεῖα. συμ-

βαίνει δ’ εὐλόγως. εἷς μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἢ πλεονεύν ἐνδέχεται, πλεονεύς δ’ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς ἁλενίκης ἀρχεῖν: πρὸς πάσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν’ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεσθαι διότι κατὰ ταύτῃ τὴν πολεμεῖαν κυριότατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα. Spengel first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ’ εὐλό-

γως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἢ ηῆς χαλεπῶς) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot supposed a lacuna to precede συμβαίνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τοῦ τόπος πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλὰ μη τοῖς ἐπιλὼν ἀριστοῖς>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικῶν πλήθους ἐν ὧ τέφερεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλήθους πολεμικῶν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικῶν before πλήθους in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολεμεῖα.

II. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γαρ...§ 21 κατὰ τοῦ νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γαρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γαρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμους. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τῶν ἄριστων...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

1 Susemihl Jahrb. f. Ph. xxv. 1866. p. 313.
2 Über die Politik p. 23 n. 24.
3 Études sur Aristote p. 47, 43.
5 Susemihl Quaest. Crit. iii. p. 16.
6 Études sur Aristote 47–51.
or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6.  (ii) No superiority gives 
exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10.  (iii) The best laws are adapted to 
the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. 
(iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminently virtuous cannot be reduced 
to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). 
Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of 
virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what 
ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the 
negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which 
we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost.  A discussion 
of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The 
conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), i.e. somewhere 
between ἀρετή (§ 12, end) and εἰ δὲ τίς ἄρωσι, the beginning of 
§ 13.  For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after 
the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. 
And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite 
considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 
is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13.

(11) III. 13. 22.  The sentence ὡστε διὰ τῶν τοῦτο...τοῦτο ἄρωσιν, if 
genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued 
to διαρθόουν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do 
with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all 
constitutions.  The words cited ὡστε διὰ τῶν τοῦτο...τοῦτο ἄρωσιν, however, 
do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of 
monarchs.  Hence, as Thurot3 saw, they would be more in place in § 23 
after διαρθόουν, at the end of the general reflexions.  Bernays4 however 
found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἐνὶ τρόποιν.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16.  On the question of absolute sovereignty, 
ποτέρον ποτὲ ἕνα συμφέρεται κύριον ἑναὶ πάντων ἢ ὄν συμφέρει, a succession 
of ἀριστοπλικ and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3.  What 
follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as 
follows4: (a) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the 
rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6.  (β) Assuming that in certain directions 
the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man 
or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case 
the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10.  Then comes a 
historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀριστοπλικ, contained in §§ 11, 12. 
(γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14,

1 Sussemihl in Philol. xxix. 1870 pp. 113—4.
2 Etudes sur Aristote 51—53.
3 In his Translation p. 211.
4 For a fuller account see the Analy-
sis p. 112 f.
and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words κατὰ τὴν ἐκατόν βουλήσεων ὁ βασιλεὺς). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν ...§ 4 πάντων, relates to a different ἀποφαία altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλει); Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος)?

Here the limit of ἀποφαία distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, ἀλλὰ μην...ὁμοίως, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν as far as κατὰ τὸ ἔδοξα in § 9 must belong to the first ἀποφαία (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) ἀλλὰ μὴν ...§ 5 τῶν κειμένων could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow κάλλους and precede ὅτι μὲν τούτων; the remainder (δ) 16 § 5 ὃ μὲν οὖν τῶν νόμων ...§ 9 κατὰ τὸ ἔδοξα might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between πᾶσαν and ἀλλ’ ἵσως. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (ε) §§ 9, 10 from ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βάσιν as far as συμφράζομεν, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after ὃ ἢς and before ἐλ δή. To this same ἀποφαία further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 εἰς δὲ καὶ νῦν to the end οὖν ὁμοίως; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ ἢς, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.
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πάλλον ἀδίαφροτον τὸ πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ὑδρὼ τὸ πλεονάζον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀδίαφροτότερον τοῦ γὰρ ἐνός ὑπὸ ὀργής κρατηθέντος ἢ τῶν ἐκείνου πάθους τοιούτου ἀνάγκαιον διεφθέραι τὴν κρίσιν, ἦκα δ’ ἄρχον ἁμα πάντας ἀργιαθήναι καὶ ἀμαρταῖν. ἦστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ’ ἢ περὶ δὲν ἐκείνων ἀναγκαίων αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τούτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ’ εἰ πλείους εἶναι ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολλοὶ, τότερον ἢ εἰς ἀδίαφροτότερον ἄρχον, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἁρμονὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴ δὴν ὡς εἰ πλείους; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν στασιάσωσιν δὴ εἰς ἀστασίαστος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ’ ἀντίθετον ἵνα συνοδήσῃ τὴν ψυχήν, ὃπερ κάκεινος ἐκέλ. 15 §§ 7—10.

tὸν ἀριστότον νόμον ἄρχειν συντελέστερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀριστότον. περὶ δὲν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἑτερ. οὐ τούτων τούτῳ γ’ ἀντιλέγοντον, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι ἀνθρώποι εἶναι τὸν κρινόντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχον πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον τ’ ἵνα ἐνεὶ δώξειν εἰ βελτίων ἤχου τε δυναν ἄμμαι καὶ δυσάν ἀκολούθησαν κρίνων, καὶ πρᾶξιν δυσὶ ποιήσαν καὶ χειρὶν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοὶ, ἐπεί καὶ τῶν ὁμαλούς πολλοὶ οἱ μικράν ἐποίησαν αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ ποδας. τούς γὰρ τῇ ἄρχῃ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιεῖται συναρχοῦν. μὴ φίλου μὲν ἐν ὀντες οὐ ποιήσονται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μοναρχοῦ προάρσεων εἰ δὲ φίλου κακεῖνον καὶ τῆς ἄρχης, ὡς φίλος ἵνα καὶ ὁμολογήσῃ, ὡς εἰ τούτοις ἵναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοῖς ἵναι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν ἄρχειν ἵναι δεῖν ὁμολογήσῃ. 16 §§ 10—13.

Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr. J. Cook Wilson. "It may be that the two chapters belong "almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being "combined they should be still further resolved." Thus

(i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν ὅνων ἱνώσασθαι = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ελαπτον.
(ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχι...πάντας corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἁρμονὸν...κατὰ τὸ...ἤθος + §§ 10, 11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
(iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...οἱ ἵναι corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλ’ ὅτι...δεῖν ὁμολογεῖ and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν

1 Journal of Philology x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

οὐδὲ ῥᾷδιον...συμφράδιμον. “Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second.”

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected1 that the second section is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τῶν βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἡεκαὶ δὲ ἀποφέων to 16 § 2 δὲ βασιλέως. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition; for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μην ὡσα...τῶν καμάνων “interrupts the argument of the context: “it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν 1287 b 23” (in § 11).

Spengel2 proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μην ὡσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ‘to follow κάλλων, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μην, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. τ’, where the recurrence of a word (συνλογοσίμος in Rhet. 1. 2 1337 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert ο’ after ἐπεζένων in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws.3

(13) IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = c. 2 §§ 1, 2

ἐξόμενον δ’ ἐστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δειμένων καὶ τόλμῃ εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην ἐναι καὶ πράττοντος καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μη τὰ καλὰ πράττοντος· οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἐργαν οὐτ’ ἀνδρός πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτῆν εἶναι φαντάζειν ἐνὶς τὰ ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτῆν, λοιπὸν ἐστί εὐτέρει. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ πάντες γὰρ ἐν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτῆν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν ἀν δύναται γραφεῖν. Objection: ἄλλοι ἐπείρσεις παραπλήσασι τὸ νόμον ἐφάπτοσι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γραμμή κρίνειν καὶ δισεβεῖς τῶν ἀρχαῖος. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπεροφθαλμίας ἢν ἑγέρει, δ’ οὐ δὲ δέχεται τεχνόμος διαμέσον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ο’ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.

2 Arist. Stud. iii. 26 (78), f.
3 ἂλλ’ ἠτών ἢν φαίνει τι τοῖς τούτων βοηθεῖται περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑκατὰ κάλλων. The reply is: ἄλλα μην ὡσα γε μὴ δοκεί δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐτ’ ἀνθρωποί ἄν δύναται γραφεῖν. Objection: ἄλλοι ἐπείρσεις παραπλήσασι τὸ νόμον ἐφάπτοσι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γραμμή κρίνειν καὶ δισεβεῖς τῶν ἀρχαῖος. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπεροφθαλμίας ἢν ἑγέρει, δ’ οὐ δὲ δέχεται τεχνόμος διαμέσον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ο’ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.
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Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of c. 1. Sussemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12.

(14) IV (vii). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen) calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶσθε γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσύνητοι: in this way § 9 ὁ λεγέσθαι ὅρος would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θέλας γὰρ...τὸ πάν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koraes omitted δῶ: it is a smaller change, with Böckler, to transpose ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι to follow ἀναγκαίοιν in § 9.

(15) IV (vii). 8. 2 οὖν ἐπεὶ τροφὴ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐπεὶ χρώμα τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἄλλο τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστὶν. Bojesen saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 ὅσα τοῖς πάλισιν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἐν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ ταῦτά τοῖς κοινωνίαι ἀλλὰ κοινωνίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) IV (vii). 8 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ ἡ...κρίματοι ἐστίν. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινωνίας of § 2.

1 Ueber die Politik, pp. 45, 48.
2 Jahrb. f. Philol. XCIX. 1866 p. 602. See also Böcker De quibusdam Pol. Ar. locis (Greifswald, 1867) p. 6 f., Spengel Arist. Stud. iii. 30 (81).
3 Comm. pp. 921, 2.
4 op. cit. 13, 14.
5 Bidrag (Copenhagen 1843) pp. 24—26.
(17) iv (vii) cc. 13—15. Wilson\(^1\) regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. “In each the main question is proposed, what is ‘happiness or the chief good?’ (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); ‘and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with 15 §§ 6, 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...Ἠχθαί).’ These transitional passages stand as follows:

...<τὴν ἀρετήν,> καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐσται, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητίνων, τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρήμενοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ θοῦς καὶ λόγου δει. τούτων δὲ ποιόν μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τῆν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσῃ πρότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἡ τοῖς θεσεῖν.

(...tauta gar deis allhla sumphiowenin allhla, poioll gar para tois ethmois, kai tηn phusin prōttoues dia tōn logon, ean peiusthous allous echei bēlton.)

(15) ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἶνος εἶναι δὲ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχερέστους ἐσωθεὶ τῷ νομῳδήτῳ, διώρισμεθα πρότερον τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐργον ἡδη παιδείας. τά μὲν γὰρ ἐπιξομενοὶ μαθήματι, τά δὲ ἀκούοντες. 15 §§ 6, 7.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποιόν...θεσεῖν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρήμενοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

\(^1\) Journal of Phil. x. pp. 84, 85.
to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of cc. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13: see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in III. c. 9 there is an elaboration of earlier sketch in III. c. 6; in I. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in I. c. 4 are but amplified and supported.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason. Hence Böcker proposed to transpose ὅστε ... ἀληθῶς to follow ἑλέτων at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to λόγος and ἐθή; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: “reason ought to work for the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would never do by nature or by habit.”

(18) IV (vii). 16 §§ 4, 5 σχίδων δὲ πάντα... τούτων. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 πληθύνων ἐτι < ἢ μικρόν>. If this be done, (1) § 6 ἵστε δ' ὅ τῶν νέων κτλ will directly explain § 4 ἐτι δ' ἔθεν ἀρχόμενοι... βουλήσει; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37 (?) respectively.

(19) IV (vii). 17 § 6 τὸς δὲ διατάσεις... διατειμομένως. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 ἀνθρώπων; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss τὴν ἔχομενην ἡλικίαν. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then ἐπισκέπτον δὴ will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred.

(20) IV (vii). 17 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδομῇ... ἀναγκαῖον. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after δυσμένειαν (? δυσμένειαν) in § 14.

(21) V (viii). 4 § 7. The clause δὲ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν... ἀνταγωνιστὰς γάρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχοντα,

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3 op. c. 15.
6 Susemihl l.c.
πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἔχων must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to ὅ.

(22) V (viii). v § 17 ἐτι δὲ ἀκροβόμοις τῶν μικρόσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρίς τῶν ρυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἐτι, should give a second reason ὅτι γνώμηθα ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡθί διὰ τῆς μονοικῆς, the first being the 'enthusiasm,' inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: ‘enthusiastic’ strains inspire ‘enthusiasm’: and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that “rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the soul undergoes a change.” But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully portraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: “because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody,” i.e. a purely instrumental performance.

(23) V (viii). v § 25 καὶ τις ἐνικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ἱρήμοισιν * * εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασί τῶν σοφῶν οὐ μὲν ἀρμονίαι εἶναι τὴν ψηφίν, οὐ δὲ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαι). Böcker recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, i.e. after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον § 24.

(24) vi (iv). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds for believing that this portion of Bk. vi (iv) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν ὁνὸν πολλέων πλεῖον καὶ δὲ ἡν αἰτίαν, ἔφη τις διότι δὲ πλεῖον τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί λέγομεν ἀρχὴν λαβώνεις τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν ὁνὸν εἶλα πολλέων, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, ἔφησαν πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskillfully added by the compiler, seems probable from the

1 Susenbuhl ib. p. 411, Q. C. IV. 20, also Böcker independently op. c. p. 18.
2 Susenbuhl /Philo/gra. XXV. 1867, 411—413, Q. C. IV. 20, Spengel /Arist. Stud./ 44: 45.
3 See Cook Wilson in /Journal of Philol./ X. 80, 81.
4 op. c. p. 18.
5 Susenbuhl in /Rhein. Mus./ XXI. 1866. 554—560.
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fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 διώτι δέ πλείως κτλ, is never redeemed; instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείως πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι τὰς ἑαυτῆς μέρη πλείω τόλμως τῶν ἀριθμῶν. 3 § 1.

ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πάσης ἑαυτῆς πόλις. 4 § 7.

καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ εἰς ἐνὸς ἀλλ’ εἰκ πολλάκις συγκεκριμέναι μορίων, ὥσπερ εἰρήνη τολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλήθος, οὐ καλοῦμεν γεωργοῦν, δεύσετε δὲ τὸ καλοῦμεν τοῦ βασιλείου, κτλ.

ὁρόστοιον δὲ <τὸ> ἀγοραίον, κτλ.

τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητείουν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προσολμαθέον, δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἢττον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν κτλ 4 §§ 9, 10.

ὁστε κτλ.....φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ γε ὁ πολιτικόν ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι τῆς πόλεως μορίων. 4 * ἐπέθανον δὲ τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργόν ὥσπερ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὡδίον δὲ τὸ ἐδομοιωτικόν κτλ.

.....ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναι τινας ἄρετης τῶν πολιτικῶν.

4 §§ 15—17.

ὁσπέρ οὖν οἱ ζῷοι προχρονίζομεθα λαβίειν ἑκοθ, πρῶτον μὲν ἀν αὐτοικρίζεαμεν ὑπὲρ ἀναγκαίων πάν ἑαυτῶν ἐρον κτλ.

τὸ δεύτερον εἶναι δει μάνον, τοῦτον δὲ εἰς διαφοράν πεῖρας ἀλλήλων καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐτείον διαφέρει τὰ μέρη την ἑαυτών. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαίων ἀρὰ πολιτείας εἶναι τοιούτα ὡσαὶ πετ τάξιν κατὰ τὰς ἐπεροχέας ἑστὶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.
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μάλιστα δὲ δοκοίσων εἶναι διό, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῶν παρεισόσεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δήμος καὶ ὀλίγαρχια. 3 § 6.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. iv (vii), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), “the second version inserts, “instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. “iv (vii) which the first version refers to.”

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.


The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διό of which it could be the effect. Thurot would find a place for it after προσόδων οἴσιον, but he has to admit that ἔχοντες σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἔχοντες μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατίκων after ἔχοντες: “on general grounds to exclude from citizenship “those who have the requisite amount of property would be an “oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical.” After this rule

1 “The words may perhaps refer to Bk. iv (vii)” (Wilson). But he does not further explain.

2 Etudes sur Aristote 60, 6
3 Bemerkungen pp. 13, 14.
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has been laid down the clause "διό...μετέχειν" comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert δ after "σχολάζειν."

(26) vi (iv). c. 12. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή; what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κράτος whether their preponderance comes from τὸ ποιόν or τὸ ποιόν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἐπερέχει...τοῖσιν; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, ὅπου δὲ τὸ ποιόν εὐπόρων...πλῆθος; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, ὅπου δὲ τὸ ποιόν μέσον...ὁ μέσος. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words δὲ δὲ ἀδὲ τῶν νομοθετῶν...τῶν νόμων τούτων, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, τίς κοινότητι κτλ. Moreover from 12 § 6, ὅσῳ δὲ ἀν ἀρμενον right on to the end of c. 13, τὸ ἀρχεῖον, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12.2

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή is broken off abruptly at ὁ μέσος in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. vii (vi). i. 5, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, ἀφηματε πρότερον—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, δὲ δὲ ἀδὲ...τοίσιν, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, δὲ...τοίσιν + 12 § 6, c. 13. §§ 1—6, ἀσφος δὲ ἀν ἀρμενον...πτερῶν μόνον in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος and τὸν δ’ εὖ μερίχθαι, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, δὲ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἀρχεῖον, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after ἀλων.

(27) vii (v). i § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, ἄρα καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται ἀδίκως ὅτε μὲν γὰρ...ἀκινον, ὅτε δὲ...

1 See Susemihl in Rhein. Mut. xxii. 564 f.; also Böckler op. cit. § 11, pp. 24—32.
2 The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: cp. Analysis p. 121 f.
μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἣττον κτλ. and in § 10 another ἐν πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτε δὲ κτλ, where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτε δὲ οὖθε...ἡ τὴν μοναρχίαν is in § 11 between πολιτεία and πανταχόου.

Wilson discovers a parallel version of 1 §§ 2—7, δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον...στάσεων εἰς, in 1 §§ 11—16 πανταχόου γὰρ...τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβένει τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλὴ γεγένηται πολιτεία πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτων δὲ ἀμφατῶντων, ὥσπερ εἰρητηοι καὶ πρῶτοι. δήμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσουν ὀψιον ὄντας οἰκεθεὶς ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἥλθει οἱ πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζοντες), ὄλγαρχία δὲ εκ τοῦ ἄνισος ἐν τῷ ὄντας ἄλλως εἶναι ἄνισους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν γὰρ ἄνισος ὀντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσι εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

ὁ δ' οὖθε, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἄνισοι, πάντων ἄνισων ἄξιωσι ἄνισοι. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα διὸ γίνεται πολιτεία, δήμος καὶ ὄλγαρχία. §§ 13, 14.

Further “the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated in a shorter form” in 2 §§ 2, 3: “there is here then perhaps another re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book “and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3.” Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. iii; at 1 § 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. i lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with 1 §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if 1 §§ 11—16 is another recension of 1 §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, στασιάζοντι δὲ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὄλγαρχίαις...ἀστι ὀντες,

1 Sussemlil Quaest. Crit. v. p. 10. 
2 Journal of Philology x. 84.
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should precede 1 § 11, πανταχοῦ γὰρ κτλ. At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 3.

(28) VII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γίνονται μὲν...ἐπιρε-ασθεῖς, have for their subject the cases where στάσεις has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλωντι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλοῖς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δὲ ἀδίκησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This ἀδίκησις may be κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν or κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουντι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλοῖς (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow διαστώσις at the end of 3 § 8.°

(29) VII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, ὁμοφωνία δὲ ἀληθικία...ἡ Ἰφιάδου. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body; (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them; (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμουν ἡ δίκαι, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated.°

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucretius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskilfully with Aristotle’s materials. In proportion as this is

1 Susenmihi Politica tert. ed. p. xxiii; Böcker op. cit. 37.
2 Böcker op. cit. 40, 41.
4 “Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shown not only that the passage cannot be placed in its old position, but that it must be placed in its new.” Postgate Notes p. 24.
5 “Hoc est uersimillimum: ipsum Aristotelem omnes habet particulas, quas in altera Politicorum recensione siue ubrius tractare siue continenti expositionis ordini inserere sibi proposuerit, in margine hic illic adnotasse; posteros autem, qui ediderunt libros, cum nescirent, quid notis illis ululisset scriptor, ineptissime confusas in hunc, quem hoc diei tenent, locum contulisse, quem for-tasse reuerat mutilatum lacunosum deprehenderant.” Böcker op. cit. 37, 33. There was no place for footnotes in an ancient book: but some instances in the above list—e.g. (3) (11) (13) (15) (27) (29)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the remark of Welldon Translation p. 100 n. 2.
admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristote- "telem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos; certe cur ab eo ipso in "libris celerimente scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, inco- "hatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem "esse inuentam non sane 'scio cur credam'."

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the Politics\(^2\) carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies\(^3\). The most important change introduced is to make Bk. i. cc. 8—11, περὶ χρηματιστικῆς, precede the discussion περὶ διαστάσεων και δούλων, thus inserting them in i. c. 3 § 3 between χρηματιστικῆς and πρῶτον δὲ. That the topics of Bk. i. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. i. in the following order: c. i. c. 2 §§ 1—6 παίδες; then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

\[\hat{\eta} \delta \; \delta έκ πλείόνων κυρίων κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ήδη. γυνομάνη μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔννοι ἐνεκεί, οὕτω δὲ τούτου εὔ ἔννοι \(\langle\omegaνχε τῆν αὐτῆς φύσιν\rangle. \; (\gammaδ \; φύσις τέλος οὕτω.) \; οὖν γὰρ ἐκατον ἄτομο τῆς γενέσεως τελειοθέσθης, ταύτην φαινέται τῆς φύσεως ἐναι ἐκάστου, ἐνόησε χαίρωσθαι ἐπίπου οἰκίας. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύση ἐστὶν, ἐπίτερ καὶ αὐτῷ πρῶται κοινωνία τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐκείνω. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34.\]

Then follows 2 § 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

\(^4\) Even Krohn Zur Kritik 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the oikeiwn συναγωγή.
\(^5\) aivē < a > for eti.
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καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει ἡ πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἐκαστὸς ἕμων ἔστιν.


What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, i.e. §§ 9, 10 ἐκ τούτων ...ἐκπληκτής, §§ 10—12 διώτι ...πολύν, §§ 15, 16 φύσει ...κρίνει: also c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικής. Then cc. 8—11 in the following order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρῶτον μὲν οὐν ἀπορήσειν (the preceding sentence of 8 § 1 ὅλως ... ἐν is enclosed in brackets)...οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 δῆλον ...ζῷον: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ ἐφευρέγεται ...μάλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὐτῇ ν αρμάτων κτήσει: 9 §§ 2—12 λάβουμεν ...ό κατὰ φύσιν: 9 §§ 14—18 τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ<οὕς> χρηματιστικῆς ...δρον: 10 §§ 4, 5; C. 11; C. 12 § 1 as far as γαμήκι. The rest of c. 3 follows, i.e. §§ 3, 4 πρῶτον [81] περὶ διεπότου ...βλάπτων γὰρ: cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὁ μὲν οὐν ἐπικαιροῦ ...θηρανικῆ, after which ἢ δὲ ἡράκλει ...τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον] should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 ποιοὶ δὲ ...τῶν ἀρχῆς: lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γνωσεῖς (in 12 § 1) to the end. Tr.

1 The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of αὐτάρκεια is found three times, and the passages where

it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle (cf. c. 804) because, if the end of the state is eb γεφ., it cannot be αὐτάρκεια. This then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Krohn calls it, ‘our old recension’, has been formed by the comprehension of heterogeneous materials.]
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good: 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the Politicus of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state: 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life: 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy: 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong: 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual: 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes: 2 §§ 15, 16.

A. Of the Family in general. There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (χρηματιστική); the relation of this subject to that of the family (οἰκονομία) is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.

I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5.

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(a) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(i) The nature and character of the slave: he is an animate chattel, c. 4.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(b) The view quoted in the Introduction from Plato’s Politicus that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.

(περὶ πάντων κτήσεων καὶ χρηματιστικῆς: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

1 [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term ‘economic science’, used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense. The more common equivalents are, for χρηματιστική ‘finance’, ‘money-making art’; for οἰκονομία ‘household management’, ‘domestic economy’. Tr.]
(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (χρηματιστικής) to a theory of the family or economic science (οικονομικής) : cc. 8—10.

(b) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(c) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 3 (ὅτι μὴν ὁδὸν...).

(d) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6.

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(e) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the natural species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(f) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(b) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artizans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(b) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(c) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to
the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched: \(i\) §§ 7—13.

III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations; also in the relation of master and slave: cc. 12, 13.

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children: c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to inanimate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free: \(i\) § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it: that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, \(i\) §§ 2—12, since

(a) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, \(i\) §§ 5—9:

(b) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave: \(i\) §§ 10, 11.

(c) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not in themselves, but in relation to another: \(i\) § 11 (\(\text{et seq.} \) ...).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves: \(i\) §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity: \(i\) §§ 15, 16.
PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION: B. II.—VIII.

A. Critical Part.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. 1 §§ 1, 2.

II. Criticism of the ideal polities: 1 § 3—8 § 25.

a. Plato's Ideal State in the Republic: 1 § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word 'all'. Plato's view would not be correct if 'all' meant 'all collectively', but only if 'all' meant 'each individual': a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.
(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood-relations: 4 §§ 2—6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when thus generalized all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree ‘watery’ and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. For Plato’s purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4.>

(7) Plato’s regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties: and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (ἀλλὰ ὑμεῖς...), § 10.

(ii) Arguments against community of property: 5 §§ 1—13.

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to μειγμα and τουμ, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (ευφωρία), in respect of one’s neighbour’s wife, or liberality: 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato’s procedure is unfair; he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(7) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (4). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.
(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory: §§ 18—24.

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: § 24 (ἀμφῶν δὲ καί...).

(vi) To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato’s part requires it: §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: §§ 27, 28.


(a) Comparison of the Republic with the Laws; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: §§ 1—5.

(b) Criticism of the state in the Laws: §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory: §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully: §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen’s real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: § 15 (καὶ τῶν ἀληθείαν...).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the Laws is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, i.e. a Polity (ῥωματικά) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme: §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato’s: §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: § 22.
c. Phaleas' scheme of polity: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10, holds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 8, 9, §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed: 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 22, 23.

d. Hippodamos' scheme of polity: c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into artisans, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 § 7 (ἀποστάτευσε 8′ ἀν...)—§ 10.
(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: §§ 10 (ἐξ ὑπὸ γεωργίας...).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurymen should vote, § 5, any better: §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, §§ 16—21, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: §§ 23—25.


(a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: § 1.

(b) The defects of the Spartan polity: §§ 2—36.


(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: §§ 14—19.

(ii) Political defects: §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephorality, §§ 19—34:

(2) in the Council of Elders, §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (παλαιομεγάλοις), § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, § 36.
(b) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(b) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(i) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(ii) How far again the magistracy of the keramoi is worse managed even than the ephorality: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephorality, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(c) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(i) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(ii) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mischievous to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—13.

(d) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(e) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the insecure favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(b) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3,

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 3—6, upon Solon's constitution,
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

[IV. APPENDIX.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: i 2 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: i 2 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philolaos, i 2 § 8,

(c) Charondas, i 2 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phaleas, i 2 § 11,

(e) Plato, i 2 § 12,

(f) Draco, i 2 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, i 2 § 13,

(h) Andromadas, i 2 § 14.]

B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

B. III. cc. 1—13.

First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question "What is a state?" and this introduces the further question "What is a citizen?": i §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (הַמַּשְׂפֵּד), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: i § 2—3 §§ 5.
β. The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

γ. Is the excellence (ἀρετή) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.

(d) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, i.e. his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (d), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their inmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (ἀρετη) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or diazonic excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artisans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.

Second group of principles. Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 25.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.
(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (δικαίως) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (δοκεῖος δικαίως, δοκεῖ ἱκανότητα): c. 9.

(b) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (of ἐπικράτεσ), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (ὁς ἀπὸ σωφροσύνης), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, §§ 1—5; but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the
III. cc. 6—13.

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Patriotism should entrust the details of state business: 11 §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, 11 §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, 11 §§ 13, 14.


(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: 11 §§ 18—21.

(vi) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: cc. 12, 13.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (στήριξιν=capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with influence: c. 12. Polities where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(iii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(i) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(ii) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—This whole discussion, (i) and (ii), or something similar, is lost.

(iii) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to ostracism and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

1 Bernays supposed cc. 13, 15 to be another version of cc. 9—11; see Introductory.
II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:
   B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).


   MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

   (a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (διαφοράς).

   (b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (πέδιον...)

   —§ 15.

   (a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.

   (β) Despoti monarchical amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

   (γ) Αὐτοκρατορία or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

   (θ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.

   Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

   (ε) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

   (c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

   (d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—10.

   (a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man:

   15 § 3—§ 5 (πάσης); 16 § 5 (ό μὲν ὁδὴ)—§ 9.

   (β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

   15 § 5 (ὅλην γιοτο...κόλλων): 16 § 4 (ὅλλοι μὲν δίκας...)—§ 5: 15 § 6:

   15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (ὅλλοι μὲν οἰκί τέκνων...)—§ 10=16 § 10 (οἰκί δὲ)—§ 13:

   15 § 10 (οἰκί δὲ)—§ 13 (δημοκρατία).

   (i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (ὅλην γιοτο...)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two:

   16 § 10 (οἰκί δὲ)—§ 12.

   (ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

   (iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves ipso facto allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.
(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 15 §§ 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 §§ 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατία).

(γ) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 §§ 14 (ἐχθεί δ’ ἀναπλασμένη)–16 §§ 2 (δῆμος).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(e) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 §§ 2 (δοξᾶτι βλέπων)–§ 4.

(e) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(a) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (δούλοι) or a normal republican government (πολιτεία); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(b) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen; yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—25): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

**Pure Aristocracy: the true normal form of the absolutely best constitution:** B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

**Preliminary Questions:** IV (VII) co. 1—3.

(a) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.

H.
A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 § 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 3 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant's life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other; c. 3.]

**Outline of the Absolutely Best Constitution:**

B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

(i) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(a) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(b) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(c) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(d) The position of the city, 5 § 3 (τῆς δὲ πόλεως...)—6 § 8,

   (a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

   (b) towards the sea: 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(ii) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artisans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-
ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (δοῦλοι καὶ περόμενοι) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(a) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (περὶ δὲ...)—§ 14.

(i) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9;

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (μὴ δρωματίαιοι), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (περόμενοι) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (δυτικό Ἰσαακία) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(8) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VIII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (incomplete).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.
(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (φόρος), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7 (left incomplete).


Its aim and end: 14 § 9—I5 § 6.

The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of V (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(b) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(i) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(ii) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (εὐθείᾳ)§ 21 (ἀνθρωπολόγιον).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (τὰ ἡμεῖς, ἱστορία).

(v) Another appeal to experience: states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.
(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the precedence: all the others ought however to be practised, since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practice in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtue. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a onesided military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans: even capacity in war, which is all they strive to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (<ορισ forEach)—end of B. v (viii).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction: yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(β) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity: c. 16.

(1) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.

(ii) The leading principles which determine it: 16 §§ 4—5, §§ 6—8.

(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(3) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, § 3.

(y) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (...βολήν αὐτῶν). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(8) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7: and (e) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality: also (i) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37 (?) for men and 18 for women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(a) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 14.

(g) Exposure of deformed infants: procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 § 15.
Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (ἀνετρι...)—§ 18.

Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (τὴν δ' ἐχαμικένυ...)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: §§ 7—§ 14, §§ 15, §§ 14, § 12.

Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (ἔξαιδο...οὐρανοῦ).

The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: IV (vii). 17 §§ 15, 16, V (viii).

General introductory remarks. Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: IV (vii). 17, §§ 15, 16.

It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: V (viii). 1 §§ 1, 2.

It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.

The right educational course: V (viii). cc. 2—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 §§ 1—3 §§ 12.

Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and trust leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure: but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (ὑπάλω); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (ἐπί εἰς)—§ 12.
(ii) Athletic exercises (γυμναστική) : cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(a) As was stated above, iv (vii). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises: 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalizing them by excessive exertions: 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training: 4 § 7 (ὅτι μὴν οἴνος)—§ 9.

(iii) Music: cc. 5—7.

(a) Statement of the question: Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely aesthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification? 5 §§ 1—§ 4 (ἐποιήσεων).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself: 5 § 4 (ὅτι μὴν οἴνος)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question: Music can and should subserve each of those three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4): yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15: and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young: 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question:

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians: 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves: §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows:

(a) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes: 6 § 6 (φαστικόν…)—§ 8.

(b) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young: 6 §§ 9—16.
(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (dōxovlai) and rhythms:

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homoeopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed: § 13–15. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing: also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young: § 13–15.]

(2) The elucidation of the further question stated in § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.

B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS: B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

Introductory remarks: B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity: § 1–7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight: § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions: § 9–11.


The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions: VI (IV), c. 3–VIII (V).

I. Enumeration of all possible constitutions: VI (IV) cc. 3–10.

[(i) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.]
(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 §§ 7—19.

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 §§ 20—6 §§ 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (περὶ ἄσθενεσιν).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § 22 (περὶ ἀσκετικῶν) §§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (δυναστεία): 5 §§ 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: 5 §§ 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (a) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (b) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.


(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 §§ 4, 12 §§ 6—13 §§ 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.


(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 §§ 4.

(iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of
illusory devices. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 12 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10. (v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (πολέμοις).


(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

ii The best constitution on the average (ἀπόλεια ταύς πολέμων πόλεων): c. 11.

(i) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotical ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (πολέμοι).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (καὶ ἐφόδους)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(ii) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.
iii. What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (τις πολιτεία τις καὶ ποιὰ ποιοὺς συμφέρει): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (διποὺ...)
§ 5.

(1) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.

(11) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 3,
(b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (διποὺ...),
(c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (διποὺ δὲ...)—§ 5,
(d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (this is wanting).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII (VI).

(1) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV). cc. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(b) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10;

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (πάντες);
(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (ρυθ δὲ τίποτα...)—§ 9;
(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;
(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(c) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratic principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratic institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Polities: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: c. 15.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 15 §§ 1, 2.

(b) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 4 (διποὺ δὲ...)—§ 4.
(γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.

(δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (....τῶν αὑτῶν), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (εἰς πόροιν...)

(e) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.

(i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.

(ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.

(iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.

(γ) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.

(i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz., who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.

(ii) These modes classified under (α) Democracy § 19, (β) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (c) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (ς) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.

(η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 21.

(δ) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.

(α) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.

(β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.

(γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (of Δίκαιωτες); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.

(δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.

(ι) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: vii (vi) cc. 1—7.

(a) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.
VI. c. 15—VII. c. 7.

(b) The species of Democracy: r § 5—c. 5.

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: r §§ 5—10.


(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 3 § 9—3 § 6.]

(e) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(f) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(g) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (τῇ τε τέλευται...)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(δ) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum: 5 §§ 9—11.

(c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(b) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army, 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.
(iii) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (incomplete).

(a) The questions to be discussed, §§ 1, 2.
(b) The officials necessary in every state, §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (a) of the markets (ἀγορακησίων), § 3. (b) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (ἀστυφυλάκιον) §§ 4...5. (c) Police officers in the country (ἀγρόφυλάκιον, ἀστρωυλος); (d) financial officers (ἐπαθέτης, ταμιής), § 6. (e) Keepers of archives and registers (μαγιόμενης, ἱστορίας), § 7. (f) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (g) Military officers (στρατηγικος, πολέμιαρχος, ναυαρχος, κτλ), §§ 13—15. (h) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (σχισθαμι, λογιστας, ἐξευτελικια), § 16. (i) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (πρώτος τοις, βουλης), § 17. (j) Officers to superintend public worship (ἴσωμι κτλ), §§ 18—20. (k) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, § 22.

The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.

v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

1 Preliminary Observations: 1 §§ 1—8, §§ 9—11, § 8: 3 §§ 14: 1 §§ 11—16.

(a) Statement of the whole question: 1 § 1.
(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: 1 §§ 2—7.
(c) Two species of revolution, 1 §§ 8—11:
   (a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—11: whether
      (i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply
      (ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or
      (iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.
   (b) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.
(d) Special application of the remarks in 1 §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 §§ 14, 1 §§ 11 (τατηρχοι...)—§ 15.
(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, 1 § 16.
The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common: cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry: the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections: 2 § 3 (πώς ...πόλεμον).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution: 2 §§ 4—3 § 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(a) General enumeration: 2 §§ 4—6.

(b) Consideration of them in detail: 2 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—3; 4 §§ 8—10: and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (διὰ τῶν ἐπεθελσι), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (A) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13:

(a) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(c) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 12, 13:

(a) force, (b) stratagem, (c) stratagem succeeded by force.
III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) The Causes of Decay, cc. 5—7.

(a) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8

(γινομεν...πρωτανω)1.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(b) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5 2.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (κενεθεται...)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people,

6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(b) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(y) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

1 Perhaps (a) should properly follow.

2 If § 5, καλ & & Επαθαι...πολιτεαν, be genuine we must add: “In the same way a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people.”
(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public means, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enmity owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotic character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11.²

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another: 6 § 18.

(c) In Mixed Aristocracies and Polities: a. 7 §§ 1—13.

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 2, 3;

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 3;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 3,

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power, 7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Polities consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 5, 6.

[Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place; that is, to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

(u) Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken in common.

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

¹ Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

(ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: cc. 8, 9.

(A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

(a) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(c) In Polities and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(d) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in vi (iv), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5; hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(e) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(c) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Polities and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14;

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14;

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.
(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, may even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 § 21.

(8) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and lastly virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification indeed in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification in a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(9) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(10) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(11) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which infallibly leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—§ 11 (δύναμις).

(12) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (μετρωτος δόλος)—§ 16.


(γ) The causes of decay: c. 10.

(a) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (ἀρχαιών).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (τυραννίς) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (ἀρχαιών).


(a) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 13, 14, and (2) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(b) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the usurper; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(c) These points of view presented in detail: 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20;

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20;

9—2
(c) Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and
kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.

(a) Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not
tyranies whether (1) under a royal or aristocratical, or (11) under a democratical
government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling
amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about
their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation
against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy
are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(6) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed
from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or
(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making
themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession
to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that
they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new
monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(ii) The safeguards: c. 11, c. 12 §§ 1—6.

(a) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute
authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(b) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(1) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common
pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;
(6) draining the means of all his subjects, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 9, 10,\)
and (7) perpetually creating wars, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 10,\)

(8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 10,\)

(9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 11, 12;\)

(10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 13;\)

(11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 14, 15, 16;\)

(12) The three leading points of view in this policy, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 17—24.\)

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented; no treasures accumulated for himself, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 19—21.\)

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 21.\)

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 22.\)

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 23, 24.\)

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 25, 24.\)

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 24.\)

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 25.\)

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always bestow distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 26.\)

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 27.\)

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 28, 29.\)

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ 30.\)

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet prefer to rest his rule upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, \(
\text{Ii} \ \S\ S\ 31, 32.\)
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato’s doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (δ ἄνδρος)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition from Tyranny or into the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.
(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Aristocracy at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under strict limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained, 12 § 18. (This is almost entirely wanting.)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. The third main division of the work, treating of Legislation, is entirely wanting.
Symbols and Abbreviations.

Γ = codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit
vetusta translatio latina Guilemi de Moerbeka.
M² = cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.
P¹ = cod. Parisinus 2093.
P¹(corr.) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
p¹ = correctiones palliadios et luteolae.
P² = cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.
P²(corr.) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
P²(corr.?) = correctiones nigriores.
P²(corr.?) = correctiones palliadios et luteolae.
p³ = correctiones rubrae.
Q = cod. Marcianus Venetus 300. W¹ = cod. Reginensis 125.
Q² = cod. Laurentianus 81, 5. Ar. = cod. Aretini deperditus.
R² = cod. Laurentianus 81, 6. Ald. = editio princeps Aldina.

IP = the agreement of Ald. and all existing mss. except M²P¹P² in a reading.
IP² = " " " except M²P¹P²P³ in a reading.
II = codex archetypus deperditus superstitum librorum et Aldinae.

Bk.¹ = the Berlin Aristote in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.
Bk.² = the Politics reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).
Susem.³ = his ed. in Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 1882. Susseim.⁴ = the present work.

Note that P⁴(corr.) = the corrector of P⁴ and the corrector of P⁴; but
P² and P⁴(corr.) = the first hand of P² and the corrector of P⁴.

[δρυσ] Bernays = Bernays proposes to omit δρυσ from the text.
<καλ εκωνωματω> Rassow = Rassow proposes to insert καλ εκωνωματω in the text.
? Susseim. = Susseinih conjectures; but
Γ (?) = Γ may have had the reading in question.
ετων = denotes a lacuna; that after ετων some word, or words, has been lost.

The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed
twice over: where they occur in the MSS. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary
type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would trans-
pose them.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περί ὁλοκονταύτης, cc. 3—33 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πόλις γὰρ σύγκεται πόλει έξ οἰκείων). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. 1, are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (ἀρίθμοι) started for discussion; (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολιτικός and οἰκονομικός, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις έξ οἰκείων, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ἡ οἰκία φύλα τῆς μηδέν ἐνεργῆς οἰκονομίας, c. 3—6, (4) the relation of χρηματική to Economic, πότερον ἡ χρηματική ἡ αὐτή τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐρήμωσα, cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artisan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἡ ἐνεργή τῆς διαγωνισμοῦ πολιτική ἡ διαγωνισμοῦ, 13 § 2 ff. See further the Analysis and Introd. pp. 23—31.

1. The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end: § 1. The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organisation, as is evident when it is analysed into its simplest elements: §§ 3, 5.

§ 1.1 πόλις, A 'city,' but at the same time a sovereign 'state.' κοινωνία—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. ἀλληλικαί, commercial transactions, exchange Nic. Eth. v. 5, 9; ταύτην τὴν κ. τεραμάκεις ἡμιλαία, the marriage union Pol. iv(vii). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the voluntary combination, association, or cooperation of free men with each other in objects in which they have common interests (τὰ ἄνθρωπος, ἅθετον, ὁ ἄλλοτε καὶ συμμαχίας κοινωνίας), or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσιμον μὴ ἐφημερὲν ἔνεκεν τῆς μεταθέσεως, συμμαχίας, καθὼς προανήκουσα χάριν). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that ἡ πολιτική κ., 'civil society' = the community, τὸ κοινόν (e.g. ii. 3. 1 compared with ii. 2. 2, iv[vii]. 14. 1). See further on i. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, 11. 9, 12.

3. Δοκούντος ἄγαθου] seeming good, which may not really be the agent's true interest, although he thinks so, cp. iv[vii]. 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated Nic. Eth. iii. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20, the solution being ὁ συνιθαῦς ἐκεῖα ἐγένετο ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ ὁ ἐκκαίριος ἐλάχιστος αὐτῷ φαινέται.) Both δοκεῖ and φαίνεται are often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖ = putare to be thought, φαίνεται = videre to appear, of an object present to sense; hence τὸ δοκεῖ = subjective opinion, τὸ φαίνεται = objective facts. Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

4. πάσαι μὲν...μᾶλλον δέ] The clause with δέ gives the true apodosis to ἐπιτείθη: 'while all aim at some good (καὶ μὲν τοῦ συνιθαῦντος ἐσφαλέται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.'

§ 5 κυριωτάτου] Cp. iii. 12. 1 and note Susem. (1)

Aristotle's proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-
περιέχουσα τῶν ἄλλων, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν η ἱκαλομένη πόλις (I) καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

§ 2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικοί καὶ βασιλικοὶ καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ διεσπαρμένοι [εἰσαγ.] τῶν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἦλθες γὰρ ἀλλὰ ὡς καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ οὖν εἰθεὶ τούτων ἔκαστον, οἷς ἅν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότης, ἅν δὲ πλείων, οἰκονόμου, ἃν δὲ ἐπὶ πλείων, πολιτικοῦ ἡ βασιλικοῦ, ὡς ὀφθαλμὸς διαφέροντος μεγάλης οἰκείας ἡ μικρὰ πόλις ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ καὶ βασιλικὴ, ὡστε μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστική, βασιλική, ὡστε δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἄρχημενος, πολιτικῶν ταύτα δὲ οὖν ἐστὶν ἀληθές).

9 εἴναι omitted by Π (added after τῶν by a later hand in Μ) || 14 ἐφεστικής Μ[1] (1st hand), ἐφεστικής Μ[2] (corrector), ἐφεστικής P8a Q 9b R9a SbT Υ9a V9a W9b Τ[1] Aldine || 15 τῶν is omitted by ΠΠΕκ. || 16 [ἄρχων] καὶ ἄρχημενος Σ Bernays (cp. iii. 17. 7) needlessly

τική to be the 'art' concerned with ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πόλις, is given Nic. Eth. I. 2 §§ 7; cp. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταύτῳ ἐστίν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γε καὶ τελείωτον τὸ τῆς πόλεως....καλλωπὶ καὶ καθένας ἐθεῖς καὶ πὸλεις, sc. τὸ αὐθαυτικόν ἀγαθόν: which is more precisely described in the case of the 'city' as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ κοινή συμφέρον.

ἡ πασών....παρέχουσα] See n. on ii. 4 § 7, where is explained, from Nic. Eth. VIII. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the inferior as 'parts' (μόρια) of itself.

§ 2 § 8 δοθεί μὲν κτλ.] Plato Politicus 253 E ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4; 7 §§ 1, 2 mm. Socrates too expresses himself to this effect in Xenoph. Memorab. III. 4 § 6 f. § 12 ὡς τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήρει μέχρι διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. SUSEM. (3) πολιτικῶν] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-governed according to Greek ideas; so 8 § 15, 11 § 13, II. 7. 1 πολιτικὸς (ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ θεωρᾶσιν, cp. Nic. Eth. X. 9. 15) καὶ σοφοτάτοι. Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that ὁ χώρος π. should know psychology, N. E. I. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other sciences; hence joined with συμβολή, a theoretical statesman, student of politics: πολιτικοὶ (I. V. VII. 4. 5. VIIV. 1 § 3. VIIIV. 9. 9. 9 πλήθους κτλ.) They assume that a king differs from e.g. a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. πλήθους—numbers: 8 § 15, Κυρί. 1. 4. 10 (τὸ 

πλῆθος τῆς φύλαξ=the strength of the defensive force), cp. Metaph. 1. 9. 24 ἀριθμός = τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγων.

10 εἴδει] or κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, 'specifically,' 'in kind'; εἴδει διαφέρειν=to be essentially different, because division into species takes account only of essential qualities. 11 ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων] Schneider supplies ἄρχω here, and καὶ οὖν before διαφέροντον, but μωλυσμένον (εἴναι) would do just as well in the latter case, and in line 14, while either ἄρχω or ἐφεστική must be understood to follow δοὺς δὲ in line 15.

12 δὲ οὖν κτλ.] Whereas the state is composed εἰς διαφέροντων, II. 3, 3, where see n. SUSEM. (2 b)


15 τῆς τοῦ τοιαύτης] i.e. τῆς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, τοῦ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, the regal science of government (Rassow Bemer. p. 3). SUSEM. (3)

CP. n. on τοιαύτης c. 8 § 7. The one man supreme over the state is called a king; the ruler who follows out the principles of the same kingly science (when in office), but takes his turn (κατὰ μέρος) at governing and being governed, is a republican magistrate.
ΠΟΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 1, 2.

§ 3 δήλον δ' ἦσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἑπισκοποῦντι κατὰ τὴν ύφης ἡμέρας μέθοδον. ὥστερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀνυπόθετον ἀνάγκης ἐθνεῖν (ταύτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντὸς), ὡστε καὶ τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνεκτίμησιν ὑψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐὰν τε τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκατὸν τῶν ῥήματων.

τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς τὰ πράγματα φυσικῶς βλέπειν (Bk. 8 νομοὶ) ὥστε ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοίς καὶ ἐν τούτοις, καθότι ἐν ὧντο τοῦ θεωρήσεως τῶν ῥήματος, διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐὰν τε τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκατὸν τῶν ῥήματος.

§ 21 τοιούτως and 23 τῶν ῥήματων should be taken as above and not referred to εἰς ὑπὸ συνεκτίμησιν (πρόδοδο) as the grammatical antecedent.

c. 2 Origin of the city from the family through the village-community: §§ 1—8. The city a natural institution §§ 8—12, prior in the intention of nature to the family and individual §§ 13, 14, and of incalculable utility §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory, as it is called by Sir H. Maine, applied to the origin of society. The family living under the headship of the father is taken as the ultimate social unit. Until quite recently this was the accepted view; see Maine Ancient Law c. 5 esp. 122—135; Early History of Institutions c. 3, Early Law and Custom cc. 7, 8. There are certain difficulties of this derivation of the state which Aristotle avoids by making the combination of families of different stocks (γένος) depend on contiguity of residence and on convenience.' See J. F. McLennan's criticisms Studies in Ancient History, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is something in Plato Rep. II. 369 B ff., Laws III. 576—582, Polybios VI. cc. 4—7, Cicero De Rep. I. 25, 16 §§ 30—42 (with Lactantius Instit. VI. 15), De Off. I. 17 §§ 53, 54, De Fin. III. §§ 62—67. A. C. Bradley Hellenica 190—212 gives the best commentary on cc. 1, 2; Unckel Staatlehre ii. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 3 τὸ πράγματα φυσικῶς] "things in their growth or origin" (Shilletto); Plato Rep. 369 A, Laws 755 C.

§ 32 συνδοξασθαι [Nic. Eth. VIII. 12, 7 ἀνθρώπων γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδοξασθείν μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτικῶν.
"It is not simply, as Füllborn (11, 77) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the establishment of this relationship: Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely: cp. 6 § 10 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατὰ συμμβασιν, 111. 6. 6 n. (L. Schiller). Susan. (7) Cp. 5 § 2. 1253 b 1 οἴοθεν γαρ κτλ. "For nature never fashions things niggardly, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their knife." (Shilleto). 2 τὴν Ἀθηνικὴν μαχαιριάν. "According to Hesychius, i.e., the Delphian knife had the upper part only of iron, λαβάνωνα διαμερίσθη μέρος σήπονος: the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Göttling De mi. D. quae est apud Aristotelem (Jena 1856. 4) maintains it was a knife and spoon combined, for sacrificial purposes" (Schnitzer). Hence Göttling proposes μοστρον for μέρος in Hesychius, as above. Oncken, 11. 25—27, dismisses the obscure words of Hesychius in favour of Oresme's explanation: "suppose a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the back left rough and the other side sharpened to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough sort of tool would certainly be cheap enough." Cp. δεικνυόμενον vii(iv). 15. 8 n. Susan. (8) Δεικτικὴ μάχαιρα ἑκτὶ τῶν φενοερωμάτων Makarios ap. Walzium. Arsen. 179: with which agrees the explanation.
nuχρος, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν ὤντα γὰρ ἀν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα (I) 4 τῶν ὁργάνων ἔκαστον, μὴ πολλοὶς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρεῖον)
§ 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάρωις τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὸ δούλων τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
5 τό καὶ is omitted by Π' Bk.
in αργές, προν. 1. 94 (tom. 1. p. 393 of the Corpus Paroemiographi, Gotting. 1839) Δελφική μάχαιρα: ἐπὶ τῶν φηλο-
κερῶν καὶ ἀντὶ παντὸς λαμβάνει προφθαρ-
μένων, παράσων οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μὲν τι τῶν
λειψῶν εἰςμέμισαν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ἀκμαῖοις (for the use of the knife) ἐπάνω.
Athenaeus IV. 74 p. 173.: Ἀχαϊς ἐν τῶν ἐφευρέσεων ἐν Ἀλκαίωνος τῷ σατυρικῷ καρι-
κοστοῖς καὶ τῷ δελφῶν διά τοῦτον.
Καρκαστοιος προφτάλλων πεπελεύνων πάρας τῷ λειψάνῳ πεπελευσμένοις ἄπειρα καὶ ἑαυτοῖς, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
ἐπαύτω ἐν ἀπόθελον καὶ ἀρσευτώ χνὶ ἀλλ' ἐν
Δελφῶν πέφοτάς ἀκούσατ' θηρίῳ μα-
χαῖος καὶ προφθαρμός τοῖς σώοις προφύ-
λασι. It was from Thomas Aquinas ad locum that Grosset derived the explanation cited above. See Von Hertling Rhein. Min. XXXIX. p. 447. Mr. W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to “a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar Nem. vii. 42.”
3 ἐν πρὸς ἐν: There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows De Part. Anim. IV. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅτως ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐ
ὅπως τὸν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐ
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ὅπως τὸν ἐν "πετσλεόν" ἔργα. Susem. 9. See De Anima II. 8. 10. 430 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices II. 11. 13. VI(vi). 15. 6.
4 μὴ πολλοὶς ἔργοις κτλ.: “if re-
stRICTED in use to a single function.” Fül-
leborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. Susem. 10.
§ 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάρωις κτλ.: “Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in barbaria they are not, be-
cause all—men and women—are slaves” (Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work μαθην διαιρέοντων τῶν
δούλων Plato Law 895 ε. Fülleborn (II. 84) object that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense in-}
6 τάξιν. αἶτιον θείο τό διότι τὸ φύσει ἄρχων οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται (I) ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλως καὶ δοῦλως. διόδιο φαίνω οἴοντα γραφάμε Οὐλίνης ἄρχεων ἐκδός,
§ 5 δό ταύτο φύσει βαρβάρων καὶ δοῦλων ὑπ’ ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν ἐκ δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὄρθως Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας ὁδόν μὲν πρώτητα γυναῖκα τε βοῶν τ’ ἀρτιόμοη
ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ’ ὀλικέτου τοῖς πέντεν ἔστιν.
ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰς τάσαν ἠμέραν συνεστηκία κοινωνία κατά φύσιν οἰκίας οὕτως, οὐδὲς ὃ μὲν Χαράνδας καλεὶ ὁμοιότυποὺς, Ἐπιτελείς ἡ μενδής δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁμοκάτως; ὡς δ’ ἐκ πλειάδων οἰκίων κοινωνία
9 ὅ περ before ταύτα Ι, omitted by Mv Π1 || 12 ἐστιν: ** Susem.3 wrongly, see Dittenberger Π. Π. Ἄνω, 1874 p. 351 ff. || 15 ὁμοκάτως: ΠΠ: ΠΠ: Susem.3 and Mv (corr.) perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 351 ff. and Commentary n. (17): ὁμοκάτως ὁμοκάτως Sudeley (also Shilleto in unpublished Adversaria: ‘si Epi-
menides ἐρείδει τουτεβατο οἰκείοι ὁμοκάτως’). Nisi forte ὁμοκάτως ὁμοκάτως’

8 Euripides Iphigenia in Aulis 1400 Nauck. The words following are διὰ οἱ βαρβάρως, μὴτερ, Ὑλείης τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ’ ἔλεβοροι. Susem. (13)

9 ὡς ταύτα κτλ.] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not combated until a late period and then by but few: 3 § 4 n. (31). This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority; it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on i. 5 § 10.
That slaves are non-Hellenics is assumed quite as an understood thing in Xenoph. Memor. ii. 7. 6, Demosth. xxi (c. Mid.). 48. See however n. (64) on i. 7 § 5. Susem. (13)

§ 5 οἱ πρῶτηι] predicatively, “from these two relationships,”—man and wife, master and slave,—“arises primarily the family.” For the sense, πρῶτειν καὶ ἀναγενέστερον οἰκεῖον ἄνδρας Nic. Eth. viii. 12. 7. The three stages, οἰκεῖον καὶ πόλιν, are given by Plato Laws i. 626 c. ff.

Ἡρώδους Works and Days 405. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, κατὰ τὸν δ’ οὐ γαμήσῃ, ἢ μὲν καὶ βοῶν ἕνα. Susem. (14)
12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κτλ.] “the ox supplies the place of a servant.” Cp. § 5 $ 9

n. (46). If with both these passages we compare 4 §§ 1—4, it is evident that Varro’s division De re rustica 1. 17, which Grotius mentions ο. c. 1. 5. 3, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: all in tres partes (loc. dividunt) instrumenti genus; vocale et semivocale et mutum. vocale in quo sunt servi: semivocale in quo sunt boves: mutum, in quo sunt plaustra. (L. Schiller). Susem. (15)

12 οὐκ οὖν κτλ.] μηδὲ οὖν, not δὲ, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 ἐκ μὲν οὖν κτλ. Take κατὰ φύσιν with ἐνοιακία: ‘thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: sharsers in one meal-jar as Charondas calls them; joint-holders of a piece of land in the phrase of Epi-
menides the Cretan. The union of a number of families first formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence is the village.” Else-
where in Aristotle ἔφοβοιAsia = lasting for a day; so Bernays here, “for intercourse of less transitory duration.”

14 Χαράνδας] 11. 12 § 7, 8 n. 116; ΤΤ (IV), 11 § 15, 12 § 2 mm. Holm Geschichte Siciliens im Altertum (Leip-
zig 1870) 1. p. 123 ff, 401. Susem. (16)

Ἐπιμενήδης] See Excursus I at the end of this book, p. 204. Susem. (17)

15 ὁμοκάτως] The reading is doubt-
ful. (1) The mess. of the better family give ὁμοκάτως. (2) If Aristotle is quoting from a collection of oracles (Χηριμολ)
ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and ὄμοσαρχος, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For ὄμοσαρχος of the inferior mss. is usually taken to be a compound with ἱερὰ a trough, crib; hence any feeding-place; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in arri could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Götting, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the families of the Cretans ‘mess-mates,’ because the σωσταρκα were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of ὄμοσαρχος Dittenberger urges that ‘it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read ὄμο-
κατος) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But ὄμο-
κατος = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.’ Yet ὄμοσαρχος should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of ‘hearth’s meaning homes or families,*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. Transactions Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading ὄμοσαρχος (with οὖ), Doric for ὄμο-
κατος (κατος) with a common plot of ground. Susem. (17)

"The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. Θάλεως. 111. 12: καταρκος is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (καταρκοι): cp. Π. 5. 2 (γάμπεος and καρπος). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original οἰκία: (3) οἰκος=joint family of Hindu or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (κατος) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine" (Early Law 337—255): after that, "(3) the οἰκος breaks up into separate οἰκαι forming the κώμη (=the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (διομοσαρχος)” (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye La propriété primitive cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214). Hearne Arvan Households 170—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan Patriarchal Theory c. 8: also Caillemer Droit de succession p. 34 ff., Jannet Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte (Paris 1880) p. 88.

* η δ’ ἐκ πλεύσεων κτᾶ: Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Füllborn 11. 95, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: 9 § 5 with note. Susem. (18)

16 προστάτης=simplicissima, quae tamquam para inest alias (Bonitz), § 6. 17. η κώμη ἄποικα οἰκίας i.e. all the rest of the village except the original

18. ** παιδός Schmidt, [παῖδα...παῖδα] Susen. || 20 σώμαθνον wanting in II° (added by p³ in the margin) || πάσα γάρ τὰ πᾶσα ὑπάτη Schmidt in a former conjecture, transposing 18 δι...20 σώμαθνον to follow 24 ἡλικία (now withdrawn).

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. **SUSEM. (18b)**

18 ὄμογάλακτας. According to Philochorus ' Fragg. 91—94 and ' Fragg. 139 in Harpokration and Nuidas (s. v. γένηται, ὄμογάλακτες, ἄγγελοι) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένη who were afterwards called γεννηταί = kin, clansmen, were originally called, ὄμογάλακτες = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider Addenda 11. 471). Paus. vi. 37. viii. 9 οἱ μετ' χορτῶν τοῦ γένους ἐκαλοῦτο γεννηταί καὶ ὄμογάλακτες, γένει μὲν οὐ διό προσφέροντες, εἰ δὲ τὴν σωμάθνον οὔτω προσαφερομένου. **SUSEM. (19)**

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κόμη and the γένος is apparently indicated 111. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλη defined as (a) ἡ τοῦ οὖν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖσ ὀικεία καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (b) ἡ γενεά καὶ κυρίαν κοινωνία." (Heitland Notes 8). Even then no place in the development is found for φατρίας, φαῦλα, or Aristotle's "associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals." 'Nic. Eth. viii. 9. 5; cp. Pol. iii. 9. 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to συνοικία, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ὄμογαλακτες, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παῖδες τε καὶ παῖδων παῖδας be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was originally applied to the clansmen (γεννηταί). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens,—indeed Dikaiarchos (Fr. 9 Muller) appears to denote by πάργα what is usually called the γένος: and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine Early Law p. 372 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant 'those of kin by descent through females only.' On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevaile in Greece, McLennan op. c. 225—309: cp. L. H. Morgan Ancient Society c. 8 esp. 230—234. "If ὄμογαλακτες = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the γένος depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Ridgeway). If so, may we similarly interpret ἀμοισίναι and ἀμόκασσοι as survivals from a time when eating from the same meal-jar or sharing the same smoke, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See 'Exx. i to B. ii.'

Another meaning proposed is: 'those who offer the same milk,' from a comparison of Sanskrit sāpara, samāndaka = those who offer the same cake, the same water: i.e. 'near kin,' 'distant kin' respectively (Hearn op. c. 171): but for this there is no evidence.

διὸ = hence: viz. because the 'city' arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues Legon iii 690 d ff.: ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν ὡς φάτρια καὶ μητρὸς γεγονοῦσα... βασιλεῖα παῖων διακοίτησαι βασιλεύομεν. 19 αἱ πόλεις = Hellenic city-states, τὰ ἔθνη = non-Hellenic races or populations. As in iv(vii). 2. 10 ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῶν ἐνδοῦν παῖς τοῦ θεουμενοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν... οὖν ἐν Σκύθων καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Ῥωμίοι καὶ Κρίτοις, Aristotle uses ἔθνη on the grounds assigned in n. (11) as equivalent to non-Hellenics, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (Jews and Christians τὸ πρῶτον). Other reasons assigned 111. 14 §§ 12, 15 §§ 11 ss. (657—9), viii(v). 10 §§ 3 (1649). 20. **SUSEM. (19b)**

Also, as Postgate suggests, vii(iv). 13 §§ 11. On the advantages of monarchy in a primitive society, see Bagelot 'Physics and Politics' 65 f. (Jackson).
§ 7 ὃστε καὶ αἱ ἀποκλίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει (φ. 3)

"Ὀμήρως, τεμοντεῖ δὲ ἐκατον

παῖδων ἦ δ ὀλίγων.

σποραδεῖς γάρ καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄφον. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύσει, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸι οὐ μὲν ἐτεὶ καὶ νῦν οὐ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύσοντο, ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ ἐαυτοῖς ἀδίστατον οὐ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὔτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 ἡ δὲ ἐκ πλευρῶν κυμάων κοιμώντα τέλειος πόλις ἥθεν, πάσης ἐξουσία τούτης τῆς αὐτάρκειας ὡς ἑπότο εἰπέων, γενομένη μὲν 30 οὖν τοῦ ἔξω ἔνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ἔγν. διὸ πάσα πόλις φύσει

21 ai is omitted by M* P1, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 σποράδες γάρ καὶ οὕτω <ἀνχέντερος>—Schmidt edits, σποράδες γάρ καὶ οὕτων [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and 25 ὡσπερ γάρ δια Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἡ δὲ M* P1,4,4,4,4,4 A1 Q M b Q b R b S t 4 T b 7 V b W b Aldine Bk. ἡ δὲ U b L || ἡ δὲ...1523 a ἢ βάθησθαι transposed by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδες. See his arrangement and alterations Introf. p. 96 || 29 γενομένη Schneider || 30 οὖν is wanting in M* P1, but cp. iv (vii). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὃστε καὶ αἱ ἀπόρ. | Wherefore likewise the colonies [i.e. the villages] 'because of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύσει τα. So §§ 11 ὃστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).


74 τὸ ἀρχαῖον | With the adversative use comp. Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 7 καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔχουν.

24 ff. "A reminiscence of the famous saying of Xenophanes given by Clem. Alex. vii. 189 11 b: Ἐξήγησεν δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπομορφώς οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρωποποιεῖ τὸν θεόν ὑποθέτευτον καὶ καθάπερ τὰς κατακύκλου ἄρἀς ἔχοντα ἐκατον διαμετραφάντων" (Ridgeway).

See still stronger statements about the popular religion in Metaph. xi (Al. 8 §§ 19–21. 1074 b 3 ff.

§§ 28 ἡ δὲ ἐκ πλευρῶν κτάλ | Cp. ii. 2 § 8 with note and references, also n. on iii. 3 § 3. 4; 9 §§ 10 (554). Susen. (20 b) "The union of several village-communities forms, when complete, an actual city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to promote a higher life." See Grote History ii. 341–344 on city-state [villages: on this deduction of the state generally A.C. Bradley Hellenica 197–199, who observes 104 n. that "freedom", though not in a more negative sense, best answers to αὐτάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of man's nature, external or spiritual, unsatisfied. In N.E. i. 7, 7 ἡ αὐτάρκεια = ἐκ μονόμοιον αἰρετόν τοῦ ἐνθ' ἔτοι καὶ μηδ' ἐνθάδε, the sole condition of a life that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp. N.E. x. 6. 2 ἐνθάδε ἐκεῖσθαι. ἀλλ' αὐτάρκεια. 29 ff. Compare c. § 8. i. 3 § 8; III. 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3. 4 ff. 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp. ἡ γενέσις καὶ κυμαίας κοιμών τέλειος καὶ αὐτάρκειος <χάρακες>, τούτο δ' ἐστιν, ὡς φασί, τὸ ἄρα εὐθείαν καὶ καλάς τῶν καλῶν ἁμα πράγματι (χάρακες) θετέοι εἰναι τῷ τολικήστῳ κοιμών, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ σύνθ. further III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 18; IV (vii). 4 §§ 1–14, 5 §§ 1, 8 §§ 4, 8 §§ 9, 9 §§ 1, 2; VII. 4 §§ 9–11; VII. 8 § 3. These passages would prove (even if it were not self-evident) that the perfected and beautified life, made complete self-sufficing and satisfying, is one with the life of happiness or well-being (εὐθείαν): cp. n. (284) on ii. 9 §§. Susen. (21) The implication of ἡ δὲ and αὐτάρκεια which disposes of Schmidt's atheism of the clauses where the latter conception comes in (Faehr. f. Phil. CXXV. 1884. 804. cp. Introf. 97 n.) may also be studied in Nis. Eth. 1. 7 §§ 6–8. In De anima ii. 10. 420 b 10–22, τὸ εὖ is opposed to ἀναγεννησθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀνάγεσθαι in De part. animal. iii. 7. 18. 560 b 23. 30 διὸ κτάλ Two proofs that the ‘city’ is natural. (1) It is the outcome and realization, the final cause, of the previous societies: they are natural, so also is the ‘city’. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;
32 [ἡ δέ...ἐστι] Schmidt || 33 εἶναι after ἐστὶν M

1253 b 21—1253 a 3.

η ἐστὶν, εἰτέρ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνία. τέλος γὰρ ἀυτῆ ἐκείνων, (1) η δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστὶν ὧν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθῆναι, ταῖτην φαινὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκαστὸν, ὦστερ
§ 9 ἀνθρώπου ἱππον οἰκία. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἑνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον. ή δ' αὐτάρκεια [καλ] τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερῶν ὅτι τῶν φύσεων ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ἱππὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀπόλις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τόχῳ ἢτοι φαύλος

but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: *Zeller Socrates and Socratics, p. 342—5.* The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias,* of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Republic B.* II, are not directly subservient of the state: like Hobbes, they are conservative in their aim.

§ 3 [ἡ ἐν...τέλος] Physics II. 1. 8

193 a 30 f. φύσις in first sense = ἄγιος mere potency; in second sense = ἡ μορφή ἵνα τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ἦσθε γὰρ τέχνη λεγέται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τέχνην, καὶ τὰ τέχνην, ὁταν καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν λεγέται καὶ τὸ φύσιν π. II 2 § 8, 194 a 28 f. η δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἑκατέρα ἤν γὰρ συνέχεις τῆς καθεξῆς ὀψις ἢτοι τα ἐκχωρον, τούτο τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἑκατέρα... βασισθείται ἄρα ὃ πώ ἐν εἶναι τὰ ἐκχωρον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἐκ αἰτίας III. 12. 3, 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into bloom and bearing fruit." (Fuller). **(22)**

§ 9 34 f. ἐπί...βέλτιστον] The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ἵνα πᾶσα πόλις φύει ἐστὶ. And so in fact it is, only it must be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former premises. With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing; 'the end discloses the true nature of the thing, and 'political society alone' (i.e. no society short of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency.' Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible: e.g. Metaph. xii(A). I § 1, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (Freudenthal). **(23)**

1253 a 1 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. N.E. ix. 9. 3: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ νυκτὶ περικλείον. See also Ith. 1. 7. 6. "The dogma τῶν φύσεων ἡ πόλις ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύει πολιτικὸν γάρ, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that τὸ πλῆθος differs from the ἱππος in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the exposition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the normal πόλις." (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἀπόλις κτλ] 'He who is cut
off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as ‘clannish lawless heartless’; for he*, not the ἀνθρωπος, but οὐ̃ Ὁμέρου λαοδορθεῖς, “is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious”—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon” (Jackson).

§ 10 7 ἄμεθ. From an epigram of Agathon (Anthol. Pal. 12, 484, esp. 10—28) Götting De loco quodam Aris. (Jena 1858) showed that ἄμεθ. nearly resembles the ‘blot’ of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (Academy Jan. 8, 1876) take ἄμεθ. to mean a ‘rover’, i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathas’ epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation  of Hliad ix. 63, 64, where ἄμεθ. δὲ πολέμου ἔργας ἐνίκησεν ἐκδρομέων ἀδέρφοισι is the subject of which ἄφθινη ἀδέρφοισι are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw

* Whether πόλεμος was a name for this game or not, the παίγνιον πόλεμος of Plato Rep. IV. 423 A (cp. the scholion) makes it likely that a compact body of pieces was called πόλεμος; if an isolated piece was called ἄναυα, Aristotle’s dissertation would be specially appropriate. Oudem, ii. 27 f., has misunderstood Agathas’ epigram and Götting’s dissertation no less than the present passage (Jackson).

(Arist. Studien III. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clannish lawless heartless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or ‘rover’ is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer’s πολέμου ἐνίκησεν ἐπιθυμητον who is a φύσις τοινοῦ, i.e. an ἄμεθ. φύσις, in whom to the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἀνθρωπος is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggregation as a characteristic of the ἄμεθ.* (Jackson). Su-

SEM. (24) 28 ἄμεθ. here, like ἄναυ., “that.”

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνή mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see De hist. anim. IV. 9. 555 a 20, b 8 ff., Probl. x. 39. 895 a 7 ff., Phed. 20 A 8, 1456 b 22 ff. ἀπαχτάνωμεν φωνὴς ἀδέρφοισι, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐνίκησεν συνετῇ
γίγνεται διότι· γι' αυτό τός θράύσις είναι ἀληθέστερος καὶ ἀληθερχημένος.

15 τό δίκαιον governed by δηλώνειν: 'and therefore also (for the purpose of signifying) justice.'

16 ἢ δὲ τούτων κ. An objective genitive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 17 κ. τότε, 'fellowship in goodness, and justice.' The 'city' is regarded as a moral or spiritual society, church and state in one.

19 καὶ πρότερον δι' τῇ φύσει. It is not in order of time γένεσις (in which sense N. Eth. VIII. 12. 7, quoted on § 5 above, asserts the direct contrary), but in order of thought and of real existence φύσις, κατὰ φύσιν, τῇ ἐθείᾳ, τῇ αἰθίᾳ, that the state is prior to the family and to the individual. On this distinction see esp. Metaph. I. 8 § 3–7. 99 a 15 ff.; ix (2), 8. 8 1950 a 3 ff. ἢ ἐθείρησε προτέρα τῆς δινάμεως (the realized and actual preceded the possible) κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χράσιν. ἀλλὰ μή καὶ ὡσεὶ γε, πρότερον μὲν ἢ δὲ τῇ γένεσις ὑπετέρα τῷ ἐθείᾳ καὶ τῇ αἰθίᾳ πρῶτον ὡσεὶ ἀνήκη παιδίον: τὸ μὲν γάρ ἤδη ἦν τῇ ἐθείᾳ τῷ δὲ ὥστε: Phys. VIII. 7. 12. 261 a 14 what is in process of development appears imperfect, ἄλοις δὲ φαίηται τὸ γιγαντεύμαν ἀκέλαιες καὶ ἐνὶ ἀρχήν ἤντι, ὡστε τῇ γένεσις ὑπετέρα τῇ φύσις πρότερον ἦν. See below III. 1. 9. normal constitutions are prior to the divergent, imperfect types. 

Σσεν. (27)

Other passages in Grant. Eth. I. 239.

§ 15. 20 ἀναφιμεμένου κτῆν.] "for if the whole body" except the foot or hand "is destroyed, there will be neither foot nor hand, except in an equivocal sense such as that in which we call the hand of a statue a hand; because a hand in such circumstances" i. e. after the destruction of the rest of the body, "will be spoil for use," cp. 5 § 5 ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἑχομεν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τούς διεξαγοράζοντες, "and all things are defined by their function and faculty, so that things which are incapable of exercising their functions and faculties (μηδὲ τοιαύτα = μηδὲ ενεργεῖ ψαλιδωτά) must not be said to be the things in question, but to be equivocally called by their names" (Jackson). Cp. Manu II. 157: 'as an elephant of wood, as an antelope of leather, so is a Brahmin unread in the Vedas. These three bear the name' (Postgate).

If the text is correct, the above explanation, in which Hayduck and Jackson independently agree, must be

* "Such as they were before, when they formed part of the whole and fulfilled their functions" (Cope). See the quotations n. (e8).
νῦν ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λαθείναι διαφθειρόμην γὰρ ἤσται (1) τοιοῦτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἐργῷ ὀρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε 24 μηκέτε τοιοῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέων τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλ' ὁμο- § 14 νυμα. ὃτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσις [καὶ] πρότερον ἢ ἐκα- στος, δὴ λοιπὲς ἐι γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐκαστος χωρίους, ὁμοίως 25 τοῖς ἀλλαῖς μέρεσιν ἔσσει πρὸς τὸ δόλον, ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινώνειν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δὲ αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος 29 πόλεως, ὡστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θέος.

§ 15 φύοις μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμή εν πάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιοῦτην κοινω- νίαν ὃ δὲ πρῶτος συνατήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίας, ὡστε γὰρ

22 λέγει Bk.² and Susem.¹ following P² and perhaps Γ. ἀλλ' φοβαίσα
Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθηνη, ἀλλ' (φοβαίσα γὰρ) ἦστα τοιοῦτη πάση: hardly right. § <οίκ> ἦσται Rud. Scholl (Comm. de legg. xii. tabb. Bonna 1995, p. 43) which is not improbable: unless we are to bracket the words διαφθειρόμην γάρ ἦστα τοιοῦτον. But see Comm. and Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. § 23 <ὁ> τοιοῦτον. Jackson. § δὲ γὰρ Γ. apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ., κτλ. § 25 καὶ omitted before πρότερον by P³. Aristotle P³ P⁴ Q M² T³ U⁴ V³ L⁴, πρότερον P³, πρότεροι Q R³ S⁴. § 25 μὴν <ὁ> Bk. μηδὲν <ὁ> Ar. § οὐδέν <Π> Bk. οὐδέ <Μ> P⁴. § 31 πρῶτος P³-φ: Q M³ R³ S⁴ T³ U⁴ V³ L⁴,

accepted: διαφθειρόμην must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐσπερμημένα καὶ τίς δυνάμεις: “in such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function and in its capacity to execute that function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name.” But the parallel passages De genere, antea. 1. 14. 7 716 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢ χεῖρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος τῶν μαχητῶν οὐδὲν ὅπως ἤδη οὐδὲν οὐδὲν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἀλλὰς ἀλλοπαθίας: Π. 1. 42. 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γὰρ ἦστι πρώτων οὐδὲν ἄλλο γῆς δύναμιν οὐδὲν οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἀλλαζόμενοι λειχθότα τοῦ μὲν εἶναι πρῶτων τὸ δὲ όρατο, δὲντερ λειτουργία Λιθανὰ τὴν ἔλοιπα: De antea 11. 1. 9. 412 b 18 ff. ἄφεναι ἢν ἁπλευτέτεισθαι οὐκ ἦστιν ὀρθάλυπα, πλὴν ἀδιάφορως, καθάπερ οἱ Λιθανοὶ καὶ οἱ γεγραμμένοι: Meteor. 11. 12. 3, 350 a 10 ff. διακατα οὐ κατέστη τῷ ἔργῳ τὸ μὲν χαίρεσιν ποιεῖ τῷ αὐτῶ ἐργῶν χάριν ἂν ἦστιν ξεκαθαρεί, ἢν ἐν ὀρθάλυπι ἢ ἔργῳ, ἢ δὲ μὲν δυνάμεις ὀμοίωνος, οὐδὲ τεθεῖν ἢ οἱ Λιθανοὶ θεωροῦσι τοῦς κακοὺς αἰτίας, ὡστε λέγει· ὁ οὐδὲν οὐδὲν οὐδέν οὐδέν οὐδέν οὐδέν οὐδέν οὐδέν οὐδέν. § 15 31 ὃ δὲ πρῶτος κτλ. Cr. Intro. 24. and notes on II. 9 § 8 (188), § 12 (356), § 14 (350). "Susem. (28a)." δὲντερ γὰρ κτλ. “Both the grammar and the sense of τεθεῖν and χαίρεσιν.
καὶ τελευθεὶς βέλτιστον τῶν ἕμφορον ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὗτος καί (1)
§ 18 χαρισθὲν νόμον καὶ δίκης χειριστῶν πάντων, χαλέπωτάτη γὰρ
ἀδίκα ἐξοντα ὅπλα· ὃ δὲ ἀνθρωπός ὑπάλλα ἔχον φύται φρονή·
σει καὶ ἁρετῆ, οὓς ἐπὶ τάνασται ἔσται χρήσθαι μᾶλλον. διὸ ἀν-
σιώτατον καὶ ἀγιώτατον ἅνευ ἁρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφόροδία καὶ ἐδαδικὸς χειριστῶν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικῶν ἦ γὰρ δική
πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστιν [(ἡ) δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις].

3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερῶν εὖ ὁμοριῶν ἡ πόλις συνάντησεν, ἠ

32 τελευθεῖς and 33 [χαρισθὲν νόμον καὶ δίκης] Jackson || τελευθεῖς and 33 χα-
ρισθὲν Spengel || χαρισθὲν Jackson || χαρισθὲν ή δικης Jackson || χαρισθὲν
Spengel || χαρισθὲν Jackson || χαρισθὲν Spengel || χαρισθὲν Jackson || χαρισθὲ
Spengel || χαρισθὲν Jackson || χαρισθὲν Spengel || χαρισθὲν Jackson || χαρισθὲ
Spengel || δικης Jackson || δικης Spengel || δικης Jackson || δικης Spengel

νόμον καὶ δίκης appear strange, and 26 χαρισθὲν is used in a different connexon"
(Jackson). Spengel (and lately Ridgeway)
would make the participles masculine.
But the concord is not too harsh; "at
fortasse, ut saepius, libriore construc-
tione uirtur Aristoloteis" (Susem.).
For the thought, Plato Lato 756 e, παῦσα γὰρ
δὴ φωτον ἣ πρῶτον βηδέτη κολάς ὥρμητσα
πρὸς ἁρετῶν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριαστάτη
τέλος ἐπιθυμεῖ τὸ πρώτοφορον...καὶ ἄνθρω-
πῶν, ἄμφρωτος δὲ, ὡς φωτε, ἡμερο...μὴ
λεικάνει δὲ ὃ μὴ κολάς τραχῶν ἀρνὶσθοιν
ἔστασι φόες τῆ.

§§ 16 34 ὃ δὲ κτλ] ‘Man is born with
weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserve)
wisdom and virtue; weapons which are,
however, especially liable to abuse’ (Monte-
tecatino): φρονείται the dative of reference
(Jackson). Most editors make it causal
or instrumental. “But (1) what can
‘weapons for practical wisdom and virtue’
mean? Hardly weapons for the exercis,
but rather such as serve for the attain-
ment, of these qualities. Yet ἀδίκαια
ἐξωνα ὅπλα shows that the former are
meant. (2) It is essential to the thought
that we should learn whence man, of all
creatures, gets these dangerous double-
edged weapons, so eminently adapted for
purposes mutually opposed (πρανεία), for
good and for evil. Whereas that they
are for good needs not be stated: Aris-
totle’s teleological standpoint implies it.”
Susem. Cp. Rhet. i. 1 § 13 (Spengel).

III. 10. 3 ωθεὶ τὸ δικαίου πόλεως φθαρτίων.
Susem. (286)

Jackson keeping the last clause ἐγὼ
δίκη κτλ (which he holds to be a paren-
thetical explanation of δίκη in ἦ γάρ δίκη
κτλ, rightly placed last in a Greek sen-
tence) would translate: “now justice be-
longs to a state,” i.e. can be found only
in a πόλις, “δίκη or the administration of
law—which is the determination of what
is just—being a regulation of the political
γάρ δίκη κρίσει τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου
κτλ. with Jackson’s notes.

c. 3 Economic has three parts treating of
the relationships which make up the
household, (1) δεσποτική (2) γυμνική
(3) παιδική: §§ 1, 2. The relation of (4)
χρηματιστική to economic is obscure:
§ 3. Upon δεσποτική, which we take
first, there are widely divergent views § 4.
Roughly speaking the rest of the book
treats of (1) δεσποτική in cc. 4—7, (4)
χρηματιστική in cc. 8—11, (2) and (3)
in cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 The household needs implements
which may be animate or inanimate:
such an implement is called a chattel
(κτῆμα), and is πράγμα, for use
not for production: §§ 1—4. The thrall
(κτήμα ἐμφύσχον) defined §§ 5, 6.

c. 5 But are there any persons an-
swering to this definition, φίλοι δοῦλοι; § 1
As it is advantageous to both and to each,
and therefore just and natural that body
should be subject to soul, appetite to reason,
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 3. [I. 3. 1

ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἶπεν χάρα σύγ-

κείται πόλις ἡ οἰκία. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία 

συνεστηκεν. οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλεύθερων. ἐπεὶ 

δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἐκατοντάτην, πρῶτα δὲ 

καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας τεσσάρως καὶ δούλος καὶ πόλις 

καὶ ἀλοχός καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ πρῶτον τούτων σκε-

§ 2 πτεύον ἂν εὑρήσῃ καὶ ἐπὶ καὶ πῦρ δὲ εἶναι. ταύτα δὲ ἐστι 

dεσποτικῆ καὶ γαμήκη (ἀννυμυνοῦ γάρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν

το ὄρος σύνεξείς) καὶ πρῶτον πατρικῆ (καὶ γαρ αὐτή οὐκ 

ἀνυμαιται ὡς ἀνυματεῖ). ἐστοικαν δὴ αὐτὰς ἀν ἐπισ-

§ 3 μεν. ἐστι δὲ τι [μέρος] δ᾽ ὁ δικεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκης Πολ. Q M U W Wb L 4 Ald., while Q R (which has however ἀ

the margin) S T V 1st hand omit ἀνάγκης... 4 συνεστηκεν a later hand has 

inserted the words in the margin of V). 1 περὶ οἰκονομίας (olias Bk. following 

the ms. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) εἰς ἐν πρῶτον P Q M Q M b W Wb L 4 Ald. 

Bk. in place of πρῶτον.... εἶπεν σύγκειται after 3 οἰκίας Πολ. Q M b L 4 Ald. 

Bk. 3 οἰκονομίας οἰκίας Πολ. Q M b W Wb L b Bk. ἔν τω καὶ οἰκία Πολ. 


Bk. 4 συνεστηκεν (as οἰκίας Bk. apparently παύσει οἰκία Πολ. 11 δὲ 

ὃς Π II Α 12 3 ἐπι τοῖς ορ. δὲ τι <τί> Σουσ., δὲ <τί> τι: i.e. δὲ <ταὐτάν> 

τι (after first suggesting δὲ τί. <ταὐτάν> τι) Schmid, probably right | [μέρος] 

Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. 11 ii 693 n. 4, ed. 3)

§§ 2, 5, 6, 10, to man, female to male, § 7, 10 it is better (i.e. § 11 advantageous and 

just) that a man whose function is bodily 

service, who is a mere adjunct of another, 

should be subject to his superior in ex-

cellence of soul, §§ 8, 9. Nature designs to 

mark this distinction upon the bodies of the 

two, but does not always succeed: §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult Intro. pp. 24—26, the excellent 

dissertation of L. Schiller Die Lehre des 

Aris. von der Sklaverei (Erlangen 1847, 


99—74, Becker and Hermann Charibdes 

III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 326—373. 

Souse. 

c. 3 §§ 3 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίας Σ ἄν καὶ | In 

his lax manner Aristotle means "the 

parts of Economic" or household-management 

"correspond to those of which the 

household consists". This at least gives 

better sense than to read ρελατ. see 12 § 1.

The oldias μέρος, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three 'pairs of' relationships 

συνεστηκεν (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνία). 4 επείδη δὲ τοῖς ἀ. κα. by the 

method noticed I §§ 3 n., §§ 1 n., 311. 1. 2 

n. (434). Souse. (29)

§ 5 πρῶτα The ανάγκης of § 3. 

§ 9 γαμήκη = 'conjugal', πατρικῆ = 'paternal' relationship: senses obviously 

more precise than the ordinary use of the 

terms warranted. Thus γαμήκη ὡμία, the marriage union, IV(vii). 16 § 1 = 

simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks 

ἀνήκης, Göttling πατρικῆ (sive) would better 

express the former relation from the side 

of the stronger analogously to δεσποτικῆ, 

or Latin maritalis. Strictly πατρικῆ = 

hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14, 6: but in 

Nic. Eth. v. 6, 8, VIII. 10, 4 it is used, 

as here, for 'paternal'.

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τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτής ὀποῖος δὲ ἔχει, θεωρητέον. (II)
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς.

πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπομεν, ἵνα τά τε
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεὰν ἐθνομῇ, κἂν ἐν τῷ πρὸς τὸ εἰδῶν
περὶ αὐτῶν δυνάμει βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολομμαν-
§ 4 μένον, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τε τῖς εἶναι ἡ ἰδιοποιεῖα, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ῥηθομεν καὶ δεσποτεῖα καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ θα-
σική, καθάπερ εἰπομεν ἀρχομένου τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ
δεσποτέον. νομοὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν δούλων εἶναι τὸν δὲ εὐεργεῖον,
φύσει δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον. διαφέρειν γὰρ.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτησις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ [καὶ ἡ κτησις]

15 [Δ] Schmidt, who transposes πρῶτον [Δ], 11256 a 2 ἰ πρῶτον (cc. 3 § 3–7
§ 5) to follow 11259 a 39 γαμική (c. 12 § 1); see Introd. p. 97 17 δυνάμεια M*1
C1, δυνάμεια M (?). Susenm. 25, ἀποτελεῖ William || 23 ἐπεὶ οὖ] ἐπομεν οὖν <νθρ̄>

§ § 13 τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος § 8 § 1, 9 §§ 12–18, 11 § 13. Susenm. (29 b)
15 ἐν κτα[λ] 'first in order to observe what has a direct bearing upon practical
use, and secondly for our theory, to ascertain any facts which may enable us to
improve upon the views at present held'.

§ 4 καθάπερ ἐπομεν κταλ § 3 f. cp. § 7 § 1 in. Susenm. (30)
τοῖς δὲ παρα- φύσει Comp. below
6 § 1 foll. with in. The only representative of this view of whom we have certain
knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidas of Elais, a disciple of Gorgias (see tll. 2,
2 n.), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf
of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the ob-
stinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἀφέναι πάντας
θέα, ὅδε δοῦλον ἢ φύσει πεποίηκεν, ἀριστο, Rhet. 1. 13. 3, with scholiast.
Compare Spengel (11. 179) [and Cope] on that passage; and esp. Vahlen Der
Khetor Alkidas (Vienna 1864. 8). 14 ff. Possibly (see 7 § 3 n.) Aristoteles was ac-
quainted with the lines of the comic poet Philemon (Frags. inc. xxxiv Meineke,
cp. Meineke's ed. p. 410) καὶ δοῦλος ἄστι, ἀφέναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. [φύσει γὰρ ὄνειρε
cαθαρ κητισμię πετ.] = δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν σώμα καταλύοντα. Susenm. [31]

21 νομος...φύσει On this famous anti-
thesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natur-
al' see Soph. Eleuch. 13 § 6 173 a 7 ff.,
Grant Ethics 1. 149–151, and esp. Sidgwick Journal of Philology v. 73–77. 32 διατηρ
cταλ Wherefore slavery (τὸ δεσποτέον) is unjust also, as resting on
mere force (Wyse).

c. 4 § 1. 23 ἡ κτησις = the theory of the acquisition of property. Ἰοττίνγκ and
Barras in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with
this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in
what follows κτησις everywhere denotes the same thing as χρηματιστική in the
wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 3 § 3,
see 8 § 1 in. Property, as being indispens-
able for living, belongs to the house-
hold; hence by analogy it follows that
evry chancel is an instrument for the
householder's use, and that the slave is
an animate instrument of this kind. But
from the fact that the theory of acquisi-
tion or even the theory of property is a
part of the science of household manage-
ment, no such conclusion follows, even
when taken in connexion with the first
premiss, which is sufficient of itself to
prove it in the manner indicated above.
Moreover, the words bracketed anticipate
the decision which at 3 § 3 is distinctly
postponed to c. 8, and the way in which
the question is raised 8 § 1 presup-
sposes that no such decision by antici-
pation has yet been given. The state-
ment made here does not agree with the
results of cc. 8–11; for not the whole
theory of property and its acquisition,
μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας] (ἀνεν γάρ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου αὐδήνατον (11)) καὶ ζην καὶ εὖ εὖ δὲ ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαίον ἀν εἰποῦσαν ταῦτα; εἰ μὲν τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ μὲν οἷας ἄψυχος δὲ προφέρεις ἐπιφυλάγον ἐγγέλθη ἢ γὰρ ἢ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὁργανοῦ ἐειδεῖς ταῖς τέχναις ἑστίν, ὡστε καὶ τῷ οἰκονομοκῷ τοῦ κτήμα ὁργανοῦ πρὸς χρήν ἑστί, καὶ ἡ κτήσις

25 καὶ εὖ εὖ wanting in Γ τε' and P1 (first hand, added in the margin) || δὴ Susem., δὲ Π' P2.6: C4 M6, δὲ ἐν Q Q6 R5 R6 S6 T6 V6 Bk.; wanting in P4.6. U6 W6 L6 Ald. Hence [δὲ] Susem. || 16 μέλλον Kones and perhaps Γ || 27 τῶν οἰκονομεῖς P2.6. Q Q6 R5 R6 S6 T6 U6 W6 L6 Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C6 and the 1st hand in V6 (the dative in V6 by a later hand); [ὡστε καὶ τῷ οἰκονομοκῷ] and 30 οἵτις καὶ τῶν οἰκονομεῖς > Rassow Susem. Thurott once proposed to omit 30 οἵτις καὶ and transpose 27 οἵτις καὶ....30 οἵτις to follow 31 οἵτις || 31 [ἀ... ...32 ἑστί, καὶ] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the 'natural' part concerns oikonomiē, and that only indirectly. My defence of the words, Ἰθικ. 5z. xx. 510a, is exposed to objections not then foreseen: it would seem that this is an un-Aristotelian interpolation. Susem. (32)

24 ἀνεν γάρ κτῆ] Cp. 2 § 8 v. (21). Mere life, bare existence, εὖ εὖ, is of course the immediate end of the household and of household management: good life or well-being, εὖ εὖ, is the end which the state has in view: but indirectly the state and its end is the end of the household 2 §§ 2 — 9. Consequently we find that side of oikonomiē, which is directed towards securing the fitness of those belonging to the household, and so towards the perfecting of life, ranked above the use and preservation of property, or the side which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 v. Susem. (33)

25 ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις = the arts which form distinct professions: 'as the craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must be provided with suitable tools &c.' Bernays. In any case the phrase means 'the arts' properly so called; immediately below they are termed productive or creative (τοῖχος, τοῖχης ὁργανα § 4 with n.) as contrasted with the merely practical activities to which Economic and the art of life belong. According to Aristotle these productive arts are to be subdivided into (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or 'fine arts'. In the sphere of practice the end lies in the activities themselves, ἐνεργεία: in the sphere of the arts, in certain definite special products, ἔργα, distinct from the activities which produce them: ἔργα. Eth. 1. 1. 2, 1094 a 31., διάφορα δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελουμένου ταῦτα γάρ εἰς εὐφροσύνην, δὲ παρ' αὐτὸς ἔργα ταύτα, 1. 1. 5 1094 a 16 διαφάνεια δὲ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ἐνεργείας αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἡ παρά ταύτα ἀλλο τι, καθὼς ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθέντων ἐπιστημών, 11. 4. 3 1105 a 26, vii. 2 § 1139 b 4, ii. 3 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this distinction Schlosser prefers to explain ὀρισμέναι τ. as arts restricted to definite distinctive ends. But can this be expressed by the one word ὀρισμέναι: ? Fülleborn wavering between this explanation and his own, which makes ὧν τῆς = definite special arts) (the one all-embracing art of life. But conduct or the art of life—even if we include in it the perfecting of life—embraces at the most only the practical activities; and from what has been said it follows that the technical or productive activities, τοῖχοι, would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV (vii). 3. 3 v. Susem. (36)

§ 2 30 ἐν ὁργάνῳ εἶδος] is classed with, ranked under the head of, implements: cp. ταύτα ἐν ὑπάρχει ἄρχει Meta. 1. 3. 3 993 b 7, the material sort of causes; ἐν μορφῶν ἐδοὺς De Ciclo 1. 1. 7 268 a 5. The same idiom is frequently where ἔδος and the genitive are almost a paraphrase for the thing in question: δῆ- μου ἔδος ἐδοὺς ἡ περίφρασις Pol. 111. 15. 2, cp. vi (iv.) 6. 9 διαγραφῆς ἔδος.

31 τοῦ κτήμα ὁργανοῦ κτῆ] 'the chattel is an instrument to aid him in
πλήθος ὀργάνων ἦσστι, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτήμα τι ἐμφυκαν. καὶ (II)
§ 3 ὡσπερ ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων τῶν [ὁ] ὑπηρέτης. ἐλ γὰρ ἤδη 5

λατο ἐκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθεν ἡ προαιθανόμενον ἀπὸ
35 τελεῖν τὸ αὐτόν ἔργον, ὡσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἡ τοὺς τῶν

Τηφαλίτων τρίποδας, οὗς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θείον
[ὑπὸ]δυσθεῖ αγώνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκείριων αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ
πληθυντά εκθερίχειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐδει εὐτε τοῖς ἀρχικότοις
§ 4 ὑπηρέτων οὐτε τούς δεσπότας δοῦλοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα

ὀργάνα ποιητικὰ ὀργάνα ἦσστι, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικῶν ἀπὸ

32 [καὶ] before ὁ δοῦλοι so that the apodosis begins here Thurlot  33 ὅ wanting

in M4 erased in P4  34 προαιθανόμενον Kornes  35 αὐτόν II  37 δυσθεῖ P4 P2

Bk.  ὡσπερ <εἰς>  Susem, following William's translation εἰς τι, ωσπερ καὶ Schmidt

αὐταὶ only ἣ and a later hand in C: the rest have αὐταί.

1254 a 1 [τὰ μὲν..4 μῶν] Schmidt

living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is

a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this;

for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between

the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any

reason for this distinction. See further

1. 2 § 5 n., 6 § 10 n. Susem. (30)

§ 33 ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων] an implement superior to other implements; see

7 § 3 and De part. animal. IV. 10. 21 687 a 21 ἐπὶ γὰρ (ἐκ ἡ χειρ) ὡσπερ ὀργανον

πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this relation δοῦλον = ἐμφυκαν ὀργανον, ὀργανον = ὀργανον δοῦλος

Eaton cites N. Eth. VIII. 11. 6.

§ 3 35 Δαιδάλου] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary

personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more

especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with

the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made

the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet

stepping apart (scholiast on Plato Meno 47 B, Suidas ι. π. Δαιδάλου τοματα). When

contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their

illusive lifelikeness; and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and

action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here

refers, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent

their running away (Plato L. c.). See

Brunn History of the Greek Artists l. 14—

23. Susem. (30)

§ 36 ὁ ποιητὴς Homer Iliad X. 397 ὅφρα οἱ αὐτοματος θείοι δοῦλαι

ἀγώνα. Susem. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lytton's

Coming Race.

§ 4 1254 b 2 ποιητικὰ for production

(of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικὰ 'for action' merely

for use, i.e. as we see from § 3 the consumption or utilization of commodities.

In Political Economy consumption is either productive or unproductive, and

the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers'

or the consumers' point of view: Mill I. c. 3, Sidgwick Principles I. c. 3 § 7.

On the distinction here made between ποιητικὰ and πρακτικὰ cp. nn. (34, 49) and

Zeller op. c. II ii 164, 177 ff., 580, 586, 655 ff. Consult also the special treatises

Ed. Müller History of the Theory of Art in Greece II. 38 ff., 374 ff., Teich-

müller Forschungen (Aristotelian Researcher) II. 12—63, Reinkens Aristotle

on Art 1—12, 169—179, Susemihl in the Jahrb. f. Philol. C. 1872, 319 f.,

Rich. Schultz De poeticis Aristotelicis principiis (Berlin 1874. 8), Walter Theory

of Practical Reason in Gr. Philosophy (Jena 1874. 8) p. 80 ff., 245 f., 276 ff.,

296 ff., 504 ff. Oncken very

justly remarks, op. c. II. 39 f., that even from Aristotle's own point of view we

must be surprised at a conception of slave-labour so one-sided that even its capacity

for production (i.e. of fresh objects of utility) is denied. "This could not be

maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellas the whole of

the unskilled labour engaged upon the
μὲν γὰρ τῆς κεραίας ἔτερον τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (II) αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθίσεως καὶ τῆς κλάσεως ἡ χρῆσις μόνον. ἐτί δὲ ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εἴδει καὶ ἡ πράξεις, καὶ διόνται ἀμφότεροι ὄργανοι, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν σὲ αὐτὴν ἔχει διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βλέπει πράξεις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστὶν. διό και ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν.

τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ὡσπέρ καὶ τὸ μόριον, τὸ τέ γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄπλος ἄλλου ὄμολος δὲ καὶ τὸ κτήμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκεῖνον δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλος ἐκεῖνος.

§ 6 τις μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τις ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων ῥήματα (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἄλλη ἄλοιπος ἀνθρώπος δὲν, οὗτος φύσες δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλοιπος δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος, ὁ δὲ κτήμα ἢ [δοῦ]... 


production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver’s shuttle.” Susen. (37) § 5 ὡς κτήμα...μόριον] Κατων compares Nic. Euth. 6, 8, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἐκ ὧν ἐκ τῆς κεραίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς μόριον, ἀστερὶ μόριον αὐτῷ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as it were parts of one self.

10 ἄπλος ἄλοιπος] “belongs absolutely to another.” To express relation and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with ἄλοιπος, as here and Pl. Rep. 1, 433 b τουτα αὐταν ἐνδια του, or (2) ἄλοιπος with the genitive, as in Metaph. 1, 2, 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and ἐλεύθερον τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλοιπος ἐν... 

12 δὲ...ἀλοιπος; Euth. Euth. VII. 9, 2 124 b 19 ὁ γὰρ δοκεῖ ἔτερον ἂν δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλοιποι τῶν δεσποτῶν ὁ δοῦλος ἄλοιπος μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἄφαρτον, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον ἄπλος δοῦλος ἄφαρτος.

§ 6 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because ‘the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it possesses or which it lacks’—Bonitz Ind. Ar. 1, 2, Cr. Nic. Eth. v. 2, 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἐπερῶν ἑξούσια τῆς δύναμις, Pol. iv (vii), 1. τί πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμις καὶ μορφήν, also iv (vii), 4, 10; Plato Parm. 134 b τῆς δύναμις ἑξεῖν ἐχοῦσα οὐ ἔχει, Euth. 1, 588 ου τὰ ἐδέξαμεν καὶ δίκαιον πράσσειν ἐν εἰσερχομαι).

15 ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτα] Conversely in Metaph. 1, 2, 19 58 a 25 we have a definition of the free man ἄλοιπος, ἐλευθεροῦ ἐλευθεροῦ ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνα καὶ μή ἄλοιπος (L. Schiller). Susen. (38)
§ 3. χωριστόν] Hereby opposed to μόριον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of ὁ φύσει δουλός is ἄργος ἄφθαρον πρακτικόν καὶ χωριστόν, ἄλλως ἄλλον ἄν, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτήμα 'chattel', 'thrall!', as for instance in N. E. v. 6, 8 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any φύσει δουλοί, for whom a slave's estate is greater good and just?

§ 1. τὸ ἄργον ἐκ τῶν γυμνῶν) Aristotel emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικός or διάλεκτικός ἡμῖν as opposed (a) to ἀναλυτικός or ἐκ τῶν κειμένων, (b) to φανερός ἡμῖν ἐκ ἰσοτείχεων : Waitz Organon II. 354, Zeller Philol. II ii 171 n. 2. Eaton rightly compares IV (VII). 1, 6.

§ 2. τῶν συμφόρων) Under the limitation laid down III. 6, 6, see n. (7).


§ 25. καὶ ἄλλα βασιλευτικά) This passage is referred to IV (VII). 3, 2, see the note: cp. iv (VII). 14. 19. τὸν γὰρ διατικὸν ἄρχον ἔκ τῶν ἐπεφάργοντων ἄρχον καλλίστον καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετής. SUSEM. (38 b)

§ 26. τούτων ἐργον) The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato Rep. i. 353 a: τοῦτο ἕκαστον ἐργον, ὅ ἄν ὁ μίκρον τι καὶ καλλιστά τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάγεται.

δόρα γὰρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition καὶ εἴδη πολλά καὶ ἀρχομένων καὶ βασιλευτικῶν διετέ, not to the particular explanation attached to it καὶ ἄλλα βασιλευτικά ἐργον. SUSEM. (39)

The sentence is parenthetical as in 1. 1, 3, where see note. "For wherever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled. This follows from the whole order of nature (ἐκ causal, as σ. ἐκ προαιρέσεως, 2 § 2) and is seen to hold good of living things."
§ 31 [καὶ τούτῳ...32 ἐμφύσχεσ] Schmidt || 33 <ἐν> ἀρμονίᾳ? Susen. || 35 ἀρχικο-μενο—(to mark a break in the construction) tiltendentium et prata William; apparently he had φαύλουs which Bücheler approves.

§ 31 Εἰς τὴν ἀπάντησιν φύσεως] The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). Susen. (38 e) It is not probable that εἰκ with genitive = a parititive genitive (Bonitz. Ind. Gr. 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise Per Arist. 836 a 39, τὸ φυτὴν οὐκ ἔστων ἐκ τῶν στερεωμένων ψυχῆ, and 828 b 27. It would be an improvement, but hardly correct, to render 'taking the whole of nature this is preeminently true of living things'.

32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσιν καὶ δεῖ τὸ χέριν τῶν βελτιών σώζεν ἑκατέρικτα, καὶ τούτο φανερὸν ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τῇ ἡμέρα καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φῶς τῷ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς ἐποίησεν. 14. 10.

33 ἀρχικὸς, ἄλογον ἀρμονίαν] "Even in things without life there is a species of dominance, in music for instance": each musical 'mode' being ruled by its keynote, ἡ μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord). Compare Probl. xix. § 33 912 a 31 ἡ γὰρ μέση καὶ ἡ γεμώτης: § 36 910 b 9 τὸ ἀρμονίαν ἐστιν ἀνάζωσι τοῦ τοῦτο ἀρχικός ἀρχικῶς. 9 ἀρχικον ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν ἀρχικῶς καὶ τῶν ἀρχικῶς τοῖς προτότοις, inas-

much as some are δριμαί, others ἀραφαῖοι. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἀρμονία as qualifying ἀρχή = dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or subordination of parts. Cp. De Anima 1. 4 (Ἀρμονίαν παρᾶν καὶ ἀνεξάρτου εὐφράτειν εἶναι). This would be the sense of συμφωνία, rather than of ἀρμονία, in music: Probl. xix. 38 911 a 2. Εἰσερχομένων ἐστὶ σκέψεως. "would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject". Obviously the simple meaning here as in ἐπὶ πάντως τῇ (VII. 3, 8): not to be pressed (as by Thurot Etudes 219 f., Ueberweg Hist. of Phil. Eng. tr. 1. 143) to signify 'those parts of Aristotle's strictly scientific works which are "dialectical" i.e. controversial, rather than "apodeictical" i.e. purely scientific.'

34 τὸ δὲ ἐκ [ἡν καὶ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἀρχικον by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δεὶ δὲ ἀκοῖν... ἐκεῖνον in such a way that even the first member (ἤφων) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second subdivision into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δύο... τοῦ to correspond with πρῶτον, in place of them we find δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖ δὲ in § 7. Susen. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what ἐκ τῶν φύοντος. 'But Aristotle's meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 οἷον γὰρ ἔκαστον ἐστι τῇ γενεσίᾳ τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστου τῶν φύων ἐκάστου. Cp. N. Eth. ix. 9, 8, Cic. Tusc. 1. § 32 (Eaton).
erasing fault that just afterwards; μομηρώς, due to a mistaken correction written over μομηρώς, may have displaced faults, as Schmidt once noted: now he suspects μομηρώς ἦ: [ἂν μομηρώς ἔχοντο] Studemund
1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φθώνιον wanting in M* and P1 (1st hand), but added in the margin by p1.  P.  have par for parā 6 [καὶ βασιλικῷ] Oncken, perhaps rightly

§ 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in Nic. Eth. v. 11 § 9, 13 § 18, 13. 3 § 18, 12 § 6. Cp. also Plato Phaedo 50 d, ἔσται ἐν τῇ λόγῳ δει ἐφίλη καὶ σώμα, τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσαι ἢ φύσιν προστάτης, τῷ δὲ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπότης Phaedrus 237 f, not to mention Rep. ix. 589 ε, 590 c, d (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἀρχη see Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8 f., 11 § 9 with Jackson's notes; viii. 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 1—6.
8 τῷ παθητικῷ. λόγον ἐχοντος] Cp. iv (vii). 15, 9 with n. (935). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, νοῆς, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. iv (vii). 7. 5 ff. (786), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller op. c. ii ii 497 f, 500 f, 506 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare Nic. Eth. i. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, 14 (vi). 14 § 9 f, 15 § 9, 10, where see the notes, cp. also iii. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: (i) cognitive reason (ἐπιστημονικήν), (ii) reflective or opining reason (ἀνοιγμικήν, διαφανείας). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which attains to a mere idea or opinion (ὑπόλαμα = unverified belief, assumption, δέξα) but

falls short of true short knowledge, and more especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (συμπέφες, see i 3 § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflection from which Aristotle has borrowed the name (λογιστική) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in n. (34) on 1. 4. 1. that the practical reason is again divided into (1) ἀράμα πρακτική, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) constructive, i.e. technical reason, ἀποτελεστική, which when developed becomes τέχνη, artistic skill*; see Nic. Eth. vi. 1 § 5 f.; 2 § 3, 8 § 1, 5 § 3, 5 § 8, 12 § 2; Metaph. vi. 1, § 1025 b 23 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views Susemihl Studies in the Nic. Eth. in the Jahrb. f. Philol. cxix. 1879—737 ff.

If we combine with the above the results stated in the note on 1. 13. 6 we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

* In the Politics however τέχνη generally denotes (i) Art as opposed to Nature, (2) the total activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the construction of new products— the exercise of crafts and industries of all kinds, including occasionally even practical aptitudes such as Household Management (πραγματεία). This is the sense in 4 § 1 above, where the former or 'art proper' are accordingly distinguished from practical aptitudes by the addition of ὑποστημένη, cp. n. (55). It is only in 21 § 6 that τεχνεύοντα ὑποστημένα = occupation where artistic skill is most required: see n. (100).
Now in the Politics we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the appetites or animal spirits (see Plato's dictum: πάντα τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἔτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν καὶ φανταστικόν). In regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or perceptive side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, ἴασις. See also Aristotle, ὀνομασίας, τῆς κακοσκελείας, τῆς ἐπικρατίας, τῆς ἐπικρατίας (in the wider sense).

14 κρείττον...χείρον] Elsewhere τὸ θήλα is declared to be ὑπέρ ἄρμαν πεπαλαικόν, to ἰασία. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sexes: ἐπηγεῖον οὐκ ἅρματε ὑπαίθρια, Λάτονος 6. 711 B ὡς τῷ κρείττον τῶν θηρίων ἀργόν. Timaicus 43 A. 4; τὸ κρείττον θηρίων εὖ γίνονται ἢ δυνατόν; ὡς οὖν, ὁδήγησιν: 10 B. 15 ἐτί πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 δοσοὶ...17 θηρίων] See Plato, Pol. 164 Α, δηθείτο τὸ τῶν τὸν κρείττον καὶ ἄγαντα τὸν κρείττον. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific De part. animal. 1. 3. 13 643 b 3, τὸν τὸν κρείττον τὸν κακοσκελεῖ, τὰ μὲν κρείττον τὴν κακοσκελεῖ, τὰ δὲ κακοσκελεῖ τὴν κρείττον. We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "the regards besital limitation to sensual enjoyment, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition ἄφθαρσις" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli Arist}-
I. 5. 9] 1254 b 10—1254 b 23.

18 ἐστώ Μτ, δότις Ἡ. Ὁ. τοῦ ὁμοίου χρήσις, καὶ τοὺς ἐστίν ἀπτο ἀντικ (II) 19 βελτιστον, αὐτοὶ μὲν εἰσὶ φύσει διόλου, οἱ βελτιστοί ἐστὶν § 9 ἀρχεσπαν ὑπὴρ τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰσπερ καὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει διόλου ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν) καὶ οἱ κοινωνίας λόγον τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰτθάνεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ εἴης τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ξοῦ σὺ λόγῳ αἰτθήσασθαι ἄλλα

Iotetis Πεδιγοτώκ 60). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, IV(VII). 17 § 7, § 9; also V(VIII). 6 § 8, IV(VII). 15 § 5 with the notes: Nic. Eth. 1. 5 § 3: III. 10 § 8, 11 § 3: IV. 5 § 6: and the further references under ἀνάφασσε δόξαν Bonitus Ind. Ar. 54 b 30 f. Susem. (43)

19 ὡς βελτιστον ἴνα Plato Rep. IX. 590 D ὡς δὲν ὄντος ὑπὸ πιθηκαὶ καὶ φροντίδας ἀρχεσπαν μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεύν ἐκαίνον τοῦ ἑαυτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔχειν ἐφευρετή- τος: a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole doctrine of natural slavery.

20 τοῖς εἰρημένοις τῷ σώματι, τῷ πάθητικον μάρτυς, τῷ ὑπηρέτου, τῷ βῆθει (Congreve).

§ 9 21 διὰ καὶ ἄλλων ἔστων As a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse, Cic. De Rep. III. § 37 (Congreve). Susem. (43)

22 ὡς αἰτθάσεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἕκαστον In c. 13 § 4 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (ἀιτθάσε- 

θας) is ascribed to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children (see note), for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the mere suggestions of the instincts and passions of sense; Nic. Eth. 1. 23. 6, III. 12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here asserting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see n. on § 6), the appetitive soul, in IV(VII). 14 § 9, cp. A.P. Eth. 1. 13. 15 f.: namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by practical reason. As the power to reflect is to Aristotle amongst the most essential peculiarities of the practical reason—see n. (40) on § 6—this cannot with any consistency be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where see note) if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part under which is included the possession of practical reason. At the most there can be merely an approximation to the state here described. See further on c. 13 § 12.

23 λόγω αἰτθήσθαι On αἰτθήσει, αἰτθά- 

σεθας see n. (570) upon III. 11. 9. Susem. (45 b) If λόγω is the right reading, then the copula is omitted as if αἰτθάσεσθαι were an adjective: "the other animals (are) not attentive to reason, but obey their passions."
παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρὸν' 14
25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τάναγκαια τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ’ ἄμφων, παρὰ τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων.
§ 10 διελείπεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τά σώματα διαφέρονται ποιεῖ τά τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχερά πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δ’ ὀρθά καὶ ἀρχηγότα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικόν βίον (οὗτος καὶ γίνεται διηνήμονας εἰς τὴν πολεμικήν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἐχεῖν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς’ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο γε φαινεῖ, ὅσι τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διὰ 15
35 ποιοῦ τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὄσον ἄι τῶν θεῶν εἶχεν, τοὺς ὑπὸλειπόμενους πάντες φαίνει ἀν ἄξιον εἶναι τοιούτου δυνατέων.
§ 11 εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ σώματος τούτ’ ἄλλοι τοῖς δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τούτῳ διωρίσθαι ἀλλ’ οὗ οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ῥίζων ἰδεῖν τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 ποιεῖ PÆ. QM. Sbh. Tª Ar. Ald. and 1st hand of P9 (emended by corr.) || μὲν <τανακαία καὶ>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ἄμφων ὑφάρε Ρeiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L. [οὕτως...32 εἰρήνην] Schneider and Schmidt, perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων ἐξήρων or a little before <τῶν δούλων> τὸς μὲν Heitland wrongly: Aristotle’s meaning would have been clearer if he had added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχᾶς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted after δυνατέων; but it came first: διελείπεται μὲν οὖν ἄι τῶν διὰ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὸ σώματος.

44. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ.
"Moreover the service afforded by the slave is not very far removed from that of domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (note the dative) towards the necessities of life."
Comp. Plato Polit. 289 b: slaves and domesticated animals as species of the same genus περὶ ζῴων κτήσεων τῶν ἡμέρων πλῆρε δοῦλων; also c. 2 5 above n. (15); and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (66) § 10 47 βοηθεῖται] Nature design, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).
32 χρεια] "including services in war as well as in peace."
54 ἐπὶ τοῦτο γε κτλ.] Cp. τυχ’ (vii).
14. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental worth is necessarily and naturally presented in a harmonious external form; and in the very beauty of the race, of which he was thoroughly conscious, Aristotle finds direct proof of its superiority to the barbarians. What a complete justification this for the slavery of the black and coloured races! Zeller op. c. 11 ii 691 n. (2). See on 1. 2 § 4 n. (13).
Lang however from another point of view justly remarks op. c. Εἰσορος 60: "we must remember no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves." SUSEM. (47)
§ 11 38 οὐχ ὁμοίως ρύθμων ἢδεν κτλ.] Eaton compares Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 16 ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς σώματι μὲν ἰδίων τὸ παραφθείνειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁμοίως. Should we not rather think of Plat. Phædr. 250 d e, Xen. Mem. 111. 10. 3?
the doctrine of natural slavery (against Ridgeway pp. 139 f.) "do, to a certain extent, argue correctly. For the terms slavery and slave are used in two senses. Besides the natural there is also the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered in war are declared the property of their conquerors."

6 ο γάρ νόμος... 7 φανεράντον Χερόνος.

Cyr. vii. 5, 73 νόμος γάρ εν πάσαν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλων ἀλλων τοῖς τοιούτοις τοῖς λεγόμενοι. Τόσον δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς γεγονότοις τοῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς.

It is well known that customs and usages purely conventional and resting on mere tradition were called νόμοι by the Greeks and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws: III. 16 § 9 ήτοι κυρίωτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριαρχίας τῶν κατὰ γραπτά νόμους οἱ κατὰ τῆς ἐκτος, and VII (vi). § 2. Yet these "unwritten laws" are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a definite lawgiver: see on II. 9 §§ 12, 14. Susem. (48) Cyp. Grote Plato 1249 f., 1252 n. § 2, 7. "This conventional right is by many jurists contrasted, like a demagogue, of unconstitutionality." Yet slavery among the ancients was at first an unmingled blessing—important conquest of the spirit of humanity. When men were altogether barbarous they killed their prisoners. Lecky Hist. of Rationalism 1. 254. § 8 ἀπανήμων. This indictment was laid against any private citizen who had proposed or carried an unconstitutional law or popular decree, i.e. one which contravened laws or decrees in force at the time and not previously before 73.
The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. A decree (φύφαμα) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the βολὴ previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the βολὴ on the same subject which it could contravene (Meier and Schömann *Attischer Prozess* 583 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. *Susem.* (49)

9 ὡς δεινὸν κτλ] “on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues.” The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῦ μᾶκεν ἐνθωμέν ὁδειγματισμὸς εἶπεν ἕνα and § 3, τῶν δὲ ἐπιστρεπόντων τῆς διάταξεως, where see note. *Susem.* (49b) Note the genitive after ἀρχομένων, “subject of the coercer”.

11 “This then is their view: others again take the former view” (κείεται): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ εἰκεῖαν repeats the παρά of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (α) the opponents (τῶν μὲν), and by (β) the defenders of conventional slavery (τῶν δὲ); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (c) the τὺς of line 22.

§ 3 12 “The reason of the conflict” between (α) and (β) “and what” at the same time “makes the (two opposed) views overlap.” The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (α) and (β) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διαστάτων χωρίς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force. Bernays differently, see p. 209. *Susem.* (81)

13 λόγους, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as “the propositions (conventional slavery is just, is unjust) together with the arguments supporting and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them,” thus nearly = views or reasons (Postgate ο. η. c. 121, 123 n.), ‘platforms’ (Heitland), theories. ἔπαλλάττεν, as in i. 9, 15, vii.iv. 10, 2, vii(vi). 1. 3; see Heitland’s examination of these passages Note 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson ο. η. c. 114 n. Bonitz Index s.v. compares ἀπημονήσεσαι and explains that from the sense of “to alternate” it comes to be applied also qua inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utoque cohærent. “Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion” (Susem.). Oncken took it of ‘arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments’. Heitland of ‘propositions overlapping’: but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (α) some slavery is just, (β) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the λόγος of (α) and (β)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which ‘overlap’ because the “slaveries which (α) pronounces unjust, (β) pronounces just.” (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. 11. p. 208.) τρόπον τινα κτλ] “in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort.” These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 128), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that ἄρα carries with it ἀπερί: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of ἄρα διαστάτων, as to when it is just to use force.
14 χρησις. = means, resources; ἄτος ι. favourable external circumstances.

15 εἰς τὸ ἱ. external goods Nic. Eth. x. 8 § 4; so of the individual Pol. iv (vii). 13 § 3. In a wider sense, anything with which the state requires to be furnished, even population, territory iv (vii). 4 § 5, 4.

16 δέ... παλιον Fulleborn remarks with truth that the qualifications necessary here (amounting in all to ceteris paribus) really make the whole theory futile, because ‘other things’ in this connexion are so seldom ‘equal’. Bodily qualities, superior numbers and weapons, all sorts of external circumstances often largely contribute to victory. Conquest is no valid proof of the higher excellence of the conqueror: besides, the one kind of mental capacity which has contributed to his victory is no guarantee that he also possesses the other which qualifies him for wise government, above all for the exercise of despotic rule over a conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle would be borne out by a belief in the moral government of the world*: in the main, success attends upon the most capable nations. SUSEM. (50)


19 ἔτη answers the sentence 15 ὧντε ὁδεγ. “If however these two views stand opposed and apart, the former has neither force nor plausibility, (implying as it does) that the superior in virtue has no right to rule and be master.” χρησις is used predicatively, διασπάζειν is the opposite of ἔταλαττειν: if the point of contact between the two views be lost, if they stand opposed without any community. For the sense of separation the passage quoted by Jackson see p. 208 De long. et brev. vitas, 404 b 25, is most instructive: τὸν τέρα ταὐτα μακρέος καὶ τὴν φῶς ὑμεῖς τῶν φῶς συνετατῶν, καὶ ἄρχωσι καὶ τὸ βραχὺσιον καὶ τὸ μεγάλον, καὶ τὰ ἔνεια μὲν τῶν τοῦτο ἐνταλαττει τὸ νοσούν τὴν φῶς σώματα τῶν βραχυσίων, καὶ ἔνεια δ᾽ οὐδὲν κυλίν. νοσώθεις εἶναι μακρέος διότι. Others (Schneider, Jackson, Postgate, Ridgeway) take διασπάζειν = 11 per se. An analogy, “If disentangled,” each taken separately.

20 ἄτεροι λόγοι. one of the two sets of arguments advanced, that is (A). Postgate (op. e. 123) thinks ἄτεροι λόγοι would be clearer. Schneider took it = neutra ratio: to which Hampke rejoined that this sense requires ὀφθήρως. Jackson however still maintains that it is a true plural as in 13 τῶν λόγων, but then we should have ὀφθήρως: his novel and ingenious interpretation, op. e. 115 n.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 6.

§ 5 οὖ δέ τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἄρετὴν ἀρχεῖν καὶ δειοτέρειν. δῶς (II) ἐν ἄντεχουμενοῖς τίνες, ὦς ἵναται, δικαίων τινός (οὐ γὰρ νόμος δικαιῶν τι) τίνην κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέσαι δικαίως, ἀμα δὲ οὐ φασίν, τινών τε γὰρ ἀρχῆν ἐμδέχεται μῆν δι-25 καὶ καὶ καὶ τοῖς πόλεμοις, καὶ τοῖς ἀνάξιοις δουλεῖαις νομο-μαῖς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι εἶ δὲ μή, συμβιβσάται τούς (p. 9) εὔγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δοῦλους εἶναι καὶ εἶ δοῦλον, εἰάν

§ 6 συμβῆναι πραθήμα λαμφθήνῃ, διότερ αὐτοῖς οὐ βουλοῦνται λέγειν δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καὶ τοῖς ὁταν τούτο λέ-30 γοσιν, οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ ἥτοιδυσίν ἠ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὄτερ εἴ ἀρχὴς εἴτεμεν ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινας φαίνει τοῖς μὲν

§ 7 πανταχοῦ δοῦλον τοὺς δὲ νομαίοι, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων καὶ 19

24 ᾽Ακάδ. δῶς Π’ Π’ Μ’ Τ’ Λ’ (γρ. ἀπὸ τ’ Π’ in the margin), ἀπολύεται apparently Ar. || 27 καὶ δοῦλων transposed to follow 1355 b 2 αγάθων Schmidt || 28 αὐτῶν Montecatino and perhaps Π’. Over this word π’ has the gloss τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατήσκεται which Π’ has in the text after λαμφθήναι π’ in the margin.

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 τῶν τῶν λόγων as a singular of one view and hence infers that ἄνευ λόγων denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'.

ὡς οὖ δέ, epekegetic of λόγων, 'the view namely that...'. But Jackson following Heinius makes it depend on πάθος: 'plausibility to show that it is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule'. Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (ά)? He admits εὐφορία as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal πολεμεῖται, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take δῶς with ἄντεχουμενος. "Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or their ancestors] 'happen to have been taken prisoners and sold'":— as Plato was by Dionysius. The view of (c), 22 τινες, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent incon- sistencies. δῶς was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (οπ. c. 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used ἐτερ δέ'. It will be found upon comparison of De Anima I. §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and Meteor. II. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that δῶς and ἐτερ δέ are used in parallel clauses to introduce distinct objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διότερ κατά "Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to barbarians": αὐτῶν used absolutely for αὐ-τῶν < τοῖς ἔλληνω> which comes to the same thing as 33 αὐτῶν. Eaton compares the noble conduct of Callirhidas, Xen. Hell. I. 6, 14.

30 οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ κατά] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (ά) and (υ).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ Nic. Eth. ν. 7. 1, 1134 b 15, τὸ μὲν φολεῖ <δίκαιως> ἀκτήσαν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχει δίκαιον (Con- greve), τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατά Cr. III. 13. 2 ή εἰ- γένεσιν ἐκάστου σκοτεινοῦ. Susem.(62)
περὶ εὐγενείας αὐτοῦς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς εὐγε-
νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἶκοι μό-
νον, ὡς ὅν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλευθέρου τὸ δὲ
ὀχὶ ἀπλῶς, ὀσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἐλλην ἕφη

θείον δ᾽ ἣν ἀμφοῖν ἐγχώνων μημάτων
τίς ἣν προσεπεῖν ἐξεσώμεν Λάρτων;

§ 8 δὲ τούτῳ λέγοσιν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀρέτη καὶ κακία διο-
μοῖροι τὸ διψάων καὶ ἐλευθέρου καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς

1233 β δυσευγενεῖς, ἀξιούσιοι γὰρ, ὀσπερ εὖ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑκ

33 αὐτοῦ Ἡρὶ Π 3 Π 4 Π 5 Π 6 Π 7 and 1st hand of Π (emended by corr.) ||

παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς Γ Μ Π 4. Π 5 Π 6 Π 7 and 1st hand of Π (emended by corr.) ||

καὶ οἷον ἐμεθεμένοι, || 35 καὶ οἷον τῆς Ἐλληνος Π 3 Π 4. Π 5 Π 6 Π 7.||

35 ἢς ὦν τι "which implies the existence of an absolute, as well as a relative, nobility and freedom in the whole doctrine of Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of Aristotle who is rather fond of quoting from him, see Susenius's note (103) on Poetics 11 § 1, Bernhardy Grisch. Litteraturgesch. II b p. 64 f., Welcker Die griech. Trag. III. 1069 ff. [also Cope Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philol. 111. 260 f. Int. to Rhetoric 53 f. note on Khet. 11. 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in Nauck's Trag. Grisch. frag. Susenius (33) § 8 39 διά τι. From vii(v). 8. 9.

8(vii). 1. 7 (cp. n. 11. 13. 3. Rhet. 1. 8. 5) we learn that true nobility is a combination of wealth with high excellence hereditory in a family, ἀρετὴ καὶ πληθοῦσα ἀρχαίας. How far this third or intermediate view of slavery and the limits within which it is justified as natural agrees with that of Aristotle himself, is more clearly seen from the discussion in IV (vii). 7 §§ 1–3, where see n. (780, 781). The question there is, what are we to ascribe the higher endowments and ‘virtue’ which distinguish the Greeks from other races and make the latter their born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Asiatic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before VII. 14. 6. δολιοῦστα ἥμισυ οἱ μὲν βαρβάροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἐπιστήμην. The other references are I. 2 § 4, 5 § 8 f., 6 § 3, 7 § 3 f., 8 § 12 : IV (vii). 2 §§ 15, 16, 9 § 18, 14 § 21 with the notes.


1255 b 1 διονυσία κα. So above § 5 to βολῆνα...πολιτειῶν ἔρων. Cp. III. 13 § 3 n., Khet. I. 9 § 33. Theognis 535 f. ὀφθαλμὸς δολιοῦστα ἤθελην δολιοῦστα οὐδὲ ἀκαθαρσία | ὀφθαλμὸς δολιοῦστα ἤθελην δολιοῦστα οὐδὲ ἀκαθαρσία (Ca-

merarius): also Plato Cratylus 394 D (Schiller). Oncken remarks: "what Aristotle requires however as the visible and palpable mark of innate slavery is not the deformity which Theognis has in view, but a greater endowment of rough muscular force. He overlooks the fact that the domestic service of the slave hardly demands more strength than the military service of the freeman, who needs a good deal besides mere erect stature." Susenius (28).
θηριῶν γίνεσθαι θηρίων, οὗτος καὶ εἶ ἁγαθῶν ἁγαθῶν. ἢ δὲ φύ- (Π) σις βουλεῖται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μὲντοι οὐ δύναται. § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινά λόγον η ἀμφιβολίας, καὶ
5 οὐκ εἰσίν οἱ μὲν φύσει δούλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν συμφέρει τὸ μὲν τὸ
10 δουλεύειν τὸ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεθείαι τὸ δὲ ἁρχεῖν, ὃν πεφύκασιν ἁρχήν ἁρχεῖν, ὡστε

1 ὧν γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ δόλῳ καὶ σωμάτι καὶ

ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τοῦ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐν ἐμφυχύν τοῦ σώματος κινηρωσμένον δὲ μέρος διὸ καὶ συμφέρον εἰ


1255 b 2 γενέσθαι Μ. Π. 14 δ ἄγαθων, <καὶ εἰς δούλων δοῦλον> Schmidt, <καὶ ἐκ δούλων δοῦλον> H. 197 1. 27 3 τοῦτο αὖτε ποιεῖν Π. 17 1. 371 f. 1. 5 τὸ τοῦτο καὶ

5 οὐκ ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ τοῦτον συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ δόλῳ καὶ σωμάτι καὶ

ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τοῦ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐν ἐμφυχύν τοῦ τοῦ σώματος κινηρωσμένον δὲ μέρος διὸ καὶ συμφέρον εἰ

12 τοῦ τοῦ σώματος σειρὸν εἰναὶ σειρὸν εἰναὶ σειρὸν 

2 ὧν γὰρ καὶ τὸν τὸν σώματος σειρὸν 

5 οὐκ ἔκλισιν 

9 τὸ τὸ διά κακῶς sc. ἀρχεῖν. 

§ 10 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κατά 

11 ὁ δὲ δοῦλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ 


μέρος] This is said of property (ἐτύμον) generally and of the child Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (27) See however Jackson's note ad loc.

§ 9 ὧν γὰρ καὶ τὸν τὸν σώματος σειρὸν 

5 οὐκ ἔκλισιν 

9 τὸ τὸ διά κακῶς sc. ἀρχεῖν. 

§ 10 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κατά 

11 ὁ δὲ δοῦλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ 


μέρος] This is said of property (ἐτύμον) generally and of the child Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (27) See however Jackson's note ad loc.
b 2—1255 b 21.

... φύσει τοῦτον ἡξιομένους, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, (ΠΙ)
7 ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμων καὶ βιασθέντας, τουναύτιον) φανερῶν δὲ
16 καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον, ὧν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐστὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ τᾶς ἀλήθειας αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ὀστερ τινές φα-
σίν. ἦ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἦ δὲ δούλων ἐστὶν, καὶ
19 ἦ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς ἁλικος),
20 ἦ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐποπτεύουσα καὶ λογικά ἀρχὴ. ὃ μὲν ὧν δεσπο-
τάς οὖν λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τούτῳ ἐννα,

14 τοῦτον] τοὐδέτερον Susen. 13, τοὐδέτερον <εἰπὲν> ? Susen., τοὐδέτερον <καὶ> Schmidt at one time: τοῦτον was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὕτως ἡκομένοις Koraes || ἡμετέροις transposed to follow 15κάμων Schmidt || 15 φανερῶν || 20 ἀρχή transposed to follow 1256 a 1 τρόπον Schmidt || 16 καὶ before ἐκ τοῦτον would perhaps come better after those words

Eudemian Ethics, VII. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff., withdraws the concession: since there is the same relation between soul and body, craftsman and tools, master and slave, in this case there is no association (κοινω-
νία) possible. οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ  δὲ τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐστιν (the two members of such a relation are not independent). οὐκ ἐπιρμένων τὸ ἐγαθυνεῖν εὐκατέχη, ἀλλὰ ἀμφο-
τέρων τὸ ἐστιν οὐ ἕνεκα ἐστιν (the good of the one is not separable from the good of the other, the good of both is the good of that one of the two for whose sake the other exists, τὸ τε γὰρ σωμάτι ἀπόν ὀργάνων αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δο-
ῦν ὀστερ κυρίον καὶ ὀργάνων ἀφαν-
ετῶν). That even a slave is a man is emphasized in another fragment of Phile-
mon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4, vii. 7. 17. ἐκ τῶν ἡμῶν 28: καὶ δοῦλοι Ἕρησις, καὶ οὐκ ἔστων, δεσπόται, ἀπὸ ἄρθρους οὕτως ἐστιν, ἀπὸ ἄρθρους. C. cp. Becker Charis-

c. 7 Διαστοίλα then, or rule over slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1. Nor does the relation of διαστοίλα depend upon science: § 2. In what sense then may be a science of the duties (α) of slaves (8) of slaves owners (the latter quite distinct from η ἐττίκη, sc. δοῦλοι): §§ 3—9.

§ 1 17 των] Plato. See on 1 § 1 n. (3). Susen. (88)

"It is plain that here and § 1 Aristotle is thinking of Plat. Polit. 258 B sq. esp. 259 B. It is however a mistake to attrib-
bute the doctrine, without qualification, to Plato, who at 268 b introduces a long and elaborate myth with the express intention of warning us, that though the shepherd-king of the theocratic period exercised all regulative functions indiscriminately, this state of things ended with the Saturnian age. See by all means 274 E sqq. From this point to the end of the dialogue the Eleate is mainly engaged in discriminating the πολιτείαs from a host of rivals. Clearly the doctrine in question is at variance with the whole tenor of the Republic. May we not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph.

Memorab. III. 4 § 13, Ωκεαν. 13 § 5, to Socrates?" (Jackson.)

19 ἦ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ...20 ἀρχή] Compare IV (VII). 8 §§ 4 (ἐξ ἀμοιβας) VI (IV). 11 §§ 8 (ἐξ ἄλλων καὶ ἡμῶν), also II. 2 §§ 6, III. 16 § 2, 17 § 1 and n. (133) on II. 2 §§ 4.

On the other hand see III. 4 §§ 5 with n. (471). Susen. (88 b)

20 A similar distinction between ἠττὶκας ἐλευθέρων καὶ λοιπον ἀρχαὶ and ἡ διαστοίλη is seen in Nic. Eth. v. 6 §§ 4, 8, where Jackson refers to Pol. IV (VII). 14 §§ 5, 7, § 19. See his notes.

§ 2 21 οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην] As is asserted in the passage of the Polit.

ica: cp. c. 1 §§ 2 n. (2), 3 §§ 4. ἀλλὰ τῷ τούτῳ ἐννα But does this latter at once exclude the former? As was shown in n. (54) on c. 6 §§ 8, Plato is very far from denying the one because he asserts the other. He too, like Aristotle, regards the more capable as the natural ruler, but for that very reason assigns the perfect art of ruling, of whatever kind, to those alone who in the strict sense have knowledge, i.e. to the philosophers; for, on the Socratic principle that all virtue or
excellence (φρεσκή) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the Ethics he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller ep. c. 11 ii 657 f. SUSEM. (69, 60) κατά = in virtue of, as in καθώς. The term ‘master’ is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐπιτύπωτα κατὰ 29 A verse of the Panathenias, a comedy by Aristophane’s younger contemporary Philemon, frag. 3. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (διανοητός) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

§ 4 1 M. 170 —wrongly, see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1362, en [tau] SUSEM. (69) § 24 επίστημα ἑπιστήμη τῆς χρηστικῆς δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ δούλων. ἐπίστημα δ’ αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδέν μέγα ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδέν σεμύνει. δ’ ἐν τῷ δούλῳ ἐπίστημαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνον δεῖ τὴν παλαιὰ ἐπίστημαι δεῖ ταῦτα ἐπίστημαι διὸ ὡς εξουσία μὴ αὐτοῦ κακοταθεῖν, ἐπίστροφος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοῖς

25 en taic M. 170 SUSEM. (69) —§ 32 οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι. Below c. 8 § 2 τῆς γὰρ ἑπιστήμης τῆς κατὰ τῷ ὁλοῖν παρά τὴν αἰκ.; III. 4. 11 τῷ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαία η ἡ ἐπιστήμη, δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐπισταθεῖν τῷ ἀρχαίοις οἷς ἀναγκαίοι ἀλλὰ ἐπισταθεῖν μᾶλλοι. SUSEM. (63) 33 οὐδέν μέγα ἡ ἐπιστήμη § 36 The overseer, επίστροφος, or house-steward, ταμίας, was himself a slave: Pseud.-Arist. Oecon. 1. 5 § 1 1344 a 26, το ὡς 31345 a 8 ff., Xen. Oecon. 12. 2, Aristoph. Knights 947 f.; Becker Charibdas 11. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 253. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of ἔπιστροφος. SUSEM. (66) Translate: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.
In what relation does κρηναστική stand to Economic? Is it (1) the same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3) a subsidiary science? It is not the same, for it serves a different purpose, accumulation: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or not is disputed, and must be decided for each of the various species of κρηναστική separately: § 3.

Review of the various natural modes of subsistence: §§ 4—12.

The natural art of production (κτησική), which has for its object the accumulation of natural wealth within due limits, is a branch of Economic: §§ 12—15.


There can be little doubt that Aristotle wrote with especial reference to Plato: Rep. ii. 370 b—372 a, Laws xi. 918 a—920 c (cp. viii. 831 B, 849 D), Soph. 319 A, 322 B F, 323 C, D, Political 287 C—290 A, etc.

§ 1 1256 a 1 Κρηναστική is applied (1) to the whole art of acquisition, being thus completely identical with κτησική. In this sense the term was introduced at §§ 3 (cp. 4 § 1 t) and this holds throughout c. 8, and in § 4. In a narrower sense it is used (2) for the acquisition by exchange, μεταβλητική, of the kind of wealth which in Aristotle’s view is unnatural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange again at a profit. In this sense χρηματιστική ‘money-making, profit-making’ = κτησική ‘trade.’ So from c. 9 § 1 onwards. Again in 9 § 12, to § 3 it is used (3) for that part of the art of acquisition which, as opposed to (2), is directed solely to natural wealth and is intimately connected with Economic. Plainly (3) = θανάτιος θάνατιος,
πόθεμεν κατὰ τὸν υψηλότερον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦ—(III)
λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τε ἦν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειν ἂν τινς πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ ὑιοκομικῇ ἐστὶν ἢ μέρος τε τῇ ὑπηρετικῇ, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποιητικὴ τῇ υφαντικῇ ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκορυγμικῇ τῇ ἀνθριαστοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ἄρθρως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν ἁρ-§ 8 γὰρ παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδιον λέγω δὲ ἐλπίζω τὸ ὑποκει-
µένον, ἐξ ὧν τι ὀπτελέσθαι ἐργον, οἷον ὑπάντη μὲν ἑρµα
10 ἀνθριαστοποιίᾳ δὲ χαλκοῦν).

ὁτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ὑιοκομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ,
βήλιν (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρῆσασθαι τὰ
γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησιμότητά τοῦ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν ὑιοκο-
14 µένην). τὸ πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τε ἢ ἐτέρου εἴδους, ἔχει διαµ-

1256 α σ [1] ὑπηρετικῶς, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικῶς Bender, certainly not right. That Mε
omits ἢ is quite unimportant 69 κερκιδοποιητικὴ P3-4 Q S Tb Βdk. and a later
hand in P3, κερκιδοποιητικὴ P3 (1st hand) || 9 ἐργα Γ P1 Susen.1-2 ||
10 χαλκὸς Γ P1 P3 Susem.1-2, χαλκί Mε || 11 τῇ ὑιοκομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ Sylvia για
ἐκεῖνη (ή ὑιοκομικὴ corr.3 of P3 and Βdk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ] περὶ Mε
P3 S Tb

(2) = ἤ µὴ ἀνιχνεύει of c. 0 § 18; and (1) the widest range of the term includes
both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. Susen. (69)
2 κατὰ τὸν υψηλότερον τρόπον] “in accordance with the procedure adopted,”
namely, that from part to whole. See
§ 3 n. (4); § 1 P (90); III. 1 § 2 n. (34). Susen. (66)
ἐπείπερ... ἢ] “since the slave is, as we
saw, included under the head of property,
being defined as στίμα, a chattel.
§ καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικόν κτῆλα] The more precise
way in which this third possibility is ex-
pressed leads us to anticipate a decision in
its favour (Hampke). However when
the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1 —
3, it only has a preference given it; it is not
exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks.
That the question, in which of the two
senses χρησιμοτέρον is auxiliary to Economic, is
never taken up is most surprising. We
can only conjecture the answer from
passing hints: see on to § 2. Susen. (67)
§ 7 ἡ μὲν ὑπηρετική... 54 τὴν ἐλπίδιον
The one provides tools to work with, the
other raw material to work up (Oncken).
Susen. (67 b)
This distinction comes from Plato Polio-
τικές 287 c ἄραν... <τέχναι> παρέχοντο
δραγανα περὶ τὴν υφαντικήν... ἐνίθην ὡς
σωφρονίσου: 288 D, κ τὸ δὲ πάροι τοῦτον

12. τὰ γὰρ κτῆλα] See n. (65) on c. 7
§ 4. Susen. (68)
What art
is to use the household goods if it be not
Economic (παρὰ = except)?
14. Two alternatives are given in
§ 1, ἢ μέρος τε ἢ υπηρετική, and it is
not easy to see what has become of the
latter in the statement here τὸ τέχναι πέρον µέρος
αὐτῆς ἢ εὐτέρον εἶδος and in § 3, 17 ἢ
χαλκορυγμικῆς τέχναι πέρον μέρος τε ἢ εὐτέρον γένος.
For reasons given in Excursus III on Βdk.
1. p. 209 γ. ν., both alternatives of § 1
should be supposed included under µέρος,
that term being so loosely used as to
include even an auxiliary science. Susen.
(69)
§ 3 φωσβήτησιν, εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσας πόθεν χρή—(III) ματα καὶ κτήσις ἐσται, ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περείληψε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὡστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι τῆς ὁικονομικῆς ἢ ἐτέρου τί γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ κτήσις].

§ 4 ἄλλα μὲν εἰδὴ γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βλοί πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζωῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν οὐ γὰρ ὁδὸν τε ἥξιν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὡστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποίηκασι διὰ τῶν φέρουσας τῶν ζωῶν. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελάδια τὰ δὲ σπο-

15 el yarp elpe Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen (Poet. p. 198f. ed. 3) has shown that el yarp can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen’s comma after 15 estai must be a full stop. But perhaps diaμεθάρησιν. el yarp...κτήσις ἐσται, * with the punctuation of previous ed., is right || 16 estai, ἢ δὲ κτήσις Bernays. 17 ** ὡστε Conring Sussebm. The lacuna began with ὡς ὠς ἐπερ, HAMPKE SCHNITTER. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, ad loc. and Addenda || οἰκονομικῆς Garve, χρηματιστικῆς ΠΙΙ Ar. Βκ. || 19 [καὶ κτήσις]? Susem.: καὶ κτήσις? Stahr || 22 πεποίηκασι after diaφέρουσας M* P4 || 23 te omitted by M* P4

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes el yarp to mean “if namely” as in Alkidamas De soph. 11, 13 ἢπ’ οἷς εὑρίσκειν ὡς ἄλλοι τινα τινα τους οὐκέτας λόγους; el yarp οἰ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαραιμένα... ἐκτάσεως καὶ φθόνοι τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γγαμάς ἐπιφάλος, and Aris. Rhed. III. 17, 11 el yarp Ἀρχηγίου λόγων Πηλία ἐπαινεί, ἔτι Δικαστήριον, ἔτι τῶν ὀφέλεως, ὡς ἄλλοι καὶ οὐκ οὕτως, ἢ (μοῖρα) τά καὶ τά τούτω ἢ τούτῳ ἢ τούτῳ. Elsewhere yarp appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: Nic. Eth. VIII. 8, 6 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡ διατρείσθαι ἤ τις πρὸς τῶν διαμελουμένον· ὡς γὰρ (so long namely αὐτοῦ προμέχρων ἢ χρήσιμος ἄλλος: so ἀνεκ γὰρ Rhed. II. 35, 10, 8 ὡς Pol. VI (IV). 8, 6, ὡς μὲν yarp VIII (V). 1, 8. “See however Spengel Aris. Poet. u. Vahlen neueste Bearbeitung p. 13 ff.” (SUSEM). 16 The elements of wealth enumerated in Rhed. I. 5, 10, 17 (and Pol. II. 7, 5, 21) are yarp, χρήσιμος κτήσις, οὕτως δὲ ἐπίτευχος κτήσεως καὶ χρηστίας καὶ ἀνθρωπον: also νομίματος πλῆθος which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth. 17 πρῶτον] There is no word like δεήτως which expressly corresponds to this, cp. Poet. 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessary of life—shelter clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls ‘instruments for life and wellbeing,’ including slaves—if directly produced or acquired by plunder without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the δεήτως. This view is supported by the actual use of τροφῆ in a wider sense than food, for sustenance generally: “subsistence,” § 8, 10 §§ 1, 3. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of χρηματιστικῆς which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science; but this does not affect the present question.) Or, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for “secondly” in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective (see on § 13 n. 74), this is not one. SUSEM. (70) πότéroς is dependent, like τὸν line 15, upon ἐστὶν τοῦ χρῆματος. §§ 4, 5 That the way in which animals support themselves determines their mode of life is more fully stated Hist. animal. 1. 1, 23, 457 b 33 ff., VIII. 1, 11, 589 a 4 ff.; and the proof is given in detail ib. VIII. 2—11. Under καρποφόροι animals are included which feed on berries,
roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than φυτέλιον=herbivorous. In *Hist. animal. θηράμους ‘carnivorous’ is chiefly used: θηράμος hardly ever.

§ 5 25 βαστώνας facilities: “to enable them to get at their food and capture it.” By τοίτων understand ζώα primarily, though καρπάς would be included. B ernays reads κάρα for καλ.: “to give them facilities for the capture of their food.”

§§ 6–8 Smith Wealth of nations

Intro. Chap., Mill Pol. Econ. 1. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of idleness. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, *Hist. anim. 1. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. n. above on § 7.

33 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotos describes, iv. 186, would represent these *νουδάδες. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory *νομεί of Hellenic democracies, vii (vi). 4. 11.

35 “The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasture the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land.”

§ 7 36 ληστεύει It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. 1. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful *όν τούτο παθετήματα τούσσολ τι τί καὶ δόξης μάλλον, cp. Hom. Od. 11. 13, ix. 252: and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. 1. 5. 11. 37, iv. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see *Introd. 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schloesser (1. 47 n.) adduces as a parallel. See *Introd. 27 f.

SUSEM. (71)
μνας καὶ ἐλή καὶ ποταμέως ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσο-κούσιν, οἱ δὲ αὖ ὀρφί-θυν ἢ θηρίων ἄγριων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον 39 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γης ἢ ἢ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ-πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἶσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτό-5 φυτών ἔχουσιν τὴν ἔργασιν καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀλλαγής καὶ κα-
1255 b πηλείας κομίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικός λησ-
τρικὸς ἀλευτικὸς θυρευτικός. οἱ δὲ καὶ μεγατέρες ἐκ τοῦ-
των ἠδονὰς ἡδίσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ἢ τινὲς ἐλλείποντας πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκειας εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν 5 νομαδικῶν ἀμα καὶ ἄρστρικοι, οἱ δὲ γεωργικῶν καὶ θηρευ-
9 τίκων ὁμοίους δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς: ὃς ἢ ἢ ἤρει λυναγακάζης, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγνωσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη 6 κτήσει ὑπὸ αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσιν, 9 ὁστὲ κατὰ τὴν προτήτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, ὅψιν καὶ τελειω-
§ 10 βείζων. καὶ τὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐς ἄρχῃς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνε-
τικτεί τῶν ἑκὼν τοιαύτην τροφῆν ἢ καὶ ἢ καὶ ἢ καὶ 4 μέχρις 6 ὃς αὐτὸν διώνυσιν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθήν, οἷον ὡσα 15 σκωληκοτοκεῖ ὢσιοτεκεῖ, τὸς γεννημένοις

41 [εργαλεία...βίες τῶν] Schmidt
1256 b 1 παραστάσει Π Βκ. perhaps rightly || γεωργικός is wanting in Π Μ, and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow ψωμίτικος || τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον Bernays, τὸν ἐνδεεστόν βίον Γ Π Βκ., τὸ ἐνδεῖς τοῦ βίου Bas.3, τὸ ἐνδεῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον Reiske (better) || [§...4 εἰμι] Schmidt || 8 δεδομένη Π Βκ. || 15 γεννη-

μένονον Π Βκ.3

37 τοιαύτην] ‘such as before de-
scribed’ i.e. ‘suitable for fishing’. The same use of the pronoun in 1. 1. 2, and in II. 4. 4 δεὶ τὸ τοιαύτης (i.e. ‘less friendly’) εἶμι. See Cope on Rhet. 1. 5. 6.
36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato Latus VII. 823 B 1: πολλῆς μὲν ἢ τῶν ἐνδε-
θρων (sc. θεία), τολκή δὲ ἢ τῶν πτη-
νών, πάραμολος δὲ καὶ τῆς πτη-
νών, ὡς μόνον θηρίων... καὶ κλο-

πειας καὶ λειτουργικής. See also n. on 7 § 5.
39 ἡμέραν] cultivated.
§ 8 40 δεῖ γε αὐτόφιλον] “derive
their employment from natural growth.” Nature is used now for what is primitive 1] the later development.
41 κατηλεία = retail trade; εμπορία = wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, “huckster-

ing”, Plato Latus VIII. 849 D, XI. 918 D, Soph. 313 D.
1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν = subsistence, support: see n. (70) on § 3. Susen. (72)
2 41 δεί κτλ. “Others select out of these some which they combine in order to pass an agreeable existence, supplying by an
addition the deficiency in independence of a more meagre mode of life” (Cope).
§ 9 7 συναναγκή = constrain: ὅπως intensive as in συμπληρών.
§ 10 12 δεῖ σκωληκοτοκεῖ ὢσιοτεκεῖ] Aristotle erroneously believed that
insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or maggots which are then transformed through several metamorphoses into the
perfect insect: see Aubert and Wimmer Intrud. to the De generations animal. p. 14, Meyer Thierkunde des Ar. p. 201 f.
What he says of the difference between worm and egg serves in particular to explain this passage. Thus De gener. anim.
II. 1 §§ 8—13, 732 a 25 ff.; one species of animals, the viviparous, bring forth young like themselves fully developed; others
bear offspring not yet organized or of perfect form, and of these the vertebrates
14 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τῆς τοῦ καλομέλουν γα- (III) § 11 λακτός φύσις. ὡσε ὧμοιος δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένοις] οἶνο-7 τὸν τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα χρώ- τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἄλλα-19 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοσκεῖας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα- § 12 καὶ ἐσθίης καὶ ἄλλα ὑγραμμα γίνεται εἰ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ- φύσις μηδεν μήτε ἀπελεύθεροι μητέρη μάθην, ἀναγκαίοι- τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκεῖν τὴν φύσιν. ἡ-23 διὰ καὶ ἥ τολμημέριον φύσει κτητική πὼς ἔσται (ἡ γάρ θη-8

15 [γενομένοις] Götting, τελευτών Αρ. Susem.1-2. γενομένοις Γ’ Β’ Bk., γενομένοις Π’ (1st hand), ἄλλα γενομένας Π’ (corr. in the margin), γενομένοις (=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the Ethics II. p. 405 f.). [καὶ γενομένοις] Bernays, δὴν δὲ καὶ γενομένοις] Bender 18 Before πάντα in II is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰ Π’), a repetition of the preceding: πῶς (π’ (1st hand), τὰ πάντα (π’ (corrector) || 20 γένετα M’ Π’ || γον’ Corning Susem., which suits the sense but is against Aristotle’s usage, γαρ’ Susem., οὗν Γ Π Β’ Bk. Bernays || 23 [διὸ...24 αὐτῆς] and 23 κτητική φύσει τολμημέρι also 24 [ἡ δὲ...26 τολμήμα καὶ πρώτω] Schmidt, who trans- poses the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θερευτική. See Qu. Cr. III. 5 ff.

(τὰ δραμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (τὰ δραμα) breed worms. The difference between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a part and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg; but if the whole of the young animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also Hist. anim. 1, 5, 3 489 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (κῆμα) is called an egg when one part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the whole of the germ by its organization and growth; cp. id. v. 19, 3 550 b 28 ff. ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκόλαγων ὅπερ ἐκ μέρους τινὸς γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, ὅπερ εἰ τῶν φῶς, ἄλλῳ δῶρα ἀναφέρεται καὶ διαφορμιωθὸς γίνεται τὸ ζῶον, and De gener. anim. III. 2, 4 752 a 27 f. οἰχὸν ὡσεὶς καὶ σκόλαγως αὐτὰ δ’ αὐτῶν (οἰ. τὰ φᾶ). λαμβάνει τὸν αὐτοῦ. It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present passage of worms is in reality only true of eggs. All that the former receive from the parent worm is that capacity for perfect self-development which is wanting in the egg. Cp. also τὸ § 3 n. (96). Susem. (78)

14 τοῦ καλομέλουν γάλακτος φύσιν = the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ ἄρος, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις = air, heat respectively: see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 838 a 8 ff. with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 γενομένοις "after they are born." The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12 is common to all the Socratics and was probably derived from Socrates himself: Xen. Mem. 1, 4, 4 ff.

§ 12 23 διὰ καὶ ἥ τολμημέρι κτῆτι This does not directly follow from the foregoing. Some intermediate thought has to be supplied: < it must further be assumed that amongst men themselves the less perfect are formed for the service of the more perfect >. Cp. also n. (70) on § 3. Susem. (74)

There are at least four ways of taking this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanius Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἃ both refer to πολεμική. (2) Lambin, Schnitzer, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμική, ἃ to θερευτική. This is plainly absurd: for if θερευτική can be used against men as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as πολεμική. (3) Garve, followed by Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητική, and ἃ to θερευτική. There are three objections to this: (a) It proves too much; for if we deduce the right to make war from the right to hunt, why should not captives be eaten?—a notion which Aristotle (7) IV (viii). 2. 15 expressly repudiates with abhorrence. (B) Wars of
defence or to regain liberty can hardly be called hunting; the notion of hostility is the wider. (g) The clause ὡς φόνοι δικαίων assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is not therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (q) Sepulveda renders: γι'ο σφι δεῖ τὸν εὐθέον τὸν ἐπεφαίνει παρά νομισματικά. a natura quidammodo profiscitarum, making θρησκεία an epithet of κτηνική and μέρος αὐτῆς = μέρος τολμεί, κτηνικής; he also refers ὑπὸ τὴν θρησκεία. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing φόνοι after κτηνική: and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in -και so combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive. "SUSEM. Quaeat. Crit. iii. p. 6 f. Then translate: "hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)" viz. of natural warfare, and θρησκεία, § 7, is αὐτόφυος θρησκεία. "It" i.e. war "has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—ἀὐτῆς = κτηνικής, ὑπὸ θρησκεία—supports Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to τολμεί. He translates: ‘natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (i) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is θρησκεία proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a branch of war which has a natural justification.’ He adds: ‘The διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχαίαις στις τῆς ἡθελομομοιοχυῖας μέρος ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ὥς πολλεῖσ'i αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑπάρχει."
πλούτου δι’ οὐδέν τέρμα πεφασμένοι ἀνδράς κείται.

§ 15 κείται γὰρ ὡσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὄργανον ὑπεται· 36 ρον οὐδεμίᾳ ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πληθείς οὔτε μεγέθεις, δὲ δὲ πλούτου ὄργανον πλῆθος ἐστὶν οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν.

ὅτι μὲν τοιών ἐστὶ τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονομοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δὲ ἢν αὐτῶν, δὴν οἶον: 9 ἐστὶ δὲ γένους ἀλλὰ κτητικῆς, ἢν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 10

29 ὃν ἐστιν] τὸν ἐστιν Madvig (this I think needed whether we emend with Labin, Zwingler, Bernays or transpose with Rassow): μέρος ἐστιν τὸ ἐστιν ὅτι εὐτυχισμὸν, δὲ δι’... ὀπτέρχει Susen.2 provisionally || ὁ] ὁν Schmidt || κτηματων Bernays (perhaps rightly) for κτημάτων || 32 ἀγαθῶν P5-2 Q 5θ T3 Ar. and P1 (1st hand), ἀγαθῶν P1 (corrector) || 35 κείται omitted by M, κεῖται γὰρ om. by P1 (1st hand—supplied by P1 in the margin) || 37 οἰκονομοῖς καὶ πολιτικῶς Ι, οἰκονομοῖς [καὶ πολιτικῶν] Schütz, but see Comm. || 38 δὲ... 39 δὴν Schmidt || 39 καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς Schütz also proposes to bracket, but see Comm.

translates "in so far as Economic must either find ready to hand, or itself provide that there may be found ready to hand, necessary of life and utilities which are capable of being stored for the common use of state or family."

30 True wealth is for use: δῶι δὲ τὸ πλοῦτος ἐστιν ἐν τῷ χρηστία μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀποκαλεῖν: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀβαδεικνύει ἐστι τῶν τουκών καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλούτων Khet. 1. 5. 7.

§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such property absolutely necessary to secure independence of all external aid.


Σάλαν] Frag. 13. 71 Bergk. Susen. (76)


1 § 5 n. (59β), 1 § 7 ταῖς γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἔχει πέρας, ὡσπερ ὀργάνων ταῦτα γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐστι, ὡς τὴν ἐπερέχοντα ζώλωσιν ἀνέγκαιον ἢ μενυόν διδόει εἰς αὐτῶν τὰς ἔχωνιν. Susen. (76 b)

37 ὄργανον πλῆθος κτλ] in other words, means and appliances for life, and for the life of wellbeing and perfection as the end of the household and of the state. But cp. Exc. ill. Susen. (77)

The definition of wealth as "instruments" (given also § 2) is commended by J. S. Mill Political Economy 1. 10 as adding distinctness and reality to the common view. His definitions are "any product both useful and susceptible of accumulation"—with which comp. 1256b 29—"and all useful or agreeable things which possess exchange value." Mill too restricts the term to material wealth.

§ 8 τοῖς οἰκονομοῖς κτλ] See again Exc. ill. p. 211 n. (2). Susen. 77 (b)


§ 1 40 ἢν μάλιστα κτλ] "which is especially called money-making" χρηματιστικὴ (2) of § 1 n. "and fairly called; to which is due the opinion that wealth and property have no limit." But 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.
41 δικαίων αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν, δε’ ἢν ουδὲν δοκεῖ (III).

42 τέρας εἶναι πλοῦτον καὶ κτῆσεως ἢν ὁ μὲν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γενειασιν’ ἐστι δ’ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ’ 4 ἢ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ’ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐμπεριάς.

§ 2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνεπεδην. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διατῇ ἡ χρήσις ἐστὶν, ἀμφότερα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἰδιώκει καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ η οἷον οἰκεῖα ὁ δ’ οὐκ οἰκεῖα τοῦ πράγματος, 9 οἷον ὑπόδημας ἢ τε ὑπόδεικες καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική άμφ.

§ 3 φύτευμα γὰρ ὑπόδημας χρήσεως καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττώμενος τὸ δεομένον ὑπόδημας αὐτά νομίσαμεν τῇ προφήτῃ χρήσει τὸ ὑπόδημα ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῆς οἰκείας χρήσεως οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαττᾶς ἐνεκεῖν ἐγένοντο. τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ 4 πρῶτον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ 15 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξάμενη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τα μὲν πλεον τὰ δ’ ἐλάττω τῶν ικανῶν

41 οὖν Bas. in the margin
1257 a 1 [ἢ...5 μᾶλλον] Schmidt || 3 εἰκονίζει] κειμένη θ (—posita William) Susen. || 6 χρησμός Π M* and p1 in the margin || 7 καθ’ αὐτῷ] after ὅμοιοι Koraes || 9 ὑπόδημας M* P1 || 12 [ἡ ὑπόδημα] Koraes, Scaliger proposed to transpose these words to follow χρήσις, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Comm. n. (78)

10 ὑπόδημας: a species not of the καθ’ αὐτῷ χρήσις, but of the κατ’ αὐτό συμβεβηκός. The two classifications are as follows:—

Politics
καθ’ αὐτό οἰκεῖα
καθ’ αὐτὸ οἷον οἰκεῖα
κατὰ συμβεβηκοὶ

Enl. Eth.
χρήσις

 umożliw. μεταβλητικὴ
ὡς ἐν τῇ σταθμῇ χρήσιμοτ
τῷ υπόδηματι

(Jackson).

9 ὑπόδημα] wearing, μεταβλητικὴ = the use in exchange. The shoe when used as an article of exchange preserves its proper nature, it is still to be worn by somebody; although as it is not made to exchange this use is οἶκα οἰκεῖα.

§ 3 10 καὶ γὰρ...12 ὑπόδημα] This is true. The question is always how much money or food the shoe as such, and not the leather used in making it, is worth: the labour has to be paid for as well as the materials (Göttling). Cp. n. on § 8 (83) and Introd. 28. Susen. (78)

12 καὶ χρήσις. "All things have a use in exchange." We now speak of the two values of a thing, value in use and value in exchange.

15 ἀρξάμενη τῷ μὲν πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δὲ ὑπόδημα, derived in the first instance from a natural origin [whatever it may afterwards become].

12—2


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 9.

(III)

έχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἦ καὶ δὴν λοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν φύσει τῆς 12
χρηματιστικῆς ἢ κατηκικῆς ὑπὸν γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὑτοῦ, ἀναγ- 13
§ 5 καὶ ὡς ποιεῖται τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν προτή-
20 κοινωνία (τοῦτο ὅτι οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐργον
αὐτῆς, ἡ θέλη πλεονά τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκατόνον πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
παλιν καὶ ἐτέρων ἀκατά τὰς δεξιές ἀναγκαίον <ἡμ>
24 ποιεῖται τὰς μετάδοσες, καθαπέρ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ]
tῶν (v. 14)
§ 6 βεβαιότους ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν, αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ
χρήσιμα πρὸς αὑτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλεον ὅτι οὐδὲν,
οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σίτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν
ἀλλών τῶν τοιούτων ἐκατόν.

η μὲν ὁς τοιοῦτος μεταβλή-
13

17 [καὶ...19 ἀλλαγήν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς τις φύσει χρη-
ματιστικῆς Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς || κατηκικῆς Bernays || 20 [οὐς...οἰκία] Schmidt || ἄτρω [καὶ] Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in Π' and ΑΧ., it is supplied by p' in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes || ἐτέρω <ἐδείκτω> Schneider, ἐτέρω <ἡπόρον> Schneider, ἐτέρων Κορας, ἐτέρων ἐτέρων Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρω <ἐτέρου ἡπόρου>? Susen. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδείκτω || Koraes added ἄτρω || 24 καὶ is wanting in Π', [καὶ] Susen., καὶ <νῦν> Schmidt and Bernays (perhaps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 sq. Michaelis in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70° refers to this passage

17 [καὶ...19 ἀλλαγήν] Barker is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes on to show. Money is an artificial means of facilitating this, not of natural origin but only due to custom and convention, see §§ 5—11. (§ 2, § 3): though when applied within due limits it is not con-
trary to nature. The whole explanation would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly observes, had Aristotle definitely stated what he means by 'trade' (κατηκία—=huckstering, retail trade): viz: that it is a buying and exchanging "not for one's own wants, but in order to sell again'. As it is, this is left to be inferred from the context. Susen. (79)

18 [δόσον γάρ κτλ] "For the necessity of exchange is confined, as we saw, to
the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants." Cp. τραπεζή = only so much 13
§ 12.

§ 5, 21 ἀλλ' ἡδη but not until the society extended. Since trade is intro-
duced at a later stage it is not "natural": Possibly directed against Plato's primitive
state, the ἄληθινη, ὑγιής, ὑστάτη, τὸν πόλις, Rep. 2. 371 A—D: σύγκριναι δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ
κόμμα τοῦ ἔνεκε γεννη-

23 [καὶ...δεῖσις] Comp. 2 § 3 n.

(18). Susen. (80)
All things which are to be exchanged must be somehow commensurable: and for this purpose money has been introduced, which serves as a sort of medium, for it measures all things, e.g. how many pairs of shoes are equivalent to a given house. The standard or common measure is in reality demand; but demand is conventionally represented by money which gets its name (νόμισμα = currency) because it is not by nature but by convention (νόμος), so that it is in our power to change and demonetize it (i.e. render it no longer current). If we do not require a thing now, money is still the guarantee of a future exchange, to take place if we require the thing at some other time. And although the value of money itself occasionally changes, yet it tends to be more constant than that of any other thing. All other commodities should therefore have a price set on them, that so exchange may always be possible.

§ 36 δὲ τῶν χρησιμῶν αὐτοῦ νῦν] Schneider thinks this is not implied by the nature of money, since certain tribes use cowries as a medium of exchange, and the Ethiopians stones with marks engraved upon them (Ἄθος ἐγγεγραμμένος Πε-Πλατ. Ερεύς. 400 b). We admit the truth of this; yet only a metallic currency can fulfill the proper end of money, and from the nature of the case the really civilized races have always availed themselves of it. Aristotle however has failed to recognize this sufficiently: see § 11 n. (87) and Introd. 29. Suev. (84)

37 χρησιμός recalls χρησιμόν: a commodity useful in itself which adapted its use handily to the purposes of daily life.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ A. 9.

§ 9. Σκῆρος καὶ ἀργυρος καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, τὸ μὲν πρὸ- (ΠΠ) τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὄρισθεν μεγεθεῖ καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβάλλοντον, ἦν ἀπολύσει τῆς μετρήσεως
§ 9 αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτῆρι ἐπέδει τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον. πορι-15

§ 10. Σεβήντως οὖν ἡδὴ νομίσματος έκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς
θάτερον εἰδὼς τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ κατηλκόμ., τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἱκνότι γεμίσαν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐμπειρίας

§ 11. Ποτέ καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον
§ 10 ποιήσατε κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστική μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι ποθὲν ἐστιν πλῆθος χρημάτων· χρηματική γάρ ἤ κεῖται τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πλούτων πολλακεῖς τιθέσαι νο-10

§ 11 καὶ τὴν κατηλκήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν Ἀργυρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντώποις, φύσει δὲ οὕτων, ὅτι μετα-15

38 εἰς δὲ Μ.ΠΙΙΙ Βκ. (perihis rightly) || 40 τοποβάλλων Μ.ΠI Βκ.

1257 b 3 or omitted by F.2-3. O.3-7. T. Ald. Bk. and P.1 (1st hand) || γενέμενων? Susam. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || του χρημάτων [γάρ] Schmidt, who transposes ποιησας... χρημάτων to follow κατηλκήσει || γάρ] δ' Bernays, inserting γάρ after the next following καλ., thus: χρημάτων· ποιησας δ' εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ <γάρ> χρημάτων· καὶ γάρ κτλ. If so, 9 τῆς χρηματιστικῆς καλ must also be omitted || εἴη omitted by II' || τοῦ omitted by M. bracketed by Kornas; διότι? Susam. || 8 Giphanius proposed to omit γάρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow δ' it || ποιησας after τιθέσαι M. ΠI || 9 δ' τοῦ} δ' it? Susam. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καλ before τῆς, καλ <εἴη> ? Susam.; Schill rejects καὶ τὴν κατηλκήν (οὐ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς καλ) || 11 νόμος Lambin, perhaps rightly; yet see Comm. n. (86).

38 σκῆρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato Comumis Feir. 3 χαλκεῦν δ' ὅτι εἰς

1257 c 3 οἵραι εἴσερχεν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ | δην συνέρχεσθε τοῖς νομίσμασι χρώταν. These coins were commonly called el σεβήντως, cp. Aristoph. Clouns 249. εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner Types of Gr. Coins p. 4 ff., Head Coinage of Lydia p. 11.

1257 d 40 μὲν πρῶτον καὶ. This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato L. e. ἐν Ἀκαδα-μονε σκῆρος σταθμῷ νομίσασι. Cp. Xen. De Rep. Laced. 7, 5; Plutarch Lyca. 17 (ἐδέξαντο, spits), Lyca. 93; Polybios vi. 49; and H. Stein On the Spartan iron money in Jahrh. f. Philol. LXXI. 1864.

332 ff. Susam. (85).

§ 9. 1257 b 1 Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ὀλλαγῆς with ὄρισθεν rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities not covered by wealth: will produce the largest profit."

§ 10. καὶ γάρ...κατηλκήσει This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith Wealth of Nations B. IV. Cp. Mill Pol. Econ. pp. 1-4. Even in Ῥήτ. B. 5, 7 νομίσματος πλῆθος is only one of many elements of wealth.

§ 11. νόμος παντώποις] An allu-

83. The derivation of νόμισμα = money, currency, from νόμος = convention, current custom: see n. (82). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμοι, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato Ergyxis l. c. 5. n. (82) (Schneider). Susem. (86) οἱ μεταβαλόμενοι κτλ. Although Aristotle himself, § 13, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is ὁδός φύσεως, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see n. (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. Susem. (87).

With this comp. N. E. v. 5 § 11, ἐφ’ ἴσιν μεταβαλέτω καὶ ποίεσθαι ἄρσενον, § 14 πάρχει μὲν ὅσον καὶ τούτῳ (αἰ. τὸ νόμισμα) τὸ αὐτόν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ τῶν δύνατων ἀργὸς δὲ μεῖρα ἐνὶ μέρῳ μᾶλλον. § 14 καὶ τοῦ κτλ. "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore; when in fullment of his in satiate prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16. This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenos and restored him to Dionysos, who in return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid Metamorph. xI. 50—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. Susem. (88) § 12 17 διὰ [τραυμάτων κτλ.] A possible reference to previous writers, see Introd. 20 n. (1) Susem. (88b)

19. ἔφρασεν ἢ χρῦ. "Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστική (3) of 8 § 1 n. 21, διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολής] "by exchange of commodities. And this species, i.e. χρηματιστική, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange: "i.e. trading begins and ends with money. οὐκ ἔχουσα, main constituent, seems to mean indispensable agent in exchange. Elsewhere called guarantee, τῆς μεταβολῆς ἀλλαγῆς διὸ ἐγγυτής, N. E. § 14: and ἱππάλλειμα τίς χρῆσα, representative of demand id. § 11, § 13 23 καὶ ἄνωρος δὴ] "In the words of the line from Solon, 8 § 14" (Bernays). Susem. (89)
25 διστερ γαρ ἡ ἰατρική τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστι καὶ (III) ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρόν (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρόν (πέρας γαρ τὸ τέλος πάντας), ούτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς 29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
§ 14 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις, τῆς δὲ οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρή- 18 ματικῆς] ἐστὶ πέρας; οὐ γάρ τούτῳ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλοῦτον πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυμνόμενον ὑμῶν ἰσχυροὶ συμβαίνου συναντών πάντες 34 γαρ εἰς ἀπειρόν αὐξομένων οἱ χρηματιστικοί μεν τὸ νόμιμον.
§ 15 αὐτῶν δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν, ἐπαλλάττει γαρ ἡ χρησις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected else: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 125a 1) § 30 τῆς δʼ...31 ἔργων suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || ὀδ χρηματιστικῆς ὸς (corr.), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Guth过大 recommend ταύτῳ instead of τούτῳ); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurow Schütz, αὐτός Bernays, ὤν <σῆς> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οὐ τὰ...32 ἔργων once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας. This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φόβοι> ? Susem. || διὰ <τῶν> τῆς μὲν * * φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ἄραμεν Syllburg, ὥστε Γάρ Αρ. || 34 νόμιμα, αὐτῶν * διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἀπειρόν; medicine is without end in respect of health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.
27 τὰ πρῶτα τὸ τέλος = means to the end.
28 πέρας...πάντας] “For all arts are limited by their ends.” True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that; and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (Introct. p. 28), to recognise Aristotle’s penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this 9th chapter, “the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society.” Cp. further iv (viii). 1 § 5 n. (695), n. (706).
SUSEM. (90)

§ 14. 30 If οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 125a 17: “but to that branch” of accumulation “which concerns the householder there is a limit”. See however n. on § 12, p. 177.
31 τοῦτο—τούτῳ—tau to attains this limit, χρηματιστική αὐξανόμενη as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν] “in one sense”, viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schultz Bernays take it as “to the one branch”, viz. that which concerns the householder.
34 εἰς ἀπειρόν] Cp. [Xen.] De Vesti-

4 §§ 6, 7: ἀγρόνων δὲ ὀδόντως τὸ ὄντων πολὺ ἐκτίκατο ὡςον ἐτὶ προκειμένων. ὀι χρηματιστικοί—those who are engaged in traffic.

35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικῆς is the cause of this mistake.
§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει. See on i. 6, 3.
3. “The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικῆς overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.
36 ἐκέταρας Ατ. and the mass. used by Sepulveda, ἐκέταρα Γ II Bk. ἐκέταρα Schneider, ἐκέταρα and then τὴν χρηματιστικὴν Bernays, perhaps rightly. || 37 κτίσιν χρήσει Götting (after Schneider, or rather Fülleborn, had proposed to omit the whole clause 36 τῆς γάρ...37 χρήσει), χρήσεως κτίσεως Γ II Bk. || 39 ὀλιγομοιρίας p.143 Q 58. T2

1258 a 1 ὁσιά] ὁσιά Sylburg (but see on 1257 b 23) || 2 δοσι...3 ἐπιβάλλονται noticed by Eustath. on the Illad p. 625, 36 || 4 ἐνέχρων Korès (perhaps rightly)

Here two χρήσεις ἐπιβάλλονται because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ. ‘The one application has a different end’ (viz. enjoyment, use ‘the other aims at mere accumulation’.

39 διατελεύσαν κτλ.] ‘perish through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely’; σωματικά = their substance or capital in money, Bonitz e. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of φύσεως, for which idiom see Witz Org. i. 283 and cp. ἡ τοῦ ἑρυθροῦ οὐνα 693 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως= τοιοῦτος διατελεύσαν κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αἰτίων δὲ κτλ.] ‘Perhaps the thought becomes clearer’ says Fülleborn ‘when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,’ without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, ‘they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment’ and for the ennobling of life, ‘their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited’, SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 a δοσι δὲ κτλ.] ‘those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments’; whereas, on Aristotle’s own theory, the true embellishment and perfecting of life, i.e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensible condition: all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Wellbeing. See Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ii ii 609: cp. iv (vii). 1 §§ 7, 8. SUSEM. (92)

3 ἐπιβάλλονται ‘throw themselves upon’ (cp. Hom. II. vi. 68, ἐνέχρων ἐπιβαλλόμενοι) ‘desire’ in the same metaphorical sense as ἐφέκασα, ἐπιτέθηκα. But otherwise π. 1, i ‘to adopt’. For the intransitive use of the active see 1. 13 §§ 8, 13. In Nic. Eth. 1. 5 §§ 1, 2 δ ἀπολαυστικὸς βιος is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains Res. ix. 580 π. 6, money is the means to this life, so that φιλοκράτει, φιλοχρηματίου are convertible terms with τὸ ἐπιθυμητόν; hence ὁ χρηματιστικὸς ἀνήρ comes to be compared with ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλόσοφος.
§ 17 ἔτερον εἰδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτ' ἐξήλθεν. ἐν ὑπερ-(III) βολῇ γὰρ οὕτως τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τῆς τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικῆς ζητοῦσιν κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύναμιν τοπίζεον, δε' ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τούτο περιώνυμα, ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνέριας 10 γὰρ οὓς χρήματα ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσεως, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς 
καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἰκρίνης τῆς δὲ ὑγείας. οὐ δὲ 
πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικῆς, ὡσ τὸτέστω ὅπως, πρὸς δὲ 
tὸ τέλος ἀπαντά δέον ἀπαντάν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς, 
16 καὶ δέ' αἰτιάν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἔσμεν αὐτῆς, εἰρήνης, καὶ περὶ 
tῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν 
ἡ περὶ τῆς τροφῆς, οὐχ ἄστερον αὐτή ἀπειρόσ ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα 
10 ὅρον δὴ δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορομένον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 21

§ 17 8 καὶ μὴ κτλ. "And if they 
cannot procure this" (ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερ- 
βολῆς) "by mere accumulation they 
attempt it by some other supposed cause, 
perverting each of their faculties to 
attain it."

§ 18 13 πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικῆς.” 
Compare Plato, Rep. 1 342 D: the true 
ἀγάπη πον χρηματιστικῆς, and 346 c, d: ἡ 
μεταποίησις accompanies the other arts to 
provide remuneration.

14 ἀπαντάν = meet in, conspire, tend 
to: referre ad.

19 δῆλον = standard, limit. Properly 
‘boundary’, ‘definition’, like διάσωμα.

§§ 16—18 In the several points Ari- 
stotle is quite right, but in reality all this 
makes against him. For it shows that 
the fault lies with the men and not with 
the ‘arts’. If men misuse not medicine 
merely, but moral virtues like courage, as 
a means to their own avarice and craving 
for pleasure; if they can follow agricul- 
ture, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same 
spirit; why are commerce trade and 
banking to be unceremoniously rejected 
merely because they can serve men 
as a still readable and more successful 
means to the satisfaction of their desires? 
Why should it be culpable in any one to 
carry on such pursuits merely to gain a 
living by them? (Glaser). It is true 
that if there were no stock exchange 
there could be no speculation in stocks, 
and then no one would be tempted to 
such excessive indulgence in it as is cer- 
tainly liable at times to endanger the 
morality of whole nations [as e.g. at 
the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But 
without the shadow no light; civilization 
is impossible without luxury. ‘In spite 
of many great evils which money has 
brought into the world it is to this inven- 
tion alone that we owe the fact that nine- 
tenths of mankind are now no longer 
forced to serve that fortunate minority, 
the owners of real property. Think of the 
time when money was still scarce in 
Europe; the land then belonged almost 
exclusively to the clergy and the no- 
bility. Money alone introduced a new 
species of commodity of inexhaustible 
ownership, which stands open to all to 
acquire' (Schlosser). ‘Aristotle forgets, 
too, that, even before money was in- 
vented, people might find no limit to 
wealth-seeking. The ἔστερον of 
Odysses, Od. xiv. 96, went beyond the 
limit of his consumption, and its aim was, 
not nurture, but power, as he could make
grants to his comitatus out of his herds and flocks” (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole householder (οἰκοδόμος); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (Introd. pp. 22, 29 ff.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: “When agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow” (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (μανικανική), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (VIII). 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on Bk. 1, and Plato Law vii. 566 D— are all paid labour, see n. (103), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme developments of Plato’s social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with more prudence and reserve. See Introd. p. 21 nn. (1) and (3), p. 33 n. (7). SUSEM. (94) c. 10. Decision of the question raised in c. 8 § 1: §§ 1—3. Urury the most unnatural form of gain, §§ 4, 5. § 1 19 δήλων δι καλύτερα “But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the householder and statesman or not, but” ...Then comes a lacuna which may tentatively be filled as follows: “But, <so far as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only so far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself; for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these> must be given already.” But the briefier and somewhat different restoration given in the critical notes is also admissible: “but <of some one else. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living;> nay there must be definite materials found him beforehand.” SUSEM. (94) 23. οὕτω καὶ τροφήν καλύτερα “So nature must provide land or sea or something else as means of support.” Lambin and Göttling make γῆν ἢ θάλασσαν exegetically of τὴν φύσιν and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato Law vii. 566 c, τὴν φύσιν ἄμοιβαν ταῖς φύσιν ἄνερ, sc. ποτέ καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. But the above rendering best agrees with §§ 9, 12, 10 § 3.
I. 10. 1

24 θαλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ἐκ δὲ τούτων, οὗ δὲ ταῦτα διαβεῖ (III) § 2 ναι προσήκει τῶν οἰκονόμων, οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντήκης ἐρμαπτοσα, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνώσας δὲ τὸ ποιόν χρησάτων καὶ ἐπιθετήδεον ἢ φαύλου καὶ ἀνεπιθετήδεον, καὶ γὰρ 28 ἀπορήσειν ἄν τις, διὰ τὸ ἢ μὲν χρηματιστικά μέροι τῆς 29 οἰκονομίας, ἢ δ’ ἱατρικὴ οὐ μόριων καὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς 3 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ὄστερα δὲν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἁρχοντος καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας ἰδεῖν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ὁ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ὁ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς μᾶλλον δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρήται πρὸ τερας, δὲν 35 φύσει τούτο ὑπάρχειν, φύσεως γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐργον τροφήν τῷ

24 ταῦτα) aitēre Glaser (wrongly), πάντα? Oncken, τάλλα Bendter (both better, but hardly correct) § 25 ὅποι ὁδέ? Schmidt § 29 δεὶ after ὑγιεῖν Mα P4, δεῖν P4 § 32 ἔγειρεν Αλθ. ἐγέρεις Mα P4.3.3.4. § τοῦ ιατροῦ ἢ τῆς ἱατρικῆς P4 Q Lατ. and P4 (1st hand—gr. τοῦ ἱατροῦ in the margin), while in SP TV V lat. ἀλλά...ο is omitted § ἰδεῖν <ἐστὶν> and 33 οἰκονόμου <ἐστὶν> Welldon § 33 τῶν omitted by P4.4.4 Q Lατ. § χρημάτων] χρηματιστικά P4 and gr. P1 (in the margin), χρηματιστικῶν Q § 34 After τῆς P4.4. Cε Q Lατ. (probably also Mα U4) insert κέρδουν § 35 ταῦτα Bendter for τοῦτο, cp. n. on 1. 31

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, παίζε (Bonitz); answering τούτο μὲν. "And then it is the householder's duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ἐστὶν)."

§ 2 25 ὅποι γὰρ κτλ.] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστικῶν is related to οἰκονομοῖς as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστικῶν provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessaries of life are certainly called elsewhere, § 8 § 15, 4 §§ 1—4, the instruments (ἔργα) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (ὅ δὲ βιος πρᾶξιν, οὐ τῶρα), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστικῶν, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is it to required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSEM. [95]

28 ἀπορήσειν ἄν] χρηματιστικά (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 34 μᾶλλον] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γὰρ κτλ.] It was explained in n. (73) on § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far
this is intended to apply to the animals which according to him are produced from worms. SUSEM. (96)

36. (aor. κτλ.) "For every animal has for its sustenance the remainder of the matter out of which it grows." Hence the animal and vegetable world is nature's reserve for the support of man.

§ 4. 1238 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολῆς ψευδομένης. Attested in equally general terms by Plato Lysis xi. 918 a 2: compare Andoc. 1. 137, Diog. Laert. 1. 104. An Athenian would find capital for mercantile concerns, but he considered it on the whole deserving to engage in them personally (Becker Chor. ii. 134 ed. 5, Eng. Tr. p. 281). SUSEM. (97)

2 αʹ αλλήλων. If neuter, the profit made from mutual exchange. But more likely masculine, derived from men defrauding and overreaching one another; the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection to trade altogether.

μεταβαλεῖν Demosth., XXXVII Adv. Pant Hæmat. § 52: μεσοῖο, φησίν, Ἀθηναίοι τοῖς δανεἰσθαι. SUSEM. (97 b)

ὁ ἀργόντως = obèl weighing, petty usury; Lydas adv. Theomn. i. § 18 p. 117 explaining the law τὸ ἀργύρον στάδιον εἶναι ἐπὶ ὀσῖν ἀν διαίβησθαι ὁ δανείων, says τῶν στάδιων τὸν ἐκεῖν ἀργοῦ ἀμοιβήν ἀλλὰ τὸ κέρα κατὰ σεβήθαι ὤσεις ἀν διαίβησθαι. Cp. also Aristoph. Clouds 1146, Antiph. Not. frag. i, Meineke 92 in Athen. i. 108 g (Cope). The insecurity of the principal lent was the main cause of a high rate of interest. Thus upon bottomry the average rate charged was 20 per cent., which would go to cover insurance, [Xen.] De Fest. Pal. iii. 9. On house-rents the return was only 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of a paper medium of the nature of bills of exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contributed to the same result: Büchsenschütz Besitz und Erwerb pp. 98, 496 ff.

3. διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κτλ.) "According to the texts both of Bekker and Susemihl ἀπολογίστηκε is hated because it draws a profit from coin instead of from commodities exchanged by means of coin. But the explanatory sentence—μεταβαλεῖν γὰρ ἐγένετο χάρω, ἀλλὰ τόκος αὐτὸ τοῖς πλοῖοι

—seems to show that ἀπολογίστηκε is hated because it seeks to accumulate coin instead of using it in the furtherance of exchange. In order to reconcile the explanatory sentence and the sentence explained, read in the latter τῆς instead of ἀργοῦ or ἀργοῦ, omit τῆς with Μ, and restore Bekker's διὰ. In this way we obtain an appropriate sense: ἀπολογίστηκε is hated because it is directed to the acquisition of coin, instead of to the end with a view to which coin was invented: for it was to further exchange that coin was introduced, while interest multiplies coin itself." (Jackson).

§ 5. τόκος] "Perhaps from Plato Keph. viii. 572, ὅ ἐκ δὲ χρηματιστα ἐσχάτῃς, οὐδὲ δοκεῖται τοῖς οὐδὲν, τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἐκ ὑποκοπτο ἐσχάτες ἐργίσαι.
δόμαι γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοὺς γεννῶσιν αὐτὰ ἐστὶν, ὁ δὲ (III) τόκος γίνεται νόμιμαι ἐκ νομίσματος, ἀστεὶ καὶ μάλστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ IV πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεί πυθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἐστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρης χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποία λυστελέστατα καὶ ποῖ καὶ πῶς, οἷον 14 ὑπονοαν κτήσει ποία τις ἤ βοῶν ἡ προβάτων, οἷον δὲ καὶ § 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ἐφών (δεὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα τε τούτων τίνα λυστελέστατα, καὶ ποία ἐν ποίαις τόπως.


With 8-10 ἐδὲ τὸ κτήμα: comp. Plato Lat. v. 742 c, VII. 842 b. Every one will agree with Fülleborn that this proof is sophistical. But Stahli rightly observes: 'It was not until capital itself attained its complete development, that is, in only recent times, that the justifications and reasonable necessity of interest became clear. The history of capital recounts the gigantic efforts that had to be made, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, in order to its formation. From the point of view of universal history the high rate of interest in ancient times has perhaps been a favourable means to that end; yet its immediate effect, in conjunction with a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was to excite repulsion in men with moral natures and this led them decisively to condemn interest altogether, as Plato did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole theory of exchange the following shape: *he first includes under the term ἐρμον (ἐλαλήθη) all buying and selling barter. Next he subdivides this genus into two species, the one good and praiseworthy, the other not so. The former belongs to Economic. It exchanges the surplus stock of the household for commodities which the household needs; or if this surplus stock be sold for money it is with no intention of making a profit, but only to purchase other necessities with the proceeds. The other species is distinguished by the intention of making a profit, and this exchange with a view to gain is χρηματιστική in the narrower sense or trading proper. It is again subdivided into two branches: the one includes all traffic in commodities whether in exchange for other commodities or for money, the other is traffic in money alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle regards this last as wholly detestable: the former as less bad, but still bad enough' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (98) p. 11. Production viewed on the practical side. Cp. Analysis p. 100.

§ 11 χρήσιν = practical application, as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτήμα] The theory has its limitations solely in the nature of the case generally; but in practice the nature of the particular locality where we live, and therefore the climate, the character of the soil, &c., determine whether we are chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-rearing, to mining or commerce by sea, whether there can be preserves of fish and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or of cattle must be procured, and so on (Schütz). SUSEM. (99) p. 11. For ἐλευθήρω τὸν ἐπιστήμων, and § 14 832 a 10, ἀναγκαῖον παντὶ πάσιν ἀντί.
1258 b 6—1258 b 29.

I. 11. 4]

ῥᾶς ἐκ ἄλλας εἰθερεῖ χόραις), εἰτα περὶ γεωργίας,(IV) καὶ ταύτης ἦδη γεωργίας τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελι- 

κρίνων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραυνῶν τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτημένων, ἥ 
§ 3 ὅσον ἐστὶ τυχίσκειν βοσκείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν ὁικεστιάτης χρῆ θ 

τά καὶ ταύτων, τάς δὲ μεταβλητικής 

μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης ήμέρα τρία, ναυκληρία 

φορτηγία παράστασις) διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἄτορα ἑτέρων τῷ 

τά μὲν ἄσφαλετστηρα εἶναι, τά δὲ πλείον πορίζεσθαι τῶν ἐπι 

§ 4 καρπίων), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μειονερία (ταῦ 

της ὧν ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναγών τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀστέγων 

καὶ τῶν σώματι μόνον χρησιμῶν) τρίτον δὲ εἰδὼν χρημα 

τιστικής μεταξύ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἐξεν γὰρ καὶ τῆς 

κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὡσα ἀπὸ γῆς 

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly || 27 τριτῶν] τέσσαρων Π III and 
P 4 (corrector), ἄλλος τριτῶν p1 in the margin || 29 ὡσα] ὡσα Bernays

§ 2 17 εὐθείᾳ thrive, have abundant 

offspring: see Verrall. Trans. of Camb. 

Phil. Soc. II. p. 165.

18 θησι and here (when we come to this) 

we find two kinds: agriculture proper and 

fruit-growing. The technical terms per 

haps of Apolloodoros, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and 

in particular of the vine would be included 

under η γεωργία; see Steitz. Heidel's 

Works and Days (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f. 

SUSEM. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία = inland trade. 

SUSEM. This is the view of the commen 

tators generally, but Cope disputes it. 

He remarks: "φορτηγία and its deriva 

tives φορτηγέων, φορτηγεῖος, φορτηγεῖα, 

φορτηγεία, seem to be always ap 

plied to commerce carried on by sea, 

whether εἰς οὐκ οἷς εἰσίν expressed or not 

(sense of 'porter' given in the lex. 

seems not necessary in any of the 


242). For this reason, and 

because commerce by land at Athens and in 

Greece generally was so utterly insignif 

icant in comparison that it might well be 

passed over without notice, I rather think 

that Aris. means by οὐκετερία building 

and letting out ships for traffic, and 

by φορτηγία commerce proper, the trans 

port of goods on board of them, perhaps 

including also land transport. On this 

view Xenophon's distinction De Rep. 

Laced. 7 ὃ μὲν γεωργία, ὃ δὲ οἰκονομία, ὃ 

δὲ ἐμπορεύεται, would correspond to Ar 

istotle's here."

ταράτασις virtually = καταληκτική, sta 

taria mercaturae, hominum nimium in foro 

consistentium.

§ 4 24 ἄσφαλετστηρα] For definition of 

ἄσφαλετστηρα in this connexion, see Rhet. I. 5. 

7 τοῦ ἀσφαλετστηροῦ καὶ οὕτω κεκρυμένου, ὡσ' ἐφ' 

αὐτῷ εἶναι τὰ χρῆσειν αὐτῷ (Jackson). 

ἐπὶ καρπία = profit additional to the 

principal (ῥήματος); see on § 11.

§ 5 μισθαρία κτλ] Cp. § 6 below. 

In any case the division is incomplete. 

The occupations distinguished in § 6 as 

technoμισθατα, which are not unskilled 

manual labour nor service for wages, 

are here omitted : see ἁμ. (101, 103). 

Moreover in υ (VIII) 2. 5, where μισθαρίσι 

ὄργασει is said to be degrading and 

βάναυσι, the term has quite a different 

meaning, see ἁμ. (981). 

SUSEM. (101)

§ 4 26 By ἄρχειν καὶ τῷ σώματι 

μόνον χρησιμῶν Cope understands the 

ὁμοια in a general division of the 

population ; farm-labourers, porters, etc.

§ 9 ὡσα κτλ is in loose apposition to 

εἰς τοὺς χρησιμοτομοιούς. Even if Bernays' ὡσα 

is right, we cannot accept his punctuation 

(a colon after 28 πρῶτον, no parenthesis, 

but a single sentence from ἐξεν to 31 

μεταβλητικής) or his translation of ὡσα 

ἀπὸ γῆς; 'directed to the land'. SUSEM.
30 ἀκάρτις

Compare Rhet. i. 5. 7: κάρτιμα δὲ λέγω ἂν αὕτη τέχνην (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ περιπετεία γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γείνη, ἐσθή interchanged: cp. § 8 § 2 ἐσθήνα ἐσθίον with § 3 ἐσθήνα γείνου.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἄδαχτον τόκχην] “where chance has least play”; where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman’s hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. Walker of c. 145 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (557) on III. 9. 8, also v. (VIII). 2. 5 with n. (981).

SUSEM. (102)

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπωφεία τέχνης ἐσθήνα, ἡ δ’ ἀπειρία τόκχην, Metaph. I. 1. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 [βαναυσότατα επί] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4 § 12, § 4, § 6, § 17; (VIII). 2. 5, § 6, § 6, § 6; 3—6, § 10, § 7; VII. (IV). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes: Plato, Laws v. 741 E, 743 D L; Xenoph. Occ. 4 § 2 f., 6 § 6, 10 § 10. — show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the serf and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large (see further Herod. II. 157). ’Servile’ occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are ‘artistic’ (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the “sedentary” crafts, τέχναι ἑθανατίκαι Euth. Eth. 1. 4. 2, 1250 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage; v. (VIII). 2. 4 n. (980).

Similarly we read in Plato Rep. VI. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and mars the soul; Xen. I.e. says that it hurts men’s bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (καθαίρεται) coupled up indoors (ἐκαταρφαίεται), or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace; and Pseudo-Plato Brut. 137 b that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent (ὑπέκάθιστα ἔπου (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property’, Zeller Phil. d. Gr. II i 142 (Eng. tr. Socrates and Socrates p. 170 n. 1). Compare Xen. Mem. III. 1. c. 10. With the definition of servile employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6 b) and c. § 7 ff.

SUSEM. (103)

For λαβδίστα see v. (VIII). 4. 1: the workmen themselves ‘spoil’ or ‘deprave’ their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.
39 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεὶς ἄρετης. 

33 <περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἐξηρται 34 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς 
§ 7 «τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτίων δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.» ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνίοτες 40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαριτίδη τῷ Παρρείᾳ καὶ 
1259 a Ἀπόλλωνῖδος τῷ Δημιούρῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψυλής καὶ 
περιφυτευμένων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν 
ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτο ὅτι ἐπιμελεῖ περὶ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα 4 
σποράδην, δὲ ὅπων ἐπιστευτικὴν ἐστὶν ἁρματικὸν, 
§ 8 δὲ συλλέγην, πάντα γὰρ ὀφέλημα ταύτα ἐστὶ τοῖς 
τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλήσιον 
τοῦτο γὰρ ἄριστα κατανόημα τῆς χρηματιστικᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος 
μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσπάθησε, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι 
§ 9 διὰ τὴν ἀνεδίδοτων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς 
τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὁποῖης, κατανόησανταν φαιτὶς αὐτῶν ἁλαίων 
τοῖς ἀστρολογικοῖς, ἐτί κειμένος ὄντος 
εὐροποιήσαντα χρήματων ἁλγών ἀραιβάσιμοι διαδόθηκα 
τῶν ἐλασφρείων τῶν τι' ἐν Μιλήσῃ καὶ Χλυτί πάντων, ἅλγου 
μισοπεισμένων ἀρ. οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλουσι· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ καιρὸς 
15 ἂς, πολλῶν ἐργασίας ἔμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα 

40 χάριν (χάρις M') δ' ΠΑΡΡΕΙΑ ΒΕΡΝΑΥΣ 
1259 a 6 οἷον.....19 σποράδην ὅταν seems to have been used by Hieronymos of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I. 26 || 13 ἐλασφρείων P1 and Hieron. 
Athηρητίων Γ Susem.1-2, ἐλασφρείων P4, ἐλασφρείων M Q7 P5 P6-3. 
Ald. ΒΙΓΚΡΑΝΟΥS ἔγραφνης L1 

39 ὅπου ... ἄρεσθης] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence "is least needed." No doubt 
dumbling money on interest is particularly meant. 10 § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. Susem. 
(104) 
§ 7 40 περὶ τούτων] With the 
transposition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ 
κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, exact parti-
culars in detail. 
1259 a 1 Ἀπόλλωνᾶς τῷ Δημήτριῳ 
Also mentioned by Varro R. R. 1. 1. 8, 
and several times in Pliny's Natural Hist. 
Susem. (106) 
§ 8 6 τῷ Θάλεων 
Nερ. Ενθ. vii. 7. 5 
1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller 1. 
168 ff [Eng. tr. Præ-Socratics i, p. 211 ff.] 

Susem. (105 b) 
8 διὰ τὴν σοφίαν] Aristoph. Clouds 
180, Birds 1130a, καθόλου τι] The device (κατανοομα) is 
of general application, depending (as explained 
in § 12) on the possession of a monopoly. See Boeckh p. 52 f, Eng. tr. 
§ 9 12 ἀραιβάσιμοι διαδόθηκα] "paid deposits in advance to engage the 
various oil-presses": 4ρπ. = earnest money, 
as guarantee for the execution of the 
contract; διὰ τί, because the sums were 
distributed, paid to various owners. Quite 
from apart from the external authority for ἀθανασίας (Hieronymos), it seems more 
like business-like to engage the oil-mills, six 
months beforehand, than the workmen. 
15 ἁλγου μεθ.] "taking them at a 
low rental, because there was no one to 
outbid him": ἐπιβάλλεσθαι: add, make a 
higher bid, run up the price.
όν τρότων ἢβουλετο, πολλά χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδεξία, (IV) ὅτε μᾶλλον ἔστi πλουτεί τοῖς φιλοσοφοῖς, ἃν βουλεύεται, ἀλλ'
§ 10 οὖ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧ σπουδᾶξουσιν. Θαλης μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον εὶ
tὸν τρότων ἐπιδεξίαν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας' ἔστι δ’, ὡσπερ
30 εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, έόν τις δύνηται
μονοπωλιάν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διό καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔναι (p. 19)
tούτων ποιοῦνται τῶν πόρων, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων μνο-
§ 11 πολλάν γὰρ τῶν ὀνόματος ποιοῦσιν. εὐν Σικελία δὲ τις τεθέντοις
tαρ’ αὐτῷ νομισμάτων συνεπριοτό πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ
25 τῶν σιδηρεον, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ὡς ἀφίκονται ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-
ρῶν οἱ ἑπτάκληθε, ἐποίει μόνον, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσασθαι ύπερβο-
λὴν τῆς τιμῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅμιον ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις
§ 12 ἐπέλαβεν ἐκατόν. τούτων μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθώμενος τὰ
8 μὲν χρήματα ἐκείλυσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἐτώ
30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῖς
πράγμασι ἀσύμφοροι τὸ μέντοι δράμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
tαυτῶν ἐστίν (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς ἐτέχθησαν γενεὰς
§ 13 μονοπωλίας) χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζει ταύτα καὶ τοῖς πολι
tικοῖς. πολλάν γὰρ πόλεως δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιοῦτων
35 πόρων, ὡσπερ οἰκία, μάλλον δὲ διὸ ὡσπερ τιμῆς καὶ πολυ-
tελούτα τῶν πολιτευμένων ταύτη μόνον.
12 ἑτεῖ δὲ τριά μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἥς, ἐν μὲν δὲ-
σποτική, περὶ ης εὑρεῖται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρική, τρίτω δὲ
16 συλλέξασθαι P4 Ald., συλλέξασται S Th
§ 25 τιμαρωμένον P2, τιμᾶμέν M
28 γόνων S Bk. || ο ἰσχυσείται M P1
§ 30 αὐτοῦ II Bk. || 31 δράμα Camerarius, θεύραμι? Koræae || ὡσπερ Καλλικράτης
§ 35 ἑπτάκληθεν S, ὡσπερ Σικελία S, ὡσπερ Καλλικράτης S
§ 38 [τρίτων] Schmidt
§ 11 21 [ἐνα] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampapsos are instances given by Ps.
§ 12 Aristoc. Oeconom. 11. 18 1348 b 33, 4, § 4 1346 b 25, § 1347 a 32.
§ 13 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πολυοικωναί “on” or “in addition to his capital of fifty
§ 14 talents he received a hundred more”: he
§ 15 made a profit of 100 talents on his original
§ 16 fifty. The preposition has the same
§ 17 force in τοῖς πολυοικωναί ὡσπερ Καλλικράτης: τότε ἐγκατέστη ἦτο δικαίωμα ή 
§ 18 πρὸς τέκνης καὶ κρήματα: τότε γὰρ ἦτο τὸ οἰκονομικὸν 
§ 19 δίκιον with Jackson's note, “in Pol. II. 6 § 7 however οἰκονομικόν ἐπηρθείον of 
§ 20 ἄρχη used to include all three
§ 21 relations.” Justice between man and wife is 
§ 22 really ἀρατημος, 3 § 2.

... ημερη, * * καὶ γάρ γυναικὸς ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθερία... 

... ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ... 

... 1259 καὶ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικὸς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικὸς· τὸ τε γὰρ... 

... ἀρρεν φύσει του θηλεός ἥγεμονικάτερον, εἰ μὴ τοις συνε- 

... σπάταις παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ κατα- 

... τέρω καὶ ἀγελότος, ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς... 

... 25 πλειονεστώτερας μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὸ αρχιμενον (ἐξ οὗν... 

... γάρ εἶναι βουλεύει τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρει μηδὲν), ὁμοί... 

... βίον τὸ μὲν ἀρχικό τὸ δὲ ἀρχηγοῖται, εὐγενείς διαφοράς εἶναι... 

... καὶ σχήματι καὶ λόγωι καὶ τιμάσι, ὁπρέπει καὶ Ἀμασίς εἶπε... 

30 γαμμικ], * * καὶ γάρ Conring; Bernays by altering ἀρχεῖν into ἀρχεῖων, Ar. by translating ἀρχεῖα, ignore the lacuna: Ἑστὶν ἀρχεῖαν, a Paris ms. 1042. See the Comm. 

1259 b 10 = ποιων Ππ (emended by p')

39 γαμμικ[**] There is here a considerable lacuna. For the sense some such restoration as the following may be proposed: "Economic science has, we saw, three branches, treating of (a) the relation of master and slave which has been discussed above, (b) the paternal and (c) the conjugal relation. Further we saw that in general a slave is only a piece of property, persons as well as things being included under that head; and it is not the acquisition but the use and maintenance of property which is properly a part of economic science. This science may therefore be divided into (1) the guidance and rule of the persons of the household, (2) the right use of the property. The former includes the treatment of the conjugal and paternal relations: the relation of master and slave would come partly under the one, partly under the other. The householder has to care for the improvement and excellence of all that belongs to the household, and hence for the improvement and excellence of the property; but property is only a means to an end by which the household seeks to attain, and the living chattel is more important than lifeless objects. It is therefore the householder's main task to direct aright the free members of the house."> In c. 13 the differences in this rule as exercised over the different free members of the family are parenthetically specialized, but in c. 13 the leading thought itself is resumed and explained. Cp. Thurot Études p. 14 f., Susemihl in Rhem. Mus. xx, pp. 212—

... 215 (where however some mistakes need correction), Bichenschütz op. c. 716. 

SUSEM. (107 b) 1259 b 1 ἀρχιμενος] like a magistrate in a republic, or, more precisely, an aristocracy, Nic. Elia. vii. 10 § 5, 11 § 4. 

Cp. Zeller ii 619 n. (1). SUSEM. (108) § 2 4 ἐν μὲν οὖν καλ.] Here follows a discussion, as to (1) how far the rule of the husband over the wife may fitly be compared with republican government, despite certain differences between them; (2) how far the rule of a father over his children may be compared with monarchical government. Cp. further 1. 5 § 7 n. (2 b) and 13 § 9 n. (117). SUSEM. (109) "In most cases where citizens rule over citizens rulers and subjects change places, for they (τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχιμενον) to βουλεύει and to ἐγενέτο to be on an equality in nature and to differ not at all: τὸν φύσιν adverbial accus. as 1. 3. 6 τὸν φύσιν λουκον, IV(vii). 1. 10 ταῖς τῆς φύσεως, cp. 15 below φύσις διαφέρου, Yet some have taken τὴν φύσιν, as subject of ἐγενέτο, to mean the spirit of republican citizenship, or the 'natures' of the citizens. 

8 σχήματι, outward signs, insignia: λόγωι, titles. ὁσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς κτλ] Herodot tells this story, ii. 174. Amasis, who had deposed his predecessor Apries (Hophra), was at first despised by the Egyptians on account of his low birth, Whereupon he had a statue of gold made out of a foot-bath, in which he and his guests had been accustomed to wash their feet. When this statue was set up the Egyptians paid it due reverence, and
§ 3 τοῦ περί τοῦ ποδαντιτήρου λόγων’ τὸ δ’ ἀρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ (V) 
10 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἢ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλικὴ; 
τὸ γὰρ γεννηθάν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ κατὰ πρε-
σβείαν ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικής εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καὶ λόγῳ Ὁμη-
ρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπόν ὁ πατὴρ ἄνδρων τε θεῶν τε ὁ (p. 20)

15 τοῦ βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάτων, φίλει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα δια-
φερέων μὲν δὲ, τῷ γένει δ’ ἐναντίον τοῦ αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ἑπονθεὶ τοῦ 
πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεότερον καὶ ὁ γεννηθάν πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

§ 13 φανερῶν τούτων ὑπὲρ πλείον ἢ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 3 
περὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κτήσης, καὶ 
20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, διὸ καλοῦμεν 
πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δοῦλων. 

§ 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δοῦλων ἀπορίσθησεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἐστὶν 
ἀρετή τῆς δοῦλου παρὰ τὰς ὁργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλης 
τιμωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σοφροσύνη καὶ ἄνθρωπιν καὶ 
25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τουτοῦ ἐξεσθεν, ὡς οὖν ἐστὶν οὐδεμία παρὰ 
§ 3 τὰς σωματικὰς ὑποτελείας. ἐξερευνήσας γὰρ ἀροτριανὸν ἀμφιτερός; ἐτέ 
γὰρ ἐστὶν, τὸ διοίκουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; ἐτέ μὴ ἐστὶν, ὄντων 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγων κοινωνικῶν ἀτομῶν; σχέσων δὲ 4

15 After ἀπάτων p5 adds as a gloss δολοθών πατέρα εἰπόν, and this πατέρα εἰπόν 
has crept into the text of Γ M* 17 τοῦ Γ P45b Ar. before νεότερον 18 * * 
φανερῶν τούτον? Schmidt; see on 1254 a 24 18 ἐνεργείται P4 S T5, 97 P3 b 
Ald. 28 διὰ M* P43 14 Q S T5 Ald. and P9 (corr.)

Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present 
ascendancy had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common 
people to the throne, and as king he 
demanded their respect. SUSEM. (110 b) 
§ 9. 4. (κατὰ μέρος 1 § 2. The husband 
held, as it were, permanent office. 
11 κατὰ φ.) by right of affection. 
12 ἐπί οὖν κτῆσιν 1 and this gives a 
form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monar-
chy, i. i. 14. 6. Bernays takes εἶδος as ‘es-
sential nature’, but compare Nic. Etr. 
VIII. 10. 4. ἡ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα πρὸς ὀλίγον 
κοινωνία βασιλείας ἐγέρεται και καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους. So 
too in Findar’s words, ὃν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, ἐν μιᾷ δὲ πλείονες ματρὶν ἀμφο-
τερον. Nom. 6. 1. men are of one race with 
the gods, earth being the common mother 
of both. The same is implied by Hesiod’s 
verse ὡς ὅρμησιν γενέσθαι θεὸν θεοτοκί τ’ ἐκ-
θρωτοι Works and Days 108 (J. G. 
Schneider). See Steltz cp. c. 50 f. 
SUSEM. (110 b) 
§ 12 Various degrees of excellence 
requirite in the different members of the 
household: §§ 1—11. The promotion 
of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in 
women and children, §§ 15, 16. 

§ 18 ‘τοῦτον traducendo ad novam 
cognitionem inscribit’ Bonitz Ind. Ar. 
quoting Phys. 1. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3—9. 
Perhaps it only resumes a thought pre-
viously expressed, ‘then’, ‘accordingly’; 
see n. (107 b). Bernays gives ‘It is clear 
beforehand them.’ SUSEM. 
20 Here πλοῦτος = ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, but 
in 8 § 15 it is πλοῦτος ὁργανικῶν. 
21 μᾶλλον ἢ δοῦλον? CP. n. (33) on 
§ 4 § 1 καὶ ἐπ’ εἰς ἔτερον. SUSEM. (111 b) 
§ 2 τῶν ἄλλων ἐξεσθεν, cp. (111 b) 
p. 4 § 1 καὶ ἐπ’ εἰς ἔτερον. SUSEM. (111 b)
taipov esti to xeroloumenon kai perip neutikos kai paiados, (V)
30 potera kai tauton elain arsta, kai dein tin neutika sofronai
eina kai andreiai kai dikaios, kai paios esti kai akro-
§4 xalastos kai sforon, i ou; [kal] katholou de to hust estin esti kai
petevo per xrokonv fuses kai xrokeosti, poteron i auti
arste i etera. ei mev gar dei xmoetepou meteke xalos-
35 xagathias, dia ti ton men arkein deo an ton de arkeanv
kathipas; (oude gar to mallo kai theton ou an de kath
30 5 de mallo kai theton oude) ei de tin men dei ton de mi,
thetaiastov. eite gar o arxan mi estai sofron kai di-
40 kaios, poi arkei xalos; ei the arxomeno, poi xarxh-
etai a sevai xalos; akolastos gar ou kai deiou oude poai-
ton prosoevkotov.

fanevrou tonin esti anagkei men meteke xmoetepou
arstei, tausti d einaia diafora, dister kal kai ton
§6 fuses xrokontan kai xromenon.

kai touto eivath uphegetai peri
5 ti xynh ev tausti gar esti fuses to men arxan to di
xromenon, ou ete xroni xam einaia arstei, ouan tov loxou
§6 (p. 21)
exostov kai tov alagon. deilov tonin esti ton auton trpovn e
30 sforon after 31 elain IP2 Bd. || 31 kal before aklastos omitted by IP2 || 32 kal before katholou omitted by IPM || 37 diaferei to Ar.
1260 a 4 arxowton kal omitted by II Ar. Bd. || uphegetai IP2 Bd. and pl the margin, uphegetai <tau> Schitz; yet uphegetai can also be used passively || 6 mven elain xam IP2, mven xam elain P4 (corrector)

§3 31 pai...sforon] Compare Nic.
Eth. III. 12. § 1119 a 33: we apply the
term xalostos to the faults of children
so far as they bear a certain resemblance
to the vice of intemperance (xalostos).
SUSEM. (III B)
§4 37 elain diaferei see on § 2.
§6 1260 a 3 dister kal...xromenon
sc. xarxhetai a po, as explained §8 2 ff.

§ 6 4 uphegetai "this is indicated
(or, given in outline) in the case of
the soul." The participle uphegetos (§ 3)
seems evidence that the verb is used pas-
sively (Bonitz Ind. Ar.); but Schitz'
suggestion <tau> gives the middle a fair
sense; "to this result the relations which
exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSEM.
6 ou etevar...alagon] "and we say
that a different kind of excellence belongs
to the one and to the other of these,
I mean to the rational and irrational parts
of the soul." Namely intellectual or
dialectic virtue (arste diaonitikai) to the
rational soul; moral virtue (philex arstei,
excellence of character) courage, temper-
ance, etc. to the irrational appetitive
soul; Zeller II 654—658. The dia-
nostic virtues are discussed in B. vi of the
Nic. Eth., and the latest detailed inves-
tigation of this subject, Walter op. a 283—
527, gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of reason,
theoretical, creative, and practical in the
narrower sense (see n. 49), has its particu-
lar diagnostic virtue, or it may be, vir-
tue. Practical wisdom or insight (phi-
hegetai), if not the only virtue, is at all
events the most indispensable and im-
portant virtue of the practical reason
(Walter p. 356 ff.); see on § 9 m. (45)
III. 4 §§ 7, 8 nn. (474—6), §§ 16, 17 nn.
To theoretic reason belongs (i) tois in
the narrower sense, intelligence, com-
prehending in itself the two extremes
of all indemonstrable knowledge, which
must be assumed for every syllogism and
§ 7 ἐχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀδον. ἀστ ἐπει ἐπει πλείον τὰ [ἀρχοντα (V) καὶ] ἀρχόμενα ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλένευρον τοῦ δούλου ἰ ἀρχει καὶ τὸ ἀριστον τῶν θήλεως καὶ ἀνηρ παιδός, καὶ πάσιν

8 ἀστ ἐπει. Bernays, while Susen,1 had simply ἀστ ἐπει πλείον τὰ Ramus, τὰ πλείον ΓΠ Βκ. [ἀρχοντα καὶ] Susen,4 especially as otherwise the insertion of ἐπει, L. 8, is untenable. || το αἰν ἡ πατήρ ? Koraces

for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest:

(ii) στράς, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysics;

(iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge, which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as diastematic virtues, or whether, as Döring tried to prove, against Walter in Kunstlehre des Arist. (Aristotle’s Theory of Art) p. 63 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a diastematic excellence, though it can lead to one. Nic. Eth. vi. § 7, 1140 b 1 ff.

For the ‘excellences of character’ cp. § 6 b. (49): in regard to temperance in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (206 b), § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 15 n. (491), IV (vii). 1 § 4 n. (503). Susen. 119)

7 τοῦν] See on § 1. But or now it is clear (Bonitz).

§ 7 ff. "Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being desitute of the deliberate faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

1 Whether this is really Aristotle’s theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter’s conception of them, p. 473, is unaffected by Döring’s objection, p. 65 n. In Nic. Eth. i. 13, 20 σύνεσιν, apprehension,—see Pol. iii. § 8 n. 17 n. (477, 5), vii(iv). 4, 84 n. 1736)—is added as a diastematic virtue along with σοφία and ὀρθόςφημε. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον] See 12 § 1, ὀλ τον αὐτον τρόπον την ἀρχή. Susen. (119)
ἔντπαρχεῖ μὲν τά μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφόρως ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικὸν, τὸ δὲ θηλυκόν ἔχει μὲν, ἄλλ' ἀκμαῖον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν,
§ 8 ἄλλ' ἀπελέχθ' ὁμοιοὶ τοῖνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰ τοῦτον ἁγίουν αρετήν τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκμῆς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ ἁγίὸς ἀρχιτέκτονος, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐκάστοτε, ὅσων ἐπιβάλλειν
14 αὐτοὺς. <ὑμοίοι ποινῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περί τούτου>; ἕτερον τούδε ἁγίουν ἀρετήν ἀκμῆς τοῦ ἁγίου
15 καὶ τοῦν ἀπαντῶν, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ φέτος Ἀκράτης, ἄλλ' ἐνυπάρχειν τοῦ εἰρήνην καὶ τοῦ εἰκών 
19 άπαντος τῶν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ φέτος Ἀκράτης, ἄλλ' ἐνυπάρχει 

14 ὁμοίως......16 ἔργον Thurot Susem. transposes to follow so αὐτοῖς: see Introd. p. 79 || Bernays transposes ἀναγκαῖον, Welldon ἀναγκαῖον έχειν to follow 16 ἄλλ' δέν, and both punctuate 15 ἁγίουν ὑπολογισμὸν δεῖν, rejecting Thurot's proposed transposition. See Comm. || 15 After ὑπολογισμὸν cor. of P2 inserts γὰρ, Ἀρ. διά (so also Koraes in his commentary) || 16 αὐτοῦ Ἐκ, αὐτοῦ Γ Π || 17 διονυσιακήν Thurot, ἡγίασθαι Π Π ΠΑρ. Ὁκ. Bernays || 20 <ἐκάστοτε ἢδη> ἡ ἡγίασθαι Susem. ἡ ἡ ἡ Susem. earlier, oidea or οἰκεία ἡ Schmidt, [ἡ] Ακράτης Thurot || 21 απαντῶν Π Π Π, πάντων P2-4 S Q ST Αλδ. Ἐκ. || 22 δ' Ἀκράτης P4, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) approves

12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ...βουλευτικόν] Just the same thing is said in other words 5 § 9 n. (45). See also n. (115). Susem. (114) 13 [ἀκμ. μὲν, ἄλλ' ἀκμαίον] Cp. n. (117). This can establish a difference of degree only, not a difference of kind, between the virtue of a man and of a woman. See III. 4. 17 n. (493). Susem. (114 b) § 17 τῆς διανοίας ἁγίουν ἀρετήν] It is self-evident that only the 'dialetics' virtue of practical life, φιλοσοφίας or practical wisdom, is here treated; see n. (45) (117); VII (171), I, 4 (693). Where it is a question of executing another's command, as it is always and unconditionally with the slave, there this virtue belongs only to him who gives the command, he who obeys having merely 'right opinion' about it. All the difference now is, whether he can attain this right appreciation more or less easily, thoroughly or carelessly: III. 4. 18 n. (408). Compare also nn. on III. 4 § 10 (493), § 17 (497), §§ 7, 8 (474-6). But so far as a natural slave, who is denied every capacity for deliberation, can be said to have ever so small a share of approximate intellectual virtue in the department of practice, such virtue consists merely in the fact that one slave understands his master's commands and knows how to execute them better, more quickly, and more aptly than another. Susem. (115) 19 ἐκάστοτε] sc. ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν δ' ἁρ. ἐπιβάλλειν] 'so far as is incumbent on them;' Impersonal; cp. De long. vitae 1, § 4, 451 b 34, λεκτόν δον οὗν ἐπιβάλλει τῇ φυσικῇ φιλοσοφία; Herod. II. 180 τοῦ δέλφου δὴ ἐπιβάλλει φαραγήν. 20 δον [ἐκάστοτε] sc. ἐπιβάλλειν. 22 ἡγίασθαι P2-4 κτλ] "that the moral virtue of each of the above classes is peculiar to itself." Bernays translates as if he had before him the words inserted.

22 Ἀκράτης] The historical Socrates unquestionably did so, Xen. Symp. 2. 93; cp. Zeller op. e. II i 221 [Eng. tr. Socrates and Socrates p. 145 n. 1]. But here no doubt Aristotle has in view the Platonic Socrates; amongst other passages in Meno 71 d f., to which he alludes.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 13. [I. 13. 9]

ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδριὰ ἢ δ’ ὑπηρετικὴ, ὕμοιος δ” ἔχει καὶ (V)
§ 10 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῖς σκοπούσις· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγουσι τε ἐξαιτητώς ἐναυτῶς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχει τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς, ἢ τὸ ὅρθοπραγμένον, ἢ τὰ τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείων λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαιρετικοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρετῶν τῶν τοιῶν ἐκ τοῦτον ἀναφέρει ἐνεκτὲν ὑπέροχον· οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων·

γυναῖκι κόσμῳ ἢ ἀνδρὶ φύρει

ἀλλ’ ἀνδρὶ οὐκέστατο τοῦτο. ἐπεῖ δὲ πᾶς ἀτέλεις, δὴ ἔχει·

§ 24 καὶ, which Ar. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἢ τὸ π. P4-6 L’ Wb Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar. τὸ P2-3 Sb To || τοιοῦτον for τῶν τοιούτων M P1 || 31 ὁ before πᾶς omitted by Π1

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon L. c., Plato (Rep. v. 452 e f.) holds that, apart from begtting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the Laws) in the public messes: see il. § 1 n. (124), § 5 n. (150), § 1 n. (254 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (τ. i. § 3 ff., § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (124) on il. 2 § 9, Zeller op. c. ii η 775 [Eng. tr. Plato p. 481], Susenmilh Plae. Phil. ι. 168—170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in Hist. Anim. ι. ι § 5, § § 7, 8 ἐναὶ πάντων, τὰ ὡμοίως μελακόντερα καὶ κυκούραντες καὶ ἐναποτάτερα καὶ περί τῆς τῶν πλευρῶν τροφῆς φροντιστικώτερα· ἔτη δὲ καὶ δόειν μᾶλλον τὸ θηλυκὸν ἄρρενον καὶ δύσελπον, καὶ ἀναπλάνσεις καὶ κυκούραντες, εὐκαταπάνσεις δὲ καὶ μενομενικώτερον. Cp. De genr. anim. ι. 6, 10 ff., 775 a 13, and Zeller ii ι 688 with n. (3). Susenmilh (116)

§ 23 ἢ μὲν ἀρχικὴ κτλ.] Cp. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 10 n. (491), § 17 n. (492): also i. § 7 n. (43 b), i. § 2 n. See on the other side n. (120) on i. 13 § 11. Susenmilh (117)

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] 'in detail'.

25 The same protest in Nic. Eth. ii. 7 § 1, cp. 2 §§ 3—4.

26 τὸ εὖ ἔχει] Plato Rep. iv. 444 E ὑφελεῖν τι καὶ τελεία ψυχῆς. Gorg. 500 D τάξι τεταγμένου ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου. 27 οἱ εὐπρ. κτλ.] As Gorgias does in Plato’s Meno 71 b f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle here defining Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the Meno insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the Ethics Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to ιι. 2. 2. Susenmilh (118)

§ 11 28 δ’ ἄνθρωπος] Sophocles Ajax 293. See further n. (117). Susenmilh (119)

21 ἀναπλάνσεις κτλ.] "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator."

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (Nic. Eth. 1. 9, 10, 11. 12. § 67): on this see iv(vii). 13. § 5 n. (975); but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely ὑπηρετικὴ, as Aristotle inexacty puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8—11 compare Politics 12. § 3 and note (561 b) in Susenmilh's edition. Susenmilh (120)
1260 a 23—1260 a 41.

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32 αύτόν θανάτου μή καί ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότην.

ἐπημεν δὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαία ἄρτησιν εἰναι τὸν δοῦλον, 35 ὡστε δήλου ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὡμῶν μήτε δὲ ἀκολούθησι μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλεύσῃ τῶν ἕργων. ἀπορήσεις δὲ ἔν τις, τὸ γὰρ εἰρήμενον εἰ ἀληθὲς, ἢ ἐν τούτῳ (p. 23) τεχνῆς δεῖσθαι ἐγεῖν ἀρετῆς τολμᾶς γὰρ δὲ ἀκολούθησιν ἐλλεύσῃ τῶν ἑργῶν, ἢ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖότερον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ 40 δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ἣν ἄνθρωπος περι καὶ δοιλεῖς: ὁ γὰρ μάνωνοι τε-

34 αὐτὸν Ταῦτα ἐπιτελεῖ θάνατον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοσοῦτον. ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος τούτων ἀληθεῖ, ἐπιτελεῖς ὡς γὰρ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον ἄρετης, ὡς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος περικαὶ δοιλεῖς, ὁ γὰρ μάνωνοι τε-

35 ἀρετῆς· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος· ἄρα τὸ τέλος τῆς ἄρε—
make δ be the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate ‘the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.’ Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει De cdeo 1. 5 § 10, 272 a 25 ἦν δὲ ἡ ἐτέρα ἡ πρώτη [γραμμα] ἐπιβάλλει τὴν ἐτέραν, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἐκείνη τὸν τούτον, where ἐπιβάλλει contrasts with ἀπολάβει. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπιλάβεται;?” In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αἰτῶ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1875). At the same time is not αἰτῶ by itself also strange? (See Critical Notes). If something like δοῦλος or τὸ ταύτικα has been lost, αἰτῶ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect ‘the shares in servile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave’s.’ SUSEM.

1560 b 1 ἀρμόν. τυλι ἤ θέλοι δοῦλαιας = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. Rhet. 1. 1 § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope’s note: also ἀπαρίχητα above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, ‘detached from the master.’ That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artizans (who had largely sprung from them, III. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 4 <τῶν> τὴν διδασκ. ἐκοντα] “the person who instructs him in routine duties.” This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δοῦλη ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from διδασκ. The discussion on the ‘virtue’ of the slave results in a more precise determination of διδασκ. and its elevation by an extension of its functions. The master may entrust his steward with the employment and direction of the slaves in his service, as Aristotle ironically remarks, 7 § 5: but he must himself develop in them the minimum of virtue which they require for this. Cp. n. (64) on 7 § 5. In line 5 διδασκ. must be wrong: δοῦλος is what we require, and Bender would accordingly insert it in the text. But neither δοῦλος nor διδασκ. is free from grammatical objections; I prefer therefore to bracket the word. SUSEM. (123)

Here διδασκ. or διδασκεῖα is the art of making good servants. The household hold the state exercises a moral superintendence over its members, 13 § 1, and its head is responsible for their moral improvement.

5 εἰ λάγον...ο μένοι “Those who permit no conversation with slaves, and hold that we should merely give them orders.” Plato Laiou 777 ε, τινα ὀλεθρον προφητ. φων χρῆ σχέδον ἐπιλάματι πᾶνας γέγονεν με. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on 13. SUSEM. (124)

Plato’s view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Elliot.

§ 15 8 διαμεισθε τὸν τρόπον τούτον] Compare the close of c. 7.
10 ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἁρετής καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφάς αὐτῶν ὑμῖν, ὁμιλιάς, (V)
τὶ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διάκ
κεῖν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φέουσαι, εἰ τοῖς περὶ [τὰς] πολιτείας ἀναγ-
καίου ἐπελθεῖν. ἔπει γὰρ οἷα μὲν πάσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα ἢ
οἷα, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἄλλου δεῖ βλέπειν
15 ἁρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν
cαὶ τῶν παιδὰς καὶ τῶν γυναικῶς, ἐπεί τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ
tὸν πόλειν εἶναι σπουδαίος καὶ τῶν παιδῶν εἶναι σπουδαῖος
§16 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σπουδαῖος. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν' αἱ μὲν
γὰρ γυναικὲς ἦμισὺ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν
20 ὁμοῦροι γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ἀργὲῖ ἕπει περὶ μὲν τούτων
διώκεται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λουσάν ἐν ἄλλους λεκτέοις, ἀρκεῖ τὸ κέλυ
ξυνάγει τῶν νῦν λόγων, ἄλλων ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγομεν,
cαὶ πρὸ τὴν ἐπισκεψοῦμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφημαμένων περὶ τῆς
ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

12 Nickes omits τάς, following Ar. || 13 διαλέεσθαι Schmidt || 17 καὶ is omitted
by ΠΓ, [καὶ] Susem. || 20 οἰκουμένοις ΠΓ, οἱ κοινώνιοι II Βκ, qui gubernant (οἰκο-
νομοι?) Ar. || [στι...21 λεκτέοι] and 22 [Οἰκουμένα καὶ] Schmidt || 24 πολιτείας τῆς
ἀρίστης ΠΓ Βκ.

11 τὰ τὸ καλὸς εἰς ὑμῖν (Congreve). πῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὑμῖν> διάκεισθαι,
how the right intercourse ought to be followed: cp. τὸ δὲ κακὸν <ἀρχεῖα καὶ
Ἀρχάς> αὑτῶν ἄτιμον αἰσθήσεως, 6 § 10.
12 ἐν τοῖς πολιτείας This discussion means the scheme of the best state
more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come
down to us in B. iv(vii) and v(viii), this point was never reached, nor the question
of the proper training and education of the women. Cp. Introd. p. 49
15 ἀναγκαῖον! Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of
the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (33).

Πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ] Προερ. v(viii).
1. 1, viii(v) 9, 11 Ἑ., and Nic. Eth. v.
2. 11, τὰ δὲ παρακλήσει τῆς ἄρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομῶν δευ ἐνομισθῆται περὶ
tαιδεύειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν κτλ, with Jackson's notes.
The all important term πολιτεία will be fully explained in
B. III (1 § 7, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will
be found to be a much wider term than
'constitution' or 'form of government'
(τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English
word 'polity' is still. See vii(iv). 11.
3, βίος τῆς πολιτείας κτλ, and n. (460) on II.
3. 9.
16 διαφέρει πρὸς is an important
means towards the excellence of the city: literally "makes a difference with regard
to..." So iv(vii). 14. 7, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
dιαφέρουσαν αἱ πρὸς...".
§18 18 αἱ μὲν...διαλείψαντων] Προερ. n. 9
§§ 5, 6 n. (285), Plato Laws vi 781 B, ὁο
γὰρ ἦμισυ μᾶν ἄντι, ἣν διέθεσεν ἃ τὸ
περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. Susem. (127)
20 οἰκουμένοι, administrators, τῆς πολι-
telēs suits Aristotle's views elsewhere
at least as well as οἱ κοινώνιοι: see n. 4
21 αὐτῶν κτλ] "let us dismiss the
present discussion as complete, and carry
on our subject from a fresh starting-point.
And first let us review those theorists
who have put forward a scheme for the
best form of polity..." With τῶν νῦ
λόγων cp. τοῦ πρῶτον λόγου, III. 6. 3.
EXCURSUS I.

EPIMEMIDES I. 2 § 5.

The most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. i. 109—115 (cp. Suidas s. v.), whilst of modern writers Heinrich Epimenides of Crete (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck Kreta III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess De Epimenide Crete (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 290 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having executed the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time pp. 12—14 (in Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjuver, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly received the requisite religious sanction. In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Urichs On the Khetra of Lycurgus in the Rhein. Mus. vi. 1848. 217—230, Duncker History of Antiquity vi. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer De ephorid Lacedaemoniis pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert Studies (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta) p. 185, Frick De ephorid Spartanis p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato Laws 1642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. i. 111—two epics, Καταστροφης καὶ Κατημέριος

1 If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see n. on ii. 9. 23), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

2 Triebel (Forschungen Berlin 1871. 8) Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a considerably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the disproportionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.
EXCURSUS II.

On 1. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—b 3.

The recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in n. (31) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the Philologus xxiv. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of εὐθεῖα, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 ἐὰν γὰρ...19 ἀρχαῖν form a parenthesis, and hence that the εὐθεῖα following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The (unwritten) law in question consists in the universal agreement that prisoners captured
in war are the slaves of their conquerors (ἐν δὲ τὰ κατὰ πολέμων κρατοῦσα γένος τῶν κρατοῦσαν εἶναι φασίν). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule. This then is their view (11 οὖτοι): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, ἐκεῖνως, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 διόταντι χωρίς) and in conflict (ἀμφιβολίησι), yet they have a common point of contact (ἐπαλλάττον), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written ποιεῖ δὲ in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (ἀρετή) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (ὅτι τρόποι τῶν ἀρετής τυχόνωσι χορηγίας καὶ βιομορφεῖ γίνεται μάλιστα, καὶ ἐστὶν δὲ τὸ κράτος ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἄγαθον τυπόν); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (χορηγία). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (ὅτε δικεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀρμοδιότητα). Just for this reason (ὅτα τῶν) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: i.e. in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish “normal politics” from “degenerate forms” (σαμπερκίβασει). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

1 [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words ὅτι τρόπους τω...ὑπεροχῇ ἄγαθον τυπός are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle’s explanation of their common statement μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in ὅτι τρόπους τω...ἀγαθοῦ τυπός as the cause but not the matter of the partial agreement between (A) and (B); and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously διώσταται and ἐπαλλάττον, (4) to the sense given to ἄνευ λόγου, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about τὸ δικαίον.]
position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), ἄτερος λόγος, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χαριτοτότων τῶν λόγων οὗτοι ἠχοντικοί οὐδὲν ἥχουσιν οὗτοι πιθανῶς ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὅτε οὐ δέ το βλέπειν καὶ ἁρέτην ἀρχέων καὶ διαστάχων). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written ἄτερος λόγος for ἄτεροι λόγοι.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (ἀλος to be taken with ἄτεροίκοος) adhere to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see Introd. p. 25). SEUSEMIHL.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 a 7—26: viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just: while Aristotle declares that in practice some slavery is just, some slavery unjust. "In 1255 a 12—21" he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

a Now the λόγος of (A) and (B)

i. All slavery is unjust

ii. All slavery is just

[Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]
Éπαλλάττουν: i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττουν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as ἄρετη with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἄγνωμα of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βλα, there there is ἄρετη, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βλα is always accompanied by ἄρετη, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βλα is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βλα is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διενεργά χωρίς and no longer ἐπαλλάττουν, the theory (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἄρετοι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὃς δεί τὸ βλαττὸν κατ᾽ ἄρετην ἀρχεῖν καὶ διενεργεῖν.1

He adds in a note: 'In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἄρχων and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἄρχων and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἄρχων or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἄρχων or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοὺς λόγους and τῶν λόγων to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', ἄρετοι λόγοι to be 'the theory adverse to (A)'s theory and the theory adverse to (B)'s theory', i.e. 'the theories of (B) and (A)'.2' He agrees with Heitland (Notes p. 111) that ἐπαλλάττειν means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: 'But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) All X is Y might be said to overlap Some X is Y, and (2) Some X is Y and Some X is not Y might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττειν marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that All X is Y could not be said to ἐπαλλάττειν Some X is Y. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττειν understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis to interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βλαττὸν κατ᾽ ἄρετην to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSKIN.

1 Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of 4 (especially ἄρετοι, ἄρετοι, ὃς ὃ δεί as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fall to see what imaginable interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βλαττὸν κατ᾽ ἄρετην to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSKIN.
in διαστάσεων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττεω here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάσεων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of κεχώρισται in μκ 1, 464 b 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττεω, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another."

Bernays' rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in n. (51), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all nobler elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, which precludes slavery; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just merely because the law sanctions it; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

EXCURSUS III.

THE RELATION OF χρηματιστική ὅπως ὁικονομική: i. 8. 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὐν οἷς ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ὁικονομικῇ, ἤ χρηματιστική, δῆλον...πέτερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι ἢ ἐτερον εἴδος, ἔχει διαμικρυβήτησιν. The most obvious course is to understand ἐτερον εἴδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὑπηρετική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hampke—see n. (67) on i. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to ὁικονομική, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by omitting μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not there said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', ὁικονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—(2) those who with Büchsenschütz rely on the received text.
EXCURSUS III.

of 8 § 12 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is really a part of οἰκονομική, but that the 'natural' part of indirect χρηματιστική, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to οἰκονομική. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of χρηματιστική, with which the householder is concerned, is related to οἰκονομική; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of οἰκονομική, in another respect an auxiliary science, to §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that οἰκονομική has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, χρηματιστική with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of χρηματιστική most closely allied to οἰκονομική cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV VII), 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 15; to §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III, 4, 17 π. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that ἄρμαν ἐδειν denotes something which is not connected with οἰκονομική either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided: and μέσος is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of to § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus χρηματιστική has three meanings, (1) = κτηματική, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8; and, in a narrower sense, (2) = μεταλλακτική or καταλλακτική, ἡ μέσος διανοσία of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = παραδοσία, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. π. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly μεταλλακτική or μεταφυλακτική as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under οἰκονομική and

1 If Büchenschütz had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.
that which is alien to it: but sometimes it is found in the narrower acceptation of retail trade proper, κατηγορισμός, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 3. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle Arist. Forschungen II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική, is, as Oncken has pointed out, a perverse way of raising the question. For χρηματιστική, conversely, has a wider field than οἰκονομική: even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a χρηματιστική (§§ 13—15; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of οἰκονομική. Cp. the notes on §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. Susem. (69)

**Note on I. 13 § 12: Reason and Virtue in the Slave.**

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) on § 9 and 13 § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls τὸ βουλευτικόν, he would be without reason altogether; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression ἔλεος ὃν ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, 13 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolical and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolical, statement κατοικὸν λόγον τοσοῦτον δοσιν αὐθαυσθέντι ἄλλα μη ἔχειν 5 § 9; reason is present in the slave only, so to speak, as a δίναμις, not as a ἔξω; and Aristotle avails himself of the 2

1 Staatslehre II. 81: "It is just like putting the question: Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species? For that χρηματιστική has the wider generality and that οἰκονομική is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what χρηματιστική is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of οἰκονομική to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (7) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that χρηματιστική is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth; that οἰκονομική teaches us to apply to the maintenance of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, (a) that only the smaller and less essential branch of οἰκονομική in Aristotle's sense has this function, 13 § 1, (b) that as it has to do with consumption, while χρηματιστική is concerned with acquisition, even this branch of οἰκονομική is not related to χρηματιστική simply as particular to universal.

2 Schütz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the omission of καὶ πολιτικόν and καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, § 15. He failed to see that it was also necessary to reject πόλεως ἡ in § 13 sub jœnu, that these words indeed must be the first to go.

14—2
NOTE ON I. 13. § 12.

hyperbole μὴ ἔχειν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the Poetics, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἢθ) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ θύλων γένοιτ' ἂν. οἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἁθέσεως τραγῳδία εἰσίν καὶ ἄλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτοι. Comp. Hermes XIX. 1884, p. 592. Susem. Plato too, Rep. IV. 441 A, says λογισμῷ δ' ἔσοι μὲν ἔσωγε δοκοῦσιν οὕδετεστε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὁψε ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.


ἀναφορικόν γὰρ τοῦ ἐλεοῦ οὐκ ἔσται ποιή οὐδὲ χείρ. εἰ μὴ ὁμοιόμορφος, ἀσπέρ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην: διαφθείρεται γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (γὰρ τῷ ἐφ' ἢμι ἄρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἀσπέρ μηκέτι τοιαύτα ἦντα οὐ λεκτὸν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλ' ὁμόνυμα. The words of n. (28) p. 150 "if toiaúthē = a true hand" will admit of further elucidation. Schöll, who maintains this to be the meaning of toiaúthē, 'talis qualis esse debet vera manus' (Susem. Quaest. Crit. IV. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τοιαύτης in De part. animal. 1. 1 §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεων ἔχει τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἄλλ' ὁμοιὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. ἤτο δ' ἄνθρωπον εἶναι χείρα <τῆς> ὁποιοῦν διακειμένην, οὐκ χειρῆν ἡ ξύλινην, πλὴν ὁμοιόμορφος, ἀσπέρ τῶν γεγραμμένων λατρῶν. οὐ γὰρ δυνάμεσται ποιεῖν τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἔργον, ἀσπέρ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ λεκτὸν τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ' ὁ γεγραμμένος λατρῶς. ὡμοιὸς δὲ τοῖς οὐδὲ τῶν τῶν τεθνηκότων μορφῶν οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν τοιαύτων ἐστὶ, λέγει δ' ἐλεοῦ ὁφθαλμός, χείρ (where Schöll has himself added τῆς). The citation is the more apposite because Schöll takes διαφθείρεσια χείρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χείρ, 'manus corporis extincti, ἀναφορικὸν τοῦ ἐλεοῦ, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.'

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Schöll contends, διαφθείρεσια is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφθείρεσια means 'a dead man’s hand,' may not τοιαύτη mean simply 'homonymous,' a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained τοιαύτη toiaúthē is parallel to οὐ λεκτὸν τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμόνυμα, there is no need to insert οὐ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576) : "posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est."
B.

ἐτέλε [δὲ] προσροώμεθα θεωρήσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς (I) πολιτικῆς, τῆς κρατίστης πασῶς τούς δυναμένους ἐξ ὅτι μά-
λυτα κατ' εὔχην, δει καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολι-
τείας, αἱς τε χρώνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομείσθαι
λεγομένων, καὶ εἰ τινες ἔτεραι τυχάνονσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρή-
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἓνα τοῦ ἀρθῶς ἔχον ὁδὴν

1260 b 27 ὁ ἐξελεύθη εἰς Π" Ατ., καὶ γὰρ would make a better transition. See

Intr. p. 14, n. 3 || 26 τῆς Π" and Π" (corr. in the margin over an erasure) || Π" Bk. Π" (1st hand) || 31 καὶ Π" Π" Bk. (perhaps rightly) || τριχωνοῦ F" (1st hand) and perhaps Γ, τριχωνοῦ M F"-4 C Q8 Tb U Z Ald. Bk.3 and a later hand in F" || εἰρημέναι Schneider, but see Dittenberger ὅτι c. p. 1268 f. || 32 τοῦ omitted by Παρ'

Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, Metaphysics, Physics, Psychology &c. Here 1–8 deal with Political Thinkers, c. 9–12 with Existing Constitutions. See Intr. p. 32.

1 Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors: § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's 'Republic'? § 3.

1260 b 27 προσροώμεθα This is evidence (as against Götting Preface p. xviii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state: see Spengel Über die Politik p. 11, and compare IV (VII). 13. 4. κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to I 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, ἡ πολιτική κοιν., was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. 1.

29 κατ' εὔχην For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); IV (VII). 4 §§ 1, 2, § 3, 10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9; VI (IV).

11 § 1 with notes. SUSEM. (128).

In Plato ἐγξαίτω δομᾶς = a chimerical scheme, e.g. Rep. 466 c, ὡς ἄρα ἄλλων γε ὅθεν ἐγξαίτω δομᾶς τυπωθηκέας, 499 c, δι' αὐτῶν ἐκαταγελαμέθη, ὡς ἄλλοι ἐγξαίτω δομῖα λέγοντες; and in 540 D μὴ ἐγξαίτω εἰσρήματι is explained by ἄλλα χαλεντά μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πτέρυγα. Thus εὐχή = an ideal, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. c. Timocr. 721. 19, εἰ τὰτ ἤπειρα καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ δυνατὸν δὲ τὶ φαίνειν, εὐχήν οὖ νῦν διαπράττωι ἐν ἑρωι. Similarly φαίνειν in Latin. By ἑνω καλῶτα κατ' εὔχην Aristotle implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances.

30 τινὲς τῶν πόλεων} See IV (VII).

14, 15 n. SUSEM. (128 b) εὐνομείσθαι λεγομένων} e.g. by the historical Socrates Xen. Mem. III. 5. 15. IV. 4. 15: Plato Cris. 52 e, Pl-P Mas. 320 1. Add Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 3.

32 ἔστω κἀ̃τα ἐν order to note what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of ingenious speculation at all hazards (as the search for some new form of polity, distinct from these, might seem to imply) but from the
καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἐτι δὲ τὸ ἔξοχον τι παρ’ αὐτὰς ἐτερον μὴ (1) δοκὴ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζων ψυχυμένον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
35 καλὸς ἔχειν ταύτας τάς νῦν ὑπάρχοντις, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην
dοκομένων ἐπιβάλλεται τῷ μέθοδον.
§ 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητοῦ, ἣ περὶ πέρικεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης ἢ
τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντως πάντων κοινοὶ τοὺς
πολίτας, ἢ μηθεῖν, ἢ τινὸς μὲν τινῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηθεῖν
40 κοινοὶνει βαλλόν ὡς αὐτοῦ του (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις
esti, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου τοῦ κοινοῦν. o μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς
45 τῆς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινοὶ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως).
§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον δόσω ἐνδέχεται κοινοῆται, πάντων βελτίων
κοινοὶνει τήν μέλλουσαν οἰκησοῦντα πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν
μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βελτίων, ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ
5 γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινοὶνει τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλίως,
σώστην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ἔκει γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης

33 τί P, omitted by Γ Μ, hence [τί] Susem.1, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐπιβαλλοντ Π Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 πολιτείᾳ Π, πόλις Susem.2|| Ar. (γ) and Γ (η), civesis William || 41 τοῦ τόπου after κοινοῖνει M2Π1 || εἰς τῷ Γ, λείψης Π II
Ar. ||
1261 a 2 ἀλλὰ... 15 αἰρετότερον. Eubulus, in Angelo Maius Script. vet. nov. coll. Vat. Π. p. 671 sqq., attempts to refute this passage || δοσω M2 Ψ Γ ΤB || πόλις omitted by Γ, [πόλις] Susem.1 but see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1363 f. || 6 πλάτωνος πολιτεία M2Π1, πολιτείᾳ του πλάτωνος Q5 U6 Wb L1d Ald.

defectiveness of all schemes hitherto framed that we have undertaken this
investigation.34 σοφίζων = affect wisdom, show one’s cleverness, whence σοφιστής. Elsewhere in the treatise simply ‘to devise,’ § 19, vii(iv). 13, 11, vii(vi). 14, 19.
§ 36 ἐπιβαλλοντεῖν Shillello compares Thuc. vi. 40, Plato Soph. 264 B, Tim. 48 c, Latos x. 892 b, for this sense ‘to take up.’
§ 2 37 ἡ ἡ πέρι πέρικεν] The natural beginning, seeing that every state is a form of association, κοινωνία, i. 1. 1 (Eaton). Susem. (139)
§ 3 38 ἦτοι πάντως πάντων κτῆν] The same alternatives are given IV(vii). § 8
§ 41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not universally true. Mere contiguity of resi-
dence is not enough to constitute citizenship: iii. i § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea of territory in the germ.
§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκησοῦνται Eaton proposes a reflexive sense, ‘direct itself
aiight,’ comparing Thuc. vi. 18 τὴν πόλιν τρέφεσθαι αὐτὴν ἐπὲρ αὐτὴν and other instances.
§ 6 [τί] Ref. iv 423 e f. v 449 c—
466 d. This passage and v(viii). 7, 9 justify the inference that δ Σωκράτης with
the article v(viii). 7, 9, means throughout δ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ, Socrates, the
character in the Platonic dialogue, in keeping with Aristotle’s cautious manner of
referring controversially to contemporary thought. Not directly named, as a
rule, Plato lurks under Socrates (op. nn. 116, 159), as under τῶν, τινῶν ἀρχιτέκτων,
and the like. See Campbell’s apt remarks on similar recitence in Plato, Intro. to
Theatetus p. xxxiv, ed. 2.
c. 2—3 An Examination of Plato’s
Republic.

2 c. 2 Community would not secure
Plato’s end, which is the utmost possible unity. Excessive unification subverts the
city, reducing it to a family or an individ-
ual: §§ 1, 2. The elements of the city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-
The text appears to be a section from a classical Greek text, possibly from Plato or a related philosopher. The paragraph discusses a legal or political concept, possibly related to marriage laws, given the context of the text. The text is written in Greek and contains philosophical discourse, likely discussing the nature of laws and their implications.

The paragraph is not fully translatable without understanding the entire context, but it seems to reference a legal principle concerning marriage and the rights or responsibilities of individuals.
end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain). For ννων in the case supposed, see § 2, 8 § 10, ννον νεόν (on the scheme of Hippodamos) διαν έγχων.

14 διήνοεν = analyse, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: 111. 13 § 6, 14 § 2, De gen. et corr. 1. 1. 1 τάς τε παραδειγμάτων.

§ 2. 16 λαμβάνειν γάρ καθά. Ζ. iv 432 d. f., 433 b. f.; v 449 b. f., 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, “the end is impracticable” in c. 2; then the second, “the means are unsuitable” in cc. 3, 4; §§ 1—13; lastly, “the many other difficulties” in c. 5 §§ 14—28 (Thurrot). Comp. Analysis pp. 103, 103. Susen. (130)

17 μια μᾶλλον = too much of a unity. πληθος γάρ τι. See 5 § 15, 111. 1 § 2, § 13.

22 οusterity...πολέμων. With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, 1. 1. 2 cp. note (2 b) and Intro. p. 23, i.e. with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—24.

The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. Susen. (131)

§ 3. The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the Republic, the ground of Plato’s analogy between the state and the individual.

24 οὕτως...ήμων. Apparently contradicted by 111. 8 § 4, 16 § 5, v (iv), 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ἐμόνων (Kaion). The present statement is repeated 111. 4. 5 where uniformity of moral excellence is dis claimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by N. Eth. v 5. 9, ὁ γὰρ ἐκ διὸς λαράων γίνεται καυχοσία, δῆλα ἐξ λαράω καὶ γεωρ γοῦν, καὶ δλος ἐκεῖνος καὶ οὐκ ἔσωσ ἀλλὰ τούτων δει θεωρήσει. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed Pol. iv (vii) cc. 8, 9. See on 1. 7. § 1 in. (§ 8 b).
25 μαχια καὶ πόλεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ποσὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἕ(1)
tὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βορείας γὰρ χάρων ἡ συμμαχία τέφρω-
κεν), διότι ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείον ἐλεύθερον (διὸσει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὡσ τὰ κατὰ κόμμας ἰδία κεφαλη-
29 σμένω τὸ πλήθος, ἀλλ' οἶνον 'Αρκάδες', ἐξ ἵν ἔδει δὲ 
§ 4 γενέσθαι, εἶδε διαφέρει. διότι πό το ἵσσον τὸ ἀντί
tροφοῦθος

26 τὸ (τὸ P') αὐτὸ P'C'Q'U'T'U' || 27 ἐκλίνῃ ΠΒ', ἐκλίνῃ Μ' || διούν...
'Αρκάδες transposed by Susen. to come before ἀλλ' ἐπέρα 1261 a 2, but wrongly ||
ἐκλίνῃ αὐτὸ P'C'Q'U'T'U' || 28 καὶ πόλεις πόλεις καὶ ? Susen. || 29 δ' ἄλλ'] πάλαι Schneider, [ἄλλ'] Schlösser Garve
|| 'Αρκάδες * * Corning, ἀλλ' <πόν> Riese; but see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1376 ff. and
the Comm. below || 30 γενέσθαι ? Susen. || εἶδε <δὲ> διαφέρει Bücheler (prob-
ably right), εἶδε διαφέρει M'

separate autonomous states, the Laceda-
emonians and their allies, for example, are
25. τὸ μὲν answered by 29 ἵν ὡς ἐδεί. The
one (the alliance for war) will be of advan-
tage from its mere size however much alike in kind, just as (it will be of
advantage) if a weight shall pull more
(than another): i.e. like a heavier weight
which turns the scale. The more mem-
bers the stronger the alliance.

27 διούνῃ κτλ] 'Upon something
similar', the character of the constituents,
whether heterogeneous (so as to allow of
reciprocity) or homogeneous, 'will de-
depend the difference also between a city
and a race, provided the race does not
live with its population separated over
a number of villages, but like the Arca-
dians.' Not observing the parenthesis
and taking ὡσ τὰ κατὰ κόμμας, as epe-
exegetical of τῶν τοιοῦτων the editors
have referred this remark to the process of
συνώνυμος, the change from village life
by which a Greek θέσις was consolidated
into one city. But (1) the Arcadians
must surely be cited as an example of a
race and not (as they would be upon
that view) of a city: (2) this is not a
distinction between θέσις and τόπος univer-
sally, but between one θέσις and another.
(3) We should then expect ὡστε, or
ἀλλ' <πόν> or something equivalent: and
the exact force of the future and of τῶν
tοιοῦτων (not τοιοῦτον) would be missed.
(4) In that case Arcadians means sim-
ply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegetians,
Mantineans and others might equally
claim to belong to the Arcadian league
(τὰ 'Αρκαδεῖαν). Hence Dittenberger, in
Göt. gel. Anzeiger 1874 p. 1381, re-
jects the supposed reference to συνώ-
νυμοσ and takes ὡσ τὰ κατὰ κόμμας as a
limiting clause, which excludes from
the comparison the cases where the people
live κατὰ κόμμας and opposes to the city-
state only such 'races' as the Arcadian.

29 'Αρκάδες Who are meant? The
interpretation of the passage turns upon
this. When Plato, Symp. 193 Α, writes
διούνῃ τὴν ἡμέραν ὡσ τὰς καθ' ἱδίαν ἀρκάδες
ἐκλίνῃ Αλκεδαμίουν the words spaced
show that the Mantineans are meant.
Demonetenes Or. xvi uses 'Αρκάδες nine
times and Megalopolitai seven times of
the same people whose city was entitled
in full μεγάλαι τόποι τῶν 'Αρκαδών.
There everything is clear from the inter-
change of terms. But if the words "when
they live like the Arcadians" indicate an
θέσις so well known as to spare Aristoc-
the further explanation the instance chosen
ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be before
all things perspicuous. Understand then
neither the Mantineans with Schneider,
nor the Megalopolitans with Camerarius,
nor with Gphianus the Maenalians and
Parrhasians in the southwest before the
founding of Megalopolis; none of these
exclusively; but the entire population of
Arcadia, as the word naturally means.
See Note on Arcadia at the end of B. 11.

"Further compare 1. 2 § 4 n. (11), § 6
(710c)." Susen. (132)

ἐξ ἵν ὡς ἐδεί. Whereas (in the case of
the city-state) the elements which must
conceal into one are (? must be, see Crit.
Note) specifically distinct. So that it
would not make a single city, II. 3 § 5,
9 § 9, to join by an external tie such two
similar units as the civic body of Corinth
and that of Megara: the conditions for
reciprocity would be wanting.

§ 4 30 τὸ ἵσσον τὸ ἀντίπροσφορός
Not 'equal retribution' but the propor-
tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in Nic. Eth. v 5 § 6, 1132 b 33 it is ántipænous òtò̀s ántipænous òtò̀s as òtò̀s òtò̀s is the equivalent of ántipænous òtò̀s in the other passage. By a similar instance in Nic. Eth. ix 1 11, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although ἄνωτος ἀκίνετος is to ἄνωτος ἀκίνετος that ἀκίνετος ἀκίνετος is to ἄνωτος ἀκίνετος in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, to ἄνωτος ἀκίνετος. See my notes on Nic. Eth. v 3 § 7.1. J. J. ACKRILL.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, Ethics i. p. 32 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the Ethics are a development and improvement of those in the Politics. The common source may be Plato's ιδίος κίριον, the true πολεμικόν δίκαιον, of Lapis vii 752 b, c: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μείζων πλῆρος τῷ δὴ έξάτων συμμορφομένον νέμει, μέτρα διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκτέργη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμᾶς μείζων μὲν πρὸς άφετην ἢ μέζων πλῆρος.

31 ἐν τοῖς ἦθικοι | Nic. Eth. v 3 3, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given to ántipænous òtò̀s is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal proportion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible: it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (Ν. E. viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state.

Compare further Nic. Eth. ix 1 11, 1163 b 33 with notes (38 c, 565).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—

1. 7. 1 n. (58 b), IV(vii). 8. 4 (797), viii (471), 17 § 2. 1 § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595). § 12 (597—9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also III. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4—7 διέσκευα τῶν ἀνθρώπων are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of dissimilar members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (ἀνάπλεκτη) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eubulus, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From
Π. 2. 6] 1261 a 31—1261 a 39.

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ἐπεί καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἱσοίς ἀνάγκη τούτ' ἐκεῖν' ἀμα (I) ἥρων οὐχὶ οὖν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐναυτὸν ἢ
§ 5 κατὰ τινα ἀλλὰν τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
35 τρόπον τούτον ὅπερ πάντας ἄρχειν, ὅσπερ ἀν εἰ μετέβαλλον
οἱ σκυτεῖν καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ δὲ ὁι αὐτοὶ σκυτουτόμοι
§ 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἢσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ** βέλτιον αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ
8 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δήλον ὅτι τῶς αὐτῶν ἀν ἐδέλτιον
ἀρχεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν' εἰν ὁδὸν δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν

32 ἄμα] ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἱσοίς ἀνάγκη τούτ' ἐκεῖν' ἀμα (I)
§ 33 γαρ] δὲ Π' ἐκ τοῦ Γ' ἤκ] τοῦ Αρ. (probably right)
§ 35 μετέβαλλον Μ' Π' Susen.1-2] § 36 ἀεὶ after of Α'βολ Π''4 C4 Qb Tb
U'' Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P'' (omitted by the 1st hand in P''') § 37 εἰτὲ] εἰκὴ
Bernays, who by omitting with Korasses τά which follows skillfully removes all traces of
the lacuna after εἰτὲ discovered by Conring and Schneider (viz. εἰκὴ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτων
ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κ. τ. πολιτικὴν δῆλον): <οὐχί> οὖν Schlosser—equally wrong;
cp. the Comm.: <βέλτιον εἰν ἐκάστοτε γίνει τοῦτον ἐργον δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πάντα ἄρῃ βέλτιον or something similar Thurot

3 § 3; 4 § 5 ff., § 4; 5 § 11, §§ 14, 15, 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was
well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it
may easily be seen that this does not
affect the soundness of his reasoning
which, as even the language shows, is
directed more especially against Republic
v 461, where Plato is showing how the
abolition of family life would be the
means of making all the citizens of his
ideal state feel as the members of a single
family (cp. n. 140) or even of a single
man (καὶ ἤτα τὰ ἐγγύτατα ἐν τούτοις ἐξελίξαν
αὐτὴ ἅρμα πόλεως διαμειλήται). Is
this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to
prescribe for the state the end of repre-
senting so far as possible an individual
man? "Aristotle's argument is that
unity when applied to the state is an
analogical term, and that Plato's use of it
subverts the very ground of the analogy"
(Eaton). Comp. also Oncken l. 173 f.
SUSEM. (133)

32 τοῦτο] τὸ ἀντιπαράθεσις. There
must needs be reciprocity even amongst
free and equal citizens, as in the ideal
state.

Ἀμα γάρ… 39 ἐναυτοῖς All cannot
rule at once: the only possible alterna-
tives are (a) a perpetual ruling body,
δὲ οἱ καθότατοι (cp. I. 13 § 4) τοὺς αὐτούς
ἄρχειν: (b) alternation or rotation of
functions, μεταβαλλόντων ἄρχειν καὶ ἀνάλλο
κατὰ μέρος (cp. Ι. 1 l 2, ΠΙ. 6 § 9).
Comp. IV (vii). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this
argument recurs.
§ 5 35 ὅστε apparently redundant

after συμβαίνει, as in vi (iv). § 3 συμβαί
νειν ὅτι τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν εἶδον, καὶ so
De Stechi 2 § 5, 437 b 8 ὁ συμβαίνει ὅστε
discut. Similarly with other verbs: Πολ.
viii (v). 9 § 8 ὅστ' ἔχειν αὐτὸν, 
Phys. viii. 6. 2, 256 b 17 ὅστ' ἐδέ
χωσεν ὅστ' εἶδον περι.

§ 6 37 ἐναυτὸν δὲ ] * * * The difficulty is
that, if no lacuna be assumed, oúthe properly
refers to μὴ δὲ αὐτό, and this is
against the sense. To take oúthe = ὁν ἐν
οὐθέν (see c. 1 § 3), with Lambin, ὁν ἐν
οὐθέν, is as forced as to insert oúthe with
Schlosser.

"The sense is satisfied if we supply
something like this: But < as in fact the
work of a carpenter is always done by a
carpenter and never by a shoemaker,
and from the nature of the case each work
is more successful when executed by the
same persons, who make this their sole
business, and as therefore it is better
it should be so political society"...

(Thurot). SUSEM. (134)
is or is not a source of individual advantage. τοῦτο τὸ ἐκεῖνοi—is this yielding of the retiring magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office; μετατίθαι is the counterpart or reflection of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

§ 7 5 ἀνάφερεν ἄρχων οἰκείων as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενομένων δὲ ἄλλως in Nic. Eth. 4. 4. ἄρχοντων] gen. abs., "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τῶν ἀρχηγῶν or 3 ἐν μέρει.


§ 7 ἐκεῖνοi is equally futile. If object, the sentence means "where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality?" If subject, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is "imitated" by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural inequality.

§ 7 5 ἦσσερεν ἄλλοις γενόμενοι as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενομένων δὲ ἄλλως in Nic. Eth. 4. 4. ἄρχοντων] gen. abs., "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τῶν ἀρχηγῶν or 3 ἐν μέρει.
miscellaneous? It is not (1) ‘unanimity’, i.e. community of political principles and aims, the ὣρος of Nic. Eth. IX. 6, 1157 a 23, as appears from c. 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) ‘uniformity’, i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic πόλις. Hence it is not (3) ‘organization’, as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) ‘centralization’. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the πόλις, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior κοινωνίαι which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior κοινωνίαι—for example, χαίρει, φοβοῦμαι, συντραπεζάω, φοβερά, δημοτικά, διασώπησι, Γραμμ. Nicol. Eth. viii. 9 § 4, 1160 a. q. v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior κοινωνίαι, which μέρος ἐκεῖνα τῇ πολιτικῇ σκ. κοινωνίᾳ Nic. Eth. viii. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior κοινωνίαι to the supreme κοινωνία. He thinks, in fact, that the πόλις is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle’s criticisms arise directly from the theory of the πόλις which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of φιλία in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the Nic. Eth."

\[\text{Jackson}\]

§ 8 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνόην ζή- (1) τεν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμειρον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκετέ- ρον ἐνός, πόλις δ’ οἰκίας, καὶ βοῦλεται γ’ ἐνάν τοῦ εἶναι τόλμως, (p. 93) ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλῆθος: εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετῶτερον τὸ αὐταρκεστέρον, καὶ τὸ ἥπτον ἐν τοῦ μᾶλλον αἱρετῶτερον.

§ 8 το ἐνόην is infinitive, 'the endea-
to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the Republic would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (3 §§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato's avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (esprit de corps) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

16 τότε = τὸ μακὸν ὅταν μάλλα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms mine and not-mine.

18 κατὰ τῶν λόγων] with apodeiktis, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of mine and not-mine: ἐὰν πάντες... μὴ ἔσον is explanatory of λόγων. For κατὰ = by, cp. Metaph. Θ. 8 § 14, κατὰ τὴν τούτου τῶν λόγων φαινόντων ὑπερθέντα μνήμην ηθος... 1050 b 3.

19 ὁ Σωκράτης] In Plato's Republic v 452 c: ὡς τὸν δὴ πόλιν πλείστον ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλο κατὰ πάντα τὸν πόλιν λέγομεν τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μακαρίωτα, ἔσομεν ἄρατα διακειμένα. SUSEM. (337)

§ 2 30 ‘All’ has two senses, (1) each individual, pro se quique; (2) the whole body collectively. If ‘all’ is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means (‘proposes to do’).

24 συμβαινόντων] ‘circumstances’: the joys and sorrows of life Rep. 462 E. νῦν δ’ οὖν ἄντικο. But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term ‘all’. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say ‘mine’ in this sense.

26 πάντες [ός ἔκαστος] Another instance in III. 11. 2. Also vii (iv). 4—26 where the distinction is skillfully worked in μονάρχος γάρ ὁ δημος γίνεται, σύνθεσιν εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν ὁ γάρ πολιῶν κύριος εἶναι οὗ ἔσον ἄντικο ἀλλὰ πάντες. § 3 28 τὸ γὰρ πάντας κτλ.] The terms ‘all’, and ‘both’ and ‘odd’ and ‘even’ by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια] See § 27: τὸν (i.e. τὸ ἄρτον) ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὀφράς ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ μερῶν μυθερατοῦ, De Soph. El. 4 § 7, 160 a 35: παρὰ δὲ τῷ διαλέγειν ὅτι τὰ πολύ ἄτικα δὲ καὶ τριάκ, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, τοῦ (fallacious) di-

vision is due the instance, that five is two
and (is) three, odd and even (Eaton).

SUSEM. (130)

Walford and Postgate would take περάτα καὶ ἀρδία to be predicates of πάντες and διάφορα. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of ἀμφότερα, 3+2, and of περάτα. As ἀμφότερα = sum of two things, so περάτα = an odd sum total, ἀρδία = an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits De Soph. El. 10 s 177 b 7, of διήκτων τὸ πάρο διάλεκτον, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as ἄριστος and ἄριστος be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ὑποτικάκες] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider); in Aristotle’s phrase they admit of σύνον and διάλεξιν, illicit combination and disjunction. See De Soph. El. 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀμφότερον καὶ τὸ διάλεκτον πάντων, the words ‘both’ and ‘all’ have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare viu (v). 8: 2: παραλαμμένοι γὰρ ὅτι διάλεξιν ὑπὸ ἀριστον ἄριστος ἀριστοτικὸς λόγος εἰ ἔκαστον μεταβάς, καὶ πάντα (illlicit σύνθεας).

SUSEM. (139)

31 ἀριστεῖν] as ὑπὸ ἕκαστον; ἀριστεῖ] collectively.

δόξαι ὑμονοτικάκες] Since democrats may quarrel, although πάντες μὲν, ὅσοι ὑπὸ ἕκαστον δὲ they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato’s main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say “mine”. § 4 Then comes a sensible practical suggestion. Comp. Tovetti, Intro. to Plato’s Republic p. 166 f., who refers to the statistics of mortality in founding hospitals.

πρὸς δὲ τούτους κτλ] ‘In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care most about their private matters and less for the public concerns.’ The zeal and attention of individual owners are checked and chilled by division of ownership. So with the sons who are a ‘common possession’ of the Guardians.

35 ὑπὸ συμμετέχοντος κτλ] ‘or (only at most) in proportion to their stake in them.’ Since the whole clause answers to μαλακται καὶ ἄρτων, the verb would seem to be impersonal: “as much as it falls to each man’s share” to care. For the impersonal use, see 1. 13 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. VII. 23 μέρος διάλεξιν ἕκαστος ἐπισφάλει: hence Herod. IV. 115 ἀπολαχεῖτο τοῖς χρηματοῖς τὸ ἐπισφάλειον = their due share. Camerarius cites Ptolemy as using the word to express ‘proportional parts’ in astronomical calculations. The same thought recurs 1202 a 3 in the words ὅπως τιγχανεῖ τὸ δρᾶμα μέν ὑπὸ. If the society consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction 1/1000. But such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτλ] ‘Each is more likely to neglect them, amongst other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants it sometimes happens that the work is not so well done by many as by few.’

§ 5 According to Plato’s regulations, Rep. V 457 c—464 b, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes who are full citizens of his ideal state, are to be taken from their mothers directly after
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 3.

§ δοῦτοι τών ἐλαττων. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστῳ χίλια τῶν πολιτῶν νοῦι, καὶ ὦτοι ὄρχ. ὧς ἐκάστου, ἄλλα τῶν τυχόντων ὦ τυχόν ὀμοίως ἄστιν νοῦι. δ' ἀπεὶ πάντες ὁμοίως ὁμαργοσάζονται, ἐπεὶ ὦτοι ἐκάστος ἐμὸς λέγει τοὺς ἐν πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ὡ ἕκαστο, ὁπότως τυχόντων ὅν ἀρμικοῦ ὄν, ὅπον ἔμοι ὦ τοῦ δείων, τούτως

1567 λι ἐπὶ Bücheler, ἀπὸ Ὁ Susem., ἀπ’ Ὁ II Ar. BK. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (Hermes vii. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. lixxv, I somewhat hastily ascribed. If ἀπ’ be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέξεως Ἐ (ὁ) Ar. ἀπὸ Ὁ Susem.1-2 || 3 τῶν ἀρμικῶν Ὁ and the 1st hand in Ὁ 1-3 Qβ (emended by a later hand in Qα), τῶν ἀρμικῶν Ὁ || ὦ ὀμής omitted by Ὁ Ar. || τοῦ δείου Ὁ II Ar. and also probably Γ, λείπει βίας William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: διαργοσάζοντες, κρίτων ἀκρίδεις ἄνεμος ἄνεμος (transposed from 13) ἐνίοτε τῶν ἄντων μόνον προσαγοροσάζοντες, διώξουσας καὶ μυρίων τῶν τριῶν τριῶν νοῦι, ἀπ’ τοῦ τῶν τριῶν νοῦι—λέγων ὄντως καὶ ἐκάστοτα τῶν χλώρων [ὅ] δεικνύομαι ὅπως ἔστω, ὀμοίως ἐκάστος ἐμὸς λέγει ὄντως καὶ ὅπως εἰ ὑπότα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑ ἕκαστο τυχόντων τῶν ἀρμικῶν ὄν, καὶ τοῦτο διάτας (ἐν μέ ἕμοι τοῦ τοῦ δείου) ἄθηναν κτλ.

Birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchild, brothers and sisters. See n. (133). Sus. (140).

§§ 38 χλώρων. Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by ἑρῆν iv 423 A. 'Now each of Plato's children has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is his son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.'

§§ 39 ων ως κακάτου. Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1253 a 1 ἐπεὶ ὄντως κτλ] Almost word for word from ἑρῆν v 463 β. πατὸς ἀνα τέλης μεντα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξωφασάζονται ἐνόσ των ἐ σ ἕκαστο πράττοντος, ὅ

νυνὴ ἐλέγωμε τὸ μήμα, τὸ δέ τὸ ἐμὸν εὐ πράττει ἐ σ τοὶ τὸ ἐμὸν κακάς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression 'it is well with mine' or 'it is ill with mine.' Hence translate: 'As [or if] ἀπ’ be retained, 'Further' each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term 'my son' to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says 'my son' or 'so and so's'; and this 'so and so's' applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists.' To take ἔμοι=my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by νοῦ in the preceding line, 6 τέκνων, 14 υόν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χλώρων νοῦ (b 38) it is the elder generation, the 'fathers', that are meant by τῶν χλώρων ὑ ὀμοίων κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 διαρχίου καὶ μυρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To ωνωρος corresponds ὀμοίως...ων, as τοῦτων τῶν τριῶν τοῦ τοῦ δείου; mine or A's or B's, and so on through all the thousand. When a 'father' uses the term 'my son' in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other 'fathers'.

2 οἴνοι Editors compare Soph. Antig. 515, ὁλίθρη καὶ μεγάλη μη λέγει.
3 οἶνος=I mean.
πολείς οὖσαν. καὶ ταύτα διαφαφέοιν. ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁ συνέβης γεγένε· (π. 26)
§ 6 συνεικονιστὶ καὶ συνεικονιστὶ γεγένετο. καὶ τοὺς πόσους οὕτως 12
κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἐκαστόν, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορευόντα
dις σειρὰς καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεισι
§ 7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγοντοι, δὲ μὲν γὰρ ὑδόν αὐτοῦ δὲ ἀδέλφον αὐτῷ

5 καὶ τὸ ὁμοῦ κτῆσι· Τέκνα, δὲν, διότι διδυμοῦ, διότι διδυμός, 
' And even this he says dubiously, for it is never certain who 
the citizens actually had a son or whose 
son, if born, was reared.' At first sight 
this seems to make against Aristotle; for 
if less than the thousand had sons, the 
fractional interest of each elder citizen, 
or 'father,' in the younger generation is 
increased. But then his chance of being 
childless is proportionately increased.
§ 6 "And yet it is better in this 
fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 
elder citizens to use the term 'mine' (of 
any one), all calling him by the same 
name" viz. son 'or as it is used under 
the present system' with the addition of 
different names, as nephew, cousin, &c.
7 [ἐκαστὸν...8 μηδόν] Of course only 
those citizens are meant whose age 
entitles them to a boy's son and not 'brother,' or 'grandson.' Here τὸ αὐτὸ = son.
SUSEM. (143) With αὐτὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλογοῦτας δὲ πᾶν 
τῶν (Thur.).
8 διασχίζουσα] Is this genitive after 
ἐκαστὸν, as above? Is it not more forcible 
if taken after τὸ αὐτὸ = the same relation? 
Each calls him 'mine,' (which will result in) 
the whole body (plural) calling one 
person the same relation of some 2,000 
people (T. L. Heath).
A different construction of § 6 is proposed by 
Bonitz: viz. to take ἐκαστὸν as the 
object, instead of the subject, of λέ 
γεν, and to make διασχίζω the genitive 
after τὸ αὐτὸ ὑδόνα, which is a correction 
for τὸ αὐτὸ διασχίζων, which is a correction 
for τὸ αὐτὸ διασχίζω. In the same essay
(Heinrich VII pp. 102—8) Bonitz defends 
the ms. reading τὸν (n.s) on the ground 
that a new objection, No. 3, is there 
troduced. The last, No. 2 (§ 4 πρὸς τὸ 
τὸσαι...διασχίζων) dwelt on the 
depreciation which the term 'my father' 
suffers. "The multitude of fathers, whom 
each of the younger men has, is prejudi 
cial and fatal to the loving attention 
which a son otherwise receives from a 
father." In the passage which follows 
(1 τὴν ὄμοι...14 ἐν) "the fact is viewed 
from the opposite side. The name 'my 
son' loses all value, as each one who uses 
it shares the problematic relationship with 
an indefinitely large number." With all 
defence to authority so weighty, it may 
be doubted if the two sides are opposed 
at all events in a 13 (κρείττον γὰρ τοῖς) the 
point of view is the advantage of the 
younger generation no less than in a 1 
(διασχίζων). Comp. Susemihl Quaest. 
Crit. VI p. 16 ff.
§ 7 9 ὁ μὲν ὧν τοῖς] "For one 
and the same person is called by one man 
his own son; by another his own brother, 
or cousin; (by another) according to some 
other kinship either by blood relationship 
or by some connexion and affinity to him 
self in the first instance or else to his kin: 
and furthermore by another his clansman, 
his tribesman. For it is better to be actually 
an own cousin than in Plato's sense a 
son." There is at present a kind of com 
munity in relationship: only it does not 
extend so far and is compatible with dis 
similar individual interests.
"For φίλοις, φίλοις consult the 
following references: § 8 § 17 n. (169), 11 
§ 8 with Exc. IV; II. 3 § 4 (511). 9 § 13
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 3. [Π. 3.7]

10 προσαγαρούνει τόν αυτόν, δ’ ἀνεψιον, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην τινά (I) συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἰματος ἢ κατ’ οἰκείοτητα καὶ θρήνοις αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑπεροὶ φράτορα, φιλέτην. κρείττον γὰρ ἤδην ἀνεψιον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦς τοῦν νοῦν. οὐ μήν ἀλλ’ οὗτος διαφανεῖ δυνατόν τὸ μή τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν εἰναι τῶν πάσης πρὸς τούς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ

§ 8 τῶν τίτεων. διὰ τοῖς ἐτεραι καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὸς τῶν τῶν τῆς γῆς περιοδίου πραγματευομένων εἶναι γὰρ τοῖς τῶν Ἀιδών κοινώς τὰς γυναίκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαμείσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὀμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς καὶ γυναίκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μόνον, οἷον ἤπειροι καὶ βῶσι, αἱ σφοδρὰ πεφυκόντων ὁμοῖα ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς ἴμμοις.

§ 4 εἰς τὸν Ὀσραλὴν κληρεῖσα Δικαία ἤπειρος. ἔτοε δὲ 14

25 καὶ τὰς θαυμάσιας δυσχέρειας οὐ μικρὸν εὐλαβηθήναι τοῖς ταύτῃ κατασκευαζόμοις τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνου [ἀσκονοῦσιν τοὺς δὲ] ἠκουσίους καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιποῖς ὅμων

12 αὐτοῦ—ἀυτῷ Βκ., ἄντω—ἀντῷ ΓΠ || § 9] εἶτα ἡ Susen. || ἑπεροὶ Lindau, ἑτεροὶ ΓΠ Ατ. Βκ., ἑτεροὶ Bernadus, ἑταίροι Spengel || 13 <ἡ> φιλέτην Bas. Βκ., aut contributum William || ἑταίροι <ἡ> φράτορα <ἡ> φιλέτην Schmidt || 27 [ἀσκονοῦσιν τοὺς δὲ] Bender, ἠκουσίους [τοὺς δὲ ἠκουσίους] Congreve; τοὺς δὲ ἠκουσίους omitted by Βκ², which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(ἐκτας); vi.(vi) 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367) II(vi). 4 § 19 (1471), 5 § 9 (1437); vii.(vi) 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1356), 5 § 11 (1364), 8 § 19 (1405)." 

SUSEM. (161) § 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp. Jowett on the Republic p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τῶν πόσων] derive their convictions; so in iv.(vi) 1. 6. § 9 19 τῶν τῆς γῆς τρόπων] Books of travel round the world, as in Rickl. 1. 4. 13 (where see Cope’s exhaustive note), Meteor. 1. 13. 13, I. 5. 14. Such books were also called περιήγκους καὶ περιηγήσεις.

Usually περιηγηθικὰσαν takes πέρας; but once, Rickl. 1. 1. 5, it has πράσα. In Pol. iv.(vi) 14. 8 we have τοὺς δὲ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων περιηγηθηκάσαν, ὡς...

20 τοῖς τῶν ἄνω Διηθέν] See Exc. 1. 1. 4. 236 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also in. 1. 4 n.
intentional homicide is forbidden by the
law of God and of nature in the case of
the nearest blood relations, while under
certain circumstances it is allowed in the
case of strangers. So too outrage, blows,
abuse are all intentional acts. On these
grounds the words bracketed must be
regarded as an interpolation (Bender).

SUSEM. (144)

28 ἀν ἐνάν άγαν] To this Plato
might certainly reply, that where rela-
tionship is abolished, crimes (even if they are
still committed) cannot be aggravated by the
fact of being crimes against relations
(Oncken). SUSEM. (149)

32 λέοντος = expletive. Editors com-
pare Ref. π. 364 ε: ὅν ἂν λέοντας τε καὶ
cαθαρωσις ἀδικήματος δεὶν ὄντως καὶ κα-
δίᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰς μὲν ἕπει διώκων εἰς δὲ
cαὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς δὲ τελεύταις καθοῦς:
Eur. Ομ. 510 φόνου φόνον λέοντα
597 μὲν
ἀκρίβεια οὐκ. Such purifications for homi-
cide were unknown in the Homeric age.
Grote, Hist. Ι. 34, compares Thuc. Ι. 116
—128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κτλ.] “All the editors as-
sume that the words τῶν δὲ μὴ δημιουρ-
whether with or without Schneider’s ad-
dition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γυναικῶν εν-
διέχεται μηδεὶς γίνεσθαι λόγων, as if
Aristotle wished to say ‘it is possible that
no exiption should be made’. He ought
however to say ‘it is not possible that
any exiption should be made’. Hence
I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ, <οὔ> δημιουρ.
JACKSON.

§§ 2, 3 ἄτοπον δὲ κτλ.] Ref. Π. 403
2: ὁποδ’ ἄρα προσωπεῖν μακρόν
οὐδὲ ἐνενεῖν ἄκολουθε τῷ ἔρωτι
ἐπιστ. 3: ἀρέστην ἄρα ἑτέρῃ (οὐκ ἔτη τὰ ἀφοροδίασ) οὐδὲ ἀνωνύματος
αὐτῆς ἐρωτεύεται τὰ καὶ παθηκών ὀρθῶν ἐρωτῷ τε καὶ ἱσχύοντος...
وط يه، وظ اه، نوتو-
νυثاقس إل يل اكتومئ تنده فیلیت
مئ كا وینیئا كا آتیئیل اوبتیر

15—2
35 σεις τὸς ἀλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν (1) ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφὸν, ἀπει καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν § 3 μοῦνον. ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὴν συνοπτὶν ἀδελφῶν διὰ ἄλλην (p. 27) μὲν αἰτίαν μορφῆναν, ὡς λαῖν δὲ ἱσχυρότερη τῆς ἡδονῆς γνω- 
µένης· ὅτι δ' ὧ μὲν πατὴρ ἡ γυναῖκα, ὡς δ' ἀδελφῷ ἀδήλλαν, 
§ 4 μὴ δὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔνοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γυναικεῖ 
41 εἶναι χρήσεων τὸ κοινὸς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖς 
τῶν παῖς ἂς ὑπὸ τοῖς φιλαξίων ὑπὸν γαρ ἦσται φίλα κοινῶν ὀντών 
τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναῖκων, δὲ στὸ τούτων εἶναι τὸν ἀρ-
χιµένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ γνωτερεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ δὲ 18 
§ 5 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούπαντιν διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὅν προς-
5 ἦκε τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίως γίνεσθαι, καὶ δὲ ἢν 
αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης ὡς οἶτε τινὰ τὰ ἔργα τὰ περὶ τὰ τέ- 
§ 6 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. φιλίαν τῇ γαρ οἰομεθα μέγιστον 
eἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεισιν (ὡς ὧς γὰρ ἦν ἡ ἑκκατο-
ζουν), καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεὶ μᾶλθος ὁ Σω-

35 εἴδω omitted by Μ and Π1 (1st hand, supplied by Π) || 40 ένοικε...b 3 συνε-
προπλέως Throt transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κοινωνίαν, Susem. to follow 1263 b 24 πολιτευόμενον, Introduct. 79 || d£ ΓΠ Βκ., d£ Susem.; the alteration stands or falls with the transposition 1263 b 4 συμβαίνει P4 T5 U6 and Q5 (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 οἴ-
τως omitted by Μ + Π6 || 7 τε omitted by Μ + Π6, quidem William, but nothing can be inferred from this with regard to Γ

V 457 c—461 E. See Zeller’s Plato p. 455, 477—8; Susemihl Plat. Phil. II 170. 
Susem. (147) χρήσεως = endearments.
35 ἃς πατρὶ...ἀπρεπέστατον) But the words ὁπερ ὑπὸ, ἱπ. π73 403 b, do not bear this implication. Plato permits to the ὁρθὸς ἄρα only such familiarities as would be unimpeachable as between father and son.
36 καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μοῦνον (ἀπρεPETHad Stand στ) according to Greek ideas. Such power lay in a ‘little word’ to extinguish the fiercest passions, Laws VIII 838 b.
§ 3 37 δ' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μορφ-
µεν] True there is no other reason assigned, but there may well be irony under the terms ἑκκατοζουν and ἀπερακάλα (see the quotation n. 146); especially when viewed in connexion with the noble conception of Socrates’ moral character and the language of gallantry at the same time put into his lips by Plato. See Appendix I to Dr. Thompson’s Phaedrus, esp. pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-
figure and etherealize gross passion was pitched in too exalted a strain of romanticism. Plato himself renounced it afterwards. His matter-of-fact disciple simply ignores it.
§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a later marginal note by the author.
§ 5 (1263 b 3 δέως δέ) Comp. 1. 6. 5 n. “Such a law must bring about the very opposite to that which ought to be the result of well-framed laws and to that which was Socrates' own reason (c. 2, § 1) for thinking that the institutions regarding women and children ought to be thus ordered.”

This criticism seems unfair. Such private friendships and affections as Aristotle is thinking of do not, according to Plato, promote concord in the state generally, but rather divers men’s attention from the whole community into private channels, and by creating private interests tend to selfishness and disunion. So the Spartan love of domesticity is censured; ῬΠ, VIII 548 Α, Β.
ιο θλάτης, δι καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησὶ τῆς φιλίας ἔργον,(1) καθώσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἱσαμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὁς τῶν ἐρωτικῶν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπειδήμοτον συμφιτεύει καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων [ἀμφοτέρους] ἕναν.

§ 7 ἑνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγεται ἀμφοτέροις ἐφθάσατε ἕν τῶν ἔνα, ἐν 15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχῃ γίνεσθαι δια τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγει τὸν ἔμον ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατέρα ἡ πατέρα νῦν. ὃσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν ἰλικεύομεν εἰς πολὺ ἔνδορ μικρὴν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κράσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν ὁλικευτήτα τὴν πρὸς ἅλλους τὴν ἄπο τῶν ὑπομα-

13 συμφθάναι P³ Q³ τ' U³ Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμφυαίνει P⁴ (1st hand), συμφυαίνει P⁴ (corr.) || [ἀμφοτέρους] Congreve || 14. εἰ τὸν ἐνα Conring, εἰ τὸν ἐνα συμβαίνει? Susem., εἰ τὸν ἐνα Tyttrall || 19 καὶ καὶ Lambin, καὶ συμβαίνει Koraes in his Commentary; καὶ συμβαίνει Bernays independently, but hesitatingly, Vahlen (Ztschr. f. d. ostr. Gymn. xxiii. 1872. p. 539), but Bernays makes ἀναγκαῖον δό (omitting the comma before διαφοροῖσιν) depend on συμβαίνει, while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly preferable to that proposed for διαφοροῖσιν (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly judges, not absolutely necessary: either ἀναίσθητον ὠνίᾳ can be supplied with Vahlen, or the acc. τὴν ὁλικευτήτα καὶ taken as the object of διαφοροῖσιν, with Congreve and Susem.; then ἀναγκαῖον δό is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bender (partly anticipated by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον δό καὶ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ Spengel

§ 6 10 φιλαίσι] Cp. vi(iv). π. 7: ἡ γὰρ καταφυγῇ ὁμιλεῖν. SUSEM.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λέγεις Plato Symposium 192 c sq., comp. 191 A. Hug in p. 9 of his edition of that dialogue considers ἐρωτικὸς λόγος to be another title for the Symposium; but this could only be allowed if the text read “Plato in the discourses on love” whereas it is “Aristophanes in the discourses on love,” and there is nothing to hinder our supplying “contained in Plato’s Symposium.” Moreover Plato’s own theory of love in its fulness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is “seeking the other half of ourselves” 205 d; cp. 212 c. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato’s Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the Symposium. SUSEM. (189)

12 ὡς τῶν ἐρωτικῶν καὶ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of δόθη or accusative and infinitive.

§ 7 14 ἑνταῦθα καὶ] “In this case either both will be spoiled, or at least the one absorbed in the other.” 15 ἑκατεροῖς watery, i.e. diluted | unmixed, ἑκατεροῖς Aesch. Agam. 770 ἑκατεροῖς φιλοτέται Poetics 7 § 13, 146 b 7 ὑπάρχῃ μικρῶν, a tame spin-out plot.

10 ἀξιότα λέγειν least likely to apply the term ‘mine’: § 5. Owing to a chaste spirit de corps they would take little pains to assert the relationship. “Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the ‘diluted friendship’ pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections between individuals he wishes to discourage; the unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out.” (Grote III. 220 n.)

§ 8 18 οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν ὁλικευτήτα] ‘So too is it in the end with the mutual affection implied in these names’: συμβαίνει sc. ἀναίσθητον ὠνίᾳ,
The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern ἄκοιννιστα by διαφοροτίζειν; so that either ἡ πατέρα καὶ is the subject of διαφοροτίζειν, as Congreve and Susemihl think, or as Ridgeway Transl. II. 132 proposes ἡ πατέρα καὶ is to be regarded as exegetic of the wider term ἄκοιννιστα. He translates: ‘so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato’s least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names’ (of father and son).

21 πατέρα ὡς νιόν καὶ: ‘that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another.’ Ridgeway aptly compares VIII(V). 11. 21 τουτε ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων. Metaph. m. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 τῶν ὡς γένους εὐδόκει, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see Critical Notes.

§ 9 23 τὸ ἄγαστρον has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique; μόνον (Eaton, quoting Odyssey II. 365 πολύν ἢ οὐκ ἄγαστρον); and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. Susem.

See Copie’s note on Rhet. 1. 7. 41: καὶ τὸ ἄγαστρον (μετὰ ἀγαθόν ἐστι), καὶ τοῖς μῶν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ’ ἄλλων, where it must have the second meaning, as ἄνισε in Catullus 6. 215.

§ 4 1263 a 40 ἄραργος Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato’s ideal state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολέμων πλῆθος of 5 § 12, all who are neither ἀρχιστέροι nor ἐπίκουροι; properly including (§ 9) τεχνικά and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See 5 § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle’s fears: see 5 §§ 19, 20, 23.

41 χρήσιμον Comp. VIII(V). 11. 15 (Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—9 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligences of Aristotle’s style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before. Comp. n. (164) on § 14.

Susem. (149) 1263 b 2 τουτοίσιν ὡς ἄγαστρον: cp. 1. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether disclaim such a policy; see Keph. 410-7, 463 n. See n. on 5 § 30, 1264 a 27. § 9 25 περὶ τῶν μεταφέρειν In Plato’s ideal state, as children of the Guardians grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,
26 τῶν γυναίκων καὶ τεχνών ἐξ τούς φύλακας, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ἐκείνων, πολλὴν ἦν ἡ ἀραχή, τίνα ἦστε τρόπον καὶ γνώσεις ἀναγκαίων τῶν διδάκτων καὶ μεταφέρονται (p. 28).

§ 10 τίς τίνας διδάσκοις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τούτων ἀναγκαίων συμβαίνειν, οἷς ἄξιοι ἐρωτάται φόνον. οὐ γὰρ ἐτί προσαγορεύονται ἀδελφοὶ καὶ ἱκτίκα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας οἱ τε ἐξ ἐως τοὺς ἄλλους πολύτατος ἐδοθέντες τοὺς φύλακας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοὺς φύλακας τοὺς ἄλλους πολύτατος, ὅστε εὐλαμβάνει τῶν τοιούτων τοις πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγκέντρων. 5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τα ἱκτίκα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας τῆς κοινωνίας διορίσθαι τοῦ τρόπου τοῦτον ἐχόμενον ἐκ τούτων ἐτίνι ἐπιστεύεθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δὲ ἑαυτοῖς κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μᾶλλον πολιτεύεσθαι

28 <ἀρ> γυναίκων Bernays, perhaps rightly; 31 προσαγορεύοντον Koraias; 32 τῶν φύλακας before of the II Bk.; omitted by MIP. 33 φύλαξ I, φύλαξ ἑις p' II Ar. Bk.

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See Republic 311 415 b; IV 423 c. SUSEM. (150)

27 πολλὴν ὑὲν ἐραχὴν Schlosser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSEM. (151)

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, Rep. 423 c, Tim. 10 a (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἐις τὴν ἄλλην λαβῆνα διαδοτῶν τὰλα, ἐσπαρομένων δὲ συνουσίας δὲ τῶν ἄξιων πάλιν ἀπέαντα διὰ τὸν πάρα σφέτερον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν τῶν ἐπαινότων χώραν μεταλλάσσεσθαι), and that other regulation about exposure Rep. η 460 C (τὰ δὲ τῶν χείρων, καὶ ἐὰν τὰ τῶν ἐξέπεμπαν αὐτοκρότους γίγνεται, εἰ διεφθάνῃ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατασκευάζεσθαι).

28 καὶ γυναίκες κτλ. But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSEM. (152)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-

union would follow the recognition of the facts.

29 τίς τίνος διδάσκει. This clause depends on γυναίκας.

§ 10 πάλαι = above, §§ 1-3. So in III. 14 14 τῶν πάλαι λόγον, VIII(v), 11. 24. Obviously Aristotle shrinks with horror (as we should) from these crimes against blood relations: but there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, “that serious mischief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation.”

34 ἡταναλαμβάνομένον “as so as to be on their guard,” as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.

c. 5 Objections to community of property: §§ 1-13. See Analysis p. 103.

§ 1 27 τίνα τρόπον δὲ κτλ. This issue is not decided in what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 5-8 excludes the first and third of these alternatives in their application to all the land, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, IV(vii), 10-11 n. (834), we perceive that even the second suggestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle’s view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory, whereas Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato’s Callipolis the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and so far they
have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See Rep. II. 416 C, IV. 419, V. 494 C, and comp. Zeller's Plato p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. n. (106) and 1. 13-9 n. (116). Thus, as Oncken 1. 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical flat, while Aristotle B. 1 c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between that that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families: whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term without settled and independent housekeeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see Introd. p. 27. Susem. (153).
public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common. Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill Pol. Ec. ii. c. 1 calls thorough-going communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier. ζητήθη, plots of ground, farmsteads, like οικόσπιον, emphasizing the site of the property.

4 ἐνα] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum VII(VI). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and ἔθνη, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his Νόμωμα or Νόμωμα βαρβαρομετροθριασμόντων; cp. IV(VII). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most appropriate references are from Diodorus V. 44, of the Vaceaeans, a Celtiberian tribe: v. 9, of the exiled Cnidians and Rhodians who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari): v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Nearchus in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain συνύμωμα. 7 τίνες] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glaris) and amongst the village communities (dessas) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (Bell. Gall. VI. 29). Strabo VIII. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Diod. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: Maine Village Communities p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Lavrelye's Primitiva Property: see pp. 109, 145 ff. (of the English trans. by Marriott). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. "They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together: and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household: i.e. something analogous to συνύμωμα; L. H. Morgan Anc. Society pp. 187, 200 ff., 235—238. § 8 οὐκόνως] a distinct body, αὐτῶν = the citizens themselves; αὐτών αὐτοίς διαδίδοον = when they are αὐτοί γιοι, Thucyd. i. 125.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the γεωργοὶ and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Oncken).سعسم. (154) 10 τὰ περὶ ταῖς κτήσεις is nomin., the subject of ἄν διαφέρουν and not the object of διαφόρονται. 11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do." This is the standing difficulty of communistic schemes, see Mill Pol. Econ. ii. 1 § 3.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γυμνομένου ἄσων ἀνθρώπων ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ἑπικήρουσιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀποκλείοντας μὲν ἤ λαμβανονεῖ. 
§ 4 πλείω δὲ ποιοῦσιν, ἤλθος δὲ τὸ συζήν καὶ κοινωνεῖ τῶν ἁλλ' ἐργατικῶν πάντων χαλεπῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδημῶν κοινωνίας σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφέρομενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν πολλ' καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούσεων ἀλλήλους. ἐτεῖ δὲ τῶν θεραπευτών τούτων μάλιστα (p. 99) ἐπάνω καὶ ἐπικοινωνεῖ ἐθεσει καὶ τάξει νόμων ὑποκλίσειν, οὐ μὴν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀμφιθετῶν ἀγαθὸν.

§ 25 λέγον τὸ δὲ ἀμφιθετῶν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινεῖ ἐν τῷ κτήμιν

12 ἀλλ' ἀλοεν omitted by T 2. 3 Q 2 T b U b Ar. Ald. Bk. and P 4 (1st hand; added in the margin) || 13 [ὁ λαμβανόμενος] Congreve, μὲν ἢ λαμβανόμενοι omitted by U b Ald. || 18 διαφέρομενοι Kones || προσκρούσεωι for προσκρούσεως Congreve || 20 χρώμοια P 4 || 22 νῦν after τρόπον ἦσα P 4 || 23 καλ after ἦσα omitted by P 4 || ἠθεσι P 5 Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖ governs τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων: “to share in all relations of human life, especially such as affect property.”

17 συναποδημῶν N. Eth. viii. 9
§§ 4, 5; συμπαραφθοῦσα γὰρ ἐμεῖς συμφέροντ' καὶ πολλοὶ πάντες τί τῶν eis τόν βίον. 18 διαφέρομενοι. προσκρούσεως Participipal construction with ellipsis of copula, as perhaps in 1. 5. 9 ἀσθενεύει. τῶν ἐν ποιεῖ things near at hand, immediately before us: Herod. iii. 79: ἔτεκον τῶν μάχαιρα πάντα τούτη τῶν ἐν ποιεῖ γεγονομένων. προσκρούσεως Comp. N. Eth. ix. 4
§ 1, τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκροκοσμοῦσίν = friends who have broken with each other. 20 τὰς δὲ τὰς ἐγκελίδους for the daily round of services. Cp. i. 9, 9 (Eaton), also ii. 9, 9 n. 291. Susen. (106)
§ 5 22 ἄλλας τοιαύτας Aristotle never urges (1) that communism will diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2) that it will relax the checks on an increase of population. The Hellenic idea of the omnipotence of the state precluded these objections. The conclusion at which he arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill Pol. Ec. 1. 18: 138: “We must compare communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country.”

δὲ νῦν τρόπον κτλ] δὲ τρόπον νῦν ἦσα with the expositive ἐπικοινωνεῖν κτλ, the subject of ἀλλήλοις: “the order of things at present existing if improved by good manners and the enactment of wise laws would be far superior”: θεσι, somewhat wider than morality, see § 153; ways, habits, instincts.

“This is in reality not so much proved as stated; still it is not laid down simply on the strength of § 4. Oncken 1. 184 goes decidedly too far in saying the attacks on community of property lack all precision and point, and that the doctrine is not refuted on its own merits like the community of families. He fails to notice what is pointed out by Zeller Platon. Studies p. 289 that the words of § 6—“all will thrive better under a system of private property because then each one labours assiduously for his own advantage”—apply to property exactly the same argument which was used with most effect to refute on its own grounds community of wives and children and was for that reason twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n. (149).” Susen. (106)
In general, almost like ἀπλός, comp. Ἰ. 9. 4. VIII(v). 1 § 3. 1 § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τὰ as here to πῶς.

The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction: the article implies ‘those grounds of complaint specified above.’ Each will set about his own, e.g. the cultivation of land.

Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, ἐν all that relates to use friends go shares in property.

Giphanius observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely introduced here because Plato (ἐπ. iv 424 Α) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misconstrues it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted it, the former restores it to its original sense. See Zeller’s Pre-Socratic I. p. 345 n. 2. Eng. tr. Susen. (156 b)

See the commendation passed on the Tarentines, VIII(v). 5. 10. Susen. (137)

prescribed, laid down as a rule to follow. Often in Plato, Eton refers to Ἐπὶ v 734 E, ὑπαγομένος πολιτείᾳ ὑπογραφῆς, Protag. 326 D ἢ πόλις ὑπαγομένων ὑπογραφῆς; add Ἐρμ. 424 A, 449 C.

In implying that.

τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ either is or might become.

Here even Aristotle’s political theory has a certain dash of socialism; only in the main he stops short of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go far beyond them. It is also justly observed by Oncken I. 183, that in general wherever, as was the case in Greece, the freemen are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling caste as a whole stands in a certain communistic relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further n. (166).

Susen. (158)

See the main the same facts, first, as to slaves and helots; and as to horses, with the more precise limitation that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he sees a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully unharmed. As to dogs, he still more definitely restricts this usage to the chase. Those who require the dogs invite their owner to go hunting; while he, if he has not the time, readily sends them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about produce growing in the fields: what he does say is that after a meal in the country people left the remainder of the food they had prepared in store-chambers: others, detained while hunting and in need of food, might, if they had no provisions with them, break the seals of these store-chambers and take what they required, leaving the rest behind and replacing the seal. Susen. (159)
§ 8 δεθησάτων ἐφοδιασ, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερῶν (Π) τούνων ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἒδαι τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς· ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτο εἶργον ἔδωκαν ἐπίτηδε. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἑδικαῖς ἀμιδρητὸν ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ιδιον τι. μη γάρ οὖ μᾶτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχεις φιλίαν ἔκαστος, ἀλλὰ ἔστι τοιοῦτο φυσικόν.
§ 9 τὸ δὲ φιλαντον εἶναι ψεύδεται δικαιῶς· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μάλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήσματον, ἐπεὶ φιλεῖν γε παντὸς ὁς εἰπώς ἐκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρισταθεῖ καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλως ἢ ξένως ἢ ἐταῖρος ἢδικον· ὑπερετά τῆς κτήσεως ἕδαι οὐσις.
§ 10 κτήσεως ἕδαι οὐσίας· τινὰ τὰ δὲ [οὐ] συμβαίνει τοῖς Λιαν ἐν ὑπογνοιὰ τὴν τοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναφεύγει ἐργα δυνῶν ἀρετῶν φανερῶς, σοφοροσύνης μὲν [τὸ] περὶ ταῖς γυναικαῖς.
in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic 'community of wives' being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true: but then neither is this the point of Aristotle's objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato's state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, *σωφροσύνη*. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual's moral freedom. Further, see n. (266 b). *SUSEM.* (162)

10 ἔργων καλῶν

Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a 'moral action' (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἑαυτοῦ), with that peculiar implication of 'nobleness' which runs through the Nic. *Ethics.*

12 πράξεως ἐλευθερίων] for which private property, *e.g.* money, is required. Comp. Nic. *Eth. x.* 8. 4 τοῦ μὲν ἐλευθερούσα τοίμα ἐρμοῦρον πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξειν τὰ ἐλευθερία; ib. § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίνι δὲ δίδουσιν; ἄντων δ᾽ εἶ καὶ ἐσται αὐτοῦ νόμιμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

13 τὰ τῆς γὰρ χρήσεως...ἐργά πρὸς] for the use of one's possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero's *ius virtutis*, Acad. *post.* 1. 38 is analogous to ἔργων in this sense.

15 την νομοθεσίαν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἃν εἰναι δόξεων ἢ γὰρ ἀκρόφονος ἀσμένος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἐσεθαί φιλίνα τινά θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς ἄντιπασ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορή τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶς ὡς γινομένως διά τὸ μη κοινὰ νῦν εἰναι τήν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκη τις πρὸς ἄλλης περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ θεωδομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλούσιον ἥκολοκείας, ὃν οὐκ ἔχεται διὰ τήν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλα τῶν ἀλλήλων την νομοθεσίαν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος. ἴνα τούτου πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθερίαν την ἄκοινων ἄλλατιν καὶ ψυχομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλούσιον ἥκολοκείας, ὃν οὐκ ἔχεται διὰ τήν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλα τῶν ἀλλήλων την νομοθεσίαν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος. ἴνα τούτου πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθερίαν την ἄκοινων ἄλλατιν καὶ ψυχομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλούσιον ἥκολοκείας, ὃν οὐκ ἔχεται διὰ τήν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλα τῶν ἀλλήλων 

11 Εὐχεθκόσπητα Π¹, Εὐχεθκόσπητα Μ¹ || τὸ after δὲ omitted by Π¹, τῷ Bernays 

13 τῆς after ψῆρ W⁰ Ald. Bk. and perhaps Q⁰ || 15 ἄν after εἰναι δόξεων Μ⁰ P¹ || 17 τινὰ (τινὰ M¹) before φιλίνα Μ⁰ P¹
δια την μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι-
νωνύματα πολλὰ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὀρθῶν ἡ τοὺς χρησ-
25 τὰς οὕτως ἔχουσας ἀλλὰ διερόμενης ὀλύγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-
nωνυμων διαφερομένων πρὸς πολλὰς συμβάλλοντας τοῖς κεκτη-
§ 13 μένουσι ἑκά τῶν κτήσεως. ἦτο γὰρ καὶ μᾶλλον λέγεις
ὸςων στερεόσυναι κακῶν κοινωνίσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀργῶν
ἀκαθώνοννα φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι πάμπνα ἅδυνατον ὁ βιος.
30 αἰτίων δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρῆ νομίζεις
§ 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὕτως ὀρθῶν, δει μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πολὺς
καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλειν, ἀλλὰ οὐ πάντη. ἦστε μὲν γὰρ οὐ
οὐκ ἄσται προϊόντα πόλεις, ἦστι δ᾽ ὧς ἄσται μὲν, ἐφ᾽ ὧς οὖν
τὸν μὴ πόλης εἶναι χειρῶν πόλεις, ἄστερ καὶ εἰ τῇ τὴν
35 συμφωνίαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρων ἢ τῶν ῥυθμῶν βέατοι μίαν.

25 τοὺς] τῶν P3 Q8W8 αὐτ. || 32 πάντως P1 II Bk. || ἄσται M' and P1 (1st
hand) || 33 Valford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow ἄσται
μὲν || 34 ἄσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem1,2, edit William

23 ἄσται καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτῆλ] "Since we
see just those people who are joint
owners and who share property quarrelling
far more than those who have their
estates separate." Are these the εἰσαγω-
γίσμα of § 4? Or is the reference to
commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ διερόμενον κτῆλ] The cases of
quarrels seem to arise out of partnerships
are few, it is true; but then we compare
with them the large number of those who
have separate possessions.

§ 13 ἄσταντος] Compare Grote
III. pp. 217—222. "This supposed
impossibility is the mode of expressing
strong disapprobation and repugnance.
Plato's project contradicts sentiments con-
ceived as fundamental and consecrated:
the reasons offered to prove it impossible
are principally founded upon the very
sentiment adverted to. The truly for-
cible objection is the sentiment itself.
Plato impugns it and declares it to be
inapplicable to his guardians: amongst
whom he conceives, a totally different
sentiment of obligation would grow up.
Similarly "if Spara had never been
actually established and if Aristocles had
read a description of it as a mere project,
he would probably have pronounced it
impracticable."

30 παρακρούσεως] "fallacy" as in
De Seph. El. 17 § 3, 175 b 11, Demosth.
c. Τιτωνι. § 104, 760 c 27 φασικήσεως καὶ
παρακρούσεως ἄπεικα.

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτῆλ] the incorrect-
ness of his first principle: see 2 § 2.
Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who
from Aristotle's own admissions (vIII).
1. 4. ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρῆ ὑμῖς οὐκέταν οὗτοι
τῶν εἰς τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς
πόλεως μόρον γὰρ ἐκαστοι τῆς πόλεως,
and 1. 4. 5 τὸ γὰρ μέρος ὡς μόρον
ἄλλον ἐστὶ μέρος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοι,
argues that "the broad principle is com-
mon to him with Plato," though "each
has his own way of applying it."

General Objections to the scheme of

§ 14. Here too it would have been as
well to state that these remarks are nothing
new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although
as new points arise out of them (see Ana-
lysis p. 104) there is much greater justifi-
cation than there was in the case of c. 3
§§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8: cp. M. (149).
Susem. (164)

33 προιούσα] advancing (to a certain
degree of unity), "if its unity be carried
far" explained by γινομένα μία μᾶλλον
in 2 § 2.

34 ὀστερον καὶν κτῆλ] "as if one were
to turn the concord of parts into unison,
or the rhythm into a single step." See
Probl. xix. 38 § 3, 921 a 2, συμφωνία κραύ-
γει ἀκή τοῦ λόγου ἐχώνων ἐναντίον τριῶν
ἄλλων.

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices
singing one part with the instruments
playing another: cp. Probl. xix. 39,
Chappell History of Music pp. 11 f., 16. Whereas in διορθωμα one or more sets of voices or instruments give the same notes. Similarly ροθυμος, \\ της κυριωτερης τατας (Pl. Lysis II 66b 4), is the orderly succession of steps in dancing or notes of music of certain definite lengths. The unit or element of which long successions of 'times' are composed is βατεσ, 'step' in dancing, 'foot' in metre. This is clear from Metabr. xiv (N) i. 10, 1087 b 33, το βδ εν ὧν μέγας συγαλος, φανερος, και ἐν παντὶ ἐστι τι ἐτερον υποχειμενον, οἷον ἐν ἀρμονιε βιοσι (in music a quarter-tone, the smallest interval), ἐν δὲ μεγαλε δικυλιον ἢ τοιοῦ ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ ρωθυμοὶ βατεσ ἢ συλλαβη. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of βατας, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat.

§15 36 προτερον] §§5—8. SUSEM. (165)

37 κοινην ποιεω] widen it so that all shall share in it.

τοις γα μελλωντα παιδειαν κτλ] Comp. 7 § 8 n. (158), and below §§18, 19. SUSEM. (165b)

39 τοις τοιοοτοισι = such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 θεος, φιλοσοφος, υψοις] Comp. φοεις, θεος, λογος of IV(vii). 13. 11 n. (687). SUSEM. (166)

φιλοσοφια] in the wider sense, 'culture' as in §7 7a. So Rhet. ii. 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Alkidamas. An approximation to Isocrates' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τα περι τας κτησεις] Aristotle's fondness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7, n. (158)—is here seen in a new direction, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. (341). 10 §§ 7, 8, IV(vii). 10 §§ 9, 10 and notes. Compare further notes 168, 192, 208—11, 234, 236 b. SUSEM. (166)

§16 1264 a 3 ουκ αν ην ηβαθεν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the doctrines he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or wide-spread beliefs. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Grote rejoins that the same objection (like the objection of impossibility) would apply to the novelties in his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a communist state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4 ου συνηκται] have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοις δ' ου χρωνται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (§ 21 n.), has always existed and always will exist Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for innumerable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less
extent everything has existed before, and
there is nothing new under the sun: all
discoveries have been already made and
then lost again, so they need to be
rediscovered. See Zeller II 772. Comp.
Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Philol. vol. II.
818). Plato however would have had
all the more right to reply to this objec-
tion that he himself has but made such a
rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes,
he has only followed Aristotle's advice
and collected institutions hitherto widely
scattered: that his innovation consists
solely in this combination of old material,
as all the elements of his ideal state were
to be found previously isolated, some in
Sparta and Crete, others amongst the
Pythagoreans, and others again in So-
Susem. (187)

This view found a strong expres-
sion from K. F. Hermann The histori-
cal elements of Plato's ideal of a state, in Ganam.
Abhandl. VII. 140; "Plato has drawn
every single feature in his picture of the
state from the actual political life of
Greece; he has but applied the abstrac-
tions of science to produce a formal and
harmonious combination." It is at least
obvious that the Spartan ἀγωγή is, in a
manner, the true starting-point of Plato,
as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote II.
209–211); but some caution should be
exercised in the choice of precedents.
Thus L. H. Morgan Ancient Society p.
417 conjectures that the system of rela-
tionship propounded in Rep. v 461 D,
Tim. 18 C, D was derived from "tradi-
tions not known to us"; and Curtius
(History of Greece 1 p. 181 Eng. trans.)
that the three orders of society Rep. IV
were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):—
two features of the scheme which bear in
a high degree the stamp of originality.

§ 17 §§ 5 τοῖς ἐργαῖς11 "actually in process
of formation." The plural is used as
well as the singular ἑργα, with or without
the article, in prose or poetry.
§ 18 εἰς συστήματα See n. (166). That
Plato too intended this, was shown in n.
(153) on § 1. From the expression here
and in § 15 we might be led to believe
that this was not the case. Comp. § 19 n.
(170), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184); 6

ϕατρίας] The form ϕατρία (as in
Aeschines II § 147), not ϕατρία, is sup-
ported by the Corpus Inscrip. Att. II. No.
509. 11 with Köhler's remark; Philippi
Contributions to a history of the Athenian
citizenship (Beiträge n. 5 th. Berlin 1879)
p. 177 nn. 55, 56; Bürmann Three
Studies in Attic Law in Jahrb. f. Phil.
Suppl. IX. p. 615. At the same time ϕο
is often written in the cursive ms. with a
small hook to ϕ, so that ϕ and ϕο can
hardly be distinguished with certainty
from one another. In such a case there-
fore it may be advisable to depart from
the one safe principle of following the
oldest manuscript authority and to retain
the only rational form ϕο even against
the codices. Comp. § 6 n. (141). Su-
sem. (189)

11 τοις ἐργαῖς Here again, as so often
in these chapters and elsewhere, ϕον does
not mean 'at the present time' but 'act-
ually', and τοῖς εἴκοσιον is but a
limiting expression for τοῖς ἐργαῖς.

§ 18 §§ 11 ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἁλίας πολιτείας
κτλ.] has never explained what is the
nature of the entire polity which (these)
members of the community share. Yet
the bulk of the state is made up in effect
by the bulk of citizens other than the
guardians." For οἱ δὲ διαὶ τοῖς, see
§ 20, and n. on § 4.
eispein. kai tois xheido tou ge plevelos tis poleos to ton ale- (II)
lon poluton ginetai plevelos, perie avon oudein diworistai, pote-
tovon kal tois genrophi koinia elnav dei tais kiteswes 
 kal' ekaston idias, eti de kai gunaikeia kai paideia idious
§19 'h koinia, ei mev gar ton auton tropsou koina panata pan-
ton, ti dioisounoi oustoi ekeinouw ton phulakov; h ti plieon
tou fupomeinous ex tis arxih auton; h ti paibontes upomeunoun
20 stin arxihn, elan h ti sofizeantas touxoton olon Krhites;
Ekeinon gar tappa tauta ton doulos efentes mwnon hph-
§20 rikasan tis gynaiaks kai tis ton othlon kthsin, ein de, ka-

15 kal after h untranslated by William and Ar. II 16 kal after de omitted by
ΠI 19 drchouei or something similar, in the place of upomeouw, Lambin
and Thurot: Bernays omits 18 ti plieon, drchih with Ar. and transposes
auton to follow 20 drchih 21 maibontes P1Π2 Bekk. Bernays, but paibontes P4 (corr.)
upomeonoi Ar., upomeonoi ΠII 21 tauta I, tauta Ar. (?), Koraes 28
afentes Q5 Q6 UB and P4 (1st hand) 28 aprieikasi P3 Q5 Q6 UB Ald. Bk. and apparently
P4 (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§19 17 ei mev gar kai] Aristotle
might well have spared himself the consi-
deration of this possibility. It is strange
that he has not learnt from Plato whether
this third order of citizens is to have
community of families and of property;
whether, in other words, just those
characteristics which, like their educa-
tion, are distinctive of the two upper
classes in the ideal state, are to be ex-
tended to the third, or not. It is not
easy to imagine a stronger case of in-
ability to transport oneself to an op-
ponent's sphere of thought. In fact he
cannot be acquitted of very culpable
carelessness in the use of the work he is
criticizing. As regards community of
property at any rate, Plato has most
expressly said Rep. III 417 A, IV 419
that nothing of the kind is to exist
amongst citizens of the third class, leaving
room for no doubt whatever as to his real
opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent.
For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better
reason, raised an objection which is only
intelligible if these institutions are not
supposed existing in the third class of
citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (170); also n.
(168) and the references there given.
SUSEM. (170)
18 ΠI ti plieon kai] See Critical
Notes. The sense we require is not,
"what compensation will those receive
who submit to their rule?" (which is
repeated in the next sentence), but "what
advantage will the rulers have over their
subjects?" The older commentators en-
deavoured to extract this by taking ton
upomeouw tis arxih=tois upomeounoi
lochi, "those who undertake to govern."
But this is against the sense of upome-
ouwes in the next clause: "or what in-
ducement will (the rest of the citizens)
have to submit to them?"

ςοφίζωνται—deceive or contrive
(Eaton).

olo Krhites] See on 9 § 3 n. (281)
and Exc. III. This statement is con-
firmed by the statio of the Cretan poet
Hydrus there quoted. See also IV (VII).
10. 1 n. (520). SUSEM. (171)
21 ton doulo ton efentes] "while al-
lowing their serfs the same rights with
themselves in other things, have deprived
them..." (aprieikasi would be 'have pro-
hibited'). As we now know, oikeis was
the proper term for these serfs, but they
are called doulo passini in the inscription
of Gortyn.

"The arguments in §§ 20—24 (ei de,
khathai...geiromen gunaikeis) are in
the main quite correct, but apply just as
much to Aristotle's ideal state as to Plato's
(Onken). Yet see n. (177)." SUSEM.
(172)

Comp. Grote III. pp. 213—215, who
lays stress on the spiritual pride, and
contempt for the dhmos, certain to be nur-
tured in the breasts of the guardians.
θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ’ ἐκεῖνος ἐσται τὰ (11) τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἐσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλις ἄλλοι πόλεις ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπεννατίας ἄλληλας. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας ὁ πρῶτος, τοὺς δὲ § 21 γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτες. ἐγκέλθη 18 ματά δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν φησὶ κακά, τάνυ ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτωσι. καὶ τοῖς λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης ὡς οὐ πολλάν δείχνονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παίδειαν, οὐν ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγοραστικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν § 22 τοιούτων, ἀποδεικνύον τὴν παίδειαν τῶν φύλαξιν. ἐτὶ δὲ κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τόσο γεωργοὺς ἀποφαίνει φέρον— (π. 32)

24 Congreve brackets μιᾷ

§ 20 23 ἔκεινος = τοῖς ἄλλοις πόλισιν, the citizens of the third class. τὰ τοιαῦτα family life and separate possessions.

24 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας? What will be the means of uniting them? Π: How will they associate as fellow-citizens with the two upper classes, who have such dissimilar institutions?

Ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ νυκτὶ ἡ Π: This is the very approach which Plato levels at the existing polities: ἐκάστη αὐτῶν πόλεις εἶναι πάμπολα, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλεις... δύο μὲν γὰρ κάνοντο τὴν ρυθμία ἄλληλας, ἡ μὲν τεχνίται, η δὲ πολεμίται Ἡρ. Π. 422 E. and VIII 551 D (Eaton). SEUSEM. (178)

26 οἶνον φρονοῦσι Ἡρ. Π. 415 D, E; Π. 419 ἀλλ’ ἄλλοισιν, ὑποτεχνίται, ὑποτεχνίται ἡθοποιοὶ, μεταβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει φαινομένα καθέσθαι υπάρχον ἄλλα ἡ φρονοῦσιν. SEUSEM. (178)

27 πολίτες: is predicate: "his citizens are the farmers and the artisans, &c." As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger and more generous conception of the purpose of political institutions than any we find elsewhere in Greece, even in Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the people as not members of the commonwealth, Π. (vii). 9. 3. Plato not only treats them as integral parts of the state, but in a sense makes them the ultimate object of his solicitude. It is for them that he sacrifices the private pleasure of the guardians, and compels his philosophic rulers to descend into the cave. Both rulers and guardians are truly public servants, whose duty it is to protect and benefit their fellows, Ἡρ. 467 B.

§ 21 29 φησὶ Ἡρ. Π. 464 D: τῇ δὲ; δίκαια τέ τι καὶ ἐγκέλθησαν πρὸς ἄλλης, ὁπότε συνήκεται ἐξ αὐτῶν; Cr. n. (163). SEUSEM. (175) καὶ τούτους just as much to the citizens of Callipolis (ὁ δὲ θείος διά τοῦτος ἀστικότατος ὁδός); for by 1. 27 the farmers, artisans &c. who make up the third class, are citizens.

Λέγει δὲ ὁ Σωκρ. Ἡρ. Π. 425 C, D; ἡ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγοραστικὰ ἀστικά ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἀγοραστικὰ ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἄλλα τοιαύτα, τοὺς πολιτέας τοὺς καθ᾿ ἐναντίον τοῦ μαθητή τοῦ παρ᾿ Ἐλληνές ἀγοραστικοὶ.

31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ. Comp. Π. (vii). 12. 7 n. (805). SEUSEM. (178 b) "Laws concerning city-police and market-police, Dionysius says of the Roman aediles (vi. 90) σχεδόν εἴσκαι τὸν κατὰ τὰ πλαίσια τοῦ παρ᾿ Ἐλληνων ἀγοραστικοῦ."

32 Take μιὰν with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This objection proceeds from an acute apprehension that in outward aspect the ideal state would not greatly differ from an ordinary Greek city, in spite of its standing army, half Amazons, and its government of experienced military officers distinguished as savants, who (like the Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in India) are at another stage of development, and belong intellectually and morally to a wholly different world from the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίους ... φέροντα] How precisely the connexion is to be understood was explained in n. (153) on § 1. Practically the result is much as Aristotle represents it, and this is certainly managed differently in his own pattern state. SEUSEM. (177) Pl. Π. 404 C: παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῆναι λαμβάνοντο, μοτὶ τῆς φύλακας, καθ᾿ ἐναντίον διαλέγοντο. Π. 410 D, E: τὰ δ᾿ ἐν τούτῳ. διὸν, ἀνεμένοι ἄνδρες ἄλλῃτα τολέμου σώφρονες.
II. 5. 25] 1264 a 23—1264 b 7. 243

tax: òll k kòll hýkòs élvai xalpetous kai fronh-(II) 35 pótois evèi deîl kai kai pevnesteias 36 kai doulleias, allá òmar eír' anàvakaia tath' ómionos étte 14 mú, nín ge ouðën dióforstai, kai perì tòn évchomévyn, tís h toûtoù te politeía kai paideía kai nómi tìnes. Ístó òn tòn 39 eúreia rágion, outhe tò diáférion mikròn, tò poûos tìnas eînai 36 toûtoù pró to súfèsthai tìn tòn fylákion kai nómi. allá 1264 b mún e ò ge tòn mún ènuvikaas poûsia poiúvas tòs de kíthseis idías, tís ókonomiûs hóster tā été tòn āgigón oî vàdré autòv; kán ei koiál ai kíthseis kai ai tòn evérqrov ènuvika- kes = * * . àtopon de kai to èk tòn òthron poiúvas tìn pa- 15 rakhfhn, òti de òi autá ènivthdèv wav ènuvikaas toûs 36 vàdrásos, oî ókonomiûs ouðën méstèstin. ènuvvalèis de kai tòus àrhonstav òs kathisthìn òso Sòkrátès' deî òmar poiúv toûs 35 pevnesteias P.3-4 Tb || 35 [kai doulleias] or kai <tòmròc> doulleias Susm., 36 kai pevnesteias Schneider, ònuías or <koudia> doulleias Schmidt || 37 dióforstai 38 kai perì avtòn> kai 2 Susm. 39 poûos tìnas P.3-4 Qb Bk. || élvai <dei> Scaliger <dei> || elvai Spengel 1264 b 3 év...ènuvikaas. These words in II come before a évper (p1 corrected this in the margin); Syliburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Koraes transpose them to precede tòis oíkouvixeis, Koraes reading 1 wv te for 1 wv te. Thurot first discovered the lacuna
te kai vàdréu, tazaménous parì tòv òllon
doûlèwv dechhthai meðhòv tòs fyláxhnu
tovn, óow òmar pevevía avtòv eîs tòv
evanóv méste ònav. 36 xalpetous kpl] troublesome and full of arrogance.
35 tòs par' ènuïos...pevnesteias] See 9 § 2 n. (180). Susm. (178)
36 doulleias] Ridgeway Transactions p. 132 thinks the word means "the serf
populations of states like Argos and Crete,
called Ymècios at Argos, and 'Arxamætai
in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the
word is used of the Helots, gev de o dou
leis epananhmína. So also by Plato, Laws
776 b of the Mariandyni.
§ 23 et' anàvakaia kpl] We are re-
called to § 18; the question, perì av
ouðën dióforstai, is the tenure of property
amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether
it is equally necessary here "< as in the
case of the Guardians, to have comun-
mism" > "or not, has certainly not
been determined, as matters stand." tòvta
=kouda étvta of line 17 above.
37 kai perì tòn évchomévyn] "Nor
about the following points: what consti-
tution and education and code of laws
are in force in the case of the citizens
at large."
40 sc. diáférion pòv to súfèsthai.
The construction as in 1260 b 16 n.
§ 24 allà mún kpl] But supposing
he intends to leave their property in
individual ownership, and yet to introduce
community of wives, where are the wom-
men to be found to superintend house-
hold matters as the men manage the
work in the fields?
"What was said in n. (170) applies
again to this argument in the mutilated
state of the text." Susm. (179)
1264 b 4 ék tòn òthron] Rep. v
451 D. Susm. (180)
poiúvas tìn parabodh, òna] should
show by a comparison from the lower
animals that... In Rhet. ii. 20 § 3, § 5
parabodh=simile.
§ 25 7 álì òmar kpl] In the Platonic
state the government is not actually
in the hands of the same individuals in
perpetuity. None except members of the
highest order, the philosophers, are eligi-
able as rulers, but they enter the ruling
body by rotation. Susm. (181)
9 9 άξιωσα = dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, άξιος, and that of others, άξιωσα.
10 θυμουδεθη...άνθρωπον] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φίλακες = άτικωφόρον) from whom the first class (άρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (συμβολικαί). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher commands, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see Republic vii 536 δ ff., comp. n. (970) on IV(vii). 17, 15 and Zeller's Plato p. 428 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on III. 1 § 10 n. (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), IV(viii). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. i to B. v(viii). As Eaton remarks, θυμουδεθη = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (Republic II 375 B, 376 e) for his caste of warriors: comp. III. 16 § 1 n. (641), IV(vii). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), § 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (932). SUSEM. (182)

§ 26 6η τι άναγκ. καλ] "Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it does not recognize the promotion of εκλικτος to be φίλακες." JACKSON.
15 δή...νομοθετήν] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 450 B, οδήγησιν τούτο βλεπότως τις τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἐν τῷ ἤμων έκπεμπτός ἐκκάθετος, διότι οἷον τό πάντως ὠσία καί τῷ ἱστόμενο τῷ πολύτιμῳ, ὡς οὖν ὁ Παλαιοπολειτών ζωή, μακραπολείτων. Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (175): and there is another in § 5 § 109).

Moreover in IV(vii). 6 § 7 Aristotle himself says εκκάθετο μή δέ τόν πολύκα τό ρέας.
εὐδαιμονίων ὀλεν, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ [μὴ] πάντων μερῶν ἢ (II) τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονίαν ὥσπερ τὸ ἄρτιον: τούτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδεχεται τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρον, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ἀδίκημον, ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖς, τίνες ἑτεροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἱ γεινᾶται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βασιλέων.

§ 28 ἦν μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν, ταῦτα ἩΠΠ. 25 τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἠλάττωσεν ἑτέρας: σχεδο (p. 33) διὸ καὶ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων νόμων ἔχει καὶ τούς ύπερθέραν γραφεῖται, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἑναδίδοσιν πολιτείας ὑπερικεφασθαι μικρά βέβαιαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὅλου πάντων διάφορας τὸν Ἰωάκημα, τοιαύτα ἐπηρρίος ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τοῦ γανακικοῦ 30 καὶ τέκνων κοινώνας, πῶς ἔχειν δὲ, καὶ περὶ κτησεως, καὶ 40 <περὶ> τῆς παιδείας, πολιάν τινα δὲ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων; καὶ § 31 τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τάξεως (διαφερόμενος δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τοξ.

18 μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Bojesen || ei μὴ Vettori, but then ei μὴ πάντων should be transposed to come after τινῶν || [μὴ] πάντων Lindau Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. II ii 568 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Buses transposes the second μὴ to precede τινῶν || τινῶν omitted by Bojesen || 26 ὥσπερ M*P3 (1st hand—emended by p) P* (corr.), ὥσπερ the remaining authorities including Δ, rendered quortum et by William || 26 τα is omitted by II* Bk. || 30 καλ is inserted after τίνων by P3 || After κτησεως Susem, inserts the clause καὶ περὶ...φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 11; Introd. p. 79 E. || the last καὶ κατὰ ? Schmidt, accepting the transposition || 31 δὲι γὰρ P* At. Bk.

τι βλέψαται δει λέγειν αὐτή, διὰ εἰς ποιήσαι τοὔ πολιτά: where see note. Susem. (186) 18 ᾧ τινων κτλ] "or unless at least certain definite parts," viz. the most important, "attain happiness." Susem. (186)

19 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] "For happiness is not a thing of the same sort with evenness, which may be an attribute of the sum (of two numbers) where it is not an attribute of either of the numbers themselves." The sum of two odd numbers, 3 + 5, is even.

c. 6 Comparison of the Republic and the Laws: §§ 1—5. Examination of the polity proposed in the Laws: §§ 6—22.


§ 1 27 ἑνταύθω] In the Laws. Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to be genuine. According to Diog. Laer. III. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus after Plato's death.

28 περὶ διλύνων κτλ] "has precisely determined very few things." In this comparison of the Republic with the Laws Aristotle's tendency to look for definite results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially prominent. He is in no way concerned to exhaust the differences between the two polities indeed the whole discussion started with the dogmatic inquiry, 'what are the limits of community in civil life?' § 2. But one cannot help seeing that the deepest ground of this difference, the altered philosophical standpoint and the change in the conception of the state, has escaped him: had he clearly recognised this, he would not have expressed himself as he does in § 5 (Zeller). See however § 4 (T. L. Heath).

31 τὴν τάξιν] Understand διάφορα, though the change of construction is unusual.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 6. [Π. 6. 2

32 πάλιθος τῶν οἰκονόμων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (III) προπολεμοῦν μέρος: τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ
§ 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνών,
§ 35 πότερον οὐδεμίας ἢ μετέχοντι των ἁρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα
δεῖ κεκτήσαι καὶ τούτως καὶ συνπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων οὖν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναίκας
πεῖται δὲ τῶν συνπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς
τοῖς φίλαξιν, τὰ δὲ ἀλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπληροκε

39 λόγοι] after πεπληροκε Susen.1-2 following William’s translation: it is omitted by M'P1 Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of ἕς compare IV(vii). 14 § 12, and possibly 18 § 6.

23 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word Rep. IV 423 A.

τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 183 Susen. (186). Supply ἐτοι. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of these latter." He quite correctly takes the ἄρχοντες to be a committee chosen out of the ἐπίκουροι: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coopted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the λογιστικῶν and the other two parts which make up τὸ ἄλογον: but in the state the wide distinction is between ἄρχοντες and ἐπίκουροι together, i.e. φίλαξιν in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔξωθεν on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on § 3 § 17 n. (183), § 19 (170), § 24 (170), § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: "fortiori it prohibits the artizan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling." See Zeller Plato p. 470 f. Susen. (187)


39 τοῖς ἐξωθέν κτλ] But in the Ροῦτιν Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 501 C—VII 535 A, X 595 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 357 E—376 E, III 412 C—IV 445 E, V 406 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B (comp. II 379 E—III 412 B, VI 501 C—VII 541 B), of the women's share in the duties of the guardians v 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul x 608 C—611 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the Ροῦτιν? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? Susen. (189)

**"In answering the question What is**
the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? it is convenient to distinguish the subject of the conversation from the subject or subjects of the work. Thus in the case of the Republic, though the thesis of ὑθέουθ τὸ μὲν πλείασταν μέρος νόμων ἐν ἠφάματι τῆς πολιτείας εἰρήκει. καὶ ταύτην βουλουμένον κοινότεραν τοιναὶ τάς πόλεις κατὰ μίαν

tοῦ λόγου untranslated by William, Ar., [τὸν λόγον] Sussem,12; but it is uncertain and it is better to follow PP, as I now think, or else with ΜP1 to omit λόγον

ally works it round to the other polity once more.” κοινοτέραν = common to many states, an average polity. Cp. § 16 and viii(iii), 2. 4.

"When he wrote the Republic Plato looked upon the pattern constitution there described as by no means impracticable. He declares that its immediate introduction might be secured without difficulty under a definite condition, which though not indeed easy, nor of frequent occurrence, was yet by no means impossible: ν’ 471 c f., 473 c, vi 497 a f., 499 b —503 c. In the Republic moreover he knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the first and the existing constitutions. But in the Laws he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the Republic (though he still holds it to be the best) is an impracticable ideal: ν’ 739 a f., vii 807 b, ix 853 c, cp. 874 b f.; iii 691 c f., 693 b f., iv 713 c f. For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitutions, not without expressing the apprehension that if the attempt were made to call this into life much in it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual result would be only a pattern state of the third order: ν’ 739 a —e, 741 e f., cp. vii 805 b. Here too the possibility of thus realizing it, though only to a limited extent, is made dependent on a condition, very similar though not entirely the same as the condition which is indispensable for the realization of the state planned in the Republic; namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (πρωτάρχος) with an inclination for philosophy, young, of good disposition and as yet uncorrupted, in conjunction with a philosophic lawgiver: ν’ 739 k f., ν’ 735 d. Cp. Zeller Plat, Stud. 16 ff., Plato (Eng. tr.) p. 483, 522 f., 531, 538 f., 546; Suckow, op. c. 133; Sussemihl Plat, Phil. 11. 619, German trans. of the Laws 976 ff. Aristotle seems to have rightly apprehended this relation between the two: at all
events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken op. c. 1. 201, that the state of the Law is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the Law to frame something intermediate to that of the Republic and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the Republic so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained." SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4 Εἰς γάρ τις τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ.
But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle’s ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the Republic as does that of the Law?

At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (138); 9 § 2 (279); § 3 (541); 10 § 8 f. (626); 11 § 8 (393): IV. VII. 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (324). Introf. p. 22 n. (3).

His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the Law: see on IV. VII. 17 § 1 n. (950), § 15 (979): V. VIII. 4 §§ 7—9, nn. True, Plato’s divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (335). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the Law, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV. VII. 10 §§ 9—11, see also nn. on 11. 5 §§ 1, 6 § 15); and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 nn. He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expediency of abortion, as a means of securing this (Introf. 34, 56, IV. VII. 16 § 15 f. nn.); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the Republic (see on 11. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 1140), had in the Law abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: n. (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle’s ideal state stands even nearer than that of the Law to the state depicted in the Republic, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV. VII. 16 §§ 1—10, nn. 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato’s, and ethically regarded a modern view (Exc. i. 10 B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself. SUSEM. (190)

§ 7 Παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the Republic is the rule of the philosophers; see Zeller Phil. d. Gr. 11 i 751 f. (Eng. tr. Plato 465, 467 ff.) and in the Law this is dropped. Aristotle overflows this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state: in the scheme of the Laws, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves: Law v 741 E ff.; VII 806 D ff.; VIII 842 C f., 846 B, 850 D; XI 915 B ff., 919 D ff., 921 C; XII 932 D ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that
is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: \textit{Laws} vii. However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the \textit{Republic} is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called ‘nocturnal assembly.’ It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by cooption, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavours thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. \textit{See Laws} i 632 c, xii 951 d ff., 961 a ff. Cp. n. (970) on iv(vii), 17 § 15. \textit{Susem.} (193)

\textbf{Kal to tòv upon kást} \textit{Laws} v 741 e, vii 806 d—807 d, viii 842 d, 846 d, xi 519 d ff. \textit{Susem.} (194)

\textbf{Dúmaithomos—necessary for support, cp. iii. 5. 3. iv(vii). 10. 7 where the antithesis is to tòv eis eisúchísmoùn kai periosofías.}

\textbf{Kal perì suostresv elástosv.} Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, § 4 17 n. (168), § 24 n. (179), that even in the ideal state of the \textit{Republic} Plato had required there should be common messes for the guards. \textit{Susem.} (195)

\textbf{Plēn en taúth ét.] As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the \textit{Republic}, as was stated in n. (153) on § 11; but in the changed sphere of the state in the \textit{Laws} he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to maintain it in the later scheme: vi 750 d ff., vii 860 e, cp. viii 842 b, 847 e. Further compare i. 13 § 9 n. (116), ii. 7 § 1 n. (231 b). \textit{Susem.} (196)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 6.

250 δει μή λανθάνειν ὅτι χάρας δεήσει τοὺς τοστούς Βαβυλωνίας (III) ἢ τινος ἄλλος ἀπέραντον τὸ πλῆθος, εἴ τις ἀργοὶ πεντακ- σήλιοι θέρανται, καὶ παρὰ τούτους γυναῖκας καὶ θεραπο-

§ 7 τῶν ἔτερος ὀχλος πολλαπλασιοῦ. δει μὲν οὖν ὑποτιθεῖσαι (p.34)
καὶ εὐχήν, μηδὲν μὲντάς ἀδιάνατον. λέγεται δ' ὦς δεῖ τούς

νομιμότερον πρὸς δύο βλέπουσα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε

τὴν χάραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. εἶτε δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσεῖ-

ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γενετικοὺς τόπους, εἰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἔχιν

14 δεῖσαι τοὺς τοστούς after 15 ἀπεραντοῦ Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γ'1, περὶ Μ'1 P2 Bk. and Π1 (1st hand) || τοῦς Weldon || 18 μηδὲν] μη M'1 P1, omitted by Qb || 19 te omitted by Π1, τήν by M' || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before εἰ by Π1 and in the margin of P1, adopted by Susem.1,2: a doubtful case, the words would then bear the sense of μᾶλατα μὲν, answered by δὲ 218

14 Βαβυλωνίας] Susem. (200)
15 ἀπήρ. τὸ πλῆθος] unlimited in size.
16 πάντα] But how does this calculation agree with that made about Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare nn. (306), (311). Even granting that the present is the more correct statement, how much smaller must we imagine the number of citizens to be in Aristotle's own ideal state according to the data given in (VII). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser). Suppose these data reduce the number by one half, one half the same objection would still apply to Aristotle. On the other hand it is interesting to observe how near his penetrating intellect comes to a discovery of the fact, that the idleness which belonged as a right to a privileged minority of freeborn landholders was really the fundamental evil of the Hellenic state. Confined however to the circle of opinions current in his own age and nation, the philosopher turns back when on the very threshold of the truth: and follows Plato in adopting this fundamental evil as an inalienable primary good for his own model state. Susem. (201)

§ 7 17 δει μὲν οὖν...μηδὲν μὲντάς ἀδιάνατον] "We should frame our scheme on the most favourable supposition, yet not so as to be impracticable." Cp. Laws ν. 735 E: τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχα τὸ ἄρατον [ματαιὸς μοιχήσεις], κ. ἃ διήκοσμων.

ὑποτιθεῖσαι κατ' εὐχήν] A reference to the expression used by Plato Laws IV ν. 709 D εὐχήθησα κατά λόγον...καὶ νομιμότερη. Keph. VII 740 D μὴ τοποῦσιν ἵππα

Schmidt inserts them after προσεῖναι (μὲν) answered by δὲ 218

18 λέγεται δ' ὦς δεῖ κτλ.] This is not expressly to be found anywhere in the Laws, but Aristotle had a perfect right to infer it from IV 704—709 and ν. 747 D. Susem. (202)

20 εἴ τις καλὸς κτλ.] But this even Plato himself has by no means overlooked; see Laws ν. 737 C ὡς ἡ πλῆθος ἔκκαψε ὅτι πλῆθος λεγόμεν ὅτι ἀλλὰ ὁ ὀμοίῳ γέγονεν ἂν λεπτῇ ἡ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ τῷ ἀνθρω- ποιαῖς πόλει (Schlosser). Aristotle brings the same objection against Phileas, τῆς κτλ. 7 ν. 11 e. Eaton. Compare n. (310) on 6 ν. 13. Susem. (203)

Cp. IV (VII). 2. 18 τῆς νομιμοτετειλῆς ἐστίν ἤδη, ἐὰν τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας γεγονότας, ποὺ τῆς ἕτερης ἀπεκτον. 21 εἴ δὲ κτλ.] See Jahrb. f. Phil. XCVIII. 1866. p. 329. The sense is clear from the parenthesis: "if the state is to be independent and secure against aggression." Editors who retained the ms. πολιτείας extorted much the same sense out of it, explaining it to mean simply a "national" life, the life of a πόλις; or a "social" life, a life of activity, πραξικ. Thus Victorius: a moribus aitarum civitatem non penis abhorreare quae fines etiam imperii proferre conatur. Shilleto
II. 6. 9] 1265 a 14—1265 a 32.

251

Blon polemicōn (ou γάρ μονον ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν αὐτὴν τοι—(III) οὕτως χρῆται πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ζύλος ἀ χρῆσιμα κατὰ τὴν § 8 οἰκεῖαν χώραν ἐστών, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξώ τόπους) εἰ δὲ
25 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βλων, μὴ τὸν ἔδωκε τοῦ κοινὸς τῆς πόλεως, ὡμοσ οὐδὲν ἵππον δὲ φοβερος εἴναι τοῖς
poleímos, μὴ μονον ἐλθόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀπεθάνουσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁδῶν δὲ, μὴ ὅτε 5
βελτίων ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαῦτην γὰρ
30 εἰναίει φησί διὸ ὡς ἐν ξίνην σωφρόνως, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ τις εἰπεν
§ 9 ὡστε ἐν εὗ (τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστί καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπείδη ἐστὶ
σωφρόνως μὲν ταλαπάτωρ δὲ ξῖνιν) ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὄρος τὸ

22 polemicōn Muret, poleitikōn ΙΓII Αθ. Βκ. ὀπλαστικον Montecatino, <ἡγεμονικα
καὶ μὴ μόνω> poleitikōn Thorot || poleitikōn μὲ μονοτικα Ι, poleitikōn μὲ μονωτικα
Π, poleitikōn μὲ μονωτικα Μα, poleitikōn μὲ μονωτικα Πα (in the margin)—all
glosses || 23 ἐπίκλαi άρσις Oncken, νομίμως ? Susem. || 25 <καὶ> μή Schmidt ||
28 ἐπίκλας Bender || 30 αὐτός is omitted by Π. Were these right εἰπεν would have
to be altered, with Bas., to εἴπερ || 31 ἐπείδη Susem. & ετί ΙΓII Αθ. Βκ. Susem.1-3

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. Protag.
322 β πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἢ μέσος πολεμικῆς,
absolutely political and having therefore
as one ingredient πολεμική. "The expression
recurs iv(vii). 2 §§ 3, §§ 5, 6 (a probably
spurious chapter) and 6 §§ 7, where
see Critical notes.

23 δ ὄριον κτα] Cr. vii(vi). c. 7
§§ 1–3 (Eaton). Susem. (205)
§ 8 24 ε ἔ β ι τι μὴ τοιοῦτον κτα] "But if any one refuse to approve of a
life such as this," i.e. warlike "for the
state at large any more than for the
individual." Whether war is the end of the
state is a question debated iv(vii). 14
§ 13 f., 15 §§ 1–6. Plato in the Law
1 682 c, vii 853, viii 859 a, holds that it
is not.

28 τὸ πλῆθος really belongs to the
dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it
might not be better, to define otherwise,
by a clearer definition, the amount of
property which one man may hold." It is
characteristic of the writer to require
analysis and precise definition, το σοφι
τὸ διαμερίστω.

29 τοσαῦτην γὰρ εἰναίει φησὶ] Lawa
ν 737 ν τῆς μὲν εὐτυχίας πόλου σωφρόνως
ἐστιν λαϊκή γρήγορος πλεονασμὸς θ᾽ ὡδὲν προ-
δεί. With what follows compare 7 §§ 7 n.
(237 b). Susem. (206)
31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this term
is too vague (cp. μία μᾶλλον, 2 § 2) since
men may live frugally and at the same
time wretchedly": literally, in hardships
and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and iv(vii). 5 § 1,
and σωφροσύνη iii. 4 § 16 can only
mean 'parsimoniously', 'parsimony'. But
in ΙΙ. 5 §§ 10 n. (162), 7 §§ 12 n. (243),
1. 13 § 2 f., § 6 (112). iv(vii). 1 § 4 (691),
3 §§ 3, 15 §§ 3–4, 16 § 8 the meaning is
temperance or self-restraint in reference
to eating and drinking and the appetite of
sex: and it is from this side that the virtue
is depicted in Nic. Eth. iii. cc. 10, 11 (1117
b 13 ff.). There however Aristotle himself
explains how extravagance leads to pro-
fligacy and to excesses in this direction,
and that δωστος, properly a spendthrift,
comes to mean a profligate; th. iv. 1 § 3,
3 §§ 4, 1123 b 5, 4 §§ 4, 1125 b 12 σώφρων
has yet another meaning; viz. modest.
Lastly, Van der Rest observes that the
next objection brought against Plato
affects only a certain ineffectiveness of
expression and not the thought, which is no
other than that followed by Aristotle, of
a right mean between excessive wealth
and excessive poverty: see esp. Lawa ν
741 έχεριματικός γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεστω ἐν τῇ
τοιαύτῃ κατασκευῇ: and next note. Susem.
(208 b)
32 ἐπείδη A better definition would be,
to live frugally and liberally, "Comp.
iv(viii). 5. 1 n. ἔλεος θύμων ἃ ἔφασκεν καὶ
σωφρόνως; ii. 7. 7 n. τοῦ μέσου στοχαστῶν;
vii(iv). 11. 4 τῶν εὐτυχισμάτων ἢ κτισμα ἢ
μέσον βελτίωτη πάσης." Susem. (207)
σωφρόνως καὶ ἑλευθερώς (χωρίς γάρ ἐκατέρφο τὸ μὲν τὸ (III) τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τῷ ἐπιτόνῳ), ἐπεὶ μόνας γ’ 35 εἰσὶν [ἐξειν] ἀπεται περὶ τῆς τῆς υἱᾶς χρήσιν αὐτῆς, ὅλον οὐσία πράως [μὲν] ἢ ἀνδρεῖως χρήσθαι οὐκ ἐστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἑλευθερῶς ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸς ἔξος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι § 10 περὶ αὐτῆς ταύτας. ἀποτεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσαξόνητα τὸ 8 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκειαζεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀφεῖ- 40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἱκάνον ἂν ἐμαυλισθησομένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὑπόθεσιν γενομένων, § 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τούτῳ καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δει δὲ 45 τοῦτ’ οὐχ ἡμοῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν’ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲς ἀπορεῖ διὸ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς υἱὰς εἰς ὑποσυνομένα πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδαιρέτως οὐσίων ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα- 5 5 ῥαξίγας μηδὲν ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ εἶλατός ὅσι τὸ πλῆθος εἶναὶ τε

33 ἐκατέρφο Koraes, ἐκετέρων ΓΠΙ Αρ. Βκ. || τῇ τῷ ΓΠΙ Αρ. Βκ. || τῇ τῷ ΓΠΙ Ar. Βκ. and Μ’ (1st hand) || 34 τῇ τῷ ΓΠΙ Ar. Βκ. || τῇ τῷ ΓΠΙ Αρ. Αλδ. Βκ. || ἐπιπόνων] laboriose vixerit William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence ζεν Susem; erroneously || 35 [ἐξειν] Susem. || ἀπεται] απεται written by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss upon ἔχειν || χρήσιν] εἶν Π’. Apparently William translated from the following order: αὐτοις αἱ ἔχειν εἰναὶ ἀπεται περὶ τῶν ἔχων τῆς οὐσίας, Αρ. from the following: αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀπεται εἰναὶ ἔχειν περὶ τῶν χρην τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by ΓΠΙ Βκ. || 37 ἔχειν Susem. || χρῆσιν ΓΠΙ Αρ. Βκ., ἀπεται Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσαχώς αὐτῶν εἶναι ταύτας, not happily || εἶναι after 38 αὐτῶν ΠΠΙ Βκ. || 40 ἀναμαλθησομένης Madvig for ἃ ἐμαυλισθησομένης
165 b 2 [περὶ τῶν πόλεις] Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ ὅτι τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ’ || 4 παράξευς ΠΠΙ and ΠΙ (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after π’ had emended it to παράξευς

33 χωρίς] if the two be separated.
34 το ἐπιπόνως (79).”
35 ἀπεται...αὐτοῖς] These are the only virtues that have to do with the use of property. ὅλον = I mean.
§ 10 38 ὑπαξονιᾳ] Λαων ν 740 ν—741 A. Susem. (207 b) “Τις άριστος (while equilizing their properties he should not regulate the numbers of his citizens.”
54 σωφρόνως καὶ οὐ [καὶ] This too is very inexpressly expressed. All that Plato in the Λαων intends, indeed all that he is able to effect, is indeed all that he is effective to the number of citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly 5040 elder men, as many younger men, with twice that number of women. All beyond that number must, as he expressly prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the normal family: only when there is childlessness or death does it become necessary that there should be other children in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser). As it stands at present, the polemic does not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the means proposed by Plato to avoid an excess of the prescribed number to be impracticable or impossible to realize he should have proved his point, as he easily might have done. Susem. (208)
§ 11 165 b 2 οὐ χρήσις ἀκριβῶς = ἀκριβεῖστερόν “whereas that requires to be fixed with a great deal more nicely in the supposed case than at present.” Cp. 7 § 18 οὐ τῶν οὐ.
4 παράξευς] the cadets; like παρά-
Π. 6.14] 253

§ 12 πλείουσ. μᾶλλον δὲ δὲν ύπολαβού τις ἃν ἀφίσαι τής ὑποθαςίας τήν τεκνοποίησιν, ὡστε ἀριθμοῦ τὸν εἰς πλείονα γεννάν τοῦτο δέ τιθέναι τὸ πλήθος ἀποβλέπουσα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἃν (p. 35) συμβαλῇ τελευτάν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτέκναια, τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι, καθότερον ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαίας ἄντιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολιτισταῖς, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποτεῖ καὶ κακοτροφίαν. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὁν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχιμαστῶν, τοὺς οἰκους ἱσούς ὁμοθεν δειν διαμείνει καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτιστῶν, καὶ καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ἁρίστους εἴχον τῶν κλήρους πάντες κατὰ μέγας ἐν δὲ τῶν νόμων τούτως τοῦνταιν ἡστὶ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦτων πῶς ἄν οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέων ύστερον ἐπελείπουν ἐκ τῶν νόμων τούτως καὶ τὰ περὶ τούς ἄρχουν·

11 Αλλαίς Γ΄, πλείαισιν Π΄Π΄ Αρ. Β.Κ. (καὶ ὁ erasure Π΄) || 12 [Φείδων... 17 ύστερον] Schmidt || 14 καί κατὰ Bernays || 15 τῶν κληρων before άντιος Π΄ Β.Κ., before εἴχον Μ΄ Π΄ || πάντες Β.Κ.3 || 17 ἐν after ύστερον Π΄ Β.Κ.

οροὶ ἄνευ, supernumeraries outside the traces, the elder brother being the yokeshorse, ἀγορίστι ἄνευ.

§ 12 6 Take μᾶλλον with τῆς ὑποθαςίας.

7 ὡστε ἀριθμοῦ τὶνος Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Exx. ΠΠ to Β.Π. Σουσέμ. (209).

Grote ΙΙΙ. 218—219: Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognise the common element in the positive and prudential checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, Λατος Β. 740 c—e, cp. Grote ΙΙΙ. p. 229 n. (g). Perhaps what Aristotle deprecates is the 'laisser faire', ἄφεσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι κτλ] Aristotle (3) repeats this 7 § 5. Σουσέμ. (209 δ). 12 ἢ δὲ πενία κτλ] See Λατος Β. 744 d; also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy Κρφ. VIII 555 556 δ—557 Α.

Φείδων ὁ Κορίνθιος Nothing is known of any such ancient lawgiver of Corinth. He is supposed to be different from the better known Phidias of Argos, about whom see VIII(v). 10. 6. Yet he is called a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar Ολυμπ. XIII. 201: τοῦτο δ' ἔρωμα, ἔπειθ' Φείδων τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰς μέτρα καὶ στάθμα. This is one of the serious difficulties in this chapter mentioned Introed. p. 23 n. 4. 14 (α). There is always the heroic remedy; see Critical Notes and M. Schmidt in Jahrh. f. Phil. cxxxv. 1882. p. 852.

16 ἐν δὲ τῶν νόμων κτλ] A decidedly unfounded assertion, as was explained in the note on § 10. Aristotle (2) repeats this objection against Phales, 7 § §: comp. n. (204) on § 7. Σουσέμ. (210).

§ 14 17 ύστερον] IV (viii). 10 § 11 f. and esp. 15 f. n. (946). From the latter passage it is seen of what means he is inquiring. To prevent any increase in the fixed number of the citizens Aristotle sanctions the procuring of abortion. Cp. Introd. p. 56 and n. (192) on § 5. Σουσέμ. (211).

18 ἀδελφαίσθαν κτλ] Λατος Β. 734 ε: the warp is necessarily stronger and firmer than the woof, δὲν δὲ τὸ μεγάλα ἀρχαῖα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἄφασται δὲ διακρίνεται τινα τρόπων ταύτη καὶ τοὺς μικρὰς ταϊδείς βασιλευόντων ἑκάστους κατὰ λόγον. As a matter of fact this objection of Aristotle's is altogether unfair. In the Laurus Plato has done exactly that which Aristotle here requires: he has prescribed for all the citizens of his model state the same course of training, on the ground of which he expects them to discover for themselves which among them
are better fitted for the warp and which for the woof, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making special provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. **Susem. (213)**

23 *διά τί τούν* οὐκ ἀν ἔνα έτει τῆς γῆς κελά*] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state: see IV (vii). **Susem. (214)**

25 *δό δὲ γάρ οἰκόπεδα*] One homestead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: *Laws v 745 E, vi 775 E ff., cp. viii 848*. Aristotle (§) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar (vii). **Susem. (215)**

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two *olektes* *Laws v 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, *olē-πεδα, oleías*: Aristotle recommends two *άλθος*, not two *olektes* or regular establishments" (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-
Π. 6. 17] 1265 b 19—1265 b 33. 255

§ 16 διελθών χωρίς, χαλέπων δε οίκειας δου οικείων. η δε σύνταξις, δια θυσίαν συνεπεία τοῦ διαρκεία, μέσας δε τούτων, ἢ τά καλούσι πολίτειαν. εκ θαρά τῶν ὑπολειτούσων ἑστών, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην παλαιύν κατασκεύαθαι, 30 ξείναι ταῖς πόλεσιν τῶν ἀλλων πολιτειῶν, καλός εἰρήκεν ἵσως, εἰ δ' ὡς ἀριστότητι μετά τήν πρῶτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς, τότε γὰρ τήν τῶν Δακῶν τις ἄν επισώτευε σὰρκος, ἢ κἂν ἦν ἄλλην τινά ἀριστοκρατεικότεραν, ἐνυιοὶ μὲν οὖν λέγοντες ὡς δεῖ 10

27 βασιλέως κατασκεύασαν. Even supposing that, in contradistinction to him, Aristotle really intended to provide only one of the two estates with a dwelling-house, how can he have believed that to farm two estates in separate localities would thus be made easier than if they had dwellings upon them? Is it not clear that the opposite will hold good? Nay more, what idea are we to form of two such detached properties, one near the town and one in the country, unless there are farm-buildings and a house upon the latter? If this be so, the above supposition is a priori impossible. Even Plato does not arrange that the country house shall be a regular establishment in the sense of being always inhabited, but the son who inherits succeeds to it as soon as he is grown up and married, and so sets up the second establishment there (Laws vi 775 ε.Ι.). In Aristotle's best state such an appropriation of the second dwelling-house is certainly excluded, because there, when the heir marries, he succeeds his superannuated father as citizen and consequently as proprietor of both the family properties (see note and Excursus on iv[vii]. 16 § 10, 1335 a 32—35); but that is the sole point in which Aristotle diverges from Plato in this matter. To what purpose he would destine this second house can only be conjectured: it may be to lodge the superannuated father, perhaps with the lands belonging to it as a sort of retiring pension. In any case the inconsistency, as Aristotle's text has come down to us, is unquestionable. Susem. 26 διελθών χωρίς=distinct, separate homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις The entire arrangement of the constitution tends neither to oligarchy nor to democracy but to something intermediate known as Polity. Plato's citizens are the heavy-armed men: Laws vi 775 b, πάντες μὲν κοινωνίας τῆς τῶν ἀρχῶν αἴρεσιν διαφωναίτερον ἄνδρα ἑπτάκοντα διὰ τῆς πολυτροπίας, τετελείσθαι καὶ πολέμικον εἰς τὴν τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνίαν. This is the criterion of a 'Polity'.

30 πολιτείαν Compare iii. 7 § 4 with the notes and references there given. Susem. (216).

31 ὡς κοινοτάτην κτὴν] 'as the most universally adapted for cities at large' vi 11, c. 11 with n. (1293) on § 1. Susem. (217).

32 Plato's arrangement Ref. B. vili implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατεικώναν i.e. a constitution which, like the Spartan, has the character of an Aristocracy to a greater extent than Polity. The term may be thus explained: true Aristocracy coincides with Aristotle's best constitution; but in a transferred and secondary sense this name is earned by such constitutions as combine aristocratical with oligarchical and democratical elements, like Carthage, or only with democratical elements, like Sparta; this is stated vi(iv). 7 §§ 2—4, cp. vii(vii). 9 § 6 ff., 7 § 7 n. (1133), § 4 n. (1141), 10 § 1, 11 § 2. Further consult Excursus i. on Bk. iii and the notes to iii. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601), § 24 (614); 14 § 15 (633), 17 § 3 (677), § 6 (678); vii(vii). 9 § 2 (1136—7). Of course such mixed constitutional forms are nearer to the true Aristocracy than is Polity, which is a blending of Oligarchy and Democracy: vi(vi). cc. 8, 9. See on this the notes to
mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to tyrannis, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, Laws XII 992 E, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice: ἐν δὲ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτα ἡ κυνική ἢ τὸ πάλαι, ἢ τόπῳ, ἢ τῷ ἐναρκτοῖς ἢ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ἢ τῷ ἀλλοις ἢ τῷ ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἢ τῷ ἐν άλλοις ἢ τῷ ἐν ἀλλοις ἢ τῷ ἐν πάλαι. 13 1266 a 16

1 See on this Introd. p. 33 n. 3 and Susenishi's critical edition p. 112.
practically democracy and τυραννίς to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls Ολιγραφία and τυραννίς the two worst forms of government, see on vii(iii). 11 § 21 n. (130e): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the Λαός it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with τυραννίς: πάντες δοκιμασίαι της θείας πολιτείας ή χειράσματος ή πάσων. βέλτιστον οὖν λέγουσι οἱ πλείους μυρίντες [... ἡ γὰρ ἐκ των 1266 a 3 χειρότεροι P² and P² (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || πάνω Π || 4 [δ...βέλτισις] Riese, see Comm.

that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken’s remark (op. c. i. 1. 905): “taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us.”

The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato’s state of the Λαός, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 ἡγεμόνες, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them; in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a τυραννίς, though there were five of them: and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the πολιτεία, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. SUSEM. (220)

4 βέλτιστον οὖν κτλ.] That is, in the particular case here given (op. n. 223) they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and eulogists of the Lacidian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one com-

* Only Oncken’s assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a decided mistake, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.
πλείωνον συγκεκριμένη πολιτεία βελτιών. ἔπειτα οὖν ἡ ἵχουσα (III) 
φαίνεται μοναρχικοὶ οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ ὁμαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-
τικὰ μέλλον δ’ ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὁμαρχίαν.
§ 19 δὲ ἄρχοντα, δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄρχοντων καταστάσεως τοῦ μὲν γὰρ
ἐξ αἰρέτων κληρονομοῦν καὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφότερον, τὸ δ’ τοῖς ἐν ἐντορώ-
τοις ἐπάνοιες ἐκκλησίαζες εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας
ἵ τι ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἀφεῖται, τοῦτο δ’
ὀλογραμμικοῦ, καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν ἐντορών εἶναι

-bounded of democracy and tyranny, then the
general statement in n. 4 might justly
be made: for any three, or more, forms
would make a better mixture than these
two. SUSEM. (221)

ἡ γὰρ ἐκ πλείωνον κτλ. ‘This statement
made thus universally is not in keeping
with the philosopher’s thought.
He does not blame Plato for not com-
bining elements enough, but because he
would construct a polity out of the two
corrupt elements’ (Riese). On
Aristotle’s own principles a mixture of aristocracy
democracy, or even of oligarchy and
democracy, must be better than one of
oligarchy, democracy, and tyrannical.
As was shown in the last note, the preceding
sentence, rightly understood, is a simple
deduction from what has been laid down
above, and needs no additional reason,
least of all one which erroneously ex-
tends it beyond the limits of this right
interpretation and lays it down as un-
iversally true. The chapter contains diffi-
culties enough, but this is beyond the limits
of all that we dare attribute to
Aristotle himself; surely this illogical
generalization is interpolated. We shall
however be obliged to go some way far-
ter than this, I think. For even one
who, like myself, either rejects or mis-
trusts Schmidt’s other atheities in this
chapter will nevertheless be unable to
deny that the entire passages §§ 16—18,
176 b 29 el ἐπὶ...1266 a 6 δημοκρατικά,
and § 22, 1266 a 22 ὡς...25 σκέψις, do
most violently interrupt the connexion
and leave the impression that they are
non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is
strengthened by the strange statements
noticed in n. (219, 220). SUSEM. (222)

§ 19 οὐ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἰρέτων κλη-
ρονοματός [For selection by lot from a
body elected previously by vote belongs
to both” i.e. the lot to democracy, the
voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy].
This took place in the election of the council,
of the magistrates charged with the police
of the city (ἀγορασμός and ἄρτοιοι),
and of the superintendents of the games
(ἀγορασμός διάλεγεται): Latus vi 756 b—e,
765 d l., 762 b—d. SUSEM. (223)

See R. DORESTE Le système électoral des
Lois de Platon in Annales de l’association
pour l’enc. des études grecques. XVII. 1883.
pp. 65—74.

§ 10 τὸ δ’ ἔφερεν [As a matter of
fact the best regulation only applies to the
election of the superintendents of the
games (ἀγορασμός διάλεγεται) Latus vi 756 c,
and of the council vi 756 b—e; but
Aristotle does not come to speak of this
latter election until § 20. SUSEM. (225)

καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντας] Not however at
the election of ἄρχοντας and ἄρτοιος,
Latus vii 764 Α.; χρονονοματικὸν ἐὰν ταύτα
δὲ μὴ ἔλθωσιν, ἐὰν ἔσσεξαν ἐπὶ τοὺς
ἄρχοντας, ἔμαθοντος. SUSEM. (226)

τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ

καὶ τὸ περατών πλείους κτλ] Of
these two statements the latter, viz.,
that the highest officers of state are to be
elected from the highest classes of the
census, is quite incorrect. Even for the
Guardians of the Laws (πυραμόλοχοι) no
such regulation is found: Latus vi 753 b,
765 a l.; nor for the supreme board of
control (ἐθνικόν) XII 945 ff.: nor again
for the military officers (πυραμόλοχοι, πυρα-
μολοχοί, φλαρχοί, ταξαρχοί) 755 b ff. And as
regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only the case of a minority, namely the ásterómatos, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (ephebes) must be elected from the third or the second class. SUSEM. (237)

§ 20. 14. τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἴρεσιν | Thus described in Ῥατσύς τ. 56 e—e. The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councilors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (φθόνον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγαλότατων τιμημάτων ἀπαντᾷ φίλος ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἓ ἐργαθεῖ τὸν μὲν πολιτικόν τῷ ἀξιόλογον τῷ δικαιότατον). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (τῇ δ' ἐπαρχαίᾳ φίλος ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταῦτα καθότερ τῇ πρώτῃ); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (τρίτα δὲ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φίλος μὲν τὸν τιμημάτων ἐπάνω χαίρει σεβολογές δὲ οὐκ οἷος τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (τετάρτη δὲ φίλος μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ σεβολογές τοῦ τιμημάτος ἐπιρροής); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by sortition, to go from each class. The passage continues: ‘On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: these are to form the council for the year’ (Dr Jowett’s translation).

Plato’s object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, Plato 361. 363 n. 9. (b) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day. (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (360 + 360 + 270 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election: there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (τηλικὸς δὲ προφορὰς τοὺς μὲν καταστήμαται...περιπτήσεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ. τὰ κατάστηματα ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τιμημάτου ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις). The voting on the fifth day is confined to those duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (ἐκλέγεται) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

ἀριστεραι μὲν κελλ. | For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second: and next from the third, save that it is not compulsory on all (to vote),

but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and (in electing candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21. 19 εἰς ἐκ τούτων κτλ] More accurately stated, there is first an election of 180 candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: secondly, a selection of one half of these, 90 from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. Vide supra. Susem. (229) 20 οὗτοι δὲ κτλ] Thus those who belong to the highest classes and who are superior men will be a majority (of the voters); because through the absence of compulsion some citizens of the popular party will abstain from the election.

§ 22. 24 τῶν ὀστερον...σκέψας vi. (iv), c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, 11. Susem. (239) 25 ἐπιβάλλει = devolves (upon us); see
on i. 13. 13 and reff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortynian inscription lately found, οἷος ἐπιβαλλόμενος ὁ ἐπιβάλλον, the next of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cr. lektor κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα λέγων De gen. anim. i. 2. 1, 716 a 3; and Pol. vii(iv). 13 § 7 τὸ πόσων ἐπιβάλλει. 26 τὸ ἐξ αἰρετῶν αἰρέτους 'it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.' This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of epoimadeis. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control. Susem. (231). 27 συντῆναι] This apparently portends something like the wire-pullers and caucuses of our day. Comp. vii(v). 3-9. c. 7 Examination of the politi proposed by Phales. See Analyt. p. 105. § 1 31. For the antithesis comp. i. 7. 5 πολετισθούσε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. i. 12. 1 ὁμοίως ἐκκυανθήσαντι πράξεις πολιτικῶς ὀπίσθιονοις, ὀλλά διεσπερόμενοι διεσπερέως τὸν βίον: P. Tim. 19 c τὸ ὄν τῶν συ- ψευτῶν τέχνης φοβοῖται μὴ ἄντεχων ορισκορθείς ἡ καὶ πολιτικῶς.

33 τοῦτον ὡμ.] that of the Republic and that of the Latin. 35 συντῆσαι τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with n. (196); also n. (153) on § 2 and (119) on i. 13. 9. Susem. (231 b) 36 τῶν ἀναγκαῖων] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments: practical requirements.] fanciful theories. 37 § 37 μέγατον τεταχθαι] The sentence is inverted; with τεταχθαι καλάς take τὸ περί τὰ ὄντα; the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περί...τεταχθαι, is subject of δοκεί εἶναι μέγατον. 'Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.' There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye Primitive Property Preface xxvii—xxviii, also pp. 149, 158 ff., 273. 39 διὸ Φαλέας...πρώτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. Exc. ii to B. 11) it is clear that Phales was younger than Hippodamos: but if πρώτος is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagreness of his proposal, its lack of all finished execution as com-
pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. nn. 255, 256 on § 3 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phæleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the distribution of artizans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böckh Staats-
haushaltung der Ath. i. p. 65 and Roscher Thukydides p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel Studien p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, n.c. 392, and thence to Chalcodon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 27, Theopompos Frag. 65 in Athenaeus xii 526 d. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phæleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great hindrances to this hypothesis. 

SUSEM. (332) § 3 1266 b 1 eis tôn should be taken with the participle.

2 τάχιστα] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 6 § 6 ὡς = laissez faire.

§ 8 και πρότερον] § 6 § 15 n. (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. 

SUSEM. (234) 11 ἐπιρράπη = exceed, rise above. 4 If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.

12 ἀνάγκη...ἀξιόθεν] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phæleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phæleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade.
The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognized (1) by Solon's legislation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Loci which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of ential, as at Leucis, where the issue of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy. Yet the size of properties needs regulation, if, when equalized, they are not to be over-large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaos at Thebes), vii(vi), 4, 9 (the Aphyteans and Oxylos in Elis), vii(vi). 7, 9 (Thuriil). See further Lavelaye op. c. pp. 161—165 Eng. trans., A. Lang Essay xii, esp. p. 84; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom.' An early equal distribution (Maine's Village Communities p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece. Long after them Philip, and Plato in the Laws, 744 e, desire a return to the old usage.

§ 6 έργον γάρ μὴ νεαντροποιούν εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. Διότι μὲν 15 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὔσιας ὁμαλότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινῶν φαίνονται διεγερμένες, όπως καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλους ἦστι νόμοις ὡς κοινῆς κτάσεως τῆς ὀσμῆς ἄν βουλήται τις, ὦμοιος δὲ καὶ τῆς οὔσιας παλαιών οἷς νόμοι κοινώνειν, ὀπέρ ἐν Λακροίᾳ νόμοι 20 ἦστι μὴ πολεμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ. φανερὰν ἀτυχίαν δεῖξῃ συμβεβηκὴν 7 κυκλῶν, ἐκ τούτων παλαιὸς κληρονὸς διασφάλει, τούτῳ δὲ λύθην καὶ παρ' Λευκάδαι δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λαών τὴν πολεμίαν αυτῶν ὑπὸ γὰρ ἦτοι συνεβαινεῖν ἀπό τῶν ἀρισμένων τιμιμῶν (p. 38) τῶν εἰς τῶν ἀρχῶν βαδίσκεσθαι; ἀλλ' ἦστι τὴν ἱστοτήτα μὲν ἢ

18 οὖσαν Ἀδ. Ἐκπ. ἐνδέχεται ὅτι δεννὶ Ἀτ., ὀπότε τινὰς F3-3 4 Qe Tb Ub || 19 οἷς νόμοις] ἦσιν Bücheler, probably right || 24 ἦστα] εἰς τὸ F3-3 4 Ua Ar. And F4 (1st hand, τρ. ἰστ. corv. in the margin), εἰς Qe Tb.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 7.

25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἡ λιὰν εἶναι πολλῆν, ὡστε (IV) τριμφᾶν, ἢ λιὰν ἀλγήν, ὡστε ξὺν γλάσχρως. ἐξῆλθον οὖν ὡς οὐχ ἰκανὸν τὸ τῶν οὐσίας ἦσας ποιήσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ § 8 τοῦ μέσου στοιχαστέν. ἐτε δ’ εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μετριὰν τάξεων οὐσίαν πάσην, οὐδὲν ἀφελος’ μᾶλλον γὰρ συν τὸς ἐπιθυμίας ὑμᾶς ἐματείξειν ἢ τῶν οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦστι μὴ παίδευσόν ἐναίδους ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἢν εἴποις ὁ Φαλέας διὸ ταῦτα τυγχάνει τέλος αὐτῶς’ ὡστε γὰρ δεῖ νοῦν τούτων λοιπὰ της ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτῆσεως καὶ παιδείας.

§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἦταν ἦσταν δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν 35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ἀφελος’ ἦστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην εξ ἡς ἠσονται προαριστικόν τοῦ πλεονεκτείν ἢ χρυμάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναπτοσύνετον ἄνωθεν, ἡ δὲ ἠγέρτης περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἦν ἵνα σαμποτῆς καὶ εὖ δὲ ἀγαθόν καὶ ἐκ οὐκ ἢ ἀποκτήσῃ γὰρ διὰ τὸ περὶ ταὶ κτήσεως ἂν

27 τοιαύτη ἢσσα Ἐρ. apparente || 28 τὰ ἔτι Μο. P1 || 31 δὲ εἴτεν Μτ, εἴτι δὲ P1-Aug. Ο1-Θ2 Αδ. Bk. and a later hand in P1, εἴτεν P1 (1st hand) || 38 ἐτε... 1267 a 17 πολεμεῖας=1267 a 37 ἐτε... 13 37 ἐτε... See the text arranged in parallel columns Intro. p. 80 f. || τελῇ Spengel, τετί ΠΠ Αρ. Bk. Susen. in the text, ὅτι?Susen. || 39 διὰ τῆς omitted by M, δῆλα by P1

1267 a 2 δ’ M1 P1-2.3 Ald. || καὶ omitted by Η and M (1st hand)

yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small.

26 γλάσχρως stingly, 'so as barely to make a living.' Demosth. c. Arist. 689. 15 ὑπὸ μικρὰ καὶ γλάσχρως (ἀποκόπεσθε), c. Pant. γλάσχρως καὶ μικρὰ; Plato Ref. vii 553 c γλάσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμακῶν φεύγοντο καὶ ἐγκαταβύσκοντο, thrillily and gradually, by saving and working.

28 τοῦ μέσου στοιχαστέν] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; iv(vii). 5 § 1, with the notes: also vi(iv). 11 § 2 ff, as quoted in n. (207). Susen. (237 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phales must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessities of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally, (c) for higher gratifications. Phales can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τοῦτο δ’ ὡς ἢσσα ταilate] Compare with what follows 5 §§ 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 §§ 12 n. (206) and Exc. II on Bk. 11 p. 333. Susen. (238)

36 ζέ ἡ ἢσσα ὡστε ἢ ταίτης. §10 38 στασιάζων] cp. vii(vii). 11 τασαχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίψην ἢ στάσεις. 40 This opposition of ἀγαθῶν, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in Níc. Eth. 1 § 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικόν, in Pd. viii(vi). 5. 10 with τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν. 1267 a 1 ἠδο δὲ ἠγερ αἰ τῆς αἰτήσεως.

2 Homer Iliad ix, 319. Susen. (239)

The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.
§ 11 Οὐ μόνον δὲ οἱ ἀνθρώποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὡς ἄκος (IV) εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἱσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὡστε μὴ λαυροῦτει διὰ τὸ 5 μὲν ἠγονίαν ἢ πειθήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς χαίροσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰὼν γὰρ μείζον ἱξοῦσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν 10 ταύτην ἀπάθειαν ἀδικήσουσιν, οὐ τόις διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἣν χαίροσι τὰς ἄνεν λυπῶν ἴδιοις. τὰ τόν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοὺς μὲν οὐσία βρα-8 ά χάει καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνης τρίτον δ', εἰ τινὲς δύναντο δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἄν ἐπιτησίεσθε εἰ μὴ παρὰ 13 φιλοσοφιὰς ἄκος. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δεῖται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσιν γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπέρβολας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυχαιότων οὖν ἰνα μὴ ῥηγῶσιν (did kal


§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in Eth. i. 12. 17 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἤχοτας ἢ αὐτὸς Ἵθες, τὰ τάς ἀναγκαία τόμος ἤχοτας, (viz. τὰ συμβατικα, e.g. τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορής, τὰ ἤχοτα μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχοτα, ἤχοτα ὑπέρβολα; these are ὧν ἀναγκαία) τὰς, τιμής, πλοῦτος are examples; and vii. 14. 2-1154 a 15 ff. τῶν δὲ συμβατικῶν ἔκαστον ἦστε ὑπέρβολα, καὶ, ὡς φαίνεται, περὶ δικές τῶν ἄνεγκλημα (sc. φαίνεται) ἦστε, ἄλλα οὖ τοῖς ἀναγκαίας (Congreve). Susem. (240)
§ 12 8 ταῖς ἄνεν λυπῶν θέματα Comp. Nic. Eth. vii. 12. 1152 b 36 ff. ἦστε καὶ ἄνεν λύση καὶ ἐπιθυμίασι εἰσὶν ἰδον, οἷον ἂν τοὺς θεωρεῖν ἐνεργείαν: X. 3. 7 1173 b 16 ff. ἦστε ἄνεν εἰσὶν ἂν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς καὶ τῶν καθά παραβολῆς, ἀλλὰ ἂν ταῖς διὰ της ἐνσώματos, καὶ ἀλλότρια, καὶ ἀλλότρια, τακτικά καὶ μεμθαλικά καὶ ἐπίπεδα. Taken from Plato Ἀριστ. 51 b–52 b where occurs αἰτὶ περὶ ταῦτα λεγόμενα τρωμάτα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁποῖαν αἰτὶ πλεονέκτα, καὶ τῶν φόβων; ἀλλὰ αἰτὶ περὶ τὰ μαθηματα ἓδοει. (Eaton.) Susem. (241)

One could hardly have supposed that this last was a fruitful source of crime. 9 ἄκος] Here is a digression into the region of practical suggestions and expedients, in the same spirit as vii(vii). c. 5, viii(v). cc. 8, 9.


Here this word means self-restraint generally, and not thrift, as before.

11 παρὰ φιλοσοφιάς As in § 15, ‘culture.’ The education of the citizens and the elevation of the masses are the leading ideas of B. v(vii).

12 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι sc. ἓδοει αὐτόν] Comp. Nic. Eth. X. 7. 4 1177 a 27 ff. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀναγκαῖοι, τῶν δὲ τοιαύτα τις πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀναγκαῖοι, λαμάτωσιν ἐκείρησιν ὡς δὲ ἀνεκαταργηθών τούτων καὶ μὲ ἢ ἀνεκαταργηθή, καὶ καλὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἄνεκαταργηθήν τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεατότοι, ὃς δὲ σοφός καὶ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῦ ἐστι: 12. 4. 5 1166 a 26 ff. (Eaton.) Susem. (243)

13 14 τυραννοῦσιν οὖν ἢ ναὶ μὴ p:] ‘It is not to keep out the cold that men become tyrants.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. 7 1134 b 6 ff. μοῦσα ἑαυτὸς ἄνεγκλημα ἂν τούτοις <ἐπεί οὔθεν αὐτῷ> πλεον ἰδεατότοι, τούτῳ δὲ τῆς καὶ γέφατος ἢν τε μὴ λεγάτα τά
§ 15. If the same punishment is to be imposed, and the same state, it is evident that the same laws should be applied.

§ 16. If we consider the nature of the laws, we must consider also the nature of the people. The laws of a small state will differ from those of a large state. The laws of a rich state will differ from those of a poor state. The laws of a free state will differ from those of a slave state. The laws of a happy state will differ from those of a miserable state. The laws of a just state will differ from those of an unjust state.

§ 17. If we consider the nature of the people, we must consider also the nature of the laws. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.

§ 18. If we consider the nature of the laws, we must consider also the nature of the people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.

§ 19. If we consider the nature of the people, we must consider also the nature of the laws. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.

§ 20. If we consider the nature of the laws, we must consider also the nature of the people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.

§ 21. If we consider the nature of the people, we must consider also the nature of the laws. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.

§ 22. If we consider the nature of the laws, we must consider also the nature of the people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people. The laws of a wise people will differ from those of a foolish people. The laws of a brave people will differ from those of a cowardly people.
30 τελειώ τοις κρείττων δια τήν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμείν, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἦν Ἆν καὶ μη ἕχων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. ὅπως ἐξεπλήγων Ἀταρνέας ἀποθέκουσα ἀπὸ τοῦτο κυρών ἄλληται τοῦ τρόπον τούτῳ τῆς διαπάντης ἔθελεν γὰρ ἐλαττ. 35 τοῦτον λαοῖς ἔκλειψεν ἢδὲ τῶν Ἀταρνέας ταύτα δὲ εἰς ποινὴν ἑποίησε τοῦ Ἀυτοφραδάτην σύννομον γενόμενον παύσαται.

§ 18 σβην τῆς πολιορκίας. ἦστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμβερόντων τῷ 11

34 ἐθελεῖν διὰ τὰ; (ἀλλὰρ William) || 35 καταλειφὼν Ἡρ. Βα. || 37 ἐστι μὲν... β 8 ἀδίκειται, with which goes b 9 φ. ... 13 έστατον, is believed by Susem. to be another recension of the preceding 1266 b 38 ἐστι... 1267 a 17 πολυερᾶς. See Introd. p. 81 should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less. The ellipse may be filled up thus, ἀλλὰ ὄντως πολεμεῖ τοις κρείττωσιν ἄν ἔκλειψεν καὶ μὴ ἔχων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. Our wealth should never tempt aggression: we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep'.

Republic IV 452 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the costs of victory, but when (even if it conquers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of ἐκείσατο and οὕσια, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute: ἀλλὰ ὄντως συμφέρεται ὡς ἄν συνέφερεν μὴ ἔχων τῶν κρείττων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. It can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Artaxerxes Memnon and at the commencement of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochos, the confusion in Asia Minor, more particularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphlagonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time ἐν θεῖο φιλικό-
τὰς ούσιας ἵσας εἶναι τῶν πολίτων πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV) πρὸς ἄλλης, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδέν ὡς εἰσεῖν, καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ 40 χαριστές ἀγανακτοῦν [ἀρ] ὡς οὐκ ἵσας δύνης ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ § 19 φαίνονται πολλακάς ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες: ἔτι δὲ 1367 b ἡ ποιγρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστικῶν, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν λεγόν  

dιαμβολὰ μὸνον, ὅταν δὲ ἢ ἡ ἀντίθετη, ἀλλὰ δένουν 

tαι πελεσοί, ἐξείς ἄξιοι ἐκλεισθείς, ἀπειροῦν γὰρ ἡ 

τῆς ἐπιθέσεως ὑπόθεσ, ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ 

§ 20 ἕσσι. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἁρξῆς, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς ούσιας ὁμα- 

6 ἔζειν, τὸ τούτῳ μὲν ἐπικείεσθαι τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτους παρασκευά- 

ζειν ὡστε μὴ βουλεύσασθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαίνοντες ὡστε μὴ 

δύνασθαι τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν, ἀν ἦσσιν τε ὅτι καὶ μὴ ἐνδικών-

§ 21 ταύτ., οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἱσώπητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρήκειν. περὶ 

10 γάρ τιν τῆς ἡτὶ κτήσιν ἱσάζει μὸνον, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δουλῶν

38 ἵσας after εἶναι Π ² Bk., perhaps Π; possibly right || 40 ἀν Π ² Bk., omitted by Π

1367 b ἡ ἁρξῆ is corrupt: ἄρα Scaliger, ἀπο Schneider, ἄρογη Μ. Vermehren, 
ἀρχή; ? Madvig probably right, ἄκαλαγης or ἀρτέριας ἁρχή Schmidt; ἄρχη 
Korner, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls 
στασιάζειν of § 19. 
39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτά] a 16 ὡστε πρὸς 
tὰς μικρὰς ἀξίας κτά. 

καὶ γὰρ ἄν κτά] “For even then (ὅν 
ἐσαι ἂν κτῆσις, § 10) the higher classes 
would be discontented, as they lay claim 
to something more than an equal share, 
and hence are often found aggressive and 
factional.”

40 ἐκ οὗ] ἀλλὰ πελεσοί: on the 
ground that they deserve something more 
than an equal share, something propor-
tionately greater. Comp. III. 13, 13 and 
Thuc. vii. 8g. 4 πάντες γὰρ ἀνθρώπων 
ἀξιῶν ὡς ὥστε ἐκ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρᾶ- 
tος αὐτὸ εἰκαστος εἰμι. In Thuc. i. 132 § 2 μὴ ἂν: superior.

§ 19 1367 b 2 διαμβολὰ This refers 
to the so-called òθεωρική, a grant of 
public money to provide for shows or public 
amusements introduced at Athens after 
Penelice’s time. In the first instance 
at those festivals only at which plays were 
exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price 
of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was 
paid from the state-chest to the lessee of 
the theatre for every citizen present. 
(Every one who went to the theatre re-
cieved a counter which he gave up on 
going in; the lessee collected from the 
state the two obols for every counter; but

he had to pay a rent out of his receipts 
and to keep the theatre in repair. See 
Bennondorf Beiträge in Zeitschrift f. d. öst. 
Gymn. xxvi. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subse-
sequently the poorer citizens received the 
like dole for all the other festivals, and 
these outgoings swallowed up no small 
part of the revenues. See Böckh Public 
Econ. of Athens p. 217 Eng. tr., Schö-
tr. An Attic obol = 1/3 of our money, 
a little more than five farthings, or 1 f 
German Pfennige; Hallach Greek and 
Roman Metrology p. 172. SUSEM. (245) 
4 ἂν πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτά] 
Comp. a 5 ὡστε καὶ ἡμὴν ἐπιθέσειν. 
§ 20 δὲ τὸ τούτον ἦν πολύνεκτον. 
Substantially the same remedy as in § 12 
τέτοιον ὅτι ἀπόφασα...ἀκό. 

§ 21 The argument from inconsistency 
is pressed from opposite sides here 
and in 6 § 15. Phæleas must have meant 
to include personal property, § 3.

10 ἢ ἡτὶ καὶ δουλῶν κτά] Comp. 
Plut. ch. 5, 7 πλοῦτων δὲ μέγα κυμα-

τός πρὸς ἔστιν, γῆς χωρίων κτῆσις, ἢ 
ἐτὶ ἡ ἐπιθέσεως κτῆσι καὶ θεαματικῶν καὶ 
ἀνδραπόδων, where Cope explains ἄν-
πλα as "moveables" opposed to fixtures, 
such as houses and land. Hence furni-
ture, even if of bronze, Xen. Oecon. ix. 6, 
Thuc. iii. 68.
καὶ βοσκημάτων πλούσιος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ (IV)
tολλῆτων καλομεῖνων ἐπίτλων ἢ πάντων οὐν τούτων ἰσό-
§ 22 τῆς ἐξηγήσεως τά τινα τινὰ μετρῶν, ἢ πάντα ἐκινήτων. φαι-
νεῖ τι ὡς ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευῶν τήν πόλιν μι-
κράν, εἰ γὰρ τεχνίτας πάντες δημόσιοι ἔστοιλεν καὶ μὴ
§ 23 πλήρωμα τι παρέξωσι τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεὶ δη-
μοσίους ἐνικήσατο τοῖς καὶ εὐρήγειμοι, δεὶ καθάπερ ἐν
Ἐπιδάμων τε, καὶ Διόρατος ποτὲ κατασκευάζων Ἀθηνῶν,
tούτων ἔχει τῶν τρόπων.
τὸ περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέως πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀν
τις τεορήσεις, εἰ τις τυχόναι καλὸν εἰρηκὸν ἢ μὴ κα-
8 λὸς 'Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφάντων Μελίσσος, ὡς καὶ τῇ τῶν

16 δὲις ὅις Ὑμιλάων (Qb Tb Uv Ia) Ar. Ald. and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.) ||
17 δὲις καὶ with a comma after 16 εἴπερ Bernays; if so, ἐργαζόμενος <μόνον>-
Susem.; probably right, but see Comm. The same sense can be obtained by Well-
don's punctuation εἴπερ δεὶ δημοσίους εἶναι, τὸ τὰ καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι δεὶ, καθάπερ
provided ὃς be inserted after 18 τῶν καὶ || 18 ὃς inserted by Morel Bk. before Δι-
φατος, omitted by II; the translations of
had ὃς in their mass. || 21 τῷ τῆς Ποι||
passage had been suspected by Fülleborn.

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι = public servants.
Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημοφυίς = ἱερὸς): also
παντελονικό and others, Plato Corp. 455 b with Dr Thompson's note, Politici-
ca 259 A. 15 πλήρωμα τι παρέξωσι τῆς πόλεως
Exactly Plato's expression Rep. 371 e πλήρωμα δὲ πόλεως εἰς καὶ μονολο-
(aton). Susem. (249)
§ 23 17 ἐν Ἐπιδάμῳ κτλ. "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy
politician like Phaeas could hatch the thought that the handicrafts
of the city should be carried on by public
slaves. The proposal made at Athens by
Diophantos, we do not know when, was
that only the artisans who worked for the
community were to be public slaves";
trans.] This was certainly the case at
Epidauros. With the present text this
sense can only be obtained by interpreting
the words τῶν τὰ καὶ ἐργαζόμενον to mean 'those who do common work for
the whole community'; and we should be
forced to assume that even Phaeas' pro-
sposal went no further than this, which is
very improbable. Hence the alteration
suggested by Bernays is tempting. The
archon of the year Ol. 96, 2 = 395/4 was
named Diophantos, but he can hardly
have been the man. "Aelian relates that
the people of Epidauros allowed any one
who liked to settle amongst them as a
resident, 'Ἐπιδάμου ἐπίθετοι καὶ μετα-
κεῖν παράξειο τοῦ βουλευτήν: V. Π. III.
16' (J. G. Schneider). But this fact
throws no light on the passage. On the
constitution of Epidauros see further III.
16 § 2. vii(v). 1 § 10. 4 § 7 nm. Suse-
men. (249)

Bernays renders: "But if (this proposal
is to be tried), state-slaves ought only
to be employed upon works for state
objects, and the arrangement must be
made as it is found in Epidauros and as
Diophantos wanted to introduce it at
Athens."

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of
Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter
is analysed p. 105 f. § 1 22 Ἰππόδαμος See Excursus
Π. 1 b το B. 11 p. 331 ff.; also K. F. Hermann
De Hippodamo Miletio (Marburg 1841).
Susem. (250)
This chapter is treated slightly by
Hildbrand pp. 58—61, Oncken L.
213—218, Henkel 161—165. See also
πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὐρέ καὶ τὸν Πειραιά κατέτειμαν, γενόμενος (V) καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίων περιπτότερον διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ὤντος ἢ ὡστε δοκεῖν ἐν τούτοις ξῆν περιεργότερον τρεῖς τὲ πλέον καὶ κόμης, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐσθήτους εὐτελεῖς μὲν ἀλεξηνῆς δὲ σῶκ ἐν τῷ κεφαλῷ μόνον ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς χρόνους, λόγους δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην φότον εἶναι βουλόμενοι.] πρῶτος τῶν μη πολιτευωμένων ἐνεχείρησε τῇ περὶ πολιτείας § 2 εἰσεῖ τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 21 μὲν μυριαδοῦν, ἐκ τριά δὲ μέρη διερρήμενην ἐποίει τὰρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνῶν, ἐν δὲ γεωργῶν, τρίτον δὲ τὸ πρὸς 3 πολεμοῦ καὶ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχον. διήρει δὲ εἰς τρία μέρη <καὶ> τὴν


22 kai...bouleumeno] Fülleborn remarked long since: "every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamos. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man's vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it." And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastus than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (250)

κατέτειμαν cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar Pyth. 5. 84 εὐθύτερον κατέθεεν...ἀπεραντόν ὄντων.

25 τὴν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words εὐθύτερο could be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of P[1] adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κακοσμίων, the reading of P[8] (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl., Suppl. 246 for κακοσμίων, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλεσμένῳ or κοιμήσας, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

πλέον τὲ πλὴν καὶ κόμης] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hegesippus, a contemporary and supporter of Demostenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρηβάδος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φθειρῇ...ἡμῶν κομφᾶς, Aristoph. Knights 280. See Becker Charicles III. 123 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453-455. SUSEM. (251)

26 ὁπλαῖον of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγος] a man of learning, as in IV(vii) 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωρολόγος.

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Onken i. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle's criticism §§ 8-12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 διήρει δὲ εἰς τριά μέρη κτῆτοι] So too Aristotle IV (vii), cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cr. p. (365) on II 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)
Here there is just a germ of Plato's ideal state, where we consider that the soldiers answer to the second order, and the artisans and farmers together to the third order of citizens in the Republic. However even when viewed in this light the differences between the two schemes are as great as the resemblances. But the state proposed in the Lais may be described as hardly anything more than an improved working out of Phaleas' ideal. Comp. L. Stein op. c. p. 162 f. Sue Sem. (255) § 4 37 ψέτο κτλ. See Exc. II. to B. 11 p. 333 f. Sue Sem. (256 b) έδθαι and ψάθη answer to crimes against the person and against property. Not precisely however; for έδθαι implies insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings or honour, whether accompanied by violence or not. Whereas ψάθη implies loss or damage sustained, whether to person or property. See Rhet. I. 12. 26. II. 2. 5 with Cope's excellent comments.

This idea of a court of appeal is further evidence that Hippodamos had a fine sense for jurisprudence. It is appropriated by Plato also Laws VI 767 c—e, XII 956 c f. (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. Sue Sem. (256) 40 τό κύριον = the supreme court. § 5 1268 a 1 σο διδ ψήφοφορίας.) In the Athenian courts the voting was secret: each juryman (δικαστή) received two ballots, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal; and there were two urns, one of copper, into which the ballot containing the verdict was thrown, the other of wood, into which the other, unused ballots were thrown. The ballots for voting were either differently coloured stones or small metal balls, or even differently coloured beans or shells. At what time the one or other of these were used is not known. Stones were certainly the most common; a black stone served for condemnation, a white one for acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a hole in it served for the former purpose, a whole one served for the latter purpose. Equality of votes was counted as acquittal. (Meier and Schömann Attische Prozess 720 f.) Sue Sem. (257) Aristotle himself is our authority for the voting at Athens: see Frag. 1548 b 5—41 of the Berlin ed. 3 ἀκόλουθον ἐκατον κτλ.] Nearly the same arrangement was actually introduced amongst the Romans: a fact which shows how clearly this proposal testifies to a legal mind of great originality. At Rome the voting was by tablets in the manner here proposed, leaving it to the judges to affirm not simply condemnation (C) or acquittal (A), but also a verdict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet). That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite unable to realize to himself the proper meaning of the proposal is a further proof of its originality. (L. Stein.) Comp. n. (560) on §§ 13—15. Sue Sem. (288)
Δ' ἀπολούοι ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <ἐῶν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μῆ, τούτο (V) διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ ὡς ἡ τον νενομοθετησθαί καὶ ἀναγκάζομαι τὰ ἡ τάκτα δικαίωσαι. εἰ δὲ 4 νόμον ἔτιθει περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τῷ τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὥστε τυγχάνοντι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευταντῶν ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν, ὥς οὗτο ἀντί τοῦ 10 παρ' ἀλλοις νενομοθετημένου· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναῖς οὕτως τὸ δήμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρων τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἀρχηγοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀριστοὺς εἶναι πάντας· δὴ δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἰρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὁρμαντικῶν.

15 τῷ μὲν οὖν πλέον καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίολογα τῆς Ἰππο-ε.'

4 ἄπολεως Μπ1 Π4 Ο4, ἄπολεως ΙL || <ἐῶν> Μείερ ἐπὶ δικαίωσαι τούτοις l.c. perhaps rightly || 6 δ' omitted by Π1 Μ4, τοῦτο omitted by Λ1 and P4 (1st hand, both words added by p1) [5] [6] Susem, but see Dittenberger ὑφ. c. p. 1560 f. || ἐτιθεὶς νόμον Μ4 in the margin, in the text νόμον omitted, ἐτιθεὶς νόμον Μ4 Π4 Q4 Λ1 Π4 (1st hand, emended by corr.) 9 τοῦτο [tôe and 10 Ἀθηναῖς instead of Ἀλαρ Σπενγλ, but see Dittenberger ὑφ. c. p. 1569 ff. and Comm.] || 11 ἐτιθεὶς Μ4 P4 Q4 Λ1 Π4 (1st hand, supplied by p1) in the margin

5 ἀναγκάζομαι sc. τῶν νόμων, § 6 9 ἄρτος κτάλι ["just as this law had not been made before elsewhere."

So K. F. Hermann De Hippodamo p. 44, who is defended by Dittenberger (Götting. gel. Anz. 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel. It is true that ὡς with the participle might equally mean (1) because in fact, as in Pl. Phaedr. 245 ζ ὡς τουτεύον ὠριστή ἄφοθεν, or (2) because as he thought (ὅως οὖν διδάσκειν § 6 6): but ὡς is not decisive in favour of (1), see n. (159).

οὕσω, not μόνο; cp. Λύσια 14 § 10 ἐπιδραμοῦν ἀναγκαίως, ὥς ἄρτος ἔκδοσιν τῇ πόλει διέστη λαμβάνει: 67 § 16 ὡς τοῦ ὁδείον ἄλλω ἀν καὶ τῇ ἑλέστῃ βίοια αὐτός μελέτοι: Xen. Cypr. v. 1. 13 ὥς ὡς ἀναγκαίως τὸ κλέπτην, αἰτία τῶν κλέπτων. The clause is virtually oblique, and the negative is reproduced unchanged.

10 ἐν τῇ δι... τοῦ ὡς δ' ἀρχηγοὺς κτάλι [Here as often ὡς = as things are, "under the existing system" not simply = now, as Spengel explains it. Unless one follows Spengel in an untenable alteration of the text, the drift of the passage can only be a censure upon Hippodamos, which is even in this form quite intelligible, though it would certainly have been more clearly expressed as follows: "whereas a law like this was already at the time in force at Athens," We cannot however prove the date of this Athenian regulation (on which Wilmowsitz Ars Kyathica p. 26 may also be consulted), but the present passage would seem to make it earlier than the treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite possible that Aristotle's censure is unfair; for who is to inform us that in its author's intention the scheme of Hippodamos was restricted to new proposals, never before realized? Cp. Hermann ὑφ. c. 43 f. Susem. (209) Cp. for ὡς §§ 5, 1 § 3, 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 ὡς ἄρτος τοῦτο (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ ὡς (as things actually are), Rhet. i. 1 § 4, 1 § 13, 19 καθάπερ ἐν ἁλίτε γι' ὡς ἢ τῆς πόλεως. § 7 11 τοὺς δ' ἀρχηγοὺς κτάλι All officials (perhaps even the priests) were consequently to be appointed by popular election and not by lot; comp. Excursus ii p. 332. Susem. (260) 12 δημο... τοῦτο [It would seem that Hippodamos did not state whether all three classes were eligible (Onken). See however n. (261), Susem. (261) 13 τοὺς δ' ἀρχηγούς the magistrates elected to have the charge of state matters and of the affairs of foreigners and minors in the city.
δάμων τάξεως ταύτης ἐστὶν· ἀπορρήσει δ' ἀν τις πρὸτον μὲν τὴν (V)
§ 8 διάρεσιν τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν πολείτων. οὶ τε γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχουσιν κοινωνούσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες,
οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνίται οὕτω γῆν οὔτε οὐκέ 
τα ὅπλα, ὡστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων.
§ 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ 
τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντων καθιστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοῦς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀρχικῶν ὡς εἰπεὶν); μὴ 
μετέχονται δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς ὅλον τὸν πλῆθος ἐχεῖν
25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ κράτιτοι εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα 
γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὖν ρᾴδιον
§ 10 μὴ παλλοῦσα ὄντας· εἶ δὲ τοὺτο ἐστιν, τί δὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν μετέ 
χεῖς τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίως εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχικῶν κα 
ταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τὶς χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίται
30 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι (πάσα γὰρ δεῖ τὰς πόλεις τεχνιτῶν), (p. 42)
καὶ δύναται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλα ὀπλα 
σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοὺς τὰ 
ὅπλα κεκτημένους τὴν τροφὴν εὐλόγος ἄν ἦσαν τι τῆς πό 
λεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαι ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἰδία γεωρ 
§ 11 γῆσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινῆν, ἀφ' ὧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἐξούσιο 
35 τὴν τροφὴν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργίσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ μά 

17 om. omitted by M, P, [o] Susem. || 25 cal omitted by II² Ar. Bk. || 26 γε 

16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. 10 
§ 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξει 
τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνίας 1. 2. 16, or τῆς 
poleis 11. 6. 1, where the sense of 
ordering, arrangement, is as apparent as 
in 11. 2 § 4, or 11. § 9, or 111. 1. 1. 
ἀπορρήσει δ' ἀν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle 
criticizes (§§ 8—15) (I) the entire division 
into classes, (2) the special position of 
the agricultural class, (3) the innovations 
in the administration of justice.
§ 8 20 δοῦλοι] This partly explains 
the proposal of Phileas to make them 
δοῦλοι.
§ 9 21 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ] 
Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to 
have been the intention of Hippodamos. 
Susem. (262)

22 πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of ma 
gistracy Aristotle understands by this 
word is not clear and is not sufficiently 
explained by the notice, viii(v). 6 § 6 σ. 
(1573), of a magistracy under this name 
in Larisa. Susem. (263)

As typography are attested by an inscription 
for Larisa of 314 B.C. (Rudgey Transac 
tions 11 p. 138) it seems likely that Aris 
totle there uses a different term in order 
to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ κτλ] Aristotle 
himself altogether excludes the farmers, 
tradesmen, and artizans in his ideal state 
from the rights of citizenship; which is a 
much stronger measure. But possibly he 
thinks it is not essential for those who 
are thus excluded to be attached to the 
constitution, but that if they are to be 
citizens, it is. Susem. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίνεσθαι = earn subsistence; 
so καταγίνεσθαι.

33 εὐλόγος ἀν κτλ] They would 
then be in the position of the δῆμος of 
the República.

34 γενὶ δὲ] whereas what Hippoda 
mos proposes is that they shall have land 
of their own.
χιμων ἐτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦσιν, βουλεταὶ δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ (V) 
ἐτεροὶ τινες ἔσονται τῶν τοῖς τῇ ἡμέρᾳ γεωργοῦσιν καὶ τῶν 
μαχιῶν, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τούτῳ τὴς πάλης, οὐδὲ 
§ 12 τοῦ μετέχου, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτρον τῆς πολιτείας· ἄλλοι μὴν 
εἰ 41 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τοῖς τῆς ἱδίας καὶ τοῖς τῆς 
κοινῆς γεωργοῦσι, τὸ τε πλῆθος ἀπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ 
§ 13 

ἐκαστὸς γεωργησθεὶς δύο οίκια, καὶ τίνος ἔνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς 
γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κληρῶν αὐτῶν τε τῆς τροφῆς 

λήφθωσι τοῖς τοῖς μαχιῶνοι παρέξουσι; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολὺ 

§ 13 λὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν. οὗ καλῶς δ’ οὖν ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως 8 

ἐξεῖ νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξίων διαιροῦσα τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς 

γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τοὺς δικαστὶν διαιτήσαν. τοῦτο γὰρ 

ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλεῖσσοι εἰδέχεται (κοινολογοῦσται γὰρ 

ἀλληλος περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοὺς δικαστηρίους οὐκ 

ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιούτων τοῦτο τῶν νομοθέτων οἰ πολλοὶ.

37 γεωργοῦν Μ P²  | ἐτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ M⁴, a similar gloss τῶν 

ἐτέρων εἶναι P  in the margin | 39 α’ ὅν Π⁴ | τῶν after τῆς πάλης Μ P²  | 42 

Spengele thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἀπορον, for which δυσφόρον 

seems to him to be required by the sense.

1268 b 1 γεωργῆσαι Π Bk., ministrabit William, habent ministrare Ατ., doubtless 

on mere conjecture; hence erroneously υπομενήσει Vettori Susen⁴ and others 

ἢō οἰκία can hardly be sound, διἀ οἰκίας Ατ. Camerarius, <ei> διὸ οἰκία Bern- 

nays, διὸ [οἰκία] Busse not happily | 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad), 

<ἐνθ> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susen⁴; there is some corruption | 5 τὸ κρίνει 

ἀξίων Π Bk., τὸ κρίνειν διὰδων Σusen⁴ wrongly from the translations of William and 

Ατ. | διαιροῦσιν P²-³ Q B³ T⁵ Α Bk., διαιροῦσιν Λ² | δίεπα Π² Ατ., κρίσεως P² 

Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) | 6 γὰρ Ατ., δ’ Γ Bk., | 7 καὶ <μῦ> 

πλὴν τῶν ? Koraes | 9 καὶ omitted by Γ M⁴ | τῶν τῶν P²-³ Q B³ T⁵ Bk., 

τοῦτων W² L² Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βουλεταὶ κτλ] Comp. n. (201) on 6 § 6.

§ 12 42 τὸ τε πλῆθος ἀπορον κτλ] 

"the amount of produce will be inadequate for the maintenance of two 

establishments." This again is a mere 

assertion which ought to have been 

proved. Susen. (266).

1268 b 1 γεωργῆσαι οἰκίας] See 

Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend 

the text as meaning to maintain two house-

holds by agriculture on the analogy of 

οἰκία οἰκεῖν.

§ 13 4. ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law 

about passing sentence.

§ τὸ κρίνειν διὰδων κτλ] "the requirement 

that a verdict shall be returned 

upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. κατὰ-

καζῆ τὸ δὲ μή, § 5) when the charge in 

the indictment is simple, whereby the 

juror is turned into an arbitrator." 

ἀξίων 

is infinitive.

§ 10 τὸ τοῦ γάρ κτλ] This is practicable 

in arbitration even (καὶ) where there 

are several arbitrators, for they 

confer with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλὴν τῶν] At Athens a single 

public arbitrator decided each case, but if 

private arbitrators were chosen by the 

parties to the dispute themselves, a body 

of 3 or 4 might well have been more 

common. Susen. (266)

§ ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect 

then the practice in the Greek courts of 

justice was just the reverse of that in 

ours. Susen. (267)
Π. 8. 16] 1268 a 37—1268 b 23. 275

10 παρασκευάζοντος όπως οἱ δικασταὶ, μὴ κοινολογοῦνται τρόπῳ (V)

14 ἀλλήλους. έπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἦσται ταραχάδης ἡ κρίσις, ἡταν ἡ ὁδοὶ κατακάζομενοι; δὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐλκούν μιᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει δέκα μιᾶς (ὅ, δὲ μὲν πλέον ὁ δὲ ἐλασσόν), ἀλλὸς δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέσσαρας (καὶ τούτων δῆ τὸν τρόπον δὴν ἡμὺν ὁμοφωνώς. 15 οὖν, ὁ δὲ πάντα καταδικάζομεν, οὐ δὲ υἱόν τις οὗ ὁ τρόπος δῆται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἐτι [δ'] οὖν καὶ ἐπικρατεῖ ἀναγκαῖος τὸν ἀπλόν ἀποδικασάμενα ἡ καταδίκασαμα, εἰπερ ἂν ἄλλος τὸ ἔγγραφον γέγραπται δικαίως: οὐ γὰρ μὴ

10 λευκὴς τὰς ἐλκούς μιᾶς. περὶ τοῦτοι οὐκ ἀναφέρεται τί τῇ ποιείν συμφέραν όψιν γίνεσθαι των τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστων ἀναφο-

12 μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ Π. καὶ πέρα ἔ, ὡς Π, ὁ πέρα Π, καὶ πέρα Π (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δ' omitted by Π. || 19 γέγραπται δι-

§ 14 οἱ δικαστὲς may be either litigant. If the participle is passive, it denotes the defendant; if middle, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

§ 14 οἱ δικαστὲς may be either litigant. If the participle is passive, it denotes the defendant; if middle, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

§ 14 ὁ δικαστής may be either litigant. If the participle is passive, it denotes the defendant; if middle, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

13 δὲ μὲν γὰρ...15 τέσσαρας ὁ δικαστὴς may be either litigant. If the participle is passive, it denotes the defendant; if middle, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

§ 15 τῆς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what way then are the votes to be counted, i.e. sorted? διὰ λογίας = collecting and arranging: divinitio Cic. Pro Flacco § 14.

19 ὁπως ἐπικρατεῖ...καίνων] “If the in-

10 τῆς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what way then are the votes to be counted, i.e. sorted? διὰ λογίας = collecting and arranging: divinitio Cic. Pro Flacco § 14.

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ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ B. 8.

Περι τα νομοθετειν, ἄλλα εὐθυμομεν ἀκούσαι μύιον’ ἔχει (V) 25 γάρ συνοφαιντας καὶ κινήσεις, ἀν τύχης, πολιτείας ἐμπίπτει δ’ εἰς ἄλλα πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἔτεραν ἀπορούνς γὰρ τινς πότερον ἡ συμφέρων τοις πόλεσι τὸ § 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἀν ἦ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διότερον δ’ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λεγόμεντι ταχύ τιγχορέοις, εὔπερ μὴ συμφέροντο εἰς κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινας νόμων λόγων ἡ πολιτείας ὥς κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιημέθα μενειαν, 11 § 18 ἐτ’ εἰμι μετὰ περὶ αὐτὸν διαστελλομένων βελτίων. ἔχει γὰρ, ὅσπερ ἐπομενεῖ, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξεις ἂν βελτίων ἐπιθέτου τὸ § 19 τοις εὐθείᾳ κινήσει παρὰ τὰ πάροικα καὶ γενικατλητή καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχνεις πόσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὡστε ἐτεί μίαν τοιῶν θετέων καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς, δήλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταῖς τῆς ἀναγκαίων ὁμοίων ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ’ ἂν γεγονόντα αἰτίας τίς ἐν αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι νόμοις ἠλλ’

27 τὸ <μὴ> W* L’ Ald. || 30 γάρ Spengel, δ’ Γ ΙΙ Bk. || 33 μηδὲ ΙΙ Βk. Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,”—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24 [καὶ γὰρ κτλ.] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see n. on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman delatores. ἐπί τῆς = should it so happen: and so τῶν τε, τιμῶν, τε, ἐπέγειρον.

26 [ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. ἀποτυγκά μὲν τινες? Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16−25 Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?

With this interesting discussion compare Ῥήμ. 1. 15 §§ 4−12 (Spengel); also Plato Polit. 394 λ −302.

28 τῶν πατρίους νόμοων] ‘The ancestral laws’ would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (οἵν οἰκεία ματά) to the written code, Plato Laws i i i 690 λ ἡ εἰς γενώματα ἐκι ποιεῖται εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς λεγόμενοις πατρίους νόμων ἀποκριθεὶς ἔχουσι. Comp. Laws vii 793 ν −β: see n. (48) on l. 6, 1, and i. 1. § 5, § 15, § 17, 29 τὸ λεγέντος = the proposal of Hippodamos.

ἐνετ’ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν] “in case it turns out to be inadvisable”: i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

30 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ.] “Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit.” When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμωι = the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γράφη παρακλήσεως, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

32 διαστελλαθεῖ = enter into detail. It is used in Topics v. 3. 8, 131 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διαπερασθεῖ. Cf. Pl. Resp. vii 555 β τοίς δὴ διαστάλλεται;

§ 18 33 Βελτίων τὸ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18−22.

34 ἐπὶ γονιῶν τοῖς ἄλλων κτλ.] Cp. III. 15. 4, n. (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8: 17(vii), 2 × 13 n. (726); 13 × 2 n. (570): III. 6 § 7 n. (531). SUSEM. (270)

36 μᾶν.....37 πολιτικῶν] It is Aristotile’s invariable practice to rank Politics with the “arts and faculties”: e.g. Ῥημ. vii 116 γέγονε (vii), 1 §§ 1−3, Nic. Eth. i. 1. §§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.
40 ἀπλοὺς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς. ἐσιδηρόφοροντο τὸ γὰρ οἱ Ἔλλ. 12
§ 20 λῆνες, καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἐνοικοῦντο παρὰ ἄλλους, ὅταν ἡ
λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαῖων ἐστὶ νυμφίον, εὐθὺς πάμπαν ἐστὶν,
1269 οἶνον ἐν Κύμη περὶ τὰ φωκανόν γῶς ὅσιν, ἀν πλὴθος
40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦτο τὸ γὰρ Πρ. 1-3, ἐσιδηροφοροῦτο γὰρ Πρ. 4, ἐσιδηροφοροῦν τὸ γὰρ
Πρ. 1, ἐσιδηροφοροῦν γὰρ Τρ. 1, ἐσιδηροφοροῦν τὸ γὰρ Βάρ. 3, ἐσιδηροφοροῦν τὸ γὰρ
Κόραις, ἐσιδηροφοροῦν γὰρ τὸν Κυμην δισ. 1, misled by William’s version; see Dittenbergs c. 1. 1371
1269 a 1 κόμης ΠΓ

40 ἐσιδηρόφορον] Thuc. i. § 3 τὰς συνεργατικὰς τοὺς τὰς ἀντικρο-
τας ἀπὸ τὴν καλλιάδα κοσμεῖται ἰμμελένως: 6 § 1 πάσας γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηρόφορη, διὰ τὰς ἀφάνειας τὰς οἰκείας καὶ δὲν ἀφανεῖς
παρὰ ἄλλους ἐργάσει, καὶ γινόμεν τὴν διάπεκται μὲν ἐκεῖνων ἀνακάλυπται (J. G.
Schneider). Susm. (270) d
41 τὰς γυναίκας ἐνοικοῦσα] The suitor purchased the daughter of her father by
means of presents (ἐδῶν): see Schomann Greek Antiquities i. 52 [Eng. trans. by
Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider compares marriage by covenant among the
Romans. Susm. (271)

There is a valuable note on the ἐδῶν or bride-price in the English translation
of the Odyssey by Butcher and Lang.

"The ἐδῶν in Homer are invariably gifts
made by the wooers to the father or
kinsmen of the bride, that is, the bride-price,
the kalym of the dwellers on the Volga...

The father of the bride was thus said
ἐδώσατο θήγαρι (Od. ii. 53), to accept
certain ἐδῶν as the price for his daugh-
ter,—what is called ‘coming to terms
about the marriage’ in Pind. xii. 381
(ἀριστη…σωματικ…ἀμφι γάμῳ). As a rule
the woman would go to the highest bid-
der, but in the case of a favoured wooer
it seems to have been not unusual either
to remit the price and give the bride
ἀνὰθέων (cp. Agamemnon’s offer to A-
chilles, Il. ix. 141), or to return a portion
of the ἐδῶν after marriage (Od. i. 278,
11. 156), as is still the custom among the
Kanekas in New Caledonia." Homer
also mentions gifts from the wooers to
the bride, and μελα, gifts from the bride’s
father to his daughter: but φερφι, the
later word for dowry, does not occur.
Even in Findar ἐνα is used in the sense
of φερφι: Pyth. 3. 94. (Eaton compares
Tac. Germ. 18; but that is the ‘Morgengabe,’ something quite different.)
§ 20 1269 a 1 οἶνον ἐν Κύμη. This forcibly recalls compurgation, the
established legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic
peoples. That the oath might thus be
employed on behalf of the accuser is suf-
ciently attested, although cases where it
is taken on behalf of the accused are
usually mentioned. The Greek custom is
confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn,
column 11, lines 36—44. The law has
prescribed certain fines, the price to be
paid for the ransom of an accused person
charged with adultery and in the power
of his captors. But he may plead that he
was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp.
[Demosth.] c. Nees. 66 § 1367, οἱ ἀδίκων ἑργάζοντας ἀψώ ἔργον. If so, the
captor must support his charge by com-
parurgators, whose number depends on the
amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four
are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200
staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is a
full citizen. (b) Two are necessary if
the aggrieved husband is a ἀρητάρας,
i.e. free but not a full citizen; while
(γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf
(πλάκος), the serf’s lord (πάροικος) and one
other compurgator must appear. The
fine for (γ) is 2½ staters, for (β) 10 or 20
staters. The Cretan text of the law runs
thus: αὐ χα δίκαιον διασαραθήθαι [i.e. ἕλυ
διάκον ναφρ διασαραθεῖν], ὁμοίοι τοι τοῦτο τὸ
πετσεκόφαστερι [τοῦ πετσεκόφαστα-
την] καὶ πλακων πετων αὐτοῦ, ἐν αὐτοῦ
[ἐναυτῷ] ἐκάκου ἐγαρυμένον [ἐγαρυμένον],
το δ’ ἀκτέραμ [τοῦ δ’ ἀκτέραμον] τριτον
αὐτοῦ, το δ’ ἀκτέραμον τοῦ πετων αὐτοῦ,
ἀκτέραμον τοῦ ἐγεγραμμένον ἐγεγραμμένον,
ὅτι ἐγεγραμμένον ἐγεγραμμένον ἐγεγραμμέ
καθάτως ἐν αὐτῷ. And if he shall plead
that the (capto) overmastered him, the
captor shall swear,—in the case of the 50
staters or more, himself with four others,
each impeaching on himself: in the
case of a classless man, himself with two
others: in the case of a house-thrall,
his lord with one other,—(an oath) that he
took him in adultery and overmastered
him not. See Zittelmann in Das Recht
von Gortyn, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. S.
Raby The Twelve Tables of Gortyn in the
Law Quarterly Review II. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of διόλωσιν with 'beguiled,' as if from διόλων.

§ 21 εἰ τις γιγαντίας ἦσαν] It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, αὐτόκτονοι; see Peller Grisch. Mythol. p. 61 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth in Polit. 271 ff., cp. Synop. 191 B f. In De Gen. Anim. III. 11. 25, 56 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio acquirivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (372)

εἰ τις γιγαντίας τίνος ἦσαν. This agrees with the view explained in n. (167) on § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato Timæus 22 c: πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθορὰς γεγονότα ἄρθρωσαν καὶ ἐξεστασαν, περὶ μὲν καὶ ὑδατι μέγασαν, μελλῶν δὲ ἀλλα πολλά βραχύτερα: Laws III 677 A ff. πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονότα κατακλυσμοῖ τε καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εν ὁδι βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λευκάστων γένος. SUSEM. (273)

§ 22 6 μόνον εἰναὶ καὶ] 'were much the same as the ordinary silly people' of today: cp. Vahlen Beitrag II. 314. of τιγχάνει recurs in c. § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3. οὔτε καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark Polit. 274 B f.: αὐτό δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἄθροισαν γεγονότα διηγήσατο τι ἀνθρώπων (κυρίως τῶν θηρίων), καὶ εὐθὺς ἀνήκουσι καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ πρώτου ὁμοιός χρόνος. Εἰ τῶν πάντων ἐν μέγαλά ἦσαν ἄπολις. SUSEM. (374)

SUSEM. (375) Πρ. Protag. 321 c: man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

§ 23 διὰ τῶν γεγραμένων] Positive law as contrasted with the διάγνωσις and ἀγράφω σώμα discussed in §§ 19—21. See VII (VI). 5. 2 τίμιως δὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τῶν γεγραμένων. The distinction is best explained by Cope Introduct. to Rhetoric pp. 239—244.

§ 22 § 23 9 ὅπως γαρ...καὶ ἀκάκοινον εἰσήν] See III. 10 § 11 with n. (653) f. and n. (657) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 n. (579): the ruler or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μη βέβαιον εἰναὶ καθένα διορίστα τί πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικήν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing." § 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.
II. 9. 1]

1269 a 2—1269 a 30.

279

νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶντων οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἠφελήσεται (V) κινήσας, διὸν ἠβασμήση τοῖς ἀρχοντος ἀπειθεὶς ἐθίσθεις.

§ 24 ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐ

20 γάρ ὅμως τὰ κείμενα τέχνην καὶ νόμων ὃ γάρ νόμος ἴσχυς οὐκ εἶχεν ἐκ τῶν ἐπιθέσεων παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τούτο δὲ οὐ γίνεται ἐι μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὅστε τὸ ραβίος μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ἐπιθέσεως νόμων εἰς ἐπετέρως νόμους

§ 25 καίνους ἀσθενής ποιεῖ τοις ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἐτι δὲ

25 εἰ καὶ κυνηγεῖον, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάγη τολμεῖσα, ἢ

ₒυ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισιν; ταῦτα ἢ ἔχει μεγά-

λην διαφοράν.

9 διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφώμην ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν (Ἀλλὸς γὰρ ἔστι καρπὸν) περὶ δὲ τῆς Δακεδαμοιανίας πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Υ

30 Κρητικῆς, σχεδοῦν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων δύο

17 ἠφελήσεται τις Μπ.1, ἠφελήσεται <φ> Susem.1-4 misled by the translations of William and Ar. 18 βασιλεύσαντι δε Schneider已被忽略 Bernays, which I should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of καί τῶν ἀρχων after 17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρὰ Π', πλὴν corr.1 of Π' δ., πλὴν παρὰ Π' Bk. || 23 νόμον

Π' T' and Π' (1st hand altered by corr.2) || 25 καὶ before κυνηγεῖον omitted by Γ'M', [καὶ] Susem.1-2 καὶ κυνηγεῖον Π' || καὶ πάντες Π' Q' T' Π' Bk. || 26 δε...1273 b 24

ψυχικάς noticed by Michael of Ephesus

17 οὐ γάρ τοσοῦτον κτλ.] Comp. Rhet. 1. 15. 12 οὖν λαοῖκαι παρασφό-


§ 24 ψεῦδος δὲ κτλ.] 'These re-

24 marks are very true. This is a difference between the sciences or arts and the laws. In the former only he who follows the science has to act and his action on an improved method proceeds from conviction: whereas, if the laws are altered, all must act according to the new law and thought unconvinced of the need for alteration' (Slosser). Susem. (276)

21 παρὰ τὸ ἔθος] 'has no force to secure obedience apart from habit.' The Critical Notes show how the 'conflate' reading, πλὴν παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 ἐτι δὲ...27 διαφοράν] Plato's utterance Λαυτοὶ 1 634 D exactly agrees with this: όμω μὲν γάρ (Cretans and Lacedaemonians), εἰκερ καὶ μετρών κατη-

καθάσταται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰ τῶν καλλιτῶν

ἐν εἰς νόμων μὴ γίνεται τῶν νόμων μὴ γίνε

τῶν, ποια καλῶς αὐτῶν ἡ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει,

...γέρων δὲ εἰ τις τις τῶν νόμων τούτων ἔστιν

πρὸς ἀρχηγότα τε καὶ πρὸς ἦκτατον μηδὲν εἰπάρχων

ἐναρίστων ἕνα τωμίων τοῦτον τούτων ἔνατον

Oncken, t. 253, strangely alleges this passage of the Λαυτοὶ as a proof of its author's design 'to strangle the healthy common sense of men in the name of political order.' Susem. (277)


This implies that the question has to be decided elsewhere in the treatise.

c. 9 Examination of the Spartan polity.

See Anal. p. 106. Since Göttling's Exeans, pp. 463—471 of his edition, this chapter has been most fully treated by Oncken t. 218—299, Π. 317—376, who writes with especial reference to Grote's memorable chapter on Lycurgus and in vol. 11, to the later monograph by Tröber Forschungen and Gilbert Studien. See p. 35 note 3. The fragments of the Polit.

1557 B. 38—1560 a 28 should be compared. See also Jamet Les institutions sociales à Sparte.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 9.

[Π. 9.1]
eisín aí skēfeis, múa méν eître tì kalóς ἡ μῆ καλοῦ πρὸς tìn (VI) ἀρίστην περιομῆντητας tāξιν, etéra d' eître tì prōs tìn upóthēsin kai tòn trōπon ἔπεμεντος tῆs prokeimenēs autōs politeias.

§ 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὲi τῇ καλὸς πολιτεύεσθαι τῇ 35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὑμολογομένων ἐστιν τάν δὲ τὰ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ἐβάθην λαβεῖν. ἡ γὰρ Θεσ-

33 <ἡ> ἐπεμεντός Scaller, ἐπεμεντόν <ἡ μὴ ἐπεμεντόν> Susen. would prefer: but no alteration is needed δ' αὐτοῖς M*Q* T* L* and P* (1st hand), αὐτῷ P* (corr.), αὐτῷ Ar. 34 <πᾶλα> πολιτεύεσθαι Madvig 37 πενεια M*P* and P* (1st hand, altered by corr.) P* and a later hand in P*) 38 of omitted by M* P* L* [ol] Susen. 1,2

§ 1 31 μᾶλ μὲν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success: "Whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed." τρόποι = when judged by a given standard.

32 eître τὸν ὑπάρχον… ἐπεμεντόν] sc. meroθρότητα. So § 18 ἐπεμεντόν δ' ὑπάρχειν τὰν τὰ αὐτὸν ὑπόθεσιν.

The Helots or Serfs: §§ 2—4.

§ 2 34 δὲν μὲν οὖν… 35 ὑμολογομένων ἐστιν[)] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle's own ideal state. Cp. also n. (192) on 6 § 5; c. 11 § 10 n. (393); IV (vii). 9 §§ 4, 7, 8; 11 § 9 with n. (813), and Introd., p. 32 n. (3); Susen. (279).

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολῆν] leisure free from imposed labour; 1. 7, 9, 11, 5, 36 36 τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἑαυτοῦν κτλ) Compare 3 § 23 n. (178). Wherever in Greece bodies of serfs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the free lot of Provincials (Περακευ) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann Antiquities of Greece 1 p. 191—194, Eng. tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194—200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert Studien p. 76 ff). The Penestae were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archachemachus Fr. 1, from Athens vii. 164 α: Βασιλεύοντα τῶν τῶν Ἀρωνα ταχιεράνων οἵ μὴ ἀχρεῖα τον Βοιωτίαν, ἄλλο ἐμφαινομένῳ παραδόκου διατούρα τὰς τῆς Θεσπολίδος διακεκοινωνον οἵ ὁμολογίας, ἐφ' ὅσι εὐξέ-

On the similar relation between the Mariandynians and the people of Hecaleia see n. (777) on IV (vii). 6 § 8. Susen. (380)

Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mariandynians Laws vii 777 C, B.

38 ἔφθασον] always in wait to pronounce upon their misfortunes; Thuc. iv. 80 δ' ἐϊ γὰρ ὑπαλλάκτικον πρὸ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τῆς φυλακῆς τῆς μαλακίας καθόθησα.
§ 3 τοῦ ἀνυχήματι διατελοῦσιν: περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδέν τι συμβαίνειν, ἀνίκων δ’ ἵσως τὸ τᾶς γενετικής πόλεως, καὶ τῆς πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλας, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-

maχον τοῖς ἀφιστομένοις διὰ τὸ μῆ συμφέρει καὶ αὐτάς (p. 45) κεκτημένας περιούσιοι, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωνις οἱ γενετικῶν ἔχοντα πάντες ἦσαν, Αργείων καὶ Μεσηνίων καὶ Ἀρκάδων;

§ 4 Μάγνησιοι. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μήδεν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργάδες εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμλῆσαι τρόπον ἀνεμένοι τις ἑξῆς οὕτως καὶ τῶν ἑσθῶν ἀξίωσιν ἐκ τῶν κυρίων, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ξύνεις ἐπιβουλεύονται καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <ὁ> οὖν ὁς οὐκ ξεφυράζουσι τὸν βδέλους

§ 5 τρόπον, οἷς τούτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰσοδείαν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ τοῖς γυναικῶν ἁγείας καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς τοῦ

1269 b 3 περὶ αἰκών M and apparently γ (praeidia circa domus William) || 6 ἐφιστοριον Bas.3 in the margin || 9 ἀνεμένοι Triebel (perhaps rightly) || 10 κακοπαθῶς corr.1 of P1 in the margin || 11 τρόπον οὖν or γοιν Susem., νῦν ΓΠ Αρ. Βκ. || 12 ετὶ...1270 a 8 πάλιν] Phlt. Lyk. 14 quotes similar statements from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles p. 30) rightly judges, from his Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία

§ 3 40 αὐτοῖς δ’ [οὐς] It might be thought that one very material reason was the much freer and less oppressed position which, according to Aristotle's own evidences 5 § 19 n. (171), the Cretans granted to their dependants (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n. (355), § 10 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374). Susem. (283)

1269 b 3 περιοικοῖς See c. 10 § 3 and Exc. III.

§ 5 τοῖς Θετιαλοῖς] dative incommodi. ἀφισταντος sc. οἰ πενδάτα.

§ 4 7 τοῦ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας τκλ] "the task of attending to this; how, namely, we ought to associate with them"—the sentence τῶν δὲ...τρόπων being dependent on the noun ἐπιμελείας, just as it is in ἰν (vii). 56. τίς δὲ ἡ ποιεῖσθαι τινὰ δυνατὰ is dependent on ἐπιμελείας. We may render: "It would seem too that apart from everything else there is the irksome task of seeing that we behave to them as we ought: for when allowed their freedom, they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their lords: if treated harshly, they plot revenge and cherish hatred."

11 δῆλον κτλ] The truth of this remark no one will wish to question. But does Aristotle really know of a remedy? He hopes to get over the difficulty in his own 'best state' by taking men of non-Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent freemen of different nations but only of the gentler races: iv (vii). 10 §§ 13, 14. n. (340): cp. iv (vii). § 8 (815), and n. (364) with Exc. III. Supposing all this could be so fortunately arranged, would it have been any real remedy? Susem. (283)


§ 5 13 ἡ πολιτεία τῶν γυναικῶν ἁγείας So Plato speaks λατοὶ 1 637 c διενεργεῖ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρὰ ὑμῖν ἁγείας, and Euripides Androm. 595 οὖν ἐν τῷ βοῦλοτο τίνα σφαίραν γένοσθαι Σαρακεντικῶν κόρη (Eaton). Susem. (283) πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας] 'judged by the intention of the constitution,' the second point of view for criticism as mentioned in § 1. The other, the standard of the best constitution, is here
called the wellbeing or Happiness (eudaimonia) of the state (Concogre). This then, and not eudaimon, is the right reading. For the best constitution is precisely that which most constitutes to the 'best life' or Happiness. See 1 1 1. 2 § 8 n. (11); and especially 11. 18 § 1 n. (683), 11vii. 1 § 1 (685), § 2 (683), § 11: 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 l (808). 13 § 3. SUSEM (286)

15 oikias mferos] So l. 3 § 1, 4 § 1, 13 § 15.
kal toplan, nomic] "one must regard the state as nearly divided into two." But the construction is not plain: is it ´γγος < οἰκας> του δικαι δημοσιω? This would be supported by vii(iv). 6, 11, viii(v). 1. 16, where ´γγος is almost an adjectival. Or it might also be made to divide into two equal parts. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 4. 8 with Jackson's note.

17 διστε εν διασε κατ] From this it is seen, as indeed before from 1. 13 § 16 m. (119) (137), that Aristotle intended to introduce into his ideal state a public education and training for women, although this education was certainly not to be common to boys and girls. Cp. Introd. pp. 49, 52 (3). In the Lat. vii 781 B Plato had expressed himself still more forcibly: ου γάρ ημών μόνον έστιν, ως δέξεις, το σφών των γυναικών έκκρεμων περικρώμενον, δε γίνεται ημών φύσιν εστι πρός δεσμήν χρόνων της των δρᾶσεων, τοιούτω διασφέξαι πρὸς τό πλεῖον διάπλασιν είναι. Aristotle however says quite the same thing Khet. ι. 6. 1360 a 10 π, δοσο γάρ τα κατά γυναίκας φάσι χαστρ άλλαις δαιμονιαίοις, σχεδόν κατά τό έμενων εκ ευδαι-μονών (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM (285)

§ 6 20 κατημεριν] of hardly endurance.

22 ἐξουσίας] has disregarded his aim. This picture of luxurious living is indirectly confirmed by Plato Rep. viii. 548 A, B; ἐπιθυμητα δε γε χρηματών αι τοιούτα αε κεκτημένη ταμιεύς και οικείων θραυσμών, κα και περιβάλλος οκονομίαν ἄτροχον νομισσάντα πίστας, εν αε αναλιπτομενοις γυναικας πόλει ή δαπανήσομαι: cp. 550 D.

§ 7 23 διστε αναγκαίον] Wealth must needs be in esteem, because the unbridled luxury of women is a very costly business. SUSEM (286)

26 Καλλίν] See Note on the Celibate at the end of B. ii. SUSEM (287)
§ 8 τετειμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας συνουσίαν. ἐσκε γὰρ (VI)
ὁ μυθολογηὴς πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζευξᾶται τὸν Ἀρην
πρὸς τὴν 'Αφροδίτην ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρενών ὡμιλιάν
30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαινομένα κατακώχιμοι πάντες
οἱ τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοὺς Δάκως τοῦθ ὑπήρχειν, καὶ πολλάκι
§ 9 διερκέσθω ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι

28 πρῶτος M*Pl, perhaps rightly || ἄρης P*3 Q*3 Ald. Bk. || 32 διώκητο
M*Pl

§ 8 28 ὁ μυθολογηὴς πρῶτος] Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and
customs, *n.n. (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are
direct inventions of individuals, who
consciously intended by means of them
to represent to sense certain ideas and
thoughts. Cp. also v(viii), 6 § 13 n.
1278. 2868. Susen. (289)
39 ἢ γὰρ κτλ.] In his assertion, that
marital races are also the most amorous,
Aristotle is supported by the views of
modern anthropologists1 (Fülleborn).
Susen. (289)
30 κατακώχιμοι] easily captivated,
with ἐπὶ v(viii), 7, 4, with &x Nic. Eth.
x. 9, 3; with πρὸς one might say “easily
allured to.”
31 διὸ παρὰ κτλ.] Schömann Anti-
quinia of Greece p. 308 Eng. tr. is cer-
tainly right in saying that the social
position and influence of women in
Sparta was not higher than it is amongst
the modern peoples of the west, and that
the prevailing condition of things with
us in this respect would have appeared to
an Athenian of the best time to be a
species of feminine rule (γυναικερταία),
although it does not at all alienate our
women from their natural and most
appropriate calling of housewives and
mothers. But this does not thoroughly
answer the question proposed by J. G.
Schneider (see n. 205 b) and by Oncken:
whether true womanliness can have
thrive under so rough a treatment of the
marriage relation as was customary at Sparta:
whether a family life and true domesticity
could be found when the Spartan full-
citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished
from the family, lived continually with
his comrades in arms, ate at the public
table, slept in a tent, and only paid
stolen visits to his wife; where conse-
quently the household was without a
head, the wife without a home of common
duty and mutual improvement, where pa-
rental duty was removed and the natural
field for the wife’s activity abolished. If

1 in the latter respect Aristotle mistook
the cause of the evil (as his retention of
common messes for the men and his
excessive public education proves), does
this justify us in assuming that his de-
scription of the evil itself is wholly in-
correct? In reference to the first question,
it if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to
hand over one’s wife to another, if, as
Schömann himself thinks, φρ. c. p. 267, a
Spartan woman, to whom proposals were
made by another man, hardly felt herself
insulted by them but referred the lover to
her husband, then (as Fülleborn and
Schömann after him have remarked)
the boast of the Spartans, that adultery was
never heard of amongst them, does not
amount to much: adultery here only
means an intrigue with another man with-
out the husband’s permission. The
further boast of the Spartan women, that
they were in an especial degree good
housewives (Schömann op. c. p. 268),
must accordingly be reduced to its proper
dimensions. Plato however concedes
(Laus vii 805 κ. e.) that though the
Spartan women did not weave and spin,
occupations which they left to their
female slaves, they yet led an active life:
since they had nearly half the responsi-
bility for the management of the house-
hold and the education of the children.
Certainly there is some exaggeration in
the charges of license and love of power
brought against them, and this must
be moderated from the above points of
view: but it is quite as certain that they
are not all pure inventions. Oncken
refers his readers to the proof given by
him Hellas and Athens II. 85. Cp.
Introd. p. 36 n. (1). Susen. (290)
32 ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς] during their su-
premacy. Cp. § 10 n. (391) g. viii(vi), 6.
13, επὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλκαότοι ἀρχῆς, 7 § 14
ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δακεδαίων: and De
Cado iii. 2 § 7, 300 b 30, επὶ τῆς φιλα-
tητος, during the reign of Love.
ΠΟΙΑΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 9.

§ 9 τι διαφέρει γυναικας ἀρχειν ἢ τοις ἀρχοντας ύπο τῶν (VI) γυναικῶν ἀρχεσθαι; ταύτῳ γαρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμοιο δ' οὖ- (p. 48) 35 σης τῆς θράσυντος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, πρὸς τῶν πόλεων, βλαβερόταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦτ' αἱ τῶν § 10 Δάκων ἦσαν. ἐθήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Ἐθῆλων ἐμβολῆς· χρησίμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὡσπέρ ἐν ἅτεραις πόλεσιν, τούτου δὲ παρείχον πλεῖον τῶν πολεμίων. εἶ τάραχες μὲν 8 40 ὣν ἐνκακε συμβαθήκεναι τοῖς Δάκων εἰλίγας ἢ τῶν γυ- § 11 νακῶν ἀνέσις. εἶξο γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας απεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τοῖς τε πρὸς Ἀργεῖος πόλεων καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσήνων σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρείχον τῷ νομαθείᾳ προσδο-

35 εἶπε Π. Β. 1.; ἦττον Syllburg Susen. misled by William's version nisi ad bellum ἢ τῶν Θεοβόλων τῶν Spengel

1270 a 1 τῆς oικείας (οἶκας? Γ Αr.) omitted by M* and P1 (1st hand), added by p1

in the margin || 4 προορθοτερομένων Bk. Susen. by a misprint (corrected by Bender)

§§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See § 8 4 n. and i. 7 § 2. SUSEM. (291)

§ 10 § 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Ἐθῆλων ἐμβολῆς] at the time of the Theban invasion under Epameinondas 369 B.C. SUSEM. (292)

38 χρήσιμων κτλ.] "For they were of no use, any more than the women in other cities, but they caused more confusion than the enemy." It is significant that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon (Hellen. vi. 5 38 αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τῶν κατάνων ὁρῶσαι θριάμβους, ἤτοι ὅτι τῶν ἰδίων πολέμου) and Plutarch (Alex. 31 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὁ διαμαρτυριών θριακάς, ἀλλὰ παντίπαιναι ἐκφάνμενοι οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κατάνων καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν πολέμων) speak much more strongly on this point. Oncken observes quite rightly, that this was the first opportunity the Spartan women had for putting into practice the brave speeches they had been making for centuries; they might at least have displayed a quiet bearing, even if they were not to be taken at their word. SUSEM. (293)

Bernays renders: 'although the women in other cities are of use' [on such occasions]. But is it so? The System of Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, Laws 806 b.

§ 11 1270 a 1 Εἶξο γὰρ κτλ.] According to Plutarch Lycurg. 1, in his account of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-


The passage is as follows: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἰψίτων συνασκέσαι καὶ συνασκεθῆναι τὴν Ολυμπιακὴν ἐκεχείραν ἑξανύσαντας αὐτόν, ἤν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀρακτόλχος τεκτήματι προσφέρων τὴν Ὀλυμπιάν ἔκτην ἐν τοιούτῳ τοῦ Δακικοῦ διασκέδασα καταγχαγμένων. E. Curtius, History Eng. tr. 1. p. 191, adopts this date. Even so, there would be a grave chronological difficulty if these Arcadian wars be supposed to precede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war is dated 743—732 B.C. But as to the main fact Aristotle is correct. A long period of camp-life, of war in which the Spartans lived perpetually in the field, must have preceded the complete establishment of the system and the institutions which are referred to the Lycurgian legislation*. Such a period we find in the tedious and difficult conquest of Laconia by its Dorian invaders.

* I entirely agree with Wilamowitz Historische Untersuchungen, Berlin 1884, p. 265 ff., that Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the supposed Lycurgian legislation never had an existence; and I also regard the account which he gives of the real state of things as altogether correct. SUSEM. 4 προορθοτερομένους] Note the double formation of perfect.
5 πεποιημένους διὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν βίων (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει (VI) μέρη τῆς ἀρέτης), τάς δὲ γυναῖκας φασί μὲν ἄνειν ἐπιχειρήσαι τοὺς Δικαίους ἐπὶ τούς νόμους, ὡς δὲ ἀντέκρουν,
§ 12 ἀποστήμαται πάλιν. αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἔτινεν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων, ὡς δέδον ὑπὶ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀλλὰ ἢμεῖς ἢ οὐ τούτῳ σχοπόνει, τόι δὲ συγγνώμην ἔχει ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, 
§ 13 ἀλλὰ πέρι τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τά δὲ πέρι τάς ἢμαρτ.

5 τολλά γὰρ ἔχει μέρη κτλ.] Cr. Plato Latus i. 330 E οὐκ ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ μέρους καὶ ταῦτα τὰ παθητικὰ ἐνεπειδή [Δικαίους] θέτειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τάς ἀρετὰς ἐργαί: Thuc. i. 84. 3 πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὐθυβολοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμος γεγομένα: v. 66. 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (294 b)
6 φασὶ] As to whether this is an anonymous quotation from Ephoros, or an appeal to oral tradition, see Introd. p. 35 n. (3). Cr. also below n. (310) on § 7. SUSEM. (295)
7 ἢ τὸ δὲ ἀντέκρουν κτλ] Precisely so Plato Latus vi. 781 A ἐὰν τὸ δὲ πέρι τὰς γυναίκας οὐδὲν ἔδωκαν ἀνομολόγητον μεθύσσατο... ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα γέρον ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραίωτας μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικολοστέρον ἔδω, τὸ θῆλυ διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνει, ὡς ἄρθυ τούτῳ εἰς ναιτος τοῦ νομοθετοῦσαν δοκήσαν τοῦ διάφελος. This Plutarch must have forgotten, when (Lycurg. 14) he attacks Aristotel alone on account of this same remark and tries to refute him. The facts which he adduces with this object prove simply nothing: but directly afterwards (c. 15) he gives a detailed account of the Spartan custom of lending wives, and this does not make the assertion, which he appends to it, very credible: τὰ ταύτα δὲ αὐτῶν πρατόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τότε τοσοῦτον ἀπείχε τῆς ἄστερον λεγομένης γενέθεσα περὶ τὰς γυναίκας εἰκορείας, ὡστε ἄλοι ἐπιστως εἶναι τὰ τῆς μακριάς παρὰ αὐτῶν. Even he does not venture to deny the subsequent laxity of the women at Sparta. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of the events which happened and therefore clearly of this mistake: but the question before us is not who is, or is not, excusable; but whether as a matter of fact (a legislator) is right or wrong."
9 ἀλλὰ ἢμεῖς...μὴ ὀρθῶς] Thus Aristotle is not unaware that the author of a code or a constitution is by no means able to proceed simply at his own good pleasure, but is tied down to the given circumstances: cp. § 22 n. (322), 12 § 5 (409); vii (iv). 1 § 3 ff. n. (1110), c. 6, 11 §§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.: vii (vi). c. 4. It is only in case these circumstances are highly favourable that he considers his own best constitution possible. But this is still a long way off the knowledge that a nation's constitution and code of laws are in general the product primarily of its individuality and history, and only secondarily of the legislator's wisdom or unwise. Nor does Aristotle omit forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of his own examination in that 'he never purposes to account for the constitution by the circumstances under which it arose, or to fathom the necessities which confronted the legislator. Instead of this, Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual state, is treated like Plato who constructed an imaginary state. Aristotle's criticism neither is nor claims to be historical criticism in our sense of the term, which is more concerned to explain the connexion of the facts than to award praise or blame. He is as one-sided in pointing out the defects of this political structure as the admirers of its excellence had been in earlier times and continued to be later on. Nor could it have been otherwise: for neither he nor they had the requisite historical data for appreciating the personal responsibility of Lycurgus." Nor have we even now:—assuming that we still retain our belief in the existence of such a person as Lycurgus. Moreover in spite of his recognition of the force of circumstances Aristotle shares with Plato 'and all the political theorists of Greece the belief in the omnipotence of positive legislation, as if mighty historical developments which are not of today or yesterday could be simply swept out of the world by a command or prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus responsible for things for which no legis-
The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.

§ 13 15 μετὰ γάρ κτήλι] Possibly we should alter γάρ into δέ, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρὸτερον, see last n.), which is referred to in § 13, see n. (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γάρ κτήλ... served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γάρ of the text is an inconsistency.

SUSEM. (296)

§ 14 16 τούτο μὲν γάρ κτήλ] Cp. VIII(V). 7 § 10 ὁ Ἀρκετάρχων εἰς δῖλαγος αὐτοῖς ἔρχομαι τήν (1603). SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus. The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitatus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given
away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch Apis 4, cp. Schömann Antiquities of Greece p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnished? See further the next note. 

21 -drop[en σι καλά] Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice; it was held dishonourable to sell. 'With this agrees the omission of Sparta, 8 § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law' (Oncken), as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions; comp. n. (237). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, with the design that this equality should be perpetual? (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, iv(vii). 10 §§ 9—13 n. (83g);—cp. nn. on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 15 (214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phalaeas—6 § 10 ff. (208—211), 7 § 5 (234)—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about: nay more, for having taken as good as no means whatever? The 7th fragment of the Polity of the Lacedaemonians: attributed to Herakleides (Müller Frag. hist. Gr. II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristidean work On the Spartan constitution, see n. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that πρότερον τοὺς μετὰ τὰ διότι Ἇκτασις is not one here. Cp. n. (310 *) on § 17. Gilbert, cp. c. 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the 'ancient portion' (ἀπροσκεκτομένα), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislator to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert's whole method of explaining this ἀπροσκεκτομένα has already been briefly, but correctly, refuted by Frick in Jahrb. f. Phil. cy. 1872. 667. Susem. (300)

21 διδώνας δὲ καὶ καταλαλεῖτεν] Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land. 

Susem. (301)


§ 15 24 τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο] two fifths.

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων κτλ] why the number of heiresses in Sparta was disproportionately large Aristotle considers it superfluous to show, because it is readily understood that in the many long wars an unusually large number of sons fell
καὶ διὰ τὸ προϊσας διδόναι μεγάλας. καὶ τοι βιλτίου ἢν (VI)
μιδὲνάν ἢ ἀληθῆν ἢ καὶ μετρῶν τετάχθην. * * τῶν δ’ ἐξετά(π. 47)
διαφαίνει τὴν ἐπίσκοπον ὅτι ἂν δοῦλαις καὶ ἀπόδοχαν
μὴ διαθέμενος, ἐν ἄν καταλήψη κληρονόμων, οὕτω οὖν ἀν
§ 16 τὴν διδώσω. τοιούτοις δυναμένης τῆς χάρας χιλιοῦ ὡς
πεῖρας τρέφειν καὶ πεστακόσιοι καὶ ὑπὸντας προσμοῦς, οὗδε
χιλιοῦ τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν, ἀφενεὶ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν
dίδοντο ὅταν οὖν τὰ αὐτῶς ἐθέτα τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξεας ταὐτήν
μᾶς ἀρ ἀπάθην τῇ ἀπειρήκενε ἢ πόλει, ἀλλ’ ἀπολέστω
§ 17 διὰ τὴν ὁλογαρφοῦσαν. λέγουσι δ’ οὐ καὶ μὲν τῶν προτε-

25 ὅ τι omitted by II, [ἐπι] Susem.1-2 doubtfully || 26 * * τῶν Bicheler, see
Comm. n. (304): τῶν δ’ ἐξετά διαφαίνει <ἐπίσκοπον> ὅτι τὰ τὸ ἐξετά διαφαίνει
τὴν κτῆν Welldon || 27 te omitted by M P, [ἐπι] Susem.1-2 || 28 δὲ ἀν καταλήψη,
<κτῆν> κληρονόμων, οὕτως οτ’ ἂν καταλήψη <κτῆν> κληρονόμων, οὕτως Koraes || 30
τραχμοῦς τραχμοῦς P1 in the margin || 33 οὐδὲ μᾶς γὰρ πλῆθιν ὑπήργευσε
Susem.1-2 misled by William’s version nullam enim plagam pertulit || 34 μὲν omitted by II: [μὲν] Susem.1-2

(Bender). Aristotle’s statement concerning
the great wealth of Spartan women
is confirmed by Plutarch’s from a yet
later time. Agis 4. 7 ὑπὲρ τὸ τῶν Δακου
νοὺων πλοῖων ἐν τῷ γαίῳ τὸ πλῆθον.
(J. G. Schneider.) Susem. (303)
The Spartan name for them is ἐπίσκο-
ποιον, ἐπίσκοποι.
καὶ τῶν βέλτιτων Here again later
authors are apparently better informed
of the facts than Aristotle. We are told that
doweries had actually been prohibited, and
that down to the time of Lysander none
were ever given; see Schömann Antiquitys of Greece p. 165 Eng. tr.
Susem. (303)

26 τῶν δ’ ἐξετά κτῆν It is obvious that
this sentence forms no antithesis to the
preceding and thus τῶν δ’ ἐξετά gives no
sense. All however is right if one ima-

gines something like the following to have
fallen out before τῶν δὲ : τι.Adding that
it would have been necessary to prescribe
who had the right and obligation of mar-
rying heiresses, whereas at present
every father can marry his daughter to
any one he pleases, and if he die without
a will his heir at law bestows her upon
whom he pleases.' Susem. (304)

κληρονόμος usually means ‘heir’;
but in the sense of the deceased, the next male
relation of full age, or, if there were
more than one such, the eldest of them.
Susem. (300)

This privilege is assigned to the king
by Herod. vii. 57: διάκειται δὲ τῶν βασι-
λιὰς...πατροχοῦ το πατρικὸν ἄριστον,
ἐν τῷ ἰκέτας ἔχει, ἵνα μὴ πειρατή ἀπίθα

§ 16 29 δυσμένη] Of course Aristotle
makes this calculation, as Oncken
remarks, with regard to the total population of
Laconia, whether Spartan or non-
Spartan descent. In any case it is rather
too high an estimate, as this total popula-

tion amounted to only 400,000 at the
most: see Schömann Antiquities of Greece p. 155 Eng. tr. But
on the other hand the reading, or rather conjecture,

τραχμοῦς would not merely give a number
smaller far too small, but also one out of
all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry.
Susem. (308)

30 οὐδὲ κληρονόμος 1 *In the time of Agis
n. c. 241 (Plut. Agis c. 5) the Spartans
were but 700, and only 100 retained their
family allotments (Eaton). Susem. (307)

33 μᾶς γὰρ πλῆθιν] The battle of
Lacatra. Cp. further § 34 n. (345),
iv(vii). 14 § 21 n. (916) : v(viii). 4 § 4,
§ 7 n. (1008). Susem. (308)

οὐδὲ καταλῆψη The negative to be
taken closely with the verb: under one
Knights 1377 δεξίον οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, Plato
Phil. 33 ἄμφοτεροι οὐκ ἀντιπέτει ὑπὸ
νεκρῶν: and below Pol. vii(vii). 4 § 30
οὐ πολεμίσαν.
34 διὰ τὴν ὁλογαρφοῦσαν] Here
35 rov βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τὴν πολιτείαν, ὡστε οἱ γίνεσθαι (VI) τότε ὁλογναθροπίαν πολεμοῦντων πόλιν χρόνον, καὶ φασίν εἰναι ποτὲ τῶν Σπαρτιάτων καὶ μυρίων ὦς ἂν εἴτ' ἐστιν ἄλλη ταύτα ἐίτε μὴ, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτίσεως § 18 ὁμαλαμαίνει, τιμήθηκεν αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντιός δὲ 18 40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιεῖν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δίορθω-

37 τῶν Σπαρτιάτων Αρ. Βücheler Susen.2, τῶν Σπαρτιάτων ΙΙ Βκ. Susen.1 in the text and probably Π; Thurot first suspected an error

again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not Provincias (Πεθέοις) and Helots. According to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. 15, 1000 Lakadaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Σπαρτιάτων who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, De Rép. Lac. 1. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (J. G. Schneider). SUSEN. (309)

§ 17 34 λέγουσιν δ' ὡς κτλ.1 It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, ix. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Thasos was the Elean and his brother Hagijs μοῦνο διὰ πάνων αὐθεντόν ἔγερ-

υστο Σπαρτιάτης πολιτικός (Congreve). Cp. also n. 312. (Plutarch Inscr. Lac. 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycurgan discipline were by the ordi-

nance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the ancient portion, τὴν ἄρχην δια-

tεταγμένη μοῖρας, which they were not permitted to sell. Cp. n. 300.) Ephoros however, as Thierer shows, had the following story, Frag. 18 found in Strabo viii. 364. The first kings Eurysthenes and Procles had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the περίστρωμα were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the au-

thority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Thierer and Susenmühler once supposed: but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephoros. For Herodotos may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidiae and

Talthybiadæ: see Schömann p. 193, 208, 215 f., 249 Eng. tr.; Gilbert p. 52 ff., 57 ff., 149 f.; Frick in Jahrh. f. Philol. cv. 1872. p. 655 ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the ῥόδικαι, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such ῥόδικαι were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lysander, Cupid

pos, Kleandrides, for example, belonged to their number, see Schömann p. 200 Eng. tr. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the ῥοδικαῖος, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of ῥοδικαῖοι is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schömann p. 198 Eng. tr.—Comp. § 11 n. (295) and esp. Introd. p. 35 n. (3). SUSEN. (310)

35 ὡστ' ὡς γίνεσθαι1 and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time. The indicative would have been used in oratio recta: hence ὡς, not αὐτ' in orbi. Thucyd. ν. 40 ὡστ' ὡς ἄρηται

καὶ διαθέσατο καὶ διαμορθα. De falso leg. §§ 166, 167, 351 with Shilleto's Appendix B.

36 καὶ φασίν εἶναι κτλ.1 Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demaratos in Herod. vii. 234 reckons them at about 8,000 (Eaton). SUSEN. (311)

37 δ' ὡστ' ἄλλη...ἀπ' μὴ] Aristot

sto himself then doubts it. SUSEN. (312)

38 ἤλθων...39 τὴν πόλιν] "It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property" than by the admission of aliens.

§ 18 40 ὑπεναντιός πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διάβρωσιν] is an obstacle to a cor-

correction of these evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 7 for

H.
construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 ΠΡΟΔΗΜΙΑ ἘΠΙΓΕΝΕΤΙΚΑ

'Stimulates the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phæleas did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See 6 § 10 ff. in. (208—211), 7 § 5 in. (234, 235).

SUSEM. (313)

4 ἀφθαρσία not liable to military service. Ψηφοφορία: ψηφοφορία is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon Hellenica, II. 4. 29 εἴησθαι ψηφοφορία, so IV. 7. 2, V. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase ψηφοφορίαν ψηφοφορία to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Βραχίδεας ψηφοφορία ψηφοφορία.

Τέταρτας Aelian Var. Hist. VI. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso Sparta i. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the old times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus; see n. (321) on § 21. SUSEM. (314)

§ 19 4 καὶ τόν δὴν φανερωκρατίαν Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effective means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the μήδακες (see n. 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. 'The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Oncken). SUSEM. (315)

The Ephorhity §§ 39—94. Amongst other monographs see A. Schafer De ephorhia commentatio (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein The development of the Ephorhity (Jahresber. des Gymn. in Konitz, 1870), Ullrich in Rhein. Mus. vi. 1847, p. 421, G. Düm Entstehung and Entwickelung des spartanischen Ephorhats (Innsbruck 1878).

8 αὐτοῖς in itself, simply as such.
P. 9. 21]

1270 b 1—1270 b 20.

291

10 δρα πεντες εις το αρχειον, οι δια την αποριαν δεινος ησαν. (VI)

§ 20 ευλογοι δε πολλαικοι μεν και πρατεροι, και κατ δε εν τοις Ἀνδροίς διαφαραντες γαρ αργυρω τινες, ὅσον εφ' εαυτοίς, ὅλην την πόλιν απωλεσαν. και διὰ το την ἀρχήν εἶναι λιαν μεγαλὰν και Ἰσοτύπανον δημαγογεῖν αὐτῶν ἡμακαζόντων και οἱ Βασίλεις, ὡσε καὶ ταύτῃ συνειτιπτέτεθαι τον πολιτείαν δημοκρατία γαρ εἶ ἀριστο-15

§ 21 κράτας συνεβαινε. συνεχεῖ μεν ἄν την πολιτεία το το λεχειον τοῦ (πιουκαζει γαρ ὁ σημός διὰ το μετέχει της (p. 49) μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὡστε εἴτε διὰ τον νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ την τοῦ τούτου συμπετατεκν, συμφεροντω πέχει τοις πράγμα-10 ἂν εἶθαν? Schneider || 12 Ἀνδροίς Αρ., Ἀνδροίς even Bk.1, Ἀνδροίς F9 (1st hand, emended by a later hand), Ἀνδροίς Γ M* and P1 (1st hand), Ἀνδροίς corr. of P1 (r altered to δ), 30. Ἀνδροίς p1 in the margin || 14 [ἀντών] Oncken, αὐτός Ridgeway || αὐτῶν ἡμακαζόντων καὶ τοῦ Σουσέμ. 5, ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινειν καὶ ἔγερε William, whence αὐτῶν ἡμακαζόντως καὶ οἱ Βασίλεις οἱ ἀρχηγεῖς Susem. 1, ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινερ ἔγερε William, whence αὐτῶν [φάγων] [ο] ἀ[φ] οἱ [Susem. 1] ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινε οἱ ἀρχηγεῖς Susem. 1, ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινε

μέτρος as well as the ἡμεριν, and so too K. F. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schömann Antiquitiae p. 245 Eng. tr. See Busolt 'The Lacedaemonians and their allies' 1 p. 21 f. (Leipzig, 1879). For παράτιον, not πάρτιον, see § 25, 10 § 10. 10 αρχηγοφ= magistrate, board: so § 21, 10 § 10 των ἑφρῶν ἀρχηγοι. ἀντών] See below 10 § 12 n. (370 b) and Thuc. 1. 131. 2 δε (Πασοραῖα) ποιεῖται κρήμας διαλύον την διαρκήν (Eaton); also Rhel. πι. 18. 6, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) κρήματα λαμβανειν ταύτα ἑκατον, ἐγώ δ' οὖ, ἀλλ' γνῶρις (Gutting). Susem. 5. 18. 6, 10 § 31. 20 ἡμακαζόντως καὶ τοῦ Σουσέμ. 5, ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινειν καὶ ἔγερε William, whence αὐτῶν [φάγων] [ο] ἀ[φ] οἱ [Susem. 1] ἔγερε ἰδιὸς συνεβαινε

§ 21 17 συνέβαινε is the keystone of the constitution.

6 § 6, 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. Susem. (319) If therefore αὐτῶν is retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in §§ 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αὐτῶν is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Busse who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17, 1365 b 38, δημοκρατεῖα κατὰ τῶν ἑφρῶν ἀρχηγὸν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου ἐνεῖν τῶν ἑφρῶν." Susem. 16 § 5 ἀριστοκρατίας See n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. Susem. (320) § 21 17 συνέβαι = is the keystone of the constitution.

10 διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην] Not Lycurgus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, VIII (v), 11 § 3. Theopompos. See n. (314) on § 18. Susem. (321) ἄριστος διὰ τῆς τέχνης Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. 12 § 5 n. (409). Susem. (321 b) 20 συνεβαλλόμενοι C. ἀπὸ συνεβαλλόμενος c. 12 § 5.

19—2
§ 22 στ' 

§ 22 21 

§ 22 § 9, § 10 n. (1264). 

§ 22 24 

§ 22 31 

§ 22 32
the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (t. 281.) adopts this view. Göttling (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators. 30 τα inserted after κατα by ΠΠ Βκ. || πολίτειας Scaliger, probably right || αυτὴ ΠΠ Βκ. || εἰσιν P, εἰσιν M' and P4 (corr.) what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined, εἶσιν Βκ. P3 (a later hand) and P2 (1st hand, ε is erased), εἰσιν Q5 P7 Ald. and P4 (1st hand), εἰσιν Βκ.2

30 τα inserted after κατα by ΠΠ Βκ. || πολίτειας Scaliger, probably right || αυτὴ ΠΠ Βκ. || εἰσιν P, εἰσιν Μ' and P4 (corr.) what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined, εἶσιν Βκ. P3 (a later hand) and P2 (1st hand, ε is erased), εἰσιν Q5 P7 Ald. and P4 (1st hand), εἰσιν Βκ.2

34 ἀλλα λάθη...[Ἀθέναι] Cr. § 35 nn. (346—7), I(VII). 15 § 6 n. (927). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-vaulted strictness of manners had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avarice even be explicable? SUSEM. (329) §§ 25—28 The Senate or Elders.

35 χρίσεως μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. i § 10 n. (443 b), VII (vii). 9 § 9, ἄλλους ἡμών κρίνεις δικαστῆς καὶ φύσιμης n. (1260). SUSEM. (329 b). 40 ἐστι γὰρ, κτλ.] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: iv (vii). 9 § 9 nn. (816—7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the Laws he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of νομοφόρα (see above nn. on 6 §§ 18, 19), under 50 or over 70 years of age: Laws VI 755 A f. Compare also Rhet. II. 14. 4 δεικνύει...ἡ φύσις περὶ τὸ ἐνός δεῖν πεποιηκόντα: Herod. III. 134 ἀποκριόμενον...
the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring
building from which no view was afforded
of the place of meeting, though the voices
of the assembled crowd could easily be
heard. Then the candidates for the vacant
office passed silently one by one through
the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while
the people, according to the various de-
grees of favour with which they regarded
them, made their feelings known by
correspondingly loud or feeble accla-
amations. The party confined in the build-
ing, to whom the order in which the can-
didates appeared by lot was unknown,
oberved on which occasion the accla-
amation was the loudest, and the candidate
who was thus greeted was regarded as
the popular choice...Aristotle's judg-
ment upon these proceedings is quite
intelligible in an age in which the man-
ers of the people had long degenerated
from their ancient purity and simplicity.
For obviously there was nothing easier
than to turn the whole election into a
mere fraudulent farce, and to determine
the result beforehand." Schömann p. 331
f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions
that arise is, how the committee which
decided on the loudness of the accla-
amations was itself appointed:—and on
this point we have no information (Oncken).
Besides, this mode of election is only a
peculiar survival of the primitive election
of chiefs by acclamation in a rude an-
tiquity, retained in a time for which it
had long since ceased to be adapted.
In general the votes of the Spartans in
the popular assembly continued to be
taken ëste τῶν, by acclamation, ροπιν:
and only in case of a doubt as to the
decision did an actual division of the

11 **δει γαρ κτλ.** This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller Plato p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 § 12 n. **Susem. (350)** Add Rep. 447 b 11, 517 D, 519 C. § 28 13 νῦν δ’ οἵτινες κτλ.) But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (τοκτίνα τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰτίσεως, a personal canvass). See Xen. De Rep. Lac. iv. 7.

16 τῶν τ’ ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκοσιουμ’ Here the term ἀδίκημα is used in a sense different from that of Rhet. 1. 13, 16, 1374 b 8 ἐστὶ δ’ ἀδίκημα μὲν ἡμᾶς παράλογα ἀπὸ τονομᾶς τε ἐστὶν, or the un-Aristotelian passage Nic. Eth. v. 8, 2 where every ἀδίκημα is also ἐκοσιοῦμ’.

**Susem. (336)** Note esp. N. E. v. 8, 2: ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγμα ὅτι ἐστι τ’ ἐκοσιοῦμ’ καὶ ἐκοσιοῦμ’ ὅτι ἄρα ἄραν ἡ ἀδίκημα τοῦ ἐστίν’ ὅτι ἐστι τ’ ἀδίκημα μὲν ἀδίκημα δ’ ἐστι, ἄρα μὲν τ’ ἐκοσιοῦμ’ προσφέρεται also N. E. v. 7 § 7, both with Jackson’s notes: also the table, p. 109, of his edition of Nic. Eth. v.

17 τὰ πλείονα συμβαίνειν κτλ.] Here Lycurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. § 5: ἢ τευχήν παρακαλεῖν τὸ μᾶλλον ἡ δει χρήματα φαίνεται. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, ‘an ambition which is contented with this prospect until then must have a very tenacious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state’ (Oncken). **Susem. (337)** The office of king: §§ 29, 30.

§ 29 20 ἄρας ἔστω λόγοι] III. cc. 14—17. **Susem. (338)** 31 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν βῶν] ‘that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct’: an elective monarchy.
In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25; 17 § 5 n. (678): vii (vii). 2 § 1 ff. nn. (1133, 1136–7); 10 §§ 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare 11 §§ 3, 4 nn. (381–3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (1. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism; and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta in the Jahrb. d. Philol. xvii. 1868. 1–9; E. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann op. c. 208, 235 f., 541–4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject, Sus. (339).


25 ἐφόρων Göttingen || 27 φίλτρα πι' (emended by corr. of P')

25 συμπροσεβουτάς] A less forcible word, like συναποθεοται, might have been expected.


The public messes: §§ 31, 32.

31 27 φίλτρα] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. Lyce. 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps ψευδο to sit; if indeed φίλτρα is the true form and ψευδοτα is ἀρχαῖοι τέχνης (?), see n. on 1372 a 23. Clearly ψεύδημα was the older Doric name, and συναποθεοται is only an Attic term.

28 ἔδει γὰρ κτλ] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 nn. (563, 365): iv (vii). 10 §§ 8 (834). Plato's criticism, Laxn VIII 847 e, is precisely the same: τρεῖς καὶ διαφορὰς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐγγύς τῆς τοῦ Χρηστοῦ νόμου ἐκεῖνης ἕρχεται τὰ τε γεγονέν κατὰ τρόπου γέγοναν κτλ. 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὰ κοινά) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth,' (Oncken): or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schömann op. c. 231 Eng. tr. Sus. (941).

For σύνοδον = πρόσδοχον the lexx. quote Herod. I. 64. χρημάτων συνόδως = contributions. But here the singular (σύνοδον) and the entire phrase αὐτὸ κοινοῦ (sumptu publico) εἶναι, favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. vii (vi). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς συνόδου ταύτης τῆς ἐκλας. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr. 29 φίλτρα = contribute.
The office of admiral: § 33.


III. 9, 34] 1271 a 22—1271 b 1. 297

ἀγομα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανάν, ὡστε συμβαίνει τούτουν (VI)

§ 32 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαίρεσεως. βούλειται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατίκων εἶναι τὸ κατασκευασμα τῶν συστατῶν, γινεται δὲ ἡμιστα δημοκρατικόν οὗτο νομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν 35 γὰρ οὖρ ῥάδιον τοὺς Λακέαν πένθην, ὥρας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὐδότα ἐστιν αὐτῶς ὁ πάτριος, τῶν ἀν δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ § 33 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τούς ναυάρχους νόμον καὶ ἑτέρων τινες ἐπιστημονικαί, ὥρθος ἐπιστημονίκες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αὐτῶς: ἐπὶ γὰρ τοὺς βασιλείαν 40 οὐδώς στρατηγοὶ αὐτίκως ἢ ναυαρχοί σχεδὸν ἕτερο βασιλεῖαν.

§ 34 καθήκοντες. καὶ ὅλῳ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθετοῦ επιτιμήθηκεν 1271 b σετεν ἂν τις, ὑπὲρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτιμήθηκεν (p. 50).

§ 32 37 μὴ μετέχειν] That is, they ceased to be full citizens (σωματίω). They were then, in all probability, included under the term ὅρκολες, Xen. Hell. III. 3. 6. See Schömann ph. c. pp. 217—220, 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures the messes as ἡμιστά δημοκρατεῖα, it is not likely that the persons thus disqualified were included in the δῆμος, as Thirlwall supposed iv. 377.

The office of admiral: § 33.


1. VI ἕτεροι τοῖς βασιλεῖσιν ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσι τοῦ Κάσπρης. In assuming that Aristotle's criticism here implies a further reference to Lysander's plans for the entire overthrow of the kingly power, VIII(i), 1 § 10 n. (1298).

A design entertained by one distinguished holder of the office, such as Lysander undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed without further ado to the institution of the ναυαρχος as a whole. Certainly a startling anomaly was introduced into the political structure of Sparta by the necessity which gradually arose for the employment of a fleet: and it is significant that of four native Admirals (ναυαρχοι) in whom Sparta trusted in the last period of the Peloponnesian war, two, Pythias and Deiniades, were Provincials (φεροκοι) and two, Lysander and Gylippus, were μοῦθαι (Oncken). Further compare VIII(i), 8 § 15 n. (1473): Beloch The office of ναυαρχος at Sparta in Rhein. Mus. xxxiv. 1879. 117—130.

SUSÉM. (243) The Spartan government took the same view as Aristotle does here when they nominated Agesilao to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to secure unity in the operations, 395 n.C., Xen. Hellens. III. 4. 27: ἕπετι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τελῷ τῷ ἐπήρ Κασπρῆς ἐφεβεῖτο ἀπὸ τῶν σκοτα τέλων [the ephors] ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ναυαρχοῦ ὑπὸ γεγονόκεια καὶ καταστάσεως ναυαρχοῦ ὅτινα αὐτῶς ἑρᾶτο. τούτο δ' ἐστίν ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐκτιμήτων τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίους τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἀρμοστῶν ἄρχει, τὸ τε πεῖν τοῦ ἔν πελώρων ἐναῖ, καὶ ὅλῳ ἐν τῷ ἔχοντος ἀρμοστῶν, τῷ τε ναυαρχοῦ, ἐπιτιμήθηκεν τοῦ πεῖν ἔνα ὧν ἔδωκεν.

The military spirit: §§ 34, 35.

§ 34. 1271 b 1 Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς ναύαρχοι 1 625 c—638 n. esp. 630 e, quoted in n. (294 b) on n. 11. Compare II 656 ff. 660 ε. 111 688 a f. iv 705 d. of even earlier Ῥέποικι χ. 547 ε II. τῷ δὲ τῆς ἀρμοστίας τοῦ τούτου ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαίς ἄγειν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ θυμοῦκέτος τῇ καὶ ἀκούντων ἀποκλίνειν, τοῖς πρὸς κόλπον μᾶλλον περικείται ὡς πρὸς ἔρθεν. καὶ ἀποκλίνει τῶν τὸν ἀρχών διάκειται. The same criticism in IV(vii). 2 § 9 14 §§ 15—18, 15 § 6 διὰ τοῦτο ἄρετην: v(viii). 4 § 2.
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς η ἁπάντα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, (VI)
τὴν πολεμικήν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.
τοιούτων ἐσοφόστοι μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπελλημμένοι δὲ ἀρκακτεῖ
5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιτασσόμενο σχολαῖς μὲν ἕκαστοι μὴν ἔπειροι καὶ

§ 35 μᾶλλον ἄσκησιν ἔτεραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.
τοῦτο δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔπτατον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ
γαθὰ τὰ περιμαχία τῇ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ

tοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὃτι μέντοι ταῦτα κριτίττω τῆς ἀρετῆς
§ 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ κακῶς, φαινόμενον δὲ ἐξειτὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ
11 κοινὰ χρήματα τῶν Σπάρτατων, οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ

tῆς πόλεως ἄτινς οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζόμενοι

πολεμεῖν, εἰσέφερον τὰ κακῶς. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπάρτατων

eιναι τὴν πλείστην γήγον ὧν ἐκτελοῦντον ἄλλην

1271 b 3 ὡστὶ M1 P1 || χρήσιμην <μενον> ? Sus. || 5 [ἐπιτευχθεὶς] ad virtutem excolitari William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἀρετῆν wrongly inserted by Susem.2 || 6 τοῦτο Π1, τοῦτο P4 Ob Ar. P2 (1st hand, altered by cor.) and perhaps also Π1 || 7 μὲν omitted by Π M1, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.3 || γίνονται after τὰ γαθὰ M1 P1 || 12 ἀναγκαζόμενοι P2 Ob 13. 

οὕτε πρὸς μιᾶν...οὕτε πρὸς μᾶλλον τὰς ταῖς; § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the notes. Susem. (344)

4 ἐξοφλητοῦν μὲν πολ. κτλ.] Repeated in substance IV(vii). 14 § 16 ff. τοὺς ἐργοὺς ἐξοφλητοῦσι νῦν; § 22 τὴν γὰρ βασιλέως ἀνάπαυσιν, ἄστερον ὁ σύνθεσις, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἰτοῦ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παρέδωκε διάπεσθαι σχολαίς, 15 §§ 5, 6: (vii). 4 § 4 τῶν Δασιαμᾶς ζουσάν, τίνα καὶ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν λειτουργίων ἑτέρων: where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the Politeia; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch Lycurg. 30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins βασιλέως τῶν ἐργῶν, ὡς ἐργασθή, μὴ ἐξερευνήτω καὶ τὰς τιμᾶς. § 36 ἐκτελοῦσι τὰς κτλ.] See above § 24, n. (338) and again IV(vii). 15 § 6 nn. Susem. (347)

9 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς They are right in thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(vii). 1 § 3 n. (697), 15 § 6 nn. (927-8)." Susem. (346 b)

οὐκ ἐξερεύνησαν...κτλ.] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (1. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamos say: τολῷ ἔπει τίνα ταῦτα (οἰς, χρυσοῖς) ἐπελεύσωμαι καὶ ὧστε ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄχωνον ὀστή ἐπιλαμβάνειν ἐν τῶν ἱδίων φέρομεν (Vettori). Cp. also what Pericles says (1. 141. 3) ἀπορηγοῖο εἰς Πελοποννήσου καὶ ὤστε ὀδοῖ ὁπέρ ὀὕτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματι ἄτινς αὐτός. Susem. (349)
Π. 10.1] 1271 b 2—1271 b 23.

§ 37 τῶς εἰσφοράς, ἀπαθήσθηκε τε τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ. (VI) 16 φέρουσας τὴν μὲν γὰρ τόλμην πεποιηκέναι ἀχρήματος, τοὺς δὲ εἰσώτατας φαλακρόματος.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαίμονοι πολιτείας ἐπὶ τῷ οἴρησθο (ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστω ἀ μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἐπεισε- 20 σεις) ἡ δὲ Κρητικῆ πολιτεία πάρεργησ μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτῃ, VII ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὖ ν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦπτον ἕλαφρος. καὶ γὰρ οὐκεὶ καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιμῆσθαι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἡ τῶν Λακώνων τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα

15 τε γ'/ ὡς οὗ τῶν ἕνωσθαι μεταβιβάσεως. As early as the first quarter of the sixth century B.C. Alceaeus (Fr. 50) quotes the saying of Aristodamos, a Spartan, 'money makes the man' as in full force at Sparta: ἔ&ν γὰρ δήνων ἀριστοποιοῦν τοὺς αὐτοὺς, τούτων ἡ σφαίρα τοῦ ἐπιτάγματος τούτων ἐκείνη τῆς σφαίρας καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομοθέτη πλεονεξία καὶ πλοῦτος ἄλοιπο ἐνθύμησα τὰ πλατύνων, δι' αὐτὸς δόξαν ἐπείγοντας ἐπέτηκε τὴν ταχύτατα φιλοποιία τοις τρυφέσι. Besides the corruption of the ephors, §§ 19 n. (316), and senators, §§ 26 (331 b), 11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have spoken confidently of that of the kings and admirals. There was a well-known oracle, φαλακρόματι Σιάτης δεῖ, ἐνδότι δὲ οὐκέτι, quoted in Aristotle’s Polity of Lacedaemon. Frag. 501, 1559 b 28 (= Aristot. pseudep. 496 = 88 in Müller’s Fr. hist. Gr. II. p. 131), and even Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it, Fr. 3. See further Xenophon. De Rep. Lec. 14. 3 and the statement in Ps.-Plato Alloc. 1. 128 e f., quoted by Eaton χρῶνας καὶ ἄρχοντας αὐτὸν ἐν τῶν Ἐλλήνων δικαίωσεν ἐν Δακεδαιμόνι ἑδαιμονία. This may very well be an exaggeration; the writer of the dialogue is however generally well informed on historical matters, see Cobet Μελένων. N. S. 11. 1874. 350 ff. Compare with this the instances of great wealth possessed by Spartans, some of which have been collected by Grote Αρχαία Ελλάδα περί τῶν ἐν οἰκείοις Κρητικῶν, τοῦ δ' ἀληθείᾳ, εὐφράσθη ἐν ταύτῃ, εἰρήθηναι μὲν ἐν ταύτῃ, εἰρήθηναι μὲν τὰ πολλά τῶν ὑπομονείων Κρητείας. Comp. nn. on §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. Intro. p. 35 n. (3). Susem. (391) c. 10 The Cretan polity.

Congreve refers to the article Crote in Smith’s Geogr. Dictionary. See also Schumann’s Antiquities of Greece 1. 395 — 310 Eng. tr.; Oncken II. 377 — 405; Hück Kreta (Göttingen 1823. 9. 3 vols.); 21 γαλαφρῶς neatly, ‘less finished’ (Congreve).

22 καὶ λέγεται. 84] Ephorus Frag. 64, in Strabo x 481. This passage is: λέ- γεται δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτον, ὡς Λακωνικῶν ἔγγορον τῷ πολλῷ τῶν νομοθέτων Κρητικῶν, τοῦ δ' ἀληθείᾳ, εὐφράσθηναι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτῃ, εἰρήθηναι μὲν τὰ πολλά τῶν ὑπομονείων Κρητείας. Comp. nn. on §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. Intro. p. 35 n. (3). Susem. (391)
§ 2 τῶν ἄρχαίων ἐπὶ τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VII)  
25 τῶν Λυκόργων, ὡς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν τῆς Χαρίλλου τοῦ  
βασιλέως καταλυτῶν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τῶν πλείστων δια-  
τρήται χρόνον περὶ Κρίτην διὰ τὴν συνήχειάν ἀποικο-  
κὸν γάρ οἱ Λυκείοι τῶν Λακώνοι ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ’ οἱ  
29 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἑλόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νυμφῶν ὑπάρχου-  
§ 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦντιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν ὁ περίοικοι τῶν  

25 ἐπιτροπῆς P4 and 1st hand of M'P8 (in P³, altered by a later hand) || τοῦ  
Χαρίλλου P¹ || Ἱλαρίλλου Bas, see Comm. || 26 τῆς omitted by Π' Δρ., [τῆς]  
Susem. || 27 τῆς] περὶ τῆς P² Bk. || 28 Ἀλεξιον κρήτης P¹, ἄλοιπος λύσος P² in  
the margin || 30 [διὸ, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Κάμηλοι] Susem. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι]  
Spengel  

24 διαμηρτῶν = quasi per mera et artus distinguere et certum in ordinem redigere (Bonitz): to articulate, elaborate (Welldon).  
§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τῶν Δ.] Ephoros  
I.e. (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus, as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous  
child of his brother Polyeuktos, for certain  
reasons which are stated went to Crete  
and did not return until Charilaos himself  
had assumed the government. Compare  
Plutarch Lycurg. cc. 2—5; Trierber ch. c.  
p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel Die Quellen in  
Plutarches Lykurgus 33 ff. (Marburg  
1870.) SUSEM. (352)  
25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos  
in VIII(v). 13 § 12 (see n.): probably we  
should restore it here, or else read Char-  
illos there. SUSEM. (353)  
28 κατέλαβον δ’ ἀποικοῦσιν] “And  
the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos  
had found the system of the laws esta-  
blished at that time amongst the inhabit-  
ants.” In just the same way Ephoros (I.e.  
481) replies to those who claim a Lacedae-  
monian descent for the Cretan institutions  
on the ground that the Lyttians were a  
colony from Sparta and that colonists  
generally preserve the usages of the  
mother state. He urges that many col-  
onies did not do this and that many  
Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta,  
yet had the same institutions as the  
Spartan colonies in Crete. On these  
considerations of Aristotle and Ephoros,  
then, the Lycurgian institutions at Sparta,  
so far from being genuinely Spartan,  
were not even of Dorian origin, but had  
belonged in the first instance to the pre-  
Dorian population of Crete; unless in-  
deed even these earliest inhabitants of  
Crete are to be regarded as Dorians (as  
they are by Otfried Müller The Dorian  
1. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has  
been refuted by Trierber p. 81 ff. In  
opposition to the view of Ephoros and  
Aristotle, which is in itself improbable,  
since he has sought to maintain the truth of  
that combated by Ephoros, that Spartan  
institutions actually passed over into  
Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare  
n. (356) on § 4. Polybios moreover IV. 54.  
6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the read-  
there also) as the oldest of the Cretan  
towns and likewise as a colony of Lace-  
daemon. Trierber has shown conclusively  
p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there  
ever really existed any specially ‘Dorian’  
political or social principles, such as are  
assumed to have found their highest and  
completest embodiment in Sparta. Suse-  
m. (355)  
§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention  
merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants  
of the pre-Dorian population, if after all  
the Spartan and other Dorian settlers  
had accepted the same institutions? Ari-  
stotle cannot have contradicted himself  
in such a manner as this, or have written  
such nonsense. It is much more likely  
that some learned Peripatetic added this  
in order to tack on the following remarks  
about Minos, his maritime power, and  
his death. He did not however perceive  
that they are not at all appropriate to this  
connexion, and that to speak of Crete as  
 favourably situated for maritime supre-  
macy over the Hellenes agrees but ill  
with Aristotle’s own statements §§ 15, 16:  
where the remoteness of the island is  
said to have shut it off from external  
complications and from foreign dominion,  
SUSEM. (355)  
Groote II. 484 n. 2 has another way  
out of the difficulty. He takes the word  
as in Thuc. 1. 17, “the neighbouring
states" (7). The words of Ephores in Strabo x. p. 737 are: τὸν δὲ Κρήτην οὐδε

μαζικά (οὐ τῶν νομίμων) κακοθείνετο τῶν

πολέμων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Κυκλοπῶν, τῶν

πολέμων μὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν νομίμων παρὰ Δυνατός καὶ Γερμανός καὶ Ἀλλᾶς τῶν πολέμων μᾶλλον ἦν παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνος. καὶ

δὴ καὶ τὰ Δυνατὰ οὐδὲν ποτὲ ἔκαθεν μαρτύριον τοῦ τῶν Δακωνίων προσβέβλητα ἀπο

φαινότας· ἀπόκους γὰρ δοθαὶ φιλότετο τὰ

τῆς μυρτοῦδε ἑσύ ἐπὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς

ἐκεῖνος εἰσίν τούτοις βλέπεται καὶ ποιητε

ομένων τῶν χωρίων ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἀνταφαίνειν.

24 ἔπειτα = commands the whole

sea [Congress].

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete

lost its fleet and maritime supremacy.

Cp. Thuc. i. 4: Ephores Priag. 64

(Müller i. 230) καὶ γὰρ ναυκρατίων πρό

τερών τὸν Κρήτην . . . . ἔνδοκις ἀποξεβληκόναι

τὸ ναυτείον.

41 ἄναλογον . . . Δακωνίων]

Triebcr p. 86 ff. shows that, although the

points of difference as well as of resemblance are not brought out forcibly enough, yet in the main the whole com-

parison is just. He tries to make it

probable that from its quite peculiar char-

acter the similarity can only be explained

by a real transference from Sparta to Crete.

Oncken on the other hand, 11.

377, finds a reason both for the resem-

blance and the limitations to it in the

one point which Aristotle has not men-

tioned, "the fact that in Sparta as in

Crete a dominant race of the same

Dorian descent broke in from a foreign

land upon an old political order, overcame

it by violence, and then directed their

whole energies to the task of maintaining

themselves uncontaminated and unmis-

sailable at the head of their new settlement."

Polybius vi. 45, 46 goes still farther and

even denies that there were any resem-

blances at all between the two polities.

SUSEM. (356)

He insists (1) on the absence of any

legal restriction on the possession of land

or money, and (2) on the annual tenure of

offices (as contrasted with the life-long

tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerousias) and

the democratic character of the Cretan

governments. Undoubtedly as we ap-

proach Roman times the power of the

ἐκκλησία increases: Hocking iii. pp. 64—

97, who supports his case from inscrip-

tions, infers that a democratic revolution

had subverted the governments of Aris-

totle's time.

§ 5 1272 a i 10 περίχου] See n. 325

and esp. Exc. iii. to this book p. 330 ff.

SUSEM. (357)
καὶ οὐσίατια παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἔκαλουν οἱ (VII) Δάκκους οὐ φιδία άλλα ἀρδεία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ἣ καὶ § 6 δὴ λέγουσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοπίτειας τὰ τάξεις. οἱ δὲ τοὺς γὰρ ἐφορού νὰ ἀυτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὺς πέντε τοῖς ἄριστοι οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰςν’ οἱ δὲ γέρωντες τοῖς γέρωντες, οὖς καλοῦντοι οἱ Κρῆτες βουλή, ἵστοι βασιλεῖα δὲ πρὸτέρου μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυμα οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡμεροῖαν § 7 οἱ κόσμοι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἐχουσι’ ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ- 11 χοῦν πάντες, κυρία τὸ οὖν ἔστιν ἄλλ’ ἡ συνενεχύσθαι τὰ δοξάστα τοῖς γέρωνται καὶ τῶν κόσμοι.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συναστίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησιν ἄ Κρήτες (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Ἀκαδαδαμοῦ κατὰ κεφάλαιον ἐκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετέχει τοὺς κόσμοις τῆς πολλῆς τεῖας, καθάπερ ἐρήται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως’

3 φαλα τὸ Π’ καὶ Π’ (1st hand, apparently altered by p’) || ἀρδεία Α’, ἀρ- δεία Π’ Βκ., ἀλλ’ ἀρδεία π’ in the margin || § 8 ἄλλη 8 “a gloss under which lurks a Cretan name” Spengel || πρῶτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Ar., perhaps rightly || 11 ἄλλα Π’ καὶ Π’ (1st hand, emended by corr.)

3 ἀρδεία = meals of men; or more precisely, clubs or companies of men who met together; see n. (378) on Π’ 3.

SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες] The same remark is found in Eheoros ιε. 482, with the object of proving the same conclusion. Comp. also Plut. Lycurg. c. 12. But that Ephorus repeats this argument three times, is a very inexact statement of Tricler, p. 100: for at p. 480 the expression is only ἐν τοῖς συναστίοις ἐκ καλούμενοι ἀρδείας and p. 483 εἰς τὰς συστι- τια ἄφηντε τὰ ἀρδεία.

SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of Sparta was the constitution of every independent Cretan town. We learn from the inscriptions that little places like Hierapytna, Priasion (Prae sus), Saxos, Allaria, had each its own κόσμος, βουλή, and εκκλησία.

§ 5 On the analogy between the Ephors and the κόσμοι, see Π’ 335 i. SUSEM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέρωντες See § 11. SUSEM. (361)

§ 7 10 ἐκκλησίας δὲ κτλ] Cp. Π’ 11 §§ 5, 6 with Ex. ι. Although the simple verb ἀνευρίζειν does not mean “to vote,” but “to put to the vote,” yet so far as I know ἀνευρίζειν is everywhere found in the sense of “vote approvingly,” i.e. “confirm by a vote,” auctores fere: Polyb. ΧΧΙ. 13. 11, Plutarch De Gavulititate 311 f. Here it can have no other meaning. The only doubt is whether we should take it literally (1) that the popular assembly was bound to ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had the right, without proper debate and without amendment, simply to confirm or reject the proposal previously decided by others. That question will be discussed in n. (386). SUSEM. (363)

Aesch. De Fals. Lég. 35 has the middle voice in the same sense. Compare κατα- συνετώθην with both meanings (1) to be very silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In the Gortynian inscription the assembly in the market-place and the stone from which the speaker addressed the people are twice mentioned X. 34. αἰτιωθίσθαι καὶ παρὰ ἀναφέρουσαν τοὺς πολιτα- ταν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαὸς ἀναγγείλειν, i.e. ανα- πελεύθεσαι [he must adopt] καὶ αὐτὰ ἀναφέρειν καταλάβειν (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ (cp. Soph. O, Col. 196) ὧν ἀναγγέλει- σοι, adoption shall be in the market- place, when the citizens are assembled, from the stone where they make speeches: and again XI. 10. 16 ἐρήτης καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31. Cp. n. (341). SUSEM. (369)


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Π. 10. 9] 1272 a 2—1272 a 25. 303

ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γυναικῶν καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά—(VII) τῶν ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ * * φόρων ὁδὸ φέρονσι οἱ περι-
οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μέν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-
νοπαίδευσις, τὸ δὲ τοὺς συστιτοὺς, ὡστε ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-
§ 9 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδας καὶ ἄνδρας' πρὸς δὲ τὴν διαλογιστήν ἂς ὄψιμοι πολλὰ περιλογισθήκην ὁ
νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάξεσιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἦν μὴ
πολυτεκνώσῃ, τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμολογαί(, p. 59)

τέρπεται ἂν εἰ φαίνοι ἡ μὴ φαίνοι, ἐπερεύεται τοϊκο-

18 καὶ ἐκ ὁμοι Λάμπιν Βκ., perhaps Γ; [ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] Götting, [ἐκ] Congre
crve || καὶ <ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τῶν> ου καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δικαστῆς τῶν> Susem., see Comm.,
[kai] Lamkin, καὶ <ἐκ τῶν> Congrewe || καὶ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων
or else after ὡστε ἐκ κοινοῦ by transposition, Schmidt || 21 [καὶ γυναῖκας …
ς ἵνα καταφέρειν καὶ ἢ] Oncken; but see the Comm. || 21 πρὸς δὲ ……"καὶ κατετραποὶ
transposed by Susem, to follow 27 φανεροῖς, but wrongly || 24 ποιήσας is corrupt,
<ἐπερεύεται> ποιήσας or something similar? Susem., better ποιήσας Schmidt

κοινοτόριος] ἐκ κοινοῦ μύλλον of 9 §

31, in a more public fashion.

18 ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public

domain." Zittelmann pp. 139, 140 con-
jectures that the citizens had the right of
pasture on this domain-land. By the
law of inheritance in the Gortynian in-
scription, certain of the cattle with the
house in the town pass to the sons as
præcipuum; but the daughters have a
share of the land which is cultivated by
Susem. (364)

§ 8 19 τέπακται [μέρος] Partly on
this model, partly on that of Hippodamos
§ 3 n.), is based the division of the
land in Aristotle's ideal state, IV(VII).

10 § 10 n. (824), into property (1) of the
temples, (2) of the sysitia, (3) of private
individuals, (1) and (2) together forming
the public land. In the state of the
Laos there is no public land, although
Plato mentions the Cretan institution
with approval, VIII 847 e quoted in n.
(341) on 9 § 31. Susem. (365)

20 ὡστε ἐκ κοινοῦ κτλ] If we un-
derstand this as e.g. Schömann does, op. c.
307 Eng. tr., that the mess-funds main-
tained the members of the family, wives
daughters younger boys and slaves, who
had their meals at home, then the whole
of Oncken's proof (II. 385), that καὶ
γυναῖκας καὶ παιδας καὶ ἄνδρας] is a spurious
addition, falls to the ground. Such slight
inaccuracies of expression, due to exces-
sive brevity, are no uncommon thing in

Aristotle. The sense might be made
clearer by a slight insertion thus: 'one
part is set apart for the worship of the
 gods and for the state expenditure, the
other for the public messes and the en-
tire maintenance of the households of the
citizens," so that all, men women and
children, are kept at the public cost.2
Schömann rightly remarks that this ex-
plains why an Aeginetan state had to be
paid for each slave: see Exc. iii. p. 337.
Oncken however gives a different ex-
planation (II. 387), he makes each of the
subject population (?) contribute an
Aeginetan state. Susem. (366)

§ 9 22 διαλογιστήν] Our only au-
thority for a Cretan ἀδρόπιον, Heraclei-
ades Ponticus, and the writers quoted by
Athen. IV. 142 l., Dosiadus and Pyrgion,
do not enable us to verify this statement:
Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old
practice of sitting at table: Cretes quorum
nemo gustavit unquam cubans, Cicero
pro Murina § 74. Their moderation in
drinking: [Plato] βίοις 310 A.

23 πρὸς τὴν διάξεσιν κτλ] See
Also Zittelmann Das Recht von Gortyn
p. 101 and the inscription itself ii. 1, 6,
8, 9.

25 ἄρρενας ἐπιται ὁ διαερκ. κακός] Since
Aristotle thought it so important for
his own ideal state to maintain uni-
formity in the number of citizens (see c.
6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5 : IV(VII). 16 § 15 ff. with
notes), and is not too nice about the
means of securing that end, it would.
skéψασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πόλεμῳ τοὺς ἱπποὺς (VII) τέτακτα τοῖς Κρητικοῖς ἢ τοῖς Λάκεσιν, ἤμεν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῖς κόσμοις ἐτὶ χείρον τῶν ἐφόρων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακῶς τοὺς ἐφόρους ἀρχέως, ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς τοῖς γαρ ὡς οἱ τυχόντες. οἱ δὲ εἰκεί συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰκεί μὲν γὰρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρρενίαν ἐκ τῶν κόσμων τῶν ἀρχέως δὴ ἕμενος τῶν πολιτείαν· ὑπάρχει δὲ ὡς ἐκ ἀπώλεσεν τῶν αἱροῦται τῶν κόσμων ἀλλὰ εἰς τοὺς γενέας, καὶ τοὺς ἔστεις λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ ἄρχων (τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βιῶν μεζόν ἐστιν γέρας τῆς ἐλέως αὐτῶς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχέως ἀλλὰ αὐτῶς τοῖς τοῖς ὑπαρχούσις ἐπισφαλεῖς). τὸ δὲ ἑσυχαζεΐς μὴ μετέχουμεν τὸν ὑπάρχειν νόμον οὐκείων σημείου τοῦ τετάρχαται καλῶς· οὕτω εἶναι γάρ λῆμ-
ματός τε τοῖς κόσμοις ἀστερ ποίις ἐφόροις, πόρρα γ' (VII)

ἀποκούσαν ἐν νήσοι τῶν διαφθεροῦντος. ἤν δὲ ποιοῦνται
tης ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἱπτρελέω, ἄτομα καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ
dυναστευτικὴ. πολλακίς γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συναίτητες τοῖς τοῖς κόσμοις ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἔξεστι
δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπεννεύτη τὴν ἁρχὴν. ταῦτα δὴ
πάντα βέλτιον γινεθάναι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων βου

§ 14 λησθην' οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῶς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαίλοτατον τὸ

τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἢν καθιστάτησι πολλακίς οὐ ἄν μὴ δίκαις βουλη

tαι δούναι τῶν δυναστῶν ἢ καὶ δήλου ὅτι ἔχει τι πολιτείας

10 ἡ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ ποιητεία εὐτῖν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰς

θαυμ. γὰρ διαλαμβάνοντες τῶν δήμων καὶ τοῖς φίλους ἀναπ

41 γ') τ' apparently Ar., γὰρ Susem.1 wrongly, enim William, whence nothing is
to be inferred about Γ

1772 b 1 διαφθεροῦντος Γ Μ and perhaps Ar., διαφθεροῦντος P4 (1st band) || § 5 δὲ

8 of in Korses, ἦν ΓΠ Αr. Schneider Bk. || 9 τῶν δυναστῶν (not here but before 8

ἡ καθιστάσαι) II Ar. Bk. and P1 in margin; so transposed, δυναστῶν <τινῆς> or
even better <ὑπό> τῶν δυναστῶν? Schneider || Helsius transposes εἰς ὅπῃ

12 ἄλλος before 9 ἡ καὶ δήλον κτλ. || 11 γὰρ Susem. following Bernays'
translation, δὲ ΓΠ Αr. Bk. Susem.1 || διαλαμβάνοντες suspected by Bonitz (Ind. Αris.

185 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem.1, δὲ λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, needlessly if we

alter μοναρχία into μαρχάρια || μαρχάρια Bernays, μοναρχία ΓΠ Αr. Bk. Susem.1

dridas, Plat. Per. 27). Hence the office is not such a prize as to excite the
cupidity of the commons.

41 τοῖς ἐφόροις] Cr. 9 § 19 n. (316).

SUSEM. (370 b)

1772 b 1 τῶν διαφθεροῦντων goes with τῶρομι: at a distance from any who are likely
to corrupt them.

§ 13 δυσναστευτικὰ] A δυναστεία is the worst and most extreme form of Olig
garchy, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of
government: VI (IV), § 2; τῶν πατρῶν αὐτῷ πατρὸς εἰσὶ καὶ ἄρχει μή ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' εἰ
dρεχεται n. (1212); 6 § 11 n. (1228); 14

8 9 nn. (1328, 1331): VII (V). 7

§ 3 n. (1447): VIII (V). 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (1509): 6

7 11 nn. (1586, 91); 7 §§ 12, 13 n. (1628): 8 7 n. (1613): § 11 n. (1617).

SUSEM. (371)

Thebes at the time of the Persian war is an instance: Thuc. III. 62. 3.

5 μεταβ. ἀπενεύτη τὴν ἁρχήν to re
sign office before their term (of a year)
expires. The verb is ἀσχέτον in the
gortynian inscription εἰκ' ἀσχέτοιας ἢν ἀσχέτος; or (?) ἢ = ο (after) ἢν ἀσχέτος.

§ 14 8 τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας = the fact of

the suspension of the office of Κόσμος,
only brought about by cabals of influ-
ential families who did not want to have
trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cp. Thuc. i. 138
καὶ τῶν Ἐλληνικῶν ἑλίπτα, ἢ ἡ ὑπηρεσία
αὐτῷ διούσων: II. 45 πεζία ἑλιπί. ἤν
καὶ ἔτι διαφυγόντων ἐποιήσωσεν (Schil-
letto).

οὐ ἄν μὴ κτλ.) Oncken (II. 393) is quite
wrong in inferring from this passage that
even the judicial office probably passed
from the kings to the Κόσμος. From
the complete analogy which Aristotle finds
between the Spartan and Cretan senators, and
between the Ephors and Κόσμος, in all the
esential features of the authority of
these offices, it is clear on the contrary
that, as in Sparta III. 1. 10 nn. (443-4),
sο in Crete, the Senate had criminal ju-
risdiction over the most serious offences,
and the Κόσμος appeared, like the Ephors,
as accusers in the case of crimes against
the state. Where there is no prosecutor
there is of course no judge. SUSEM. (372)
11 διαλαμβάνοντες = by forming parties

II.
§ 15. Χίαν τοιεύον καὶ στασιδέζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τινὲς τε διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτο ἡ διὰ τῶν τρίων χρόνων μηκέτε πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύσεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p. 53)

15. ἔστε δ’ ἐπικίνδυνος ὁ ὅρκος ἐξουσίας πόλεις * * τοῖς βουλημένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται, σφηκταὶ διὰ τῶν τόπων ἐξελθομείας γὰρ τὸ πάρο τοῦ πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μὲνεῖ τοῖς Κρητῖσι, οἳ δ’ ἐξελοῦτες ἀφίστασθαι πολλάκις. ὡστε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρητῖσι, περιττοὶ τὸ τῶν εὐκομοίδες διάβεβηκέναι εἰς τὴν κέρδον, ὅς πεποίηκε φανερῶν τὴν ἀθετεῖαι τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαῦτ’ ἦμιν εἰρήθω τῆς πολιτικῆς

15 ἐπικίνδυνος [valid pericula] William on his own conjecture probably, hence λαμ ἐπικίνδυνοι Susem. 1 wrongly ‖ τῶν βουλημένων and ἐνυμαίνειν Παῖ Αρ. Βκ. "because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Bernay; <ὅτιν> τῶν βουλημένων Bas. 2, <ἂν> τῶν Β. Busse. If the dative is right an infinitive has dropped out, as Bücheler saw ‖ 21 φανερὸν Βκ. 3, a misprint ‖ 23 εἰρηθεῖον before τοσαῦτ’ ΠΠΒκ.

from amongst the people and their own friends. Susem.

§ 15. 17 ἐξουσίαις Acc. plur. 'The distance has kept out aliens as effectively as a formal prohibition.' No foreigner could come to Sparta and live as a resident alien (μέτοχος): strangers stopping there for a time were strictly watched and, as soon as it seemed advisable to the Ephors, dismissed: see Schömann p. 276 f. Eng. tr. Susem. (379)

§ 16. 18 διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν π. κτλ. Consult however n. (181) on 9 § 3: where also a different reason, it should be observed, is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that the Cretan states, even if at war, assist one another against the revolted πολιτικῶν. Susem. (374)

19 οὗτε γὰρ] It is the isolation, not the strength, of the Cretans that secures their independence; for (1) they are not strong enough to acquire foreign dominion (ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς), while (2) their internal weakness is now patent.

20 γενότ’ τε τὸ πόλεμος κτλ.] There are two events to which this passage, taken by itself, may refer. (1) With Höck, Kret. III. 61 f., we may understand it of the Phocian war. Phalaeceus, the last leader of the Phocians, after withdrawing from Phocis came at last with his mercenaries to Crete: by a stratagem he conquered Lykton and drove out the inhabitants who turned to their mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid they received under the command of Archidamos, who beat the mercenaries and reestablished the Lyktons in their city. Phalaeceus however stayed in the island and fell at the siege of Kydonia B.C. 343. See Schafer Demosthenes II. 339 f. Or (2) we might with Füllborn (Π. 253) refer it to the despatch of Agesilaus with the mercenaries of his brother Agis II, who was allied with the Persians and sent the expedition directly after the battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete. The Lacedaemonians with their mercenaries effected a landing successfully and met with no material resistance: see Schafer III. 163 f. As therefore both events suit, if, when he wrote the passage, Aristotle had been acquainted with the second he would certainly have spoken of τῶν foreign wars, and not of one only: thus it seems as if this passage were composed before the latter of the two events took place. But it need not be inferred from this that the completion of the book, so far as Aristotle did at all complete it, could not have been of a much later date. Aristotle often worked at several of his treatises at the same time. Cp. Introd. p. 66. Susem. (376) ἐξουσίας = of mercenaries (Congreve). Better, 'foreign.' For III. 14. 7 ἐξουσία as opposed to of πολιτικῶν means a foreign force, though a force of mercenaries.
11 τείας· πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ διδοκιναι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ VIII
25 πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δὲ ἓναι παρα-
πλησίως των Δάκων· αὐτὰς γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἀλλή-
λαις τε σύνεγγυς πῶς εἶσαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρο-
σιν, ἣ τε Κρήτηκαὶ ἣ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἢ τῶν
29 Καρχηδόνιων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρὰ αὐτῶν
§ 2 καλῶς· σημείον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τῶν δήμων
ἐκουσίων διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στά-
σιν, ὥς τι καὶ αἰχμών εἰστεῖν, γεγονήθαι μήτε τύραννοι.
§ 3 ἔχει δὲ παραπλησία τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συν-

24 καὶ καρχηδόνιον after καλῶς Μ' P' || 28 ἢ before Λακωνικῇ omitted in Μ' P',
[9] Sus.|| 30 σημείο τε Ε' Sus. || <εἰ> συντεταγμένης Schneider, εἰ
tetagmenē Bergk (Comm. crit. spec. vi, Marburg 1816), one or other seems necessary;
here institute Ar.; ἡδον for πολιτεία Bender || 31 έκουσιον Spengel, έχονων
Γ' P' Bk., omitted by M' P', untranslated by Ar.; ἕκωσι Bergk, ἑκωσι Hampke,
εκοσια W. Wagner (De Plauti Anul., Bonn 1864 p. 37), all before Spengel:
εχ <εντα ει=ουσια Sauppe, έχονων <κέρω> Bender following Lambin's translation
populum rerum compotem || εν omitted by Μ' P', crossed out by P'².

C. 11 The constitution of Carthage.
On this chapter consult Kluge Aristoteles de politia Carthaginensium. Accedit
Theodori Motchianae descripitione reipublicae Carthaginensis (Breslau 1814); Heeren -
Idee 11. p. 1, Works XIII. 103—147; Movers Die Phönikier (Berlin 1849) vol. II.
pt. 1. p. 479 ff; Mommsen History of Rome, vol. II. pp. 15—23 Eng. tr. Su-
sem. (376)
§ 1 24 πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ καλῶς || "are thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution,
(b) with many features of unusual relative excellence, and (c) some which most
nearly resemble the Spartan constitution." Of these three points Aristotle adopts
the, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 2,
and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the
further discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently
that he also accepted the second point.
Isocrates III. 31, and Julian, Or. I. p. 14
(Spanh.), also point to a similarity be-
tween the Carthaginian and Spartan
constitutions which they declare to be
the best actually established. Polyb.Ti.
51 f. and Cicero De Rep. II. 23 § 41 ff.
compare them both with one another and
with the Roman constitution, while Era-
tosthenes (in Strabo I. p. 66) praises the
admirable character of the Carthaginian
and Roman constitutions. Sus. (377)
The exciting struggle with Dionysios
for Sicily must have called attention to
the government of Carthage; see note on
1173 a 36 (Wyse).
§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is
thoroughly <well—organised when the
popular element is attached to the
system of its own free will.
31 διαμένει, like μένων § 16, =
abide by, remain loyal to, a government.
32 μήτε τύραννον]. This assertion
seems true. For the efforts of Hann
(about B.C. 344) to make himself tyrant,
mentioned by Aristotle himself viii(v),
7 § 4, met with no success, see n. (1597); while the attempt of Bomicar
was not until after Aristotle's time, B.C.
308. That also ended at last unsuccess-
fully: see the same note. Lastly
there was one Malchus between 600 and
550 B.C., who having been banished be-
cause he had been defeated in Sardinia
procured his return by force of arms.
He then summoned the popular assembly,
justified his conduct before it, and had
ten senators put to death, but made no
change in the existing constitution. How-
ever he fell under suspicion of aiming at
tyrannical power; in consequence, and
as a punishment for his former violent
proceedings, he was executed, Justin.
xviii. 7, so that this instance does not
contradict Aristotle's statement. With
regard to viii(v). 13 § 12 see n. (1772).
Sus. (377 b) || § 3 "The points of analogy to the
Spartan polity are the common meals of
the clubs like the φάστα at Sparta, and

20—2
the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit)." See Exe. iv. pp. 349-347. SUSEM. (378-9-81-2). Comp. 9 36 ek ton tuchon] See c. 10 § 10 n. (369). SUSEM. (389). § 4 § 38 "And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity," like the Heracleid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartiates is obscure. See Hdt. v. 72, Curtius History i. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann Antiq. quae[m, pp. 226, 226, 241-244. Eng. tr. 39 mēche kath aîrētē ktl] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. SUSEM. (383). el ti diaφerōn See the Critical Notes. The sense required is "and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority."

40 καθ  ἄμακα ἡμικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Conybeare renders boldly "elected rather than hereditary": Cope more cautiously "according to age." But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerontias, at Sparta.

41 εὐρείας= cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in Реч. ii. 15 § 31 here, in moral character also.

§ 5 173 a 2 τά μὲν οὖν πλείστα κτλ] "Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences" occurs from the best type "are common to all the constitutions mentioned." And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). SUSEM. (385)
παρεκβαίνεις ** κοινά τυχόμανε πάσιν δυνα ταῖς εἰρημενίαις (VIII) πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ** τὰ μὲν εἰς δήμου ἐκκλησίας μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ εἰς δημαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν (p. 54) τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δήμον αἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετά τῶν γεραντῶν, ἀν διμοριομοιοί παίντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ, § 6 τούτων καὶ ὁ δήμος, ἀ δὲ ἂν εἰσεφέρως ὤντοι ὦ δια- τοῦ κούσιν μόνον ἀποδίδοσι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δέξατα τοῖς ἄρ-

3 παρεκβαίνεις <τὰ τῆς ἀριστείας τάξεων> or something similar Susen., cp. 9 § 1. Füllborn first suspected a defect § 4 ὑπόθεσιν <ὑπερασπίας> Bernays; cp. also 9 § 1 § 5 πολιτείας <τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι> Susen., ἐκλέξεις <τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι> Thurot, who discovered the lacuna § ἐκλέγεις P1, ἐκλέγεις M1 (corr.) § 6 γὰρ τὸ Morel Bk. Bernays § 7 τὸ δὲ μὴ II Bk. Bernays. In Q6 τὸ is a correction of τὰ, apparently by the scribe himself § 9 τούτων καὶ Susen., καὶ τούτων ΓII Bk., καὶ τούτων Bernays § εἰσεφέρως II (emended by corr. in P1) § ὦντοι omitted by II1, [οὗτοι] Susen.1,2 perhaps rightly § 10 τὰ δέξατα τάξεως M1, τάξεως P1 (1st hand, corrected by P1), τάξεως I

4 With τῶν δὲ supply ἐπιστημονίων ἄν. and take πρὸς when judged by.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ]. The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μὲν μὲν εἰ τι καίδως νὰ μὴ καλως πρὸς τὴν ἀριστείαν νεωδομένης τάς, ἄγα δ' εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τῶν ὑποτάξιον τιμαρείμεθα αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an aristocracy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy: more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see VI(vi). 2 § 4 n. (1141); 7 § 4 n. (1238), and cp. VIII(v). 7 § 4 n. (1557), 12 § 12 n. (1728), § 14 n. (1760); or else at any rate as a polity (κοινολογία) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental assumption (ὑποθέσεις) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. § 9 τὸ καὶ ἄρετον ἀρετῆς ὦ ν., § 11 μᾶλλον ἀρετῆς παρακείμενος, VI(iv). 8. § 7 ὑπὸ ἄρετῆς καὶ n. (356) on III. 7 § 3. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for these must stand highest: hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchical principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristocracy departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of Oligarchy and Democracy; hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see VII(vi). c. 9. Cato quoted by Servius on Vergil's Aeneid IV. 685, Polybius VI. 51. 2 and Cicero l.c. call the constitution of Carthage, less accurately, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, optimatum potestas: Cicero, genus optimas), and democracy, Susen. (386)

6 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] "For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed: otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice."

7 παίντες = both; viz. the Shofetes on the one side, the Senators on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: "παίντες ubi de duobus tantum agitur, i.e. dubiis earum potestate" (Inl. Arct.). Comp. Anal. Priora 1, 28, 45 b 21 dea πᾶσι ἔστω "τὸ ὑπὸ ὀποτέρῳ, et maiori termino et minori" (Waitz): also VII(vi). 4. 2. See also Exc. IV, ὁ δήμοι, p. 347; Susen. (387).

8 οὐ - both; i.e. the Shofetes on the one side, the Senators on the other.
383 b 17, and De Anima III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen).
§ 6 11 άλλα κύριοι κράτεις εἶσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλημένῳ τοῖς (VIII)
12 εἰςφερομένοις αὐτεπείγέ δέστων, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-

χωσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κράτεις εἶσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλημένῳ τοῖς (VIII)

12 εἰςφερομένοις αὐτεπείγε δέστων, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-

had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to invoke it in case the Sholetes and the senate were agreed; whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing it must be conceded to Oncken (1. p. 279 f.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch Lycurg. 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhetra) by the kings Theopompus and Polydorus (αἱ δὲ σκολὴ ὁ δύνατον ἐλευθερίαν, τοῖς προφήταις καὶ άρχοντας ἀνασταθμίζω ἡμοῖ) is, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should respect a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;—supposing further that Aristotle's language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal Spartan institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. Thus we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, τοῦτον ἐστι μη κυρίοις, ἀλλὰ ὀλίκον ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλέξει τοῦ δήμου, ὡσε ἐκτρέπουσα καὶ μετανόωσιν τινὶ γνώμῃ παρά τό βλέποντι, i.e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. Susem. (389)
Π. ΙΙ. 10]
1273 a 11—1273 a 31.

(Π.ΙΙ.)

§ 7 τείχαις οὐκ ἔστων· τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχιὰς κυρίας οὐσιας πολλῶν· καὶ μεγάλων υφὶ αὐτῶν αἰρέτας εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατὸν
15 ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι τῇ μεγαθίνῃ ἀρχῇ, ἐτὶ δὲ ταύτας πλέονα ἀρχεῖς χρόνων τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξελπιθοῦσε ἄρχουσι καὶ μελλοντες) ὁλιγαρχικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀμφότεροι καὶ
μὴ κληρονόμας ἀριστοκρατικῶν θετεῖν, καὶ εἰ τέ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχεῖων δικαίωσαι τὰς
30 σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλαις ὑπὸ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονί.

§ 8 παρεκβάλει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Ἰερσαινούντων μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν κατὰ τὰν διάνοιαν ἡ
συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστείνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ
πλουτιύδην οἶνωτα δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
§ 9 γὰρ τῶν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν καὶ σχολαζέων· εἴπερ οὖν
τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτιύδην ὁλιγαρχικὸν τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρισ-
τείνν ἀριστοκρατικὸν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἰ τὰς τρέτη, καθ’ ἧν
περ συντείχαται καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι τὰ περὶ τὴν
πολιτείαν αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ
30 λίστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς.

§ 10 δὲ νομίζειν ἁμέρημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρεκβάσιν εἶναι

16 πλέον Μ’, πελοπία Πν-α Qn Tn Ald. Bk. Susem.1 Pn (later hand), πελοπία Fn1 (1st
hand) || 17 μένοντες Syllburg wrongly || τὸς τὰς Fp4 and p1 in the margin, τῶν
Qn Tn || 18 καὶ εἰ περὶ ἕτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place || 19 τῶν
Koraes (cf. III. 1. 10), τῶν Π. Bk., τῶν <ἀντίθετον> Vettori: τῶν ἀρχείων πάνω
Γ+44 Αr. || 20 καθάπερ Λακεδαιμονί Bender thinks not genuine || 28 [καὶ
Susem., untranslated by Ar., καὶ συντείχαται Congreve transposing, καὶ <παρεκβά-
θες> or something similar Thurot

19 ὑπὸ τινῶν ἄρχοντων] Aristotle
says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratic provided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are mere appendages to different offices of state. Further cf. III. 1 §§ 10,
11 τὰς δίκας διεξάγοντα κατὰ μέρος... τῶν αὐτῶν ἃ δέ τρόπων καὶ περὶ. Καρχηδόνοι τὰς γὰρ ἄρχοι τε πρὸς εἰσελθεῖν τὰς δίκας, nn. (443.4): also n. (315) on § 23 above, p. 348 and Introd. p. 54 n. 3. Susem. (391)
20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονί] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors at Sparta, see nn. (32, 329 b) on 9 §§ 23, 25; on that of the kings Schissmann p. 349 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates ὑπ. c. 250 ff. Susem. (391 b)
§ 8 23 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτιύδην] Yet apart from the ideal state—see n. (858) on IV(vii). 13 § 9 πάντες of πολίτες—
Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 12 §§ 5,
6: III. 11 § 8. Susem. (392)
§ 9 30 τοὺς στρατηγοὺς] See Exc. IV. p. 349f. Susem. (392 b)
§ 10. 31 δὲ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ.] See 9
§ 3 n. (179); compare IV(vii). 9 § 3, § 7, 10 § 9 n. 1. "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payment."
(Füllborn). See however Exc. IV. p. 348. Susem. (393)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 11.

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[Π. 11. 10]

τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦτον ὅραν ἔστη (VIII)
τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βελτίστοι οὐδόν ταῦτα σχολάζειν
καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχωντες ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐδώ
τεῦντες. ἦλθεν ὁ βελτίστος, ἐκαὶ προεῖτο τῷ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
τοῦ ὁμοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἄρχωντας πεπραγμένας σχολής νομίζον μέν
ταῖς, χάλεφος τῷ τάς μεγάλας ἄνωτάς εἶναι τῶν ἄρχων,
§ 11 τήν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τήν στρατηγίαν. ἔτημαν γὰρ ὁ νόμος
οὗτος ποιεῖ τῶν πλεοντῶν μᾶλλον τῆς ἁρετῆς καὶ τῆς στά
ολης, ϕιλοχρήματος. ὦ τι γὰρ ἄν ὑπολαβῇ τίμιον εἶναι τῷ
τάς κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τήν τῶν ἀλλῶν πολιτῶν δοξάν ἀκολου
θεῖν τούτων. ὑπὸ δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
§ 12 ὦν οὖν οἷον τε βεβαιώς ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τήν πολιτείαν. ἔθι
ζέσθαι δὲ εὐλογίαν κερδαινεῖν τῶν ὄνομάκουν, ὅταν διαπ
νιστάντες ἄρχοντες ἄτοπον [μὲν] γὰρ εἰ πένθης μὲν ἀν ἐπιεικής
δὲ βουλήσται κερδαινεῖν, φαντάσεος δὲ ὅν οὐ βουλήσται
καὶ τήν παπανήσας, διο δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἀριστεῖς ἄρχειν,
τούτοις ἄρχειν. βλαστὸν δ', ἐκαὶ προεῖτο τῷ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἑπικῶν
ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἄρχοντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῇ σχολής.

31 ταύτης BK.3, a misprint probably = 33 βελτίστου Pn.3
1173 b 6, 7 βέλτιστος...σχολής transposed by Susen, Introf. p. 81 f. ||
6 εὔπορόντις Pn.3 Pn. Ar. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly
1173 a 35 δὲ] δὲ Tn and Qn (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὲ δὲ Pn.3 ||
39 δὲ τι Pn.3, δὲν Μn Pn.4+ Ald. BK. and perhaps Pn. || γὰρ Ar., δ’ Γ Π (for which Pn. in
Susen.1 is a misprint) BK. || 40 πολιτείας Γ Mm
1173 b 1 τέ...τής] τ’ εἶναι βεβαιῶς ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι II Bk. || 2 δ’ γὰρ Spengel
τοῦτ’ ὄνομάκουν Γ Mm and Pn (1st hand, corrected by p1 in the margin), [τοῦτ’ ὄνομακουν]
Susen.1,2 τοῦ ὄνομάκουν Ramus || 3 μὲν is rightly omitted by II Bk. || 4
δὲν Γ Mm || 5 ἀριστεῖς ἄρχειν Spengel, ἀριστερχεῖς Γ Π Bk.

35. εἰ δέ, πρὸς εὐπορόντα καὶ χαρίν σχολής] "But even supposing that means
must be taken into account, in order to secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can
devote their whole time to their duties,
"it is a grave defect that the highest
offices, like that of Shofeta or general,
should be purchasable." Here he takes
up the condition postulated and justified
above § 8, a 33, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλούσιον κτλ.
36. τό τάς μεγάλας ἄνωτάς κτλ.] The
same thing is said by Polybios vi. 56. 4
(Schlosser), Susen. (390) Mr Wyse re-
fers to Plato Rep. 544 D ὁ ωνηταὶ βασι-
λείας and such like intermediate polities
are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ
tοῦ βασιλέως).

§ 11 (τάς κύριον) the supreme autho-
ritiy, i.e. the government : iiii. 6. 1 n. (523).

41. τούτοις...τῶν κυρίων. In c. § 15.
§ 8 he has dwelt on the comparative
weakness of direct enactments and
government interference. But public
opinion can be legitimately educated and
influenced, and this is to παθεῖσθαι πρὸς
τὰς πολιτικὰς. See viii. 9 §§ 11—15.
§ 12 1373 b 1 διὰκριθαὶ κτλ.] "Nor is
it strange that the purchasers of place
should be accustomed to make a profit out
of it, when it has cost them dear." The
article with the participle need not be
suspected; the sense is "buying office as
they do." Cp. c. § 8 § 10 εἰ δὲ γεγοροφ)
πορίστητε=if they supply, whereas of
πορίστωτε would be 'supplying, as they
do' = as they supply (Tyrrell).

5. οὐ δὲ κτλ.] Cp. § 27 n. (335).
Susen. (390)

(VIII)

§ 13  φαίδων δ’ ἂν δόξειν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλεῖον ἀρχηγὸς τῶν ἀυτῶν ἀρχεῖν ὑπὲρ εὐδοκίμει τοῖς Καρχηδονίσις. ἐν γὰρ τὸν ὑψὸς ἐργον ἀριστά ἀποτελεῖται. δειὶ δὴ ὅπως γίνηται τούτῳ ὅμως τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάτης τῶν αὐτῶν αὐλειν καὶ σκυτοτείμεν. ὡσθ’ ὅπου μὴ μικρά πόλεισ, πολιτικότερον πολείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχών, καὶ δημοτικότερον κοινότερον τὸ γὰρ, καὶ καθαρὰ εἴπομεν, κάλλιον ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττων. δὴδε τὸ τούτῳ ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφότεροι διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελθεῖτε τὸ ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὸ ῥχεέσθαι.

§ 15 ὁλογραμμὴ δ’ ὄσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀριστα [στάσις] ἐκ-9 φεύγουσι τῷ πληθυντεῖ, αἰεὶ τῷ τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες

6 βέλτων...7 σχολή. See on 1273 a 33 — 1273 b 19. || 10 ὅ ἀλλʼ Σασεμ, 8 Γ. Π. (θέ Μ) Βκ. || 14 καὶ Καθάρσει Σασεμ, καὶ εἰτερ εἰς τοὺς Γ. Π. Αρ. Βκ. Σασεμ.1

Bender, with Bernays, accepts Susemihl’s transposition, or else would omit καθαρά εἴπομεν. || 15 τῶν αὐτῶν Μ* (1st hand), ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν Μ; ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολεμικῶν. || 13 κοινότερον τὰ γὰρ sc. ἔστω. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικότερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικότερον. || 14 ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολεμικῶν. || 15 τῶν αὐτῶν Each of the invariable taxa incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath). 16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ κτλ. The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Picart). || 17 ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολεμικῶν. Σασεμ. (396)

15 τῶν αὐτῶν Each of the invariable taxa incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath). 16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ κτλ. The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Picart). Σασεμ. (397)

§ 15 10 ἄλλο οὖν τοῦ δήμου Σασεμ. VII (11), 5. 9, βίων κατέχεται τῶν δήμων. del γὰρ των ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοχὰς ποιούσι εὐθείᾳ. The subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa may be classified as follows: (1) the so-called Libyan-Phoenicians, i.e. the old Phoenician settlements and others recently founded by Carthage: fortified towns, partly no doubt inhabited by a mixed Phoenician and Libyan population, which had to pay a fixed tribute and furnish contingents. Utica alone escaped a similar fate, and had its independence and its walls preserved to it from the plous feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors. (2) The agricultural villages of native Libyans who had been transformed from free farmers into fellahs: they had to pay a fourth part of the produce of the soil as land-tax (Polyb. l i. 72. 2) and were subjected to a regular system of recruiting. (3) The roving pastoral tribes (ποιμάκης) who had to pay tribute and to furnish contingents. In the treaties of the Carthaginian state preserved by Greek writers (3) are called βίων, “tribes,” and the villages occupied by (2) are called ποιμάς, “towns,” of subjects (Mommsen 11.
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20 ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἵναι καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνον τὴν (VIII) πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργῳ, δεῦ δὲ ἀστασίᾳ

§ 18 στους ἐναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δὲ, ἀν ἀτυχία γένηται τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν αρχομένων, οὔδεν ἀστὶ φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.

(12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας πολιτείας καὶ Κρή

12 τοιτοῦ ἔχει τῶν τρόπων τῶν δὲ ἀποφήμημα τι περὶ τοῦ
λιτείας ἐνοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔκοινωθῆσαι πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ ὠντινομοῦν, ἀλλὰ διεκέντον ἤβαινοντες τῶν βίων, περὶ (p. 36) 30 ἐ τι ἄξιολογον, εἴρηται σχεδόν περὶ πάντων, ἐνοῦ δὲ 

νομοθέτης γεγόνασι, οὐ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεις οὐ δὲ καὶ 

τῶν ὀδυνεῖν τισὶ, πολιτευόμενος αὐτοῖς καὶ τούτων οὐ 

μὲν ἐγένοντο δήμουργοι νόμων, οὐ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἴον καὶ 

νυκήργος καὶ Σύλων' οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-

§ 2 στησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας εἴρηται, Σύλωνα δὲ' 36 ἐνοῦ μὲν οὖν ἔφεσαν νομοθέτην σπουδαίον. ὀλυγραγίαν

25 περ...1274 b 26 ἄν (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188v.

Götting pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. mm. (399, 423, 427) || κρήσειν Μ' P1 || 26 αἰτερ[e] [περ]? Susem. (Γ may have omitted περ. quae William) || 27 τὶ omitted in Π2, hence [τὶ] Susem.1.2 || 32 νόμου inserted after μὲν by Π Αρ. Βκ. || 33 νόμου μὲν Π2 Αρ. Βκ. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην Π2 Βκ.

p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. xx. 55–4. It is the latter which are here meant (ἐν τὰς πόλεις). We are not to understand the passage, with Heeren (p. 47) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation of new colonies; but of appointments like that of governor and assessor of taxes which gave the holders the opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of their subjects. (See Kluge p. 192 ff., who however incorrectly assumes that such officers were sent to Libyan-Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.) It was in accordance with the principles of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to give these appointments to decayed nobles (as might be inferred from Mommsen's account ii. p. 17 Eng. tr.), but according to Aristotle's explicit statement to plebeians, or citizens who did not belong to the ruling houses. Susem. (398).

§ 15 24 φάρμακον τῆς φρονείς "No spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e., no means of terminating civic strife. Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51 on the second Punic War.


§ 1 28 οὐκ ἔκοινωθῆσαν κτλ.] see 1. 7. 6. 11. 7. 1. Here legislation is apparently a branch of practical politics; cp. n. on πολιτικός, l. 1. 2.

33 νόμων, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείαι] This distinction, which is quite in place here, induced the author of the suspected passage, §§ 6–14, to believe that in Aristotle's opinion a list of mere legislators was a further requisite. Whereas in fact Aristotle intends with these words to dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such list drawn up by Aristotle the interpolator supplied the supposed want on his own account. Susem. (399).

§ 2 36 ἐνοῦ μὲν ὄφεσαν] Introd. p. 20.
II. 12. 3] 1273 b 20—1274 a 2. 315

τε γάρ καταλύσαι οἱ ἄρατοι οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τέν (IX) δήμων παύσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πάτριον, μὴ δια τὰς καλὰς τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι γάρ τιν τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ 40 πάγῳ βουλήν ὁμογονίκον, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτετος ὁμο-

Στοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικόν. ἐστι δὲ Σόλων 1274 a ἐκείνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρῶτον οὐ καταλύσαι, τὴν τε βουλήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἴρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δήμων καταστήσαι,

37 γάρ omitted by M. 41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια Π.2 Ar. Bk., but see § 4, where Schneider restored the plurals κόρα...τὰ δικαστήρια...Ἀκρωταὶ ὁστα...ταὐτ.

n. 1. The context shows that these eu-

logists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed 
constitutions, and not of Democracy, as 
Oncken strangely maintains. Such a 
combination of oligarchical and aristo-

cratic elements they found in the "old-
fashioned" Solonian democracy: in other 
words, not merely a moderate Democracy, 
but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least 
a kind of Peltyn.  

SUSEM. (400) 

Diels Uber die Berliner Fragmente der 
Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία (Berlin 1889), p. 33, 
refers to Isocr. Areop. 16, Antid. 252, 312, 
for expressions of the current notion that 
Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; 
δὲ Σωλὼν ὁ παλαιὸς ἡν φιλόδομος τὴν φύσιν, 
37 οἷον ἄρατον] Too unqualified. 

38 τὴν πάτριον The old-fashioned, 
as distinguished from the modern, dem-

ocracy (ἡ νῦν ὅ).: comp. §§ 3, 4; vii(vi). 
6 § 5; 14 §§ 7, 11, 12; vii(vi). 4 §§ 1, 2, 
§ 3; vii(vi). 5 §§ 10, 11 (μεταβάλλοντι 
ἐπὶ καὶ πάσας δημοκρατίας ἐς τὴν 
νεωταργήν) with the references in the 
notes. Comp. also vii(vi). 7 § 7 n. 
"modern oligarchies": 111. 6 § 9 n. (532). 
Aristotle quite accepts the distinction, 
ep. §§ 5, 6; 111. 11; vii(vi). 11. 19 n. 
(1923). For he has no objection to raise 
against these panegyrics of Solon, except 
that they referred even the aristocratical 
and oligarchical elements of the combi-
nation to Solon, whereas in fact only the 
democratic accession was his doing. With 
the following sentences compare Schö-

mann The Solonian Heliaea and Ephialtes' 
coup d'état, an article in the Jahrb. f. 
Phil. xciii. 1866. 385—594: and R. 
Schöll De symposio Atticis p. 10 ff. (Jena 
1876).  

SUSEM. (400b) 

"Inter eos qui Solonem laudant, ni 
fallor, Isocratem in Areopagiticudo 
intelligit; ita enim loquitur, ut Soloni et a-

pheres ἄρατοι et βουλῆς tributum, at nimir-

ille de δικαστήριοι" (Spengel). 

39 "by a happy blending (of other 
elements) in the polity." 

39—41 Parallel to the account given, 
probably by the same writers, of the 
Spartan polity 6 § 17. 

§ 3 On this battle-ground of con-
tending opinions there are at least three 
issues. (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting 
the views of the panegyrists of Solon 
[Grote, Fränkel], or is he correcting 
them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Schömann 
Ath. Const. Hist. p. 37 Eng. tr.]. (b) 
What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See Exc. v. p. 326 f.] (γ) Is 
the statement it contains historically true? 
[Grote, Curtius reject it: Thirlwall, Schö-
mann accept it.] 

41 οἷον] Schömann, Fränkel Die at-
tischen Geschworenengerichte 61 f. (Berlin 
1877. 8), and others lay far too much 
stress on this word οἷον = "seems", here 
and below, § 3 l. 15. Aristotle often 
speaks in a qualifying manner about 
things of which, in reality, he has not 
the slightest doubt. Thus οἷον, l. 15, 
comes very close to φαίνεται l. 11: the 
force of which, as often in other writers 
besides Aristotle, is to express not so 
much what is merely apparent and prob-
able, as what is obvious, what has com-
es to light.  

SUSEM. (401) 

See οἷον l. 1, 6, viii(vii). 3 § 16, 9 § 2. 
"The words express Aristotle's own 
opinion, because (1) the construction re-

quires it (ὅτι μὴν ἔοτε...οἷον δε), 
(2) the sense requires it; some thought 
that Solon established a mixed constitu-
tion, Aristotle contends that he only 
added a new element, the δικαστήριον. 
(Case). 

1374 a 1 τὴν τε βουλήν What powers 
Aristotle might ascribe to the council of the 
Areopagos which Solon found existing 
and left unaltered, it is not easy to see 
from this.  

SUSEM. (402) 

2 καταστήσαται—laid the foundation 
for the democracy.
Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon’s panegyrists in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts¹ the historical statement of Solon’s critics, but attacks the censure which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n. (196), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

1. This is strangely overlooked by Oncken it. 440 m. (i). As against Schömann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes these critics speak of Solon as having introduced the appointment of the Hellica by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these controversial critics the form used is the singular, ἐκεῖστιν, which had given some show to the meaning which Schömann has refused: see Exc. v. This defence then is fatal to Oncken’s position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (it. 404) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Hellica. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon’s critics and admirers in thinking that it was he who made the Hellica, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.

1 See Exc. v. P. 350 ff., SUSEM. (403)
This is why in a fragment of his *Politics* Aristotle mentioned "Themistocles'" proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Polyaeon, *Str. t. 36 § 6*). Diels *loc. c.* p. 34.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle's sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy: the Moderates (*Epinikia*) headed by Aристocles, Cimon, Thucydides (ο Μενομην), Nicias, and Theramenes (*Enag. 369, Plut. Nic. 9*), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon.

But above, § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schömann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's admirers, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

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*SUSEM. (411)*

17 καὶ εὐθέεινεν. By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or perhaps even before the popular assembly direct; and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cpr. Exc. v.; further iii. 11 § 8 n. (569), vii(iv). 11 § 10 n. (1303), 14 § 3 (1319), § 6 (1324), § 10 (1332); n. on 16 § 2; and vii(vi). 1 § 4 (1475).

*SUSEM. (412)*

"With this statement of the ἀνωτετάτα of democracy, compare the summary of the characteristics of true ἐνομομα which Herodotus iii. 80 puts into the mouth of Otaenes: τάλα μὲν ἀρχή ἄρχει, ἀπόδοσιν δὲ ἀρχήν ἔχει, βούλευ- ματα δὲ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπων [sc. τῶν τέκνων]" (Jackson).

*SUSEM. (414)*

§ 6 18 τὰς δ' ἀρχάς. The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons enjoyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.

19 ἐκ τῶν πυντ. κτλ. On these four Solonian classes see Schömann *Antiquitates* 1. p. 319 ff. Eng. tr. Further see iii. 11. 8 n. (569), vii(vi). 4–5 (1417).
ΠΩΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 12.

ἐπιπάδον τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θετικον, ὡς οὐδεμιάς ἀρχής μετηρ. (IX)

[νομαθέατι τὲ ἐγενομον Ζιλευκος τε Δοκρος τοις ἐπίξευς τῷ

φυρίων, καὶ Χαρώνας ὁ Καταναύς τοις αὐτοῦ πολλάκις καὶ

ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαίς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ

§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρούντα δὲ [(καὶ)] τινες καὶ συνάγεν ός ὁ Ὀνομαρκί-

του μὲν γενομένου πρῶτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γραμμα-

σθήναι δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν Κρήτη Λοκρὸν ὡντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα

κατὰ τέχνῃς μαντικῆς τούτου τοῦ δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλησ τέατον,

Θάλησος δὲ ἄκροατην Λυκόφρον καὶ Ζαλευκον, Ζαλεύκου

τὸ ἐν Χαρώναν. ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν λέγοντος οὐκεπτότερον τῶν

χρώνων ἔχοντες ἐγενομον δὲ καὶ Φιλάδελφος ὁ Κορίνθιος

21 [νομαθέατι]... 26 ἐπὶ] Bojesen 23 αὐτοῦ Γ' Π', αὐτοῦ Μ' Π'

24 ταῖς before Χαλκιδικαίᾳ Schmidt would omit 25 καὶ omitted by Π' Ατ. 27 αὐτῶν

omitted apparently in Γ', perhaps rightly 28 μαντικεῖς omitted in Μ' 'θελήτα (in Γ' after ἐταιρὸν)

and 29 Θάληται Γ' Π' 30 τῶν χρώνων Ατ., τῷ χρόνῳ Γ' Π' Βκ. 31 ἔχοντες

Susem., λέγοντες Γ' Π' Ατ. Βκ., cp. Plat. Gorg. 501 C ἀκάπτοντας ἔχοντο τοῦ ἀρεινον

or, with Spengel, transpose them to go with τεταρτον. Cp. H. Landwehr in Philo-

logy Mag. Band v. 1885, pp. 116 ff. 21 Comp. Julius Pollux vili. 130 of

δὲ τὸ θετικὸν οὐδεμίας ἀρχής ἐρῶν.


Many of the arguments with which Götzing Comm. p. 344 f., impugned the
genuineness of the whole chapter were answered by Nickes De Aristotelis politi-
corum libris p. 55 ff., and Spengel, Ueber die Politik p. 11 note, Arist. Studien III.

p. 18 f. Götzing was followed by Böckh and Bernays Gr. d. Ath. i. 172. The case
must depend mainly on the language.

22 Δοκρος τοις ἐπίξευσι] i.e. the

Locrions living on the promontory Zephyrion in Lower Italy. The laws of

Zalenkos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to have been the first which were committed
to writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng. tr.,

Antiq. iur. pub., 80 n. (8). Susem. (415)

23 Χαρώνας] Mentioned i. 2 § 5 n.

(16), viii. 11 §§ 15 n., 13 § 10. Susem.

(416) On his laws see Diod. xii. 13:

24 ταῖς Χαλκιδικαίς πόλεσι] i.e.

the colonies which Chalcis in Eubea

planted in those countries: see E. Curtius Hist. i. 436 ff. Eng. tr. Susem.

(417) § 7 25 περιούνται δὲ τινες] Euphoros

Strabo p. 487; cp. Plutarch Lycurg. 4.

Triebel sp. c. 67, 72, 101. Susem. (418)

The construction after συνάγειν, ὡς

and genitive absolute in the one clause balanced by an accusative with infinitive

in the other, is awkward; but it can be

nearly paralleled from Plato Philebus 16 C: ὅς φύλον παράδοσεν ὑπὸ ἐνὶ

μὴν...οὐ...ἐχομεν, ὡς ἐνὶ...περὶ...διεν

οὐ...ἡμᾶς...κτλ. Cp. Rep. 1. 383 A λέγειν

καὶ τοιχεῖν ὡς ἐνὶ...οὐ...αὐτοῦ...χωντα...δοτα,

ῥήσι...ἡμᾶς...καταγεγορέων.

28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean

"for the purpose" κατὰ θέλαινε...ὑπερ...κτλ., or

"in connexion with," almost "prac-
tising his mantic art."


(419) 29 'To the arguments advanced

against the genuineness of this portion

of the chapter may be added one derived

from the fact that here we have Θάληται

as the form of the genitive, and Θάληται

of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere

uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic

gen. Θάλης 1259 a 7, the Doric Ἀρθρα

1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation

from Alcæus III. 14 § 10. Plato on the other

hand regularly changes quotations from

other dialects into Attic; cp. Gorg. 485 E,

255 E, with Dr Thompson’s note (Ridge-

way sp. c. p. 135).

30 ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.] This criti-

cism is very just. Susem. (419 b)

The same date εἰρήν. Ol. 29 or 664 B.C.

is the best attested for Thaletas, who

comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes

fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgus

between them whom the latest estimate

only brings down to 770!
§ 8 νομοθέτης Ἡθβαῖος. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν (IX) Βακχιδῶν, ἐραστὴς ὁ δ' ἐγενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος Ἡμιμίασαν, ὃς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πάλιν ἐξῆκε διαμισθῆς τὸν 35 ἔργον τῆς τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκινόης, ἀνήλθεν εἰς Θῆβας κακές τοὺς βιοὺς ἐπελεύσθησαν ἀδιάφότερα. καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐκείνους τοὺς τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλους μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ἔστατο, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὖ συνόπτου μυθολογικὴ γὰρ αὐτούς οὔτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν 40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπεθάνειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὥστε μὴ ἀποτοπίσει ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χωματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὡς ἀποτοπίσει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ τοῖς Θῆβαισι, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτῶν ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ τ' ἄλλων τιμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, οὕς καλοῦντι 4 ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικοὺς καὶ τοὺτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὦν ἐκείνου, ὡς ἀποτοπίσει, μενομοθετήμενον, ὅπως ὁ ἀρχιμός σφιξεῖ τῶν κληρῶν. Χα- 8 ρώνου δ' οὔδεν ἐστὶν ἰδίως πλὴν αἱ δικαὶ τῶν κεκραμαρτυρίων (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐπόησε τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν), τῇ δ' ἑκρι- 33 βακχισδῶν Γ Μμ (unless Γ had βακχισδῶν) ἐπισκεψίαν PΠ Ar. Bk. Susem. 13 4 τοὺς βεφελές Bücheler 6 οἰκὸν ἐστὶν οἴκον P, θανὸν οἰκὸν ἐστὶ P, θανὸν μὲν ἐστιν οἴκον P1-3 Q1 T1 Ald. Bk. 4 ψευδομαρτυρίου Scaliger and Bentley (Phalaris p. 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτυρίου ΓΠΙ Αρ. 4 ἐπίσκεψιν Scaliger and Bentley, ἐπίσκεψιν ΓΠΙ (in P3 the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)


§ 9 40 ἀποτοπίσεις 'seen from far' may be used for visible, as here, or invisible; but the former in late writers.

§ 10 1374 b 1 βιοῦσαν μὲν οὖν κτῶ] The interpolator here explains how he has related the history of Philolaos at such length, namely to make clear how this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if he really considered such a detailed explanation necessary, when its necessity or even utility is not further discoverable, then he ought at any rate a fortiori to have shown how a Corinthian stranger came to give laws to the Thebans. Susem. 421)

§ 11 7 ἐπίσκεψιν sc. ψευδομαρτυρίων (Stobæus says σωκράτων) prosecution for perjury. Editors quote Pl. Laws XI. 937 b, (Dem.) 1139, 7.
βεία τόν νόμον ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. (19)

§ 12 Φάλεου δ′ ἵδου ἢ τῶν ὑπολογίων ἀνομίλασες, Πλάτωνος δ′ ἡ (v. 38)

το εἰς τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδίων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ
tὰ συνεστία τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτερον δ′ ὁ περὶ τῆν μέθνῃ νόμος,
tὸ τού νήσφιον συμποιητικώς, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικῷς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μέλετιν, ἀν δὲν μὴ τὴν μὲν χρῆσιν ἐκεῖν τῶν χερῶν τὴν δὲ ἀχρηστοῦ. Δρακόντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν ἔσται, πολιτείας δ′ ὑπάρχῃ ἡ χούση τοὺς νόμους ἐδῆκεν ἵδου δὲ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὑδὲν

§ 12 9 Φάλεου δ′ ἵδου κτλ] Even Füllborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phæleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. note (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phæleas Hippodamos has he said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (πολιτείας ἐξέδωκε περὶ πάσης): also that in § 1 f, he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 599), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phæleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Göttling, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. Susem. (423) ἀναμβλάσει: Rhet. III. 11. § καὶ τὰ ἀναμβλάσει: (read ἄναμ-

§ 13 15 πολυτική δ′ ὑπαρχοῖται κτλ] From n. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Za-leukos Charondas Philoeloos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phæleas and Plato, which

ἐστιν οὶ τι καὶ μνείας ἀξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότητις διὰ τὸ τῆς ζη- (IX) μίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιπτακὸς νόμον δημιουργός ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας: νόμος δ' ἰδίος αὐτοῦ τὸ τούς μεθύοντας, 20 ἀν τι πταέσσοι, πλείον ἀκαίραν ἀποτίναι τῶν νυφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ύβριζεν μεθύοντας ἢ νυφόντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγραμμὴν ἀπέβλεψεν, ὡς δὲ μεθύοντων ἐχεῖν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ § 14 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας 'Πραγμός νο- μοθέτης Χαλκιδεύσα τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περὶ τὰ <τὰ> φο- 25 νικα καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἰδίον γε οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἐχοι τις ἄν.

20 τι πταέσσοι L, τι πταέσσοι C', τυπτέσσοι Π, τυπτεσσοι M, τι πταίσσοι Bas. || ἀποτίναι Γ (?) Ar., ἀποτίναι M M Dio Qb Tb Al. ἀποτίναι P || 21 γὰρ omitted by Γ || 22 ἀπέβλεψαι P Qb Tb || 24 <τὰ> Kornes || 25 ἀλλο Kornes

were made for an ideal state. But this does not mend matters because, as Draco was not the author of a constitution, there is a marked antithesis between them of quite another kind. Sus. (437)


18 On Pittacus see III. 14. 10 with Exc. II. on B. III. Sus. (439)

noun δημιουργός has been objected to; but Nickes cites ἁρτήτης δημ. IV (VII). 9. 7.


§ 14 14 Ἀνδροδάμας τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης]

The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalci- dice, which derived its name from its colonization by Chalcis in Euboea, this took place before the settlement of the western colonies of Chalcis, noticed in § 6 n. (417): see E. Curtius 1. 428 ff. Eng. tr. Sus. (431)

25 Laws of Charondas respecting heiresses are mentioned by Diodoros xii. 18.
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διοίησε δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλει ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὑπὶ κεκωρισμένοι τῷ πλήθος, ἀλλ’ οἶον Ἀρκάδας: Π. 2. 3.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see n. 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a συμμαχία, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of ἐθνός, however, conceived as analogous to a συμμαχία, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words ὅταν μὴ κατα κόμας ὑπὶ κεκωρισμένοι τῷ πλήθος, 'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.' By the latter he means the ἐθνός which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwalled towns without political independence (κόμαι). In other words it is the organization with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek nations: whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the συμμαχία, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see n. 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic πόλεις." Dittenberger in Gött. gel. Anz. 1874, p. 1382. Susem. (132)

To Dittenberger’s explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (1) that there is a reference to some συνοικισμός of Arcadians, and that the πόλις is distinguished from ἐθνός = the unorganized race. Then if it be granted that ὅταν μὴ δοσὶ = διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι or τῷ μὴ εἶναι, the words will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus μὴ κατὰ
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κόμας κεχωρισμένον will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the συμμαχία must consist in the isolated independence of the villages: the ἱθνος 'Ἀρκαδικόν being composed ἐξ ὁμοίων, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegea and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note ad loc., it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle may have interposed at this point the remark that as the πόλεως differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but not from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (Notes p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race is the πόλεως; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (11) to understand by ἱθνος the organized race or tribe, as something distinct from the πόλεως, retaining the reference to the events of 370–369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows: 1: Xenoph. Hell. vi. 5. 6 ἰῶν ὧν ἔγερσαν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῶν Καλλίσης καὶ Πρόσερον συνήγον ἐτί τὸ συνήγηται τε παῦ τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὃ τι γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τάν πόλεως· οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν Ξάσιον ἔργον οὖς τῇ κατὰ χώραν τὴν πάλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις τῷ μοίχεις χρῆσθαι: ib. vi. 11 ὃ δὲ Ἀχαίας...καταλαβοῦν πόλιν ὄρθων οὖσαν Ἐσθαιν καὶ εὐφῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ οἱ ὀχρομένοις εἶς τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὅμως οὐκ ἠδίκησε τὴν πόλιν: ib. vii. 4. 2 Ἀκρωπόλις πεῖθε τοὺς μυρίους πραξίτευς περὶ συμμαχίας. (Comp. Harpocr. p. 280 μύροιν ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει...συνεδρίαι ἐν τῷ Κόισβω Ἀρκαδιῶν ἀνάμεσα διεβάλλεται δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκαδίων πολιτείᾳ.) Xenoph. Hell. vii. 4. 12 καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ηλείοι Δασίνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐφεξῆ, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι

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συντελοῦσα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: § 38 εἶ δὲ καὶ τινὲς ἐπαιτωροῦσα, ἐλεγον [οἱ Μαρτινεῖς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαρτινών πόλεις ἐγγύμον ἡ μὴν παρέξειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν ὑπόσως τις προσκαλοῖτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμεινόνδας ἔλογεῖτο σφίνω υπάρχειν...Ἀρκάδων τούς τὰ σφίντα φρονοῦνται. ἦσαν δ' οὖν Τεγέαται καὶ Μεγαλόπολις καὶ Ἀσσάται καὶ Παλλαντεῖς, καὶ εἶ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικρὸ το εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις πολλαὶς οἰκεῖν ὑπογεία τουτοῖ. From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινὸν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (μέγα), a federal army (ἐπάρμοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. xvi. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Thesoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis.1

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κόμας κεκωρωσμένου. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the unorganized race, which lives κατὰ κόμας τῷ πολιοῦ τῆς Εὐλάδος τραπέζης. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the southwest of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

1 Plut. Philo. 13; Paus. viii. 27, 7; Freeman p. 626 n. 4.
is it that (a) the league embraced Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraea, πόλεις which were not absorbed in Megalopolis: while (β) most of the towns-
ships or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are 
unmistakably called πόλεις, not κώμαι, in respect of their previous existence.1 
It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new 
league that these places became κώμαι: previously they had been πόλεις.2 Nor 
is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing 
the πόλεις (1) from a συμμαχία or federation of states (Staatenbund) and 
(2) from a federal state (Bundesstaat), and if Arcadia is the illustration 
of (2) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in 
his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only 
be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view 
of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partisan might hold no doubt that the 
opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even 
with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of 
all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal 
city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe 
and the πόλεις, ex hypothesi all-important, disappears.

(iii) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the 
condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization 
so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-
community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: ‘when 
the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, 
but lives scattered and without political organization.’

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those 
who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example 
of a πόλις or an έθνος. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victorius3 
and Camerarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the 
πόλεις, implying that distribution of the population over villages or ‘demes’4 
(κατά κώμαις) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But 
apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how any tribe or region 
of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

1 Paus. viii. 27 §§ 3, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: πόλεις δὲ 
tησαυρίζοντες αποκύκλωσαν...πατρίδας οίκων οίκας ένειλιπέν 
έπειθον οἱ Άρκαδες. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse 
however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term πόλεις which 
is often interchanged with κώμαι: cp. Thuc. ii. 12 κατά πόλεις 
κτείνητο, but Isocrates x. 35 άποφόβαν καὶ κατά κώμαι 
ακούσαν (both of Attica before Thesegens).

2 Ibid. viii. 27. 7, τῶν κατειλεμένων πόλεων οἱ μὲν έτέ άπαν 
οίκων οίκων έφε ήμῶν ἔργαμε, τὰς δὲ έξων οί 
Megalopolitai κώμαις, Γάργηου, Δεσπότας, Θρασύπων τινά 
πρὸ Όρχυσθον, Μεθόδος, Τευθων, Καλ-
λίας, Θέμεσωτα, 12 § 6 Μεθόδος πόλεων 
μὲν οὐκέτι κώμαι δὲ ἐς τὸ Megalopolita-
tikón συντελόμενα (cp. the similar lan-
guage of Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 12, as quoted 
above, with regard to a single city, 
Lasion, as a member of the Arcadian 
League).

3 Excipio, inquit, cum cives ipsius tota-
que illa multiudo, quae civitatem conflat, 
non fuerint per pagos distincti, non sunt 
autem, addidit, nunc Arcades, quibus 
distantibus inter se intervalibus locorum, 
domiciliaque habentibus valde diuincta, 
conficiendarum tamen civitas, Victorius 
Comm. p. 78.

4 Stow (sc. sc. έν Πελαγονίην) μὲν γὰρ 
κώμαι τὰ περιουσία καλεῖσα καίσα, Δή-
ναοι δὲ δήμους, Poet. 3 § 6, 1448 a 36.
Dr Jackson has supplied this reference.
EXCURSUS I.

of the Phoci and the Lacedaeemonians, who were of the same blood as the Corinthians; and the Cleisthenes of Athens, who were related to the Phoci. The former were said to have been the founders of the city of Corinth, and the latter were the protectors of the Athenians.

The city of Corinth was the center of a large and influential city-state. It was the capital of the Corinthian League, a federation of city-states in the Peloponnesus. The Corinthians were known for their wealth and their love of luxury. They were also noted for their military prowess, and they were able to extend their influence throughout the region.

Corinth was a major center of trade and commerce. It was located on the narrow Corinthian Gulf, which connected the Gulf of Corinth with the Aegean Sea. This location made it a natural port, and it became a center of sea trade. The Corinthians were also skilled sailors, and they were able to extend their trade throughout the Mediterranean.

The Corinthians were also known for their political influence. They were a major power in the Peloponnesus, and they were able to influence the decisions of other city-states. They were also able to extend their influence through their alliances with other city-states.

In conclusion, the city of Corinth was an important center of trade and commerce, and it was a major power in the Peloponnesus. It was a place of luxury and sophistication, and it was a center of political influence. The Corinthians were a powerful and influential people, and their influence extended throughout the region.


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EXCURSUS I.

Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them. From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotos (iv. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (Austae) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela i. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Götting): Nicolaus Damascusenus, Frag. III. in Stob. Flor. XLIV. 41 (Müller Frag. hist. Gracc. III. p. 458), of the Liburnians 1 (Eaton). Diodorus III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglydetae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (iv. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathysri community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view 'in order that they might all be brothers;' ἵνα καθάρωτο τοις ἀλλήλοις ἐστι καὶ οἷοί τις εἴσπετε πάντες μὴ φθόνοι μὴ ἐχθεῖ ἱέρωται ἐς ἄλλην ἄλλος. The case of the Massagetae, cited by Congreve, Herod. 1. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, l. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. 1, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrrenhians by Theopompos Frag. 222 in Athen. XII. 317 D, E, Müller Frag. hist. gr. I. 315 2, and of the Scythian Galatophagi by Nicolaus Damascusenus Frag. 123 in Stob. Flor. v. 73, Müller Frag. h. gr. III. 460 3.


The description seems to owe much to Plato's republic.

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MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY.

It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken i. pp. 179—181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the Ethics shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, Nic. Eth. VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence.' Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union: and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions one blood, one stock, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4: the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, op. c. II. ii. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals'—and to use Zeller's apt expression (Plato p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—'Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most...
primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to
develope out of the family a higher unity. That these considerations do not
recur in the Politics, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly
due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more
especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which
the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of
marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his
own premises. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political
aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose.

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's concep-
tions, understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approxi-
ately the modern or monogamous family. From the time of Plato and
Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost
universal. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory un-
tenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages
discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the
same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical
to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon
these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the
monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the
family is a παλλαχώς λεγόμενον, and what he assumes to be its simple and
primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they
tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the
world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily
at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the
monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests.
Beginning with the Auseans, Trogloxytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus,
early all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient
world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself.
The phrase εἶναι κοινὰς τὰς γυναίκας is not likely to have been literally true, or
to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases. Few tribes are so

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1 It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice
happily married.
2 Prof. Susembh is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus,
and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the
Politics.
3 But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that mater-
nal instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan
custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.
4 B. 111. of the Laws is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.
5 McLennan's epoch-making work

**Primitive Marriage** is here followed. Down to the year 1857 its author accept-
ed the Aristotelian account of the origin of society. See Enc. Brit. (8th ed.)
Art. Law, vol. xii., p. 255 f.
6 That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a
rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much
Aristotle collected in Νόμων βαρβάρων, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments
are of little value.
7 What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller infor-
mation we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.
backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the ‘group’ being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object). It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of μητρίς for ‘motherland’ by Cretans and Messenians. Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race) and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother’s side. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager. Exogamy must anecdotally have been the rule of the Roman gentes. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father’s side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy.

1 Called a totem in North America and a kobong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The asparagus was the totem of an Attic γέων; Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 ἔθε γικάδα καὶ Ἰωάννης πάρον κατέγλυ μήτε άνθρωπων άνθρώποι, μήτε άναγενεσθαι καί τιμᾶτι. See ‘The Worship of Animals and Plants’ in the Fortnightly Review Oct. 1896—Feb. 1870.

2 Plato Rep. IX. 575 D, Pausan. iv. 26 § 3.

3 Herod. i. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. Frag. Hist. Gr. i. 316 (Müller) άκει τάς γυναίκας μάλλον ἢ τοὺς κόρους τιμᾶτι καὶ καλοῦσι μητρόθει, τὰς τε κληρονομασθέντας ταῖς θυγατρίσις λέιτοσι, οὐ τοῖς νεότητι. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glauce, Hom. Il. vi. 150 ff.; the daughter’s son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

4 Strabo i. 4 § 18, p. 165 τὸ παρὰ τοὺς Καρνόρας τοὺς ἀνδρίας διδάσκει τὸν γυναικότροφο, τὸ ταῖς θυγατέρας κληρονομεῖν ἀκόλουθον, τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκδίδοντι γυναῖκας, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοῖς γυναικοκροται. The covard among the same people, Th. § 17 p. 164 γνώσια τῇ διακονοῦσι τοῖς ἄνδρισι, ἐκεῖνοι ἀνθρώποι τῶν καταλήψεως. From Herod. II. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

5 Varro apud Augustin. De civ. Dei xviii. 91: cp. Justin 18. 2, Suidas p. 3102. For the Locrians, Polyb. xii. 5 πᾶντα τὰ ἄνδρα τῶν προγόνων άνθρώπων παρὰ αὐτῶν ἀπό τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνδραν, e.g.: Aristotle apud Polyb. xii. 6, 150 b 8 ff. ἐκαὶ τῇ οὕτωσιν τῇ ἀνδρικῇ ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εὐκάρτια ἐπέθεσαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν χάριν τὰς γυναῖκας προσεπικούρησαν, ητὶ δὲ τὰ πόλιτα καί τὰς συμπαλαιὰς τὰς προγόνους ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνετονίται.

6 Hom. Iliad ii. 601 ff. (Tlepolemos), xxii. 95 cp. xxii. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus Fab. 229, 174 implies that Meleager’s maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer Iliad ix. 56a ff.

7 Plutarch Quaest. Rom. § 6 p. 265 δ΄ ἡ μὴ νεομερέσσα συγγενείας γυναῖκες... πρότερον γὰρ ὁ εὕμορος τὰς ἀδόκιμα, ὄπως ἐνδοῦ τὰς τυπικὰς, ἐνδοῦ τῶν εὐεργετῶν γυναῖκων, ἀλλ’ ἐνεχωρήσασιν ἀνεκαν ὀφθαλμοῖς: § 108 p. 289 E δ’ ἐδὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ ἑργῇ γένους οὐ γιαμοῖς;

8 Deiphobus is an instance. Lycurgus declined to take his brother’s wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though...
The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the 'stocks' (γένος) and 'brotherhoods' (φράτους) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first became known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see n. 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, οὐκοῦσιν and οὐκόκτων το οὐκόκτων? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this v. I. The ωμωγόλακτες (i. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a γένος (for ωμωγόλακτες = γεννηταί, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother's milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive family (οἶκος: i. 2 § 5) may have been known as ' sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.' This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning ' those who eat together' (coeddich), and ' those who have a common residence' (teadhloch). There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in ωμωγόστρως and ἀδελφός, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier ψαράμως, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek ψαράμως continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Polib. xii. 6 ταρά μέν γορ τοῖσ Δακεδαυοισ και πάτρων ήτα καὶ σώματε τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐχειν γεννηταὶ καὶ τέτταρας, ποὺ δὲ καὶ πλείον ἀδελφοὺς ἔχεις, καὶ τέκνα τοῦτον εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννηταὶ παῖς ἵππον ἕκδοθαι καὶ "γεννηταὶ τοῦ τών φίλων καλῶν καὶ σώματε."


3 This explanation seems the most
Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind; he has to admit that γάμος, γαμεῖα, fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κοινωνία δούλης καὶ δούλου, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth, he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.

EXCURSUS II.

HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS: II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV (vii). II § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ἱπποδάμειος ἁρών; Xen. Hell. II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Tharian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent satisfactory, though we might have expected some ruder mark of comrade-

ship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the εἰσίν, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellow-

ship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." Studies in Anc. Hist. p. 132.

1 See I. 2 § 23, II. 8 § 20 f., and III. 11 § 5 καὶ τῷ, διαφορομεν ἐνοι τῶν ἥρων, ὥσ ἔσω εἰσίν;


3 ἐκεῖ ἐκεῖν τὰ Ἐλληνονεοτεραὶ ὕπερ τοῦ ἀκατοὶ ἱσχετέων, ὡς φασίν, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἔργου Ἐλληνών. [A very cautious statement.]
of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (περὶ εὐδαιμονίας) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (περὶ πολιτείας) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the Florilegium of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle: and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 nn. 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 s. f. n. 255 b) 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 n. 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 n. 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible; hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. Oecon. 4 § 3) leads its partisans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. De Rep. Lac. 13 § 5, Plut. Perc. 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.' It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycophron (III. 9. 8 n. 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to
attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual
rights' in Lycephon's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose
aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour
in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippo-
damos preceded Lycephon in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly
probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward
theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with
old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so
derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical
scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's
dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does, with originating an important
idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after
what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these
conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old
Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered,
'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united
in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be
morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development
of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippo-
damos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a funda-
mental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in
virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual
budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. nn. 209 and 211). After its full and
logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into
the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against
disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and reli-
gion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be
very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and
Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which
had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that
repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all
the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres
too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely
instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destruc-
tive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by
Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look
at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for educa-
tion, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in
so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal
obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, the
admire of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and
morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclu-
sively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of
laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

1 *Staatstheorie* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quo-
tation marks indicating actual citations.
Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 f.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1. SUSEM. (250)

Note on the Celtæ: II. 9. 7.

On the Kelts see also IV(vii). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and Nic. Eth. III. 7. 7, 1115 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celtorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus xiii. 603 A' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian. Marcell. xxxi. 9' (Fülleborn). Plato Laws i 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. Hell. vii. 1. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian Anab. 1. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle Meteor. i. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 35) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea Nic. Eth. III. 7. 7, his pupil Eudemus III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros Fr. 44 (see Nicol. Dam. Fr. 104, Aelian. V. H. xii. 25): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff Deutsche Alterthums-kunde I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same
EXCURSUS III.

THE EPHORS AND THE Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἱκανοὺς δύναμιν τῶν ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομένων κόσμων, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἑφοροὶ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι ἀδελφοὶ εἰσίν: II, 10, 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see n. 340 on 9 § 30 (Triebel). Compare n. (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-
manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the Ἑφόροι are ‘overseers’, the κασάμοι are ‘orderers’ (Oncken). Ephoros (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and Κάσαμοι. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle’s is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle could not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoros. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called Πολιτεία which we have under the name of Heracleides¹ of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle’s Πολιτεία, as Schneidelwq who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his Cretan Polity. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoros the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter’s verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSEM. (360)

THE CRETAN περιοίκοι.

φόρων οὐδε φέροντιν οἱ περιοίκοι: Π. 10. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan περιοίκοι (see n. 355) with the Spartan περιοίκοι, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. n. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosidas (Frag. 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus vi. 263 E f., that there were three dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the Mnoitae, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the Aphamiotae, and (3) the περιοίκοι, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them “subjects ².” Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. xv. 695 F (in Bergk Poet. lyr. Gr. no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybris boasts that the Mnoitae call him their lord.³ Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. vi. 263 E, describes the Aphamiotae as

¹ Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.
² τὴν μὲν καὶ ἦν δουλεῖαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦν μνοίαν, τὴν δὲ ἦν ἀφαμίστασιν, τούτω δὲ περιοίκοιν ὑπ' ηκόνιν.
³ Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body’s safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whose durst not carry spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship me, addressing me as lord and mighty prince.

...προσκυνεῖς τί (με) δεσπόταν καὶ μέγαν βασιλῆα φωνεῖτε.
'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae: and earlier still Ephoros (Frag. 32 a, in Athen. vi. 263 f) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves Clarotae. It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called δημαία, as well as κλάδοι, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land: see Schömann Antiquities p. 298 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan Helots either (a) both the clarotae and mnoitae; or (b) the mnoitae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term περίοικοι in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words φόροι οίδε φέροντοι οί περίοικοι would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (Fr. 1) in Athen. IV 143 A, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see n. 366 on § 8 extr.), Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his περίοικοι the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if φόροι οίδε φέροντοι οί περίοικοι can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessaries of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the
common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before φώμων is unavoidable, whether we supply ἀπὸ μορίων τῶν, or in agreement with Dosiadas ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν φώμων.

The term περίοικοι is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the freer position which these peasants occupied (cp. II. § 19 n. 171, 9 § 3 n. 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cretan Dorian cities made use of purchased slaves: Schömann p. 298 Eng. tr. in IV (VIII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. nn. 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9. 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by δῶλατοι and by περίοικοι: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term περίοικοι by 'villains' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cretan περίοικοι are, whereas the Helots are δῶλατοι pure and simple. The former might very well get the name περίοικοι, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schömann suggests p. 229 E. tr. And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian περίοικοι, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cretan περίοικοι a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cretan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority. We recognise the περίοικοι of whom Aristotle speaks in the Φωκές of the code, and the περίοικοι = ἐπίθικοι of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the ἀδερφάρωος of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (πολίστατοι) and from purchased slaves: of the μανδραί the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

1 [Blackstone himself compares emancipated villains with the helots, Commentaries B. II. c. 6 vol. II. p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders δῶλατοι by Leibegene, περίοικοι by Hintersassen. The Gortynian ὀλέης, though a specially privileged class of villains, are nevertheless called δῶλατοι: vid. infra.]

2 But when Schömann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once", for the term occurs three times, viz. 10 § 5, 8 § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 also in c. 9 § 3. It is only in c. 9 § 19 that Aristotle calls them δῶλατοι. Höck (Etica 111, p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II. 384 f. 387 ff. may be taken to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

3 The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the American Journal of Archaeology I. pp. 324—350, II. 24—45.

4 "Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's περίοικοι are not the περίοικοι of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the καταξάρια: i.e. those who in the code are called Fowkes," Zitelmann in Das Recht von Gortyn p. 62 n. 56.

5 We find ὀλέης for ὀλέης in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias X. 10, ὀλέης καὶ δῶλασ (Bücheler). Comp. Kallistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

6 The ἐνδοθεία δῶλα or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II. 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (χρωσκάρειον): Zitelmann 65, p. 64.
distinction of πολιται, ἄφτεραπος, Φοικες, answering to that of Σπαρταται, περιοκος, Ηλωτες at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Höck, Grote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an ἑταρία; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain cattle (ῥὰ καρπαίοντα, Code IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (ἄνωτος), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (κλάρος) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the Φοικες who tilled it. To these Φοικες he stood in the capacity of πώτας, 'lord' or patronus. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The ἄφτεραπος was also a freeman like the πολιτῆς, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any ἑταρία, he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a Φοικες (100 staters, 10 staters, 5 drachmai = 21 staters, Code 32. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the serf and the freeman is 1:2 or 1:5, Zitelmann p. 102 n. 8).

The Φοικες were not free men: Φοικες and δίκλας are used indifferently in the code, and the terms ἄνωτος and κλαμὸς do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villegage or servitude, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses: they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled κλάρος. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villein possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the servus, if indeed it be not that of the cliens, at Rome.

By the 'strong-footed' may be meant (1) all large beasts, as opposed to sheep and goats; or (2) oxen (cp. Pind. Ol. XIII. 81, where the scholiast says the word means a bull in the Delphic speech); or (3) horses and mules, like μύηνες ἐπηκοι. It is probable that the ἑταρία as a division of the φωλιδια answered to the Attic φωλιδια, and that admission to it was an indispensable condition before any one could become a full citizen. See Athen. iv. 22 p. 143, Zitelmann pp. 55, 161. In the Derreras inscription fines paid by the Κόσκιοι are to be divided amongst the ἑταρίαι (p. 337). At the foundation of these close mess-companies lay, no doubt, an earlier and ruder tribal association (p. 330 f.): cp. Höck. Crete iii. p. 126.

In the code, as by Aristotle, δίκλας is used to include any form of servitude.

Their tenure of the land might almost be compared with that of the privileged villeins who by gradual emancipation are on their way to becoming copyholders.

Code V. 26 rās Fωικες ὑπὸ νῦν κυρίττι (= de ἐν) ἅ κλάρος.

v. 27, Zitelmann pp. 64, 144.

vii. 1, 2 Zitelmann p. 65 f. That the children follow the status of the mother is probably a survival of the matriarchate and female kinship; see above p. 329.

22—2
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tà συστήμα τῶν ἐταιρείων.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patriarchs, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek φυλαί and the three ancient Roman tribus, the latter to the Greek φυσαί and the 30 Roman curiae (see below on γεροντίας, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or ‘gentes’ that are here called ἐταιρεία, ‘mess-associations’.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the φυλαί in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the ἀρχαι, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schömann Antiquities of Greece 1. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. transl.), were called συστήματα: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables ‘in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence’ (ib. p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the ἀνδρεῖα in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20. 6, 29: c. 9. 12, 23: 1 Kings 1. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the συστήματα of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the curiales in their places of assembly or curiae. It is also to be remembered that ἐταιρεία was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiodas specially used the term in reference to the Lyctians, διήφηται δ’ οἱ πολίτες πάντες καθ’ ἐταιρείας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεῖα (Frag. 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; ‘probably guilds under oligarchical management’ (ib. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the συστήματα at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called ἐταιρεία in Greece (cp. n. 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake
of having compared a Spartan public institution with the arrangements of merely private associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The circuit and consiva at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy xxxiv. 61 § 5; their 'meetings' (σύναδαι) also in Theodoros Metochita Hyppomn. c. 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p. 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. Susen. (378)

η τῶν ἱκανῶν καὶ τετράδων ἀρχῆς.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?): to these were added the highest magistrates, the two Shofetes (see below βασιλείς) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin xix. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen out of the number of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberar civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et indicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices delignuntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigentem, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesqes respicerent. Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals but beyond doubt the Shofetes [kings] and Gerusiasts [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless
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cruelty,' comp. Diod. xx. 10. 3 : since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly met out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (ibid.) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate: see below γεροντία and n. (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (XXXIII. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6, tum temporis consulum: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: iudicum ordo Carthagin ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis obfendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices decret. horum in tam impotenti regno...praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihilo habuit, nam...quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accepi orationem animadvertit et inimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam

1 In Diod. xiv. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: ὅτι ἀνεγκωσθείη ὑπ’ ἑν τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ σύγκλητος is therefore the same as γεροντία, the smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called σύγκλητος by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of γεροντία for the small council and σύγκλητος for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (n. 388). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called σύγκλητος.
eorum, legem exempeulo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulos annos iudices legerentur, neve quis biennium continuum iudex esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephorality. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 23 n. 325): and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (μεγίστῃ ἄρχῃ, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 ἐν ζῷ ρ ἄρχῃ κυρία τῶν μεγίστων αὐτῶν ἐστὶ). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (διήκει δὲ ἐν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπάρχων ἄρχῃ πᾶσας εὐθυγραμμοῦτα ἄρχας), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaesitor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it: and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. Susem. (379).

οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (Hannib. 7. 4); but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy xxx. 7. 5, Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius v. 11, Nep. l. e., cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6); and Polybius also vi. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades
(XXXVIII. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidae, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election ‘of a king’ (Zonaras Ann. VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. XX. 10. 1 n. 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. XIII. 80. 2).

It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad. It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in n. (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were dissevered. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin XXII. 7. 7, Diod. XIII. 43. 5, XIV. 54. 5, XV. 15. 2, XX. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyæn. i. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

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1 It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet De Rep. Laced. speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

2 Only the incorrect statement of Zonares l.c. remains without justification on this view; but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

3 Comp. Oris. iv. 6. The words κατὰ γένος added to the title of King in these passages of Diodoros (κατὰ γένος τότε βασιλεύσατε and βασιλεύει κατὰ γένος) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king μεν κατὰ γένος, ἕξιν κατὰ γένος ὄνομα, ἐν ἔννομω ἐν Καρχηδόν, κατὰ γένος πολιτική γὰρ ἔστιν, ἕν εἰς Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.
still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office: (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called "judges" or shofetes (see above, also Cato as cited by Festus s. v. mansues), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3, Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings praetors: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l.c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is, it is true, in the last degree confused, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal B.C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 tum temporis consulem, Zonar. IX. 14 s.f. την μεγιστην των Καρχηδονων αρχην). According to Cicero's statement, De Ref. II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life: but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7); and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l.c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship.

SUSEM. (381).

η γερουσία: § 3.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: triginta seniorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis. It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called στάγλητος, even by Aristotle III. I. 10 (cp. n. 442), and although the terms γερουσία, στάγλητος, and συνέ-

1 Praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 186 s., proposed to alter rex into dux: but that here also rex denotes the Shofete and that the alteration is therefore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romanes Consules sic Carthagin quoqannis annui hini reges creantur.

2 πλέωνα ἀρχην χρῶν τῶν ἕλληνων.
are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms γερουσία and σύνεδρον X. 18. 1 δῶν μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου and XXXVI. 26 τριακοσίων ὁμιλόντων...τούτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 30 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general, and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom, probably, see Polyb. i. 26. i, the subordinate commanders were taken; it despatches were addressed (Mommsen ii. 15 E. tr.), to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see 11 § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators (Valer. Max. ix. 5. 4 ext.

1 As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. Dion. xiv. 47. 2 (see p. 342 n. 1) and xx. 59. 1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερουσίας ἐν Καρθήνιῳ βουλευτείᾳ περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [καλὸς] ἠδοξε τοῖς συνεδρίοις τῆς στρατισμοῦ..., εκτείνεται. The σύνεδρον are the members of the γερουσία itself; the transaction takes place in the γερουσία alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word συνεδρία is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

2 Duncker (Hist. of Antiquity ii. p. 185, ed. 4, 1874) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. ii. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators exclusive of the kings.

3 See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

4 Whether it was so "regularly", as Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

5 For the senators Mommsen (ii. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four, although it may certainly be quite true...
THE CARTHAGINIAN DEMOS.

insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi aemulatio fuit: ille enim separato a plebe balineo lavabatur; cp. Juven. v. 90 propter quod Romae cum Bocchare nemo lavatur, also Movers p. 501 n. 57). The deputies of the senate (σύνεδροι) with the army formed part of the general's council of war, Polyb. III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, καὶ πάντες οἱ γερουσιασταὶ Καρχηδονίων μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνιοι οἱ στρατεύομενοι μετ’ αὐτῶν, Polyb. VII. 9 § 1, § 4. Movers, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the γερουσιασταί; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. nn. 340, 360). Susem. (382)

δὴ δήμος.

'The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not: if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions,' at Sparta and in Crete: §§ 5, 6.

Klupe was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly; that this was not the case may be seen from Livy XXI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, XXIII. c. 12 ff. However the senate and the shofoetes might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. VI. 51. 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (τὴν πλεῖστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλεύσις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίως ὁ δήμος ἤδη μετελήφθη, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀκριβῶς εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος). And yet even this very war was decreed by the shofoetes and the senate alone, Polyb. III. 33, Livy XXI. 18. Susem. (387)

that the latter are also called "senators" by the Greek and Roman writers, as being elected, as a matter of fact, from the (smaller and larger) senate.
This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. n. 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards entered the council of the Hundred, but only that they elected that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shoefetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy xxviii. 37. 2), and the censor (praefectus morum: Nep. Hamtlc. 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by principibus quibusdam et magistratibus mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—vectigalia publica partim neglegentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant, xxxiii. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (Hyll s. f., III. 3 § 11 cp. nn. 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shoefetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (i) the Boards of Five and (ii) the Council
of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose; and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two shofetes or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year: at any rate it appears to follow from Livy’s account (see above n. 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above: unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. Susem. (390)

οὐ στρατηγός.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above n. 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above n. 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (111, 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian ‘kings’, exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 340) takes it to mean that ‘the Shofetes were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.’ The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 7¹, Cato cited in Gellius X. 24. 7, Frontin. Strateg. II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 8². The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of shofete and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly: yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

¹ There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once shofetes and generals, or that the Hasdrubal in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.
² At least I take this to be the most probable view.
EXCURSUS V.

THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3.

Δικαίωση τοῦ Σόλων...τόν δήμον καταστήσας, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaea, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure. It is another matter when Fränkel The Attic δικαστήρια p. 63 f. infers from III. ii. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Heliaea to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon's legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

1 This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.
2 The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-
precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Fränkel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Fränkel’s explanation be consistently applied to vi(iv), 14 § 3, § 6, § 10 (see nn. 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not ‘obscure’, but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon’s fault but by the course of events; though Fränkel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian Heliaea consisted, as Fränkel very ably proves (pp. i—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., cp. pp. 21—51) not only this Heliaea as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another ἐκλησία, as

1 Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (445 B.C.) ἐκθεναι has the wider sense of “trials” generally, and not the later, narrower sense of “trials” of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge; Wilamowitz Aus Kydathen p. 88 f. shows that the word has not even the former sense in that place but means “punishments.”

2 ἀνεγορημάτων.

3 For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what Aristotle may or may not have said.

4 It is indeed more than questionable whether ἀνεγορημάτων, popular assembly, is really only a shorter form of ἀνεγορηματίσσα.
a representation of the popular assembly. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy. All this however does not exclude the possibility that on Aristotle’s view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state: indeed on the analogy of vii(iv), 14, 6 (n. 135) there is a certain probability even, that by his remarks in ii. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paconian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaucos cited in Plutarch De Mus. 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 B), which were called Paean and Hypoi-

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation; see Wilamowitz op. c. pp. 87—94.

1 Fränkel, pp. 23—27, endeavours to show that the Hellenice possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

2 And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon’s times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

3 E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.
underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. 1 to B. 1): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Πόρσω). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, frag. 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 C, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopaedia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. i. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger De Thaleta poeta Essen 1851. 4, Höck Kreta III. 339 ff., Bernhardy History of Greek Literature 3 ed. 1 p. 378, Christ Metrik p. 415 ff., also E. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)
Γ.

1374 b 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς
38 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἐστὶν τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρέπον τοῦ·
32 § 1 τον' τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ
ποία τις, σχεδόν πρώτῃ σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἱδεῖν, τὸ ποτέ
ἔστιν ἢ πόλις. τὸν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, οὔ μὲν φάσκοντοι
35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραγμένην τὴν πράξειν, οὔ δὲ οὖ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ
tὴν ὁμαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύπαν τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ

In the notes to this book fr. denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heybut in Rhein. Mus. XLIII. 1887. p. 103 ff. See Exc. iii. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1374 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν... 35 ταξις τις, was by all previous editors appended to B. 11 § 28 εἰρημένας Κορας; cp. it. 1. 1., but see Dittenberger op. c. 1368 ff. τὸν τοῦτον * * Thurot; τῷ <ἐν> ἀρχ. Susen. This ἐν is all that we require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some other cause is uncertain, see Introd. p. 14 n. 3 § 32 καὶ before τίς ἐκάστη omitted in Π Αρ., perhaps rightly § 38 ἢ τε; Susen. ἢ ἄριστον (ἄριστον Π') after τάξις τα Μ Π'

B. 11 includes two parts: a statement of General Principles, cc. 1—13, followed by a review of Monarchy, cc. 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See Anal. p. 108 ff., Introd. 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken ii pp. 117—174.

cc. 1, 2. The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining by descent 1 § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.

Mr A. C. Bradley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in Hellenica pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitutions "proper," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So κυρίας with ἐπίθεσιν, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like ἀπλός to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

35 ἀλλὰ τὴν διληματικὴν] "that it is not the state which has done this or that but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. III. 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (485) on c. 3 § 2 below. Susen. (432)

36 πολ. καὶ τού γνωμ.] See above on 1, 1, 2, 11, 12, 1.

38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of this organization is explained δ § 1 πόλεως τάξις τῶν τοῦ ἀλλού ἀρχῶν καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς κυρίας πάσης, n. (522). Comp. vi
III. 1. 4] 1274 b 27—1275 a 10. 355

§ 2 ἐστι δή τῶν συγκεκιμένων, καθάπερ ἀλλοι τῶν ἄλλων. 40 μὲν συνεστάρτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δὴ ἂν πρόσερεν ἡ πολίτης ἔξηγετο; ἡ γὰρ πόλεις πολεμῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστιν. 1275 α' ὡστε τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τῶν ἡ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκεφτέον, καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλακίς. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην ἐστὶ γὰρ τις ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὅπως ἐν ὅλην πολλακίς, οὐκ ἡ πολιτεία ἐστιν.

§ 3 ἐστι πολιτείας. τούς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ποιεῖ τυχόντας ταῖς ὑπό πολέμων, οἷον τοὺς ποιητους πολιτάς, ἀφετέρων καὶ διὰ πολιτείας ὡς γὰρ τοῖς πολίτησι πολιτείας ἐστίν (καὶ ἡ πολιτεία 41 τοιοῦτοι καὶ διόλου καυσοφοιτάρας τῆς οἰκῆς) οὐκ ὡς τῶν δικαιῶν μετέχοντες ὡς τοῖς ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάν. 1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς <μετακοι καὶ τοῖς> Bücheler, most likely right.

(1v), 1. 10 τοῖς ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαῖς, τίνα πᾶν τόπῳ νεκροῦ, καὶ τῇ τό κτῆρον κτλ. n. (1129), vii(iv). 3. 5 n. (1156).

SUSEM (432b)

§ 2 ἐστι δὴ κτλ. "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts." (Jeffb).

41 τὰ πολιτείας "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, ἱκανῶν τοι αὐθάρρειῶν ὑπῆ, § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447).

SUSEM (433)

1275 a 1 ὡστε τίνα κτλ. Schlosser's censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, 1. 3 § 3 n. (4), § 1 (2), § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at 1. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define πόλις by reference to πολίτης; if on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser 1. 218).

In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 12 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. comparing 1. 2. 8 n. (21), adequate for the end of the state. And just because this

is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in 1 cc. 1, 2.

But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Herein he is certainly right; the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See nn. (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM (434b) § 36 τοὺς ποιητοὺς "honorary citizens" (Susemihl). But probably cases like those of § 5 § 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demesth.] c. Neat. 1376 b 15, ὅποιος ποιητής ἡ πολιτεία.

7 ou τοις δικαιῶν τοὺς ἡ πολίτης ἡ πολιτεία does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, ὅποι ἔστω τῆς κοινωνίας τότε, with n. (357): on the other 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM (434b)

§ 4 τοῦτα οἱ τῶν δικαιῶν "the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": δικαίως = iuram.

τοῖς ἄλλων "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below 9 §§ 6, 7 (Schneider) nn. § 49, 550. SUSEM (435)

23—2
πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν (1) οὐδὲ τούτων τελέων οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμεν
§ 5 ἀνάγκης προστάτης, ὅστε ἀτελῶς πιὸς μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παίδας τοὺς μήπω δὲ 15 ἡμεῖς ἐγγεγραμμένοι καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτες, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίγαν ἀλλὰ προστίθεται τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρημένους ἢ τοῖς τοιούτων ἑτερον (οὕτω γὰρ διαφέρει δὴ λόγῳ γὰρ τὸ λεγομένου). Ξυπόμενον δὲ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἤχουτα τοῖς τοιούτων ἐγκλημα διερωθέσιος δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαύτα καὶ διαπορεὶς καὶ
§ 6 λύειν, πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν τῶν άλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἤ τὸ μετέχειν [κρίσεως καὶ] ἁρχῆς· τῶν δ' ἁρχῶν αἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν διηγημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὀστ' εἰναι μὲν ὀλοὺς δίς

καὶ ἔτερον ὑπάρχει omitted by P1 4 Ar.: [γὰρ] Görting, [καὶ γὰρ]......ὑπάρχει. Susem. 1: Thurot proposed to transpose the words to follow 12 μετέχους. Bender considers the whole passage 11 καὶ γὰρ......22 λέον spurious μὲν οὖν here, as in IV (vii). 10 § 7, in the sense of μέσων, which Schmidt proposed. This makes Bückler's insertion all the more necessary 12 ἀλλὰ νέμεων......13 μετέχους omitted in Qb Tb Ald. and P1 (1st hand, inserted in the margin) 13 ὦτε δὲ Vettori Bk. 16 λαβοτ untransl. by Ar., [Λαβ] Koraes, πολιτεία Spengel, πολέμῳ Görting (in his lectures). Schmidt would transpose λαβοτ to follow 17 τοῖς δὲ. Possibly due to a variant πλῆρης of ἀλλα: yet I do not venture to decide against λαβοτ ἀπλῶς= 'quite absolutely' 17 ατέλεως P2 Qb Tb 18 19 20 21 22 Thurot Susem. 1: Conring assumed a lacuna higher up before 14 ἀλλὰ, Spengel proposed to omit καθάπερ there: but see Vahlen Petites p. 376 ed. 3, cp. Comm. 19 δὲ Ar. Conring, γὰρ ΓΠ (including fr.) Bk. 22 κρίσεως καὶ ἁρχῆς] πολιτείας Stobaeus p. 328, [κρίσεως καὶ] Thurot 24 διαφέροντας ΓΠ Bk., διαφερόμεναι Scaliger, Susem. 5, probably right: determinatae Ar. 14 καθάπερ καὶ παίδας κτλ.] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases added, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and supernumerary old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. Susem. (437) 17 τοῖς μὲν ἄτελεοι] Cp. 5 § 2, n. (305) Susem. (437) δ' Add i. 13. 7. 18 19 20 ἐγκλημα διερωθέσιος δεομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by an added qualification, as citizen under age.

The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ συμβασιών τῇ καθαρεύουσα ἔλεγχος, Μενοκράτος 4, 18. See (Demosth.) De Hellenismo §§ 9—13, Pollux viii. 63, 88; Harpocrates s.v. and Aris. Frag. 380. 1541 b 1: whence some infer that at ἔναβοθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωκόμους δικαίον of Thuc. i. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh Philol. Einw. of Athens pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope's note on Rhel. 1. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in Amer. Journal of Phil. 1886. 1 pp. 3—11:

μὲν omitted by Γ, perhaps rightly, unless it be changed to ζ with Spengel: Ar. leaves it untranslated || 27 δὲ φαίνει Γ Πτ. λ. fr., φαίνει Μ', αὐτοφαίνει Πτ. Q'. Tā. All., δὲ αὐτοφαίνει? Göttling || 28 καίτοι...... 29 ἀρχίς omitted by Π', added by corr.1 in the margin of Π || 32 οὕτως τοίς οὐ ταύτης? Spengel || 34 πολίτων ἄρχων > Ε.; Schneider.

§ 6 26 διὰ ἀριστοτ. sc. ἀρχῶν: in other cases the officer holds an undefined office; i.e. one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 15 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the διαστήματα and εκκλησιαστήματα as themselves ἀρχεῖα but only as parts of the complex ἀρχή, the διαστήματος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ καθηγήσας; cf. p. (438).

§ 7 28 οὖν...διὰ ταύτατα that to serve on a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who wield the highest authority a claim to hold office.

καίτοι γελαίον] Comp. Plato Laws 767 Α, Β: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (διαστήματα δὲ οὖν ἀρχῶν καὶ τινὰ τρίτον ἀρχῶν οὔ πᾶσι φαίνεται τὴν τόδε ἀμέρον, ἕτερ δὲ κρίνει τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀνεξανθρώπου οὐκ ἔτεινο). Hence the dikastas may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cf. Aeschin. III. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. Nευρή 587 καὶ ταύτ’ ἀντικφορύνοι δρομῶν τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὕτως ὑμεῖς ἄρχης). Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been re-elected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal: whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterrupted." (Franke p. 21 f.).

§ 8 33 διαφερεῖτο κτλ] "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklesiaist. For the sake of distinction, we will call theirs an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 9 35 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ] "Where classes of things (like πολίτης) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several
 polynomial and, consequently, the polity as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ἰδίως. Here however polity is probably παραγόντων, like ἀρχήν in Nic. Eth. 1. 6 §§ 8—12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller Plato p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In Ind. Ar. ὑποκείμενα is explained (1) res singulare quae continentur notionis aliciaus universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio referetur et a quibus suspensa est: e.g. Met. A. 2. 4. 982 a 23, ὁ τῶν καθολον ἐστιν ἐκ δὲ πάντων τῶν ὑποκείμενων. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πρακτικῶν (ut polonov) εν ὑπὸ τῶν ιδιών (singulac nonunt ad quas refertur τῶν πολιτικῶν notio) διαφέρει. 35—38. "See Catec. 1. 1. f.: things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the same being different (ἰδίωμα λέγεται ὁ ἰδίωμα μόνον καθολον, ὁ δὲ καθὰ τούτων λέγον ἐπεξεργάσηται). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense [J. G. Schneider]. Comp. Waitz ad loc., Bonitz Ind. Ar. 3. v. ἰδίωμα [Grote Aris. 1. 81 f.]: also 1. 2. 13 above n. (18)." Susem. (438 b) Hence obviously πράγματα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. De Interpret. c. 7 § 1. 17 a 38, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν καθολον τῶν πράγματι τὰ δὲ καθ' ἐκατόν. Any general notion, however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'thing,' if it is denoted by a single term. § 9 39 ὑποτέρας...προτέρας Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See 1. 2. 13 n. (27). Susem. (439) 1275 b 1 ἤμαρτησαν Plato's word Rep. v 449 A, VIII 544 A. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong,' perverse': cp. 6 § 11, VIII(v) 1. 5, N. E. IV. 9, 35, VIII. 10. 4. In VIII(v) 1. 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἰδίωμα...desecure. 3 9 ὑποτέρας] cc. 6. 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (426). Susem. (439 b) § 10 5 ὁ λεγέται The citizen as thus defined. 6 ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίαν καθ' But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. Ifthen Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 nn. (598, 599): IV(vii). 9 §§ 7—9. 13 § 9. 14 §§ 3—5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 3 §§ 4. 5 nn. Susem. (440) 6 ἐν δὲ τὰς ἀλλας With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which
would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." 

§ 8 συγκλήτους Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. iv to B. ii p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. 

§ 9 κατὰ μέρος not "in turn" but "by sections." κατὰ τὰ δίκασ. κατὰ μέρος "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two "indefinite magistracies", the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened (συγκλήτους) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judiciary into a special government department. 

§ 10 τῶν συμβολαίων C. Cope's note on Rhet. i. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to συμβολα which are κακά." δίκαια τῶν συμβολαίων = civil suits, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 Καρχηδόνα If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὸ τά δίκασ ὡς τῶν ἀρχείων διακόσμησιν πάσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλον ὡς ἄλλον, καθάπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. iv. p. 348 f. and nn. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of δίκαια annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 324. 

§ 12 τῆς ἀρχῆς βοολυκτηκῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, 

SUSEM. (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρσεμένος "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between κριτηρία and βοολή on the one hand, Heliaca, νομοθετή, and Areopagus on the other.) 

SUSEM. (445)
20 της τῆς πόλεως, πόλει δὲ το τῶν τοιούτων πλήθος ἱκανόν (1)
2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειας ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰσεῖναι ὁριζόμενον δὲ πρὸς τὴν χρήσεων πολίτην τῶν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ
βατέρου μόνων, οὖν πατρὸς ὁ μητρός, οὔ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πλέον χρυσοῦς, οὖν ἐπὶ πάσσων διὸ ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλεῖον,
25 οὕτω δὲ ὄριζόμενον πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροθήκευται τινες τὸν § 2 τρίτον ἐκείνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης.
Γοργίας μὲν (p. 61)
οὖν ὁ Δεονισίως, τὰ μὲν ἰσος ἀπορων τὰ δὲ εὑρωνομεύον, ἄφθος καθάπερ θλημος εἶναι τούς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλυμπιοῦν πεποιη

κης] "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aris
totle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (ἀπορων ἄργη). SUSEM. (446)

ηθος is simply untranslatable: without going further, without anything more being necessary.

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειας [κης] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. n. (21), 2. 8 n. (156) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: τίμους ἐχαρακτήρια μῆ

μονὸν ἄθροισιν εἶναι τοῖς ἐκ δειν Ἀθηναίων ἄρσενώτατοι.

25 τοιμίσκων] Like our word 'popular,' or popularis in Cie. De fin. iv. § 24, v. § 121 i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation ταχέως, pingu Minerva.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to i. 13, 10 (cp. n. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leon
tini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics:


Phil. iii. 65—80.

The following passage, ii. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in Transactions of the Camb. Philo
tological Soc. vol. 11 pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (Journal of Philology xx. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaens by Lycoh

phon of Phere in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon Helen. iii. 2. 4.

27 έλωνομένους=ironically, though the word could have the meaning 'jesting.' But we are told Rhet. iii. 7. 11, 1408 b 20, ἢ μετὰ έλωνειας δηπο Θερ
gias εὐδείς, that Gorgias used to be ironical in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 ἄφθος καθάπερ θλημος κτλ.] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magis
trates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of ἔλωνομένους, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. n. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or
III. 2. 4] 1275 b 20 — 1275 b 37.

30 μένος, οὐτω καὶ Λαρισαίοι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημοσίων τιμῶν (1) 29 μένος[; αὐτοὶ γὰρ τʰινας λαρισαστοιούς]· ἐτι δὲ ἀπλοῦν. εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τῆς δημοσίας διορισμῶν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν ἣν πολίταν καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατον ἐφαρμόστεν ἢ ἢ πολίταν ἢ πολίταν ἢ πρώτων οἰκετάντων ή κτισμάτων. ἀλλὰ ἰσοὺς ἐκείνου μᾶλλον ἔχει ἄποριαν, ὅσοι μὲ 10

35 τοὺς μεταβολῆς ἱμηρόμενης πολιτείας, οἷον Αὐδηνίας ἐπέσεθεν Κλεισθένης ὑπὲρ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν πολ- 40 λοις γὰρ ἐφυλάττεσαν ἔτενους καὶ δούλους μετοκους. το δὲ

29 λαρισαστοιοι fr. Λαρισαστοι not λαρισαστοι Βκ.2 (so throughout) || τῶν omitted by Μ'Tb || 30 [ἐναλ. λαρισαστοι] Ridgeway || λαρισαστοι Camerarius, larissaeos factores Λκ, λαρισαστοι ΠΠ (including fr.) Βκ.1 || 32 ἦσαν δὲ P2-Qτ Tφ Ar. Βκ., ἦσαν Πτ fr. Ald. and, over an erasure, P4, ἦσαν Uφ || καὶ γὰρ ὁ P4 Qφ Tφ Lφ Bκ., ὁδὲ γὰρ Susem.1 misled by William's translation non dubium || 33 ἦσ εκείνου omitted by P1 and perhaps by Γ, [ἐκ] Susem.1,4, perhaps rightly || ἑκείνου [ὁ κυριαρχὸς] Bender || 34 ἐκείνου Vettori (ins. correction in the Munich copy of his 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Aldine at Munich, εκείνου Pφ and, with an erasure over α, P1: ἐκείνου Susem.1 in text and perhaps Mφ, εκείνου Tφ-Qφ Qφ Tφ Ub Ar. Ald. and Pφ (corrector), probably also Mφ, accepted by Bender; ἐκείνου apparently Pφ (1st hand?): I'm uncertain, illi magis habent William, whence ἐκείνου....ἐκείνου the editors from Vettori and Morel to Bekker || 35 ὁδὸν <Ἀ-> Chandler || 37 δούλου καὶ ἔτενου Mφ (1st hand) and Valckenaer (notes on Herod. p. 404) || καὶ δοῦλου καὶ ἔτενου Ar. Bk.2, καὶ [δοῦλου] μετοκους ο ἢ καὶ τολλον μετοκους? Gottling, μετοκους καὶ δοῦλους Niebuhr (II. 325 n. 2, Eng. tr.), μετοκους ἔκοιν Spengel. See however Meier De gentil. Att. p. 6, Bernays Herakl. Briefe p. 155 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

'buregouster,' and as this was so in parts of Thessaly (see Schömann Antiq. iur. publ. p. 84 n. 10, Antiquities of Greece p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been also at Larissa while (2) at the same time in Attica, and the common language generally, it was the term for workmen or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The jest, when cited in this context, raises a presumption that the magistrates of Larisa bore this same title at the foundation of the city and had full powers to make citizens of whom they pleased, yet who in the world would spoil such a joke or pun by inquiring whether this was historically true? (But the jest would lose all its point if δημοσίου be taken, as Oacken suggests, to mean the founders, not the magistrates, of Larisa. For every town has its founders, and not merely Larisa and certain towns like it: nor does the word bear this meaning unless some more precise phrase be added.) Further comp. viii(v). 6 § 6 n. (1573), 10 § 5 n. (1651): vii(iv). 4. 16 n. (1188). Susem. 450 Cp. Thuc. 1. 36 ἐπικήμνωριγαί. 30 εἰναι γὰρ τινας λαρισαστοιούς] "For (he said) some of them are Larissa- makers," i.e. hardware manufacturers. Why should Gorgias interpret his own joke? It is far more likely that this is a gloss by some one who did not see that ἐπικήμνωριγαί has with Λαρισαίουs above; or perhaps believed that λάρσας, λαρσις meant a ‘kettle’ on the analogy of τάψας, τάσας. In Anthol. Pal. vi. 305, τῶν Λαρισαίων κυνόγατας ἀψήρας, Λαρι- σαίουs is an adjective, and this makes against its supposed use as a substantive, and therefore against the emendation of Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 30 ἀπλοῦν] a simple question, οὐκέτι πρωίδων. 37 τολλον γὰρ ἐφυλάττεσαν ἔτενους καὶ δοῦλους μετοκους] "for he admitted into the tribes many resident-aliens of foreign and servile extraction, (δοῦλον = freedmen). It is well known that Cleis- thenes abolished the four ancient tribes
άμφισβητηται πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότες ἡ ἄδικος ἢ δικαίος. καὶ τίν ἐν τούτῳ τις ἔτι προσαπορήθη ἄρει εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταῦτα δυνάμενος μὲν τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἄρχων τινας ἄδικος, οὕς ἀρχεῖ οἱ σέμοις ἄλλων οὐ δικαίως, ὡς πολίτης ἄρχη τινας διωρισμένος ἐστὶν (ἕν γὰρ κοινών), δήλων ὅτι πολλὰ μὲν εἶναι φατέων καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἡ μὴ δικαιοσύνη συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροφάγη γὰρ τοὺς πόλεις ἐπιτραπέζη καὶ πότε ἡ πόλις ἡ πόλις, ὅπως ἂν ἔξω ἡ ἐλεοφρικὴ ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται διδυμοκρατίᾳ. τὸ γὰρ ἄρα γενέτευ τὰ συμβολαία ἐνός βουλευτικαὶ διαλεύει, οὐ ότι τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβώντος,
The Delphians admitted the claim, the Elecans rejected it; see Plat. De Pys. orsc. 13. 420 E (Schlosser). Comp. further n. (439) on § 1. SUSEM. (455)
Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of the United States and the bonds issued by the abortive Confederate government. λαβότων Comp. Thuc. iii. 81 διέ-
θεσαν. Ἀλλαὶ (θέσα) χρημάτων σφένδα τέως λαβότων (τῶν διαισιτισμένων Schol.).
12 ὡς ἑνία κτλ.] "for some forms of the state rest upon superior force and are not due to public expediency." This is the second time that Aristotle refers beforehand to his doctrine of 'degenerate' forms of government, more precisely laid down in c. 6: see above nn. (439 b, 440).
SUSEM. (456)
13 συμφέρων. * *] The lacuna may perhaps be thus supplied: <But democracy also is a government of this sort.> SUSEM. (457)
14 δημοκρατούνται] Ridgeway suggests that William of Moerbeke took this word to come from δημοκρατία, and hence his rendering; in democratiam versus fuerunt.
§ 3 11 διουκτικά κτλ] But the true grounds of this controversy lie deeper in another question which now needs to be investigated. SUSEM. (458)

20 [ἡπην] The most obvious mode of investigation is concerned with the place and the inhabitants. 21 διαζευγθήσα] "disjoined," "separated." Aristotle has in view the measure which the Greeks called δοκείτως, cp. VIII (v). 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town was destroyed by its conquerors and the inhabitants were driven to seek new homes in the neighbourhood in a number of unwarred villages and hamlets, as was done to Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 b.c. This was an oligarchical measure: for the custom of living together in a walled town was usually favourable to democracy. The opposite and democratic procedure, the union of several country places, hitherto unwarred, in a single town was συνοικία: and directly after the battle of Leuctra this was done by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city b.c. 370 and moreover gave the impulse to the foundation of a common capital of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See Curtius Hist. iv. pp. 305, 417 ff. Eng. tr., Schomann. Antiq. p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp. also i. 2. 8 n. (20 b). SUSEM. (459)
§ 4 22 ταυτήν μὲν οὖν προστέρεσαν] In this form the problem must be regarded as easier to solve, for the variety of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates a solution.
ΠΟΔΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 3. [ΠΙ. 3. 4.

πρατέραν θετέον τήν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πῶς εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως· ὡμολογεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δὲ γραφεῖται μίαν εἶναι τήν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δέ τοῖς τείχεσιν εἰς γὰρ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβάλεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῖς εἰς τοῦ βασιλέως ἐστι καὶ Βαβυλών καὶ πάσα ήτοις ἕξετε περιγραφήν 29 μῆλῳ ἰδίῳ ή πόλεως· ἦς γε φασίν ἐκλοκικίας τριτήν

§ 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθένειται τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἀλλὰ καρπὸν ἁρμόδιον ἑπεξετάζει (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσο καὶ πότερον ἐκστατικὸν εἶναι ἐν τῇ περιβάλλον τῶν πολιτικῶν), ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων τῶν αὐτῶν ὑστέρων, 13 πότερον ἠοὶ ἢ τό γένος ταύτῃ τῶν κατοικοῦντων, τῆς αὐτής εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων.

23 Πολλαχῶς λεγομένης] As in Greek there is only the one word πόλις for ‘city’ and ‘state,’ in such a case as that just cited in n. (459) it might well be asked, whether the state of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the city. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word πόλις, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (Introd. p. 21), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would have been a gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of πόλις, πολιτικός, by ‘city’ ‘civic’ rather than ‘state’ ‘political’ is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a ‘municipal corporation’ we cannot always style them the ‘burgess-body.’

§ 5 25 οὐ γὰρ δὲ τοῖς τείχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. VIII. 77. 7 ἀναρχομένως γὰρ τῶν τείχων καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐστάτως ποιεῖται. Soph. Oed. Rex 26 οὐδὲν ἔστω ὁτι δίδοι λέγεται ὅτι τῶν ἐν τοῖς τείχοις ἀνθρώπων ἔστω ὁτι δίδοι λέγεται. SUSEM. (469)

§ 6 31 ἐς ἀλλὸν καρπὸν] The size is discussed in VIII (v). 7. 11 praising the uniformity of race in VIII (v). 7. 11: comp. n. (1531). See however Introd. p. 56. SUSEM. (469)

Comp. for the phrase solvere in alium diem.
υνω τῶν δὲ γυμνεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοῦ εἰδόθαμεν λέγειν (1)
touς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὸς αὐτὸς, καὶ περ ἵνα τὸ μὲν
ἐπιγεινόμενον νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόω, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώ-
πος τῶν φατέων εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτήν, τὴν
§ 7 δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γὰρ ἑστε κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστε δὲ
κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γυμνεῖν ἑτέρας τῷ εἰδές καὶ
dιαφανείᾳ τῆς πολιτείας αναγκαίον εἶναι δύσειν ἀν κα
τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μη τὴν αὐτὴν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χωρὸν ὅτε
§ 8 τὸν κοινωνίαν καὶ συνθέσιν ἑτέραν, ἀν εἶδος ἑτερον τῆς
συνθέσεως ἢ, οἷον ἄρρωνισ τῶν αὐτῶν φιόνοις ἑτέραν εἶ-
§ 9 ναὶ λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ἡ Δώριος ὀδεῖ καὶ Φρύγιος, εἰ δὴ τοῦ-

1276 b 2 "πολιτείας is pleonastic or the text is corrupt" Eaton, πολιτεία Congreve,
[πολιτῶν? Susem.] = 3 an omitted by Π, δείκτης Μ* = 6 anthesis omitted by
§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πο-
λιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this,
translating "For if the state is a kind of
community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a
community possessed by citizens in a
constitution," and adding the ms. text
of 9 § 14 as another instance of the
double genitive with κοινωνία. If any
change is to be made at all, we should
omit πολιτῶν, which, though grammati-
cally unobjectionable, is superfluous and
somewhat obscures the sense. Usually
κοινωνία πολιτῶν or κοινωνία has been
made the subject of the second sentence,
and κοινωνία πολιτείας or πολιτεία its pre-
dicate, "and fellowship (of the citizens) is
fellowship in a constitution" or "consists
in a constitution." Sussem.
§ 8 7 εἴδος ἑτερον τῆς συνθέσεως
"if the kind of combination be different,
i.e. if the elements be differently combined.

§ ἄρρωνισ] See Exc. iv on B.
v(viii). Susem. (465)
In these two modes the notes (φθόγγον)
are the same: but the Dorian mode is
from Ε to Ε, and b natural is μέση or
key-note; while the Phrygian mode is
from Ο to Ο and a is μέση. Comp. Dio
Chryost. iii. p. 21 ἄρρωνις Δώριος καὶ
Φρύγιος ἄλλη καὶ Δώριος.

§ 9 9 εἰ δὴ τούτον ἑξά τοῦ τρόπων
"On these principles then it is plain that
we must affirm the identity of the city by
a reference to its constitution." It would
be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this
conclusion *in its literal sense his assertion
§ 6 1 n. (523), 7 2 (535), 13 5 (597),
that the constitution is nothing but the
form of government, πολιτείας, κύριον.
For the truth is that, like Plato, he
includes under πολιτεία all which goes to
condition the form of government as well
as all that is directly conditioned by it.
Thus, as Zeller ii. ii. p. 551 rightly
observes, he includes "even the main
features of the commonwealth which
find expression in the spirit of the state
administration and in the mode in which
the end of the state is conceived": see
iv(vii). 8 § 5 n. (900), 8 § 3 (966). Thus
his notion of a polity or πολιτεία is not
narrower but wider than our notion of a
constitution. For when we speak with
scientific precision the term 'constitution'
usually denotes only the particular form
which the political organism assumes, or
the sum total of the rules regulating the
distribution of political functions:—al-
though no doubt, as a matter of fact,
the text of a modern constitution does

* Oncken (l. 122—139) ascribes to him, as his
real view, almost the exact opposite of this con-
clusion.
not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see vii(viii), 9 § 1 f. n. (973), vii(v), 9 § 11 (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, vii(iv). 5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from vii(vii), c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see nn. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, nay utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildemband p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people: and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. vii § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. Suskem (466) 13. ἐν δὲ Βίκησον...Λόγοι Εἴστροσι. 14 But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repute our obligations (§ 3) when the state changes to another constitution is a different question. The point is not resumed in the sequel.

This shows at once the definiteness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of reparation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question. suspect. (667) cc. 4, 5. Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen? See Anal. p. 109, and Thunot études pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the Republic, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. viii, ix. Aristotle admits it in some cases (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with N. E. v. 2. 111 ὁ γὰρ διοικεῖν τῶν ἁρμόθεν ἐνέθεται τῷ καὶ πολιτείᾳ παινεί, on which see Jackson's note which dispenses of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book v used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the Politics.

16 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρήμενων...18 μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to
III. 4. 3] 1276 b 10—1276 b 32. 367

πότερον τιν αυτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπος ἄγαθον καὶ πολίτου σπου- (11) δαλοῦ βετοῦν, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ἄλλα μὴν εἰ γε τοῦτο τυ- 
χεῖν δεῖ θετήσως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπον τινὶ πρῶτον λή- 
μετέχων. ἄσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνίας ἑστὶν, 
§ 2 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τοῦ δὲ πλωτηρίου καὶ περὶ ἀνο-
μοιῶν ὑποτάσσομεν τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐρετής, ὃ 
δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὃ δὲ προφερόντα, ὃ δὲ ἄλλην τινα ἔχων τοιαύτην 
ἐπωνυμίαν) δήλων ὡς ὃ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκατόν ὁ λόγος 
25 ἵκος ἐσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμο-
σεῖ πάσιν. ἢ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτικῆς ἔργον ἑστὶν αὐτῶν 
§ 3 πάντων τούτῳ γὰρ ἐκατόν ὁ δρέκεται τῶν πλωτηρίων. ὁμοίως 
τοῖν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίω ὑποτάσσεσθαι, ἡ σωτη-
ρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἐργον ἑστι, κοινωνία δ᾽ ἑστιν ἡ πολιτεία. 
30 ἄσπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν 
πολιτείαν. ἀπερ οὖν ἐστι πλεῖον πολιτείας εἰδι, δῆλων ὡς ὁ 
ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίῳ πολίτῳ μιᾶν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε-

17 ἄγαθον ἄνθρωπον M' Susem. and perhaps Γ || 19 πρῶτον omitted in P' (1st 
hand, added by corr. in the margin), πρῶτον? Spengel needlessly || 20 εἰς ὑπὸ τ' II || 

inquire how far, under any constitution, the state can reach this goal touches a fundamental point in constitutional theory of the utmost generality; and constitutions may be classified as (1) better or best, (2) worse or worst, according as they are more or less adapted to this end. The present inquiry accordingly serves as the basis of the classification of constitutions in order of merit which follows in c. 6, and of the entire theory of the separate constitutions. This then, and this alone, is precisely the right place for cc. 4, 5. That they have defects in the execution we are not prepared to deny, since Aristotle must have himself intended materially to recast them subsequently (see n. 477; compare nn. 473, 478); but this intention was never carried out.

SUSEM. (468)

One glaring defect in the execution is the frequent violation of the rule forbidding the hiatus, which is fairly well observed in the rest of book III. There are 40 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total of 90 odd for the whole of the book.

19 τοῦτον τυπ. in outline. A frequent expression: I V(VII), 16, 12, V(VIII). 7, 5, 

§ 3, § 4 παραλέλος καὶ τύπου.

20 The simile of the crew is much used by Plato: Rep. VI, 488 A ff., Politicus 297 b, e ff.; in the latter passage joined with that of the physician which is perpetually recurring in B. III.

§ 22 τὴν ὑπομονήν is an adverbial accus. See n. on φόβως I. 12, 2.

23 κυβερνήτης steersman, or pilot, answers in some respects more to the ship's captain, as he is skilled in navigation (Plato II. c.c.) and responsible for the course of the vessel. Whereas the 
παύλερος or skipper, usually the owner of the ship, although nominally in command, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὁμοίως τοῖν κτηλ. Some of the citizens take part in the administration of the state merely as members of the popular assembly, others merely as judges in the law courts or members of the council; others again in a higher degree by filling various official posts. (Schlosser has strangely mistaken the sense: he thinks that the skill of the cap-
tain, helmsman, helmsman's assistant in the simile answers to the excellence of the man; and the performance of a successful voyage to civic excellence.) SUSEM. (469)

28 ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοιν. the maintenance of the (political) union.

30 πρῶς relative to. Congreve com-

pares I. 13 § 15.
Λείαν τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατά μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι (II) § 4 τὴν τελειαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολύτινῃ ὑπὸ σπουδαίων 35 μὴ κεκτηθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἑυ σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, φανερῶν· ὁμ οὖ μᾶλλα καὶ κατ' ἄλλου τρόπου έστι διαπορώντας ἐπελευθερωμένος ἄνδρα
§ 8 θείν τον αὐτον λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γάρ

33 τὸν δ"... 34 τελειαν omitted by M* P3 Q* T* fr. Ald. and P1-P4 (1st hand, added by corr.3 of P* and in the margin of P*, and there τῆς is also above the line) περὶ omitted by Albert At. (?2) Bk. (who writes κατ' εἶναι κατὰ Γ Bk. 34 τῆς omitted by Bk. and P1 (1st hand, added by corr.), for P4 see above 36 ἄλλα omitted in Fr. 11 (added by p*) σαν Π σεσμπρ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (ἄνδρον) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετὴν of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see 4 § 15=18 n. (491, 492); 17 n. 9-11, nnn. (114 b, 117; 119). Susem., (479)

§ 5 36 ἐπεκτείνω τῷ οὐ περὶ τίνος are separately found: while viii(V), 10, 1 ἐπεκτείνων καὶ περὶ μορφής εἰ ὦ φθείρεται is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with δαιμονίοις: "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state."

But the sense seems to require that ἐπεκτείνω τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ should mean here "to arrive at the same result"; and if so, περὶ might be necessary = "starting from the best constitution" or "from the point of view of the best constitution."

Susem.,

§ 5 37 εἰ γάρ δεδομένον] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike."

But how does this agree with the passages quoted in n. (143) on 11, 2, 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurat p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4-6 § 11; see n. (684) on 18 § 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, § 5 § 5, the arguments περὶ and εἰ had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18 § 1 refers us back, may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4 or in the lacuna at c. 13 § 6 (see Intro. p. 43 ff. n. 599).

But at c. 6 § 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13 § 6 is too near to 18 § 1 to be meant by the words ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction: see § 6 n. (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); § 1 (501).

But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18 § 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18 § 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently vii(vii). 9 § 3, 13 §§ 9, 10, 14 § 8: vi(vii), 7, 2 (nn. 684, 808 and Intro. p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men: and this alone is reasoned out logically (see n. 468). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not..."
all equally virtuous men, but it does affect the much more illogical inference that the inferior citizens of the best state have only civic virtue. On the contrary the degree of civic excellence also must be regulated by that of individual excellence, and the special nature of the one by the special nature of the other; and one consequence of this is that which Aristotle in complete accordance with the facts lays down as a criterion of the best state, viz. that in its administration each is employed according to his special faculties and capacities and assigned to his right place. It may thence be inferred that Aristotle had no intention of permitting all the members of the governing civic body in the pattern state to fill all the various public offices in rotation, but that he assumed that this most virtuous civic body would always elect to particular state offices the fittest and most virtuous of its members. Cp. 11 § 8 n. (560). Consequently it must be allowed that the officers of state in the perfect city do not represent the union of the virtue of the citizen and of the man, as is here stated, but rather that they represent the highest and most perfect degree of this union: and so far from being erroneous it is quite correct to say that Aristotle includes in this polity those who are not yet elected but are still eligible to such a position. Only they do not actually attain a complete confirmation of this highest individual virtue (which is at the same time the highest civic virtue) until they are elected to office: cp. further n. (521) on III. 5. 10. Nor should we forget that at IV(vii). 14. 8 n. (903) Aristotle makes only the virtue of the ruler (πολιτικός καὶ άρχων) equivalent to the virtue of the man: in the best state the rulers are primarily the popular assembly composed of the elder citizens, but in a still higher degree the men selected out of it who are elected to offices of state. Susem. (473) 40 όροιν See n. on II. 2, 3, 1261 a 24. 

§ 8 1277 a 6 έδοθος for instance, like αίσθηα. The first instance that comes to hand.

7 όρεξεις] Appetite, or impulse; here put for the irrational part of the soul in general (Eaton). See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. Susem. (472)

χείς άρχων τε... έδοθον] But these constituents are not all citizens in the sense of the definition given c. I § 2, and yet this alone is material here (Thurot),
In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in n. (504) on III. 5, 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of II. 23: 32 comp. n. (133). See, (473)

§ 7 13 άλλοι άρα, έστι τυχου κτλ.] “Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?”

15 άγαθον και φρονίμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμον, ἀγαθός refers to moral virtue (cp. n. 49). Not in the same way at 11 § 3 we have ἀρετή και φρονίμοι in combination; where ἀρετή is 'virtue' simply, i.e. moral virtue. Cp. n. (565) and n. (709) on 17(VII). 1. 16. On the relation of φρόνιμον (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see nn. (45, 113, 113). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with nn. (493, 497, 498). See, (474)


§ 8 17 ισορροπεῖς] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. See, (476). Mr Wyse finds the reference in P.x: Plato First Alc. 131 d ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.


19 τά κομψά κτλ. παράλληλοι γενοίτο] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἶ δὴ ή αὐτή κτλ.] Far more just is Aristotle’s admission viii(v). 9 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολεμεῖν τού τινι τοῦ πολεμίου (Thur.); Cp. n. (1639). See, (478)

23 τινὸς μὲν τοιοῦτοι "but in a

24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἰσως Ἰάσων ἐφη πεινην ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς (11)
§ 10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἰδιωτής εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ τοῦ τὸν
dύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχισθαι, καὶ πολίτων δοκιμῶν ἥ ἀρετὴ
εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχισθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν
τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικεῖν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀρχεῖν
§ 11 λέγω τὸν ἀμφω, οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἀμφω ἐπαινεῖτα ὁμοίως. ἐπει δὲν
30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ τοῦτο δὲν τῶν ἀρχοντῶν μαν-
θαίνει καὶ τῶν ἀρχικων, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερον ἐπι-

24 ἰσως omitted in P4 (added by the corrector of P3), [sine] Susem.1 τυραννοῖ
P4 and P3 (1st hand, altered by corr.) 26 δοκιμῶν τὗ δοκεῖ ἦ Γίφπανιος, δοκεῖ
μὴ ἦ Ζώγιερ, δοκεῖ πολὺ ἦ Weidlon following Jackson, δοκεῖ αὐτὴ Rassow (ep. § 15, 1277 b 15), δοκεῖ δοκιμῶν ἦ Bernays. On this whole paragraph cp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 382 f. 27 οὖν δὲ? Susem. 29 ἐπει δὲν Schlosser, ἢ Kornes, εἶ μὲν
Rassow, εἰ; Susem. Yet ἐπει may be right, if the lacuna after 32 ἀμφω is much
larger than the mere loss of τοῦτο τὸν σπάσωμεν or something equivalent; or if
Welldon's conjecture below is right 30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ κτλ] apparently corrupt,
Bernays translates as if he read ποτὲ μὲν δοκεῖ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 ποτὲ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ;
ἀποδείξεσθαι δὲ; Susem.2 doubtfully; <ποτὲ> o οὐ ταῦτα Weidlon, much more
probably, if 29 ἐπει is right ἀμφότερα ἦ τῆρα Kornes, ἀμφω ἦ τῆρα Bernays,
highly probable καὶ Susem. 32 ἐν Schlosser [ἐν] Rassow, [καί] Spengel: if so,
tὸν τε in place of τὸν δὲ 33 ἀμφότερα P4:3:4, ἀμφότερον Q̣P̣̣Ṭ̣

specific citizen. The gloss fairly gives the
sense.

24 Ἰάσων] The famous tyrant of
Pherae in Thessaly, who attempted to
carry out a policy in Greece similar to that
afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon.
He came to the throne before B.C. 378
and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius
Hist. iv. pp. 443—451 E. tr. and Krat's
Art. 'Jason of Pherae' in Pauly's Real-
encyclopaedie. Gotting recalls another
saying of his cited by Aristotle Rhet. 1.
113 ποτὲ ἦ 1373 a 25, that he must do some
wrong in order to have the power to do
much right. Susem. (479)

ἐφη] Not ἐφη, as it would be, if
the quotation came from a tragedy.

πεινην... ἰδιωτὴς εἰναι] "he must starve
if he were not on the throne, implying
that he had never learnt the trade of
being a subject." Eaton compares the
saying of Astyges to Harpagos, and of
Demaratos to Leotychides Herod. 1.
129, vi. 67 and what is related of Theras
ib. iv. 147; and Aeschy. Prom. 916; but
in all these cases the point is essentially
different. Susem. (480) Even Grote
is caught mopping here, for he represents
Jason as saying that he felt hunger until
he became despot (II. p. 36 n.).

§ 10 25 ἀλλὰ μὴν... 30 καλῶς] Eaton
comparis Pl. Laws i. 643 E: τὴν πρὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐκ παιδίων παιδείαν, παιδίων
ἐπιμαθήτην τε καὶ ἐμποτὴν τοῦ πολίτην
gεννησθαι τέλειον, ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἀρχισθαι
ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. Susem. (481)
27 εἰ οὖν... 30 οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἀμφω
ἐπαινεῖτα ὁμοίως] "If then we lay down
that the excellence of a good man is that
of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is
that of both," ruling and being ruled,
"they cannot both be equally praise-
worthy." It is the virtue of the good man
which alone is one and perfect. § 3
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνθαματικῶς καθά πλὴν ἀρετὴς
ἐῖναι τὴν τοῖχον. Of civic virtue this is
true only in so far as it denotes the
excellence of rule (here declared to be the
excellence of the citizen), but not in so
far as it is the excellence displayed in
due obedience. This latter then is a
subordinate excellence. Susem. (482)
11 Weidlon, reading 29 ἐπει οὖν
ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ <ποτὲ> οὐ
tαῦτα δὲν κτλ, translates "Since then it
seems that there are some cases where
ruler and subject ought to learn both (rule
and subjection) and other cases where they
ought [each] to learn only one." But this
strains ὡς ταῦτα = μὲν both the same.

24 — 2
πολιτικῶν Γ. 4. [III. 4. 11

στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἁμφοῖν, ** κανέτευθεν ἂν κατάδοι τὸς. (11) ἐστι γὰρ ἀρχῇ δεσποτικὴν ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα 8

34 λέγομεν, ἀ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοῦ ὦν ἀναγκαῖον, (p. 65)

§ 12 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον βάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδίας. λέγω δὲ βάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δὲ ἐκ τινων λέγομεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ γαρ ἐργασία πλείους. ὃν ἐν μέρος κατέχοντοι οἱ χρήσιμοι, οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶ, ὡσπερ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῦναμα αὐτοῖς, οἱ ξώστες ἀπὸ 1077 β τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάριαντος τεχνίτης ἔστιν. διὸ παρ’

ἐνοῖς οὐ μετείχοι οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἁρχόν, πρὶν

§ 13 δομον γενέσθαι τὸν ἐσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἁρχο-9

μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἁγάθον] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ

5 τὸν πολιτικὸν [τὸν ἁγάθον] μανδαίνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν

ἀντί πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν

32 κατέθεν Μ', τοιοῦτον Π' ι. Ar. Bk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture

for κατέθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; ἕττεθεν Kores Rassow

11 [κατ'...] 1177 b 8 ἑλευθέρων] Congreve || 34 λέγομεν & Lambin, λεγόμενα

ΠΠ ι. Ar. || 38 χρησιμοὶ p4 and p4 (corrector) || 39 ἀντὶ p4 (1st hand, emended by a

later hand), αὐτῶν or αὐτὸ Montecatino

1177 b 4 ἁγάθον] ἀρχοῦσα Rassow, [τὸν ἁγάθον] Susem.4, [ἀγαθὸν ὅπε θῶν] Susem.3,

οὕτω πολιτικὸν οὕτω πολιτικὸν τῶν ἁγαθῶν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν τῶν ἁγαθῶν]

Thurow || 5 [τὸν ἁγάθον] Welldon Susem.4, || 6 γαρ ἐρι] γαρ τοι Riese || τοῖς

....7 τοῖς, τοῖς, τοῖς ΠΠ ι. Ar. Bk. Susem.1, cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5

1132 b 37, τοῖς, . τοῖς Lindau, wrongly

32 ** κανέτευθεν κτλ.] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer

omission, we may eke out the sense as follows: “but the citizen’s knowledge and experience of both <is now the question before us,> and may be understood from what follows.” SUSEM. (485)

33 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἀρχῇ δεσποτικῇ] Not ‘despotic’ rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. “For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καὶ = even) to serve in domestic functions.”

τῶν ἀναγκαίων] More clearly expressed

11. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαία: cp. 1. 7

§ 3.

35 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον] Cp. 1. 7

§§ 3, 4, 8 § 1 nn. (63, 69): also Xen. Oecorn. c. 13. SUSEM. (485)

Plato Politic. 255 ο ὦς βασιλεύει διὰ μᾶλλον χρῆσι καὶ ξύσμος τῷ σώματι ἀμέρι ἄρτα

eiτὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἁρχήν δύναται πρὸς τὰ τὴν ψυχήν σώσειν καὶ σώματι.

βατερον δὲ καὶ σώματι


(105, 123) and III. 5 § 4 with n. (507). SUSEM. (486)

1177 b 2 τὸ παλαιὸν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἄρχων 1. 1 § 7.

This was the state of things at Athens under Solon’s constitution.

3 δήμου τῶν ἐσχάτων] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more moderate democracy: see 11. 12. 3 n. (406) and the passages cited in nn. (400, 405). SUSEM. (487)

§ 13 εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρησίμοι κτλ.] “except in certain cases for his private use.”

Comp. IV(VII), 14. 7 with nn. (500, 501) and v(vIII), 2. 6 with n. (983). SUSEM.

(488)

6 οὐ γὰρ ἐρι] for (if he learns them
for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

§ 8 ὠρφον τὸ γένος—his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἄξια in accordance with the soundest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 10 ὑπάρχουσα κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten τάξεις, one from each φυλή (see n. 451), and perhaps themselves called φυλαι. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a τάξαρχος. Each such τάξις was divided into λόγχα or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λόχαρχοι. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἱππαρχοι, and under them were ten φιλαρχοι, one for each tribe. The generals, ὑπαρχοι, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις: but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive political-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the τάξαρχοι were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the ἱππαρχοι: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might carry on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schömann Antiquities p. 420 f., 422, 424 f.


SUSEM. (489) § 12 ἡγεῖται κτλ] Comp. iv(vii). 14. 6 f. n. (898) ff. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in Diog. Laert. i. 60, Stob. Flor. xi. vii. 22 (Eaton), but hardly on good evidence. SUSEM. (490) § 16 τὰ ἀνδρῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κτλ] Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thorotrocks, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle’s view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition: but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, i. 13 §§ 7, 9, 10. n. (114 b, 117, 119) 50 as to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (470). SUSEM. (491)
καὶ εἰ ἐπερεν εἰδὸς σοφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχηγῶς (11)
καὶ [γὰρ] ἀρχηγοῦν μὲν ἄλοθερον δὲ, δήλον ὅτι οὐ μὴ ἀν εἰς τοῦ ἰδίου ἀρετῆς, οἰνον δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ' εἰδὴ
τού έχονσα καθ' ἀ ἄρχει καὶ ἄρχεται, ὀσπερ ἄνδρος καὶ γυν.
§ 17 εἰκὸς ἑτέρα σοφροσύνη καὶ αὐθεντία (δὰ γαρ ἂν ἐναι
dειλος ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἄνδρεως εἰς ὀσπερ γυνη ἀνδρεία, καὶ
gυνῇ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἰς ὀσπερ ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ ἀγα-
thος, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς τοῦ
§ 21 εἰς ἄρχουσα τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦν ἐργον ἑστι) ἦ δὲ φρον-
ησις ἀρχοντος ἑιδὸς ἀρετῆ μονή. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας οἰκο-

18 [γὰρ] Götzling, τότε? Susem., γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Götzling, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἄρμον and a colon after 17 ἀρχηγὸς. See Bonitz Zeitch. f. Gymnasiasten. XXVI. 1872. 893—895, Susem. and Bonitz ib. XXVII. 1873–797; ἀλασος Που Susem. (in the text), ἀλασος Ποι. Βκ., ἀλασος Ποι. Το, ἀλασος Ald. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Sussemlh Quest. crit. coll. p. 389.

17 σωφροσύνης. See n. (266 b) on II. 6. 9. Susem. (492)
19 τού ἰδίου ἀρετῆς. Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on I. 2. 6 n. (40), § 9 (42), § 6 (112), § 18 (115): III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). Susem. (493)
20 δὴ έχουσα κτλ. "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). Susem. (494)
The adoption of Bernay's suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling (and in being ruled). For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the freeman who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἄρ-
χοντος καὶ > ἄρχοντος), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antistas maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφροσύνη II. 11. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant.

23 οὕτω κοσμία. "Only just as frugal," it follows that the differences of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on I. 13 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. Susem. (495)
24 οἰκονομία πήρα. It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. 1. cc. 8—10: see Exc. II. 11. to B. 1. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. Mem. II. 7. 2—14. Oec. 7. 1 (Eaton)." Susem. (496)
25 ή δὲ φρονήσεως. By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (43), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115); III. 4. 7 n. (474–5). Comp. Nic. Eth. VI. 10. 2 ή μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεως ἐπιτυχίας ἐστιν; ή δὲ αἴσθης κρατικὴ μοῖρα; also n. (498): VI. 4. 14 n. (1180), and Khet. I. 11. 27, 1371 β 27, ἀρχον τοῦ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV (VII). 9 5 n. (810). Susem. (497)
§ 18 ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε ὅσι ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρονίμης, ἀλλὰ ἀδίκα ἀληθῆς· ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποίος ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἀρχών αὐλητῆς ὁ χρόμειος, πότερον μὲν οὖν ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄμοδος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίον ἢ ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἢ αὐτῇ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρᾳ, φανερῶ οὖν τούτοις περὶ δὲ τῶν πολίτην ἐτι λειταταί τις τῶν ἁπαρίδων. Ἡ ὡς ἀληθῆς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ὁ κοινομενὸς ἐξ ἐστὶν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τῶν βασιλείσαν τολμᾶσα θετέων; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτον θετέων οἷς μὴ μετεσπυρν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οὖν τε παντὸς εἰναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν (οὕτως γὰρ πολίτης·) εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τοῦ τοιούτου πολίτης, ἐν τοῖς μέρει θε-
§ 2 τέχνος ἐκάστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μετοικὸς οὐδὲ ἔξοι. ἥ διὰ γε τοῦτον (111) τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἀποστο. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀπελευθεροὶ. τούτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετόν πολίτας ὃν ἀνεύ οὐκ ἂν εἶν ἔτις, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ οἱ παῖδες ὁσαντος πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δὲ εἰς ὑποβέσεων πολίται μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν, § 3 ἅλα ἀπελεύθερος, εἰν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοις παρὰ ἐνος ην δοῦλον τὸ βάπτασον ἦ δείκνυο, διότεροι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτοι καὶ άλλοι ή δὲ βελτίστη τόλμη οὐ ποιήσει βάπτασον πολιτίς. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολιτίς, ἀλλὰ πολιτίς ἀρετὴν ην εἰπομενοι τοιούτου στις παντός, οὐδέ ἐπελευθερου οὖν οὖν, ἀλλὰ ἴσοι τῶν ἐρ- § 4 γαν εἰσὶν ἄφεμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαῖοι. τῶν δὲ (ἀναγκαῖοι) οἱ μὲν ἢ 3

39 othe......othe Spengel
1278 a 5 ἐκ προνέθεσις Bas.

ertia in the margin, εκ προνέθεσις Casaubon || 9
tolmhe * * Oncken, wrongly || 11 δὲ [ἀναγκαίοι] Susem.3, δὲ μὴ ἀφεμένοις?

Congreve, δὲ αὐτώρων Schmidt, δὲ <μὴ> [ἀπελευθέρων τῶν> ἀναγκαῖοι or simply δὲ <μὴ> ? Susem., δὲ άλλως Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended
(tων ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

§ 9 ἐκάστος] each native artisan.

"What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as under Solon’s constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (502)

§ 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners). The indispensable elements of a state (ὡς ἀρχεῖ οὐκ ἂν εἶν πιέτο) need not be all citizens.
1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γάρ κτλ] This reason is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves cannot come into the question: while the freedmen were regarded (and with good reason) as a special class of the resident aliens: see Schomann p. 351 of Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself considers them, if the reading is correct, c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the term, in accordance with its etymology μέτοικος denotes only a permanent resident in a town of which he is not a citizen, though he is a citizen somewhere else [cp. Eur. Hel, 895]: and this condition is not fulfilled in the case of the freedmen." (Dittenbergen). SUSEM. (503)
2 τούτο γάρ ἀληθὲς, κτλ] “For this is quite true that not all who are indis-
pensable to the city ought to be classed as citizens.” A very important point for our view of Aristotle’s ideal state: see I.(VII). 8 § 1 ff. n. (798). SUSEM. (504)

4 ἄφεμενοι καὶ] equally with. See on II. 8. 20 ἰδανοῖς καὶ.
5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense: the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up.
6 ἅλα ἀπελεύθερος] "but under age," See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 b). SUSEM. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see Herod. 11. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been ‘learnt’ from them by the Greeks.
8 ἓν δὲ βελτίστη τοῖς Comp. IV.(VII).
9 § 3. § 7. n. (809). SUSEM. (506)
9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης] “But if the artisan too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from mental functions” [including free artisans].

§ 4 II τῶν δὲ [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this see II. 9 § 2 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχεδος, and I. 8. 3, 11. 6. 5): ‘in respect of compulsory work
those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers; or the word "slaughterer" of II. 7 § 23.

12 or to koum Comp. I. 13 § 13: o mén dōlos koimantos zōhē, o de forrrr-terer: o gár bainanous tekhitēs ēphorou-mēn τόv exhe doulēs, with n. (112); I. 11 § 6 n. (103); III. 4 § 12 n. (486).

SUSEM. (507)

13 θηρευτής = ελέεθρων βολ. πείναι ἐπὶ ἀρ- γυρίας doulēs ἔστη Φόλλυκος III. 82.

οφανέων δ’ ἐντεθέν “In what position the artisans stand becomes clear upon slight reflection from the following consideration”; viz. that a variety of ‘citizens’ is implied by c. 1 § 8.

14 αὐτὸ τὸ λεγένοι Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανέω take it as εἶναι φανή; “if seen” (i.e. understood) “even our former statement makes (the matter) clear.” δῦναι ποιεῖν absolutely, as in c. 8 § 6, 1270 b 35; so φανέ- ρων τοιεύχει c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. “Yet in both passages a clause with ἤτοι follows equivalent to substantive” (T. L. Heath).

§ 5 15 καὶ εἴθη πολύντα “There must also be several species of citizens.” See c. I §§ 8–11. SUSEM. (508)

18 οὖν δ’ τῷ ἔστων ἦν κτλ. Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (sec n. 440 on c. I § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (556), § 4 n. (558); c. 13 § 8 n. (593).

SUSEM. (509)

20 οὖ γὰρ οὖν τῇ See again n. (101). SUSEM. (510)

If we grant Aristotle’s premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that “if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good” Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμητάτων μακράν = high property qualifications. Comp. vii.(iv), § 4 § 5 μακράν οὖνιαν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.
Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle commends this regulation vii(vi). 7 § 4, n. (1496), and justly too, as Schlosser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy; on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be ‘flooded’ with alien or upstart elements. Further compare viii(v). 3 § 8 n. (1512). But in Aristotle’s own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights; nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. “In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, Rhet. 1. 7-32, 1366 a 19: but his Politics nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations invariably incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the ‘rough labour’ of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur).” Such people do not lack the indispensable “leisure” which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (βασανία) “at whom the polite world looks askance” (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, Hellen. p. 216, very justly remarks that “no honest observer will deny that there is a moral βασανία which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aristotle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens” of the best state IV(VII). 14 § 7; cp. VII(VIII). 2 § 6 nn. (982 a—3). “And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato’s, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the βασανία. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What ‘society’, thinks of ‘persons in trade,’ not to speak of the ‘lower orders,’ no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle’s. If he shares our prejudices, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of ‘high life’ with which βασανία is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable.” SUSEM. (511)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς Hence ἐγγραφής βίος IV(VII). 9 § 3, δήμος VI(V). 3 § 2, ἄγοραν πλήθους 4 §§ 10, 21 (Eaton).

27 προσεβεβληκται] drags in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Hippocrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demosthenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins.

ὁ γάρ ἐκ πολιτείας] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 a. SUSEM. (512)
§ 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόδους παρὰ ταλαιθῆς. οὐ (III) 30 μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔπει δὲ ἐνδεικνύει τῶν ἡμερῶν πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται πολίταις τῶν τιμώντων (διὰ γὰρ ὄληναν ὑμνίαν ὑπὸ τό κρᾶνται τῶν νόμων), εὐποροῦντες δὲ ὑγιές κατὰ μικρὸν παραμορφοῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρώτον ἢ δουλῆς, εἰτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, § 9 τέλος δὲ μὲν τοὺς εἶ σοφόν ἀστῶν πολίταις ποιοῦνται. ὅτε μὲν 35 οὖν εἴδη πλεῖον πολίτου, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης οἱ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμών, ὡσπέρ καὶ Ὄμηρος ἐποιήσεν ὡς εἴ τινες ἀδίκους μεταφάσονται ὡσπέρ μέτοικος γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὲν μετέχων. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου τὰ τιμώντων ἐπικεκριμένοις ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοικίων ἐστίν.

31 τιμώντων [θᾶ] προ̣ Βεννας (without parentheses) || 32 ἀπορροφοῦσας Γ Μ° || δὲ Συσεμ.2, δ᾽ Π (including fr.) Βκ., untranslated by William Ar., [8] Syllburg Susem.1-2, γ᾽ Συσεμ. || 34 ἀστῶν fr. Perizonius (on Ael. V. H. vi. 10), αὐθε! Γ and all other mss. || 36—40 The right order given only by corr. of P1; 36 ὡσπέρ...38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστιν fr. P1 (1st hand) and P4 (corrector), 37 ἐστιν ἐστιν...38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστιν P2b, Q Ἐρ. Ald. and P4 (1st hand), 38 ὡσπέρ...μετέχων after 40 ἐστιν Γ Μ° || 38 ἐστιν διὸν Βεννας, omitting ἐστιν before 39 ἀπάτης and after συνοικίων; not rightly

29 τῶν νόδων] Under this name we were included not only those children whose mother was not a citizen, but also the children of a citizen mother if she were not lawfully married to the father. The latter were always accounted citizens at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle is only thinking of the former. See Schömann pp. 355—8 Eng. tr. Susem. (513)
§ 8 "But as the admission of such persons to the franchise is due to a dearth of citizens of legitimate birth, as population increases they gradually pare off from the roll of citizens, first, the children of slave fathers or slave mothers."
33 τῶν ἐκ δολοῦ...δουλῆς] See preceding notes. Susem. (514)
ἐτα τῶν ἀπὸ γυναίκων] This remark has been rightly added to show that at Athens even in those times in which the bastard children of citizen fathers became citizens in their turn (n. 516) the children of a citizen mother by a father who was not a citizen were not reckoned citizens. The child followed the status of the father in both cases, although the former case was restricted to the periods in question. See Philippi Contributions to a history of Athenian citizenship p. 64, Schömann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the reference in n. 6, incorrectly given, is to the present passage). Compare too 9

§ 13 n. (558) and VII(vi). § 16 n. (1425). Susem. (518)
34. τόλος δὲ κτλ] This was done at Athens by a law of Pericles about 460 B.C., and by a law of Aristophon in 403: Schömann p. 357 f. Eng. tr. Susem. (518)
§ 9 36 "Ομηρος" Tlial 18. 648, xvi. 59. Susem. (517)
37 "Like some unprivileged outlander," i.e. settler from abroad. But in Homer the meaning of ἀδίκους is probably "without any τιμήν" or blood price attached to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with impunity, rather than "without τιμήν" in the sense of civic privileges (Jackson).
38 ὡσπέρ μέτοικος κτλ] For he who does not share in the privileges (of citizenship) is no better than an alien settled in the place. But where such a principle is disguised, it is for the purpose of deceiving the joint settlers. ἐτα τῶν ἀπὸ γυναίκων i.e. where the poorer citizens and the lower classes of people are nominally eligible (i.e. have not been formally deprived of the right of being elected) to the special offices of state; but precautions are taken by various means to secure that such persons are not easily elected to any of them: cp. vi(vi). 13 §§ 1—4. Susem. (518)
39 τῶν σύνοικοντων] Ridgeway proposes to take this in a narrower sense as
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 5. 1178 b 3 υμὸν μὲν οὖν ἔτεραν ἡ τῆν αὐτὴν <ἀρετήν> θετεύω, καθ᾽ ἣν (111) ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἔστι καὶ πολιτικὴς ἀπουδαιοῦ, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενον, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ’ ἔτερος, κάκεινης δ’ οὖ πᾶς ἀλλ’ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἡ δύναμις μενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἢ μετ’ ἀλλων, τῆς τῶν 6 κυρίων ἑπιμελείας: ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ τὰ ταῦτα σκεπτόντων, πολυτεία μιᾶς θετεύων πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξεως τῶν τε ἀλλων

178 b 1 <ἀρετήν> Schneider Susem. following Ar., ἔτεραν <ἀρετήν> Spengel, less probably, θετοῦν <ἀρετήν> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine 2 εις τῶν εἰρήμενον omitted by II 1 (added in the margin of P1), [ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενον] Susem. 3 <πῶς η ἄνω καὶ πῶς ἔτερα, καὶ ἐκ βασιλείαν καὶ πολιτικήν>, or something similar, Thurot; see however Comm. n. (500) 4 κάκεινης P1 (corr.), κάκεινης Γ M II fr. Ar. Bk. 3 P1 (1st hand) and corr. 1 of P1 (κάκεινης changed to κάκεινης and o again written over η) 5 omitted by II 2 fr. Bk. 6 η η... κυρίων omitted in Q T 1 Ar. Ald. and P 1 (1st hand; added in the margin, but in P 1 again erased) 8 καὶ εἰ II fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M)

'joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an κυρίων': and he quotes in support of this view VIII (v). 3 §§ 11, 12, ἐκ δὲ ὧν ἴδων συνόλων έδεικτο έποικῶν, εἰ πλείους διεσπάσατο αὐτον... ἐν Θεοφιλίῳ ἱσθαραί τοῖς συνοικοβάσισιν. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the συνοικον are really μακάκους.

§ 10 178 b 3 υμὸν μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 n. (471. 8)

SUSEM. (929)

τινὸς δ’ ἔτερος The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the deprived forms of government; viz. 1 the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (διανοαί), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master’s rule (δικαίωσιν) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. SUSEM. (520)

4 κάκεινης δ’ οὖ πᾶς “And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over the public administration.”

5 ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἢ μετ’ ἀλλων] This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an “absolute monarchy” under the pre-eminently best citizen; see cc. 13, 17.

SUSEM. (921)


§ 1 9 πολιτεία an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. “Comp. c. 1 § 1 ἡ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης τάξις ται ζητ. VIII (v). 1 § 10 τινὰ τὰς πόλεως ἢ περί ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τίνα τρόπον νεώνυμαίς, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τί το κύριον της πολιτείας, καὶ τί το κύριον ἐξακολουθία της κυριαρχίας ἐπιστ. 3 § 5 with notes.” SUSEM. (922)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that constitution is not a term wide enough to express politeia, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the “form” of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3, 5 μικροποιίς) its identity. “An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one
The text is a page from a Greek philosophical work, discussing the relationship between the ruling class and the governing class. The text contains references to Aristotle and other philosophers, and discusses the concept of democracy and oligarchy. The page contains a paragraph discussing the distinction between the 'ruling class' and the 'government', and how this distinction may be superior to another. The text includes footnotes and references to other works, including those of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers. The page is well-organized and structured, with clear margins and page numbers indicating it is part of a larger work.
Αλλά μὴν καὶ τὴς ἁρχῆς τῶν λεγομένων τρόπους μαθῶν, διὸ διελεύσαν ἡγεμόνας καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ οὗτων ἐλέγχοις λόγοις διοικήθη πρὸς αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ διεστοπείᾳ, καὶ περὶ ὄντος καὶ ἀλήθειας τὸ τέσσερις δοῦλοι καὶ τὸ 

Σεμπελ | 26 καὶ συνέχουσαν ἑξατέρῳ: "καὶ τὸν πολλούς μὲν ἑξεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV) καὶ συνέχουσαν τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. Ἰσοσ ὡς ἡπειράτω τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἃ διπλάνη λίκνην. δὴ δὲ ὡς καρπέροροι πολλὶκες κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοί τῶν αὐθαρίστων γηγομένῳ τοῦ ἡπειρᾶτο μὲν ἑξεκεν, ἵνα ὡς ἐνιόμενος τινὸς εὑρήσῃς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑλικῆτες φυσικῆς.

§ 6 ρήματα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ διεστοπείᾳ, καὶ περὶ ὄντος καὶ αἰτήσεις τῷ τοῦ δόμου καὶ τῷ

Σεμπελ | 35 φασὶ περὶ διεστοπείᾳ ταύτῳ συμφέροντος, ὡς ἀρχηγὸς πρὸς τό τε διεστοπείᾳ συμφέροντος οὖν ἢ ἤττο, πρὸς τό του διεστοπείᾳ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (όν γὰρ ἐνδεχεστι λόγοι που διεστοπείαι) ἢ δὲ τέκνων ἁρχὴ καὶ γυναικοῖς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ἢ δὲ καλοῦνες ἐκοιμημένης, ἢ δὲ καλοὶ καὶ ἐκοιμημένοι οἱ ἐκοιμημένοι. οἱ ἐκοιμημένοι: Susem. § 31. γεῖς ἔνας μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν συμβεβηκός, ὡς πρὸς τό του διεστοπείᾳ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (όν γὰρ ἐνδεχεστι λόγοι που διεστοπείαι) ἢ δὲ τέκνων ἁρχὴ καὶ γυναικοῖς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ἢ δὲ καλοῖς καὶ ἐκοιμημένοι; Susem., οἱ ἐκοιμημένοι: Susem.

§ 4. 25 χωρίς] to each separate individual. 


Σεμπελ | 27 κατὰ τῷ ἔθετι] in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 38 κατὰ τῷ βίου. 

Σεμπελ | 28 μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς καλαί] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man's true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5. 31 τῶν λεγομένων τρόπων] Bonitz: the usual modes, Ind. Ar. 424 b. 4: i.e. the modes (usually) stated [ἐρρ. κατὰ εὐθείας τῶν εὐθείας λέγεται (Met. t. 9 § 11). But what we require is 'all the possible modes,' and so Bernays 'the modes in question.' This is supported by τοῦ λεγομένου t. 1. 1 § 3. τοῦ λεγομένου διαφραγμά 4 § 4. The modes of government in question—the modes of governing men. But even so we should rather expect τὰς λεγομένας ἀρχὰς τῶν τρόπων, see Critical Notes and Θ. 1. 4. § 5. Susem. (327).

Σεμπελ | 32 διελεύσαν] distinguish. Comp. 11. 2 § 1 n. ἢ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦ] See Excursus 1. to B. IV (vii). Susem. (527 b) διορισμένοι not necessarily of accretive distinction.

§ 6. 33 μὴ μὲν γὰρ διεστοπείᾳ] See 1. 2. 3 n. (71), 1. 6 § 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side 1. 4. § 5. Susem. (529)

Σεμπελ | 35 μὴν ὡς ἀρχὴς. Nevertheless the slave-owner's rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) 'to the interest of the slave.'

Σεμπελ | 36 οὐκ ἔτην ἄνθρωπον] μάλλον, predominately.

Σεμπελ | 37 φθειρόμενο] while the slave is becoming useless, spoilt.

§ 7. 39 καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης] This
40 ήτοι τῶν ἄρχομένων χάριν ἐστίν ἡ <ei> κοινῷ τινὸς ἄμφωι, (IV) καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἄρχομένων, ὡς ὀρισχεὶ καὶ τὸς ἄλλα
179 a τέχνας, οἷον ἅτρηκν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός
δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν εἴη. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοιλύῃ τῶν παιδοτριβήν ἕνα
τῶν γυμνασμένων ἐνίοτε εἰσὶ καὶ αὐτῶν, ὡςπέρ ὁ κύκερ-
§ 8 μίσης εἰς ἕστιν ἄρετετροι τῶν πλωτήρων' ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτριβή (§ 61)
5 ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἄρχομένων ἀγαθῶν, ὡς δὲ
tοῦτον εἶν ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτῶς, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει
τῆς ὕστεραν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὡς δὲ τῶν γυμνασμένω-
§ 9 νων εἶς γνώτεται παιδοτριβής οὖν, διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς
ἀρχικας, ὅταν ὡς κατ' ἱστοτήτα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκίᾳ καὶ

40 έτει τοῦ Άστου Lindau || <ei> Susem., fr. omits ὡς <ei> || 41 αὐτὸν II fr. Bk.
179 a 1 <i>ατρηκνεῖ> ὑπερετέρ Lindau || 2 [ἑα] Susem.2 mistaking William's
version, εἶναι II omitting 3 εἰναι || 6 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς P4 Qb Tο || 7 φύλεται]
ἀφαλείας Qb Tο Ald. and P4 (1st hand) || 8 δια...τὸ ὀμοίωτα probably quite
sound: * * * did Conring, ἄνω...συνετηκίᾳ Αρ. Rameus, τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς
Spengel, Schlosser thought τοῖς had been dropped, ὀμοίωτα <ἡ πολιτεία> Schnei-
der, but if the word has been lost it would be more likely to drop out after ἀρχι-

addition appears contradictory and un-
Aristotelian: for it would include once
more the rule of a master over his slaves
to which the rule in question is held to
be opposed. Nor are the words ἡν δὲ
cαλοῦν ἀκεραιωμένοι free from suspi-
cion, for the rule of the householder again
includes a rule over slaves. We must
therefore understand ἀκεραιωμένοι in
a narrower and more special sense 'em-
phatically' (as Congreve says) to mean
the rule of the householder over the free
members of his family as contrasted with
his rule over slaves 1. 13 §§ 1, 2. But
even then it is very doubtful whether
ἀκεραιωμένοι and διαιτητική can be so
opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by
1. 1. 2. Susem. (829)
40 ήτοι τῶν ἄρχομένων χάριν Comp.
tο ἀκεραιωμένοι δίκαιον N. E. ν. 6, 9
and Jackson's n.

But in the state this good of
the subjects ruled, and common good
of rulers and subjects, consists in the
'end' of the state mentioned, or rather
recalled to our memory, in §§ 3—5 viz.
the highest possible life, εἰ γὰρ. This
is the reason why the recapitulation of
the facts in §§ 3—5, οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι, had to
be prefixed to this passage. Susem.
(830)
καθ' αὐτῷ μὲν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός
§ 61] essentially...incidentally.
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. P. I.
Politicalis 197 ε.: εἰς δὴ τὰς εἴκοσι ἐπανω-
μεν τάξιν, αἷς ἄνθρωπον ἀνεπίλητον αἰ
tov βουνος ἄρχοντας...τῶν γεννών
κυβερνήτην καὶ τῶν ἔτοιμων πολλῶν ἀρ-
tάξεις ιατρῶν (Eaton): and earlier still,
Socrates Xen. Memorab. III. 9. 11
(Honkell). See further below c. 15 § 4
n. (638), c. 16 §§ 6—8; 14 (vii). 2 14 n.
(726), 13 §§ 2 n. (870); and above II.
8. 18 n. (170). Susem. (531)
179 a 2 αὐτῶν] i.e. αὐτῶν τῶν
ἀρχώντων, cp. n. on l. 6, 6 αὐτῶν.
With this summary justification of
διαιτητική (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in Ἐρ.
190 D 1: ἦν καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος (ὅ ἄλλῃς φύσιν
ἐξω) τὸ τῶν βελτίστων εἴδος ὑπὸ ὀμοῖον
ἀρχηγόν ὡσπερ ὁ βελτίστος, διώκετο αὐτὸν
φαινει δὲν εἰσὶ τοῖς βελτίστοις, ἐξουσίων
ἐν αὐτῶ τῷ θεῖον ἀρχηγόν, εἰς ἐπὶ
βάλητί τοῦ διότι δὲν αἴρεται δὲν ἀρχηγεῖται
αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ θεραπεύουσα ὢστε τοῖς ἄρχο-
μένοις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμείνον ἐν παλιν ὑπὸ
θείου καὶ φυσικοῦ ἀρχηγείου, μάλιστα μὲν
οικεῖον ἔχουσιν αὐτῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, εξουσί
ἀρχηγηθότων.
§ 8 7 δὲ μὲν, sc. καὶ κυβερνήτῃς, πλωτήρ
(.gamma). § 9 8 διὸ κτλ.] "Hence too with
civic offices, when the city is framed upon
the equality and similarity of the citizens,
their claim is to hold office in turn." 9
ὅταν ὡς κατ' ἱστοτήτα...καὶ καθ' ἱστο-
τηταποταμά ὡς ἐξ ἕνωσι καὶ ὀμοῖοι sc. ή
τόλμη, supplied from πολιτικάς.
"Although this is the case not only in
Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Polities, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSEM. (532)

10. [Próteorôn...nai] "In early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after his: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterrupted; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would have doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11. [Leitourγητι] of the onerous task of the magistrate e.g. in old Athens: manus publicum dam gerit, comedio civium inservit cum damno etiam rei familiaris.

12 and 13. [Aútou] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. 11. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where διὰ τὸ τὴν φόβον ἄνων εἶναι πάντας rechoes the ἡ πέρον of the text here) and 11. § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτική, even if his essential identity with βασιλικὸς be assumed.

15. [Ov on el...oχραῖα] Comp. Isocr. vii. (Pimpocritus) 24, 25: αὐτοῖς δὲ ἐν τῷ μῆνει περιμαχῆσθων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, δόμοις μεριδιώκοντος ἑρμηνεύονται καὶ φειδέονται, καὶ ρήματα δημοσία τὰ σφέτερ αὐτῶν διαλέκτων. Διὰ ἐκ τῶν ἔκτατον ἑπαρχιῶν, τὸν ποτὲ βέβαιαν, τὸν κοινῶν ἑπαρχῶν, ὁπῶς δ᾽ ἄπειροχότο γαρ ἀνακάμαμα τὴν τῷ πόλει, ὡστε ἀρχεύοντας ἤν τὸ ἐκεῖνο τῶν χρόνων εἰρήνη τῶν μεξικομένων ἄρχων ἢ τῶν τῶν μεξικομένων ὄχρως ἀνακάμαμα ἄλλα λειτουργῆσαι ἀνέμενον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. SUSEM. (532b)

17. [Kouνη...sphērōn] This is τὸ δίκαιον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

20. [Orðal] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the Politicus Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 b τίς ὁ δὲ τῶν ὑστ. ἀρχῶν τοῦτων ἡκατέρα ἀρχὴ αὐτὴ, πῶς ἄρχουσιν ὑπόσχοντας τῶν ἐξεσθησάς, ἢ, 302 c. What Aristotle calls ὁρᾶτι, are the κοινωνία καὶ ἑνεκὼν ἡ τοῦ Politicus, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παρεκβάσεις of Plato.

Κατὰ τὸ ἄτατον δίκαιον. As opposed to τὸ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν.

20. [Sphērōn] explained by τῶν ἀρχῶν = τὸ σφέτερ αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, e.g. iv. 114, viii. 46.

20. [Parekβάσεις] 'perversions'; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb parekbainai is both intrans. and trans. = to violate, e.g. vii. (v). 10. 5. The noun = error in Metaph. xiv (N). 2 § 13, 108, b. 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62. 13, and so Nic. Eth. i. 5. 1.
III. 7. 3] 1279 a 10—1279 a 35.

385
despotica] γαρ, ἣ δὲ πόλεις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθερῶν ἑτέρων, (IV)
7 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενων ἑστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπὶ
σκέψασθαι, τόσαι τόν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσι, καὶ πρὸ-
41 τινος τῶν ὀρθῶν αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἐστοιν
§ 2 φανερὰ τούτων διωρισθείσων. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ
πολιτεία σημαίνει ταύτων, πολιτεία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον
πολέμων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἥ ἢνα ἡ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς
πολλοὺς· ὅταν μὲν οὐ εἰσὶ οἱ ὀλίγοι οἱ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοι-
νὸν συμφέρον ἄρχοντα, ταῦτα μὲν ὀρθά ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἱδίον ἢ τὸν ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλ-
γον ἢ τῶν πλῆθους παρεκβάσεις. ἡ γὰρ ὑπὸ πολιτείας φατέων
εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δὲι κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
§ 3 καλεῖ δ' εἰσδίωμα τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τῆς πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν
35 πλεῖστον δὲ ἐνῶσι αὐτοκρατιᾶν (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριστότοὺς ἄρ-

25 δὲ) [ἡ Weilc] || τὸ ἹΠ fr. (omitted by HΠ Bk.) || 37 ὀλίγων Η Μ' fr. 33 <μὴ> μετέχοντας Bernays || 34 τῶν omitted by M' Π[τώ] || ὀλίγων] [omitted] fr.

21 despotikal] like the sway of master over slaves.
cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 1) Threefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (a) one man, (b) a few, or (c) the many, are supreme.
§ 2 23 πολείς τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τίνες εἰσι?] See Excursus 1. to B. III. 1. p. 447 ff.
SUSEM. (533)
§ 2 35 ἐπὶ καὶ καὶ See Exc. 6 § 1 n. (513): also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (534)
26 σημαίνει ταύτων] For constitution we may substitute ‘ruling body.’
πολιτεία δ' ἢ ταῦτα τῶν πόλεων] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or ‘sovereignty’ lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the polity includes the sovereign, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.
27 ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς.] But as early as § 4 it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive: see nn. (538), 540, 543. SUSEM. (535)

28 ὅταν...πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχοντα] But how, a Platonist might ask, can they so govern, unless they have knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?
32 τοὺς μετέχοντας] sc. τῆς πόλεως. They may still be indispensable elements, e. c. § 2 ἢ χαιρὸν οὖν ἢ τοὺς πόλεις.
35 ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριστότοὺς ἄρχοντα] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, u. (386) on II. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: II. 6 § 16 n. (218), 9 § 29 (320), 11 § 5 ff. (380); III. 5 § 5 (593), 13 § 8 (593), 15 § 10

25
...
III. 8. 2] 1279 a 36—1279 b 17.

§ 5 αυτής οἶκε καθεμισέν τὰ ὀπλα. παρεκβίασε δὲ τῶν εἰρήνη ἄμεν τῶν τυραννίσκων μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίσκων ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἢ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπρόσωπων, ἢ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν ἀπέρων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λυστελοῦν ὑπὸ δέμα αὐτῶν.

§ 8 δεὶ δὲ μικρὸ διὰ μακρότερον εἰσέσχεν τὴς ἐκάστης τοῦ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστὶ καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τῶν ἀποριῶν, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντο καὶ μὴ μένοι ἀποβιβλέποντες πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορμῶν μηδὲ τὶ καταλείπεις, ἀλλὰ ὑπῆκοι τῇ περὶ ἐκάστου ἀλήθειας.

§ 2 ἔστι τὰ τυραννίσκων μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κυριαρχεῖ.

1279 b 6 ὁν possibly Π, ἐντὸς William || 13 ἐκατον (or ἐκάτον) μεθόδος? Koraes || μῆδε? Schneider, perhaps rightly if 15 τι, which is not in Π Λ, should be omitted || 16 διὰ ή γὰρ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || διεσπαστικὴ? Syllburg

Immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unobserved found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For them in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely picities but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding ῥωμαικαρία in Plato’s Republic (Excursus 1), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristoteles himself later on, vii(v). 8 §§ 1, 2, n. (1239). Comp. Zeller ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. n. (535). SUSEM. (538).

§ 5 6 ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίσκων] Earlier still Thucydides, i. 17, accusses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539).

7 ἢ ἄλλως δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέπρεπων] Here then the numerical standard completely disappears, see nn. (535, 538): as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See n. (544). SUSEM. (540).

c. 8 § 11 12 δὲ δὲ... ἐστὶν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the Politics, except bk. viii(v), has no other object. SUSEM. (541).

12 τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι] Comp. c. 13 § 14 n. (601), vii(vii), 15 § 4 n. (1250); also Introd. p. 70 f. SUSEM. (542).

Further see vii(v). 10. 1, vi(viii), 3, 12. Here μέθοδος—branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in ii. 1 § 2 (a nearer parallel is Nic. Eth. i. 1 § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11). 14 ἀποβιβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πρῶταν] But in Nic. Ethicis this is the supreme end of theory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα πράξει, ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ εἰλομένα τὸ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἄλλα δὲ ἀγαθὸν γινώμεθα.

μὴ παρορμῶν μὴδὲ τὶ καταλείπεις] “not to overlook or omit anything.” Cf. De Part. Animal. i. 5 § 4, 645 a 5, μὴ δὲν παραλαμβάνεις ἐλ αἰσθητῶν μὴ ἰκτίστων μὴ τιμώμερον.

§ 2 16 διεσπαστικὴ κτλ] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 8.

19 τής πολιτείας οἱ τὰς υστέρας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V) τῶν διοικήσεων δακρωνοσ σεμιναρίου.
§ 3 πρώτη τ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διοικησμὸν ἐστιν, εἰ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πλείους ὑποτελεῖν κύριον τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐστιν ὅταν ἡ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὑμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν ἐπὶ ποὺ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττως μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐπιφάνειας, κρειττον δ' ὑπότευς κύριοι εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπως ὁ ὁλόγος κύριος τὸ πλῆθος, διαλεγαζόμενοι εἶναι φανέρως ὅπως ἄν καλὸς δοξεῖν
§ 4 διώρισθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν <ἐί> τις συμβ. δὲ 

18 υστέρας] property (in plural).
§ 3 πρώτη τ' ἀπορία) "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀπορίας affects τὸ διακόνον (Wysc.).
§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of vii(vi), 4 § 6 οἱ εἰλθήγοροι καὶ ἀπόροι πλείους ὑπετέ, οἱ πλαῦσυς καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ἐλάττως ὑπετέ.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?
§ 6 § 4 διάκοποι τοιοῦ κτλ.) "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [p. e. § 1 πε] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ πάντων οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὸ μεταξὶ τινῶν ὑμικομένων. So in 1. 1. 2, 11, 7. 4. ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.
§ 38 διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὸς ἑνεστὰς αὑτοῦ γίνεσθαι διαφοράς] A διαφορά or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (διάφοροι) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether
§ 7 ἐπήθειας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς), ὥς δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἦ τε (V)
40 δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὁλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενίᾳ καὶ πλούσιοι
ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαίων μὲν, ὅπως ἂν ἄρχον ἄλλοι πλούσιοι ἂν
τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείονες, εἶναι ταύτην ὁλιγαρχίαν, ὅπως
§ 8 δὲ οἱ ἄπειροι, δημοκρατία, ἀλλα τιμὶς ὑπαινεῖ, καθὼς ἐπιτε
μεν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλλούς εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εὐποροῦσιν
μὲν γὰρ ἀλλού, τῆς δὲ ὑπερβολῆς μετέχουσι πάντες· δ' ὡς
αἰτίας ἀμφιμέτρητοι ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.
39 διαφοράς Γ', accepted by Koræs Bk. Bernays etc. Then aīrias is predicate and
πολιτείας must be understood with ρηθείας or else inserted; thus ρηθείας <πολι
τείας> Bernays: ρηθείας <άρτος> Koræs wrongly, see Quast. crit. coll. p. 391 f.
1280 α 6 πολιτείας ** Conring, perhaps rightly; a transitional clause is needed
aīrias goes with τὰς ρηθείας, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we
expect ἡ δὲ aīrias aīrias, as §§ 8, 8δ' ὡς aīrias. "And for this reason too it
follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the
reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise
Bernays (without inserting δ', but making aīrias διαφοράς the predicate):
"it follows that the constitutions mentioned, τὰς ρηθείας ἢ πολιτείας, are not
causes of specific difference."
Although from distinct points of view
various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of
government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the
rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are
traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain
state of equilibrium or relative prepon
derance amongst the competing social
elements. See Intro. pp. 60 ff., 63; c.
7 § 1 n. c. 2 § 10—13, VII (iv). 9 §
10, 11 §§ 9—11, 13 §§ 10, 11, VIII (v), 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley
Hellenica p. 225 f.
§ 7 1280 a 1 ὡς τὰ ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείονες Here is a plain statement that
any government whatever by the rich
majority would be an oligarchy, any
whatever by the needy minority a democ
racy. Yet the writer of the interpolated
passage VI (iv), cc. 3, 4 has failed to
understand this: see n. (164) and VII (iv).
§ § 5 δ' ὡς aīrias 'on which
grounds both parties claim to be citizens',
viz. in an oligarchy because they are
wealthy, in a democracy because they are
free-born.
§ 9 Right, or justice, in an oligarchy
and in a democracy: their conflicting
claims judged by the standard of perfect
justice.
Oncken i. pp. 30—33 has treated this
chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's
analytical method.
§ 7 Properly ὄροι = definitions, like
ὅρωμοι. Better, standards or determining
principles; that which gives its special
character to Oligarchy or Democracy:
τὸ δ' ὁ λαὸς τῆς χρήσεως τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας (VII (v), 9 §§ 14.
The word was so used by Plato Rep. VIII
554 c (comp. 562 b 3 πρῶτην ἀγαθόν, καὶ
δ' ἡ ὁλιγαρχία καθίσταται ὑπερπολούμενος,
... τὸ δημοκρατία ὄρισε ἀγαθόν = ὑπερ
πολλά). We have had it before II. 6 §§ 9, 9
§ 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the
sequel. Grant's argument Ethics i. p. 61
f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the
interval between writing the Ethics and
the Politics, is disproved by its occurrence
in the Republic.
All the various elements of the city
distribute something in virtue of which
they claim a share of political privilege.
The predominant element (7 § 3) or class
fixes its own contribution as the qualification
for citizenship, or standard. This
again may be viewed as the end which
the citizens pursue.
§ 8 Τὸ τὸ δικαίον τὸ τὰ ὁλιγαρχικὰ κτῆμα
The state is a realisation of distributive
justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, καριν \(\delta\alpha\iota\lambda\nu\iota\) ναιν: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as wealth or free birth in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 παντες] Here again ἀμφότεροι might be expected. Comp. II. 11 § 5 n. (382) and Ἀριστ. II. 9 § 3 ἀποκριμον ἡμιαν δι’ ὑπάρχουσιν = all who are envious or righteously indignant, ‘both classes’ (Shilleto).

[ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 9.
[III. 9. 1]

10 καὶ λόγους οὐ πάντως κτλ.] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οὐδ᾿ ὑποκείται κτλ.] ‘Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.’ They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2 14 οἰς δὲ τοῦτον ἀφαιροῦσθαι κακώς] But they omit the qualification for whom equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 ἀρσενοκοιταζων κτλ.] Ἀριστ. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστε ἀπελέξαι κτλ.] ‘Hence since right means ‘right for given persons,’ and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to.’

18 ἐν τοῖς ἰδιοις] Ὀ. Ε. B. v. c. 3 (Bekker’s c. 6) esp. §§ 4–6, § 10 διηρήτουσι γὰρ ὅσον οὐ τῇ καὶ αὐτῇ. Comp. n. (584), also viii(V). 1. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant Ethics i. p. 53, but see Jackson’s commentary on B. v. p. 77–81.

Τὸ χάθημα τοῦ πράγματος κτλ.] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

“This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. viii(V). 1. 2 f. n. (1493).” SUSEM. (546)
III. 9. 6] 1280 a 9—1280 a 35.

30 μᾶλλοντα μὲν διὰ τὸ λέγειν ὑπότε, διὰτε κρίνοντα τὰ περὶ (V) αὐτοῦ κακῶς, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινός ἐκατέρ

§ 4 ους δικαιῶν τι νομίζουσι δικαιῶν λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἀν κατὰ τὶ ἄνευ ὑπότε, ὅλων χρήσιμως, ὅλως οίσονται ἀνε

§ 24 οὐ εἶναι, αὐ ἀν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι, ὅλων ὀλυθερίας, ὅλως

§ 6 ἱσοί, τὸ δὲ κυριωτάτου ὀν λέγονται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτῆτο 10 μάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνήσαν καὶ συνήλθαν, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τὰς πόλεος ἃνων περὶ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσ' ὁ τῶν ἀλι

γαρχικῶν λόγος δοξεῖν ἀν ἵσις εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δικαιῶν ἵσις μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατό τελάντων τῶν εἰσενεχόντα μίας μνή 

30 τοῦ διὰ τοῦ λιοτύ πάν, ὡστε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀστὶ τῶν ἐπιγνω

§ 6 μένων): εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζην ἑνεκεν μόνων ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ

ἐν ζην (καὶ γὰρ ἀν δοῖλω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζην ἡν το

λις) νόν ὅ ὁν ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδε

τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἑνεκεν, ὅπως

35 ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἄδικονται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγάς καὶ τὴν

22 μεταγραφής <τά>: δίκαιον Spengel, perhaps rightly || 24 ὀλυθερία Vettori, ὀλυθερία (or ἄτο) Γ Ά, ὀλυθερία M4, ὀλυθερία II fr. (the first iota above the line), ὀλυθερία P4 || 27 ἀλιγαρχία P4 Q4 T4b || 29 ταλάντων Γ μνῆς II (including fr.) || 31 μνῆς P4 fr., omitted by P1 (1st hand, added by corr. in the margin) || 34 ὀλυθερία M4 P4.

21 μέχρι τινός See on § 1 above. 'Because each side contends for a partial justice, but thinks it is contending for an absolute justice.'

§§ 22 ὀλυθερία κτλ] Comp. c. 12 § 2, and VIII (V). § 2 l. mm. (584 b, 1493). SUSEM. (546b).

25 κυριωτάτων] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 5 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι κτλ] 'they have a state in the city proportionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλάντων] A talent = 4715 German marks = £231 3s. 6d., a mina = 78s. 6d.

Applies: Hultsch Greek and Roman Metrology p. 171 f. SUSEM. (547).

30 οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς...ἐγνωμονέα] 'ought not to have an equal share of the principal nor of the profits accruing.'

Congreve however suggests that the participle may be masculine, and so Bernays, with a different sense: 'either of those who originally contributed or of a subsequent generation of shareholders.' This can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 τοῦ δ' ὀλυθερία κτλ ] Comp. 1.

2, 8 and the further passages cited in n. (21). Also Nic. Eth. x. 6, 8, 1177 a 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οἶδες ἀνθρώπῳ μεταβίβασιν, εἰ μὲν καὶ βλαν, and x. 7, 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, ἐντὸς σχολ. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated Pol. iv (VII). 15, 2 (Eatont). Cp. too mm. (925, 926) at that passage. SUSEM. (548).

35 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγάς καὶ τῆς χρήσεως κτλ] "for commerce and mutual intercourse." Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse: viz. περὶ τῆς ἀρτικάς καὶ χαίρεις διασώσων, §§ 8. Thereupon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential though indispensable conditions (κοινωνία τόνον, περὶ τᾶς μεταβολῆς, §§ 9—12); and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, § 13, from which
the real measure of political rights is a deduction or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα = a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier u. Schönmann Attisch. Proces p. 474 n. 49. Here συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν are commercial treaties in general: σύμβολα = special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

30 Ἀρχαὶ πάντων ἐπὶ τοὺς κοιναὶ ἕναν ἄρχον. This maritime alliance between Carthage and the Etruscans, which formed soon after the beginning of the sixth century, B. C., to drive out the Greeks and keep them away from the western half of the Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus i. 106, Mommsen i. p. 153 Eng. tr. Susen. (549)

4 οἴσι σύμβολα] Comp. c. i. § 41 n. (436). Susen. (550)

οὐ] as it were, like σωτήρ.

§ 38 συνθήκαι...σύμβολα...γραφαὶ] Usually συνθήκαι = a general term for a treaty or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα = a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier u. Schönmann Attisch. Proces p. 474 n. 49. Here συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν are commercial treaties in general: σύμβολα = special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

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δει περὶ άρετὸς ἐπιμελείς εἰναι τῇ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἑσομασφαιρομένη (V) μένῃ πόλει, μὴ λόγον χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τότε διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεούν τε συμμαχικῶν, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιτής, ἐγγυτής ἀλλήλων τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ’ (9. 27) § 9 οὐχ οἴσι ποιεῖν ἁγαθοὺς καὶ δικαιοῦν τοὺς πολιτάς. ὅτι δὲ τούτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων, φανερῶν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγαγό τοὺς τότες εἰς ἑν, ὅπερ ἀπεσταλμόν την Μεγαρίδαν τόλμη καὶ 15 Κορινθίου τοὺς τείχες, ὄμος ὡς μία πόλης. οὔ’ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιμαζάτω ποιήσατο, καίτοι τούτο τῶν ἔνδοι ταῖς

7 ἐπιμελεῖς ἐνέβαλαν Π’, ἔπεμε Μ’ [including fr.] Ar. Bk. II 13 συγγρ. Π’ Bk.

7 ἐπιμελεῖς εἶναι κτάλ] "the city which truly and not in mere pretence deserves the name must give its attention to virtue."

See A. C. Bradley Hellenica pp. 193 f.

8 γίνεται κτάλ] For else the society is transformed into an alliance differing from all other leagues, whose members dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too is transformed into a compact and 'a guarantee of mutual rights' in the words of Lycephon, not calculated to make the citizens virtuous and just.

10 Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιτής] See Exc. II to B. II p. 333 and Introd. p. 35.

To all appearance Lycephon belonged to the school of Gorgias (n. 448) perhaps, as v. Wilanowitz conjectures Hermes XIV. p. 173, he was the same as the erotic poet Lycofronides (Bergk Poet. Lyr. III. 1. p. 653 ff.). He is specially known to us elsewhere only as the composer of an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining that one thing cannot at the same time be many and that therefore every combination of a predicate with the subject by means of the copula is inadmissible: also that nobility is only an imaginary good.

Comp. Vahlen The Sophist Lycephon in Rhein. Mus. xx. 1865, p. 143 ff., Zeller Pre-Socrates vol. II. pp. 425, 477. Esg. tr. A sophist was originally any man of intellectual importance, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart it to others: hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (ἐνμάζονες), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing; in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifogging quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved: although the movement towards freethinking and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. n. (31) on I. 3 § 4-4. SUSEM. (552)


§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Laconian party. See Xen. Helen. IV. 4 § 6 αἱ ἁγαθομυκῆς δὲ ἁρπαγημένη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὅτου ἀναποθαυμα καὶ Ἀργος ἀντὶ Καρυάτου τὴν παρθένα ἅπατος ἀνωμαλήτου: v. 1 § 34, § 36.

16 ἐπιμαζάτω] Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers or to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

[...A negative 'enlightenment' or 'illumination, Aufklärung.'...]

1280 a 36—1280 b 16.
§ 10 τολεσί κοινονιματών ἔστιν. ὑμιοί δὲ οὖθ' εἰ τινες οἰκοιν (V) χωρίς μέν, µή µέντοι τοιοῦτον ἀποθεόν ὡστε µή κοινονίαν, ἀλλα εἴησαν αὐτῶς νόμοι του µή σφας αὐτῶς ἀδικεῖν περὶ τῶν µεταδόσεων, οὖν εἰ ὃ µέν εἰη τέκτων ὃ δὲ γεωργὸς ὃ δὲ σκυτοῦσοµος ὃ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰν µέριοι, µή µέντοι κοινονικοὶ ἄλλου µηδενὸς ἡ τῶν τοιοῦτων, οἷον ἄλλαγις καὶ συµµαχίας, οὗτος οὖτο ποὺ τόλις. διὰ τά κύρια δὴ τοῦτο αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ µὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνελθοῦν οὖτοι κοινονικοῦντες, ἐκαστος µέντοι χρῆτο τῇ ιδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὁπλείς καὶ σφίστα αὐτῶς ὅσ' ἐπιµαχίας οὐσὶς βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τούς αἰδοίκους µόνον, οὗτος οὖτος ἄν εἶναι δῷξαι τόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰ-§ 12 περ ὁµοίων ὁµιλοῦν συνελθοῦντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοινῦντιν ὃ τι οὐκ ἦστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπον καὶ τοῦ µή ἀδικεῖν σφας αὐτῶς καὶ τῆς µεταδόσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν ἀναγκαῖοι υπάρχειν, εἰπτε ἦσται πόλις, οὗ µὴν οὖθ' υπάρχοντων.

18 ἀποθεοῦ fr. Bk. 2, ἀποθεοῦ II Bk. 1 || 19 εἰσείρῃ Γ 4 Ατ., εἰ ἐσάρῃ Γ Μ Π II 3 || 20 εἰ.
omitted by Π 11 21 µέρος Ald. Bk. 1 || 23 ποι Ἀτ. (apparently) and Bk., ποι possibly Γ (quidem William), που II (including fr.) Susem. 1 || 30 ὡς φόλιος οὐκ ἔστιν II fr. Bk.

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 191, 366, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchidae of Corinth (Π. 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. viii. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. Susem. (555) τῶν ἱδίων ταῖς π. κοινονιματῶν] one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.

§ 10 17 οὖθ' εἰ τινες οἰκοίν χωρίς Aristotelian does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 mn. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-
in noble living, to the end that they may attain a perfect and independent life. This however will not be secured unless they dwell in the same place and have the right of intermarriage."

§ 13. 30 καθεδατί = ties of affinity.

37 φρατράκας See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17, VIII. 4 § 19 nn. (141, 169, 1427). Amongst the Greeks these "brotherhoods" were (or appeared to be) the next subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φαλα) having a number of clans (γένος) included under them. Susem. (558). θυσίας Clubs which met to sacrifice.

Διαγωγάς Cp. IV(vii). 15. 2. n. (525). Susem. (558) b. "The recreations of a life in common which depend on φαλα" would include much, e.g., the commerce of disciple and friend as well as the pleasures of social reunions (Wyse).


40 ταύτα] all these minor associations, κοιναὶ, φρατρῖα, &c., are necessary means to the end, and that is why they came into existence (36 δέ). "This certainly looks as if to Aristotle the φρατρία were something posterior to the origin of a τίμημα ὑπὸ συνοικίας τῆς ἀνθρώπου." (Wyse).

§ 14. πόλεις δή κτλ.] "Therefore a city is the union of clans and villages (to attain) a perfect and independent life." Ridgeway defends the double genitive: "the fellowship of clans and villages in a perfect and independent life."

1281 a 1 τελεῖας καὶ αὐτάρκους Cp. I. 2 § 8 nn. (20 b, 21): further nn. (459, 460) on III. 3 § 3: also III. 1 § 12 n. (447) 1v(vii). 4 § 11 n. (559); 5 § 1 n. (764), 8 § 8 n. (824) and n. (130). Susem. (560).

2 τῶν καλῶν...πράξεων] With regard to this conclusion, see n. (708) on IV(vii). 1 § 11. Susem. (560 b). § 15. The citizens have a stake in the city in proportion to their contributions towards civic fellowship, in the sense just given to the term. Superior contributions to other objects (wealth, birth) are of no avail to confer a greater share of civic rights.

C. 10. Where ought sovereignty to reside?
10 τες μέρος τι τού δικαίου λέγουσιν, τουερέν ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμην· (V) νον ἔχει δ᾿ ἀπορίαν, τι δει τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. VI ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλήθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἑνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταύτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολιάν. τι γάρ; ἂν οἱ πέντες διὰ τὸ τὰ πλέον εἶναι διανέμονται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄδικον

2 έστιν, ἐδοξεῖ γάρ [ἀν] διὰ τὸ κυρίον δικαίος· τῆν οὖν ἀδίκιαν τι δεῖ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων λήφθηντο, οἱ πλέον τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἀν διανέμονται, φανερῶν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ χεῖ γὰρ ἀρετὴ φθέρει τὸ 30 ἔχον αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ τὸ δικαίου πόλεως φθαρτικόν ὡστε δήλον

3 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οὖν τι ἄδικαι εἶναι δικαίοι. ἐπεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὅσα ὅ τύραννος ἐπράξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντας δικαίως. βιάζεται γάρ ἃν κρείττον, ὀστέρ καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν πλουσίων. ἄλλὰ ἡ ἀρα τοὺς ἐλάττων ἀρχεῖν δικαίον

25 καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἃν οὖν κακεύνοι ταύτα ποιοῦσι καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρεῖται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ

4 δικαίοι; καὶ βάτερον ἀρα. ταύτα μὲν τοῖν ποτὲν ὅτι φαίνεται πάντα καὶ οὔ δικαία, φανερῶν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δείκ

13 [ἡ τέμενος] or change to [ἡ τῶν νόμων] Spengel (not bad) || 16 ἀν omitted by P4 Π2 fr. Ar. Bk. || 17 δει θρη το Π2 fr. Bk. || πελεω Ληφθηνων corrupt according to Oncken; see Comm. n. (391) || 19 φθεατ Π || 24 ἄρα Π2 fr. and Μ1 (1st hand) || δικαίων ἀρχει Π2 fr. Bk. || 25 ταῦτα Vettori and Lambin in their translations, ταὐτα ἼΠ Αρ. || 27 πάντα φαίνεται Π2 fr. Bk. || 28 δικαίων σπουδᾶει Π1

In particular, (c. 11) Should it rest with the Many or the Few?

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austen Jurisdiction Lect. vi. pp. 236—255, ed. 3.

§ 1. 2 ἢ γάρ τοι κτλ] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.

16 ἐδοξεὶ γὰρ κτλ] Ironical. “It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?”

§ 2. 17 πελεω το κτλ] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. Susém. (561) The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὐχ ἢ γὰρ κτλ] Cp. Π2 2 § 7 n. (135). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: Nic. Ech. Π2. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve) whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἡ γάρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικῇ ἀρχῇ N. E. vi. 5. 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton). Susém. (561) Cp. Pl. Ref. x. 528 e: if moral evil, which is the evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὐδε τὸ δικαίου...φθαρτικόν] Comp. 1. 2. 16 n. (128 c), 11. 2. 4 n. (133), 112 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590).

Susém. (562) § 24 αλλ’ ἄρα κτλ] Passing to (3), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ βάτερον ἀρα] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (εἴτε...κτλ) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν ἀρχέων.
καὶ κύριοι εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους (VI)
§ 30 άτιμοι εἶναι πάντως, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἁρ-
χαίς· τιμᾶς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἁρχὰς, ἁρχόντων δὲ
§ 5 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαίοι εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους άτιμος, ἀλλ' ἐναὶ
tὸν σπουδαίοτατον ἁρχῆς βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἐτούτο ὁλοκληροβο

35 τὸ κύριον ὄλος ἀναπρόσκειται εἶναι πάντα, τὰ συμβαίνοντα

§ 2 πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαύλον. ἀν οὖν η νό-


11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων έστι τῆς έτερος λόγος· ὅτι 40 δὲ δὲν κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν

οἶκους δὲ, δὸς εἶναι ἃν λέγεται καὶ τῶν ἐχειν ἀπορίας,

§ 22 πάχα δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πόλλους, ἃν ἐκαστὸς ἄτιμιν

1281 b oὐ σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, ὅμως ἐνδήχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ-

τίους ἐκείνους, οὐχ οὖς ἐκαστὸν ἀλλ' οἷς συμπάγοντες, οἷον τὰ

συμφορτιά διαίνει τῶν ἑκατῶν διάπανθας χορηγήθέντων

πόλλων γὰρ ὄντων ἐκαστος μόριον ἐχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-

35 ἐχειν... 35 ψυχὴν after 35 φαύλον P4 Π4 fr. Βκ. || 37 διολὴ P4 Qb Τb ||

41 λέγεται... 42 ἀλήθειαν. That the text is unsound was seen by Camerarius,

λέσθαι < ὄντι? Schneider, λέσθαι] Götting, λέσθαι καὶ Susen.1 (λέσθαι: a

variant on ἀλήθειαν), τοῦ ἐχειν ἀπορίας, πάχα δὲ καὶ λέγεται κατ’ ἀλήθειαν Thurot,

< οἷς λέγων> λέσθαι Shute || τὸν] τινος τὰ M* || ἔχει M* (1st hand) || εὐφό-

ροῖς] Koraes, accepted by Bernays and by Susen,2 as less violent than the other

proposals, cp. De caelo 11. 13 § 1, 291 b 27, εἰ τίς δὲ τὸ φιλοσοφικὰ δυνήν ἡμᾶς

ἐνορίας ἀκυρῆς περὶ δὲ τὰς μεγάλας ἐχομεν ἀπορίας.

1281 b 16 of Π4 Αγ., o Π2-a Qb Τb

31 ἁρχόντων δὲ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] This is the reason why the same feature

in Plato’s government is called dangerous (ἐπισοφαλές), though unavoidable, 11. 5

§ 25 n. (181). § 5 Similarity the claim of the one pre-

eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle’s ‘best state’) is reduced to a

case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

32 ἀλλ' [σως κτλ] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c.

16 § 3 fr. n. (641). SUSEM. (562 b)

30 φαύλον] sc. εἶναι predicate, “that a human being, whoever he may be, with

human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the law, is a mistake.”

ἀν οὖν κτλ] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy;

and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 39 ἐστω τις ἄτομος λόγος] cc. 12—17 and B. vi(vi), B. vii(vi). : comp. Inter. p. 43. SUSEM. (563)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κτλ] This is a defence of the claims of (1) as against

(3). In c. 15 the claims of πλῆθος and βασιλείας are compared.

§ 2 42 τοῖς γὰρ πόλλοις κτλ] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (643); also c. 11 § 9

below. Thuc. vi. 18. 6 ὁμοί δὲ (φρουράτες) τὸ τὸ φαύλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ
tὸ πάνω ἀκραῖς ἃν ἔφυγαθον μᾶλλον ἀν ἐξήλθεν, with Herod. III. 80 l. fin. ἐν
gαρ τῷ πολλῷ εἰς τὰ πάντα (Eaton), SUSEM. (565).

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his
definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 1 2 οὐχ οὖς ἐκαστόρος ἀλλ' οἷς

συμπάγοντας] See II, § 2 and note.

3 συμφορτιά διαίνειν] ‘public dinners,’

to which many contribute.

4 πολλάν γὰρ ὄντων κτλ] Cp. c. 4
5 νήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὁσπερ ἐνα ἀνθρωπον (VI)
tὸ πλῆθος πολύτατα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχουν,
§ 3 αλλαθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἡδη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ
cαὶ κρίνουσι ἀρείουν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικής ἔργα
καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀλλ' ἀλλ' τι μορίων, πάντα δὲ
καὶ οὐ τινα | or καὶ οὐτερὴ? Susem., following Thurot hesitatingly τονοτοὺς | Πολύ Γ' Οβ Αρ. Αλδ. Βκ. καὶ corr. of Γ' τὸν
περὶ τὴν Μ' Susem. of and perhaps Π' || 8 κρίνῃ Γ' Μ' (et kries melius William)
§ 7 n. (474): also IV (vii). 1 §§ 10, 11 n. (703). Susem. (665)
Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an artificial body.
§ 5 ὁ πολλοῖς συνελθόντων...οὗτοῖς διά
νομοῖς! Trendelenburg in his "Law of Nature" (Naturrecht: p. 405) rightly objects
that 'in works of art man is essentially a free, unprejudiced spectator; in politics
he is a partisan fellow-actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy
which draws an inference from the universal common to all the cases com-
pared, when in fact it is the difference between them which is decisive.' But he
proceeds to argue, that the comparison leaves out of account the desires and pas-
sions which in the case of the multitude dull the intelligence and pervert the will;
that the truth brought together by their collective wisdom is materially preju-
diced and hampered by the falsehood collected along with it; that the supple-
menting of the truth from various sides is hindered or frustrated by the resist-
ance of errors and self-seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when
the public at large judges and enjoys works of art, only healthy popular incli-
 nations and instincts are brought together: whether they are not blended
with others which are unhealthy and misleading. Aristotle at least is of this latter
opinion (VIII). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n. (1097), and certainly he is right. Fur-
ther is there no fallacy in the criticism which overlooks the true analogy in the
difference?
On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned,
although passion no doubt is inflamed and the critic is converted into a judge in
his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9), yet at the same time the intellect is
sharpened: thus in accordance with the analogies applied in § 14, (whose cor-
rectness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where
his own weal and woe are at stake, the
§ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτω διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκαστικῶν πολλῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν μῆχρας κυρίους φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνην τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῶν ἱστοσχέμων τρισδιάστατες χωρίς εἰς ἔννοιας, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένοις γένεσις καὶ κάλλιον ἐξείκειν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις τοῦ ὑφθαλμοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν πλήθων ἐνδεχόμεται ταῦταν εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ῥητοῖς σπουδαῖοι, ἀδύνατον, ἵνας δὲ τῆς Δίδυμος ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσεις λόγος. καί τί διαφέρουσιν τοῖς τοῖς θηρίων ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀδύνατον; τοῖς πλήθων τὰ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιούτῳ δὲ εἰσὶν ὡσοὶ μῆτε πλούσιοι μήτε ἄξιωμα ἑξουσίων ἀριθμοῦ μὴν, τὸ μὲν γάρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων τῶν μεγάλων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διὰ τῆς γὰρ ἀδικίας καὶ δὲ ἀφροσύνης τὰ μὲν ἀδελφοὶ ἄν<ἀγη> να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να να νा
something standing to to μή μετέχειν ...ον συμφέλει as the clause οὐ γάρ ...υπάρχειν, πολεμίων ...πάντων, which stands to to δὲ μὴ μεταδιδομένων...φοβερόν.

With Rassow's conjecture, ἀμφήκη (ἔστι), there is such a verb; without it there is no verb on which the infinitives διότι and ἀμφίπολοι can depend.

32 διήθη καὶ Σίδην...πόνοιν Comp. II. 12 § 3 (Exc. v. p. 350 D), § 5 mm. (412, 413); VII. 11 § 10 n. (1302), VII (vi). 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitutional restriction is not admissible, certainly, for the citizens of the ideal state who have the best culture and education and are in the possession of a fixed amount of land. There suitable elections of officials must be assumed without such a restriction; there all the citizens have equal rights (cp. mm. 440, 889). But nevertheless, as was inferred in the Introduction, p. 84 from II. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there can be hardly any doubt that even in the ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict the activity of the whole body of full citizens to the election of the officials, together with the final decision upon legislation as well as upon questions of war and peace and treaties with foreign states. Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSEM. (619).

33. 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to them' the election of the magistrates and the scrutiny of their conduct (when they retire from office).

ἐπιλ. after τάττοντος. Other constructions are εἰς, κατά and ἐπιλ. with dat.

§ 8 35 ἀκοντὴν αἴσθησιν) 'sufficiently clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.' The terms αἴσθησις and ἀκοντὴν αἴσθησιν in Aristotle often go beyond the notion of mere sensation and sense perception to which Plato in the Theaetetus restricts them. Thus αἴσθησις = to understand another's command in 1 § 9 (cp. n. 45 b). Like Plato himself at an earlier time, Phae. 271 f., even where the terms express that notion, Aristotle always has in view the discrimination of the sensible individual by sense, the judgment of perception, so that he calls it a discriminating and judging faculty (δομέως σπορελ. cp. n. 497): Anal. Post. II. 15 § 5, 99 b 35. De Anima III. 9. 1, 432 a 15. Thence by a very natural transition he applies these terms to denote the discrimination of the individual and particular generally, and the decision as to what is right and wrong in relation thereto in practical life—an instinctive process, so to speak, or at all events one which rests merely upon observation and experience, Nic. Eth. II. 9. 8, 1109 b 20, IV. 5, 13, 1136 b 3 ff. SUSEM. (570).

καθάπερ η μὴ κ. . "as in nutritious food when mixed with the nutritious makes the whole a better diet than the scanty supply" (of nourishment alone), § 2 n. (564). SUSEM. (571).

χορήσα] alone, by himself.

ἀτέλεια Properly 'immature' or 'un-developed' or 'incomplete': thence 'un-
δ' ἡ τάξις αὐτῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἀποριάν πρὸς τὴν μὲν ὀτὶ (V)
40 δόξεως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι τοῦ κράτους ὁρθοῦ λάτρευκεν,
οὕτε καὶ τὸ ἱερόν ταῦτα καὶ ποιήσας ὑμῖν τῶν καίρων τῆς
νόσου τῆς παροσφάγης, οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἱερός, ὁμοίως δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔμπειρας καὶ τέχνας, ὡσπερ οὖν
ἰατρῶν διεῖδον τῶν εὐθυμιῶν ἐν ἱατρῶι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.
§ 11 οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως. ἱερός δὲ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἄρχω
τεχνοτρόπος καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τῆς τέχνης εἰσὶ,
5 γὰρ τινες καὶ τοιούτου περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰσεπέν τῶν τέχνας, ὁπο
διόδεμεν δὲ τῷ κρίνειν οὐκέτι ἤτοι τοὺς πεπαιδευμένους ἢ τοὺς
§ 12 εἰσίοντα. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τῇ ἁρεσίᾳ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ δόξαν ἐξεῖ
ἐεῖν τρόπον, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέειον ὀρθός τῶν εἰσίο
των ἐργῶν ἐστίν, ὁλος γεωμετρία τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ
10 κυβερνητῶν τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἕνων ἐργῶν καὶ
τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' ὡς τι τῶν
§ 13 εἰσίοντων γε μάλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐκ

42 δ' omitted by Π3 Bk. || καὶ added after ὄρασις δὲ by Γ M4
δ' 5 τοιοῦτοι καὶ Π3 Bk., καὶ untransliterated by William, Ar. || 7 καὶ omitted
by Π1, hence [καὶ] Susem.1−2 || 9 τε omitted by P1+4 || 10 τε [τερ] or [τερ ἐνών]
Spengel (the former perhaps right) || 11 καὶ before τῶν ἰδιωτῶν omitted by P4 Q6 T5
|| οὗ τοι Koras Bk.3

qualified to judge. The word was used in 1. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue' (Congreve). Cp. also n. (875) on IV(VII).

§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician can properly judge a course of treatment and pronounce with authority that it has been successful.

§ 10 οὕτως πρὸς τὸν ἱερὸν ὁμοίως. Certainly this mode of ordering the constitution involves a difficulty—in the first place that &c.:

§ 11 3 ἱερὸς δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ τοιοῦτοι. Compare Plato's illustration of the physician tried by boys at the accusation of the cook,

§ 11 ἱερὸς δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ τοιοῦτοι. ‘Physician’ may mean (i) the practitioner in ordinary cases, (2) the scientific student who has mastered the whole field of medicine,

H. 26
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Τ. ΙΙ. 11.

[VII]

14 Having the power of making laws is a public trust and the object of this law is to regulate the manner in which laws are made. (p. 77)

15 To what extent the power of the sovereign should be exercised, and how it can be checked, is a matter of continuing debate. (p. 78)

16 Sparta was an exception in its approach to the balance of power. (p. 79)

17 Even so, the balance of power in the Greek world was not always stable. (p. 80)
λύσει τον τόπον τούτων ἔπορισαν. Ἡ σος γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτα (VI)
§ 17 ὅρθως. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ’ ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ’ ὁ ἐκκλη-
σαιας ἄρχων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ
δήμος τῶν δὲ ἰδιεύκουσας ἕκαστος μόριον ἐστὶ τούτων (λέγω
dὲ μόριον τοῦ βουλευτῆρος καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστήν καὶ τὸν δικασ-
§ 18 στὴν) ὅστ’ ὁ δικαστὴς κύριον μειζόνον τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ γὰρ πολ-
λῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
dὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ’ ἵνα καὶ κατ’
§ 19 ὅλοις μεγιστά ἁρχαῖς ἁρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὐν διορισθοῦν

1282 b 10 τὸν τόπον δὲ πρῶτη λεγέντα αὐτοῖς ποτει φανε-
ρῶν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐτερον ἢ ότι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-

rion κειμένους ὁρῶς τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ ἠν τε εἴς ἄν τε πλείον ὡς,
περὶ τοῦτον εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσον ἐξαδώνα

5 τούτων οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθ-

§ 20 λοι διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὅποιοι μὲν τὸν τὸν δὲ εἶναι
tοὺς ὁρῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν ποι ἔλθον, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μένει
τὸ πλαίσι διαστορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ μείον τοὺς πολιτείας

40 τὸ βιοτεῖον omitted by Πλ, hence [τὸ] Susen.12 || πάντων τοῖς Π

Bk. || 41 ἡχόων Π

1284 b 1 τὸν τόπον τοῦτον Μ Π1 || 6 διορίσατε διήλθεται Π Βk. || εἶναι δὲ Π2 Bk.

|| 8 ἀλλ’ γὰρ ἑν… ἐν δέκιοι transposed to follow 11 νόμους by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τέξει αὐτῆς τῆς πολι-
thetis, § 10.

§ 18 30 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κτλ] Moreover the amount of property at which all
these are rated is far greater collectively than the property of individuals in high
offices and of the members of small boards.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὐν κτλ] Tren.
delenburg thinks that we do not quite
see clearly whether Aristotle is only
setting up his analogies dialectically or de-
defending them as his own opinion. There
can be no doubt, however, especially after
such an explicit explanation as is here
given, that the latter is the case: nor
can any reason be discovered, even on
other grounds, for a doubt of this kind.
SUSEM. (577)

1283 b 1 κτι πρῶτη λεγέντα αὐτοῖς]
This is the question treated in c. 10, and
then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz.
who is to possess supreme authority?
(Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was
"the whole of the burgess body in every
state which has any degree of excellence": and
on the basis of this decision, the point
which came up at c. 10 § 5 is now
settled by the addition of the qualifying
clause "but in accordance with the laws,"
and in such a way that the greater or less
degree of excellence and correctness of
the laws is determined by that of the
constitution to which they correspond.
This raises the question of the relative
merit of the normal constitutions which
we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13: see
however Intro. p. 41 f. SUSEM. (578)

3 κειμένων ὁρῶς] if they are good
laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κτλ] "and the ruler,
be he one or many, must only be sove-
reign in such cases as the laws are quite
unable to lay down precisely, because
of the inherent difficulty of framing
general rules applicable to all cases,"
Comp. c. 15 §§ 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with
nn. (637, 652, 653): Nic. Éth. v. 10. 4,
1147 b 13. Here again Aristotle is
following Plato, Politicus 624 A—503:
see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. SUSEM. (579)
To these references Laws IX 875 c
may be added (Jackson ad loc. Nic. Éth.)
also Pol. II. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 παλαι] At c. 10 § 5: comp. n.

(578). SUSEM. (580)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 11.

§ 21 καίον τοὺς ἀλίκους. τῦλην τοῦτο οὐ δει πρὸς τὴν
πολιτείαν καθεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμολογῇ ταῖς
πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαίλουσι ἡ στουδαιοῦσι εἶναι
καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀλίκους. αὐτᾶ μὲν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι
tοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους:
tοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβεβηκαίας οὐ δικαίους.

§ 12 εὖ ἐπη δὲ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἑπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VII
ἀγαθὰν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριο-
τάτῃ πασίων, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἐστὶ δὲ
πολιτικῶν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῷ συμ-

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμολογῇ] 'for relatively
to the constitutions the laws, too, must
necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust,'
Comp. vii(iv). § 9 n. (1128), Isocr. vii.
4. SUSEM. (581)

In cc. 12, 13 true constitutional principles
take a more definite shape. In a
note to his Translation, p. 173, Bernay
remarks that these two chapters contain a separate sketch for the discussion of the same questions which are partly treated in cc. 9—11, partly in cc. 16, 17. As the sketch presents some peculiarities, e.g., the mention of ostracism, c. 13 § 15 ff., those who arranged Aristotle's papers thought it ought to be preserved and the place they assigned to it seemed recommended by the close connexion of its contents with the neighbouring chapters. Where the tautologies thus arising appeared too obvious, the attempt was made to lessen them by formulae such as εἰς τὴν καὶ πρὸς τὸν κύριον, which the word φαίλουσιν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτείων ἢ ἔστιν τὰ ἄπολε,
§ 1 n. (1), Nic. Eth. 1. 2 § 4, 1094 a 26.
SUSEM. (582)

The structure of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (Arist. Stud. iii. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἐπὶ to 22 λατρεύων. But this requires in line 15, whereas δῆ εἰς is the reading of II.

16 δύναμις] Joined with ai τέχναις, 11.
8 § 18; so Rhel. 1. 2 § 1, ἑστὶ δὴ ἡ ὑπο-
κάθεστης δύναμις περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ διαφθορά
τοις γὰρ ὀδηγείται ἑδρεύουσαν πάσιν οὖν.

ὡς ἐπὶ δὴ, 17 δίκαιον] 'The good for
the state, i.e. the interest of the common-
wealth, can only be justice.' πολιτικῶν
ἀγαθὸν is the subject and τὸ τέλος refers to
this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next
sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 2 and
the references given in n. (562). SUSEM.
(583)

It is convenient at this place to reproduce,
from Nic. Eth. v. 6 § 4, the fuller
account of πολιτικῶν δίκαιων, the embodi-
ment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil so-
ciety: τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ καὶ ἰδίων ὁ πρὸς τὸ
ἔθνος αὐτόρεξιαν, ἐξευθέντων καὶ λεῖψιν
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ᾽ ἀρμόδιον, the justice
of free and (proportionately or actually)
equal citizens living together with a view
to the satisfaction of wants. When this
is not the case there is only an analogical
sort of justice, τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθ᾽ ἰδιώτης.
ὡς ἐπὶ δὴ δίκαιον ὁ πρὸς τὸ νόμον πρὸς
φέρων. δοκεῖ δὲ πάσων ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII)
γε τινος ὀμολογοῦσα τοὺς κατὰ φιλοσοφιὰν λόγους, ἐν οἷς
διαίρεται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν (τι γὰρ καὶ τις τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ
§ 2 δεῖ ποιὸς ἵσον ἵσον εἶναι φασίν) πολῶν δὲ ἱσότης ἵστι καὶ
πολῶν ἀνισότητι, δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ
φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικῆν. ἵσον γὰρ ἐν φαίνεται κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνισότερον νενικήσαι τῶν ἀρ-
χῶν, εἴ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροντες ἀλλὰ θυμοῦ
τυγχάνοντο ὅπερ τοῦ γὰρ διαφέροντες ἔτερον εἶναι τὸ δὲ
§ 3 καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθῶς, ἔσται
καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὀνομά τῶν
ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξίᾳ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοὺς ὑπερ-
§ 4 χουαν. τι ὕποτο ἐπιτόλου τὸν ψεύδον; φανερῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀπλῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν γὰρ ὀμολογοῦν ἀνθρώπων

19 [ἐν οἷς...ἡθικῶν] Stahr || 21 δὲ omitted by P 4=C, [δὲ] or else τ᾿ Spengel, δὲ
Bonitz || 23 ἰσοτη...1283 b 32 δίκαιον noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil.
c. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καὶ] Schneider, [τῷ] Ramus || 30 δὲ γὰρ Spengel

ἀφοίρων: τοῖς δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀξιοῦ ἡ γὰρ δική
κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου...ποίο δὲ
ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὕτη νόμος τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρώ.
πολῶν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιών. See
further Jackson's admirable comments,

18 [ἰσον τι] 'All hold that justice is
a species of equality,' So also in Nic. Eth.,
see n. on 9 § 1.

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφάνειαν λόγοις] Strictly
scientific or philosophical discussions as
contrasted with such as are merely dia-
lectical, Topic. 1. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and
with the exoteric discussions carried on
from the standpoint of the ordinary or
'envisaging' consciousness, Enod. Eth. 1.
§ 4, 1317 b 22, ἔντεκας δὲ...καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἑστεροταξίων λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ

§ 2 21 πολῶν δὲ ἱσότης Comp. c.
9 § 4. κατὰ τι οἷον χρήσιμα, οἷον ἔλευ-
SUSEM. (584 b)

22 [ἰσοτη...φιλοσοφίαν] 'Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus
to research in political science.' SUSEM.

23 κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ] on
the ground of superiority in any
advantage. This is one of the phrases
used in 1. 6 § 3. Here certainly external
goods: see line 28.

26 τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (he
would say) people who differ have
different rights and their relative merits are
different.' The correction of Ramus, καὶ
κατ' ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their
different rights go according to merit.'
See n. (1493). SUSEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour
(white and dark races?) or size (cp. IV
vii). 14 § 3 or in any other external
good would confer a larger share of political
rights. The falsity of this is seen
from the other arts.

Eaton compares Nic. Damasc. (s. voc.)
Ἀλτερίας Ἀδίκης τοῦ σωτητῶν αὐτῶν
ἀφοίρισθαι βασιλεῖς.

§ 4 31 ἀληθῶν] A partitive genitive
with ἰσοτητῶν. The comparison be-
tween ἀληθεῖς καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀφετήρ
is best known from the discourse of Pro-
tagoras in Plato's dialogue 377 A (cp.
323 b). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c.
4 § 18.
32 τὴν τέχνην | Adverbial accus. after ὁμολογήσω, as after ὁμολογήσω 1. 2 § 6, ἐξ ὁμολογίας 1. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπά in line 25.

33 διότι μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον κτλ] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὄργανων τῆς ὑπορεχοῦσας = the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονεκρίτως τῶν ἀθλῶν = advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προσάγωγοι υπῆρξαν | “if we advance a little further.” Intrans. as in Phys. 1. 1 § 2, 184 a 19, προσάγωγοι ἐκ τῶν ἀσφαλείτων ἐπὶ τὰ σάφεστερα, Poet. 4 § 7, 144 b 23, κατὰ μέγατα προσάγωγοι. It appears then that αὐτὸ is a nom., as § 4: ‘of itself.’

§ 6 38 ἐλάφρυνε | “even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes.” I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐλάφρυνε from what precedes as the subject of ὑπορεχοῦσαι. Riese treats the entire passage 35 el de μήτε ἔργον...1183 a 3 oúde as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark ‘although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty’ has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen Beiträge zu Arist. Poet. 11. p. 71 (1597). SUSEM.

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle’s constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. 11 § 17 λέγοντες...διακρίνεται, Rhét. 1. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, ἰθ. 111. 2 § 6, 1404 b 32. Vahlen also argues this in defence of καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει in c. 1 § 4 of the present book of the Poetics. 1283 a 1 διότι γὰρ ἔτσι τὸ ἔργον] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν = commensurable. See De gen. et corr. 11. 6 §§ 1, 2 el μὴ οἱν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν (συμβλητόν), ἄνω τῆς ταυτότητος τοῦ ἐν τῇ συμβλητῇ ὑπερβαίνει, οἷον el ἐξ ὑπόλοιπον κόσμου ἔτσι ἐν ἄλλοις θέους.

§ 6 el γὰρ μᾶλλον τινὰ μέγατον] ‘For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than’ i.e. in preference to—here we must supply ‘a certain amount of wealth or good birth.’
5 ἃν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμμιλλον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς (VII)
ἐλευθερίαν. ὡστε εἰ πλείον ὧδε διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὧδε κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλείον ἀρετῆς μέγεθος ὑλὸς ὑπερέχειν * * ἐν περὶ τὸν συμβαλλέται πάντα. τοσόνδε ἡμὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ
§ 7 κρείττον τοσούτο, τοσούτε ἐνελκεῖν ὡς ἱσχ. ἐπεί δὲ τούτ’ ἄδυ-5
10 νατον, δῆλον ὃς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐυλόγως ὁμοιότατ’ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οὐ μὲν βραδείς οὐ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὔτως διὰ τούτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλείον τοὺς δ’ ἐπαύτου ἑρείαν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς γενεικοῖς ἁγίοις ἡ τοῦ
§ 8 τῶν διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν) ἀλλ’ εὖ ὃν πόλις συνε-15 ἐστικεῖν, εἰ τούτως ἀναγκαίον ποιεῖται τὴν ἀμφισβητήσεσιν. διότερα ἐυλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τὴν τιμήν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ πλού-
σιοι καὶ ἐλευθεροὶ. δεῖ γὰρ ἑλευθέρους τε’ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα
φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἐν εὖ πόλις εὖ ἀπόροις πάντων, ὧσπερ
5 ἐνάμμιλλον εἶναι would enter the lists with, be comparable to.
6 ὡστ’ εἰ πλείον κτλ] ‘Hence if A’ s superiority in stature exceeds B’s superiority in merit, and (if) in general stature cæs exceed merit, evidently everything is comparable with everything else’ —can represents the ἑγκάθευται conjectured to stand after ὑπερέχειν. Bernays takes <ei> καὶ πλείον ὑπερέχειν ὧδε ἀρετῆς μεγάθος, εἰ δὲ συμβήκατι as all belonging to the apodosis: “then, although virtue in itself is more excellent than bodily size, yet a common measure can be found.”
8 τοσούτε γὰρ καὶ κρείττον κτλ] If a cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic inch of silver, then clearly a certain amount of gold is equal to a cubic inch of silver. But this being impossible in the case where wealth, or bodily strength, competes with virtue, it follows that “in politics as well as (καὶ) the other sciences or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of inequality on which men ground their claims to public office, and this for good reason.” μέγεθος, except in line 8, = stature, not ‘amount.’
§ 8 14 ἀλλ’ εὖ ὃν πόλις συνεστικοὶ
But it is on the ground of the elements of which a city is composed that they necessarily contend for state offices, ὃν κατὰ τὸ ἄγαρ ὑπέρεχονται § 4. Of these ‘elements’ of the city, the various factors or sections of society whose preponderance fixes the constitution and the nature of the qualification for political power, he enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free
birth. Comp. nn. on 7 § 3, 9 § 1; also vii(iv). § §§ 7—9.
17 τίμημα is the rated valuation of taxable property, upon which taxes were levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly below the true, or selling, value. Thus τίμημα ὁμός or ξύλον = to have property so estimated, to be a taxpayer, hence returning a rateable value of property. So in vii(iv). 13 § 2, τοῖς μὲν ξύλοις τίμημα and τοῖς ἀπόροις are found opposed, and ib. δ 6 § 2, κτάθη εἰκὸς τὸ τίμημα το ὁμορ-
μένον. But in itself τίμημα does not mean taxes.
18 οὖ γὰρ ἐν ἀπόροις...19 διόλου] A body of needy paupers would not have the necessary leisure, Ιτ. 9 § 2. A body
of slaves would be without natural rulers, I 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian elōs constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians.  

§ 31 ἀνεκ τῶν προτέρων. These indispensable factors or elements, ὡν δὲν οὐκ ἐν εἶνε τόις, c. § 2, iv (vii), § 8 § 1. But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly. 

c. 13 § 1. These claimants for power (ἀδικευομένη τῶν ἄρχων, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state. 

23 πρὸς μὲν οὖ, τὸ πάλιν όλα] 'In view of the bare existence of a city, as contrasted with ἐκ γῆς, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πάλιν εἴρη = τὰ συνήθη of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14. 

24 πρὸς μὲν τούς ξενον ἀκανθόν κτλ.] Comp. 1. 2 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (688) 

25 τῇ συμβολα καὶ ἡ ἀρετή] καὶ explicative. Education (cultura) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, καὶ δέξαν = καὶ ἀρετής, 5 § 5 (Bradley). See also Khe/. 1. 8 § 4 with Cope's note p. 156 f. 

26 καὶ πρὸτερον] In c. 9. Compare Introd. p. 42. SUSEM. (566) 

27 πάντων ξενόν ἕξων κτλ.] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 κατά τι ξενόν) should have an equal share of everything.' 

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve).  

§ 2 καὶ πρὸτερον] c. 9 § 1. It was said, Introd. p. 43, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Bernays' suggestion (n. on c. 12 § 1) requires. SUSEM. (687) 

31 τῇ πλείων…τοις κτλ.] 'that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern.' A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Bonitz s.v. See also Cope on κανώντορα, Khe/. 1. 1 § 10. But Bernays renders 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right. 

32 τῇ πρὸς τὰ συμβολα κτλ.] 'Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life,' as they have not the temptations of the poor. 

33 "The claims of the free born and
of the nobles are closely related." Supply ἀρμόσφητον. ἔγγος is nearly equivalent to an adjective, see n. on II. 9 § 5. 

34 οἱ ἐγγόνις ἀλλήλων. From time immemorial, as noble birth stands to merely free birth so free birth and descent from citizens have been opposed to the status of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 §§ 7, 8, a passage which should be compared with the following words also. 

SUSEM. (888) § 34. This is confirmed on two grounds: (1) the nobles are the truest citizens, and (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly speaking, it is only in a republic that a real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Freeman, Comparative Politics, Lect. vii. pp. 246—247.

35 The use of γενειαστέρως and ἐγγένες does not bear out the distinction made in Rhet. ii. 11 § 3, ἐγγένες κατὰ τὴν τύχη τῶν γενέων ἄρετῆς, γενειαστέρως κατὰ τὸ μὴ ξεχωριστὰ τὴν φῶσαν. 

36 οἱ ἐγγόνις τῶν. Cr. I. 6 § 7, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις ἐμφανίζεται οἷον μίκρον εὐγενείας, n. (53). 

SUSEM. (888 b) "Blestious eidos." Ambition to win fresh honour is a trait of good birth, τὸ φαλεστρόφορον εἶναι τὸν εστερικοῦν, Rhet. ii. 11 § 2. § 3 37 ἄρετη γένους. Comp. nn. (54, 44) on I. 6 § 7; vii(iv). 8 § 9 n. (1448), viii(v). 1 § 7 ἕργον ἄρετης καὶ πλούσιος, n. (1406). 

SUSEM. (889) "ōmios διὰ...δυκαλοῦ...ἀρμόσφητον" As the claim of "a" the wealthy εἶναι 31, (9) the free born and the nobles, so now that of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a partial justification.

With δὴ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on Rhet. 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, compares ii. 3 § 2, viii(v). 3 § 10, 4 § 10: often strengthened at the close of a list, as καὶ ἀλὸς δὴ, καὶ καθήλων δὴ. 

38 κοινωνικήν, "justice especially; for justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential to civil society (κοινωνία), on which all the others must necessarily attend": i.e. justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as is more fully explained in Nic. Eth. v. i. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see Jackson's notes]. Compare too N. E. viii. 1 § 4, 1155 a 22, 29 § 1 ff. 1159 b 25 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2 and the references cited in n. (56).

SUSEM. (990) A remarkable reason for the claim of ἄρετη, after all we have been told (Wyse).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ οἱ πλείωνες sc. δικαίως ἀρμόσφητον. The justice of this claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γάρ κρέιττους κτλ. Comp. Plato Gorgias 488 D ὁσοὶ οὐκ οὖν τοιοῦτοῦ ἄρετης εἰσὶν κατὰ φύσιν; (Eaton). 

SUSEM. (591)

42 ὁ λαμβανόμενον. Comp. c. 10 § 3, τὰ τῶν λόγων ἐπεξερήσατο: "if the many are taken in a body and compared with the few in a body" (Congreve).

1283 b 1 λέγω δ' οὖν I mean, namely. 

3 τότερον ἀμφισβήτησις κτλ. The question raised in c. 10.
§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται: καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων 9 ἂναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρίνως τίνας ἄρχειν δεὶ (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφέροντος ἄλληλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τὸ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τὸ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἄνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον· ἄλλα ὡμοί σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
§ 6 αὐτῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέως. ** δὲ τοῦ \( 10 \) αὑρίσκων εἶναι ἄλγος πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἔκτησιν, τίνα δὲ διελέχθη τρόπον; ὡς τὸ ἄλγος πρὸς τὸ ἄργον δεὶ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατό διοίκειν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοὺς τὸ πλῆθος διὸ εἶναι πάλιν ἐπὶ αὐτῶν; ἐστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἄπαν
§ 7 ταῖς τούτοις διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

8 σκοποῦμεν μὲν Αδ., σκοπήσομεν? Sylburg, σκοποῦμεν Bas. in the margin, considerandum est Ar. || 9 ὑπάρχῃ P, ὑπάρξῃ P1 || 10 δὲ......13 αὐτῶν; transposed by Thurot to precede 1284 a.4 εἰ δὲ τα; see Introd. p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ.] "Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others." τὰ κόσμα is the plural of τὸ κόσμον the 'sovereign,' a supreme authority: also found in Ethik. 1. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ κόσμα διήρνοι κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, διαὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τουσώτα καὶ τὰ κόσμα ὁστιν, and Demosth. Pala Lep. § 259 p. 424, 11 εἰ δὲ λοιπῶ καὶ τὰ κόσμα ἄτομα την ἐκάστη τῶν πόλεων. Cope compares N. E. II. 11. § 13, 1160 b 18, τὰ κόσμησε = the citizen levies, as a similar plural.

5 τῶν κυρίων] Comp. c. 6 § 1 τοι (533); c. 7 § 2 τοι (532); also n. (466). SUSEM. (692)

§ 8 περὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν χρόνων] So § 4, ἐν μῖα πόλει.

On the following sentence, 9 εἰ δὲ... 13 εἰ αὐτῶν, see Introd. p. 43. Thurot Ethik. p. 49 gives a brief analysis of §§ 6—14. Aristotel proposes to investigate what class ought to have power in a state where all sorts of superiority (riches, nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented: and this is his answer: (1) If the virtuous are few, we must inquire whether they are numerous enough to govern the state or to make a state by themselves, § 6. (2) No superiority gives an exclusive right to the exercise of power, §§ 7—10. (3) The last laws are relative to the interest of the whole state and to the great body of the citizens. The citizen is not the same under all governments; under the best government he is the good man, §§ 11, 12. (4) If a single individual, or a handful of men not numerous enough to form a state by themselves, be preeminent for virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level of equality, §§ 13, 14. On this answer Thurot remarks: "the first proposition (1) has nothing to do with the question Aristotle has just raised: it is clear that before he discusses what is to be done with the virtuous few he should prove the right of the virtuous to command. The second, (2), has a direct bearing on the question, of which it is the negative solution. The germ of a positive solution is found in (3), but this solution is not given directly; for Aristotle is handling a difficulty as to the end of the best legislation. In § 4 he discusses a particular case analogous to that which is the subject of (1). This analogy and the impossibility of understanding (1) in its present place lead me to suppose that the words εἰ δὲ... εἰς αὐτῶν should be transposed to come after καὶ ἐφηρότην and before εἰ δὲ τα; (1284 a. 3). Then there will be a good sequence of ideas."

§ 6 13 ἀπορία] So 10 § 1 ἀπορία ἐτης... χρίστου διακόσμησαν. §§ 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as c. 10, but is a species of reducit ad absurdum by the enforcement on the same ground of the right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.
15 ξιαν γάρ ἄνευ οὐδενός δείκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιόντες (VII) ἄρχειν, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος, ἁδὲν γὰρ ὃς εἴ (p. 81) τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιότερος ἀπάντησιν ἐστὶ, ἂν ὑποθέσετε ὃ πέτο τὸ ἀπόκομα τούτου ἀρχεῖν τὸν ἐνα ἀπάντων δεῖσει, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐφρενία διαφέρουσα τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντος τὸν δὲ ἐξεστισάν. ταύτῳ δὲ τούτῳ συμβαίνεσθαι καὶ καὶ
21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰ γάρ τις εἰς ἀμελεύτων ἀνήρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ ποιεῖται πασχαλοῖ ἀπόκομος, τούτῳ εἰμί δεὶ κύριον κατὰ ταύτῳ δικαίον. οὐκόν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰμι γιὰ δεὶ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰς τῶν
25 ἀπολόην καὶ εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἐνός ἑλάττων δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὅσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτων ἄν δεό κύριους
§ 9 εἰμι ναλόν ἃ τὸ πλῆθος πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐστι χοικεῖον φανερῶν 12


16 δέδεσαι γάρ ὁς κτλ] Comp. vii(vi). || 3 § 3 n. (1427 b) δέν εἶ παλεῖ τῶν ἄλλων εὐσήφων, κατὰ τὰ ἀληθερεῖαν δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν δίκαιον μόνον. SUSEM. (892a)
17 πάλιν ἐν σα, in this case as in the former.
18 τὸν ἐνα ἀπάντων] This is called παραθεῖν in vii(vi). 3 § 3:

§ 21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cpr. e. 5 § 5 n. (505), c. 7 §§ 3, 4 with mk. (535b, 8). SUSEM. (893)
There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, cc. 10, 11; viz. ἐν τῇ δικαιοτέρᾳ ἄρχῃ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείαται σπανοῖς ἄτομοι. All the governing class are good, but he is preeminently in goodness.
§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὴ ταῦτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissenschaft ix. p. 157) and Hildbrand (p. 422) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-

of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, “since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, true constitutional monarchy,” cp. Introd. p. 44 ff. Hildbrand rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildbrand however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected,—whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is superior or inferior to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle’s own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 nn. (690, 681), viii (v) (1) §§ 6 n. (1495): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two forms of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate con-

text §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle desires
ρὸν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὀρθῶν οὐδεὶς ὅρθος ἦστι, καθ’ ὧν ἀξίζει (VII)
οὕσων αὐτοὶ μὲν ἁρχεῖν τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἐπὶ σφόν ἄρχεσθαι
§ 10 πάντας, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας
κυρίους εἶναι τοῖς πολιτεῖοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ
πλοῦτον, ἔχοντες ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλῆθυ λόγων τινὰ δίκαιον:
οὕτω γὰρ κοιλῦει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἰναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλγών
καὶ πλουσιότερον, οὐχ οὕς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀλλ’ οὕς ἄβροις.
§ 11 διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἢ ξινοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσι
§ 16 τίνες, ἐνδεχέσθαι τούτους τοῖς τρόποις ἀπαντῶν (ἀπαραυνὴ γὰρ
τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετήτων, βουλομένως τίθε
σθαι τοὺς ἄριστοτέους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελετῶν συμ-
§ 19 φέρουν ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλείων), ὡστε συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεῖθρον.
§ 12 τὸ γὰρ ὄρθον λυπεῖτον ἰσως: τὸ δ’ ἰσως ὄρθον πρὸς τὸ τῆς

28 ὤρθος ΚΠ Ald. and P (1 hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀπαραυν...
39 πλείων) Bernard: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντῶν and no parenthesis
|| 37 βουλομένως <γε> Schneider || 40 γὰρ Susen. || 41 Π Plutarch Bk. Susen.1

distinctly to express this here. See nn.
(597, 599). SUSEM. (598)

28 τῶν ὀρθῶν οὐδεὶς κτλ. Cp. 9 § 1 n.
None of the ‘standards,’ i.e. the defining principles upon which they claim to
govern.

§ 11 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῖς πολιτεῖοι] to control the governing body,

33 τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλγῶν] This is the thesis which Grote is
striving to prove throughout his history,
taking the Athenian Demos as his great
example. He dwells upon the sacrifices of
which it was capable at Salamis and
Argennasae, upon its financial honesty,
as attested by an undoubted coingage,
and its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,
when after the unparalleled provocations
of the Thirty it consented to a general
amnesty, B.C. 402.
The appeals made to
the humanity and enthusiasm of the
multitude had most chance of success,
as the cases of Paches and Diogoras prove.
Against all this must be set the panic
and terror at the time of the mutilation of
the Hermæ and the hasty condenmant
of the generals at Athens, the troubles of
Corcyræ and Samos, and other occasional
outbursts of popular fury like the Scyta-

34 οὐχ οὕς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν] See the parallel
expression in c. 11 § 2 and the
note on 11. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 [προβάλλουσι] Was this
also in writing? SUSEM. (598)

36 τίνες] “bring forward as a
problem”; whence πρόβλημα.

36 τούτων τοῖς τρόποις ἀπαντῶν...39

§ 12 40 τὸ γὰρ ὄρθον λυπεῖτον ἰσως] The problem is to find the standard to
which the most upright laws (τοὺς ἀριστοτέους νόμους) must conform.
Here
the right must be taken to mean the
equally right, and the equably right
generates the interest of the whole city
and the welfare of the citizens.
For ισως = equalisher Shilleto quotes Plato
Laos vii. 805 A. Σαυρομάθας αἰς τῶν
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄρθων κοινωνία καὶ τῶν
ἄθρως ὄση προστατεύσημεν ισως ἀνέθητι:
Ec. 911 ισως δὲ τῷ ἐλάστω ἀθρῶ
δικαίων τε τῶν μείζων: Dem. De Pace
59, 18 ὡσιάν αὐτής συμφόρουν οὕς ισως ὡσὶ
καλῶς προείσθη Ψαθαίας: Isocr. Pangyrr.
77 συνήθεια, αὐτής ἰσως καὶ κοινώς
ἀνείρισας ἄγωι, and probably Soph.
Phial. 738. Though restored in Plut.
11. 6 § 30, it is not elsewhere certain in
Aristotle. It is however a v. i. vii(i).
14 § 12, Nic. Eth. 11 6 § 6. Also found in
Rh. ad Alex. 9 § 10, 1430 a 1, ὡσιάν καὶ κοινώς πρὸς αὐτῆς προσφέρειμεν
(o citation).

41 τόλεος ὡς συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. (VII) πολιτείας δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τῶν ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐστὶ, καθ’ ἐκτάσεις δὲ πολιτείαν ἐπερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρόμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρέτην.

§ 6

<# * ei de tōn
10 <ἀριθμὸν εἰς ὁλγαὶ πάμπαιν τινὶ τὴν ἀρετήν ἔχουσε, τίνα
11 <δεὶ διελεῖν τρόποι; ἦ τὸ ὀλγαῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐγχόν δεὶ σκοπεῖν,
12 <ei δυνατῷ διοικών τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοιοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος
13 <ὅπως εἰναι πόλιν εἰς αὐτῶν; >

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly || 3 τῶν after βίων omitted by Qb Tb and P4 (1st hand)
1283 b 9 * * Conring Thurot (by Susem.1 placed after 12 αὐτών), see Comm. n. (599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be transposed to follow either (1) 1283 a 40 τὰς Δαλας or (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπων || δὲ Susem.2, δῆ Γ Π Plutarch Bk. Susem.1-2 in the text || 11 διελεῖν τὸν Qb Tb Plutarch Bk. || 12 [?] Schneider, probably right

42 πολιτείας δὲ κοινῆ μὲν κάθη | A next formula summing up the results of cc. 1–9.
1284 a 1 καθ’ ἐκτάσεις δὲ πολιτείαν ἐπερος] See c. 1 § 10 n. (440). SUSEM. (598)
1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ ...3 ἀρετήν | In the best constitution, the better class (βασιλείων) coincides not merely with the majority but even with the whole mass of citizens: cp. IV (VII). 9 § 3; 13 §§ 9, 10; VI (IV). 7 §§ 2–4. Thurot rightly remarks that after the negative answer §§ 5–10 n. (595) to the question first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11, 12 also contains the germs of a positive answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed to follow directly upon it, the answer is continued in the context without interruption of the connexion. Thurot is no less right when he observes that this solution is no direct answer to the former questions, but as regards its form is only this answer to the subordinate question of § 11 itself. There is therefore a considerable hiatus after § 12. But Thurot is scarcely correct and clear when he assumes that it can be supplied from §§ 11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that “in a state where there are virtuous men, rich men, nobles, and a mass of citizens, power belongs to all those who have true civic virtue, this being something different from moral virtue not only under an ideal government but everywhere else.” In my opinion, we should rather expect the conclusion that in the best constitution, all citizens ought to have equal rights, and that the true aristocracy is one in which all citizens are provided with sufficient property. But where the excellence (ἀρετή) of the few is equal to that of the many, especially if neither exceed a certain amount, in default of other means of satisfying the claims of both parties, either the exercise of full citizenship, or else the merely passive right of being elected to office (11 §§ 8 n. 569), must depend on a moderate property qualification, and wealth be introduced as a supplementary consideration. Thus, although inferior to aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity, would still be included among the normal forms, and would in such a case be better than democratic equality. SUSEM. (598) 2 δ’ ἀρματοὺς καὶ προαιρέσεις Comp. Thuc. IV. 5 §§ 11, 126 b 9; οὗτο γὰρ ἐν προαιρέσεσιν ἄδικαν δὲ, οὐθ’ ὁ δυνάμενος μὴ προαιρέσεις δεδιαβαλος ἢ φέναι. § 6 1283 b 9 ei de tōn ἀριθμὸν…13 πόλιν εἰς αὐτῶν] “But if the possessors of virtue are altogether few in number, how should we decide (Bernays: set the limits)? Or must their fewness be considered relatively to the task; are they competent to administer the city or, in other words, numerous enough to form a city themselves?” Schneider rightly saw that the last sentence contained a single supposition: able to manage the city, because strong enough to form a city by themselves.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 13. [Π. 13. 13]

§ 13 128α 4 εἴ δὲ τῆς ἐστίν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων καὶ ἀρετῆς ὑπερ-VIII 5 βολὴν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἐνός, μὴ μέντοι δύνατο πλῆρωμα πα-

§ 14 128ά 4 σῳπέρ γὰρ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκός εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. οὔτε δὲ ὃς ἂν ἡ τὸν πολιτείαν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι περὶ τούτος ἒνοντι καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δύναμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἐστὶ νόμος. αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖοι ἄν εἴῃ νομοθετεῖν τίς

Bradley. Trans.: “these men must cease to be accounted members of the city. For they will be wronged if they are deemed worthy of more equality when they are so far superior (ἀνθρώποις) in merit and civil capacity.” See II. 7 § 18 n., VIII(v). 1 § 3.

11 ἄνθρωποι γὰρ θεῶν] Comp. § 15 and n. (615). Aristotle could hardly express more strongly how improbable he himself considers this case. His reasons for considering it notwithstanding are no doubt those mentioned in § 1 for the consideration of other no less improbable cases. Cp. n. (542) and Introd. p. 79 f. See also n. (678) on II. 17. 5. Bradley Hellenica p. 239 rightly traces this thought to its origin in Plato’s Politicus. SUSEM. (601)

Plato’s words are ποιοῖς γὰρ ἐς ἔχεται ὃς, sc. τὴν ἐρήμων πολιτείαν, ἐκκεντροῦν, ὡς ὑπέρ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαι, 393 b.

§ 14 13 καὶ διήνυσει, applicable to, binding upon; and not necessarily ‘against’. Even the rule of law does not bind such men.

“This sentence καὶ ἄνθρωποι on καὶ ἀνθρώποι occurs word for word in St Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 53, suggesting, at all events, a direct adaptation from Aristotle.” (T. L. Heath.)

14 αὐτοῖς ὑπέρ ἐς νόμος] Comp. 17 § 2 n. (675). SUSEM. (601 b)

“Comp. the identical sentiment in St Paul’s Romans c. 2 v. 14, where λατρεύω εἰς τὸν νόμον is applied to θεὸν τὰς μη ἐξετάση τοὺς νόμος, further described (v. 15) as men who do by nature (φυσικῶς) the same things as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have
moral virtue" (T. L. Heath). Comp. Nic. Eth. iv. 8 § 10, 112a 32, õôv nômôs õôv tòv ãôv tòv ãôv.

The celebrated pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic school. The quotation is probably from his work Πολιτικός, 'The Statesman': cp. A. Müller De Anistithenae Cynicâ viâ ael scritâ p. 64 (Marburg 1866); Zeller Socrates and Socrates p. 233 n. (41) and c. 13 generally, p. 184 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (603)

Treatment of disproportionate eminence in the imperfect constitutions: §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead democracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15, 16. This has a counterpart in the execution by violence of eminent citizens which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in the policy pursued by sovereign states (Persia, Athens) in humiliating their subjects, § 19.


§ 15 16 17 διά... ὀστρακισμοῦ] It is improbable that this conception of Ostracism is the correct one. It was resorted to rather when two party leaders had each about the same number of followers and thus the machinery of the state was likely to be brought to a dead lock. In such cases, the removal of one converted the other into the leading statesman. This at any rate was the significance of this institution at the best period of the Athenian democracy, although according to Philochoros, Fr. 79 b, it was at Athens originally directed against the followers of the Peisistratidae (μὲν δὲ τὺν θέμος τὸν αὐτὸν... ὀστρακισμὸν ἤδη μεθαρμάθηκεν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς γυρίσαντας, ὥσπερ εὐεξίας καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αὐτ... Müller Frag. hist. gr. 1. p. 397, 3 ff.); and elsewhere too it may have had a similar origin. Thus it is possible that here Aristotle really adheres to the original intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in Jahrb. f. Philol. CXV. 1877 742, n. 8) though on the other hand in his remarks further on, § 23, there can be no doubt that he refers to its later degeneracy (n. 613). This institution prevailed at Athens from the time of Cleisthenes until the latter half of the Peloponnesian War or even later (n. 613), at Argos, VIII(v). 3 § 3 n. (1590 b), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, and Ephesus. At Athens the question whether there should be an Ostracism in any particular year was regularly debated and voted on in the popular assembly. If the result was affirmative, a day was fixed for another meeting of the Assembly, at which at least 6000 citizens had to be present: so Frankel and before him Lagebi ‘On the nature and historical significance of Ostracism at Athens in the Suppl. to the Jahrb. f. Philol. N. S. iv. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherds the name of the person whom he wished to banish, and the man who was thus designated by the majority had to leave Athens within 10 days for a term of ten years, subsequently diminished to five; he might however be recalled before that time by a vote of the Assembly. See Schömann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with Frankel's corrections ad. cit. p. 12 f. n. 1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 80 ff. SUSEM. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyrus, on which hardly decipherable fragments of Aristotle's ἄθρωμαν πολιτεία have been discovered, relates to the establishment of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes two phases in the development of this institution. At first the dread of a restoration of the Peisistratidae prevailed, and (a) relatives or friends of Hippias and Hipparchus were banished. Later on, as a settled institution, it fell upon (b) any who by preponderant influence threatened to become dangerous to democratic equality, such as Aristotle and Xenophon.' Diels restores ἐτὶ μὲν αὐτὸν ἄθρωμα (ἐπιτίδος τῶν τοιαύτων) φίλοις ὀστρακισάμενον, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῶν ἀποκεκομημένων (? δ_alpha) τις δῇ σχῆμα μείζον (θ|ραμ). The name of Aristotle is recovered from a brief excerpt in pseudo-Heraclides Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. ii. p. 209, 7 of the very passage which is but half recovered.
as far outweighing her crew"; φθηγχα- μένη μη δύνασθαι φέρειν το τούτον βέρον. Apollodor. 1. 9. 19.

17 οὐχ ἁπάντων οἰστέων ὅρθως ἐπειμένων") must not be thought to blame it with absolute justice."

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Πειρανδρὸν
In the account given by Herodotus v. 92, the parts of Periander and Thrasyllos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to the story again viii(v). 10 § 13. n. (1669).

For the tyrant Thrasyllos of Miletus see E. Curtius ii. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for the tyrants of Miletus in general viii(v). 5. 5. n. 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth, probably from 626 to 585, one of the most brilliant and at the same time most tragic figures among the earlier Greek tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded as one of the first to introduce all those measures which appeared, not without reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as inseparable from the tyrannis. See viii(v). 11. 4 n. (1711); also viii(v). 12. 3 nn. (1751, 1754), viii(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 10 nn. (1525, 1573); E. Curtius i. p. 250 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)

Livy (i. 54) borrows the story for Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.

32 συννοησαί] Comp. σύννοι θεόν θεόν, ii. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τούτο γὰρ κτλ] Oncken (ii. 173) says that Aristotle approves of Ostracism. It would be as correct (or
rather incorrect) to deduce from this ex-
position his approval of the violent mea-
sures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he
approves of both, but only from the
standpoint of Democracy and Tyranny
respectively, two forms of government
which he condemns and pronounces to be
degenerate types. See however n.
(614). SUSEM. (606)
35 δομιοὺς ἔχει, i.e. συμφέρει, it is the
interest of oligarchies and democracies
and accordingly they take such measures.
§ 19 38 τις πόλεως καὶ τὰ ἑθνῶν
'in the case of cities and nations' (und.
subject to them). See n. (11) and the
references there given. SUSEM. (607)
39 'Αθηναίων μὲν περὶ Σαμίων) Aris-
totle is thinking of the famous Samian
revolt, 441–440 B.C., see E. Curtius H. p.
471 ff. Eng. tr.: Von Wilamowitz
Athen. Kydathen p. 11 f. SUSEM. (608)
40 'Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους) Samos, Chios,
and Lesbos, were the only independ-
dent states amongst the allies of Athens.
In the year 424 however, the Chians were
compelled by the Athenians, who had
suspicions of their intentions, to pull
down their new walls: Thuc. iv. 51.
The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost
all the other cities of Lesbos, and their
punishment (427) are noticed viii (v).
4–6 p. 154 ff. (158); see E. Curtius H. pp. 100 ff.
118 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (609)
έπεται γὰρ... ἐν πάρα τὰς συνήθεις]

H.

For as soon as they had firmly grasped
empire they humbled these states in
violation of the compacts made with
them.' It is clear from n. (609) that
this is not true of the Lesbians: even in
regard to the Chians and the Samians it
scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM.
(610)
For ετῶν δὲντα as soon as, Shilleto
compares Demosthen. Panait. § 41 p.
957, 8, Conon § 5 p. 1257, 8; Plato
Protag. 325 c ἐπείδαν δὲνταν συνή τις τὰ
λεγόμενα, Alc. 1. 102 ἀνά δὲνταν εἰς τὸν
'Αθηναίων δήμων πάραλθη.

1284 b 1 τοῖς περιφοροματισμοῖς
κτλ.) 'Who had become haughty from
having once held empire.' The meaning
of ετῶν, 'to have been in authority' or 'to
have reached empire,' is worth noting.
It seems a metaphorical parallel to ετῶν
tiōn, i.e. ετῶν εὐθείας κριτικῆς. Com-
pare perhaps Dem. Philipp. 1. 7 p. 43 f. 4
ότι ἐπεὶ τῇ τινὶν ἐδόθη ἡ ἐνεχθήσει γενέθαι
gνώμην νῦν.

2 έπέκοπτες πολλάκις] 'used often to
reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod.
1. 159: externally regarded, his conduct
was certainly unusually mild. In regard
to the Babylonians see Herod. iii. 159
(Eaton). Comp. Ducker's History of
Antiquity (ed. 4) iv. pp. 334 ff., 464 ff.,
477 ff. (vol. vi. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.).
SUSEM. (611)
The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21. This is a frequent cause of revolutions (βλαστών), as is explained viii(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 καὶ eis the normal forms, § 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας a foot that violates symmetry in its size (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτήχοι), even if it were of surpassing beauty. κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπά c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbolaon) see Vahlen's Arist. Auffätze II. pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see Metaph. M. 3 §§ 11, 1078 a 36, τοις δὲ καλοῖς μέγατα ἑπὶ τάξιν καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν: this is illustrated in Pol. iv(vii). 4 §§ 7, Polit. 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see Intro. p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands ταῖς πόλεσι to be those which are ruled by μονάρχας. So Postgate (Notes p. 7). "Both 'poles' in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μονάρχας (notice not τίταραν)." See note (612).

15 κατά τὰς ὑπολογογομένας ἑπερατομένας Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for fictitious purposes.

17 βλαστῶν μὴν οὖν κτλ] Comp. vii(v). 3 §§ 3 n. (1510) where the same recommendation is given, κατὰ βλαστῶν ἐν ἄρχον ὡς ὅταν μὴ ἐπεσταλή τοιούτων ὑπερατομένων ἢ ἠδικότα γενέσθαι ἱερά προστεθεῖν, and c. 8 §§ 12 n. (1619). SUSEM. 611 b

13 ὅστε διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,
while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as αἰσθητῷ that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected αἰσθητῷ by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 23, ὡστε...δολάν, be inserted between τῶν ἄρχων and δολάν at the end of § 20; these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (ὡστε...δολάν) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch’s subjects as πόλεις; we should rather expect τῶν αρχηγῶν or at any rate τῶν πολίτων in both places instead of τῶν πόλεων; and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of καὶ “also” before τῶν πόλεων would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays’ own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. Susp. [618]

20 ὡστε...δολάν] If Thurot’s transposition be approved, this means: “but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government.” Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν αρχηγῶν δολάν — it was not used as a corrective.

21 οὐ γὰρ...κτλ] It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolos, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-
§ 24 συμφέρον, ἄλλα στασιαστικῶς ἐχρώντο τοῖς ὀστρακομοί. ἐν (VIII) μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκέναις πολιτείαις οḿεν ἰδία συμ-
φέρει καὶ δικαιῶν ἐστι, φαινοῦν, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ὦτε οὐχ ἀπλῶς
25 δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ φαινοῦν ἄλλα ἐπὶ τῆς ἁριστῆς πολιτείας ἐ
χει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἱσχύος καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἄλλα (p. 84)
§ 28 ἀν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ ἀρετῆς, τί χρῆ ποιεῖν; οὐ
gρά δὴ φαίην ἀν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθολοῖν τὸν τοιοῦ-
τον; ἄλλα μὲν οὖν ἥρχην γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον (παραπλησίω
γρά καὶ εἰ τοῦ Δίων ἥρχην ἄξιοίην), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς,
λειτουργοὶ τοῦτοι, ὅπερ ἐοικε περιπλεύσατε, πείθοντες τὸν τοιοῦτον
πᾶντας ἁρμένως, ὡστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἄδιων
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπὶ P2-3 || 31 ἄξιον Π Susem.1,2, 31 μὲν M. The
parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal
clause: μερίζοντες? Susem. || 32 ὅπερ-<καλ> Susem.1,2 and possibly Γ (quod et
videtur William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἄξιον] ἀπαγαγόν P4-6 Qb Tb || βασι-
λέας P2-3 Tb
casion how easily a combination of two
parties could defeat the true aim of this
institution, and turn it against the most
zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no
evidence that it was ever actually re-
sorted to again at Athens. Cf. Schö-
mann pp. 183, 395 Eng. tr. When the
healthy life of parties ceased there, and
especially when its surplus strength be-
gan to fail the state, and every man
of talent was needed at his post, Ostra-
cism proved to be superfluous.
When it had been more than once employed
in order to remove some person dis-
pleasing to the dominant party (Damon
Plut. Per. 4, Aristid. 7, Callias Pseudo-
Andoc. iv. 32) it disappeared from the
frame-work of the Constitution (See-
liger). SUSEM. (613)
Summary of results: the removal of
eminent men is (a) expedient and just in
the interests of perverted constitutions,
but (b) not absolutely just. The bet-
ter state can neither expect such a man of
prominent merit, nor treat him as an
ordinary subject. It only remains to make
him sovereign, §§ 24, 25.
§ 26 23 Ἰδιά] expedient and just in
the private interest of the government.
Not 'in particular cases.' This is a
restatement of §§ 18, 20.
24 εἰς ἀξίαν sc. ἐπὶ δίκαιον. The
mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον
of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἄλλα ἐπὶ τῆς ἁριστῆς πολιτείας
Aristotle does not say what should be
done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy,
which are also to be reckoned among
right forms of government. Is it possible
that he regarded Ostracism as still ad-
missible? Further comp. infra on 11.
9 § 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9
(595), 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5
(677–8); VI (IV), 2 §§ 1, 2 (113-3.6-7),
10 § 3 (1280) and Introd. p. 43 ff. 
SUS-
SEM. (614)
26 ὁ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἁρμένων τὴν
ὑπεροχήν] κατὰ governs ὑπεροχήν. Note
that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostra-
cism before, § 15, are now excluded.
§ 25 31 τοῦ Δίως] Used proverbi-
ally, as in Herod. v. 49 ἐν τῷ Διὸς τῶν
πιθανῶν ἄξιοίην, ὑγίαν ἦν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Ζεὺς
in wealth.' Comp. Nuc. Eth. vi. 13 §§ 8, 1145 a 10 ἔτο ἄξιον καὶ εἰ τῇ τοῖς
πολιτικῶν φαίη ἄρχην τῶν θεῶν (Eaton).
μερίζοντες τῶν ἀρχών] 'Not to rule
such an one, in a distribution of offices':
i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better
taken with ἀρχήν γε than, as Bernays
and others, with ἄξιον, in which case it
must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἀρχήν
καὶ ἄξιοις as in c. 17 § 7, ἄξιοι
ἄρχουσι κατὰ μέρος.
32 [βασιλεὰς ἀξίων] Kings for life.
The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν
tαι πόλεων certainly do not favour the
reference to Alexander which it was once
14 ἵνας δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τούτων εἰρήμενοι λόγους μετα-IX
36 βήναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας, φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὁρθῶν
πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτόμεν δὲ πότερον συμφέρει
τῇ μελλοῦσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσασθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα βασι-
λεύσθαι, ἡ οὖ, ἀλλ' ἄλλα τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τοιoi μὲν
§ 2 συμφέρει τιαί δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δει δὲ πρῶτον διελθάσαι
πότερον ἐν τῷ γένοις ἔστιν αὐτῆς ὡς πλείους ἐχεὶ διαφοράς.

185 a Ῥάδιον δὴ τούτι γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλεῖον τε γένει περὶ-
§ 3 ἐχεῖ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἔστιν οὐχ εἰς πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν
τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μᾶλλον τῶν
κατὰ νόμου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔξελθῃ

35 ὀλοκλήρωσεν Γ Μ' || 37 ἔδωκεν <καὶ> Koraes || δ' Susem., δ' ΓΠ Αρ. Βκ. ||
40 δ' ΓΜ' Π'2-3 || 41 τεν λατῖν τον Π' Βκ. || αὐτῶν Π Αρ.
185 a 1 Ῥάδιον Μ' Π' || δ' Susem.2 (perhaps rightly) || 4 δ' δ' Π4 Ο4 Tb Un
L', γάρ Αρ.

the fashion to discover in the treatise.
From viii(y), 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian mon-
archy was widely different from this exalation of one eminent citizen of ex-
traordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

14. Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the
first of which is Monarchy. There are five actual and historical types of single
rule: (a) the Spartan king, (b) the or-
iental sovereign, (c) the absolute sovereign, (d) the king in the heroic age:
§§ 2—14.
To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (e) that of the absolute sovereign with
full power, § 15.

The last type is alone of value for our
inquiry, because, as shown 14 § 25, 17
§§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate,
form of the best constitution. See Intro,
pp. 44—47, Analysis, p. 113 f., and VI(IV).
c. iō.

§ 1 36 φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὁρθῶν πολι-
tεων] Bernays, Trans. p. 172 n., arguing
in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out
that there is no link to connect these
words with the foregoing, as the normal
constitutions are not mentioned. He
therefore prefers to take the clause in
direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which
focuses on the words, 'the laws in the
normal forms of the state must necessarily
be just, but those in the perverted forms
not just.' To this it may be replied that
there is a mention of the 'normal forms'
in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply
the same antithesis). But it is more im-
portant to insist that a merely verbal
allusion of the kind, is, after all, inde-
cisive, whereas the discussion of mon-
archy forms a natural sequel to the result
enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25: which, be
it observed, answers the question of § 13
and § 6. Indeed Bernays' view would
have been more tenable if he had short-
ened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13
§§ 1—12, and had allowed the main
thread of the discussion to be resumed at
c. 13 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. Comp.
Introdc. p. 42 n. (3).

38 οἰκήσασθαι] middle. II. 1 § 3.
πόλει καὶ χώρας Comp. IV(VII). 6 § 5
χώρας καὶ πόλεως. This admits the case
of the θεσθορ or nation, and helps us to
see that Aristotle would not have allowed
Persia or Macedon to rank as a πόλεως,
although he would have admitted their
claim to possess a πολιτεία, and although
he calls the subjects πολιτείας, § 7. Cp.
n. on 12 § 8.

§ 2 185 a 1 γένει] Used indifferently
with θήνος (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for 'speci-
cies' or 'variety'; so L. 11 § 5 n., VI(IV).

§ 8. 'The kingly office in the Spartan
constitution is held to be the truest type
of monarchy according to law,' i.e. con-
stitutional or limited monarchies (ty-
ranries.

4 ἀλλ' ἄτον [εὐθὺς καλ.] 'He is
merely commander in war when he has
quitted the country.' See Schlämm
p. 228 Eng. tr. It is remarkable that
Aristotle does not notice the judicial
power of the Spartan kings and their
presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating after wards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 648) he rightly emphasizes the former.  

SUSEM. (612)  
§ 8  εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ "except in a specified case." To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 6 ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖς and the transposition of 9 ἐν τῶν ἀρχαῖοι ἐξήλθοντος to take their place.  

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαῖοι ἐκδέχοντος. In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schomann p. 217, Eng. tr., Tricher p. 114.  

SUSEM. (617)  
So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. vi. 57, Xen. Rep. Lac. 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, martial, and from its simple martial organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oligarchy, as the nobles profited by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the peculiar circumstances of Sparta crystallized (or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Epheors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.  
9 ἐν χερός νομῖοι in hand to hand encounters.  

10 Ἀγαμεμνών γὰρ κτλ] For Agamemnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates: e.g. Iliad 1. 215.  

SUSEM. (618)  
The Homeric 'ecclesia,' or ἀγαμή, is not the boule of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Gladstone Homeric Studies II. p. 114 ff., Freeman Comp. Politia, pp. 261—267. Grote has unduly depreciated it.  

§ 11 λέγει γὰρ] Iliad 11. 391 ff.  
But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words πάρ γὰρ ἢ μὲν θέσων are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ἐν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνυθεν μάχης πάνσωσιν νοῆσοι ὥστε οἱ ἀρχικοὶ ἐσπεύδαντε φυγεῖν κόμας, in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. 4 from II. xv. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater.  

SUSEM. (619)
§ 6 a] μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν αὐτὲς οἱ κατὰ ταῦτην ἐνὶ (IX) ἀλλο μοναρχίας εἰδος, οἷον παρ᾽ οἷον εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βασιλέων. ἔχουσι διὰ αὐτῆς τὴν δύναμιν πάσας παραπλησίαν τυραννίσουσι, εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ κατὰ νόμου καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ (p. 89) τὸ δουλικότερον τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν φόροι οἱ μὲν βασιλειαὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑβραίαν, ὑπομενοῦσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.

§ 7 τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ πάροικοι κατὰ νόμον εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλείας ἡ λειτουργεῖ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτίαν. εἰσὶ δὲ πολλὰς πολλὰς ὑπομενοῦσας ἐπὶ πολλῶν τῶν βασιλείων, τοῖς δὲ τυράννους ἀνεξενούντος ὑπὸ τοὺς βασιλείας, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἄνεξαντος ὑπὸ τοὺς βασιλείας, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἄνεξαντος διὰ τὰ δικαίωμα τῶν ἄνεξαντων, ἄφθος οὐ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλάς ἑξενούσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν ἤθη ταῦτα ἡ μοναρχία, ἡ συνόλως ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἄρχων Ἑλλήνων.

18 παρατησίων P² (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπλησίων Pα C⁴ Q Nb Ρb Rb Sb Tb Uv Vb L⁴ and P⁴ (1st hand, emended by corr.?) 19 τυραννικαί, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Susem., τυρανναὶ κατὰ κατὰ Γ Μ⁵, τυρανναὶ κατὰ P⁴ and P⁴ (corr.), τυρανναὶ κατὰ P⁴ Tb Vb and P⁴ (1st hand), τυρανναὶ κατὰ C⁴, τυρανναὶ κατὰ Κ Qb Rb Sb, τυρανναὶ εἰσὶ δὲ διὰ κατὰ P⁴ Q M⁵ Qb Uv L⁴, τυρανναὶ εἰσὶ δὲ διὰ κατὰ A, τυραννικαὶ εἰσὶ δὲ διὰ κατὰ W⁴ Ald. Bk. 20 πατρικὰς Γ Μ⁵, πατρικαὶ Ῥ, πάτριας Σpengel 21 δουλικότερα P⁴ Q Uv Ar. Ald. δουλικότερα M⁵ 22 εἰσὶ τὰ ἤθη Bk, εἰσὶ κατὰ τὰ ἤθη Π³ Ar. 23 πάροικοι ἡ πατρικοὶ Σchneider 24 πατρικοὶ Schneider 25 αὐτὴν τὸν τοῦ Ἑλλήνων ὁ τὸς τῶν Ἐλλήνων Ἑλλήνων Ἑλλήνων πατρικοὶ Ἑλλήνων.

16 a] οὐ a] a)] οὐδὲν a] a) Possibly the τάγην of Thessaly, called βασιλεία Her. v. 63, Thuc. i. 111; compared with the Roman dictator by Dion. Hal. Greece retained few traces of that older institution common to many Aryan races, an elective monarchy or chiefshipship but with presumption greatly in favour of a few noble families (βασιλεῖς=duke, while οἱ γεγονός= noble). See Gladstone Hom. Stud. III. 51, Freeman Comp. Polit. Lect. IV pp. 114—159.

§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule over unfree subjects (διοικητική), with their consent and in treaty of traditional forms.

18 τυραννικά οἱ τυραννοὶ In Eur. Herc. 423, ὡς ἄρα τυρανναὶ ἀντὶ βασιλέων ἄρει, the rule of non-Greek kings is called a tyranny (Eaton). Susem. (670) 19 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικότερον κατά Comp. 1. 2 §§ 4—2 n. (11), IV (vii). 21 § 12, 14 § 21; and note (lx, 756, 751). Susem. (621) 20 τα ἤθη] This accus. 'of respect' depends on δουλικότερον. Comp. 9 § 10 πλῆθος εἰς μέρος, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς firmly established, not to be overthrown (like tyranny). "Yet in 16 § 9, 1887 b 7; as in 11 § 7; 1881 b 26, and in 11 § 10 'safe,' 'trustworthy is the meaning.' (T. L. Heath.)

24 ἡ φυλακὴ] From meaning 'self-defence'—see viii (v). 11 § 27—the word came to be used in the concrete sense of a protecting force, or body-guard. So also ὡς ἄρα τοῦ βασιλευτή τοῦ Ἐλλήνων, vii (v). 23 § 8. 26 οἱ] Foreigners, a force of foreign mercenaries. Comp. c. 15 § 10 n. (665), § 14 (666), and especially viii (v). 10 § 10, φυλακὴ τυραννικὴ διὰ ἄρα κατα, n. (1666), Rhed. i. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 ff., Herod. i. 59 (Eaton). Susem. (622) 8 § 8 State officers called αὐταρχαῖοι were appointed anciently in troublesome times, some for life, others with a commission to accomplish a definite political task (πράξεων). Hence their analogy to the Roman dictators.

30 ἐπορον δὲ... αἰτεῖ] τυρανναὶ Comp. 15 § 14 n. 667, vii (iv). 10 § 2 n. (1277—9). In the Polity of Cyrene (Fr. 481, 1557 a.
οὐς καλοῦσιν αἰτωμενήτας. ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰσείν (IX) αἰρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς ὡς τῷ μὴ κατὰ § 9 νόμον ἄλλα τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἤρχον δὲ οἱ μὲν διὰ βλου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ἀριστερῶν 35 χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἶλομυτο ποτε Μικηληνίου Πιττακοῦ πρὸς τοὺς φυγαίδας ἄν προεισῆγε καί Ἀρτεμινίδης καὶ § 10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλαδὴ δ᾽ Ἀλκαῖος ὥστε ἄντρινον εἶλομυτο ὁ τῶν Πιττακοῦ ἐν τοῖς τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν ἐντυμήμα γὰρ ὃτι τῶν κακοπάραδικα

Πιττακοῦ πόλεως τάς δικήλδα καὶ βαρυδαμοῖς ἐστάχνητον τύραννον μὲγάλ᾽ ἐπαινίστει ἀδόλες.

35 ὁ μὲν Μ., ὁ μὲν Ρ., ὁ μὲν Ρ' καὶ so subsequently || 38 skolion Göttling || 40 τόδε Σνέιδσεν, τόθεν all ms. ecd. || dχιλω Schmidt Bergk, ἐδωλώ οτέ ἀδώλω Μ., dχιλω ΠΠΠ' Ar. Bk. Susen. 1-3-3, dχιλω Καμεράιου 1285 b 1 μέγ.] μὲν Γ. Μ' καὶ apparently 1st (1st hand) || παινίστεις? H. L. Ahrens

5ff. = 476 Rose Ar. produc. = 192 Müller Aristotel stated that in olden times the tyrants were called αἰτωμενήται (ὁ δὲ 'Αρισ-

τοτήλης ἐν Κυκλων τιλτήτα τοῦ τυρά-

νον ἕφη τὸ τρόπον αἰτωμενήπα προ-

αγορέσθησθαι, ἐφυμητέρων γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ-

νομα). Susen. (623)

32 ὁ τῷ μὲν κατὰ νόμων] For he was constitutionally appointed, although to powers beyond the constitution.

§ 9 35 ὁ μὲν ἔλοντο κτλ] The similar fragment of Theophrastos in Dionys. R. A. v. 73, already mentioned in the Introduction p. 18, n. 7, runs as follows: οἱ γὰρ αἰτωμενῆς καλοισίων παρ᾽ Ἑλληνὶ τῶν ἀρχών, ὡς τοῖς περὶ βασιλείᾳ ἐθνεῖς 'Θεόφραστον, αἴρετο τυπὸ τῶν τύραννων ὑποκοῦν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοὺς τέλειον τῆν ἡ 

ἐπὶ ὑποστηθεὶς τοῖς τε 

καὶ ὡς τῶν χρόνων. Τοιούτης ἡ Εἰρηνέων, τὸς δὲ πολλῶν, τοῦτο ἡ ἀναφορὰ 

φέειν, καὶ ὡς τοῦτον χρόνον: Those whom the Greeks in olden times called αἰτωμενή-

ται were, as Theophrastos states in his books on Monarchy, elected tyrants. But the states did not elect them for an indefinite period, nor yet regularly, but only during the pressure of misfortunes, as often and for as long a period of time as seemed expedient, as e.g. the Mityle-

nians once elected Pittacus to ward off the attack of the exiles, who followed the poet Alcaeus. The single expression "during the pressure of misfortunes" (πρὸς τῶν καιρῶν) is, as Krohn shows, thoroughly in the manner of Theophrastos and "so too is the further treatment which undertakes to assign to αἰτωμενήται its historical position in political development. Originally, he says, there prevailed everywhere in Greece a law-

abiding monarchy based on law; but gradually this degenerated into arbitrary rule, and the next step was to a republic. But neither did this prove strong enough to uphold law and right, and thus, through the pressure of circumstances, (καιροὶ τοῦ μέγαν νομοθετῆς) they reverted in reality, though not in name, to the establishment of monarchical powers. Compare the words, ν. c. 74, ὄρεα ἀνάδου, παρὰ τῶν τῶν βασιλείᾳ καὶ τυραννί-

κας ἐξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ὁπότε περικελέσ-

τοντες αὐτὰς εὐφέρεττας, οἶκα τοῖς μὲν 

ἀρχών, ἀκακεκλίουμεν δὲ ἀμοιβῆς καὶ κα-

λως, φοβοῦμεν τῶν τυράννων ἢ βασιλείᾳ αὐτοῦ τοὺς καλοῖς, with the fragment from Theophrastos Politeik pρὸς τὸν καιρὸν Β. i (in Harpocr. s. v. ἔποιμαν) πολλὸν γὰρ κα-

λως κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὄντοτοι δικαιο, ὡς οἱ 

ἀλακεκλίουμεν δὲ ἀμοιβῆς καὶ καλοῖς, ὡς 

Ἀθηναίοι, as a proof that the account moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to 

Theophrastos." (Henkel Zur Arist. 

Pol. p. 3, n. 1.) Susen. (624)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skollion was a particular kind of drinking song, sung by the guests at a party singly in a certain order. Fragments of them may be found in Bergk Phot. lyr. ΠΠΑ. p. 643 ff. Susen. (625)

39 κακοπάραδικα Does this mean base-born?) εἰσπρατίδαι? They set up the base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the
warful ill-fated town with loud cries assenting in full assembly (Wyse). Or is it 'be to his country'?

40 ἡπτακόμ. See Exc. II. on this book, p. 451 ff. Susem. (628)

§ 11 1285 b 2 διὰ τὸ διστοπικαὶ ἐναπανυκικαὶ κτᾶ. These two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves; hence they come under coercive or arbitrary rule (δεσποτεία, π. 68 ff. with note). Χερσες is σχῆν ἱππόφωνος ἀλέξει, Lysias. Οἰρος 213: Pittacus is αἰτητός τοῦ στάθμου. So far they are akin to the rule of an usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As Aristotle says they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).

4 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμοκάκης χρόνους The monarchies of the heroic age are described by Grote, Part I c. 20; Gladstone Studies on Homer II. pp. 1—69. See also Freeman Comp. Pol. Lect. IV. and Lect. II. p. 64 ff. 11 τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάστασιν. The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer calls the thing sworn by (σκῆπτρον), Zeüs vii. 411 &c. δρόκοι, Aristotle gives the name to the solemn accompanying act.

He is probably thinking of the mythical inventors. 8 τόις παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι 'he- reditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Ridge- way The Land Tenure in Homer in the Journal of Hellenic Studies vii. 1885, p. 337: the témpēs of Odysseus is by no means secure to Telemachos, Odys. xi. 184 f. 10 καὶ τῶν ὑσυγοιν ΚΤΑ. 'Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites,' e.g. like the Eumolpids (Jebb). So Saul, the Israelish king, is described as offering sacrifice.
§ 13 οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πᾶλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερώρια συνεχώς ἦρχον ὄστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παραείποντο τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάρτεις ὄντος κατελείφθησαν τοὺς βασιλεύοντας μόνον, ὅπου δὲ ἄξιον εἰσεύρεται εἰς βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερωρίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἄρμονιαν μόνον ἔχον.

§ 14 βασιλείας μὲν οὖν ἔδη ταῦτα, τέταρτα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Χ μᾶ μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχαίους χρόνους (αὐτὴ δὲ ἂν ἐκείνων μὲν, ἔπληκτος δὲ ὄστερον στρατηγὸς τοῖς γαρ ἦν καὶ δικαστής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρῶτοι τοὺς θεοὺς κύριοι), δευτέρα δὲ ἡ βαρβαρική (αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχής δεύτερη) κατὰ νόμον, τρίτη δὲ ἂν αὐτομονθεῖαν προσαγορεύσαν (αὐτῇ δὲ ἐστὶν αἱρέτης τυραιών); τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Δικαιοκρίτη τοῦτον (αὐτὴ δὲ ἂν ὅσῳ ἄπλοθες εἰσπερασμένοι στρατηγικά κατὰ νόμον). οὔτ' ἂν ἄρκετον ἢ ἄξιον εἰς τὸν ἑαυτόν ἐπεπείτη ἐκατόν τῶν κύριοι εἰς ὅν ὄστερον ἐκάτωτον καὶ πόλες ἐκάτοτη τῶν.

§ 15 γένους αἴδιοι: αὕτη μὲν οὖν τούτου τῶν τρόπον διαφέρουσαν ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δὲ ἐδοξεῖ βασιλείας, ὅταν ὦ πάντων κύριοι εἰς ὅν ὄστερον ἐκκάτωτον ἐδώς καὶ πόλες ἐκάτοτη τῶν [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ τάρται Μ器具, omitted by ΠΒ Αγ. Βκ. || ὁδεῖα ΠΒ Αγ. ΡΤ τε omitted by ΠΒ Βκ. || 27 εἰσεύρεται ΠΒ Αγ. Βκ. || 30 εἰς omitted by ΠΜ ΠΟ ΠΤ ἄρσεν Bücheler, probably right, ὅταν τετειμάτη ἐκάτοτη Courting.

§ 13 14 τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερώρια] 'As the kings themselves resigned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' παραρουμένων = shedding or paring off, as in e. e. 8.

§ 15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτα] 'Thus at Athens the second of the nine Archons specially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. iii. 142, iv. 161 (kings at Cyrene), vii. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also vii (vi). 8 Π τὸν (148) below and n. (1653) on viii(v). 10 Π τὸν. Susan. (629)

For the functions of the King Archon (whose wife was βασιλεία, as the wife of the Roman rex sacrorum was called Regina’) see also Lysias c. Andocidem, Or. 6 Π 4. 5: on the Argive kings Pausanias ii. 10 § 1 and Plutarch De fort. Alex. ii 10. § 8, p. 340 D; and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrifex, Dion. Hal. iv. 74, Plutarch Quaest. Rom. 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman 96. 9. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

§ 17 ὅτου δὲ ἄξιον θαύματος ὑπὲρ ἔδη, where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

§ 18 τῆς ἁμορρίας μόνον] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (516). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὅποιος εἰσίν, for the most part. Susan. (630)

The Argive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. vii. 149.

§ 15 22 ἂν τοῖς ὄστερον ΠΒ ἄρρυμων. On certain fixed conditions: ἄν μη τοῖς γένοις σπαρακτεῖ ἡ βασιλεία, Thuc. i. 13.

§ 24 ἀρχαὶ κατὰ γένος, hereditary.

§ 27 ὁ ἀπλόθες εἰσίν] See n. (630) and ii. 9 § 33, ἂν τοῖς βασιλεύον ἀκούσα τραγούδιον, n. (345). Susan. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the art of household management, τετραγώνη διὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας: cp. i. 1 § 2.
κοινῶν, τεταμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν ὁποτερ γὰρ ἢ (X) οἰκονομική βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἢ <παμ>βασιλεία πόλεως [καὶ έθνων ενὸς ἡ πλείονοι] οἰκονομία.

15 σχεδόν δὴ δύο ἕστιν ὡς εἴπετο εἰδή βασιλείας περὶ δὲν σκέ-πτεσκε, αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἡ Δακωνική. τῶν γὰρ ἀπλῶν αἱ πολλαὶ μετα-ξὺ τοὺτῶν εἰσίν. ἐξαιτίας μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασι-

31 τεταμένων Montecatino: Bücheler rightly thinks no change needed; if any, he prefers τεταμένη || 31 παμβασιλεία Susem., βασιλεία Γ Αρ. Βκ. See vi(iv).

10 § 3, 125 a 19 || 33 [τα...πλείονοι] M* || πλείονοι M* Π* and P*2 (1st hand, as the gen. of πλείον used as a subst. || by corr.1 or corr.2) || 36 βασιλείας Π*

tribe or Hellenic city. Comp. nn. (11. 633). Susem. (632)

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομία It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as M* gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see 1. 2. 4. n. 11) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpolator has been misled by the preceding words κατόπιστον ἄνωθεν καὶ πόλεως, and has made the mistake into which since his time many modern critics have fallen (see Introd. p. 36 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also vi(iv). 10 § 3 and n. (1780). Susem. (633)

34 Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be δεσποτικός, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle’s classification, Esprit des Lois B.XI cc. 8, 9.

§ 1 35 αἱ πολλαὶ The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the παμβασιλεία; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as δεσποτική ὁρκὴ from οἰκονομική in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy; but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (κοινωνεῖτε τὰ μοναρχικά) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler’s advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) heredity, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 Διατόνων μὲν...παμβασιλείας Of the ‘despotic’ kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarz rightly charges him, in Die Staatsformenlehre des Arius. p. 32 f. (Aristotle’s Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. To the former is opposed any arbitrary or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (δεσποτικὸς κατὰ τὴν εαυτοῦ βασιλείαν): to the latter is opposed only the μυχές rule of the τύραννος.

To what extent may this also be assert-
$2$ leias, πλειόνων δ' εἰσί ἡς Δακονικῆς. ὡστε τὸ σκέμμα σχέδου (X) περὶ δυοὺ ἐστὶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεισι στρατηγῶν ἀῤῥοῖν εἰναι, καὶ τούτου ἢ κατὰ γένους ἢ κατὰ αἴρεσιν, 1286 a ἢ οὔ συμφέρειν, ἐν δὲ πότερον ποτὲ ἐνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὔ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τούτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), (p. 87)

§ 3 ὡστε ἀφελεθῶς τὴν πρώτην ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πόλεως πολιτείας εἴδος εἴστιν, ὡστε περὶ τούτου δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἑνόσασας. ἀρχή δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὐτῆς, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον

39 αἴρεσιν $^{44}$ Le Ar., μέρος $^{48}$ Π 2 $^{48,6}$ Q 1 $^{5}$ £ Wc Wd Bk., ἀρέτην Bas. $^{4}$ in the margin 1286 a 1 ποτε omitted by Π Αρ. Bk., perhaps rightly $^{3}$ εἶχεν omitting εἶδος? Bernays

ed of the αἰσθήματα? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the αἰσθήματα too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the αἰσθήματα himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUSEM. (636)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμων ἢ ἐν χαλκό εἰδός—presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. ἔχειν as in εἶχεν λόγον 1. 6 § 9, or ἔχειν, III. 10 § 1, 11 § 1, 10, 12 § 1: and so ἔχει δ' ἐκτέρα χαλκ. De Part. anim. 1. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with ἔχει δ' is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὑπόγειον ἐδει, 1. 4 § 2. A better example is Rhet. II. 32 § 1, 1295 b 31, ἀλλ' ἵππον ἔχει δ' ἐκτέρα (Bekker ἐκτέραν) τών ἀνθρώπων. Trans. 'a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4 1286 a 1 ποτε Comp. 16 § 11. (669).

SUSEM. (635)

§ 5 ἀρχή ἀρχής 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his Politics. See Introd. p. 32 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τὴν πρώτην = at the first, as in Meta. Z (vii). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τοιαύτη εἰρήνη τῆς πρώτης. In Herod. 1. 153 τὴν πρώτην εἴσπρα: cf. III. 134. In Probl. II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης εἰς ἀρχήν. § 3 5 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ.) "But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution: hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed." Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i. e. πολιτεία. See nn. on c. 17 § 1. For ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like ἐκτελεῖν, comp. Rhet. 1. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from Introd. pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from Philologus xcv. 1867, pp. 386—392. Its rationale is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (ὁ δέ) ... § 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—9 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See Anal. p. 117 f.

First ἀρχάλα: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀρχάλα stated in 16 §§ 2—4.
§ 4. Argument in favour of monarchy. Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

"This side is defended in Plato's Politeia 294—303. Cp. c. 11 § 19 n. (179), c. 16 § 11 n. (652b—3), § 18—22 n. (275), VI (iv). 4 § 31 (1210)."  
SUSEM. (637)

12 ἐν ὑπομονῇ τέχνῃ...καθότως] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, Politi. 299—9.

καὶ τῶς ἐν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 293 c. See ii. 8 § 18 n. (370), III 16 § 6 (726), IV (vii). 2 § 13 (870). SUSM. (638)

13 μετὰ τὴν τρεῖμορον...καθότως] "After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk." Herodotos (II. 84) does not mention this, but Diodoros 1. 92 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not easy to determine which of the readings, τρεῖμορον οτι τετρήμορον, is correct. That melētēn must be understood with τὴν τρεῖμορον οτι τὴν τετρήμορον, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 if τετερακοσιοθέμερον τὴν μελητὴν καὶ τὴν ἡπίδημος χρή ποιεῖσθαι. Herodotos II. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the corn country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Diodoros § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all. SUSM. (639)
14. φανερῶ τούτον κτλ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5. Reply to this argument.

το ἀλλὰ μὴν καλεί νυν] "But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned; yet that which has no emotional nature" viz. the law "is in general superior to that in which it is innate."

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νῦν κτλ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); Nic. Eth. v. 6 § 5, 1134 a 351 X. 9 § 12, 1180 a 21 (Eaton). SUSM. (660)
Four objections to the human ruler.

Law is passionless and therefore its rule is the better; § 5.

Whether of marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place.

The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there were too of would have no force.

The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad Themist., 361) ὁ δεινόφορος...τῆς ἐπιθυμίας εἰς τὸν κόσμον...ὁ δεινόφορος...ἐπιθυμίας εἰς τὸν κόσμον, which is more clear than the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κελευόμενον ἀρχέει κελευόμενον ἀρχέει...ὁ τε ὡς ἐπιθυμία τουτέστιν, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἠρχόμενος διαστρέφεται καὶ τοῦ αἵρεσιν ἀνέργως. δύον ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ τε ὡς ἐπιθυμία τουτέστιν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τοῦ νόμου μόνον, the corruption of which into τοῦ νόμου is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See Julian and Aristotle in the Tz. Athens. 1878 p. 380f. Susen.

Trans. "he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers, it would seem; he who appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfeathered by passion."

Best explained by the Platonic simile in Rep., ix. 588 e, the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν).

While Plato makes ἐπιθυμία and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller Plato p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (i. 5 § 6 n. 46). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Hacker seems to assume in his treatise on the divisions and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics (Berlin 1865. 4) p. 5 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, βιαστικόν. At any rate Hacker's careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, ἄθλος on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; ἐπιθυμία then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unim-
32 ἄραντας διαστρέφει καὶ τῶν ἀπόστοις άραμα Προς Ιουλίου Bk. καὶ Πς (in the margin), ἀλλ' Πψ (1st hand, marked by dots for erasure). interrīmet William || ἦν οὖν νόμος Μηλος fr. Julian and Πς (1st hand): no doubt Π also. The full text of this older recension was ἦν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελέως . . . τόδε καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἦν . . . διαστρέφει καὶ τῶν ἀπόστοις . . . διάστησιν ἀπόστοις ἦν νόμος, ἦν ἦν καὶ τῶν νόμοις, ἦν ἦν καὶ τῶν νόμοις, ἦν ἦν καὶ τῶν νόμοις, which gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other || νόμος] μόνος Cod. Voss. of Julian || 34 γράμμα Μηλος fr. || καὶ omitted by fr. [καὶ] Susenr. 24, ἀλλ' untranslated by Ar. [ἀλλ'] Schneider || 35 φυλάττοιν ϰτος έξήκαν > Spengel (hardly needful) || 36 άραμας Μηλος Αρ. and apparently Πς (1st hand) || 39 πιστεύοντας Schneider Βκ. 5, probably right

peded activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit ὑμᾶς to external reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in Nic. Eth. VII. 6. 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master's opinion from the pupil's, and assume that in ὑμᾶς the idea of displeasure at oneself was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, 11(VII). 7. 2 n. (761), are the principal manifestations of ὑμᾶς, indeed ὑμᾶς is sometimes actually used for "Anger," sometimes for "Courage." As regards Hācker's second statement, the conception of ὑμᾶς in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere warding off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks 11(VII). 7. 5 n. (786), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call "the affections." On this analogy however, Fear should belong to it as well as Courage (709. IV. 5. 4 126 a 8 f.) but scarcely, as Eaton supposes, all the passions in contrast to Desire. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Hācker and Brandis (Gr. -
c. 16 § 8 | ξυτήσασαν αυ το κοιλόνν.  ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γάρ ἐπὶ εαυτοῦ ἑνός
1285 b | οἱ ἰατροὶ καμίνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γνωρίζοντες παιδοτρίβας, ὡς ὁ ἐνυμένος κρίνει τὸ ἄλθος ἐκ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τὸν ὦτος ἐπὶ τὸν ὄστης δήλον
4 | οὐ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον εἰσίν τοῖς ἐμοῖς  ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸνον ὄστην ἔργον ἐμὸς ἀνθρωπος ἀρχικος ἀρχαλέστερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐθνὸς.

c. 16 § 9 | ἀλλὰ ισῶς ἀν διάφη τοῖς ὃς ἄντι συνετὸς,  ἐς τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστά καλλόνν.  ἐν τῆ ἐμοὶ ἐντυπώσεις
1285 b | ἐν τῆ ἐμοὶ ἐντυπώσεις περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά καλλόνν.  ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμοὶ ἐντυπώσεις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμων ἐντυπώσεις περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά καλλόνν.  ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμοὶ ἐντυπώσεις περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά καλλόν
5 | κρίνειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἐμὸν ἀνθρωπος ἀρχικος ἀρχαλέστερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατά τὸ ἐθνὸς.

1285 a 20 | ἀλλὰ ισῶς ἀν διάφη τοῖς ὃς ἄντι συνετὸς,  ἐς τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστά καλλόνν.  ἐν τῆ ἐμοὶ ἐντυπώσεις
1286 a 21 | κρίνειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἐμὸν ἀνθρωπος ἀρχικος ἀρχαλέστερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐθνὸς.

§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainers in their practice (call in) other trainers, which implies that they cannot here judge aright, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling."

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The expression apparently used of the judge: the belligerent took this oath, says Demosthenes, XXIIII. C. Aristocr. § 50. p. 523 s. in fin. γυμνή τῇ δικαιοστή ἰδιαῖα παξικότησα, cap. αντ. Lepro. § 180, p. 493. i καὶ περὶ ὃν ἂν νομὸς μὴ δοθεί γυμνή τῇ δικαιοστή κροεῖν [δικαιομοίωσις θύμων]. Pollux VIII. 10 § 123, δ' ὄρκον τὸν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ἰδιαὶ γυμνῆς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ἄν μη εἰσὶ, γυμνῆς τῇ δικαιοστή. (Eaton.)

SUSEM. (645)

Aristotle remarks in Rhet. I. 15 § 5, 1375 a 29 f. that the oath may be explained to mean τὸ μὴ παστελῷ κριότατον τοῖς γεγομένοις.

27 ἑπανορθοβοῦσας. "and allows them to adopt any correction which appears upon trial to be an improvement upon the established laws." The play upon words ἑπανορθοβοῦσας...κειμένων is quite accidental.

On behalf of the place here assigned to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28 it may be urged (1) that the plurals (τῶν ἄρχοντων, παρεκβαινοντων) are not appropriate to the transition from the first to the second διαφορά, and (2) that only in this way do the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυριοῦ ἄναπαθείαν become intelligible.

c. 15 § 6 Transition to the second διαφορά. If it be allowed that there is a province (viz., that of particular cases) in which the decision of the laws is insufficient, should it be supplemented by the one best citizen, or by the entire community?

1286 a 25 ἀντί τοῦ καθ' ἐκάστον that he (viz. the ruler). Otherwise Eaton, "that there be some one to make laws."

25 ἄναπαθείαν ἄναπαθείαν...καθ' ἐκάστον. "but should not be unalterably binding where they are wrong." This refers to the gradual correction of the established laws just mentioned, c. 16 § 5.

§ 7 With §§ 7—9 compare the parallel version c. 16 §§ 10—13, printed in parallel columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνώνομα The subject is πάνες sc. of πολίται, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκάστον C. Rhet. I. 1 § 8 περὶ τοῦ γεγομένου ἢ μὴ γεγομένου, ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἢ μὴ δικαιοσύνης, ἢ ἑκάστην ἢ μὴ ἑκάστην, ἢ εἰς τό ἡμών, ἢ μὴ εἰς τό.; 7 περὶ τοῦ καθ' ἐκάστον καθ' ἐκάστον.

28 καθ' ἐκάστον Taken individually καθ' ἐκάστον inferior [to the one best citizen]
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 15. [ΠΙ. 15, 7—10

άλλ’ ἐστιν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὡσπερ ἐστιν συμφορητός (X) 30 καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τούτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον
§ 8 ὅψις πολλὰ ἡ ἐς ὅστισιν· ἐτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφορον τὸ ὅ
πολι, καθάπερ ὑδρό τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
όλοις ἀδιάφοροτέρων· τοῖς γάρ ἔνοις ὑπ’ ἄργης κρατήθηκεν
ἡ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεξάγεται τὴν κρί-
35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐργον ἀμή τάντας ἀργοθηκνία καὶ ἀμαρτείνει.
§ 9 ἐστι δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐκεῖθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τῶν ὑμῶν (p. 88)
πράπποντες, ἄλλ’ ἣ περὶ δὲν ἐκλείπει ἀναγκάζει αὐτῶν.
εἰ δὲ ὅτι μηδ’ ἐν τούτῳ ρέουν ἐν πολλοίς, ἄλλ’ εἰ πλεῖον ἐνεί
ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολλαὶ, πλῆθος δὲ ἐν ἀδιάφορος
τέρων ἄρχον, ἡ μᾶλλον οἱ πλεῖοις μὲν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἄγαθοι

29 [ὁσπερ...30 ἀπλή] Oncken || 30 κρίνων Μον II 32 καθάπερ <γάρ Bk.3, rashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian. Cp. Vahlen Zeitschr. f. d. ost. Gymn. XVIII. p. 721 ff. || 33 γάρ Susem., 3' Γ II Ar. Bk. || 37 ὅ Γ β Bk. || 38 τοῦτο μη Πο Bk.

29 ἵσταλες συμφορητός τινα ἤι σειστις ἥν εἴης ἀρχαίους, ἣτοι τοις ἵσταλες τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἄγαθοι.] Yet when, Rhet. 1. 1 § 7, he is comparing the functions of the dicast and of the laws he expresses an opinion which it is difficult to reconcile with this, δι’ ἐνα λαβεῖ καὶ ἀληθῶς μὲν ἡ πολλών εἰς ἀμαρτίας καὶ θυμωνίας τοιούτων διελέγεται καὶ διεξάγεται.

35 ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐργον "But in the other case it is improbable" lit. difficult, see II. 7 § 3 m., "that all should err at once."

36 ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐργον ἀμαρτείνει] This is hardly
correct. A large assembly is more likely to be led into over-hasty con-
cclusions than a single capable man and ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a large assembly, the passion does not generally last so long; and they more easily regain composure; while a single ruler, if once misled by inclination or hatred, may easily confound obstinacy and stubbornness with energy, so that there is greater danger that he will misuse his unlimited power. Susem. (647)

§ 9 36 μηδὲν παρὰ τῶν νόμων κτλ. "not acting against the law except," i.e. only acting against the law in cases where it [i.e. the law] must necessarily be de-
fective.

38 ἐν πολλαῖς = ἐν τῷ πλῆθος line 36.

32 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀδιάφορον. Nume-
rous enough, indeed, in the best state, to
III. 16. 9, 10] 1286 a 29–1286 b 3, <1287 b 8–1287 b 15>. 435

1286 b 1 δὲ τάντας; ἡ δὲ λοιπὴν ὡς οἱ πλείοις; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζοντες (X) ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀπασίαστος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιθετέων ἦσαν ὅτι σπουδαίων τῆς φυσίν, ἀστερν κάκεινος ὁ εἰς. 

1287 b 8–15 τούτων θείων πολλὰ τούτοις ἡ ἐνεστεία ἡ ἐνεστεία, τούτων τῶν ἀπό τούτων ἑνωμένων, ἡ ἐνεστεία. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζοντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιθετέων ἦσαν ὅτι σπουδαίων της φυσίν, ἀστερν κάκεινος ὁ εἰς.

1287 b 10 δὲ καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c. 13 § 8, §§ 13–25. See also c. 15 § 3 s. fin. If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate: "Lastly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior:" but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐν... διαφέρει) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are concisely worded and to which Barns says refers us c. 11 §§ 1–3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 12 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transpose thus: "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man &c." SUSEM. (649)

13 τοῦ δὲ ἐνοῦ] For δὲ in apodosis after τε ὡς, Phys. IV. 8 § 11, 215 b 15, etc. τὸ τῶν τριῶν ὑπέρεξεν ἐν, πλέον τοῦ βασιλέως οὐκέτι ἔχει λόγον ὑπέρεξεν. With ἀλλὰ this is frequent: see e.g. c. 5 § 3 of this paper.

14 τοῦ τε δὲ ἐρωμένου] Homer Iliad. X. 224. SUSEM. (650) ἡ εὐχή] Agamemnon says this of Nestor, Iliad II. 372 f. SUSEM. (651)

form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members amongst them, provided they are not too old: see iv(vii). 14 § 5. n. (817). SUSEM. (648)

§ 10 1286 b 1 δὲ τάντας] δ' ἄρθροι Γ Μ θ Ρ. 

στασιάζοντες Ar. Morel Bk.

1287 b 8–15 πολλὰ omitted by F6 Q5 T6 Ar. Ald. and P3a4 (1st hand, added in the margin of P4, and by a later hand in P5, but afterwards erased) 9 ψωφ' αυτοῦ fr. 11 δ...12 ἐστὶν before εἰ πρώτη Π II Ar. Bk., transposed by Susem. See Comm. n. (659) 13 δέ οἴκος μὲν οἱ πλείοις added by T6 untranslabeled by William ; a gloss which has found its way into the text, given by p3, and in red ink on the margin of P4, in the more correct and fuller form ἀπὸ κοπῆς τοῦ φίλου του τοῦ ἐνοῦ εἰς λόγον ἀργεῖν δικαιοῦν

The one ruler cannot overlook all things himself: he must appoint a number of officials; so that the state of things is virtually the same as if there were a number [i.e. a large body of the citizens] ruling.

1287 b 10 ἀρχηγὲς εὐθὺς ὑπέρεξεν] Whether this was the original state of things as it would be if the great body of citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 δὲ καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c. 13 § 8, §§ 13–25. See also c. 15 § 3 s. fin. If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate: "Lastly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior:" but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐνδο... ἐν αὐτῶν) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are concise worded and to which Barns says refers us c. 11 §§ 1–3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 12 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transpose thus: "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man &c." SUSEM. (649)

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28–2
4 τῶν πλείουν ἀρχήν ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἄνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίας στῶν θετῶν, τὴν δὲ τοὺς ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετότερον οὖν ἐν εἷς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνάμεως ὁμοίως τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείον ὁμοίως. § 11 καὶ διὰ τούτου ἵνα διαμετάβηται καὶ ἀρέτῃ, ἀλλὰ πεπέρας τότε καὶ τότε 10 μικράς οἰκονόμας πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἀν' εὐρείᾳ καθίστασι τοὺς βασιλείας, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνειπέραι ἐνίκεσαν πόλεις ὁμοίως πρὸς ἀρέτῃ, ὁμοίως ἢ ἐμφάνισθηνοι τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασιν. § 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρων γενόμενοι ἔχρημα ζωντανόν ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 8

1256 b 3—1257 a 3 1256 b 7 ἄρμος Γ 113 Ar. 7 9 πολέ. φθινὲς Ar., πολλοῖς Šylburg 110 ἐκεῖθεν Susem., ἐκεί Jackson, ἐκεῖ δὲ Susem. 1-2-4 with all earlier authorities 111 ἀνδρῶν Krolm rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐκεῖθεν disposes of his doubts. See Comm. n. (659) 13 καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ πολιτείαν; Susem. 14 γενόμενοι Π 13 Bk. 1, γενόμενοι Bk. 2

c. 15 § 10 1256 b 3 ἐκ δὴ τῆς μν... 5 Περιον] Compare n. (236) on 7 § 3. Susem. (659) 6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως “whether the king has an armed force granted to him or not.” Cp. § 14-16 § 3 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7 n. (612). Susem. (656) 7 αὐτοὶ λαβεῖν κτλ.] “provided always a majority can be found of uniform excellence.” In fact an “assembly of kings” as Kineas said of the Roman senate. ὁμοίως as in 4 § 5, and as in 15 § 11 ἁμολογαὶ πρὸς ἀρέτῃ. In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίας), we have a sort of historical appendix to the first two ἀρχαία.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τούτου κτλ.] The immediate reason is rather to be sought—as Aristotle himself explains 1. 2 § 6. n. (19 b)—in the development of the state from the family through the intermediate link of the village-community. It would have been better therefore to repeat that fact and then to add that on account of the further reason which is here adduced kingly rule was maintained for some time longer. Cp. n. (659). Susem. (657) 9 τότε μικρὰς ὀικονόμας πόλεας “considering too the small size of the cities in which they lived then.” Comp. § 13 n. (663), and the passages there collected. Susem. (658) 10 ἐπειδὴ ἀν' εὐρεγίαις κτλ.] It would have been highly desirable to adjust this second reason to the first. For if monarchy is traced back on the one hand to the government of a community by its elders, and on the other to personal merit, the two causes cannot simply be at once combined, though a partial combination is not only conceivable, but even right. Aristotle however has neglected to make it, and has thus left a difficulty unsolved. For when Henkel writes Stud. p. 96, “but even in places where the original connexion between the state and the organization of the family no longer exercised a determining influence, it was only monarchy that grew up in the beginnings of civilization,” adding the second reason to explain this, he is quite right, but unfortunately there is nothing of the kind in Aristotle. See also viii(v). 10. 3 n. (1649). Susem. (659) 12 συνειπέραι ἐνίκεσαν πολλοῖς κτλ.] Comp. viii(v). 10 § 37 n. (1708). “They would no longer submit to the rule of a king, but strove after a commonwealth (κοινὸν τι) and tried to set up a free government” (πολιτείαν): i.e. a republican constitution, or more accurately, first an aristocracy or a “polity” of horse soldiers, next a “polity” properly so called, of heavy-armed foot: vii(v). 13 § 10, cp. n. (1273). Susem. (660) 13 διὰ ταχέως κτλ.] Comp. vii(v). 15 ἀλλαγαρχαῖς And yet Aristotle (vii(v),...
15 ἐπετειθέν παθεν ἐσφαγῳς γενέσθαι τάς ἀληθείας, ἐκτιμοῦν (X) γὰρ ἐποίησαν τῶν πλουτοῦ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννιῶν εἰς δημοκρατίαν, αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἀληθείας ἄγοντες δὲ ἀισχροκέρδειαν ἀρχήσθητον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὡς τε ἐπιθέσεις καὶ γενέσθαι δη-
§ 23 μοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μελζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πό- 21 λεις, ἵσως οὐδερ ρᾷδιον ἐτὶ γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίας.

ei δὲ δὴ τις ἀριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύουσαν ἑκατὸν τὰς πόλειν, τῶν ἐξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος ἐι βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιοιμένων ὁποίοι τινε
17 μετέβαλον Μ' Π' fr. Ek. || 18 ἄγοντες <τοὺς ἀληθείας> οἱ ἄγοντες <τοὺς πλουτοὺς> or something similar Henkel (Studien, p. 56 n. 24): see Comm. n. (662) || 22 δι... 27 φῶν κατεβαζότας cited by Julian ad Theist. p. 260 D f. || 23 περὶ τὰ πολλὰ τὰς μος τος οἰκείοις except the Cod. Voss. || 24 οἰκείοις (οἰκείοις Μ') Π' fr. Julian and P² (corr.), οἰκείοις P² W² Ald. and P² (1st hand), οἰκείοις P₁ Q₁ T₁ L C

12 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Timocray to Oligarchy or precisely the same way (Schlosser). See nn. (1767, 1777). Susem. (661)

18 εἰς ἀληθείας ἄγοντες] Here τάς ἀληθείας or τίν ἀληθείας must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοὺς ἀληθείας or τοὺς πλουτούς in the text and translate: “while the powerful” (viz. the tyrants) “from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich.” But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchs were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (II. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δῆμος in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did “dispersed over its farms and isolated,” vili(v), § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a democracy arose. Susem. (662)

§ 13 δι ἐν τῷ ἐκ τῶν μεθομεν κτλ.] Comp. § 11, vii(iv), 5 § 6 n. (1325), 13 § 11 (1721), § 5; vii(vi), 5 § 5 (1435), 6 § 5 (1448—9), also vii(v), 12, 3 n. (1310). Beside this increase in the population, Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, viii(v), § 8 § 9, comp. mm. (1558—9), and viii(v), 10 § 5 n. (1650): the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, vii(vi), v, 2, and the development of the navy, κυ ρον. (1453—5) (Henkel). Susem. (663)

21 τῶν οὐδέρ ρᾷδιον κτλ.] “Nowadays hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise.” “Kingly rule in particular is not to be expected; if a monarchic constitution arises at all, it is in the form of tyrannie, viii(v), 10 § 37; cp. vii(vi), 5 §§ 8—9 (Henkel) with n. (1705). Susem. (664)

22 δι δὴ τις... 23 τῶν τέκνων]) This is the third δῆμος: a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heredity has been modified at different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on 12B § 16; (2) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γιοιμένων ὁποίοι τινες ἐτέραν ἀληθείαν ἂν ἔφεσαν] “But that will be mischievous if
the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random; or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior." So Pl. Gorg. 514 ε παλλά μέν ὅπως ἔσχατον τοιχίαν, παλλά δὲ κατορθώσας: Eur. H. E. 79 τῆς μὲν ἄκαμπτης ἡ δ' ἰσχυρέτερη.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important" (Congreve). Susem. (666).

48 οὐ διαυήγηται] The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means nothing only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (680), 14 § 7 n. (612). Susem. (666).

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι κυρίος ὑπὲρ τοῦ, "For even if he be legally sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws."

Susem. (667).


39 ὅτι ἐν τοῖς φιλάκασι] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (ἐπισχεσίᾳ τὸν διὸ τὸν ὄρατον Διόδ. xiii. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros xiii. 83—94 (cpr. nn. 1562, 1576) ο. c. 406 or 425. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm Gezichte Sicilien ii. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. viii (v. s. 5) § 10 n. (652), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723): also i. 11. 12 n. (166), Khet. 1. 2. 19, 1357 b 30, Plato Rep. viii 566 b, Polyaeon. v. 2. 2. Susem. (668).

c. 16 § 12 827 a. 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλείου κτλ.] This clause with δὲ answers
πράττοντος ὁ τε λόγος ἐφόσον τίνι καὶ ποιητέων τινὸς σκέ- (XI) ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νῦνον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἐστὶν εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ υπάρ- χεις εὐνέχεια στρατηγίας αἴδευς, οὗν ἐν ἐμφανίσει καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἑνὰ κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἄρχη τις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμον, καὶ περὶ ὁποία σὲ κατὰ τὰ μέρη ἐπάττον·) περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβατ- σείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἓν ἄρχην πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν βουλήσεως ὁ βασιλεὺς, = *.

Προτέτο καὶ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν κύριον ἐναὶ πάντων ἐναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτου, συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὀμολογίας ἡ πόλις· τός γὰρ ὀμολογίας φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δικαίως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν

1287 4 πολιτείας Camerarius and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλείας Γ’ II (including fr.) Ar. Susen, 1 in the text = 8 Διακήρυκαν Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahel’s copy of Morel (probably right) = 8 περ. 13 διακήρυκαν quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 631 A. f.

1 ἐστὶν Codex Vossianus of Julian = ἀρχηγὸν... 10 βασιλεὺς perhaps transposed by Γ’ II (including fr.) πὲν Codex Vossianus = 10 αὐτοῦ Cod. Voss. (accent by a second hand), αὐτοῦ Hertlein = λεκτων inserted after βασιλεὺς by Γ’; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by π’; κατὰ κατὰ τὸ λεκτόν. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δ’, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Sylburg and Scaliger, to δῆ. τὸ κατὰ Julian = 11 εἶναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐναὶ Γ’ Mt. Susen, 1–2 = ὄνομα.... 12 πῶς and 13 καί.... φύσιν omitted by Julian.

to the preceding one beginning τάχα μὲν ὄντι 15 § 16; and it is an objection to Mr. J. Cook Wilson’s analysis of cc. 15, 16 that it ignores this correspondence.

2 ἐφόσον] the question is now at hand, impedes.

4 καθάπερ εἴπομεν c. 15 § 2, n. (135). Susen. (699)

5 ἀδίκως held for life.

6 τῆς διοικήσεως’ of the administration. Not in the technical sense in which ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως meant the Minister of Finance at Athens.

7 περὶ Ἐπίδαμου] Comp. VIII (v). 1 § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1580); also II. 7 § 23 n. (1349). Susen. (676)


9 § 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 α βασιλεύς; the omission of δὲ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δῆ is another.

For instead of extending to παμβασιλεία the fourth ἀποφαίωσε which in 15 §§ 15, 16, 1866 b 34–40 received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, ἀποφαίωσε (5); viz. is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly when all are peers (鸹ሙ)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (ἀπὸ προσωποῦ) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law? Thus by the mention of law the difficulty brings us round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unexceptionable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments §§ 4–13 which bear more or less closely upon the first and second ἀποφαίωσε.

10 δικαίως ἐπὶ τῆς] Comp. II. 2 § 2 n. (134), § 6 (134 b); IV (vii). 3 § 6 n. (740); further 1. 7 § 1 n. (28 b); IV (vii). 8 § 2 (797), VII (iv). 11 § 8 (1923). Susen. (672)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 16.

[ΠΙ. 16.2]

εἶναι, ὡστ' εἴπερ καὶ τό ἵσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἄνδρος τροφήν ἢ (XI)
15 ἐσθήτα βλαβερῶν τῶν σώμασιν, <καὶ> οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
§ 3 τῶν τιμῶν, ὁμοίως τοῖς τιμωνίης καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τῶν ἴσων. δύσπερ οὐδένα 3
μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος τοῖς
νόμον ὄστρακον, τούτο τὸ αὐτὸ νόμος ἢ ὑπηρέται τοὺς
νόμοις. τὸν (p. 90)
19 ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετοῦτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα
§ 4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτήν δὲ λόγον τούτων, καὶ εἰ τινὰς ἄρχειν
βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατεῖν νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
νόμοις. αἰνεικειοῦν γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔνα τοῦ-
23 τοῦ εἰφατον δίκαιον ὁμοίως γε ὄστρακον πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν
δὲν γε ἰδιόκτητα διορίξει οὐ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπος
§ 5 αν δύνατο νομολογεῖν. ἀλλ' ἐπιτίθεται παραδείγματος ὁ νόμος
26 ἀνθρωπος τὰ λουτρά τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνει καὶ διοικῶν
τοὺς ἄρχοντας. η τι δ' ἐνακροβούθαι δίδωσιν, ὁ τι δὲν δεῖ
28 πειραμάτους ἀνείπου εἶναι τῶν κεφάλων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον

14 εἴπερ] ἣν τῆς an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine [ἢ] ὡστ' 
εἴπερ καὶ ἦν τῆς ἢν Schneider | 15 <καὶ> Gotling [ἢ] ἦν Schneider 
§ 3 16 οὗ τοῦ ἢν αὐτήν κτλ.
"So too it is quite as harmful if unequal 
shares are assigned to those who are 
equal. Hence it is right that in ruling 
and being ruled all should be alike, and 
consequently should interchange with one 
another in both. But here we come to 
law, for the system "on which they 
interchange "is a law."

17 τὸ ἐνδα μέρος rotation in ruling 
and being ruled.
18 ὁματία γε ὅτι.
§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας = guardians of 
the laws : the expression used by Plato Law IV 715 C (Eaton). 
SUSEM. (673b)
22 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ.] " In order to bring 
this passage 1187 a 23–28, as it stands, 
into logical connexion with the preceding 
fifth ἀρχοντα, it will be necessary to regard 
it not as an objection to the view therein 
expressed, but as introducing a new objec-
tion to a ruler who goes beyond the letter 
of the law: ἀλλὰ μὴν = but again, as in 1162
b 24, 1187 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25 — 27, allows that within certain limits the 
one ruler is really in a position to make 
such decisions, and speaks of rulers in 
the plural. Hence there can be no ques-
tion here of attacking or defending monar-
chy, and besides all the ἀρχοντα are alike 
in treating absolute monarchy unfavour-
ably. It would still be open to us to 
read ἵνα with Arctinus instead of ἤνα, 
a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the 
next line would not be in place: ἄρ, omits 
it and we should rather expect ἤνα or 
ἄρει or something of that sort." SUSEM.
28 ὁ μὴν οὖν] " It is not to be denied 
that, if the preceding passage 1187 a 23–28 
be transposed, this passage 1187 a 28—b 8 
might quite well follow the fifth ἀρχοντα, 
so far as the connexion of thought goes. 
But the form renders this impossible. The 
fact that law is passionless is not an infer-
ence that can be drawn from the natural 
injustice of a permanent ruling body: so 
that ἦν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor 
will it suit as a transitional particle, with-
out something else, καὶ or ἦν ἦστ'" SUSEM.
κελεύων ἀρχαῖν δοκεὶ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεόν καὶ τῶν νοῶν (XI)
30 μόνον, ὁ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησεν καὶ θηρίον ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ·
τοιοῦτον καὶ ὃ θυμός ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἄριστους
§ 6 ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διότι ἀνεῖ ἄρξεως νοῶν ἂ ν νόμος ἰστὶν. τὸ σὲ
δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παρὰ δεινοῖς φεῦγει, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ
34 γράμματα λιατρεύεται φαίλων, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρέτωτερον χρή·
§ 7 στὶς εἰσ νὰ τὰς πέρας. ὁμώς μὴ γνᾶθεν διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
παρὰ τῶν λόγων ποιῶντο, ἀλλ' ἄρνεται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
κάμοντας ἕμαστήντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
πολλά πρὸς ἐπιρρεῖαν καὶ χάριν ἔλθασι πρᾶξιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
τοὺς λατρεύεις ὡστὶ ἐπιτεύχοντας πιστεύει. τὸν ἑχοῦς δια-
40 ϑέλειν διὰ κέρδους, τότε τὴν ἓ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεύει·
§ 8 ξητισάντων· ἄν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μήν εἰσάγοντας γ' ἵ' ἐναυτοὺς 0
1286 b 15 οἱ λατρεῖ καμάντας ἀλλοις λατρεῖν καὶ οἱ παιδατρίβαις γνώ-
ματιζόμενοι παιδατρίβαις, ὡς οἴνον ἀνάμειν κρίνειν τὸ ἀλήθει διὰ
τὸ κρίνειν πρὸς τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄρισε. ὡστε δηλον ὅτι τὸ
§ 9 δικαιὸν ξητισάντων τὸ μέσον ξητισάντων· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ μέσον.
5 ἦ τε κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριώτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὕστερον εἰ τῶν κατὰ γραμ-
μάτας ἀνθρωπος ἀρχαι ἀσφαλέστεροι, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατά τό (p. 91)
8 έθες, ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδὲ βάθιον ἐφοράν πολλά τὸν ἄν' ἐφέτειας ἡ
ἀρα πλεονασμα εἰναι τούς ὡς αὐτοῦ καθυστημένα άρχοντας,
10 ὡστε τί διαφέρει τούτο ἵς ἀρχήν εὐθείαν ὑπάρχειν ἂ τὸν ἔνα
§ 10 καταστήσας τούτον τὸν πρότοσπον· ἦτε, ἦτε, ἡ τα πρότερον εἰρήμενον
12 ιστήν, ἢ ἀνήρ ἢ σπουδαῖος, διϊκτε βελτίων, ἀρχεῖν δι-
13 καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνος οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίων· τούτο γὰρ ἠπτό τὸ
14 στὸν τε δι' ἄρχομεν
καὶ ἡ εἰς τού Άγαμάννος
τοιοῦτο δέκα μείς ἑμφάνζοντες.
|| εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ εὐνῶν αἱ
16 ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὡσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὅν ὁ νόμος
ἀνεπατε διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὅν γε διατῶν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-
1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν... 15 συμφράδομεν transposed to follow
1286 b 3 ὄ εἰς: see p. 435
1287 b 15 εἰς δὲ καὶ... 35 δεῖν ἀμφισβητος is another recension of 1286 a 26
—b 3. See Introd. p. 84 f. || δὲ] γὰρ? Susem. || 17 γε omitted by Π ΒК.

C. 16 §§ 10—13. 1287 b 15—35. In
Introdd. pp. 84—5, the reader will find this
passage printed in parallel columns side by
side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3,
an arrangement which cannot be adopted
here, simply because it is then no longer
possible to preserve the lines of Bekker's
quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.
ΠΟΛΙΤΩΚΩΝ Γ. 16. [III. 16. 10]

τέι περι τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἀριστα ὁ νόμος ἀρξει καὶ κρίνεται. (XI)

§ 11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληψθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ § 20 ἔτος, ταῦτα ἔστιν ἂ ποιεὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τῶν ἀριστῶν νόμων ἀρχεῖν αἰρετότερον ἢ τὸν ἀνδρὰ τὸν ἄρι-

ςτον. Περὶ ἄν γὰρ βουλευταί θαυμάσθησα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔστιν. ὡς τοῖς τούτοι ή ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄν-

24 ἄρωστον εἶναι τῶν κρινόντων τῷ τούτους, ἀλλ' ὅτι § 12 οὖν ἕνα μόνον ἄλλα πολλοῖς. κρίνει γὰρ ἐκάστος ἀρχηγός πεπαι

dεμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀποτελεῖ τ' ἱερὸν ἄν εἶναι δύ

ξειν εἰ βέβαιον ἔξοι τῆς δύον ἱεραί καὶ δυναί ἀκοιαῖ

κρίνειν, καὶ πράττον δυναί ποιεῖ καὶ χειρέως, ἢ πολλαὶ πολ

λοίς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦν

30 αὐτοῖς καὶ ὧτα καὶ χειράρ ποῖᾶς. τοῖς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ

§ 13 καὶ αὐτῶν φίλους ποιοῦντα συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὡς

οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προάρρεσε' εἰ δὲ φίλοι

κακεῖνον καὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς, δ' εἰ φίλοι ἱερὸς καὶ χειρός, ὅστ' εἰ

τούτων οἰκεῖα δεῖν ἄρχειν, τούς ἱεροὺς καὶ χειρῶν ἀρχεῖν οἰκεῖα

35 δεῖν ὁμοίως.||

17 ἄ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγου-

18 ὧν...κρίνεις transposed to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by IP, untranslated by Ar. || 19 καὶ omitted by Γ and P4 (1st hand, added by p1') || ἐπεὶ δὴ Π2 fr. Bk. || 22 νεομο-

βησινοθεθῆσθαι Susem.1 2 άλλη statuta esse William || 25 κρέων Spengel, κρίνεις Π Π2 Ar. Bk. || 26 ἀποκορον...31 συνάρχονς cited in Scholla on Aristoph. Birds 92 || τ' Π2 fr., θ' Π2 fr. Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ἔγχυς Susem, δὲ Π Π2 [including fr.] Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || διὸν Sylburg || 28 πράττει Conring wrongly, but recog-

nizing that the text was unsound || 29 μεταρχεῖν Π3 fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || 30 αὐτῶν Morel, αὐτῶν II Schol. Aristoph., αὐτῶν Susem.1 2 (idi William), possibly right || τῇ ἁρχῇ Casaubon || 31 αὐτῶν Susem.3, αὐτῶν Π3 Susem.2 Bk.1, αὐτῶν Schol. Aristoph. Susem.1, perhaps right, αὐτῶν Bk.2, but see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 123 a 18 ff. || 32 δ' omitted by fr. || 33 δ' τε Π, ἤτοι Π4 Π2 Ald., ἤτοι Qb, ἤ δ' Ar. || φίλον τοὺς Γ M4

c. 16 § 11 19 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ταῖς μὲν κτλ] It is on this account that 'equity' is necess-

ary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See Nic. Eth. v. 8. Cf. also Rhet. 1. 13 § 12ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Copes comments and his In-

terp. pp. 190—193], Plato Polit. 294 a ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 570, 637 and v(VI). 4. 31 n. (1213), Susem. (652)

22 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ βουλευτῶν] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of Nic. Eth. III. c. 3. Susem. (653)

tῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔστιν] Here, it may be remarked, Mr J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1297 a 23—28, ἀλλὰ μὴ δει...τῶν κε-

μιον.]

§ 12 29 ὀφθαλμοὺς] An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king: Herod. 1. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. Persæ 973, Aristoph. Achar. 94 with scholiast, Xenoph. Cyr. par. viii. 2 §§ 10—12. Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. De Mundo c. 6, 398 b 21 ff., Poll. II.

4 (Eaton) and n. (1715) upon viii(V). 11 §§ 7. Susem. (658)
c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3
III. 17. 3] 1287 b 18—1288 a 6.

(11)

36 si, σχεδον ταυτ’ εστίν αλλ’ ίσως ταυτ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τῶν τρόπων τούτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἀλλὰ βασιλεῖαν καὶ ἀλλὰ πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον τυραννικὸν δ’ οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, (p. 98)

40 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν πολιτειῶν ὅσα παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν ταῦτα § 2 γὰρ γίνεται [ταῖ] παρὰ φύσιν. αλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φα- 1288 a νέρων ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὑμοίοις καὶ ἴσως οὕτω συμφέρουν εστὶν οὕτω δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἰναι πάντως, οὕτω μὴ δύνανται νόμοι, αλλ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ὑπηκοοῦν, οὕτω νομαί δύνανται, οὕτω ἄγαθον οὐδὲν ὑπηκοοῦν μὴ ἄγαθον, οὐδ’ ἀν κατ’ ἀρετὴν § 3 ἀμείων ἕ, εἰ μή τρόπον τινά. τίς δ’ ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέουν εἰρημένη δὲ πῶς ἐστὶ καὶ πρῶτον. [πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ 11

38 δεσποτικῶν δεσποτών P4 P5 Q5 Q6 T9 fr. Ald., probably also P4 (1st hand), δεσποτῶν Syllburg Bk, ἄρσητων Bk in place of either δεσποτικῶν or βασιλείας Schlosser. See Comm. || καὶ ἀλλα βασιλείας omitted by P1 (in P4 added in the margin) || βασιλείας P4 Q5 Q6 T9 fr. Ald. Bk., probably also P4 (1st hand), βασιλείας P4 (corr.) || 41 τά righted omitted by IP Ar. Bk., retained by fr.


will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the leitū τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας, or absolute monarchy. Comp. Susenil Ques. crit. coll. p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to that commonwealth of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise. Comp. c. 15 § 9.

§ 1 36 ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν i.e. in certain circumstances: not, as Bernays and others translate, "in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies)." See n. (677) and Ques. crit. coll. p. 397 ff. Susen. (674)

38 δεσποτικῶν…βασιλείας 1"Bekker writes δεσποτῶν after Syllburg and βασιλείας as in P1. But we find τυραννικῶν standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like ἄρσητων καὶ πολιτικῶν, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read δεσποτικῶν with Götting, as in P1, and adopt βασιλείας from the corr. of P1. Further, how else are we to construe καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀλλον παρεκβάσεις, to which Lambin raised an objection? But with the text before us ἦστι φύσιν is the predicate of the first clause, ἦστι κατὰ φύσιν the predicate of the second clause; all the rest is subject."

Suses. (674)

40 ταυτα γὰρ…παρά φύσιν) Compare the apparently inconsistent passage VIII (iv). 12 § 3 n. (1310). Susen. (674 b)

§ 2 1288 a 3 αλλ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ὑπηκοοῦν] Cp. 13 § 14 n. 601 b. Susen. (675)

This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato.

§ 3 6 καὶ πρῶτον) γίνεται c. 13 §§ 13—25. Susen. (676)

6 πρῶτον 81….15 ἀρχαί] Kohlen is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle’s conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it faithfully. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and rulers. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for
aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true
monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz.
that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see Intro. p. 44). For this very reason,
we would not translate above at 17 § 11 "for some people monarchical government
is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather:
"under some circumstances the one, and
under others the other." But the inter-
polator, like many modern critics, mis-
understanding the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him
necessary to interpolate here an exact
account of each kind of people. When
the passage is rightly interpreted, the
incorrectness of this interpolation at once
becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is
closely connected with καὶ πράσινον...
(§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this
connexion entirely. In its present form
the definition of the people suited to a
Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether
we adopt the reading εὐπώρος or άπώ-
ρος; the former gives a mixture of aristo-
cracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous
combination of aristocracy and demo-
cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad
even for this interpolator, and we ought
perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τοῖς
εὐπώροις καὶ τοῖς άπώροις which would
remove the difficulty. Susem. (677)
§ 4 12 πολιτικῶν δὲ πλήθος κτλ.
If we adopt the very probable change of the
second πλήθος into ἦλθος, the sense is:
"And the population suited for a Polity
is that in which there is naturally a
wilful character (ἦλθος), qualified to be
rulers as well as subjects in accordance
with a law which assigns the offices of
state in accordance with their merits to
the rich (οἱ ἄξιοι)?" If this
change be not made, the sentence will be
differently rendered according as the
second πλήθος is regarded (τ) as mere re-
dundancy (Postgate Notes p. 25), or (ε) as
used in a different sense from the
first: i.e. as meaning 'body,' 'class'
within the entire civic population. Ber-
nays, while adopting this latter view,
makes διάκομα...ἄρχεται refer to the first
πολιτικῶν πλῆθος; which seems inconsis-
tent. If 'the population suited to Polity'
were 'one in which a warlike class natu-
rally arises,' it should merely be this class
and not the population generally 'in
which an interchange of ruling and being
ruled can be carried into effect.' Susem.
16 ἄλλον ἐνα τιμαὶ συμβαθὶ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατʼ ἄρετῆν (XI) τοσοῦτον ὠς ὁ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἔκεισθη τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλεύκος καὶ κύριον πάντων.
§ 6 τοι καὶ βασιλεύα τῶν ἑνα τούτων. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρὸ τοῦ τεροῦν, οὐ μόνον ὀντως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ προφέρειν εἰσὶν, ὁι τὸ τοιαύτα καθιστάντας οἱ τε τὰς ἁριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ἀναρχικὰς καὶ πᾶλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντῃ γὰρ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἄξιον, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν § 7 αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεγέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἡ § 13 φυσικῶν οὐδ’ ὀστρακίζεσθαι δὴ ποῦ τὸν τοιούτων τρέπον ἐστὶν, οὔτ’ ἄξιον ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος’ οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τὸν πνεῦμα τὸ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύνην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοιτι.
§ 8 τοῦτο συμβαθὲν, ὡστε λειτυται μόνον τὸ πειθοῦσι καὶ τοιοῦτο καὶ κύριον καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τούτων] ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.

περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς, καὶ πρότερον XII

10 τιν δὲ omitted by Π[!] (τιν] Susem.1 || 20 [ο.opacity] Bojesen || 21 ἀριστοκρατίας and 22 ἀριστοκρατίας Γ M Susem.1 || 22 δημοκρατίας Γ Susem.1 and Μ[!] (1st hand) || 23 πάντῃ fr. πάντῃs Π[!] Α[!] Β[!] and Π[!] (1st hand), perhaps right; yet altered to πάντῃ by the corr. of Π[!]] δὲ [ὁ]...ὑπεροχὴ omitted by Τ[!] and Π[!] Q[!b] (1st hand, δὲ[!] added in the margin of Π[!], and δὲ[!] ἄξιον ἀρχεσθαι by a later hand in the margin of Q[!b]) || 24 <καὶ> Schneider, which supersedes Bojesen’s violent change (line 20) and Spengel’s suspicion of 20 ὁ ὀμόνοι οὐς || 27 τὶν omitted by Μ[!] P[!] Q[!b] T[!b] Β[!] || 29 τούτων omitted by Π[!] || κατὰ μέρος εἰς τοῦτον ἀλλὰ ἀπελεύθερον.

§ 5 18 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ] Aristotle speaks with far more correctness here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing with a whole stock of individuals or even a single man. But this gives a fresh proof (προ. ψωφ. p. 49) that in describing his ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of Macedonia; for not even Oncken would attribute to him the absurdity of regarding the whole royal family of Macedon as gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615). Susem. (678)
§ 6 19 ἔρημον προτέρου) viz. c. 13 §§ 23—24 and §§ 1—12. Susem. (679)
21 τὰς ἁριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of aristocracy, we should at first sight rather expect polity: for aristocracy is founded on the right of fitness or merit, the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 526). But Aristotle is here pointing to the explanations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is aristocracy and not polity that is discussed; and even this is hypothetically designated as faulty, in cases, that is, where the excellence of the community is not weighed against that of individuals to see which excels the other. Susem. (680)
24 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεγέν] sc. δίκαιον ‘but also according to the right previously expounded’: viz. the right of merit, when the estimate just mentioned (in n. 680) has been correctly made. Accordingly we are referred back to c. 9 as well as to c. 13. Further comp. τὸ (595) and v. 18 (1495). Susem. (681)
§ 7 26 ὁ ...-πέφυκε...28 συμβαθὲν] ‘For it is not natural that the part should outweigh the whole, and the possessor of such extraordinary eminence has happened to be in this case’ viz. that all the others together stand to him as part to whole. The ordinary interpretation is, ‘For it is not the course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas this happens when a man is very superior to the rest.’ But see c. 13 § 13. Susem. (681 b)
§ 8 20 μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς] ‘not merely in rotation’ with others, ‘but absolutely sovereign.’
31 ο ν συμφέρει ταίς τόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πώς, (XII)
18 διωρισθού τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀριστήσιν εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν οἰκονομομενῆς, τοιαύτη δ' ἔστιν ἐν ἦ συμβεβη-
35 κεν ἦ ἐνα τινά συμπάντων ἦ γένος ὠλον ἦ πλῆθος ὑπέρεχον εἶναι κατ' ἀρετήν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαί δυναμένων τῶν δ' ἀρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἱρετικὴν ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδεί-
χθη λόγως ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνήφρο ἀρετήν εἶναι καὶ πολίτων τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεος. φανερὸν ὅτι τοὺς αὐτὸν τρόπουν
40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν αὐτὴ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖοι καὶ πόλων συ-
στήσεως ἀν τις ἀριστοκρατομενῆς ὁ βασειλευμένης, ὅτε ἐστάσει 2
1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἐθή ταύτα σχέδου τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαίον
§ 2 ἀνδρὰ καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικῶν [καὶ βασιλικῶν]. διωρισμέ-
νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδὸν περαιτέρω λέγεν τῆς
4 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθιστασθαι πώς.

36 ἀρχεσθαί καὶ ἀρχέων > Spengel Bk. || 35 τῆς τόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης ἰἱνέρ. Bk.
|| 41 <ἀριστήν> ἀριστοκρατομενῆς Bücheler, probably right. Schmidt
thinks ἀριστοκρατομενῆς ἢ βασιλευμένης a gloss which has taken the place of the
true reading ἀριστήν πολιτευμένην ὠ εἰς τασαγμῆν; [ἡ βασειλευμένης] Spengel who
first saw the text to be unsound.
1288 b 2 πολιτικῶν πολίτης ἀγαθῶν (οἱ σπουδαῖοι)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικῶν]
Spengel, καὶ βασιλικῶν <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῶν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλευόν
Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good
sense || 4 καθιστάσθαι τῶν Μ, καθιστασθαί πῶς Πδ Τδ Υδ Αλδ. and Πδ (1st hand,
the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense,
i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy.
This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV
(vii), v(viii), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal
state in its normal form is or is not
identical with the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία Aristocracy:
point which Forchhammer (Philol.
XV, p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (Philol. XIV.
p. 293 ff. Der alte Staat des Arist. p. 66 ff.),
defending the traditional order of the
books, denied. Their objections are
examined by Spengel Arist. Studien II.
p. 60 (652) f.
§ 1 34 οἰκονομομενῆς administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see vii(v), § 48 τῇ ἄλλῃ
οἰκονομῇ.
25 ἦ ἐνα τινά... ἦ γένος ὠλον ἦ πλῆθος] The first two cases give the ideal kingdom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third
gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n.
(600). SUSEM. (682)
37 πρὸς τὴν... ζωήν] Comp. ii. 1 § 1
n. (128): also n. (21) on i. 2 § 8, n. (284)
π. 9 § 5 and the passages there
SUSEM. (683)
c. 5 δη τοὺς πρῶτοι λόγους] c. 5 § 10; see n. (471).
SUSEM. (684)
At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and
including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀνάγει δὲ τῶν
μέλλωντα περὶ ἡσύχασθαι τὴν προ-
θέκουσαν σχέσιν. It was Spengel's great
Stud. II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in
this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back
from the time when that discussion im-
mediately followed the present chapter,
and consequently evidence of an older
order of the books than that adopted by
the compilers of our present text (An-
EXCURSUS I.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. 1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel Studien p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotos III. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that 'during the Peloponnesian war,' as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names (Thuc. III. 82): afterwards the Socratics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν εὐδομαν ὀρατοκρατίαν, Plato Politic. 302 D.' Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannis, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the mastery descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding1 as at Sparta (Xen. Mem. III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. De Rep. Lac. 10. 7, Plato Crito 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. Mem. IV. 6. 12, cp. I. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

1 And not, as Oncken II. 153 misinforms us only 'after performance of definite statutory injunctions.'
the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (Xen. Mem. III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master’s footsteps most closely in his Politicus, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates’ Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the Republic so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the Politicus arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the Republic on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the Politicus to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller Plato p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the Republic and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

1 Hence Oncken’s criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account, and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

2 That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: Plato Polit. 219 D f., 302 C.
the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (ll. 6. 17 with n. 219, cp. also Introd. p. 20): for Plato in the Republic does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: IX 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shows himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the Laws, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also n. 191 on II. 6. 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited: the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the Politicus, except that it is not stated in the Laws whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyrannis, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the Politicus, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy: nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the Republic. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the Laws, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a ‘government by the best,’ although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 C D it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by “Aristocracy.” We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7, 3, VI (IV), 7, 1, Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 1—cp. n. 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato’s time gave it the common name Poliarchia, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution par excellence; or else (b) because as in their opinion the best constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the Ethics I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-

H. 29
tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 n. (537), VI(IV). 9. 3 n. (1254), VI(IV). 13. 7 n. (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(IV). 2. 3 (cp. nn. 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the Politicus, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the ‘old fashioned’ and the ‘modern’ Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(IV). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4. VIII(V). §§ 10 and n. (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(IV). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. n. 1126), also VI(IV). 2 § 4 n. 1140 b, VII(VI). 1 § 7 n. 1383 b, VIII(V). 12 § 18 n. 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(IV). c. 4 f. VII(VI). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato’s procedure in the Politicus and the Laws he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Polities, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 §§ 9, cp. 2 § 1 n. (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(VII). 11. 5 (849), also n. (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 nn. (595, 597, 601), c. 17 nn. (677, 678); VI(IV). 2 § 1 f. nn. (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 n. comparing nn. (521) on III. 6. 1, 614 on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. Introd. p. 44 ff.

The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 1—3: 2 indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotos, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy.

1 Comp. e.g. Isocr. VII. 15 ff.
2 The divergences which Oeckel, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.

3 But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.
in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (Panath. §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the Ethics, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published; nor is there anything said in the Ethics about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f, criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s’appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l’organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intrinsèques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, c’est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is there not a difference in the ‘principle of the constitution itself’ between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it.

SUSEM. (533)

EXCURSUS II.

PITTAUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Töpfer more particularly has recently shown in his Quaestiones Fisistratiae pp. 81—107.

1 Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Müller’s History of Greek Literature, Geschichte der griech. Litt. ii ii p. 281 f. (op. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that the Nicomachean Ethics owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils’ notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato’s lifetime in the Academy; but see, as against this, Sussemlil in Philologischer Jahresbericht XLIII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken ii p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded: — if, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teichmüller and Bergk that the polemic of Isocrates in the Panathenaicus §§ 16—34 is directed against Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato’s death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 344 to 342 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Sussemlil Jahresber. XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of these ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the Panathenaicus). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I take it, to abstain from it.
(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthilidæ, viii (V. l. 39 n. 1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris Fr. 53 in Diog. Laert. l. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenæans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Trœad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenæan colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenæans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippus (Fr. 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo xiii. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. xiii. 600, Plut. De Herod. malign. c. 15, Diog. Laert. l. c., Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo ii. c., Apollodoros Fr. 78 in Diog. Laert. l. c., Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," στρατωρικά, as they are called (Strab. xiv. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, Fr. 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. l. 76, Diod. ix. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 n. 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. l. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record
in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger: hence the *floruit* (ἄντιχ) of the latter, *i.e.* his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2 = 611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2 = 651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, *i.e.* as Eusebius in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3 = 606. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, viz. the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus’ appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne ‘Researches into the life of Sappho’ in *Symb. phil. Bonn.* p. 755 ff.), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus’ tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3 = 570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Laert. Diog. 1. 79, where ἤθεοκτόνα must obviously be altered to ἤθεοκτόνα). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, *e.g.* to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenes we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfrid Müller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, ‘A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,’ in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Müller’s only reason on the other side, viz. that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *ep. cit.* vi. p. 281; “Antimenes may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar’s Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

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1 The text of Suidas (s. v. Πιττακός) καὶ τῷ μὲν Ὀλυμπίδω Μελαχρον τὸν τύραννον Μινυληφής ἄντιχε. καὶ Φρύνωνα στρατηγὸν Ἀθηναίων πολέμουτα ἐπὶ τοῦ Σίγειον μετειχέον ἄντιχεν διατηρεῖν περιβαλὼν ἄντιχε should be thus punctuated, with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἄντιχε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Töpffer p. 85 ff.
EXCURSUS II.

Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem.” Moreover, as Alcaeus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (Fr. 106 in Strabo 1. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. Susem. (836) Cp. now Rhein. Mus. xliv. 1887, p. 140 ff

| Ol. 32, 2 | Pittacus born | B.C. 651 |
| Ol. 36 | Phrynion aetat. 25 victor | 636 |
| Ol. 42 | Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros |
| Ol. 42, 2 | Pittacus floruit, aetat. 40 | 611 |
| Phrynion aetat. 50 conquers Sigeion |
| Ol. 43, 3 | Phrynion slain in single combat by Pittacus | 606 |
| Ol. 47 | Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles | 592 |
| Ol. 47, 2 | Pittacus aetat. 60 | 591 |
| Ol. 47, 3 | Pittacus made Aesymnetes | 590 |
| Ol. 50 | Pittacus resigns his office | 580 |
| Ol. 52, 3 | Pittacus dies, aetat. 81 | 570 |

EXCURSUS III.

FRAGMENTA VATICANA RESCRIPTA.

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the Rheinisches Museum for 1887, vol. xliv p. 102 ff. G. Heybut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the Politics: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age¹ the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blemishes of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes². The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius’ conjecture ἀντῶν, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of καί, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P³, the principal codex of the family P³, although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent². For the definite separation between the two recensions P¹ and

¹ Heybut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

² It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heybut 59 record the partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of η ἐπιλεκτικόν; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of ditography, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

³ Namely, of the XIV century, four centuries later than fr.
\( \Pi^4 \) was brought about, as I have shown\(^1\), in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian’s \( \text{MS} \) apparently more nearly resembled \( \Pi^1 \) than \( \Pi^2 \), while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of \( \Pi^1 \) and of \( \Pi^3 \). Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heybut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in \( \Pi^1 \) or \( \Pi^3 \). On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that \( \Pi^1 \) has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases\(^2\) than \( \Pi^3 \), and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heybut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with \( \Pi^1 \), or with \( \Pi^3 \); sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, “\( 1276 \text{ b } 30 \) διακομονοις, 1287 \text{ b } 13 \) ερχομενον.” The second of these three erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as \( \Pi^1 \) has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, διακομονοις for διακομονοιν, the fragment as well as \( \Gamma \) Μ\(^4\) had already converted this into διακομονοιν\(^3\). Still more interesting is \( 1292 \text{ a } 3 \), where \( \text{M}^4 \) has the true reading with \( \Pi^3 \), while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in \( \Gamma \) and, originally also in \( \Pi^1 \). At \( 1287 \text{ a } 33 \) \( \Gamma \Pi^2 \) rightly have γράμματα, fr. has γράμμα with \( \text{M}^4 \Pi^1 \). The statement “\( 1286 \text{ b } 17 \) μετέβαλλον with \( \Pi^2 \)” is quite misleading: for here it is only \( \Pi^1 \) that has μετέβαλλον at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of \( \Gamma \). At \( 1278 \text{ a } 36 \) the order of the words in fr. is the same as in \( \Pi^1 \) and corr. \( \Pi^4 \), i.e. a branch of \( \Pi^3 \).

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2 A reference to a single passage may suffice. \( \Pi \) 2 § 6, 1261 a 39 ff, where \( \Pi^3 \) affords an especially deterrent example: cp. Quast. crit. coll. p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a series of similar passages.
3 See above p. 76 n. (1). We know that \( \Pi^1 \) was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century: for on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrios Chalandonas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.
Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heybut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have 
*βουλεύομεν* with Π² and *κρινόμεν* with Π¹. Heybut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Π¹ or Π², as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with Π²" in the following cases: 1276 b 33, 1277 a 29, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (εσπαρειο); and "with Π¹" in the following: 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (ς το πολιτεύμα), 1280 b 4 (εσπαρειο), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write ὀδείει and *γίγνεται* with Π², on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Π² against Π¹ 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Π¹ 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided². The correctness of the calculation that Π¹ has retained the true text oftener than Π² cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *αφιη* is undoubtedly derived from Π¹. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π², even this makes but very little change in favour of Π².

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. *φύει * μὲν ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἄνθρωπος *πολιτικὸς* on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π² fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heybut adduces; but unfortunately Heybut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 διὸ πολιτικὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπος, Eth. Nic. 1097 b 11 φύει πολιτικὸν ἀνθρώπος, 1169 b 18 πολιτικὸς γὰρ ἀνθρώπος. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἀνθρώπος, as Stöhr suggests.¹]

On the other hand in the above calculation καὶ εἶ or καὶ εἶ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotele everywhere wrote καὶ εἶ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently Places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς πόλεως τῆς άριστης: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

¹ It is a mere accident that Π² here agrees with Π¹. With the copyist of Π² no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

² Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Π² fr. agree against Π¹ there are 11 others where the text with Heybut collated fr., viz. Susen, agrees with Π¹ against Π², viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 b 12, b 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases Π² omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292 b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 34, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heybut's silence) to agree with Susen, i.e. with Π¹ as against Π²: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π² fr. are agreed as against Π¹.


⁴ See Commentationes Philologicae (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.
feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension Π¹ (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f, 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heybut's examples at 1280 a 15 f,¹ and 1288 a 13 f.² Those which he adduces in favour of μία διπόη 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight.³ However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heybut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms μύδαρχος and μονάρχης: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words οὐκ ἔλαττον, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by Π¹ than added by Π² without justification. But now it appears that Fr. agrees with Π¹ in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heybut has proved that they are untenable.⁴ On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the ye inserted after δετής by Π² Fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace τοὺς in the text with P² Fr. Ald. Bk., as here the sense favours the article. SUSEM.

Heybut's collation with the text of Susm.⁵ is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 εὐγεγορυμένους | 19 γὰρ | ἀπλῶς: λ is added above the line | 21 εστίν | 22 μαλῶν | 24 εἰσαν | 26 αὐρίστως: o added above the line | 33 (ο μὲν) | 34 (λεγομένους) | 39 (μεκανοῦσα); there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted τῶν δὲ προτέρας

1275 b 4 (ναὶ...ἐκακάζεται) πολιτείᾳ (ἀν διὸ) περὶ ὅλης (θέσεως) | 5 εστίν | 7 εν omitted | 8 δικαίουσα | 10 αλλος αλλος | 11 τὴν τετειμέ | 12 κριμασιν | 13 (ταύ) | 15 εστίν | 16 βουλευθεῖσα with Π² | 19 βουλευθεῖσα η κριτικής | 20 (προ) ...21 (ορικώς)

¹ In favour of φαίλω κρατεί, the order of Π¹ Fr., Heybut quotes 1282 a 16, Τοπ. viii. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 ενελ δὲ φαίλει καρποῦ δ ἐμποδίζου κτλ., Nic. Eth. 1. 3 § 5, 1994 b 28 ἀγαθὸς κρατής.

² For the less usual order of Π² Fr., δικαίουσα κα τρίχων, Heybut cites 1459 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with Κιτικ. not.

³ They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18, 1322 a 8, a 26.

⁴ Heybut points out that θλαττον denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. πελος—

⁵ In favour of φαίλω κρατεί, the order of Π¹ Fr., Heybut quotes 1282 a 16, Τοπ. viii. 11 § 3, 1318 a 26: εἰς ἔλαττον εἰς ἐξακόσιαν ἵλον, viii. (vii). 6 § 3, 1305 b 12: αὖ γὰρ ἑξάκοσιν, αὖ δὲ δὲ ἔλαττον (sc. χρόνου) ποιώτως τίτι ἀρχάς viii. 15 § 1, 1299 b 6: αὖ γὰρ ἐλαττῶν διεξογράφων viii. (vii). 3 § 2, 1241 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by αὖ ἴττον, αὖ δὲ ἴττον, the opposite of which is πολὺ ἴττον = much less easily, e.g. vii. (vii). 11 § 11, 1260 a 5. At vii. (vii). 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, ἴττον is parallel to αὖ γὰρ ἴττον μῆναν.
EXCURSUS III.

Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut’s statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have δολαιμοβατιου with Πβ and ἐφόδον with Πα. Heylbut’s omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Πβ or Πα, as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added “with Πβ” in the following cases: 1276 b 33. 1277 a 30. 1278 b 19. 1281 a 3. 1288 a 29. 1292 b 9 (ἐφόδον); and “with Πβ” in the following: 1276 b 36. 1279 a 25 (ἐν πολεμισμοῖς). 1280 b 4. 1285 b 41. 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write ἐφόδον and ἐφόδουμ with Πα, on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Πβ against Πα 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly. While 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Πβ 37 times, 20 times rightly and only 7 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided. The correctness of the calculation that Πβ has retained the true text oftener than Πα cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 αὐτῶν is undoubtedly derived from Πβ. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Πα, even this makes but very little change in favour of Πα.

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. γονεῖς ἐν εἰκῇ ἐκ τῶν μοιχῶν γίνομεν: on the contrary there can be no doubt that Πβ fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 ἀποταματίων γόνι ό μοιχῶν, Eth. Nik. 1007 b 11: γονεῖς μοιχαίνων ὡς ἀποταματίων, 1169 b 18, 18 πολεμισμοῖς γίνοι σκώρα τῶν μοιχῶν. Moreover ἀνεπίπονος may be for ἀποταματίων, as Stöhr suggests.

On the other hand in the above calculation αἰνεῖ ἢ or αἰνεῖ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote ἀINEῖ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς μοιχᾶς τῆς ἀνδρός: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

It is a mere accident that Μα here agrees with Πα. With the cogniz of Μα no such task is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is but a doubt.

Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Πβ fr. agree against Πα there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collocated fr. var. Sasen, agrees with Πα against Πβ. viz. 1375 a 35 f. 1377 a 18. 19. 1278 a 24. 1320 b 4. 1888 a 19. In which cases Πβ omits words: also 1277 a 3 f. 1280 a 24. 1291 b 27. 1292 b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32. 1280 b 34. 1286 b 24. 1288 b 27. 1290 b 19. 1291 a 39. b 6. 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut’s silence) to agree with Sasen, i.e. with Πα as against Πβ: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Πβ fr. are agreed as against Πα.

See Kassow Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik. (Weimar, 1874) p. 54. 4 See Commentationes Philologicae (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.
feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension Π¹ (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut’s examples at 1280 a 15 f.¹ and 1288 a 13 f.² Those which he adduces in favour of μία ἀριθμὸς 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight.³ However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor’s own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms μοῖρας and μοῖρας: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

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Heylbut’s collation with the text of Susen.³ is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 εὐγεγραμμένοις | 19 γαρ | ἀπλῶς: λ is added above the line | 21 εἰσιν | 22 μᾶλλον | 24 εἰσὶ | 26 αὐτῶν: o added above the line | 33 (o μεν) | 34 (λε).γεγραμμένοις | 39 (πα...σοσιας): there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted τῶν δὲ πρῶτοι.

1275 b 4 (νωμεν...) πολιστε(αν διο) περαλαχθειες) | 5 εἰσιν | 7 εν omitted | 8 δικαζομαι | 10 αλλοις ἀλλας | 11 της ετερας | 12 εκφοβησι | 13 (του) | 15 εἰσιν | 16 ο.year the copyist with Π² | 19 βουλευτικδις ερντικδις | 20 (προ...) 21 (ποριστικδις).

¹ In favour of φαίλοι κριτι, the order of Π² fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, Top. viii. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 ἐπει δὲ φαίλοι κοινών ἐμποδίζων κτλ., Nic. Eth. 1. 3 § 5, 1924 b 28 ἀγαθός κριτῆς.

² For the less usual order of Π² fr., ὄχρωτα διὰ ἀρχαις, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with Crit. note.

³ They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18, 1322 a 8, a 26.

⁴ Heylbut points out that ἔλατον denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. πλεον—

Διατομον. vii(vi). 3 § 3, 1318 a 26: εἰ ἔλατων ἐν ἐξαισθησις ἄθροι, viii(vi). 6 § 3, 1305 b 12: αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐξαισθησις, ὑπὲρ δὲ ἔλατων (sc. χρόνου) ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχας vii(vi). 15 § 1, 1299 a 6: ὑπὸ γὰρ ἔλατον ἀλτικνίαν vii(vi). 3 § 3, 1325 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by τῶν ἄτονον, οὐδὲν ἦτεν, the opposite of which is πολλοῦ ἦτεν much less easily, e.g. vii(vi). 11 § 11, 1326 a 5. At vii(vi). 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, ἦτεν is parallel to ὑπὸ γαρ διομον βῆσαν.
EXCURSUS III.

ζουται) δὴ | 23 επὶ...οινον twice over | 24 παμπυσον | 25 ατορπομνικον | 26 εφευρετονομικον | 29 στο αυτον twice over | λαρμασσομενον, but just before λαμβανομεν | 30 εστιν | 31 διομοσιον | 32 και γαρ αυδε

1276 b 18 ἡμι corrected from ἡμι | 21 τοδε | 23 τειχωμην τουκαιτερ | 24 δη(λουν) | 25 (αρχη)ε | 26 (κρηναν εστιν)ε | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία δ’ εστιν is omitted | 30 διοι με Π1 Π2 | πολε(του προ) | 31 εστιν | 32 (αρχη)ε | 33 των δ’...τελειων is omitted with Μ1 Π3 | 34 επεκεκοθαι(αι) | πολε(την) | 35 (καθη)ε | 36 ἀλλα is omitted with Π1 | εστιν | 39 αυτων | ποιειν | 40 επακε Π2 | (παρ)γαν

1277 a 1 ει(νι)μυ(αι)αρετη η σις | Π2 | (κα)ε | 2 (σουδαιον πολει(νοι)ει | 3 (αναγκαιον ειναι τη)η(ν)ε | πολε την | πολετην | αγαθον αδυνατον ει μη | 5 (τραπον)δαια | 6 (πολεωσερ) ζωον | ψυχη (ει) | 8 εκτρεπε | 9 ανοικουν | 15 αναγκαιομαι as Π2 | 16 φορομαινων | 17 λεγομαιν | 18 ευηθειος φοσσων | 19 κομμαι as Π2 | 20 εικοναις as Π2 | 21 εστιν | 22 αποδοσ αν εισ as Π2 | 24 παρη | 29 αρμων επαινουν ποτε | 32 τουντειον as Π2 | 33 εστιν | 39 τουνταιονων as Π2

1278 a 32 τονυσθεν | as in πολλασ over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ελεγω(αι ν.) | δρομιαν, between γ και δ room for four letters | 32 δοχα(λων καιρα) | 34 αστον | 36 στειρα...38 μεταχων comes after 40 συνοκορναι εστιν as in Π2 cor. Π4

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρημενων με Π2 | 3 κακειοσ ευ with Π2 | 8 καιει | 10 εστιν | 14 καιει | 16 συνερηξεν | 19 δη | 21 o is omitted with Π2 | 22 περει ηλλακων πολητεια orγοναται* | 24 εστιν τερω | 25 πασιν | 26 και... | kaoanis between auton and ειον as Π2 | 28 παταβαλη | 29 κακοπαθη | 31 ιε | 32 apol as Π2 | 34 των | 35 δεισις | 37 σοθεν | 38 (ξαλεθας το) | (πασω...δειλαιγως | 39 μεν is omitted.

1279 b 2 παθειε (εις) | γερετα | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (μη δε τι) | 15 καταληψεν | 16 εστιν | 20 εις(νοι) | 23 συνεδρια | 26 καιει | 28 προσορενει | 34 the line ends with το, the next begins τεια: either λαι is omitted, or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 διοι is omitted | 39 γνωσταιν | 40 δυσκορεται

1280 a 1 αρχασιν | 10 παν το: παντα | 14 αφερουσι | 15 αφωνου κρατα with Π2 | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεξθεθαν κρινον | 22 νυμφαις ομοιον over an erasure | 24 ελευθεροι: the first s above the line | 26 μετερθαιν | 29 εσταιν μενον | ειςεγερκαται with Π2 | 31 μενον εψεκε Π2 | 33 εστιν | 36 τυχουν | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 τον is omitted with Π1 | αθεον: κ above the line | 4 εξει with Π1 | αθρωπωσιν | 5 δαρετη | διακονουσιν with ΓΜ5 | 8 γενεται | 9 απαθη | 10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφοροι | 17 πολεσιν | δουδει | 23 του | 26 ακαιαι | σφαι(σι)εν | 27 δοξουν | 30 η πολε αυτον εστιν with Π2 | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και η | 40 δει

1281 a 1 χωριον is omitted | 3 χωριν with Π2 | 5 μεταστην | το(νι)ε | 6 μεταζων

* περ with Μ2 Π5, πολιτειας with ΓΜ5, αθε Ελαστον omitted with Π1.
FRAGMENTA VATICANA.

7 (whose words are omitted) | 10 legens | 16 & is omitted with ΠΠ'.
17 γε with ΠΠ' | 21 τοτε | 24 διακηρυξατος with ΠΠ'; | in error above the line | 27 τιμοθεου with ΠΠ' | 30 ευγενα...οντων after φασιν with ΠΠ'.

1286 b 17 ἐκεῖθεν with ΜΠ' | 18 αἰκατερίδας | 21 γεγονον | 24 γεγο

1287 a 2 εφ'σχημαν | 4 βασιλείας | 5 στοι | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | 11 ευγενεῖν εἰς with ΠΠ' | 16 ομοίως τον Π ης as ΠΠ' | 21 τυχεῖ | 25 τυχεῖ | 34 καί is omitted with ΠΠ' | 37 εἰς is omitted | 38 εἰς is corrected from θεαματικώς | 38 εἰς | 40 διωχεῖ.

1287 b 4 a γερα αἰώνοις | 5 τοις καθα | 6 καθα | 8 υφαντον | 10 καταστρεφεῖ | 11 επικρατεῖ | (οὐ) | 13 εστιν | ερχομένως with ΠΠ' | 15 εστιν | 17 αἰὼν | 19 εστιν | 23 στιχοι with ΠΠ' | 27 στιχοι with ΠΠ' | 28 τοις | 29 ημεραῖοι with ΠΠ' | 32 ημεραῖοι | 34 καί is omitted | 37 εστίν | διαστότος with ΠΠ' | 39 καί is omitted | 41 γεγονον τοις παρα φωτιν with ΠΠ'.

1288 a 2 στοι τοις with ΜΠΕ' | 5 εἰ is omitted | 6 ομοίως | 8 εστιν | πεφυκε | 13 ομοίως άγγειον αὐτοῦ as ΠΠ', omitting καὶ in ΠΠ' | 14 αὐτοῦ ομοίως | 17 αὐτοῦ | after κατα- ditography; διάπρονομ οικοδομία, then διαπρονομία | 15 αὐτοῦ with ΠΠ' | 17 (τοις) | 18 βασιλείας | 21 εἰς for εἰς | 23 εστὶν with ΠΠ' | 24 καί is omitted | 26 πεφυκε | 29 εἰς τoν ΠΠ' άλλα κατα | 30 πρότερον | 31 after η συμφερεί ditography; τοις ΠΠ' | 33 δισεκατεχομένης | 34 apparently οἰκονομίας | 35 τοις ΠΠ' | 39 τους ΠΠ' | 41 αὐτοῦ.

1288 b 1 παιδία | 3 διηγομένων | πολλάκις | (οὐ) | 10 καταφθάνεις πολιτείας: γ: in the margin by the same hand.

.Δ. [fol. 302' begins with this heading] | 11 γεγονον: the second γ scratched out | 14 καλιτά | εκχειρισμένως | 16 εργον with ΠΠ' | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν with ΠΠ' | 23 εστιν | 24 αριστοτέλεως with ΠΠ' | 26 τοις κατά την is omitted | 31 άγγελοι | 35 εἰς | 36 λεγεῖν.

1290 a 36 ομοίως: the second & above the line: οὐδείς.

1290 b 2 δότων | πολλοὺς with ΠΠ' | 5 φαν | 8 ετί instead of εγέν | πλείον μοιρά | with ΠΠ' | 11 δήμος | 12 τούτων | 15 δήμος | ομοιός as ΠΠ' | 17 εστιν | 19 δότων | 21 πολιτείας | 22 πολιτείας: | 24 πολλοί | 25 me is omitted as ΠΠ' | 29 δὴ | εἰδομένως | 33 πλήθυσ | οὐδὲν before συμφερεῖ with ΠΠ': | 40 εστιν | 41 καλλομένων.

1291 a 4 ιδρύματα | 5 καὶ τὰς οὖν | is omitted | 6 καπηλίας | 7 οὐδὲν | εστίν αναγκαίως as ΠΠ' | 11 φαν' | 13 τούτων τους | 18 μαλακοί | 20 αποδοθούσης: | 21 αποτελέσων as ΠΠ' | 22 τεττάρων | 27 δικαστήριας corrected from δικαστήριας | 29 οὐδὲν | γαρ before συμφερεῖ with ΠΠ' | 33 αναγκαίως μορίον τῆς πολείς.
EXCURSUS III.

with Π² | 34 o with Π², not διπερ | ογδον | 39 υπελευσεν with Π²* | 41 πο-λεον | γενεσθαι | δικαιο

1291 b 3 αυτος: ι above the line | 4 και τεχνη των twice | 12 καθασται | και
δοκουσιν twice | 14 εστιν | 15 εστιν | διμοκρατεια | 17 λεγωμενων | 21 χρησι-
τιστικον | 22 αλευτικον: the first i above the line | εκαστα: τα above the line |
27 αμφοτερου | στρον | 30 διμοκρατεαι | εστιν | 32 ναρκην | 34 μαλλιστειν

1292 a 3 το παιδ μετεινα ταλλαγων εισι with Π² | 17 τοιοντο | δημος as Π² | 22 παρ is omitted | 23 διμεγνωσι | 24 εστιν | 29 προσκλησιν with Π² |
30 αρχη | 32 εστιν | 33 εκαστα or εκαστον | 34 εστιν | 36 ουδεν

1292 b 1 μακρων with Π² | 3 ποιων | 5 σταν παις | 9 τελευτας | εις μεν
with Π² | διμοκρατεων εν παις is omitted | 10 καλουσιν | 13 between κατα and
tou room for 3 letters | δε after δια is omitted | 14 πολιτευοναι δε δημοτικως | +
15 κατα των ποιουν | 17 του το δε | 19 άλλα γαγασιν

* Apparently κραου with Π²; this at least is the inference to be drawn from
Heylbut’s silence.
† Apparently έδος with Π²; Heylbut is silent.
‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut’s
annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 εικωνεγηντα is given as
the reading at any rate of Π² and presumably of fr. {εικωνεγηντα Heylbut}.]

NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

In Mr Newman’s edition I. p. VIII. f. II. p. LIV. there recurs, although in a
much milder form, Heylbut’s assertion already refuted by me in Jahrb. f.
Philol. cxxv. p. 801 ff., and in Excursus III. above, that I seek to base
the text of Aristotle’s Politics primarily on Π², and especially on Γ. Mr
Newman writes:

“Sussemlh bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially
on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second.”

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too
often followed Π², I have nevertheless already said at p. XXXII.:

“quonquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis appareb, ita nobis traditum esse hoc
Aristotelis opus simuliter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtæm ex utraque
codicum familia recensionem perficere hocium equum, tamen in hac mixtura
artis criticae regulae diligentissim, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas
periti omnes concedent. Quod ut flat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba...
cum libris affinis Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinque quaerendum, ubi
huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent; ubicumque autem utraque
bonam sententiam utraque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est
posthabenda.”

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished a priori
to make the recension Π² the basis of the text would proceed just as
perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with
Π²; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its
merits: quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent; and
only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added “and on linguistic grounds”) a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family \( \Pi^1 \). The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from \( \Pi^1 \). In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of \( \Pi^2 \), as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the _Politics_ has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in \( \Pi^1 \), however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel’s dictum, that the _Politics_ has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown _a priori_ by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in \( \Pi^1 \) are corrected by means of \( \Pi^2 \) and those in \( \Pi^2 \) by means of \( \Pi^1 \); whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity.

Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger’s, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the “Vetusta translatio,” or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of \( P^1 \) and \( A_r \), for the rest is certainly true only of the “deteriores” of the family \( \Pi^2 (=\Pi^3) \). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from \( \Gamma \) or from \( P^1 \) and \( P^4 \) (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, _common to all our sources of the text_? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-
strained, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. A\textsuperscript{1} of the \textit{Rhetoric} and \textit{Poetic}, or \Sigma in Demosthenes, or \textit{Π} in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K\textsuperscript{a} alone presents right readings in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension \textit{Π}\textsuperscript{1}, or of the better class of \textit{Π}\textsuperscript{2}, present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of \textit{Π}\textsuperscript{1}, that while these cases are not quite rare in \textit{Π}\textsuperscript{1}, in \textit{Π}\textsuperscript{2} they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. xii. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. \textit{notes}] on this matter:

"soli \textit{Γ} libro debemos praefer 1260 a 4 ἄρχοντος καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Ἀρχαρίης, 1260 b 41 τῆς, 1266 b 2 ἡ ἡ φήνη, 1271 a 20 καὶ (μήν \textit{Π}); partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἑδόνοι ἵν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἔνα δή, 1336 a 34 σπουδαιομένων (aut σπουδαιοσπουδαιομένων, quod praeber \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1}), 35 καθα, 1256 a 8 συντάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πληθεί, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταυρινίων ἀρχής, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὤστεικ, 1303 a 24 ἔγραψε (ut \textit{γραφεί}?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),

soli \textit{Γ} \textit{P}\textsuperscript{6} has: 1328 a 5 παρά, 1336 a 6 εἰδάσεις, 1340 a 16 δήλου ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὸ om., 1322 b 36 προσευθέντος (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:

soli \textit{Γ} et pr. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1259 b 28 δή:

soli \textit{Γ} \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1265 a 16 παρά, 1272 b 39 καθ’ αὐτὸ;

soli \textit{Γ} et corr. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1278 b 22 παρ’;

soli \textit{Γ} Ar. 1289 b 38 σολάμων:

soli \textit{Γ} \textit{P}\textsuperscript{6} Ar. 1336 a 5 δή:

soli \textit{Γ} \textit{R}\textsuperscript{1} 1303 b 31 τή:

soli \textit{Γ} Ald. corr. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1332 a 33 τά:

soli \textit{Γ} Ar. corr. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1335 a 26 σώματος:

soli \textit{Γ} \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1254 a 10 ἀπάλω (ἀπάλω ἀρχὸς \textit{M}\textsuperscript{1} \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1}, ἀρχὸς cec.).

Neque fas esse censeo in tali rerum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus \textit{ὅλοι} και \textit{μόνοι} multa exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppediat translatio, \textit{αἰκονίου} et \textit{ταλάντων}...

E solo \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} has...depromere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβαλλόντων (nisi idem habuit \textit{Γ}), 1259 a 13 ἐλασουργεῖων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr.\textsuperscript{1}), b 4 κάθεινος corr.\textsuperscript{1} (nisi potius retinendum est κάθεινος), 1286 b 17 μετάβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam \textit{Π}), 1287 b 38 ἑβασιλικῶν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχει, 1335 b 20 γενειομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr.\textsuperscript{1}, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ὑπέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):

e solis \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τῷ, 1280 b 19 ἐπίσκα:

e solis Ar. et corr. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} has: 1255 a 37 ἐγγονος, 1299 a 14 πολεμικός:

e solis \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} mg. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} rec. \textit{P}\textsuperscript{1} 1284 a 37 κολάσις, quarum nonnullae...ita sunt comparatae, ut etiam calamo a Demetri Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingenios facile potuerint restitui, velut ἐλασουργεῖων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπίσκα, ἐγγονος...Solo autem \textit{M}\textsuperscript{1} codice paene nusquam..."
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nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo Π, solo Π 1253 a 25 (καὶ post φῶς om.), 1270 b 38 (ἐπειδά), 1235 a 29 (αὐτὸ τῷ corr.), 1339 a 14 (ἐπειδὼν), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 ἀναδιαγράμματος."

This is exclusive of the cases, in which Πς¹ alone or Πς¹ alone or Π¹ alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (I.C. p. xi.)

1253 b 33 δ omn. Π, erased by Π¹ (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 συµβαίνει Π²:
1336 a 17 ψυχρῶν Π¹Π⁴ (corr.):
1342 b 33 ή added by Π¹ and corr.¹ of Π² (here conjecture is really out of the question):

1290 a 1 δο Π¹ and Π² (corr.):
1290 a 2 διελάμψει Π⁴ (corr.), διελάμψει Π¹, διελάμψει ceteri:
1291 b 32 ὑπερέχει Π⁴ Ar.:
1295 a 39 δ erased by corr. of Π¹, γρ. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δέ corr.³ in the margin of Π² (this may be a conjecture):
1319 b 24 καὶ τῷ Π² (corr. and γρ. in the margin of Π¹:
1309 a 40 ἀνερχεῖ Π⁴ (corrector):
1316 a 38 ἀναβίβαζον Π¹.

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the Vetusta translatio is "instar optimi codicis." That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Π¹ only at

1252 b 28 (ῥηθη, Π¹),
1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 23,
1258 b 40 (Χαριτίδης Π),
1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),
1259 b 28 (Δ Π 1st hand of Π¹),
1260 a 37 (ἄρα),

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: ἀποδώσθησιν ΠΜ possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 δ is only added before ἀνερχεῖ in Π¹, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the Ethics (as I have remarked on p. 456) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from ΜΠ¹; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in B. II. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of διὰ τὸ χρή against ΜΠ¹; but at 1233 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have διὰ τὸ τὸ χρή. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the καὶ between ἐγκεκρίτακται and ἐγκεκρίτακται with Π²; and at 1260 a 26 ή before το with Π² Σ Ψ Τ. In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations (after οἶνος, ἀστράπη especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15
unless καὶ be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before κατατεθέμενοι) the explanation must be quite different, viz. ἀποκατεστήκας κατατεθέμενοι must mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profiteering." At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting ἐλαχίστατα or leaving it out: as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π'. And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (Qu. crit. coll. p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π' is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π, yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 if he wrote ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ without συνήθεων. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted ὄμοκιστας, but it still remains doubtful whether ὄμοκιστας be not right after all (see Addenda ad loc.). At 1253 b 27 τῶν ὀλεονυμικῶν (Π') is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 ἢ is omitted by P46 Ov U1 L Ald., but one which is justified by the facts; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write ἢ): that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π ἀρχετὶ ὀλεονυμικῷ. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that ἔλαχιστα is explained by ἄπλως or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable: still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, λόγῳ (Π') to correspond better to the sense and grammar than λόγῳ (Π), I have laid down Qu. crit. coll. p. 343. and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 ἄρταςπετα and 1256 a 6 κερκαϊπετα are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present διδομένη to the perfect δεδομένη and conversely 1260 a 4 the present ψηφίστας to the present ψηφίσταν, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 <ἀρχαῖς καὶ> ἀρχαῖς, see Addenda ad loc.

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (ὁμοκάτας or ὀμοκάτας), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 κοινοῦσα and 1258 b 1 μεταβολική (Π') may be corruptions of κοινοῦσα and μεταβολική; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π' is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (ταύτης), 1257 b 24. Π' is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (τὰδ Π'), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (Χνημεῖα Π'), 1259 a 37; b 28 (ὁ Π 1st hand Π'), 1260 a 4 twice (ἀρχαῖς καὶ Π' and
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εἵραται, 1260 a 37 (pery), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M as well as ΓΠ. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π, either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple errata, as e.g. φιλίρα, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Sussem. p. xiv.), and the repeated φαλλίσ. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading ἀδρέα (ἀδρέα). Apart from the order of the words 1265 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 34, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π at 1263 a 23 (καὶ omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr. Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of Π. In the remaining 109 cases Π has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (ἐκεῖ ὁ τέσσερις ΓΠ), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (ἐχθρεύει, ΓΠ), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's crit. n.), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (ἴθειαν, b 7 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (ἀλλακτει ΓΠ), 30, 1266 b 2 (Γ), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (ἀνώτερον ΓΠ), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (ἀνώτερον affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (καὶ Γ), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (ἐκεῖ omitted by MΠ, probably wrongly, whether by Γ also, cannot be known), 35 (at least MΠ), b 7 (ὁ, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least MΠ), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (φαλλέαν), b 6, 1267 a 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least MΠ), 25, 27 (at least MΠ), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (φαλίρα, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least MΠ), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless ὅτι is here nearer to the true reading than τὸ δικαστήριον, τὸν ἄρκτον being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Προορίστησιν is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but ὅπως gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὸ δικαστήριον into the more natural and simple τὸ δικαστήριον?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his
doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 30 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π² presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way ἐν τοῖς has arisen from τοῦται, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then τῷ before ἐν μῆρι need not be changed into τῷ; but there is no need of this with the reading τοῦτο: see Susen.⁴ crit. n. and Qu. crit. coll. p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of τῶν φίλακας in Μ Π¹ is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263a 23. For ἐδεικνύει Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263a 28 ff. see the Addenda ad loc. If ἐκάλαυρ προσεδρεύουσι (Γ Μ') is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 90th case in favour of Π¹.

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π¹ has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits πλείστως, not διάλεκτος into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading πολυτελῶν were right, τὴν could scarcely be omitted before this word or before κοινωνίαν.

1267 b 25 f. With the reading κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ arises the absurdity, that ἐσθητος εὑρείας would depend not simply on πλήθει, but on κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is καταδικάζει τὴν δίκη in the sense of “to decide the case against the accused” Greek at all, except in the formula ἐφίμην καταδικάζειν?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman’s statement in the critical note, that Ἑκη is left out by Π¹ here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Π and Π¹ (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken τοῦτο (Π¹) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, τῆς δεσμίας τῶν δυνάμων is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman’s intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose
NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

τῶν δυνάτων, with Π2, to follow δυναμεὶς (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Koraes, of ἦν (line 8) for δυναμεὶς. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π2, as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δυναμεὶς (Π2) instead of δυνάτων (Π3) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be δυνατεία μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτεία. Not so. Once for all, Π2 is made out to be the better recension!

1272 b 39. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ' αὐτῷ is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of Π1, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in Π. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ' αὐτῷ, a second κατ' αὐτῷ (Π1 and somewhat corrupted Μ'), and a third κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ (Π3), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π2 is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐπρεπίαν from Π2 and Π3, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π1 and Π2 when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: “haud raro hanc, saepius illam meliorem.” Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heybut’s account, which I have not correctly reported in the Jahrb. f. Philol. CXXV. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π3, but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π1. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π3 any more than in favour of Π1: on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, ἀπτων 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καὶ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the care bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π1. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the Vetusta translation is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-
ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to I. c. 11 I agree with him: I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the *Economics*, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. 

SUSEM.
H.

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη δὲ τῶν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσφ-

1323 a 14 κοιναν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τῶν μέλλοντα ποιήσα-

1

§ 1

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη...6 σκέψιν joined by all previous authorities to B. III, omitted by Bk. See Comm. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ II. Pαθ. Qn Tn fr. Ald. Bk. Susen.¹ in the text, γὰρ (with the omission of the following τῶν μέλλοντα) Pαθ. I'. Ar.

1323 a 14 [περὶ...15 ἀνάγκη] Spengel || δὲ added after περὶ by Pαθ. and corrector of Pαθ.; perhaps rightly, yet see Intro. p. 14 n. 3 || τῆς inserted before ποιήσα in Pαθ. and in the margin of Pαθ.; cp. p. 456 f.

B. ιν(VII), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, commences a sketch of the best polity which is continued through the next book, B. V(VIII), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1—3; the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4—12; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the means at the legislator's command for realizing it; the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. ιν(VII) and not at all in B. V(VIII).

1288 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ...6 σκέψιν] That this conclusion of B. III, breaking off in the middle of a sentence, is only a parallel version of the beginning of the (old) seventh book, is acknowledged by all who recognize that the proper place for the (old) seventh book is immediately after the third. Beyond all doubt, of the two parallel versions, that at the end of B. III is the original one, as Spengel rightly decides, and it ought not to have been omitted from the text of Bekker's octavo edition. When the rest of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed; hence the clause περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης ἀνά-

¹ Not that of Oxford, 1837, but Hieronymus editio.

2 Bekker, Berlin, 1855; quarto iteratum 1876.
On a chapter of the Politics (Vienna 1871; 52 pp.).

§ 1. 123 a 16 aitbartatos bios. See n. (663) with the passages there quoted. SUSEM. (666)

ten αριστων πολιτειαν i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see vi (iv). § 3. ταλαι παρ την αριστος τιχειν ειςω αθυ-

naton, διε απαριστηνε τοις ιππιω και την τοις ατατημένων αριστε τοις δει λαθη-

θεινε τους ως ισθυμοι πολιτειων. and n. (1116). SUSEM. (666)

18 προσχει. 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (ει τοις 

αντικειμενων αυτοις to be taken closely with αριστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most desirable life.

§ 2. 21 κοινον ταις πολεις, χωρις εκκος. ταις εξεταρεις λογοις. See Ex-

cursus 1. to this book. SUSEM. (667)

33 καλον χρηστον αυτοις. "It is clear from passages such as De Caelo 11. 13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. επει δε περι των 

διαιρεσεων προτερον διαι κατα την ακοινων 

βουλευματος εχουν, χρηστον ως παρεχοντων 

and Meteor. 111. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 f. ετω δε περι των την τοις δημημερους εν τοις 

περι τας αλληλους διεκμεθοντα δια τα 

μεν λεγομενοι, τοις δε να παρεχοντας χρηστο-

μενα αυτοις, that this expression does not 

imply that an exposition given elsewhere 

is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that 

the results of some other discussion will 

be employed and utilized. Those who 

remember the tolerably frequent use of 

the verb χρησθαι by Herodotus e.g. in 11. 

120 ελ χρη τι τωι επανωσαρι χρεουσαν 

λεγομενοι, corresponding to Thucydides 1. 10 § 3 τη των Ομηρον αυ ποιησε ελ τι χρη 

καταθεια πιστευει, will hardly raise any 

objection to our taking the word, used 

here and in Nic. Eth. 1. 13 § 19, 110 a 27 

in connexion with the εξετερεις λογοι, 

but not as confined to them, in the sense 

of the phrase in Nic. Eth. vi. 4 § 3, 

1140 a 2, τοις επεις δε περι αυτων τοις 

εξεταρεις λογοις. It is plain that this ex-

pression does not in any way show whether 

the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own 

or belongs to some one else, nor to what 

degree or extent it is utilized" (Vahlen).

SUSEM. (688)

§ 3. 24 προς γε μη διαιρεσεις ουδεις 

δια The appeal to the εξεταρεις λογοι 

in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 664) thus 

amounts (in effect at any rate) to an 

appeal to public opinion, to what was 

at the time conceded by all, or at least 

by all cultivated and intelligent men. 

We should also notice how, as 111. 12 § 1, 

the strictly scientific (philosophical) dis-

tinctions and discussions are opposed 

(1) to opinion universally current, and on 

the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle 

himself at least by his pupil Eudemus 

(see n. 584), to the εξεταρεις λογοι; and 

it is hardly possible to regard the latter 

as anything else but the expression of 

that universal opinion. Bernays sees in 

these words an ironical excuse on Ari-

totle's part in reply to the charge which 

was no doubt often leveled at him, of 

useless logical hair-splitting, when he 

thus expresses the hope that he may 

be allowed to make one division at 

least without opposition. But Vahlen 

rightly urges against this view that, in 

spite of the announcement of at least 

this one division, the emphasis is not
25 σεβων δ' το ιν φαι νυχην και των εν τοις παντα ταυτα υπαρχειν
§ 4 τωια μεκαρισων χρη. ουδεις γαρ αι φαινεκαρισων των μητον
µαιρων έχουνη ανδριας μηδε σωφροσυνης καιδαικουνης
μηδε φρονήσωσιν, ολλα γε διεις τας παραπετομεινας
30 µιας, απεκχουκενον δε µηδενοις, αν εσπανυµησυ τον φαινευν ή τον
πιεεν, των έσχατων, ένεκα δε τεταρτηριων διαφεβρυτα των
φιλοτουν φιλουε, ωμοιος δε και τε περι την δαινων

25 [sic] Oncken wrongly. || 26 το omitted by P² V³ Ald. and P¹ (1st hand) ||
27 χρη omitted by P³ P² (added in the margin of P¹): δε Vettori Bk. || 29 [µαιδε
φρονησεων] Susem.¹; see on a 32. || 30 του Κοραις, [του φαινευν ή του πιεων]
Bernays, perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen Arist. Aufsätze ii. p. 11 (9) ff. || το του
before πιεων omitted by P² P³ Bk. || 31 πιεων P¹ and M¹ (1st hand) || 32 [φαινου]
Korai Bk.² || την δαινων is omitted by M¹ (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by
P¹; quae circa prudentiam τε habent, necesse enim beatificant William, doubtless from
gloss. Hence ομοιος δε και τε περι την φαινεων έχει, ωδε γαρ µακαρισουε
Susem.¹-² wrongly

laid on the division, but on the inference
drawn from it; that just because there are
three kinds of goods, he who is to be
happy cannot entirely dispense with any
of the three. But I do not perceive why
this thought ought properly to have been
elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as
Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the
form of ‘argumentum ad hominem’ here
chosen, proceeding from premises uni-
versally conceded, where all that was re-
quired was to prove the superior claim of
intellectual goods, which was alone in
dispute. Besides the request that ‘he
might be allowed just this one division’
would appear very strange in connexion
with this division of goods. For, except
perhaps the comprehensive term “ex-
ternal goods,” it is not at all peculiar to
Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere,
e.g. Nic. Eth. 1. 8 § 3, 1098 b 12 ff., Rhet.
1. 5 § 4; 1350 b 25 ff., and often mentions
it in passing as something well known
and perfectly certain, without a word of
justification or approval. Susem. (689)

25 μεκαρισων Even though it is plain
to everybody that the subject is “goods,”
yet it is strange that no express mention
of the term occurs either here (where
it would be very appropriate instead of
the word chosen, μεκαρισων) or in what
precedes. Susem. (690)
§ 4 28 σωφρονησεων] Comp. n. (206 b).
Susem. (691)

These are the four Platonic virtues,
οὖτος ἄφορον καὶ διευθευμένων ὡσπερ τι παντίν ἢ μαίνοντι…(1)
§ 8 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὡσπερ πάντες ἢ συν…
35 χορήγειαν, διαφέρονται δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑποχάισ.
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρέτος ἔχειν ἰκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅσονον ὁποιονδήποτε
πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δύναμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ τάν…
§ 8 τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι ἀπειρον ζητοῦσιν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν.
ήμεις δὲ αὐτῶν ἐρώτησεν ὅτι βάδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν
40 ἐργῶν διὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πλέοντων ὑπερβολήν, ὅρωντας ὅτι κτώται καὶ
πολλάττωσιν ὅπως τὰς ἀρέτας τοῖς ἐκτός ἀλλ’ ἐκείνα ταύτας,
τοῖς τε ξὺν еὐθαμομένως, εἰτ’ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἄτιτ’ ἐν ἀρέτη…
34 ὡσπερ] οὕτω before λεγόμενα P4, [ὡσπερ] Scalliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπόλοις Bernays, <ἀπόλοι>: ὡσπερ ἣ Susen, a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen’s defence of the text p. 14 (16).
Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὡσπερ λεγόμενα ἄπαντες would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὡσπερ ἢ Schneider, οὐδὲν τις Koraes § 36 εἶναι omitted by P8.8[b] Ald. and P4 (1st hand) § 37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Bernays, wrongly § 40 λαμπάνεις Lambin, διαλειμμάτων Π2 P4 Αγ. Βκ.1, διαλειμμάτων Π1

tues; cp. 1. 13 § 8, 111. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, 11 § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with mm. (40, 45, 112, 118, 474—476, 498, 595, 703). Susen.
§ 5 34 ὡσπερ πάντες “Almost all would allow, when stated.” Comp. n. (689).
Susen. (694) ὡσπερ πάντες: ὡς εἰσεῖν πάντες = ὡσπερ οὖθεν: ὡς εἰσεῖν οὖθεν.
Vahlen compares Eth. 1. 6 §§ 24, 1363 a 11. ὡσπερ γὰρ πάντες ὡς ἀμφιλογότα = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope); and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato Symposium, 199 β ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἀκούειν, Protag. 311 ε. τι δημοκρατία ἡν γε λέγομεν περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν; and the Herodotean ταύτ’ ὡς ἀπενεχθήτο ἔχωνα.
35 διαφέροντας Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.
37 cp. 1. 9, 10, 1367 b 7 πλοῦτον καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).
38 εἰς ἀπειρον ζητοῦσιν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν] cp. 1. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with mm. (765 b, 90).
Susen. (695)
§ 6 ήμεις δὲ αὐτῶν ἐρώτημα] Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 2 § 1 n. (733), vii(1). 2. 3. 1389 b 9 [add 11. 9. 12. 1270 a 10]. De Anima 1. 3
§ 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐρωτήσαμεν; Mela. 111. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 i. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν λόγον ἔρωτιν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), Post. Anal. 1. 3 § 38 f., 73 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φαινομένου (Vahlen). Susen. (696)
39 διὰ τῶν ἐργῶν] To convince oneself by means of the facts. Like γραφεῖα, χαρακτήρα, ἀναλογία ν. we find ἐρωτεμον and πράγματα used for ‘facts’ as distinguished from λόγοι, ‘theories.’ See c. 4 § 7, 1236 a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12: B. 11. c. 8 § 19, 1308 b 30, c. 9 § 16; also c. § 8, 1252 a 17 (λαμβάνεις ταύτα πάντες).
40 ὀρώσατο δὲ κτώται καὶ] cp. 11. 9 § 35 with n. (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 n. (298) below. Susen. (697)
1333 b 1 εἰτ’ ἐν τῷ…2 εἰτ’ ἐν ἄμφοτοι] Bernays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle’s own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. “Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e. g. Nic. Eth. vii. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the Ethics is Aristotelian]; cp. 13
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἑν ἁμφότεροι, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (1) ὑδάς μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἐκείνης τῶν ἄγαθῶν μετρίασον, ἡ τοῖς 5 εἴκεια μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείον τῶν χρήσιμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔλλειπον οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοτούμενας 8 § 7 εὐινυπότον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὡστε ὑπερβολῶν τι (πάν γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον ἄστιν, ὁ δὲ τὴν υπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγαίνων ἢ μὴν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς 10 ἔχοντις) τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἔκαστον ἄγαθον, ὧν περὶ ἀν ὑπερβολῆ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [ἐνει], ἐν δὲ καὶ τούτως ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ χρήση ἄρα.

§ 8 διὰς τὰ δήλον ὡς ἀκολουθοῖς φήσομεν τὴν διαθήκην τὴν ἀριστοκρατείον εἰς τὸν καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.

— 1333 b 6 ἄλλα omitted by Μ, by P4 (1st hand), and possibly by Γ 8 γὰρ Susen. de Γ Π Αρ. Βk. Susen, in the text and Bernays, who alters τῶν into πέρας, wrongly ἀχρήσιμον ἐν τῷ Vahlen, perhaps rightly; χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐχεῖ πέρας ἐκεῖνος ἀριστοκρατείον (or something similar) Susen. Both probable corrections, the one is no easier than the other ὡς ἀπὸ Bernays, and so (or perhaps ὡς ἀπὸ) Αx, cornim William, αὐτῶν perhaps Γ; ὡς αὐτῶν Susen, but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) 9 αὐτῶν omitted by Π1 Αρ. [αὐτῶν] Susen,1 with Koraes, ἀριστείς Oncken, quite needlessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly ἀριστείς χρήσιμον Πο Σb 9 [ἐνει] Schneider Βκ, ἐνεις Ἀπελεγ. χρήσιμον Bernays. I am not convinced by Vahlen’s defence p. 23 (25)

§ 2, 1153 b 15 ff., and i. 8 § 6 ff. 1098 b 25 ff., and also cp. Rhet. i. 5 § 3 ff,” (Vahlen). Cp. also below vii. 8 § 10 (Eaton) with n. (1031), SUSEM. (899)

2 δὴ μᾶλλον...6 ἀκολουθοῖς] Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8 § 9 f., 1179 a 3 ff. ὡστε τὴν υπερβολήν τὸ ἀδυνατόν οἷον ἡ πρᾶξιν...καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μεταγενέσθαι δὲ τῷ πρᾶξιν κατὰ τὴν ἀριστείαν (Eaton).

SUSEM. (899)

§ 7 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ...δραγανόν τι] Cp. i. 8 § 15, 9 § 13 with n. (76 b, 90), also De Anim. i. 3 § 15, 407 a 23 ff., τῶν μὲν γάρ πρακτικῶν νομοί ἐστι πέρας, πάντων γὰρ ἐκεῖνον χάριν, Metaph. xii. 2 § 17, 904 b 13 ff. [yet this is a spurious book], Nic. Eth. vii. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐνθαμομοιώς ὁ δρόμος αὐτός [spiritual] (Vahlen). SUSEM. (700)

8 πῶς γὰρ κτῆ The sense required is "whatsoever is useful is useful up to a certain point [or, has a limit to its utility], to exceed which must necessarily either do harm or confer no benefit upon its possessor." Vahlen supposes a participial clause to have been replaced by the words ἀν ἀν τὴν υπερβολήν. "The simplest draft of the sentence would be τὰ εἰκτὸς ἔχει πέρας...

...ἀν ἀν τὴν υπερβολήν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγαίνων ἢ μὴν ὄφελος τοῖς ἔχοντις. Then by a familiar idiom the second alternative is replaced by ἢ μὴν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτός). The sentence thus becomes somewhat unsymmetrical in form, because τὴν υπερβολήν, though it goes well enough with βλάπτειν, is less suitable as the subject of μὴν ὄφελος.

11 καὶ τούτως ἐπιλέγειν: ἢ το προδοτικας τα αὐτόν, vis. of mental goods. So Nic. Eth. ii. 6 § 9, 1105 b 10 ἐδραμάντες ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς ἔχοντις ἔργα ἔργα ἐτοίς ἐφεξῆ οὕτω προαίρεται. With the use of the prep. cp. the phrase ἐπὶ πόλλων.

§ 8 13 ἰδιος τὸ δήλον...15 διάθεσις] "Further, as a general rule it is clear that the relative superiority of the best condition of one thing [as compared with that of another] will be said to be measured by the difference existing between the things of which these are said to be in themselves the best conditions."

Comp. Rhet. i. 7 § 4, 1363 b 21 ff. (Congrevé), § 18, 1364 a 37 ff. καὶ ἂν ἀν ἀν ἀν τὴν υπερβολήν...καὶ ἀν...
στὴν ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, (1) ἵνα ἐλέγχει διάστασιν ὅπως φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταῦτας διά-
θεσις, ὥστ' ἐλέγχει ἑστὶν ἡ ψυχή τιμωτέρον καὶ τῆς κτίσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄπλως καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ-
διὰ ἑλπίς ΠΠΒΚ. ¹ (emended by corr.² of ΠΒ) || διάστασις Αρ. (apparently) and Γ, but before ἵππος: διάστασις] Bojesen, ἵππος διάστασις ὑπὸ Bernays, wrongly, ἵππο...διά-
στασις? Vahlen needlessly: see Comm. || αὐτὰς εἶναι διάθεσις ταῦτας ΠΠΒΚ. avoiding hiatus || ταῦτα] τωστάς Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see Comm. || τιμωτέ-
ρων Μ', pretiosior William

τικείων δὲ τῶν βελτίων αἱ ὑπερθελια βελτίων καὶ καλλίστων καλλίστων. So i.e. § 4, καὶ ἔνω τὸ μεγαῖτον τον μεγαῖτον ὑπεξοφί, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ ἤθη[ὁ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγατον τοῦ μεγαῖτον: Τερ. 38 § 4, 118 b 4. ἤτοι ἡ ὑπερθελη ὑπερθελῆς αἰρε-
τοτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετότερον (Vahlen): 2 § 9, 117 b 33 f. ἐν ἔνω τοῦ ταὐτοῦ βελτίων, καὶ τοῦ βελτίων τῶν ἐν τοῖς βέ-
λτίων τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑλπίς βελτίους (Bernays). Even in this unmistakable and express 'development of the logical formula' Bernays discovers a proof of quotation from a dialogue. See n. (701). SUSEM. (701)

11 A parallel to πρὸς ἄλληλα after έκάστον is Ροέα. 23 § 2, ἂν δικαίων ὃν εἴκοσι ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. Comp. ἄλληλων after εἰκάστων Pl. Phaedo 97 a. Aeschines 1. 137; after ἄλληλον Ar. Lysistr. 49. Take κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν with what immediately precedes: the best condition of two things 'companied in point of superiority,' i.e. as judged by the superiority of the one relatively to the other. All this forms the subject of ἀκολουθίας. What is the object? Either λαβεῖ τὴν διάστασιν (for which cp. σ. 14 § 1, 133 b 15), ἵππος κτλ. Normally one would expect this to be changed by attraction of the relative into ἵππος ἐλέγχει διάστασιν (or καθ' ἵππος ἐλ. διάστασις). Instead of this, the antecedent is absorbed into the relative sentence and assimilated to its construction ἵππος ἐλέγχει διάστασιν. Such absorption and assimilation may be seen in VII. 4. 8, 190 b 28, 5. 2, 1302 b 8, 13. 2, 1396 b 20, possibly (see n. ad loc.) I. 8, 85, 1326 b 29. A good example is Pl. Κρη. 400 b εὐθυγρ. ἀκολουθεῖν, οὐχ ἢ ἄνων ἔχειν ὑπεροχιεραιμενα καλομένα ὡς εὐθυγρ. ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐλέγχει διάστασιν: where the construction of the relative sentence invades the resumed principal sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The paraphrase of ἔχειν c. accus. for a verb is sometimes varied. Here ἐλέγχει διά-

στασιν = διαστασιν αἰτ. Πτ. Tim. 38 b, Pl. 238 b δύναμιν ἐλέγχει = διαστάσιν. Phyl. 56 b σελευκον ἐλέγχει τὴν ἑλπίς = σελευκον ἑλπίζειν. In its simplest form the proposition states that the ὑπεροχή of the best condition of two things compared corresponds to the διάστασις between the things. The best state of A: the best state of B: A : B. Allow the soul's superiority, and you must allow the superiority of ἄρετη and φιλοσει ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα ἡσικα Β. SUSEM. (701)

15 διάστασις] The order of the words in Γ (distantia quem quasi sit vestigium qui autem est quam dicimus esse revertit has Will.) may suggest that διάστασις was originally a variant of ὑπεροχή, and to be bracketed (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig who also proposed <καθ> διάστασις). But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—36) has shown that διάστασις is all but indispensable for the sense, and himself admits that it is not necessary to alter to ἵππο...διάστασις. Schneider, who first felt a difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ: προ ayr ι λαβεῖ τὴν ὑπεροχήν ἐλέγχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ ὑπεροχήν ὑπὸ φιλοσει κτλ. SUSEM.

αὐτὰς ταῦτας] Vahlen shows that this is an instance of the idiomatic attraction of a pronounal subject (here a demonstrative, often a relative) into the number and gender of the predicate. In Plato Phil. 57 καὶ ταῦτα διὰ πέραν ἐνταῦθα ἄρηβεται καίν οὐκ ἐναὶ = this is what we especially mean by the exact sciences. So here: 'the things whereof we say that just this and that are the attributes' becomes, not ὧν αὐτὰς ταῦτα, but ὧν αὐτὰς ταῦτα φαμεὶ εἶναι διάθεσις.

17 καὶ ἄπλως καὶ ἡμῖν] Both absolutely and relatively to us. See N. Eth. 1. 4, 5, 1509 b 2: Bonitz Ind. Ar. 77 καὶ 21 ff. where τοῦ ἀπὸ, ἐκάστῳ, πρὸς τὸν, πρὸς τοὺς are cited as similarly contrasted with ἄπλως. So Πτ. 3. 1380 a 21, μέχρι τῶν.
Take τάσιν after ἔπισταν. For the use of ἔπισταν ἔχει absolutely cp. II. 10 § 4, 1271 b 41, 11 § 3, 1272 b 37.

§ 9 ἄμετραν τῷ κρίσιν του ἄνάλογον τοῦ ἐκάστου, ἔχειν. ἐτι δὲ καὶ (1) τῆς ψυχῆς ἔεκεν αἱρετικά πέρυκε ταῖτα καὶ δει πάντας αἱρετικοὺς καὶ τὸν εὐφρονίτας, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἐεκεῖνον.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει οὐσίαν τούτου, ὅσον περ ἀρέτης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἐπωτον αὐτοματομαχημένον ἣμιν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμάτω. 18 καὶ omitted by P134 P 80 Bk. 19 ταύτα πέρυκε αἱρετικά P 80 P 81 Bk. 20 καὶ added before τοῦ οὗφρονίτας by G 18

with Bernays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of description here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term ἐνέργεια used in that passage. Cf. also § 13 with n. (710), and n. (726). SUSEM. (704) 29 μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμάτω Bernays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than ‘taking the happiness of God as evidence’ or ‘appealing to the happiness of God,’ cp. Thuc. 1. 73, 2, just as in a similar phrase the Cyrenaics and Epicureans are reproached with appealing to the lower animals, Plat. Phæd. 67 θεῶν ζητών εἵπον ο崞σα κύριος εἶναι μάρτυρας, Cíc. De Fin. II. 33 § 109 bestius ..quibus vos de summo bono testibus ui ut soletis. It is nothing unusual for Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between c. 3 § 10 (cp. n. 740) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in Nic. Eth. X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 7 ff., and similar references to the deity occur e.g. Nic. Eth. VIII. 7 § 4, 1138 b 35, cp. VII. 14 § 8, 1154 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists, see Zeller op. c. II. ii. p. 365 ff. Aristotle’s aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not unsuitable for his purpose: the inference from this is that happiness in general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities;
νοει, δει ευδαιμον μεν εστι και μακάριος, δει ουδεν δε των (1)
25 εξοπερικων αγαθων αλλα δει αυτων αυτως και τω ποιω της
ειναι την φυσιν, επει κατ την ευτυχιαν της ειδαιμονιας δια
tauτη παναγακιον ετεραν ειναι (των μεν γενε εκτος αγαθων
της ψυχης αυτων ταυτοματον και τη τυχη, διακαιο δε ουδες
§ 11 ουδε σωφρον απο τυχης ουδε δια την τυχην εστιν) || εξομενον
30 δε εστι και των αυτων λογων δεδομενον και πολιων ειδαιμονα

25 αυτων Μυρτη (perhaps rightly) || 27 [αγαθων] Bernays, [της ψυχης] Spengel Suecem,1 but see Vahlen p. 40 (42) ff. || 29 εξομενον...36 σωφρον a duplicate of 1324 a 4 στομα...13 σωσικτωραν first recognized by Suecem, Spengel (following Schlosser) having previously remarked that the two passages do not go well together. See p. 86 ff. where they are printed in parallel columns.

and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see u. 68o) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen). Suecem. (706).

For this N. E. x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, ει μη ουδεπερει ονω των εκτων αγαθων μακαρων ειναι: cp. p. 1. 10. 16. 1101 a 19.


Add Phys. 11. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημειον β' δει κακε εν τω ταιτω ειναι την ειδαιμονια η ευτυχια η γραφη, η β' ειδαιμονια πραξει της ευτυχιας γαρ.

29 απο τυχης ουδε δια την τυχην] Cp. Phys. 11. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. εν τοις απελλαιους τραβηξαντων, ηταυ μη τω συμβαλων ηνα τοια αναγεννησαν εις την ταιτων, τοτε απο ταυτωματον λεγομεν απο τυχης δε τοιτων δει απο ταυτωματων γενεται των προαιρετων των έχουσιν προαιρεσιν: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of purpose are said to be by chance." (Eaton). Suecem. (707).

Comp. the lucid comments of D. D. Heath. Misconceptions of Aristotle in Journal of Philology vii. p. 111 ff. § 11 εξομενον β' ουτα κτλ. Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 ειδαιμονα and 31 πραττουσαν καλως are predicates of which την αρετην των is the subject. 30 των αυτων λογων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already addeduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 13) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πραττειν has (i) the transitive meaning "to do = to perform certain acts," line 32 τα καλα πραττουσαν, (ii) the intransitive meaning "to do = to be (in a certain state)," as e.g. in this present connexion καλως πραττειν = to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays' conclusion that Aristotle would
not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, *Gorg.* 507 c [Rep. 353 E], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. nn. 733, 744) and III. 9 § 14 (cp. n. 560 b), and similarly in *Nic. Eth.* 1. 8 § 4, 1098 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildenbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel *Art. Stud.* 11. p. 73 (565) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildenbrand’s view is that in III. 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by III. cc. 5, 6 (cp. nn. 471, 684), whereas in IV. (vii). 1 §§ 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore III. c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle’s pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Böckler observes) in the words ‘virtue or happiness’; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the *virtue* of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness or wellbeing. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. 1. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the *virtue* of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cc. III. 5, 6) and the reference to it in III. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the ‘virtue or excellence’ manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. 13 §§ 9, 10 and VIII (vii). 9 § 12 with n. (1042). *Suseum.* (708)

§ 12 33 Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the *Republic*, made implicitly III. 358 e and reasserted expressly IV. 435 b, 142 d ff. On διάνως καὶ λογικῶς, terms cognate to εἰδός, λόγος, φάσις, cp. *Bonis.* *Ind. Ar.* 206 b 12, and n. on I. 4, 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of ἢ, if expressed, would be τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως: see on 1323 b 15.

§ 13 39 ἐγράφας...ουδένες. For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,
40 λής ταύτα: νόν δὲ υποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βλέψ, μὲν ἀριστός, καὶ (1) χωρίς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῆς ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ’ ἄρετος κεχο- (p. 96)

1324 a 4 prep. om. by P4 Vb. Ald. and the first hand of P3 Sb (added in the margin of Sb by the same hand, in the margin of P3 by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 εἰκόνι P3 Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P3 || κεχοργημένοι P4a I. Ald.

1324 a 4 πότερον...13 στοιχειώσαν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86

10 μακριάνων or μακριάνων Ar. Spengel || 11 ἄν before εἰκόνι P2 Bk. and P4 (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἀλλά...1325 b 34 πότερον] Susem.22

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle εὐδαμία—pleasure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τῶν φιλοσοφών, τολμική τις ἐλατ. Nic. Eth. 1. 2 § 9, 1004 b 11; see Introd. pp. 67, 70 l. As there was a work of Theophrastus called ἐκκλησίαν κεχωριζόμενον (Diog. Laert. vi. 47) Kohrh fr. c. p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle's. But his view requires some stronger proofs. Susem. (709) "That εὐδαμία was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τὴν μὲν Ἐκκλησίαν εὐδαμία τολμική, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατα- τηρήσαν, Diog. Laert. vi. 47: cf. also Cic. Tus. Disp. 1. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholarum Graecorum more habere aedem, itaque dierum quinque scholaras, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contulit" (Kridgeway). But the witticismes attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting before they can pass as historical (Susemihl).

41 ἄν ἄρετος...1324 a 1 πράσι- enom] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in n. (704) is applicable. Cp. also n. (736). Susem. (711)

1324 a 3 διασκέδαστου υπότον] Spengel rightly observes, Ueber die Pol. p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. Excursus 1. Susem. (712)


c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τετεύθηκαν πρότερον).

A subsidiary question is: Is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophic retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceful rule over freemen and of internal activity?

§ 13 [ἀλλά...ταὐτ’ ὅση δόο] The close
IV (VII). 2. 5

1323 b 40—1324 a 28.

taut' ἥν διὸ ἐστὶν ἡ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἱρε- (II)
15 πότερος βλος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-
λεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ θεωρίκος καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-
λεκμένος, ἐτι δὲ τινὰ πολιτείαν θετοῦν καὶ πολίαν διάδειχ
νεῖ τόποις ἀρίστην, ἐτις πάσιν δῶτος αἱρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως
§ 4 εἰτε καὶ ταὐτὶ μὲν μὴ τοὺς δὲ πλείοτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς
tο διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ’ ἐστίν ἔργον, ἀλλ’ ὥστε τὸ περὶ ἐκατο
ν αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προφητεύεις τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο
μὲν [γάρ] πάρεργον ἢν εἴη τούτο δ’ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.
§ 5 ὡτι μὲν οὖν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην 3

See Comm. nn. 712—717, 725, 729, 738, 741, 745, 748, 747—749

Γ’ M’ P’ P* S’ Ar. (M’ has νῦ) || 18 αἱρετός <τοῦ> Koraes || 19 εἴτε δὲ || εἴτε διὰ
Μ’, τὸ δ’ περασέως is a gloss of παρασύρεις in the margin; γάρ Spengel, quite wrongly ||
21 νῦν after προφητεύεις Π’. Π’ Bk. || 22 γάρ omitted by Γ’ P*’ L’ Bk., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3
have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the
same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it
from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see n. 708). Even
setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by
the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present
themselves in this section, see nn. (713—
717, 725, 729, 738, 741, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in
c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might raise
doubts as to the genuineness of that
portion (see nn. 690, 709, 711) should
be more closely compared. Read Ed.
Müller’s exhaustive examination in his
History of the theory of art among the ancients II. pp. 366—373, Breslau, 1837,
a work universally neglected, which ought
to have led subsequent inquirers to a
renewed consideration of these chapters.
What a deal of pains he takes to re-
time the difficulties in them, and all in
vain. Although my view differs consi-
derably from his, in many respects it is
most intimately connected with his ex-
position. This is not the place to enter into
a more detailed examination of his argu-
ment, but see n. (743). Only one difficulty
is common to the two portions c. 1 (with
cc. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 3 §§ 3—c. 4 §§ 1:
viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry
of c. 1, and so too a little further on
in c. 13 §§ 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in cc. 2,
καθ' ἡν τάξιν καὶ ὁστισιόν ἀριστα πράττει καὶ ἔφη ματα-κοις 480 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 2. [IV(VII). 2. 5]
καὶ καρίως, φανερῶν ἐντὸν ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογοῦντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βιών αἰρετῶσατον, πότερον οὖ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βλές αἰρετῶς ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποθελευμένως, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τε, δι' ὥστε μένον τινὲς φασίν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων τούς 30 διό βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἔμφυλητοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρομένου, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν μέτων λέγω δὲ δυὸ τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὔ 4 μερίνῳ ποτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ αἰθήσεως ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν τε εὖ προφοροῦσα πρὸς τῶν βελτίων σκοπῶν συνυπότεσσαί καὶ τῶν 34 ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζον τε ἦν μέν τὸ τὸν πέλας ἄρχειν διαστημικῶς μὲν γνώμενον μὲν ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τὰς μεγάλης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὰ μέν ἀδικίαν
24 ὥς Ἀτ. apparently, [τάση] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) || 57 M1, 55 P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.) || 22 τις ἀνανδ. ἢ φ. Koraes, [τις] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 φιλόσοφοι [sc. αἰρετῶν] Jackson || 30 ἀποφ. after τοῦ διὸ M1 P° || φιλοτιμότατοι M° P1 A1. || 31 πρότερον Koraes (needlelessly) and P1 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33 γε Spengel, τε M° P1 II1 Bk. Susem.1 in the text, omitted by P2, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve || 35 ἐκάστων P2 P1 A' Bk. Spengel, 10. ἐκάστων P1 (corr. in the margin), perhaps rightly || τῆς πολ. M1, τῆς πολιτείας (πολιτείας 1st hand of P1) II1 A' Bk (τῆς τῆς πολιτείας corr. in the margin of P1), perhaps rightly; τὴν πόλιν Spengel, needlelessly || 37 τινὲς omitted by P1.

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness' Cpr. c. i § 1 and n. (685). SUSEM. (714)
29 τινὲς 'Some' only? We should expect 'all'. But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cpr. d. (491). SUSEM. (714)
§ 6 σχεδὸν γὰρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον] The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. SUSEM. (716)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, N.E. 1. v. 4. 1094 b 23. Whereas in N.E. x. 7. 1177 b 19 ff. αἰ καὶ τὰ πράξεις ἀρεταὶ are sharply distinguished from ἡ τοῦ ποιῆσεν ἐνεργεία (θεωρητική), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as αἰτοτελές (Newman).

34 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. But granting that the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration: for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (Cpr. d. 745b) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which arises with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cpr. h. n. (743, 745). SUSEM. (717)
§ 7 35 οὗ μὲν] The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotism over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy prosperity. The conjunction of τὸ ἄρχειν and γνώμην ἢ ἄρχει γνώμην is harsh, but can be paralleled. On διαστημικῶς (properly as slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.
41 ov' mellovoi] not so much.

§ 8 Secuta est uberior expositio sententiae eorum qui vitam optimam esse contendunt civitatisque quae kai aithras idrero- 

muovs sint, cf. 1335 b 23—27. Susem. 1334 b 1 polistosmuovs. * * ] To complete the connexion we require words to the following effect: — "and there is the same difference of opinion with regard to states. For some think that those states lead the best and happiest existence which devote themselves purely to domestic politics and have nothing to do with any policy of war. For, they say, etc." — "This then is one view, but others (al de) etc." Susem. (718)

§ 9 7 Ösper et Dakebiovoi — polio- 


H.

§ 10 9 en tois òvohoi] cp. t. 3 § 6, and n. (19 b). Susem. (720)


12 kal Keltovei] cp. p. 2. 9 § 7, and n. (287) p. 234 f. and below c. 17 § 3 and n. (953). Susem. (722)

14 ton ev tois krikoiv kósmos] Does this throw any light on the real significance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the rings of the Roman equites, as told by Livy xxiii. 12 ? (Ridgeway).

§ 11 15 kal peri Makadivnai] Here we see the Macedonians expressly reckoned among barbarian peoples. And even if this is pronounced the interpolation of a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier Peripatetics were attached to the Macedonian cause, the more probable it becomes that the pupil is here reproducing
μηδένα ἀπεκταγοῦσα τοιούτων ἔναρα περιεξόθηκα τὴν φόρ- (11) βελίνην ἐν δὲ Ἑλλάδιοις οὐκ ἔχουσι πίνειν ἐν ἔσορτῃ τινι σκυφών περιπερομένων τῷ μηδένεσ ἀπεκταγούσα τοιούτων ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑβηρῶν, ἐπεί τὸ πολεμικόν, τοσοῦτον τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑβελίσκουσιν κατασχηγνοῦντι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσον ἀν διαφθειρή τὴν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς καὶ ἐτέρα ὅπως ἐτέρως ἀστὶ τοιαύτα πολλά, τὰ μὲν νόμων κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐθέσιν.

κατά τοὺς δόξιες ἀν ἀγαθὸν ἂν ἠτοποῦ ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλουμένων ἑπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐργόν τὸν πολιτικόν, τὸ δύνασθαι (p. 98) τοῖς θεοφείς ὅπως ἄρχη καὶ δεσπότης τῶν πληθυντῶν καὶ βουλουμένων καὶ § 13 μὴ βουλουμένων, πῶς γὰρ ἀν ἐς τούτο πολιτικῶν ἄν μοροματικῶν, ὅ γε μηδὲ νόμων ἐστὶν; οὐ νόμων δὲ τὸ μὲν μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκταγότοι Π4, ἀπεκτακοῦ τοίς (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκτακοῦ Π4-εἰς Ald., ἀπεκτακοῦ Μ4 + 17 τοῖς κτηματομένων; Schneider § 18 ἀπεκτακοῦ Μ4-εἰς, ἀπεκτακοῦ Π4 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκταγότοι Π4 § 19 ἀριθμοῦτες ὁρ ἀριθμοῦτες, apparently, Γ (numerariae William) o βελίσκους Μ4 § 21 καὶ Κορας wrongly § 24 διαφθείρα transposed by Lindau to follow 28 ἄρχειν, wrongly § 27 μόνον after δικαίως Π4 Susem.14 and apparently Γ unaltered his master's view. Susem. (723). Cp. Introd. p. 46 n. (3).

17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθοις] Comp. Herod. iv. 66. Susem. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς [Ἑβραίοις] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious De Mira: bilitibus 46, 85, 87, 88, 883 b 15, 837 a 8, 74 ff. Susem. (725)

19 βελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcilable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia rows of stones are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the Academy of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

"βελίσκους means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally "spits." Originally the spits carried the heads of the slain: when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the spits, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted beside the trophies of the poloi; i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with "mili: tancy", of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spencer's Ceremonial Institutions ch. ii. p. 48 with p. 186."


25 τῶν πληθυντῶν] but § 8, a 5 τῶν πελαί.

§ 13 Hampke compares with this the discussion upon slavery i. 6 §§ 1-5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρμοδιότητα, is certainly echoed by the protest 27 f. οὐ νόμων δὲ κτλ 'το rule at all hazards, whether justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."
IV(VII). 2. 16] 1324b 16—1325a 2. 483

(II)

αλλά μην ουθέν ταῖς ἀλλαξ ἐπιστήμαις τούτῳ ὅρωμεν· οὔτε ἂν γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνητοῦ ἔργων ἐστὶ τὸ [ὑπ' ἡμῖν] πείσατ' ἢ τὸ βιώσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πληγήσαπτος ἰατροῦ·

§ 14 ρας. ἀλλ' ἐνίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν ὕσσεθαι εἶναι, καὶ οὕτε αὐτοῖς ἐκαστοῖς οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὖν αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκούντες·

35 αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ δίκαιος ἁγιοίς ἐϕοίνικε, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδέν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄντων δὲ εἰ μὴ φύει τὸ μὲν δεσπόστατον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστῶν, οὕτω εἰπτερ ἢ ἔχει τὸ τρόπον τούτον, οὐ δεί πάντων περάσαι δεσποτζε' ἀλλά τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θῶμρην ἢ τὴν ἁγιασάναι αὐθαρασίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τούτο θηρεύοντ' ἐστὶ δὲ θηρεύειν·

§ 15 τὸν ἀνάρρησιν ἢ ἐδεσποτῶν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰόῃ γὰρ καί ἐκαθ' ἐκαστῷ μιὰ πόλις εὐδαιμονίαν, ἢ πολιτεύεται δηλονοῦσα καλάς, εἰπτερ' ἐνδεχεται πόλιν οἰκείοις ποινα ἑκατονθ' αὐτ' ἐκαθ' ἐκαστῇ νῦ.

1325 a ἀλλὰ...ἀφάσεi omitted by Π 1 (supplied in the margin of P1) || 30 θ' before τίναι inserted by Π Π4 Bk. || 31 το omitted by Π Π4 Bk. || ἑδασάθτω Π (but βάδεσάθτω a correction in P1) || 33 δεπερ <παρ> or <παρ> ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || 36 μὴ φύει κπλ can hardly be right: [mach] Thurot, perhaps rightly. Schneider suspected a lacuna: if so, it may conceivably be filled up thus: μη <φύει κπλ> ἐκαστών, καὶ φύει || 37 δεσποτῶν—δεσποτῶν Stahr, δεσποτῶν—δεσποτῶν Giphaeus, δεσπότων—δεσπότων Π Π4 Al. Bk. Susen.1 in the text || 39 δεσποτῶν a later hand in P4 and Lambin, δεσποτῶν Π Π4 3.3 S V A 41. and Π4 (1st hand), δεσποτικῶν Π 4.4 L. || 40 ἐστι δὲ <πρὸς τοῦ> θηρεύουν Oncken rightly, though perhaps this need only be understood

29 The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superfluous. See Xen. Mem. III. 9 § 11. Pl. Ref. 488 D ὥσ τῶν ἅλλων ἢ ἄρσον ἢ τίνας τεκτεινὲς ἢ βιάζοντες τὸν καλόν, Polit. 590 b ὥσ τῶν ἢ μὴ τίνων τῶν ἱατρομενων, ἢκτον ὥσ ἢ ἂν ἄρσον τὴν τέχνην, ποια τὰ γεγραμένα βλέπων ἄναγκας ἢ δρᾶν τινα, τὰ τῶν ἁπατεινὰ τίς σφυγμαὶ τούταν; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 30 ἡστροί οὐθέν, τεχνητὸν ἔργον, πείτως δὲ, οὐθέν ἂν εἶναι, 33 ἐκαστοῦς ὁ, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not remov-able by transposition.

οὕτω γάρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὕτε κτλ] Comp. Plut. Gorg. 456 b (Eaton); also c. 13 § 2 a. (870), and above III. 6 § 7 n. (521). 15 § 4 n. (628), 16 §§ 6—8: H. 8 § 18 a. 1770). Susen. (736)

§ 14 35 αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς] at home, in their own political affairs.

§ 15 37 φύει τὸ μὲν δεσποστῶν] See B. I. c. 4 § 6, cc. 5, 6. Susen. (727)

39 θηρεύοντ' ἐπὶ θηρεύον τήσειν θυσίαν Plutarch. Alexander. 72 ἦσπερ ὑπ' ἥμας καὶ κυριεύοντ' ἐξερχόμενος ἐξεδέλτη, καὶ τὸ Καρπαθίων ἔβος κατεπτρῆτο, κάτωθεν ἠξίων ἀπεκοφτότων. τοῦτο δὲ Ἰωσπατίων ἐναγμός ἐκάλετο. This was B.C. 324—3 quite at the close of Alexander's career.

40 τὸ πρᾶσον τοῦ θηρεύοντ[.] Implying that wild animals which are not fit for food may be hunted for other purposes, and to supply other necessities of life. It is not quite clear whether the writer thinks that for such other purposes it is also under certain circumstances permissible to hunt men, and whether therefore he would allow of war for the capture of slaves, which Aristotle disallows (1. 8 § 12 an. 65, 25) as a branch of θηρεύον. Susen. (728)

31—2
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ Η. 2. [IV(VII). 2. 16

μοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἃς τής πολιτείας ἢ σύνταξις οὐ (II) πρός πολέμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἢ σταἰ τῶν πολεμίων.

§ 17 δήλαν ἁρὰ ὅτι πάσας τῶν πρὸς τὸν πολέμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς 10 μὲν θετών, οἷς ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατων, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ βεβαιασθαι 9 πόλις καὶ γένος αὐθεντούν καὶ πάσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζησὶς ἀγά.

§ 18 θής πῶς μεθέξους καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῦ εὐδαιμονίας. δι-

οίσιν μὲντοι τῶν τατομείων ἵνα νομίμων καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-

θετικῆς ἕως ἱδεῖν, ἐὰν τινὲς ὑπάρχωσιν γευματιέντως, τοία πρὸς 5 ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοὺς καθίσκουν πρὸς ἐκάστος χρηστέον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὑστερον τίχοι τῆς προσηκούσης 15 σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συνείσχειν. 3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογούσας μὲν τῶν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἴναι βλένων III αἰρετῶτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-

κετέον ἠμῖν πρὸς ἀμφότερον αὐτοὺς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκίμα-

ζοῦσι τὰ πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, νομίζοντες τὸν τὸν ἑλεοθέρου

1325 a 6 ἄρα ὁποίο τῆς πολιτείας] We may well believe that such conceptions, although foreign to Pericles, and new even to Isocrates, had become familiar enough in the Athens of Phocion, especially amongst those who lived to compare the brilliant peace administration of Demetrios of Phaleron with the disastrous results of the active policy which had led to Chaereonea and Cnaunus. Comp. Bernays Phocion pp. 31 ff., 55 ff. and Newman 1. 311.

§ 16 1325 a 3 ἡ τῆς πολιτείας] But this is only true with the proviso that such a state is not attacked by offensive wars, for which it must by its constitution be prepared, as indeed the writer himself explains, § 18. SUSEM. (729).

§ 17 6 δήλαν ἁρὰ...ἰεῦδαιμονίας] Precisely the same statement as in these two sentences is made by Plato Lecos 1, 618 b: ὁσιότατος δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν τολμῶν ἐπι-

mενίαν ἢ καὶ διδάκτου διανοούμενον οὕτως τις 618 b. ὁποίος πολιτικόν γένοστι ὁρθά, πρὸς τὰ ἐξώνθων πολεμικὰς ἀποβελεῖς μόνων καὶ πρώτων, ὡς ἔν τοι χρήσει τῆς τολμεῖν εὐμοβολών καὶ λάλου

τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐκεῖ τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (730).

§ 18 12 ἐὰν τινὲς...γευματιέντως] So already II. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-de-

fence.

§ 19 τέτεραμ τοῖς ἕλειθος] How it is to be enjoyed.

§ 20 λειτουργὸς ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφότερος] Comp. n. (696) on c. 1 § 6. SUSEM. (733).

§ 21 1611 a 18' Bonitz Ind. Gr. 749 b 44 ff. τοῦ ἑλέοθρου τὸν ἀπολυμένου, untrammeled by office and by civic obli-

gations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were meteors, as Anaxagoras had been before them.
20 βιον ἐπέρεν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶτατον, (III)
οὐ δὲ τοῦτον ἁριστον. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μονὴν πράξσιν πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δὲ ἐυπραγιὰν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὁρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀρϑῶς, οὐ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἔλευθερου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἁμείνων.

§ 2 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς: οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δοῦλος, οὐ δουλος, χρῄζει μὲν ἐπίταξες οὐκ ἔπειρε τῶν ἀνάγκαιων οὐδὲνος μετέχει τῶν καλῶν, τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δε- σποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθῶν οὐ γὰρ ἔλευθερον διεστίκης ἡ τῶν ἔλευθερον ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δουλῶν οὐκ ἄτοι τὸ φύσιν ἔλευθερον τὸν φύσει δοῦ-

§ 3 ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπέκειλα τὸ ἀπράκτης τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀλη-
θὲς: ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἐστὶν, ἐτὶ δὲ πολλῶν κα-

21 εἶναι before καὶ Μὴ Π1 25 τῷ τῷ Ν. Π1-2-3, τῷ Α. 27 δεσποτείαν Π2 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), δεσποτείαν Π2 and perhaps Π, so that this may be right — 29 αὐτὸ τοῦ Π2 (corr.), αὐτὸ Π1, αὐτὸ Π2 Sb Vb and Π2 (1st hand)

21 ἀδύνατον γὰρ...23 ταῦτα] Comp. n. (708). Susem. (733)

§ 2 25 οὐδὲν γὰρ...σεμνον] Comp. l. 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 14 n. (913). Susem. (734)

§ 3 ἐπίταξες] See note (114) on ἐπι-

τάξιν ἐρειδήθη l. 13 § 14.

27 νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν δεσποτείαν] See n. (58). Yet Plato was free from this error when he classified the forms of rule, Laws 11. 698 a ff. On the other hand he makes πολιτικὴ = βασιλεία, Eut.

τάξις 292 c. a passage which should be added to Polit. 328 E, as quoted on l. 1 § 2. 31 ἀὐτὸ...δουλος] How great that difference may be, we learn from l. 5 § 8 n. (47).

§ 3 31 οὐκ ἀληθὲς] This is not right, hand verum est.

32 ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις] This is certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine. See c. I §§ 10—13, n. (704, 710); Nic. Eik. 1. cc. 7—9; vi. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, vi. 5 § 4, 1140 b 7, x. 6 § 3, 1176 a 33; Phys. 11. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; Polit. 6 § 13, 1450 a 17; Eth. l. 6 § 3, 1366 b 14; comp. Zeller ii, II p. 612. But still it is so provided only that under πρᾶξις is included not merely practical, but also theoretical or mental activity, and that consequently the term is understood in the wider sense: for otherwise this doctrine would not be

true of the highest felicity of pure thought, as it pertains to God alone (n. 705), to which however the author himself appeals § 10, n. (746). And of human well-being, too, scientific perfection in active operation is the higher element, moral perfection only the lower element, according to the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. " It must be granted, that then it would be hard to say how the happiness of the individual and of the whole state can be one and the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser endeavours to explain the mistake pointed out in nn. (717, 745) by assuming that "Aristotle subordinated the idea of internal activity to that of contemplation." This thought is quite just, but does this unhappy attempt to mend matters by such a confusion look more like the master or a pupil? Granted that this subordination is intended here (and from § 8 this cannot be doubtful—see n. 743), still of those who prefer the scientific life to the practical life it cannot possibly be maintained with truth that they prefer in activity to activity, nor can Aristotle himself have written anything so inconsistent. Susem. (736)

33 ἐν δὲ πολλῶν κτιλ] "The actions done by the just and temperate contain a realization of many noble ends." This is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle himself. Further comp. for ἀγαθὰς ἡ n. (306 b), n. 6 § 9. Susem. (737)
λοις τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ σοφρόνων πράξεις. (III) καὶ τοῖς τάχ’ ἀν υπολάβοι τις τούτων οὐτό διωρισμένου θεοῦ ὃτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον οὖν γὰρ ἂν πλείον ἐστὶν καὶ καλλίστων κύριον εἰς πράξεων. ὡστε οὐ δει τῶν δυνάμειν ἀρχὲν παρίναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλά μᾶλλον ἀφαιρέσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδιν μήτε παῖδας πατέρας μήθ’ διὸς δίκαιος νῦν ἄφησιν ὑπολογίζων μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ τούτο φροντίζεων τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετότατον, τὸ δὲ εὖ πράττειν ἀριστόν. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἵστος ἔγονεν, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει ξεῖ τοῖς ἀποστεροῦντας καὶ βιαζόμενοι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν αἰρετῶν τούτων ἄφησε. ἢ τοῦτο ἂν ἱερὸν τῷ τῆς ὑπάρχειν, ἂν ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος, οὐ γὰρ ἐτί καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδεχέται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντες τοιοῦτον ὅσον ἀνήπαρκον ἢ παρεκβεβηκε τῆς ἁρίστης τοῖς γὰρ ὑμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ μὲν μέρει, τούτῳ γὰρ ἵστον καὶ ἄμοιον τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵστον τοῖς ἵστοις 39 ἢ τῶν [ν] υπολάβων τις. ‘Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.’ This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. ’SUSEM. (738)

37 παρείλθατο τὸ συναγοράζοντα. ‘Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.’ This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. ’SUSEM. (738)

38 τριάντα παῖδιν κτλ. Plutarch, De Strip. c. 3, p. 890 b, complains that the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire.

39 ὑπολογίζων | This verb, if indeed it be right, is ὑπολογίζων in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Democritus.

41 ὁ τε | 'perhaps,' conforming to Aristotle's own dictum Rhet. 11. 13 § 2. 1380 b 18 ὁμοιομοίως ἐπικαλέσθαι de τὸ ἱστον καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it con- cals a very positive opinion under a cautious formula.

§ 3 1325 b 3 τὰς πράξεως | The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἀποστερών καὶ βιαζόμενων).

4 ὅσον ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον | These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See Is. 11. 12 § 1 e. and Nie. Eth. VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSEM. (739)

5 ὁ παραβαλειν | An Archelaos or a Napoleon.

6 κατορθώσαν | would perform a right action: rectum factum. This use of the verb, as opposed to ἀπαρεξίαν, may be easily understood from Nic. Eth. 11. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, οὐ μὴν ἐμποδίζεται ἰσαρχείαν τῷ δὲ μῶν ἐπικαλεῖται κατορθότατον, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of κατορθώμα as a technical term.

§ 8 134 b 2 μὲ ἱστον...παρὰ φύσιν | Cr. 11. 16 §§ 2—4 e. (672), ἵστον...παρὰ φύσιν. SUSEM. (740)

10 τοῦ μὴ ὄμοιον τῶν ὄμοιων παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (III) 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ’ ἀρετήν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ § 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τούτῳ πειθέσθαι δίκαιον. δεδ' οὐ μόνον ἄρετην ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ’ ἧν ἐστι πρακτικὸς. ἄλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 15 εὐπραγιάν θετεῖν, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ἣν εἶναι καὶ καθ’ § 8 ἐκεινὸν ἄριστος βίος ὁ πράκτικος. ἄλλα τὸν πράκτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαίοι εἰναι πρὸς ἔτερους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἰναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαθρώντων χάριν γινομέναις ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον λοι τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς ἀυτῶν ἐνεκεν θεωρίαις καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι after μόνων Π'] after ταύτας Γ || 20 αὐτῶν Vettori, αὐτῶν Π’ || διανοησεις...πράξει τις μᾶλλον ἐκείνην θεωρίας καὶ δια-

10 διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις] To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUSMEN. (741) § 7 12 δεδ' οὐ μόνον κτλ] "He must not have only the virtue but the force to develop his activity fully" (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24, 25: also n. (672) and Introd. p. 44. SUSMEN. (742)

14 ταύτα] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, βίος δεσποτικός, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable §§ 4 —6).

15 ὁ πράκτικος] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. Nic. Eth. x. 8 § 8, 1178 b 32, ἤ γεν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τις κατὰ τὸν τῶν βίων καὶ εὐδαιμονιστος: δεικέρω δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, as some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action: on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical." By τινες we should naturally understand Plato: but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, Nic. Eth. x. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεικεῖται πρὸς οὐ δικαιοφραγεῖται καὶ μεθ’ ὅσον § 7, αὕτου, sc αἱ πολλὲς πράξεις, ἀνθρώπων καὶ τέλους τῶν ἐφεστεκαί καὶ εἰ δὲ αὐτὴν αληθὲν εἶναι. Eaton compares Resp. iv 443 D where justice is expounded to be harmonious activity of all the parts of man, and therefore internal, περί την ἑνότον ἄλλον περί εἰκόνων καὶ τὰ εὐαίσθημα πράξεων. 20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς...διανοησεῖς] This can only mean theoretical or purely scientific thinking; Ed. Müller's uncertainty on this point is the chief defect in his whole exposition, which hinders him from arriving at any really tenable result and is the cause of many errors. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7 § 5, 1177 b 11 ὁ οὐδεναὶ αὐτὴν, sc. τῆς θεωρηματικῆς, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρηματικά, αὐτὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἡ πλῆθος ἢ ἁπλὸν περαποδόματα παρὰ τὴν πράξειν. Upon Aristotle's view two things must be distinguished in every activity, the end and the means: theoretical activity differs from practical and creative activity (see n. 34) in this respect, that in the former internal activity is a self-contained end, while in practical activity the end lies in the act produced by it, which affects some external person, and in the creative activity of art the end is the work or result produced. 1 See De Caelo ii. 12 § 9, 192 b 6, ἡ πράξας εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν διάλεκτῳ, ἐναν καὶ αὐτὴν ἢ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ένεκα, Nic. Eth. vi. cc. 2—5, De Anima iii. c. 9 (Eaton): Zeller op. cit. ii. ii. p. 177 f. If αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς θεωρὶς καὶ διανοησεῖς are the most truly practical, the supporters of the view that the intellectual life is to be
preferred to that of the statesman are
unconditionally right, nor can we see
how far the writer thinks he is mediating
between them and their opponents. He
would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that
man must exercise not only his intel-
lectual, but also his moral, powers: that
he is an integral part of the whole
formed by the state, and not a god. 1
2
§§ 11, 12. That consequently, although
it is life in the state which alone renders
possible an assured scientific activity
itself, yet it may well be permitted to
individual men to be active for science
primarily, and for the state only secon-
darily and in the fulfilment of the most
general duties of a citizen. That at the
same time there must be others who find
their real satisfaction in the activity of
the statesman and consequently adopt the
opposite procedure: while a symmetrical
combination of excellence in both will be
the highest, and for that reason certainly
the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7–11,
n. (606), also nn. (717, 1024) and Intro.
p. 48, p. 59 ff. SUSEM. (743)
21 ἡ γὰρ ἐντραξία τέλος] Comp. c.
1, § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744)
§ 9 23 ἄλλα μὴ...28 ὅτι ἀν-
θρώπων] ‘However even for states placed
by themselves and determined upon an iso-
lated life there is no necessity for inaction:
activity is still possible to them in sections,
for the various sections of the city have
many ways of associating. And in the
same way this is true of each individual
man.’ What was recalled to mind in n.
(717) is true here also. The comparison
is not suitable; for neither is the internal
administration of the state a theoretical
activity, but rather it is practical or partly
practical, partly creative (see nn. 34,
743); while in the case of the individual
man every activity (except the theo-
retical) is always finally directed to others.
Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller
Plato p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of
Aristotle, the individual’s moral virtue is
primarily a mutual relation of the parts
of his soul, the rational soul and that
which has to be subjected to the guid-
ance of reason (see nn. 41, 112). Yet
its active exercise is for the most part
possible only in intercourse with others.
SUSEM. (740)
28 ὁ δὲ κόσμος] See n. (705) on c. 1 § 10,
n. (736). SUSEM. (746)
20 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and
happiness of the universe cannot, strictly
speaking, be in question on the ortho-
dox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats
the Platonic assumption of a World-soul.
The world as a whole is only passively
affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve
round the earth, which is at rest, in 24
hours: or precisely stated, this passive
affection belongs to the rest of the uni-
verse, the earth alone being exempt. All
other motions and activities, affections
and changes, belong to the several
beings inside the universe. See Zeller
11. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though
comprehending all this in its harmonious
arrangement we may call it, in a meta-
phorical sense, the activity of the uni-
verse, or even say that the world has its
wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered
activity, yet considered as an analogy
to the internal administration of the state
this is more halting than the last (n. 745).
For it is intended to prove that the highest
happiness of the individual man
lies in purely internal or theoretical
activity: hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (ἔκκλημα καλόν) is exactly identical with its happiness (εὐδαιμονία).
Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. SUSEM. (747)
31 και τοῖς ἄνθρωποις This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. SUSEM. (748)
34 και περὶ τάς ἄλλας πολιτείας By “other forms of government” were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of this latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχή τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the “other forms of government” can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the “state to be constituted according to an ideal,” τῆς μελλόντος ἐκτός ὑφηχθείσης πόλεως (cp. Diebitsch’s excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only as such that it has any meaning and connexion, as Spengel, Über die Politik, p. 26 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: “After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its external and then of its internal requirements.” Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τάς ἄλλας πολιτείας to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Susenbhl. But when Hildbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (Philologus XVII. p. 164 ff.) pronounced “the other forms of government” to refer rather to the other model polities or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposed connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if cc. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of c. 4 § 1 as far as πολιτείας. We need then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpretation, that the words do refer to B. II., since the interpolator has tackled his composition on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III., so that, as we have already stated, Introd. p. 48, he either found or made a redaction, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the
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35 τερον, ἀρχή τῶν λαοτῶν εἰσεῖν πρῶτον πολιάς τινας δεὶ τὰς υπο-
θέσεις εἰσί τῆς μελλούσης καὶ εἰχήν συνεστώναι πόλεως.

8 οὐ γὰρ οἶνο τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀντίθεταν ἀνεὶ συμ-
μετρώ τινος χορηγίας. διά δὲ πολλά προϊστηθήσεις καθάσπερ
39 εἰχήμονες, εἰσίν μέντοι μηδὲν τῶν οὐδον. λέγω δὲ
8 οἶνο τε πεῖ τε πλῆθος πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ
136 a τοῖς ἄλλοις δημοφυργοῖς, οἶνον υφάντω καί ναυτηγό, δὲ τὴν
ὑλὴν ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὕσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσον γὰρ ἀν
αύτη τυχαίη παρεκκεκυμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-
νυ υπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἰσὶν κάλλους), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ
5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ δὲ τὴν ὁικείαν ὑλὴν ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείους ἔχονταν.

8 ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικής χορηγίας πρῶτον τὸ τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων, πόσον τέ καὶ ποίους τινας ὑπάρχειν δὲ φννεῖ, καὶ κατὰ
10 τὴν χώραν ὁμοίως, πόσον τε εἰσὶ καὶ πολιν τινὰ ταῖς

οἶνονται μὲν ὅπως ἡ πλείοται προσήκεις μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν
10 εὐδαίμονα πολίν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλος, ἀγροῦσι ποιὰ μεγάλη καὶ

35 τῶν λαοτῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (149). If these words take up the sen-
tence 1332 b 37 ἄλλα γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν...1344 a 4 πειθόμενοι, we should expect ἄρχη
<δὲ> τῶν λαοτῶν. 36 πεῖ omitted by M5, [πεῖ] Susem. 1-5, perhaps rightly ||
37 γενόμενα Susem. 1-5, fore William, γενόμενα? Susem. || 38 προϊστηθήσεις Syl-
burg Susem. 1-5, priaeipsoiu William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εἰχή-
μόνες, as Syburg suggested

136 a 3 αὐτῆς ΠΠΒK. || 4 κάλλιον] βλάτοις M5 || 7 κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσον Syburg, δεὶς II BKK. 1
Susem. 1 in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4, § 1, ἀρχή τῶν
λαοτῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its
present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention
(see nn. 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἄρχη
τῶν λαοτῶν κτλ. a place immediately after the end of Book iii. without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last un-
finished sentence of B. iii. to B. iv(vii). —as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. iv(vii). and at the same time treat the words τῶν
λαοτῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here:

"Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c." Susem.
(149) Cp. ii. i. § 2, 1360 b 36, ἄρχη ἐν δὲ πρῶτον πολιάς, ὃ περ πέραν ἄρχη
ταῦτας τῆς σκέψεως.

4 c. 4 §§ 2—14. cc. 5—7: πεῖ τε πλῆ-
θοις πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. With this
compare generally Plato Latio IV.

§ 2 38 χορηγίας See n. on i. 6
§ 3 1255 a 14.
鸠 δὲ πολλὰ κτλ] Cp. ii. 6 § 7 n.
(202): also ii. i. § 1, n. (128) and the
references there collected. Susem. (750)
§ 3 40 ὡσπερ γὰρ κτλ The analogy
was used i. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the
population: how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So like-
wise in regard to the territory: how large
and of what nature ought this to be?
The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14: their race and
mental characteristics in c. 7.

The size of the ideal city: c. 4 §§ 4—14.
136 a 10: ποιὰ μεγάλη] With §§ 4—
6 compare Pl. Rep. IV. 423 B: ἐκὼ ἀν ἡ
πόλις σα ὦις σωφρόνως ἐστὶν ἐγκάθη,
§ 5 ποίαι μικρὰ πόλεις. κατ’ αριθμὸν γὰρ πλήθος τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων κρή(IV) νοουὲ τὴν μεγάλην, δεδε μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἦστι γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἐργον, ὅστε τὴν δυναμικὴν τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰκτέον εἶναι μεγάλην,15 οἴον Ἰπποκράτην ὁποῖο ἄνθρωπῳ ἄλλα λατρευῖν εἰμι μείζον φήσει
§ 6 εἰ ἂν τῶν τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κἂν εἰ δεδε κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχόν πλῆθος τοῦτο οἰκτέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν ὡς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχει καὶ διόλου ἀριθμὸν πολλὰν καὶ μετοικοῦν καὶ ἐξέχουν), ἄλλα ὅσοι μέρος εἰς πόλεως καὶ εἴ δὲν συνώσταται πόλεις οἰκεῖοι μερῶν, ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, εἴ ἐς δὲ βιάναυσοι μὲν ἐξέχονται πόλοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλίτων δὲ ὄλγος, (ὁ 303) ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην ὑπὸ γὰρ ταύτων μεγάλη τε πόλεις καὶ πολλὰνθρωποὶ. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τούτῳ γε ἐκ τῶν 826 ἐργῶν φανερῶν ὅτι χαλεπῶν ὅσοι δὲν ἀδύνατον εὐφορεῖται

11 ποία added by ΙΜΑρ., omitted by all other authorities and Βκ. || 12 εἰς δὲ] ἄλλα εἰς preferred by Thurow, but such variations should be noted without correction. The passage supports R. Schöll's conjecture at 1253 a 22, <οὐ> ἢ ἄλλα. || 14 οἰκτέον omitted by ΙΙ, [οἰκτέον] Σουσεμ,1 perhaps rightly || 18 τοιοτάτων Καμεραίος Βκ², ὅπως (ὡς) Σουσεμ || ἵππων after 19 πόλεως Π² Π² Βκ. || 20 εἰς μέρος πόλεως apparently I, πολέως εἰς μέρος Π² Π² Βκ. || 21 μερῶν Π² Π² Βκ. || 25 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα Π² || ἄλλα τούτο γε καὶ ἵπποι || 303 ἀδύνατον ὅτι χαλεπῶν ὅσοι δὲν ἀδύνατον εὐφορεῖται

μεγάλη ἢ ἐστι, οὐ τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων λέγεται, ἄλλα ὡς ἄληθεν μεγάλης, καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἑλλήνων τῶν πολιστέμονων (Eaton). Plato also criticizes the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy Λατσ 743 D ff., cp. 738 D, E. 11—13 Comp. Isocr. vii. 13. || Σουσεμ (753). Add vi. 81, xv. 171 f. (Newman).

§ 5 12 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν
We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency: explained, in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In § 10, a 38 it is rather "essence," cp. c. 1 § 11, 1253 b 33.) For the use of δὲ instead of the more usual ἀλλὰ, as in a 15 ὁποῖο ἄνθρωπῳ ἄλλα λατρεὺς, cp. Thuc. IV. 86. 1 ὁποὶ ἐπὶ καί ἐπὶ ἐνέπεζέ τε δὲ.

15 ἰπποκράτην We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which constitute the first and third books of the 'Epidemics,' the no less excellent little work 'On the influence of air, water and locality,' and perhaps 'On the origin and cure of diseases,' and the fragment 'On wounds in the head.' Still these are enough to prove the ability of the man, who is rightly called the Father of Medicine. Σουσεμ (753).

§ 6 18 κατὰ τὸ τυχόν πλῆθος 'We must not estimate it by the mass of any and every sort of people.' Comp. c. 8 § 8 n. (804) and VIII(v). 3 § 11 ὅποιο γὰρ μέρος ἢ τοῦ πολιστέμονος πολλὰς ὑπάρχει ὡς ὡς ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντων πλῆθους πολλὰς γίνεται οὕτως ἢ καὶ τὸ τυχόντων ἕνα εὖ n. (1531 b). || Σουσεμ (753)

20 ὅσοι μέρος...21 μερῶν] 'but only count those who form an integral part of a city or the parts of which it properly consists'; see cc. 8, 9. | Σουσεμ (753) Τούτων depends on πλῆθους.

23 ὅποιοι] Of course the soldiers are here mentioned only to exemplify the organic members of the city generally. || Σουσεμ (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπῶν, ὅσοι δὲ νὰ ἀδύνατον]
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τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπων. τῶν γονῶν δοκούσων πολιτευόμεθα (IV) καλὸς ὡδέμιαν ὁρῶν οὐσιαν ἀνεμείνην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 8 τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. οὐ γάρ 30 νόμος τάξεως τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαίαν εὐταξίαν εἶναι, οὐ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀρίθμος οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως. θείαι γάρ ὡς ἓ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔφεσι, ὡς καὶ τούτου συνέχει τὸ πολ. ἐπὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθο καὶ μεγέθει

§ 9 εὕρετα. διοι καὶ πόλεως ὡς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λαός

ή χρῆσις 35 ὅρος ὑπερβάλλων, ταύτην εἶναι κακλίστην ἀναγκαίαν, <ἐπεῖ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθε καὶ μεγέθει εὐθείᾳ γίνεσθαι.> ἀλλ' ἐστι τα 36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρου, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. § 10 τοῦ, ζυγοῖ φυτῶν ὁργάνων καὶ γῆρ τούτων ἐκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβαλλόν έξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν ὄλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὡτὲ

20 τε omitted by M* P*, very likely by Γ, perhaps rightly, [red] Susem.]] 33 εἴη τε ... 34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Böckler to follow 35 ἀναγκαίαν. See p. 87. Schneider, who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ὑπερβάλλω καὶ τὸ γε καὶ 34 [δό] Κορές || 34 πόλεως] τῶν P* P** Bk., civitates Ar. || 38 αὐτοῦ P* * αὐτοῦ M* P*

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of ἐφοίμα. Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government 11. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most popular cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 800,000, the numbers given for Acragas Diog. Laert. vii. 63, Holm Gesch. des Stifters ii. 402 (Diod. xiii. 34 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 100,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξεως τῆς And poli-

tεῖαν ὑπερβαλλόν τίς ἐστι τὰς ἀρχὰς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. Gorg. 503 b ff. esp. 504 b ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεωι καὶ κοινωνίαι (ὁμορρομον ταῖς καὶ νόμοις. 33 θέλει γάρ... 32 τῶν πολ. "for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together." And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, φοινίκως φόνσα, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause: see esp. Met. xii. (A) 7 § 6, 1073 b 13 ἐν τοῦτω ἀρα φύσεως ἄριστῃ ὁ ὀρθανός καὶ ἡ φύσει; 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 παραδόσει παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων δότα περιηθεὶς τὸ θεῖον τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν. Susem. (756) § 9 34 ἦς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ. "which has the definition here given," i.e. σύστασις, "combined with a certain size," ἐπι τὸ γε καλὸν κτλ. 'since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude,'

Comp. Pet. 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐτέρ 3' ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζύγων καὶ ἀπαθεῖα ὥσπερ τοινυν τῶν μόνων ταύτα τεταγμένα δέ έχειν ἄλλα καὶ μεγέθος ὑπερβαλλόντος τοῦ τοῦτοτο χάριν καλόν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστιν. δοκούσω δὲ πάρομον ἀντὶ τοῦ γένους καλὸν γένος... οὔτε παραμετέχεις: Met. xii. (M) 3 § 1, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλὸς μεγέθει τα εἶναι τάξει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὁμοιομονῆς: Probl. xix. 38; xviii. 1: Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τὸ καλὸν ἐν μεγάλω σώματι, οἵ μειοὶ δὲ δοτέοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' ἐστίν: Ed. Müller op. c. 11. pp. 84—107: Zeller ii. ii. p. 765 f. Susem. (757) Plato Philob. 64 d, μεταφοράς γαρ καὶ ξυμμετρία καλός ἢπετε.

§ 10 39 ἀποτελομένον κτλ. 'robbed of its true nature,' i.e. deprived, like the
40 δὲ φαύλοι ἐχοῦν, οὖν πλοῖον σπηλαιμαίον μὲν οὐκ ἐσται (IV)
pλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυνόμεν σταδίου, εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὼν ὅτε
§ 11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ καῦστος ή μὲν ἐξ ὧν ἱλιον 7
λιαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης, ἢ δὲ εἰς πολλὰς
ἀγάν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὀστείροις, ἀλλ' 5 οὐ πόλις:
πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ βαθίου ὑπάρχειν τῆς γὰρ στρατη-
γάς ἐστιν τοῦ λιαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθος, ἢ τίς κήρυκς μὴ
Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς πολλὰν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἑκ
τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ ἐξ
ἐστὶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδεχέσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν
10 ταυτής ὑπερβάλλοντας κατὰ πλῆθος εἰναι [μείζων] πόλιν,
§ 12 ἀλλὰ τούτ' οὖν ἐστιν, ὀστείροις ἀστρείωσιν, ἀστρείωσιν. τίς δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ
τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἔρος, εἰς τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν βαθίου. εἰς γὰρ αἱ
πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόμενων τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων,
§ 13 ἀρχόμενοι δὲ ἐπίταξιν καὶ κρίσις ἐργῶν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν (p. 102)
15 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τός ἀρχόμενοι διανέμεις κατ'

136b 3 ἢ δὲ πόλεις αὐταρκείς omitted by P¹-² Π² Λτ. || 4 μὲν αὖτε τοῖς P²-³-⁴-⁵ S¹ V³ Bk. || αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὀστείροις οὐ αὐτάρκης, ὀστείροις <ὁ> ἐθνὸς Jackson,
perhaps rightly || 5 πολιτείαν] τοῖς P²-³, πολιτείαν S¹ V³ || 8 γὰρ after 9 εἰ
Π³ Π⁴ Bk. || 10 [μείζων] Schneider Bk.² Schmidt would transpose thus: μείζων ταυτής <κατ'.
Presumably μείζων is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλοντος κατὰ πλῆθος

diebaphemena of 1. § 5 (cp. 1. 2 § 13 n. 28),
40 'or stunted,' in poor condition.
41 οὐ δὲ δυνόμεν σταδίου] nor yet a boat two furlongs long: comp. Pind. Ἰ. 7 § 9, 1431 a 2, σωλου καὶ καὶ σταδίου ἔργαν.
§ 11 136b 2 ὑπὸ τοῦ P⁴-³ ὑπὸ τοῦ Π³ Bk. || ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ καὶ πόλις] Comp. Nic. Ἐπο. ix. 10 § 3, 1170 b 31: ἠ ἐν τοῖς τι μέγερον καὶ φαλαινός πλῆθος, ὀστείροις πόλεις; ωστε γὰρ εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸν πόλιν, ὡστε ἐκ τῶν συνα-
δρομὴν ἐν τῷ πόλει ἐστὶν (Eaton).
SUSEM. (758)
5 αὐτάρκης] See 1. 2 § 12 n. (31), also n. (136), Ἱ. 1 § 12 (447), 9 § 14 (850), iv. viii. 5 § 1 (704), 8 § 8 (824).
SUSEM. (759)
4 αὐτάρκης, ὀστείροις οὖν, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις] See n. (11) and ii. 2 § 3 n. (132).
SUSEM. (760)
5 οὐ βάθους] The larger the city or
canton-state becomes, the more difficult
is the working of the constitution. Baby-
lon, like all Peloponnesians (ii. 6 § 6, 111,
3 § 5), has passed the limits within which
civic unity is possible. Such an over-
grown city or canton-state must be treated
as an ἔθνος; or possibly that is what he
contemplates in ii. 14 § 1 (ὑπὸ καὶ
χώραν). The problem which to Aristotle
seemed almost insoluble was solved by
events, as the federal system became
developed; the Achaean league, an ἔθνος,
included for a while all Peloponnesian in
political unity, Polyb. ii. 37. 11.
7 πρῶτη] primitive, earliest as b 8 πρῶτον.
The term is applied to oles,
κώμη 1. 2 § 5. So in the definition De
Anima ii. 1 § 6, 412 b 5, πρῶτη ἐντελε-
χεια σώματος φασικῶν ἕρωμακω.
§ 12 14 ἐπίσταται καὶ κρίνει] Cr.
vii. (iv). 15 § 4, μάλιστα δὲ ἄρχα λέοτα
ταῦτα ὅσα ἄναξον ἐπίδοσαν, μεταμορφικά
τα περὶ τῶν καὶ κρίνει καὶ ἐπίταξιν, καὶ
μάλιστα τούτῳ τὸ γάρ ἐπίταξεν ἀρχο-
μένων ἐστιν, n. (1349 b).
SUSEM. (761)
Similarly Pl. Politics 660 a, συμφυεῖν
tῆς γεωργίας τὸ μὲν ἐπιστατικὸν μέρος, τὸ
δὲ κριτικὸν.
§ 13 17 ὅσον...·18 κρύστας] τοῦτο = τὸ γνωρίζειν ἄλλοις. A genuine Athenian sentiment; not only does Plato's judgment agree with this (Laws V. 738 ε, ὅπως ἂν φιλοσοφοῦσαν ἄλλους μετὰ θυσίας καὶ γνωρίζουσαν, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πέλει ἀγαθόν, ἢ γνωρίζουσα αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς εἶναι. ὅπως γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἄλλους ἐστιν ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἄλλα αἰτήτατα, οὔτε ἐν τιμῇ τῆς ἄξιος οὔτε ἄρα ἐξετάζει ποτὲ τι ἢ ἄρσεν μηδὲν ἐν τῇ ἡμερομερίᾳ ὅρθῳ τυγχάνως), but Thucydides also remarks, viii. 66 § 3, that during the reign of terror under the Four Hundred people were afraid to communicate their suspicions to one another. 10 ἂν τὰ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πέλει καὶ τὴν ἄλλης ἀγωγίας (Eaton). SUSEM. (763)

§ 19 οὐ δικαιον αὐτοφημίαν] "it is not fair to pronounce off-hand." Knowing the ground of his objection to over-populous cities, we can argue (as in a similar case previously, see on 111. 5 § 5) that his own principles require him to withdraw it where increased facilities of communication have enabled men to surmount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη...·24 εἰσύσωμοι] 'the largest excess of population which will promote independence of life and yet can be taken in at one view.' This closely corresponds with the decision pronounced by Aristotle as to the proper length of a poem, and the size of a work of art generally, Poet. c. 7 § 10, 1454 a 3 ff. 23 § 5, 1450 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1457 b 18. Comp. rhet. iii. 9 § 6, 1409 b 17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with n. (768). SUSEM. (768) c. 5 deals with the territory. It should be sufficient for the support of the inhabitants without external supplies, §§ 1, 2; compact and easily defensible, § 3; and with direct access to the sea, § 4.

§ 1 30 αὐτάρκεια] 'Independence' implies that the soil produces all the necessaries of life. See 1. 2 § 12 n. (21), and the references in n. (759). SUSEM. (764) πλῆθος ἡ καὶ μεγίστη] 'in extent and magnitude'; muchness and greatness are here nearly synonymous.

31 ἡν σχολάζωντας Crs. χώρας βεβαιότατα τοῖς καθότητι ἐξ ἦν ἄργοι διδάσχονται, ιτ. 5 § 6 n. (201): διδάσκει ἡ ἐκδίάθησιν ἐν ἑß
§ 2 φρόνος. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγον (V) μὲν, ὦστερον ἐπισκεπτόμεν ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ἀλλοι περὶ τῆς κτησιον καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαλλων ποιεῖσθαι 35 μοιένα, ποίον δέ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχει πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῆς; πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσίν ἀμφιβασθήσεις διὰ τῶν ἐλκοτας εἰς ἐκτέραν τοῦ βλου τὴν ὑπερβολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυκοχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.

§ 3 τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπῶν εἶπεν (δεῖ δὲ ἐναι 40 πειθεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίας, ὅτι χρή μὲν τοὺς πολεμιῶν εἶναι δυσαμβιβαστέος αὐτῶς δὲ εὔξοδον. 1327 a ἐτέρωσεν τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφαμεν εὐσκόποτον εἶναι δεύ, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δὲ εὐσκόποτον τὸ εὐθυμίδεστον εἶναι τὴν χώραν εὖ τίνη.

τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θείαν εἰ χρή ποιεῖν ἀπ' εὐχήν, πρὸς τέ 5 τὴν ἑξετάζω την συνάρτησιν κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. (p. 104)

§ 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λευκὸς ὅρος (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκείσθειν κοι- 32 τὰ τοῦ τ. Ἀρ. Αιδ. || τὸν ὅρον omitted by Π.Αρ. (supplied by corr.3 in P) || 38 τῶν before γλυκοχρότητα omitted by P1, P4 || 41 μὲν τοῦ τοὺς μὲν ? Susem. (cp. v. 1. 1236 b 4)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν after εὐσκόποτον Π. P4 Bk. || 6 μὲν < αὐτ. > Schneider

σχῆλε εἰς τὴν ἐνόχλομενα γὰρ ἵνα σχῆλα- τ疵, Nε. Εἰθ. x. 7. 6.

Διευθύνους ἡμᾶς καὶ σωφρόνους “at once with liberality and temperance”: cp. Π. 6 § 8 n. (206), § 9 n. (206 b, 207); also Π. 7 § 7 n. (237 b), and Π. 4 n. (1250 b). Susem. (768) § 2 Π 33 ὄστερον An unfulfilled promise; there is no such treatment or political economy. See Introd. p. 49 n. (4), 53 n. (6). Susem. (766) § 36 ἀμφιβολίας “There are many controversies on this subject; because of those who urge us to one or the other extreme in life, to parsimony on the one hand and to luxury on the other.” Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολήν] excess, extreme, as in c. 1 § 5, 1323 a 38, vii(iv). 11 § 10 τὰς ἐντατικὰς ὑπερβολὰς. Cp. c. 1 § 7, 1323 b 11, 11. 9 § 24 (ὁ δεύτερος ὑπερβολέος ἐπὶ τὸ σχῆλα) and N. E. iv. 1 § 59, 1121 b 27 (ἀναγώστηται δ' ἀνὸ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸν μηνὸν ἐν δύναι).

§ 5 τοὺς πολεμιῶν...εὔξοδον] ‘a difficult country for the enemy to invade, but easy for the citizens to quit.’ Comp. c. 11 § 3 n. (848). Susem. (767) 1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσκόποτον εὐχήν] See c. 4 § 14 n. (765). Susem. (768) “We say of the territory, as we said of the population, that it should be such as can be taken in at one view; meaning thereby that reinforcements can easily be marched for the defence of every part of it.” 4 κατ' εὐχήν] “If we are to fix upon an ideal site”: comp. n. (128): ‘a position favourable for access to the sea and for communications by land is imperative.’ Susem. (769) § 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λευκὸς ὅρος] “One defining principle,” see n. on Π. 9 § 1 “is that just mentioned” τὸ εὐθυμίδεστον ἐναι: “the city must be equally in communication with all parts of the country for defensive purposes.” This is expanded c. 6 § 3, a 21—23, κοινῶν εἴναι: facilium aditum habere ad omnes locos Bonitz Ind. Α. l. v. 7 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς] “And the other is that it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐφαρ- κώμετον ἐναι τὴν χώραν) for the conveyance of the produce of the soil as well as of material like timber, or any other similar material in which the country may
8 The punctuation (a comma after παραστάτως instead of a period, and no comma after οἷον) Jackson followed by Welldon ᾧ τινὶ πρὸς τὸν θάλασσαν κοινωνίας, πότερον οἰλίμος τοῖς εὐνομομένοις πόλεσι ἤ θελερα, πολλοὶ τυχόνοις αὔμφιβητοντες τοῦ τε γὰρ εἰπενοῦσαί τινας ἐν ὀλίοις τεθραμμένοι νῦνοι αὐτοφοροφόροι φασιν εἰναι πρὸς τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν γένοισαί μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κρῆταν τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαστήμαται καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δὲ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτευτεῖαν  
§ 2 καὶ γὰρ, ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς ἐυπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν τὴν ἐν τοῖς καὶ τῆς χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἀδήλου.  
§ 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ μένος φέρεις τοὺς πολέμους εὐθεῖοτοι εἰναι δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρα τοὺς σωθησόμενοι, καὶ κατα γῆν.
IV (VII) 6. 5] 1327 a 8—1327 a 37.

καὶ κατὰ βδαλιστὶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψας τοὺς ἐπιτυθεμένοις (V) 24 νους, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἅμφως δυνατῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὕπάρ-
κουν μᾶλλον ἁμφοτέρον μετεχοῦσιν. ὡσα ἃ ἣν μὴ τυχναίνῃ
παρ' αὐτῶν ἄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα
tῶν γνωμικῶν ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστιν. αὐτῇ
γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν,
οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφάς αὐτῶν πάσιν ἄρομον προσέδουν
30 χάριν ταῦτα πράσσοντι ἢν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης
μετεχέναι πλεονεξίας, οὐδὲ ἐμπόροι δεῖ κεκτῆσαί τοιοῦτον.
8 εἴτε δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅρισαν πολλὰς ὑπάρχοντα<τα> καὶ χρώμαν
καὶ πάλαι σεία καὶ λεμένα εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν, ὅταν μήπε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστι μήτε πόρω λιαν,
35 ἀλλ' καταδείκται τείχεις καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἄλλοις ἐρμάσας,
φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίνεται διὰ τῆς
κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ (p. 105)

24 ἀλλ' εἰ Π', ἀλλ' γε Schneider || 30 ἢν Π' V\* Ald. and apparently Ar. ||
32 εἴτε δὲ δὲ εἴτε δὲ Π' Ar., εἴτε δὲ Gotting || ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, ὑπάρχοντα
Congreve Susem. 24, ὑπάρχων καὶ ΓΠ Bk. 3, ὑπάρχον καὶ Schneider Bk. 4 || 34 ἀπο
ἀυτὸ Π' Susem. 1, ἀπὸ τὸ Π' Susem. 2, ἀπὸ τὸ after a lacuna Π' (1st hand), τὸ ἀπὸ (ἀπὸ Π')
rebbe other authorities and Π' (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busse
r. p. 38.

33 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψας] Cp. c. 11
§ 11 n. (853). Susem. (771) Also n. 6
§ 8.

34 κατὰ βάτερον] 'in one of the two ways, if both are at their command.'
(μετέχουσιν dative plur. of the participle.)
§ 4. 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστιν] Passive
genitive: 'is one amongst necessary
conditions': see n. 11 § 10. 1273 a 33.
This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid
the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαίων.

αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν κακή] 'For it
ought to carry on trade in its own interests
exclusively and not for the advantage of
others.' This dictum strikes at the root
of free-trade legislation (Eaton). Susem.
(772)

Thirty years ago our other English
commentator Congreve uncompromisingly
denounced this dictum: "Any theory
like this of Aristotle's—such as the mercan-
tile and protective system of later
times,—which aims at exclusiveness, is to
be condemned as a direct attack on the
real interests of mankind." Even now
how large a part of civilized mankind is
in Aristotle's position and fails to discern
its real interests in this matter.

39 πάσιν ἄγοραν] 'a universal mart.'
This exactly describes the situation of
Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from
31 1οτ' ἐμπόρον] The ideal city is not
itself to be such a place of trade, nor is
it to have a commercial seaport of this
kind.
§ 5 32 ἐτέλθει βιομεν] 'This was
the situation of Peiraeus, Cenchreae,
Lechaeon, Notion [cp. viii (VII). 3 § 15 n.
1541], Nisaea, Pegae, Patrae, Argos"
(Eaton). Susem. (773)
35 τείχεσθαι As the long walls con-
necting Peiraeus with Athens, Lechaeon
with Corinth, and Nisaea with Megara.
37 εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερὸν] "while any
harm they may cause it is easy to guard
against by prescribing and defining in the
laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy
mutual intercourse." Here then even
Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's
policy in regard to the treatment of
foreigners, Laws XII 950 ff., esp. 952 D-
953 E (Eaton). Susem. (774)
Plato
would exercise a strict surveillance on all
who enter or leave the country: comp. n.
(372) on the Spartan ἔποιησαι.
τι βλαβερον, φυλαξασθαι ραδιου τοις νομισι φραζοντας (V) καὶ διορισαντας τινας ου δει καὶ τινας ἐπιμεσθαι δει πρὸς ἀλληλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτε μὲν ἐβλεποντων ὑπάρχηκα μέχρι τινος πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ 1307 βόσκων αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πληθυντῶν τιν δει καὶ φοβερόν εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γήν, καὶ κατὰ τὰν ἑλλάδαν) περὶ δὲ πλῆθους ἦδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταυτῆς πρὸς τῶν βλοντων ἀποκεκεπέτων τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἤγεμονικόν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζησταί βλον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταυτήν τὴν τῶν δύναμεων ὑπάρχην πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολινασθὼς τὴν γινομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχην ταῖς πόλεις, οὑδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶς μέρος εἶναι δει τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβιβασθεὶ καὶ κόντοι πειθευτῶν καὶ τῶν πειθευτῶν ἔστιν, οὐ γὰρ οὕτως καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτικῆς ρήματες ὑπάρχοντος περιοικῶν καὶ τῶν τῆς χώρας γενομένων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν ὀρμῶν δε τούτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισί, οἷαν τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἰππολιτῶν πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκκλησοῦσιν ἀρξάμενα κεκτημέναι τὸ μεγέθει πόλεως ἐτέρων ἐμελεστέραν.

1337 b 1 αὐτῶν Μονο 224-24 Ald. πελεσιον Ρρ 29 καὶ φοβερόν εἶναι τραπεζων transposed to follow 2 βοηθείας by Camerarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly 5 πολεμικῶν Schneider (in the translation) Bk. 8, μηνί καὶ πολιτων οὐδέριος Schneider, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket καὶ πολιτων is not commendable 8 Δραμα Schlosser (wrongly) οὐδέριος Πρ Βκ., ὀναίρε Πο καὶ μέρος omitted by Λ. C. Ald. Wδ | 8 καὶ added after δὲ by Πρ Βκ. 14 ἤγεμονικῶν Ρρ 15-15 Βπ 15 ἐκκλησάμενα Sepulveda, and Υ apparently had κεκτημένας πόλεως τὸ μεγέθει πέραν ἐθνεστάτην (aedificia civilitate magnitudinis alii contracionis). A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote l.c. 79.

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote l.c. 79. For the city is to have a career of supremacy. One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: at 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state; a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however n. 917 and Introd. p. 55. Susen (776) 5 πολιτικῶν Schneider well remarks: quasi reliqua civitates politi학교 navy non colon. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to II. 6 § 7, IV. VII. 2 § 3. 8 § 6 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβιβασθεὶ καὶ κατατάσσεις κτλ. § 9 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβιβασθεὶ κτλ. 14 καὶ τῶν πολιτων At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. n. 1549). Thuc. III. 58 § 4, VIII. 24 § 3; but generally (n. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. VI 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh Histoil. p. 483 f., 649 f. p. 400 Eng. tr. Susen (776) 14 καὶ τῶν Ἰππολιτῶν Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the
§ 9  περὶ  μὲν  οὖν  χώρας  καὶ  πόλεως  καὶ  λιμένων  καὶ  (V)
θαλάσσης  καὶ  περὶ  τῆς  ναυτικῆς  δυνάμεως  ἐστὶν  διαφορισμένα
τὸν  πρότοπον  τοῦτὸν  περὶ  δὲ  τοῦ  πολιτικοῦ  πλῆθους,  τίνα  μὲν
7 ὄρον  ὑπάρχειν  χρῆ,  πρὸκειτον  εἰπομεν,  ποῖον  δὲ  τῶν  τὴν
τοῦ  φιλίαν  εἶναι  δὲν,  νῦν  λέγομεν.  σχεδὸν  δὴ  κατανοήσειν  ἂν
την  τούτω  γε,  βλέπεις  ἐπὶ  τὸ  τῶν  πόλεως  τῆς  ἐυδοκιμοῦσας
τὴν  Ἑλλήνων  καὶ  πρὸς  πᾶσαν  τὴν  οἰκουμένην,  ὡς  διελθ—
16  καὶ  πόλεως  καὶ  λιμένων  Susen.,  καὶ  λιμένων  καὶ  πόλεως  Γ Π  II  Αγ.  Bl.¹
Susen. ¹,²  in  the  text,  καὶ  πόλεως  λιμένων  Welldon  wrongly,  καὶ  λιμένων  καὶ  πόλεως
Congreve.  In  place  of  πόλεως  Koreas  conjectured  ἐπινειον,  Schmidt  ἐπινειον,
Broughton  ἐπινειον,  Jowett  πόλεων.  Conning  followed  by  Bl.²  bracketed  καὶ  πόλεως
17  διωσαμένων  L²,²  P⁴ b,  Ald.  Bl.²  and  P⁴ (cont.),  διωσαμένων  P⁴,  διωσαμένων  S⁸ V⁸
21  τῶν  πόλεως  omitted  by  P⁴ b,  L² Ald.  W⁵

Heraclíeots,  Ἄραθ.  V.  6  §  10  (Gibbon).  He  also  calls  Heraclíeots  in  Pontus  a
colony  from  Megara,  settled  in  the  land  of  the  Mariandynians  (Ἀράθ.  v.  10  §  1).
We  know  from  other  sources  that  there  were  also  Boeotians  (from  Tanagra)
along  with  the  Megarian  colonists,  and
that  the  colony  was  founded  about  550.
Strabo  xii.  540  is  wrong  in  designating  it  a  Milesian  settlement.  The  colonists
had  converted  the  Mariandynians  whom  they  had  conquered  into  subjects  or  vas-
sals,  in  virtue  of  a  compact  similar  to
that  made  by  the  Thessalians  with  the  Penestae  (ἐν.  no.  280)  and  by  the  Spartans
with  the  Helots,  containing  a  special  proviso  that  they  should  not  be  sold  out
of  the  country.  Indeed  the  Heraclíeots  did  not  call  them  their  property  or  their
slaves,  but  their  spear-bearers  (ἀκροφόροι).
See  Poseidonius  Ἄραθ.  16  in  Ath.  vi.  263
C,  Strabo.  xii.  543,  Plato  Laws  vi  776  D
(J.  G.  Schneider).  Comp.  also  Pseudo-
Arist.  Gnom.  ii.  9  §  1,  1347  b  32  ff.  (Eaton).
SUSEN.  (777)
15  τὸ  μεγέθεν  ...  ἡμελευσάμενον  “A
city  of  but  moderate  size,  as  compared
with  others.”  We  do  not  anywhere  else
find  an  accurate  statement  as  to  the
probable  size  of  Heraclíeots;  but  extracts
from  the  work  of  its  native  historian
Memnon  in  Photius  give  us  information
as  to  its  power  and  history  (J.  G.  Schnei-
der).  See  Müller’s  edition,  Ἁρμονιόζων
Gr.  iii.  p.  553  ff.  There  are  notices  of
the  early  internal  history  of  Heraclíeots
VIII(V),  §  3  no.  (1554);  §  6  no.  (1569),  §  7
(1575);  §  15  (1582).  SUSEN.  (778)
Comp.  also  Grote,  c.  98,  vol.  xii.
p.  622  ff.
18  περὶ  δὲ  τοῦ  πολιτικοῦ  πλῆθους...
§ 2 παί τοις ἐθνεσιν, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τότοις ἔθνη (VI) καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλῆρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατιθέμενα μᾶλλον, ἀπολύοντα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλούσιον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἱσπανίαν διανοητικά μὲν καὶ τεχνικά τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀνυμα δὲ, διόπερ ἀρχόμεναι καὶ δουλεύοντα (p. 168).

§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένους Ὀστερ μεσεῖοι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὗτοι ἄμφοι μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνδυμα καὶ διανοητικῶν ἔστιν διόπερ ἐλευθέρον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολεμεύουν καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μὲν δὲ τοιχώματος πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐχεῖ διαφοράν καὶ τὰ 2


§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ καλά ["The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thrace (Hömm. Hymn to Apollo 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epegegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." SUSEN. (779)]

26 ὀπολλέντα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φάτεις ἄρχον Aristotele considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φάτεις ἄρχομενοι.

28 διόπερ ἀρχόμενα... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSEN. (780)

§ 3 30 ἔθνοι] spirited, courageous. 31 διόπερ ἐλευθέραν... 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been." [lit. continues to be] 4 free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. ix. 2 makes the Thesbians say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ έμφυτῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἀνθρώπων ὑπεράντωσεν, ὅπερ καὶ πάρος παύσα ἐγώνακον, χαλέπτα οὖν περιμνήστα τι καὶ ὀπολλέτοις Πολιτείας (Eaton). See further Introductory p. 46. SUSEN. (782)]

This is the passage on which Oncken l. 18 ff. ii. p. 277 relies for his interpretation of Aristotele's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish θωράκια (Panegyricus, De Pace, Philippides, cp. Eph. 3). According to Oncken the μία πολιτεία was already realized de facto in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) περὶ τῶν πρῶτων Ἀλέξανδρου αὐθεσίων. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (συμμαχία βοηθείας χάρις) and not a πολιτεία (ii. 4 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθέσει καὶ κοινῇ εἰρήνῃ themselves (cp. Rhet. i. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 ἢ τί τοῦ ἄθους γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸς δοῦλον [εἰστίν], καὶ τὸ μετέχει τῶν κοινῆς εἰρήνης τοις τῷ προστάταξον). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotus, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotele had in mind,
under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by "constitution" Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchical and "despotically" governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of barbarism they may be said to have a constitution. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theologically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (11. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 §§ 1, 5; 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes; see vi(vi). 11 §§ 18 ff., and Frag. 81, 149 b 26, Plutarch De Alexandri victu 1. 6, where "Ἀρεστολέγη συναμβίλλων αυτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἄρμασιν καὶ τοῖς δὲ βαρβάρωι διαστοπίωσεν. To us Chaeronea, or Cannons, may mark the end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion. 
§ 4 34. The Dorian, Ioni, Thessalian, Arcadian, Acarnanian, Aetolian θῆκη, occur as examples of Greek tribal populations.
35 μονόκλων] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy peoples of the north: the Asiatic Ioniens to the softer Asiatics.
§ 5 38 διπέρ γάρ φασι τινς] Plato in Resp. ii. 375 c ff. Compass. n. (1065) on v(viii). 4 § 2. Susen. (783) 39 τοῖς φιλάδει] See n. (146) on ii. 3 § 5. Susen. (784) φιλαδελφάκης] The word itself is not used by Plato, but in substance his meaning is not essentially different (δι' ἐρήμοις μὲν τῶν ἐκείνων πρῶτον αυτῶν εἰλημένοι), so that it is difficult to see why Schneider should believe that Aristotle does him injustice. See however n. (789). Susen. (785)
40 ὁ θυμός ἠστεν... φιλάδειν] "It is passion or temper which makes us friendly; for that is the faculty of soul with which we love." The logic reads faulty in the translation because we can scarcely render by the same word θυμός = courage, θυμός = affection, although we too speak of the heart as the seat of both. See n. (641) on iii. 16 § 5. Compass. Thebs. 11. 7 § 6, 113 a 35 ff., ὅποις ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐτελεύτατον ὑμᾶς ἔφθασεν, ἐπὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέσον ἐν τῷ θυμῷ, εἶτε ἔκεις ὑμᾶς ἐντελῶς, ἢ ἐν τῷ ὀργῇ, ἢ ὑμᾶς. Soph. T. 11. 5 §§ 5, 6, 126 a 8 ff.: ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀλέξανδρον ἐν τῷ λογισμῷ, ἢ δὲ ὀργὴν ἐν τῷ θυμώδει, καὶ ἢ μὲν λέπτην ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητῷ, ἢ δὲ ὀργήν ἐν τῷ θυμώδει, where fear and anger are hypothetically assigned to 'spirit,' but love (φιλία) to the ἐπιθυμητικός or impulsive principle of the soul. [J. G.
ΠΟΙΩΤΙΚΟΝ Η. 7. [IV(VII). 7. 5]

1328 a δύναμις ἡ φιλούμενος σημείον δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας, § 6 ὀλεγωρεύεσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος προσηκόντος τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν·

5 οὐ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀνάγκαιον.

καὶ τὸ ἀρχόν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀρχικόν γὰρ καὶ λάθτητον ὁ θυμὸς. οὐ καλὸν δ᾽ ἔχει λέγειν χαλέπιον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας· πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρή τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσίν οἱ μεγαλόφυσιοι

1328 a 5 οὗ Bergk, following Schneider, οὗ Γ Π Αρ. Βκ. Σusem. in the text δὲ M', untranslated by William ἀνάγκαιον P3, ἀνάγκαιον M' and apparently Π (a lancelis poririontnes William), ἀνάγκαιον P2 3 4 ὁ Ald. Βκ. Bergk, ἀνάγκαιον P4, ἀνάγκαιον P5, ἀνάγκαιον Sb ιν and perhaps Ar. (lancelis transfixei et)

Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109 ff., ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or θυμὸς" (Camerarius). Further comp. loc. (720, 183, 839, 953). Σusem. (788)

41 αὐτῷ] Not τοῖς, see c. 1 § 8 n. 1328 a 1 πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις Eaton compares Rhet. 11. 2 § 15, 1379 b 3, πρὸς φίλους ἀναγκαζεῖ τόσον μάλλον μᾶλλον πάντων . . . τοῖς φίλοις αὐτῶν διὰ τὶς ἀναγκαζεῖν μερὶς.

Σusem. (787)

2 αἰτητις] rises viz. in indignation.

§ 6 3 Ἀρχιλόχος Φραγ. 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the θυμὸς belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the Poetics). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the Ὁ Βίδαρχος attributed to him (Φραγ. 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (Φραγ. 119).

Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paens cannot be certainly inferred from Φραγ. 76. 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music constructed according to the rules of art, and he supplied it with a series of strophes composed of short dactylic iambic and trochaic verses, and of verses in which dactyls or anaepasts and trochees or iambs were combined. See Westphal Greek Metric 11. p. 350 ff., 445, 450, 457, 479 L. 498, 563 ff. The fragment of verse here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter without the opening dipody, and it belonged to a poem composed throughout of such tetrameters, as we see from another longer fragment (Φραγ. 66).

On Archilochus, see Bernhardy History of Greek literature 11. p. 486. Σusem. (788)

§ 7 7 οὐ καλῶς κτλ.] Here clearly Aristotle is taking Plato's statements much too literally, and in a much cruder and stricter sense than they are meant. Σusem. (789)

9 οὐ δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόφυσιοι κτλ.] Plato also Rep. IV. 440 c designates indignation at injuries received as a main element of θυμὸς, and indeed, as already noticed in n. (641), he refers ambition to θυμὸς. But Aristotle also mentions Post. Anam. 11. 13 § 22, 97 b 15 ff. as one of the chief characteristics of the μεγαλόφυσιοι, that they will not brook insult. On the other hand Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 30, 1125 a 31 ff. that they are not revengeful, but know how to forgive and forget (Eaton). It is not easy however to reconcile what is here stated with the description given there § 24, 1124 b 9 ff., according to which the high-minded man is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed of receiving them, and always requires services done
him by greater services in return, so that he may not be under obligation to others, but rather others to him (Broughton). 

Cp. also n. (875). SUS.EM. (790)

§ 8. 'And this is a result to be expected for they imagine themselves to be robbed as well as startled by those from whom they believe a kindness ought to be due to them. 'αποστερηθαν [ἐκείνως] παρ' οί—by those in whose case there ought to be an obligation to a service to themselves.

'Cp. Rhed. II. 2 § 15, 179 b 2 ff. (Eaton, Congreve).' SUS.EM. (781)

14. δηθν ἁρπησάμην. This is a line of Euripides, from what play is not known, Frag. 965 (Nauck). SUS.EM. (792)

16. οἳ τοι πέραν κτλ. We know neither the author nor the play from which this is quoted (Frag. aed. ἡ. 53 Nauck) SUS.EM. (793)

§ 9. 19. οἳ γάρ καὶ ἄλληθρας Comp. c. 13 § 9 n. (868). SUS.EM. (794)

Also Nic. Eth. 1. 2 §§ 2—5, 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of these (ἄν σὺν οἴποι) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (Ast. Lex. Plat. s. v. οὐσίαν), or necessary conditions (Camerarius). Cp. Mdroph. v. (2) § 1, 1015 a 20: "necessary (or indispensable) is that without which as secondary cause life is impossible" (Eaton). See Zeller II. ii. p. 331 n. (1). Cp. n. (907) and n. (504) on III. 5 § 2, SUS.EM. (798)

Τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνετατῶν. Natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in 1. 5, 3, 1254 a 29, which with πόλις was ranked ΙΙ. 1, 2, 1274 b 39 n. (434). They are frequently mentioned in the zoological treatises.
22 μόρια] Also μέρη (ἐδόσε σώτα ὅστα 1329 a 4 l., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical terms for ‘full members,’ constituent parts and not mere adjuncts of the organic whole. See the good instances c. 4 § 6, 1236 a 20 f.; vii(VI). 4. 14, 1291 a 24. In contrast to them the adjuncts are (1) necessary appendages, διὰ ταῖς πόλεως ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, (2) ἰνε γάρ διὰ τοῦ ἅπα τόλμηται, ἵνα τοῦ πόλεως ἄνωκται, (3) requirements, ὃν δεῖ, or even (4) τὰ ἐντάρχοντα κατὰ τρόπον, χώρα. Note that both μέρος and μύριον are also used as non-technical terms, for the adjuncts. So μέγεχου τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as here) of full membership, 1329 a 35: sometimes again of the entire population, 1279 a 32. The relation between constituent parts and necessary conditions is explained III. 12. 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and iv(VII). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the νοτιότατος δύνας is no part of Aristotle’s city. There can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συντάσσεσθαι] A term with various meanings: (1) the putting together = construction, (2) the thing so constructed = σύνταση, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ φύσιν σύντασιν, cp. 1329 a 35. It is largely used in the biological works for ‘structure’ or ‘organism’: so also vii(VI). 11. 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy between organism and state, implied in this term and in ἕγα = functions, but drawn out at length vii(VI). c. 4 §§ 8, 9, see A. C. Bradley op. c. p. 203 ff.

The view of De Partibus Animal. 1. 5 §§ 11—16, 1251 b 14—20, is that every part (μύριον) of the body, like an instrument (ἐργα), is for an end: this end is a function (πράξει τι). The parts are nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more or less specific, γένεια, αὐθεντικότης, ὑπότασις, πορεία, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause σὺν ἑτέρῳ τὸ εἶτε τρόφον... 28 ἐστὶ appears inevitable, because ‘food’ and a ‘quantum of territory’ would otherwise be adjoined as instances of ἐν τῇ κοινῇ τῶν κοινωνίας, for which purpose they are clearly inappropriate. The common object of the society, which gives the city its unity, is its ethical end, the conviction of the members that they must endeavour to realize a noble life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. iii. c. 9). On the other hand a supply of food and so much territory are indispensable requisites, and would seem to be included under κτέσις a 33.

24 οὖν ἄλλας κοινωνίας. ἡ γάρ ἐν τῷ τῷ γένοις! “Nor is this true of any other association which is to form a unity of kind” (and not merely of mass, γένος is adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a true organic unity, not merely the collective unity of an aggregate or heap. After 25 ἐν τῇ there is no need to insert ἐστιν, for γεννηται (or ἔσται) can easily be understood. SUSKEM. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the society must have some one identical common interest, though they need not all share in it equally. Haece mihi videtur esse sententia: num aliquid idemque sociis commune necesse est (Susseum).

25 A generic unity, or natural composite whole. I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 m., but not a κράτος, μὲν ἡ σύμφωνα in which the mingled elements vanish and give birth to a new product: for the citizens continue to exist as parts of the whole 1. 2, 14, 1253 a 26. The difference between the mere heap and the organic whole is explained Meta. 17. 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (examples: a syllable, flesh; each something apart from its constituents). See also Meta. II. 6. 4, 1045 a 8, ὃσα ἡλέαι μὲν ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἐστιν οὖσα σφυρὰ τὸ πέρα, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν τὸ δῶρο παρὰ τὸ μῦριον. For a parallel to the language see Phys. v. 3. 1227 a 14, ἐν τούτῳ ἐστιν τὸ συνεχεῖς, εἶ ὡς ἐν τῇ πέροις γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν σύνεχεις.

The notion of Unity is analysed Meta. Δ. 6. 1. 1: τὰ πρῶτα λεγόμενα ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν ἦν οὐσία μιᾷ ἡ συνεχεία (sometimes τὸ δῶρο is
ti [kai] koivon einais de kal tauto tois koumariois, an te tou (VII) an te anisou metalembanouin (olou eite trophe touto isin § 3 ete xhara plesios eite allo ti tois toucous isin). Otan 2 de h to meun toutou enekov to de ou enekov, oudein en ge toutou 30 kouvon all' h to me povetai to de labein legei, olon or-yagio te panti prois to ginomenou ergon kai tois deimogrammi oikia gar prois oleodomou oudein estin h ginetai kouvon, all' § 4 esti tis oikias xurin h tois oleodomou tychi, de ou khtesow meuv deis paolees oudein d' estin h khtes mikros tis 35 paolees. Pollla d' eimphicha meri tis khteseos estin. h de


added to ti estin) h izei h lego, 1016 b 8. The last two together = an de to lego eis δ, 1042 a 19.

§ 3 There is no such 'common interest' in the case of the means to an end and the end itself, the tools and the craftsman, architecture (the builder's art) and the house. § 4 Hence property may be necessary to cities, but nevertheless does not form part of a city.

28 estin d' &; ....35 estin] This passage is closely connected with § 6 b 2 estin estin etc. to kol. No one would suspect any loss if the intervening passage §§ 4, 5, 1328 a 25—b 2 were removed. In fact this intervening passage must be regarded as a parenthesis, suggested by a 26 de te ison to te anisou metalembanov, apparently inserted in the wrong place: Quastil. crit. coll. p. 401 f. In confirmation of this view may be cited Dr Postgate's remark. (Notes p. 9): 'the same sense can be got out of the text by making en xar to metalembanov, § 2, parenthetical, and h de paules kol. § 4, a resumption of it: thus olon...estin will refer to dea tais paolees anagnwv uparxov.' That is, though his own remedies are different (see Crit. n.), he agrees as to the end in view: viz. the reference of 27 olon kol to 24 dea tais paolees anagnwv uparxov, and the resumption of 15 en xar ti. 27 metalemban-

28 estin d' &; ....35 estin] 'When one thing is the means and another the end, in this case at least there is nothing in common, except that the latter receives the activity of the former.' A very doubtful use of labain instead of labain ti, said of the thing acted upon: by no means established, as Prof. Ridgeway thinks, by Pl. Apol. 25 f, where tis skhotan spondai tais leviston is followed by kai tois labain av' avtoi. Dr Postgate's pathain brings out the exact shade of meaning: 'the one acts and the other is acted upon; the builder makes and the house is made.'

30 olou orhagn] Nic. Eth. viii. 11, 6, 1161 a 32 ff. The same incompatibility exists between the tyrant and his subjects as between soul and body, workman and tool, master and slave. Cp. E. E. viii. 9, 2, 1241 b 17—19. (Could labain = be the recipient of services, sou- 

§ 5 33 That property is no 'part' of the state, but merely an indispensable condition, must weigh with us in deciding whether khtes is a branch of oikosvnu, 1. 4. 1. n. (32), from the constant parallel of household and state 1. 8 §§ 13, § 15, 1256 b 30, 37 f.; 11 §§ 13, 1259 a 33 ff., 35 pollla d' eimphicha kol] Under
the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see 1 c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also n. (37). Susem. (801)

§ 37 άνθρωπος και κτής] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the Ethic. Comp. the Exercitus I. Susem. (799)

§ 38 άρετής ένεργεια και χρήσις τούς τόλμους] A fair paraphrase of the definition of Nic. Eth., as may be seen from E. E. II. 11, 1119 a 16, τών δ' ή χρήσεως έγγον, 1121 b 7, άν έκαστη χρήσει έστιν ένεργεια, και ή υπάρχει και ή πράξει. Susem. (802)
μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἐπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ (VII) ὀργάνων δεῖ τὰ (ζην'), τρίτον δὲ ὁπλα (ταύς γὰρ κοινο- νοῦνται ἀναγκαίοι [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐχειν ὁπλα πρὸς τὰ τὶν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθουσῶν χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξοθέν ἄδι- κείν ἐπίχειροντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινα εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχαὶ καὶ πρὸς <τὰς> πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὰν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢν καλούσιν ἱστατέιν, ἔκτον δὲ τὸν ἀρμοῦν καὶ πάντων ἀναγ- καίτοποι κρίνων περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

§ 8 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτα ἐστὶν οὐ δεῖται πάσα πόλις ὡς εἰσεῖν (η γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἅπιν οὖ τὸ τινά ἄλλα πρὸς ἐξήν αὐταρκεῖ, ὡς φαμέν, εάν δὲ ταύτων τοιγάμῃ ἐξελισσέν, αὐταρκεῖ τὴν κοινολογίαν εἶναι ταῦταν' ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταῦτας συνεχάται πόλιν δὲ ἥξερον τὲ εἶναι πλῆθος, οὐ παρακεντοῦντο τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ εἰρείς, καὶ κρίσις τῶν δικαιών καὶ συμφερόντων).

§ 9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπῶν σκέψασθαι πότερον πάσι καὶ VIII

§ 8 [καὶ] Kornes, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly. || αὐτῶς P3 (7), αὐτῶς Π and the rest of our authorities || 11 <τὰς> Schneider Bk.2 || 12 [καὶ πρῶτον] Spengel || 16 ὢδὶ Μα P1 || 18 τούτων after τηγάμῳ (τηγάμῳ P4) IP1 P4 Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 20 συνεχόμενα Μα P1 || 21 παρακεντοῦσιν P3 Π3.3 Π3 Bk. || 23 δικαίων Lambin, ἀναγκαῖων ΠΠ Αρ. Bk. Susem.3 in the text.

§ 7 An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato Rep. II. 381, cp. Phaedr. 248 D, E. || § 8 πρὸς τα τὴν ἀρχήν κατ. To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third cp. § 21, 1334 a 2 n. (918). || 12 πρῶτον First in importance.

14 κρῖνων Under κρίνει τῶν συμφε- ρόντων is here included everything besides the administration of justice which belongs to the government of a state. Thus it includes the making of laws and the common action of the consultative and executive councils as well as of the officers of state. Susem. (806)

§ 8 § 8 οὔ δὲ φαμέν] III. 11 § 12, cp. n. (447); IV (VII), 4 § 11 n. (750); also n. (31) with the passages there quoted. The present φαμέν is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but cp. to § 9, n. (831), c. 13 § 4 n. (873), 14 § 8 n. (902). Any multitude of men taken at random does not constitute a state; a remark which was made c. 4 § 6 n. (753) and repeated VII (V). 3, 11 n. (1531 b). Susem. (804)

§ 9 20 κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.

21 Cp. II. 11. 10, 1268 a 32 f.

23 κρῖνων] So above, § 7, 14, κρῖνων.

14 κρίνων] Susem. c. 9 Exclusion from the franchise of the producing classes: artisans, traders, husbandmen. Those who remain will have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial duties. This close body of citizens will own the land: when superannuated, to become priests.

This exclusion of the 'necessary appendages' from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the criticism of Plato's Republic, II, c. § 18—18; and of Hippodamus, c. 8 §§ 8—12: it was laid down distinctly III. 5: see n. (504).
29 τοῦτοι συνομον οἱ πάντες πάντων (ένδεχεται γὰρ τῶν οὐτοὺς ἰσότατον (VIII) ταῖς γεωργοῖς καὶ τεχνίταις καὶ τοὺς θεομορφοῦντος καὶ δικαίωσασ) ἡ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλλοις ὑποθετεῖ τά μὲν άδα τὰ δὲ κανόντα τὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης διό εἰστιν, οὗ ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ταῦτα πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐστέμεν, 30 ενδεχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πολεῖς τὰς πολιτείας ἄδερφας ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς δημοκράτεις μετέχουσιν. § 3 πάντας πάντων, ἐν δὲ χαίρει διαγραφὴς τοῦνανιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοιαύτα παρατίθεντες περὶ τῆς ἀριστοτῆς πολιτείας, αὐτὴν 35 β' ἐστι καθ' ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν ἐμὲ μᾶλλον εἰναι εὐδαιμονίαν ἡν χαρις ἱστη οἴκου ἀνάπτυχει ἔτη ποτέρον, φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦτον ὅσον ἐν τῇ καλλίστῃ πολιτευμενή πόλει καὶ τῇ καλλίστῃ δικαίωσις ἀνδρας ἀπὸ λοιπῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὐτε βιασμος βίον οὐ παροικοῖ 40 δει γενεται τοῦτον πολιτικάν (ἀγενής γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀριστή ὑπεραντίον), οὐδὲ δὲ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλη.

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§ 1. 29 τοῦτοι συνομαντας. This would be the case in democracies.
§ 2. 29 καθάπερ γὰρ ἐστεμέν. Just before, § 1, b 25 ενδεχεται γὰρ κτλ.

SUSEM. (805)

35 πάντων ac. ἐργαν. § 3 35 αὐτῆς... 35 εὐδαιμονίαν Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (686). c. 13 § 4 n. (872): also 11. 9. 5 n. (354) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία see n. (456).

SUSEM. (806)

36 ἀριστερα πρόποτεραν. It was observed in Excursus 1., n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1378 α 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀπόδεικτα, “proved,” rather than εἰστιν (stated.) Comp. further n. (873). SUSEM. (807)

38 ἀπὸ λοιπ. In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy: 111. 9.

39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ὅς) for the standard. See 111. 4. 3, 1276 b 30, vi(IV). 7—2, 1293 b 3 ff. τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀπὸ λοιπ. κατ’ ἱστη οἴκου καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἐπιθετεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων, with n. (1233). Comp. also 11. 9. 1 n. SUSEM. (808) Add vi(iv). 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἐν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνει τα, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and Met. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1092 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁμώς λέγουσιν, ἀπὸ λοιπ. ὁκ ὁμῶς. Bonitz Ind. A. 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τῶν οὐ καὶ δότοι. Apparently the meaning is the same here as in 22 ὑπόθεσιν of II. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ τούτην ὑπόθεσιν.

40 ἀγενής. See iii. c. 5, esp. n. 356, 509, 211. Cp. also n. (103) SUSEM. (809)

On the construction ἔτη προὶ πρὸς cp. ii. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 30.

For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. ὁ λοιπος. iii. § 32, p. 37, 10: ἢ οὔτε δ’ ἀποδείξει, οὐκα, μέγα καὶ πεπεζοντα φρονίμου λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φθαίρει πράσσουντας ὧν ἀνέπαυ αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ ἐμπροσθότα ἄνθρωπος ξηκορεί καὶ τὸ φύσιμον ξηκεῖν. Cp. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together.

§ 4 1239 a 1. δει γὰρ σολὼν.
Sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs. Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: n. (63). The artizan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cp. Aelian V. Hist. x. 16, ὁ ἀργός ἄδελφος τῆς ἐκείνης ἑστι. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews; see Ecclesiastes c. 38, 24—34 (Newman).

3 Βουλευόμενοι καὶ κρίνον. From ἀμφότεροι a, 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cp. § 9, a 31, τὸ τε ὑπάλληλον καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον.

4 ἔννοπρέξεις ‘are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense’ not merely indispensable adjuncts.

6 ἀμφότερος: the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

§ 7 διότι = that (after φανερῶ): as 1253 a 7 and often.

8 <έτερα> ἀκριβῶς; sc. ἐστι: belongs to a different time of life.


§ 8 κτλ.] This is said to be στάχως αἰτίων, ii. 5. 25; 1164 b 8. With the participle genitive των ἄδικων cp. c. 6 § 4.

1328 b 25—1329 a 13.

4 § 1332 b 32. 11 ταύτη δὲ] Resumptive of the δὲ in a q.; ‘in as far as it is impossible...’ in so far they must be the same.’ When δὲ has preceded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. (e.g. ii. 50), Thuc. (ii. 46), Xenophon, Isocrates (Panegyr. § 98, § 176), Plato (Lach. 104). De taũta ἐγκαθίστατε ἐκάστοι ἰδίως, ἀνεψα δὲ, δὲ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα δὲ καίδες) and Demosthenes (c. Mid. § 100, see Buttman’s Exc. XII.). Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 166 b 38—167 a 12, and Studien ii. 111. pp. 124—129, has disposed of the view formerly held (by Zell, Göttling, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used δὲ where other Greek prose writers introduce the apodosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1287 b 12 n.), (2) as δὲ occasionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλῶν κτλ.] Hence one of the favourite measures of tyrants was to forbid the use of arms (VIII. iv, 10 § 11, and 11 § 23 24 n. (1627, 1742 b). See moreover Xen. Cyrop. vi. 5. 79, Thuc. iii. 27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained arms: ἐπειδὴ δὲ θαλαμῆς ὄνομα ὅτι ἤκροτον ἐγερθήσατο (Eaton). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13 τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης] ‘hanc partem rei publicae administrandae’ Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. ‘It only remains to
entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons (a lame conclusion): as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀρμόσεις and ταύτα (see Crit. notes), then τῷ πολιτείᾳ becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀρμόσεις.  

17 ἠξαν...ἀξιῶν] “This division recognizes desert.” See c. 14 § 4. 1232 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (812) § 7 18 ἐναν τῶν τούτων] Cp. § 8, a 25, ἐναν τῶν, § 9, a 35, τῷ ἀρμόσεις ἠξαν περὶ τούτων, “per l. acc. remin. sign. ad quam alioquie actio rectatur” Bonitz Ind. Ar., who cites Topics II. 7. 5. 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 ἐν ἀρμόσεις τῶν περὶ τῆς δύναμεν ἀλληλούποιος = the sensation of sight. “The landed property must be in their hands.”  

16 Civic rights are not for the artizans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the ‘manufacture’ of virtue.

21 ἐκ τῆς ὑποθεσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813) 23 εὐδαιμονία δὲ πόλεω] ‘When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class,’ cp. 11. 5. 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (814) § 8 φανερον δὲ κτλ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle’s decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 30 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Peneiact, Helots, etc. mm. (380, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (859) and Esc. ‘On the Cretan περίοις’ p. 336 SUSEM. (815) § 9 33 περὶ αὐτοῦ must be περὶ τούς
30 tymásthai toûs theôous, èpê de διήρηται toû politeikôn eîs ûn (VIII) μέρη, toûtê éstî toû te õptilínikôn kai toû bouleutikôn, πρέπει (p. 110) de tûn te therapeûn àpodidònai toûs theous kai tûn ànásthainèn õxèn peri aûtoûs toûs dia toûn chrônôn àpèrphkôtas, toûtau toû eîs tûs ieroussûnas àpodotênov.

10 oûn meûn toûnn ànêv pûlês ou suvìstatai kai õsa meûr 36 pûlèsos, õrîntai (geîrorgoi mév õdr kai tekhîntai kai õs toû õthetikôn ànâphkônon õpârhkewn taîs pûlèsos, õmêrê de tûs pûlèsos toû te õptilínikôn kai bouleutikôn, kai kekò- 39 riaîtai õi toûtau õkastôn, toû meûn àei toû de kata mèrôn)

33 àuton? Susen. || toûtau G F (1st hand, for os is written over an erasure) and Bk. || 34 toû ierousínous Ar. and Bas.3, tûs ieroussûnas G II Bk. || 36 geîrorgoi—tekhîntai? Scaliger || 37 [ôpârhkewn] Spengel: the text can hardly be sound || 39 de Schneider, õi G II Bk. Susen.1 in the text || 40 [ôexe...1339 b 39 χώρας] Susen. || 13 τα τε...25 Σελêntenas Chandler, [b 5 άρχα...15 Σελêntenas] Bojesen: see Comm. and Quest. crit. coll. p. 404 ff.

śliç, in their service (Weldon). But see Quest. crit. coll. p. 404.

toûs dia toûn chrônôn àpèrphkônàs
Those who are superannuated: upon the principle stated II. 9. 25, see n. (330). This is the solution of an apparent inconsistency: that in this, the only genuine aristocracy, see n. (330), and yet aristocracy is the rule of a minority: III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15 §§ 8—10 n. (449), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the citizens of the ideal state must complete military service before admission, at the age of 35, into the popular assembly (c. 16 §§ 1335 a 30 ff., Exc. II.), and are not eligible to the Council or the offices of state (military commands excepted) till they are about fifty, while later on they are again released from all civic duties and lose all civic rights by becoming priests, it follows that it is only from his fiftieth to about his seventieth year that each citizen can have a share in the entire government and administration, as indeed was remarked Introd. p. 51, p. 54. For these twenty years only is he actually a full citizen, in the active exercise of his rights. This being so, the ruling body of full citizens will always remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of the civic body in the wider sense, including the soldiers and superannuated old men, even if the boys and youths are excluded. Comp. c. 11 § 9, 1332 a 34 n. (882), c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position which the priests hold in relation to the magistrates proper see VII. 4. 2 n. (1344), VII (VI). 8. 21 n. (1478). Susen. (816, 817)

35 ff. ‘Thus we have given (1) the indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral parts of a city: i.e. cultivators, artisans, and the whole class of labourers are adjuncts indispensable to cities, while the integral parts are the defensive force and the deliberative body. These elements are severally distinct, the distinction between integral parts and adjuncts being permanent, that between the army and the deliberative body only temporary.’ A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [Historical digression: §§ 1—9.] Particulars respecting the division and cultivation of the land: §§ 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently an interpolation by a well-informed Peripatetic. At all events the suspicion under which it labours (see Crit. note) has not been dispelled by Spengel’s fond admiration of this “beautiful passage” (Arist. Stud. III. p. 3 n.), or by Newman’s dispassionate survey, Vol. i. p. 573 f.

§ 1 40 oûn ouû õôûtê neîstê? Possibly this is directed against Plato, and intended to prove that he was by no means the inventor of the particular classification wherein Aristotle here follows him. E. Curtius History of Greece 1. 5 p. 162 (t. p. 185 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to suppose that all the three ‘orders’ of the
Platonic state had actually existed in Crete—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16-17. (167). Susen. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 3. 17. 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato’s republic in the Indian state: Holm. Griebr. Gebr. 111 p. 185.

41 γνη[θ] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: ιερείς (ib. cc. 37, 143), μάχαιρι (c. 168), βασιλέα (c. 63), συνελθάν (c. 47), κόμης, κυβερνάτα, ιμπρέσος (c. 144). See however E. Meyer Gesch. des Alterthums 1. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 606.

1329 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: “μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciatam amplius explicatur” Bonitz Ind. Ar. s.v. The stock instance is Phot. c. 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: όλλα ἐν ταύτα τοιαύτα ποιήσας, ἢ αἰσχρα ἢ βαρβαραμέα ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, ἢ αἰσχρα ὡς τοῖς βαρβάροις. Vahlen Beträge 111. 371 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαραμέα. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ὡς μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαύτα ἐκ μεταφορῶν and τοῖς βαρβάροις. Consequently οὖν is not illative; a simple μὲν and οὖν would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and Sept. Eli. 6. 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits Catug. 2 § 1, 1 a 17, 798 b 21, 128 b 9, b 38 to be not very different: while Pol. 1. 1. 8, 1253 b 29 (see Crit. notec. IV(VII). 17. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (δηλω μὲν οὖν...μαλακτα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(V). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps De Rep. Athen. c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K, but Harpocratie omits οὖν.

4 ξενάγων The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker History of Antiquity, 1. § 154—158, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 149—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1350), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker 1.3 191 f. Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. Susen. (819)

“The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father’s calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste.” A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, Herodotis secundae Buch p. 573, who quotes Plato Tim. 23, 24, Isocr. Bursis 6—8, Diod. l. 73 f., l. 28, Strabo XVII. p. 787. Cp. L. castes in Egypt in Le Ménest, 1886. Also E. Meyer Gesch. des alten Egypti (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (ib. p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostris, any more than User-tesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (Egyptische Geschichte p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke Weltgesch. 1. p. 26, Maspero Genre ép. p. 83: ‘Sesostris, var. Sessu-râ, le nom populaire de Rhamsès II.’

Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (Gesch. p. 117): “the three notices dealing with
the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into castes originated with Sesostris does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotole can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

**Milno de τά περί Κρήτην** The division of the Cretan population is mentioned in 11. 19, 1264 a 21, n. (172), c. 10 §§ 1–8 with Exc. iii. p. 336 ff. Susen. (820)

§ 2 5 τῶν συνοιτίων ή τάξεων The system of public meals, as ἔν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, 11. 17, 1272 b 30: cp. also 11. 5, 5, 1267 a 23.

§ 6 περί τῆς Μιλνο βασιλείας Compare again 11. 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. Susen. (821)


**'Iταλόν τινα...15 γεωργοῦσι** Antiochus (Fr. 6 apud Strab. vi. 254 f.) however calls the Lametic gulf the Napetine: the name common in later times is ἰταλικοπαλαιόν. This gulf is in the southwest of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia: just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Scylicet Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 460 stadia [i.e. 18 miles 660 yds] apart, rather more than half a day's journey. The name Italy was then originally confined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulls on the other. Oenotria means Wine-land, Italus the Ox, or calf: Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be meant, a symbol of the transition of the Graeco-Italians from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, shrewdly connects the original Italian legislation with the transition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as reapers (Siculi perhaps also Sicani) or field-labourers (Opsici). See Mommsen, History of Rome 1. p. 21 f. Eng. tr. Thucydides vi. 4. 4 calls this king Italus not an Oenotrian but a Sicel. For the name Europe, see c. 7 § 7, n. (779). Susen. (823)

§ 16 καὶ τὰ συνοιτία There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. Susen. (824)

**Διὰ καὶ φϊν...17 χρώματι** The language is undoubtedly the echo of 11. 10. 3, 1271 b 30 διὰ καὶ φίν οἱ περαιάς τῶν αὐτῶν τρόφων χρωμάτων αὐτῶν. But we hesitate to draw the inference that here, as there, an extract from Ephorus follows (Newman: t. p. 57 ff. n. 2).

§ 18 καὶ ἐκ φλοιοῦ Here the in-
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 10. [IV(VII). 10. 5
19 νίαν Ὠπικείοι καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπαυσίν· (IX)
20 μίαν Αἰσίνης, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον
Χώνες, τὴν καλομένην Σιούτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χώνες
§ 6 Οἰνοντρι τὸ γένος, ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν συστηθέν ταῖς ἑντευθεὶς ἢ
tέγενος πρότον, ὁ δὲ χορηγός ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (φ. 111
24 πληθοῦς ἐξ Αἰγύπτου τοῖς γαρ ὑπερτείναι τοῖς χρύσως τὴν
20 αἰσίνες Μ. Π. 45 Vθ || 21 χάινος (χάινος S Vθ) Π. Π. 4 Αρ. || Σιούτιν Ποτμίλινg Bk„, System William, σφρων Pθ and Π. (1st hand), σφρων the other authorities Ar. Bk.1 Susem.1 in the text and P. (later hand), Σιον Heyne (Opusc. I. 211, 252) from Arist. Frag. 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (Σιούτιν is the correct accentuation.) || χάινος Π. Π. 4 Αρ.
terpolar takes the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole
passage has nothing whatever to do with the
point he wants to prove. The nearest
neighbours of the Oenotrians or Itali on the
north-west and north-east only, are
mentioned here. At any rate this must
be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these
places has any meaning at all. The
name of the one, Opici, is the same as
the Opsci or Oscans, explained in n.
(823). Why the Greeks called them
Ausonians we cannot tell. Iapygia de-
notes what was afterwards called Apulia
and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the
south east of Lucania. His inclusion of
the Chonians among the Oenotrians is
another proof of the author's agreement
with Antiochus (Frag. 6, n. 823). But
the Oscans were not near neighbours of
that oldest Italy; even according to the
account given by the interpolator they
lived south of Ῥύρρηνα (Etruria) in
Frag. 567 [568 Arist. pseudo. Ναύου ed.
Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. Ant. Ρομ. 1. 77
where Latium is described as a region in
Opike, τὸν τόπον τῶν τῆς Ὀπικῆς, ὅπερ
καλεῖται Λάτον (Eaton). But Antiochus
goes on to say that the name Italy, and
probably also the earlier name Oenotria,
had first been extended further north as
far to the north-west as the river Laos
which flows through the south-west of
Lucania and to the north-east as far as
the plain of the Siris and Metapontum,
situated to the north of this plain in
the north-east part of Lucania; so that the
Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum,
was still included in Iapygia: for he tells
us, the country round the plain of the
Siris had been inhabited by a great
Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave
it the name Chone. Thus the whole of
the west coast of this region newly added
to the old designation Italy is washed by
the Termina Gulf, of which the Hipponia-
tic in the extreme south is only a particular
bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy
quite accords with this, for he includes
Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the
boundary towards Iapygia (VII. 33 § 3).
while he appears to include Tarentum in
Iapygia (VI. 44 § 2) and places Campanian
Cuma in Opicia (VI. 4 § 5). Herodoto-
s (1. 167) even extends the designation
Oeotria beyond the Laos and the
Terminus Gulf, so that Elea also is in-
cluded in it. The country of the Opici
would then touch this enlarged Italy on
the north-west, but unfortunately in our
present passage there is no mention of
this extension of the name; and, besides,
the Chonian territory is not said to border
on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is
itself included in it. The whole passage
is therefore doubtless a wretched interpo-
lation, and as such would have to be
removed from the rest, if that really be-
longed to Aristotle. But it will be shown
in notes (829, 830) that the whole passage
§§ 1—9 has been added by another hand,
and that its author, one of the oldest
Peripatetics, though he has drawn from
good historical sources, may yet have
written this sentence, in which he has
fainly made very bad use of them.
SUSEM. (825)
§ 6 24 πολὺ γάρ ὑπερτείναι κτλ] As shown in n. (819). SUSEM. (836)
τοῖς χρύσοις] The plural as in vii(iv).
6 § 5, 1323 a 1, and in the suspected
chapter II. 13 § 7, 1374 a 30: more usu-
ally as in vii(iv). 3 § 3, viii(v). 4 § 1.
Another instance is Nic. Eth. VIII. 12 § 2,
1161 b 25, ἢ δὲ προδίδοντα τοῖς χρύσοις.
MAGNA GRAECIA

Showing the limits of Italy as given (1) by Antiochus and (2) in Ac. Pol. IV (VII), 10.

Names occurring in this Chapter are underlined.
§ 7 Μίνω βασιλεύαν η Σέσοστρίως. σχεδόν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (IX) ἀλλὰ δεὶ νομίζειν εὐρήσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μάλλον δὲ ἀπερακίας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία τὴν χρείαν εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ἱπταμένων ἦδη τουτοῦ εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξήσεως 130 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἷςθα δεὶ τὸν αὐτὸν έξειν τρόπον. οὐδὲ δὲ πάντα ἁρχαία, σημείον τὰ περὶ Ἀργυντίνον ἐστιν οὕτω γὰρ ἀρχαίατα μὲν δοκοῦσαν εἶναι, νόμον δὲ τετυχήσαντι <αὐτῶν> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διό δεὶ τοὺς μὲν εἰρήμενον ἰκανῶς χρήσατε, τὰ δὲ παραλληλιμένα 35 περιασθῆνειν τετελεῖσθαι.

§ 8 οὕτως όμοι ἡ τῆς χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὡλην κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότεινοι, καὶ διὸ τῶν γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρως εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρή καὶ ποιαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν;] περὶ δὲ τῆς 49 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργοῦντων, τινας καὶ ποιούς εἶναι χρή, λεκτέων πρῶτον, ἐπειδῆ ὡτε κοινὴν φαμέν δεῖ εἶναι τὴν 36 εἴς <τῶν> Spengel 45 δὲ</p>

28 eidos after διδάσκειν ΠΠ ΠΒ Βκ. || 30 τὰ omitted by Π and Π (1st hand, supplied by corr.1) || 31 δὲ γάρ ? Susem. || 33 <αὐτῶν> Bernays and Susem. independently. <πρῶτον> Schneider || 34 εἰρήμενοι Lambin Bk.², apparently right || 36 τῶν <τῶν> Spengel 41 δὲν after εἶναι ΠΠ ΠΒ Βκ.

27 μάλλον δ' απερακίας] Cp. the well known passage Metéorol. 1. 3 § 8, 339 a 29. 30 ὡδ' γάρ η δοφομεν ὡπει ἄλλῃ διὰ οὖν διδάσκει τὰ αὐτὰ διάδειξις ανακειμένων εἰς τούς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ' ἀπερακίας. § 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα. Comp. n. (798) on c. 8 § 1. Susem. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην αὐτὸν]. All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian : see Π 8 § 16, 156a 3 with Π (167) and Meta. 1. 1. § 15, 981 b 17 ff. esp. b 30 ἐδώ δὴ πάντως τῶν ταὐτῶν κατασκευασμένων αὐτοῦ μὴ πρὸς ἴδιον μηδὲ τρόγλοις τούς ἀνθρώπους εὐφέρεσθαι. But see n. (816). Susem. (829)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παραλληλιμένα παραδείγματα ἠγαλλιὰν οὕτως] How can that be done, if everything has already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. SUSSEM. (829) Cp. Plato Laws 620 θοὶ of legislators : <ο> γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐν χρόνῳ εἴσηγεται, τοῦτο εἰς τῶν παραθέσεων. But Waitz compares the end of the Topics, 184 b 6—8. 89 36 δὲ μὲν οὖν...39 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming for the sysstax, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle's treatise. SUSSEM. (830)

41 φαμέν] ΠΠ 5 § 4—9 nn. (156, 156b,
ακτήσιν, ὃσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει ψιλικοῦ (IX) γινομένη κοινή, οὔτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτών τροφῆς.
§ 10 περὶ συστάσεως τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εἰς κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ἐργάζεσθαι γε' ἵνα δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεί καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡστερον ἔρχομαι. δει δὲ τούτων κοινωνίας πάντας τοὺς πόλιτας, οὐ ράδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἄδικων τε εἰςφερέσθαι τὸ συντεταγμένου καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἀληθὲν οἰκίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς διαπαινίσατα κοινὰ?
§ 11 πᾶσις τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν. ἀναγκαίοις τοῖς εἰς δύο μέρη διερήσεαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴ τὴν δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἐκατέρων διερήσεις δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἔτερον μέρος εἰς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἔτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συστάσεως διατάξεως, (p. 119) τῆς δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν τὸ ἔτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατικὰς, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κληρον ἐκάστῳ νεομενήσεως ἄμφιτόροικων τῶν τῶν τῶν πάντως μετέχων. τὸ 8 τε γὰρ ἴσαν οὐτωσικές ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς


158, 9 §§ 2 — 4 n. (179), 11 §§ 10 n. (593). Compare also II. 6 §§ 10 — 14 n. (211); IV vii. 9 §§ 3, 7, 8. The same use of the present, φαίμω, as in c. 8 §§ 8 n. (804), and below c. 13 §§ 5 n. (871), c. 14 §§ 8 n. (902). SUSEM. (851)

1330 a 1 τῶν] Plato alone is meant by this. SUSEM. (853) See n. on συστάτων a 6. 2 οὕτωσι: ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα] A condition upon which special stress is laid in the criticism of Caruthage cited n. (831): ἐξ ἀρχής γὰρ τούτων ὡρᾶν ἐστι τῶν ἀναγκαστάτων, ὅτι οἱ βιολογοί δίωκεται σχολάζωσι καὶ μεθίον διάχυσιν, μὴ μόνον ἁρχικοῖς ἀλλὰ μηδε ἰδιωταῖς, 1273 a 32 ff.
§ 10 3 σωτόκες πᾶσι] As e.g. Plato Latte 780 n, ἔκακον μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς σωτηρὶα τὸ πόλιμα, XEN. De Rep. Lec. c. 5, 5 ὡστερον ἔρχομαι An unfulfilled promise: Introd. p. 49 n. (4) and p. 33. SUSEM. (833)

1330 a 8 οἰκίαν] "Now all the citizens must take part in these (syssitia), but it is not easy to arrange that poor men should contribute their quota from their own means and at the same time pay all that is needed for their own housekeeping as well." See n. 9 §§ 1 n. (341), 10 §§ 8 n. (365). Compare also n. (153) on II. 5, 2. SUSEM. (834) For τὸ τεταγμένον cp. II. 10 §§ 7, 1272 a 15.
§ 11 κοινὴ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The Politics takes for granted the maintenance, even in the best state, of the popular faith and the traditional worship" (Newman). Comp. n. (859).
§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συστάσεως διατάξεως This is precisely the solution which the criticism in Book II indicated: see nn. on 8 §§ 3 (824), 9 §§ 341, 10 §§ 8 (365).
14 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν...16 μετέχουσιν] See n. 11. 6 §§ 15 n. (115). SUSEM. (835) The lands nearer to the city would possess many advantages over those more remote.

16 τὸ τε γὰρ ἴσαν...20 κατὰ] Comp. Thuc. I. 130 § 2 (the various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy), II. 21 § 3 (the Achaeans): the Book of Numbers c. 52 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as
§ 19 ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὑμνηστικότερον. ὅπως ἄρα μὴ τοῦτον (IX)
ἐχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐ μὲν ὄλγωρουσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόροις
τὸ ἔχοντα, οἱ δὲ λιαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ
παρ' ἐνίοις νόμοι ἐστὶ τοῖς γειτονικοῖς τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-
μετέχειν βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμουν, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἱδίον
οὐκ ἀν ὁμοφέρομεν βουλεύσασθαί καλῶς.

§ 18 τῆς μὲν οὖν χώρας ἀνάγκη διηρήθαι τοῦ τρόπου τοῦτον
25 διὰ τὰς προειρήματάς αὐτίς: τοὺς δὲ γεωργίσαντας μάλαστα μὲν,
εἰ δὲ κατ' εἰκόνα, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφόλους πάντων μήτε
θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πρὸς τοὺς ἐχαρίσαν ἐνεχρήσιμοι
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν διερθέτουσιν ἁσφαλείς), δεύτερον δὲ
29 βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπληθοῦσι τοῖς εἰρήμενοι τὴν ὕπο-
§ 14 εἰσίν, τοὺτον δὲ τοῖς μὲν [ἵδιοις] εἰν τοῖς ἵδιοις εἶναι ἱδίοις
τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς ὀυσίας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινῷ.
τίνα δὲ δεὶ τρόπον χρῆσαθαι δούλους, καὶ διὸτι βέλτιον πάσι
tος δούλους ἄδικον προκέκαθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν.

11 τῆς δὲ πόλεως ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινῇ εἶναι τῆς ἡπέρου τε ἔξ
35 καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἁπάσης ὁμολογεῖ οὖν ἐκ τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρήνη πρὸς τρόπον: αὐτής δὲ πρὸς αὐτῆν εἶναι

19 τῇ... τὴν III.18 || 20 ἔχοντας III.18 || διὰ παρ'... ἔχοντας II., perhaps rightly ||
21 δούλους... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... 27 θυμοειδεῖς... hardy right || 29 <ἡ... τῆς... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... Schneider, cp. 1339 a 26 || 30 ἱδίοι before εν
omitted by IV.1.4.1., the second διός omitted by IV.1.4.2. || 34 τῆς... τοῖς... Schneider. || 35 δούλους... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... other authorities BK. Susen. || 36 αὐτήν... τοῖς... Susem. || 37 δούλους... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... 38 δούλους... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... Schneider Susem. || 39 δούλους... τοῖς εἰρήμενοι... wrongly, si ad totum

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12
generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (111). SUSEM. (856).
§ 13 16 εἰ δὲ κατ' εἰκόνα Compare the passages collected in II. 6 5. 1 § 1. SUSEM. (832).
§ 16 μήτε ὁμοφόλους] So Plato Laches vi. 777d
cp. μήτε παρηγορεῖται ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς ἱδίοις
δούλους ἐνεχαρίσασθαι ὁμοφόλους τοὺς ἱδίοις
δούλους δεῖ καλὸν. Comp. ἔνανθ. Οἰκ. 1. 5 § 5, 6, 1344 b 11 f., cp. b 18 καὶ
μή καθάσθαι ὁμοφόλους πολλοὺς (Schneider). SUSEM. (888)
μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression
II. 5. 5. § 25, 1164 b 9, see n. (182); there
"men of spirit," here "passionate." Compare what is said of ὁμολογεῖ in notes
on III. 16 § 1 (64), IV.(vii). 7 § 5 (786),
§ 7 (790). SUSEM. (896)
§ 20 δεύτερον δι' ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n. (815), also notes on II. 9. 4 (182) and
Fac. III. on the Cretan περικοί p. 338. SUSEM. (860).
§ 31 δούλου... ] A new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of
slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the
best state actual slaves or serfs can only
be, must logically remain slaves for ever.
However comp. ἔνανθ. Οἰκ. 1. 5 § 8 f.,
1344 b 14 ff. ἠχότι δὲ καὶ τέλος... πάνω... δικαίων... καὶ... καὶ... καὶ... ἃ... ἃ... ἃ... SUSEM. (841)
§ 33 ὐστερον] an unfulfilled promise:
Intro. pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (842)
c. 11, 12. The city: regulations in
detail for the site, the water-supply, the
plan of the streets, the fortifications, and
§ 13 36 ἐρημια... ] in c. 5 §§ 3,
4. SUSEM. (843)
37 τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέταρτα δὴ βλέπω (X) § 2 ποινάς. πρώτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαίον, πρὸς ύγιείαν (ἂν τε γὰρ πρὸς ἐν τῇ ἑγκλων ἔχοισα καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα τὰ τὰ πνεύματα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιείνητεραι, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχεσθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον); τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν

opert adipiscit positionem, quattuor ultique respiectientes William, who doubtless translates a gloss || εὐchai omitted by P₂, [εὐchai] Bk.² (perhaps rightly), et de Weldon, who transposes 37 εὐχεσθαι δεῖ to follow κατατυγχάνειν (wrongly). Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. suspects that κατατυγχάνειν is corrupt || 37 εὐχεσθαι ἀρχεθαι M* || πρὸς omitted by Π² (supplied by p²) || δὴ omitted by Π² Bk., δὲί? Schneider, ** δεί Susem.³ ³ 38 a i re ἀριθ. P₂ ³ S, ai Π², ai [re] Susem.¹ at μὲν Kornes (needlelessly) || 40 δὲ <ai> ἀριθ. Kornes, certainly necessary; perhaps δ’ αἱ is better || 41 καταβορέαι Lindau; but Schneider shows that κατὰ βορέαν has the same sense || εὐχεσθεὶς ἀριθ. Susem.¹ in the text, recensiones William, εὐδέσσας Muretus, εὐδέσσας Böcker, approved by Susem.¹ —all resting upon misapprehension of κατὰ βορέαν

αὐτής δὲ πρὸς αὐτήν εὐθαῖα...κατατυγχάνειν...37 ἥλποντας. The construction of the infinitives εὐθαῖα, κατατυγχάνειν is disputed, and Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. suspects the latter word. Busse (ib. c. p. 17) compares (as Göttling had done) phrases like εὖν εὐθαῖα and the like: he thinks an object of the verb κατατυγχάνειν can be supplied without trouble from what follows. On the contrary, if κατατυγχάνειν is sound; it is on this verb that the accus. with infinitive τὴν θέσιν εὐθαῖα must depend: this construction already given in Passow’s lexicon has lately been proposed anew by Dr. Jowett (= τῷ θέσιν εὐθαῖα). To this Susemih objects: “at non hoc optandum est ut τὴν θέσιν accipiat urbis, sed τὴν ἐπιστάσει χαίρειν vel τὴν θέσιν εὐθαῖα δεί, quod ut subaudiri possit e verbis πρὸς τέταρτα δὴ αὕτη ἀριθ. scribendum potius erat fecisse: αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν θέσιν κατατυγχάνειν. Αὐτὴigitur lacuna deformat esse videtur locus sui, quae est Bonitzii suspicio, κατατυγχάνειν corruptum. Omnia bene se habentur, si <τοῦ ἐπιστάσεως> vel <τοῦ οἴου δεῖ> εὔθανε legereetur, sed in ter tam incerta praestat a consecuturis abstinere.” Mr. Weldon’s proposal is met by the inquiry, Can κατατυγχάνειν govern an accusative? and if it can, would it not be easier to omit εὐθαῖα with P₂? (See Quest. crit. coll. p. 407, of which the foregoing is an abstract.)

Susem.¹ ³ 37 εὐχεσθαι] Another of the passages collected in n. (128) on 11. 1. 1. Susem.¹ ³ (846) § 2 38 a i the yap...40 ύγιείνητεραι] Similarly Hippocrates De aev. 1. p. 525 ff.

Kuhn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. Meteor. 11, 15, 301 b 19 f., Problem. xxvii. 36. Oecon. 1. 6, 9, 1345 a 32 ff., Thuc. iii. 33, 5. Aristophanes Wasps 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus De ventis § 4: like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Socrates in Xen. Memor. iii. 9, 9 and Xenophon himself Oecon. c. 9 § 4 (a passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. Oecon. c. 1. c. as Schlosser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (Eaton). Susem. (866) Add Plutarch De curiosis e. c. 1. c. 515 c: ὁπετρὶ τὴν ἔμνῃ κατάρα πρὸς ἔξωρον ἄνωμον κεκλησθήνη καὶ τὸν ἐρίσθεν δὲλθη ἀπὸ τοῦ Παμφυλίου ἐξελθοντος, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπέζῃ λέγοντα ἐπὶ τοῦ Χαλθμού. The east wind is spoken of as warm Prod. xxvi. 31, 943 b 24 (Newman).

41 κατὰ βορέαν Under the north wind, and so protected from it: i.e. with south aspect. Cp. Oecon. 1. 6, 8, 1345 a 34, κατάβορον οἶκον, Plato Crises. 116 a 8, bi: πρὸς νόμον ἐπιτρέπτω ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν κατάβορον (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. Susem. (866) τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are accounted for by the words πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράξει καὶ πολεμικὰ καλῶς ἔχων; the one which still remains is, in all probability, beauty
ποτών ἐξει. πρὸς τε τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλός (X)

§ 2 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εἰνέξοδον

5 οἰκείων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοῦτο γε ἐγρήγορα διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν

ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίου ὑδάσων ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε

§ 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ὑγείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικιῶντων, τούτῳ δὲ

ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κείσατι τῶν τούτων ἐν τοῖς οὐοῦν τι καὶ πρὸς

τούτων καλός, δεύτερον δὲ ὑδάσων ὑγείως χρῆσαται, καὶ

τούτων τὴν ἐμπιστευθεὶν ἐχεῖν μὴ παρέχειν. οἷς γάρ πλείστοις

χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλείστη. ταύτα πλείστην

συμβάλλει πρὸς τὴν ὑγείαν. ὡς δέ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τῶν

§ 8 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἐχεῖ τὴν φύσει. διότερ ἐν

ταῖς εἰς φρονούσαις δεῖ διαφεύγειν πόλεισιν, εὖν μὴ πάνθρωπος

of situation. See ἡδονή 1, 330 b 22, κόσμον

b 31, ἐκείνοις 1331 a 36, καὶ ποιῶν τῶν ἐνοικίων a 38. If the mention of this has

been lost after λαοῦσι, we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the Critical

notes, and render the whole: “if of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty

of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well

situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes.” See

Quaest. crit. coll. p. 408. SUSEM. (847)

§ 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν κτῆλν

Again from the same point of view as

c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see π. (757).

SUSEM. (848)

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek
towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy):

that of Antioch was wonderfully good:

Liban. i. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 736),

commends the Romans for their attention

to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl.

Lact. 779 c.

5 τοῦτο γε εὑρήται] See Oeconom.

2. 22, 1350 a 17, εὑρήται = assequi; though

tοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must

be “thus what is required has been at-
tained.” Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29

SUSEM.

7 ‘Recte Ridgewayus ὀδοὺς subiecit
tum esse monet et eirγωμένουs objectum
verbī ὄπελεισιν’ (Quo. crit. coll. p. 408
SUSEM. That this is Aristotle’s regular
use of the verb is plain from Rhet. 1. 13,
20, 1374 a 33, ὄπελεισι ὃν ἄν ὁ ἀληθ
diaphrēma, and iii. 11. 17. 21, 1418 a 35,

οὐχ ὄπελεισι αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are emi-
nently sound and practical.
ομοια μην αφθονία τοιούτων ἦ ναμάτων, χωρίς τὰ τε εἰς (X) τρόφην ἔδοτα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν τῶν ἐρυμων ὑπάρχων ὡς ἄκυρων ἀριστοκρατικῶν καὶ μοναρχικῶν, δημοκρατικῶν δ' ὀμαλότητι, ἀριστοκρατικῶν δὲ ὀνειδετῶν,
§ 6 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἵσχυροι τόποι πλεονέκτων, ἦ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεως διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμοτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, αὐτὸν μή κατὰ τὸν ἔθνην
καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδαίμον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
25 ἀσφαλείας τούτων ὡς ἐξήκοντα κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαίον χρόνων·
dυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τῶν ἕξινων καὶ δυσεξερχόμενοι τοῖς
§ 7 εἰπτιθεμένοις. διὸ δὲ ἀμφότερον τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται
tαι γὰρ, ἂν τις ὑπόπτως κατασκευάζει καθαρὰ ἐν τοῖς
gεωργίαις ἡ καλούσθη τινὲς τῶν ἀμπελῶν συστάσεως) καὶ τὴν μὲν
30 ἀλλὰ πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν εὐτυχῶν, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τῶτοις.

16 μὴν τὴν Κοραεαν ἄφθονον ἡμᾶς Ἀρ. Βκ. 2. 18 των omitted by M P, <τῶν> τῶν τῶν
§ 5 τῶν ΠΠ ὡς τῶν τῶν τῶν
παλαιών Α. Βκ. 1. 21 ἐκεῖνον M at and P (1st hand, corrected in the margin) Μ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν περὶ δὲ τῶν τῶν
translated by Long. I. 24 [καὶ] Schneider Susen. 3, 4, possibly right πόλεων ΠΠ (in P ἐν it is written faintly) II. 25 τῶν
τῆς ἤτοι τῶν τοῦτον ΠΠ Βκ., thus avoiding hiatus II. 28 ἀρδεύων Scaliger, ἀρδεύων ΠΠ Α. Βκ. Susen. 1 in the text, ἀρδεύων Susen. 1 in the text, ἀρδεύων ΠΠ Α. Βκ. Susen. 1 in the text, ἀρδεύων
30 θαλψιν Αρ. and P (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) τῶν πολεμικῶν...

§ 6 ἂν κατὰ τὸν ναμάτον...τρόπον
See Exc. ii. to Book 11.: p. 331. Susen. (850)
§ 6 24 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς...τοιαῦταν Eaton remarks that the surprise of Plataea (Thuc. ii. 4. 1) in ancient, and the
Plataea (Thuc. ii. 4. 1) in ancient, and the
second siege of Saragossa in modern, second siege of Saragossa in modern,
times, will illustrate the author's meaning.
times, will illustrate the author's meaning.
But "Aristotle probably has in view the But "Aristotle probably has in view the
experience of Perinthus, when besieged experience of Perinthus, when besieged
by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a
hard struggle made himself master of the hard struggle made himself master of the
city-wall only to find himself in face of a city-wall only to find himself in face of a
close array of houses rising tier over tier close array of houses rising tier over tier
up the slope of the hill, and parted by up the slope of the hill, and parted by
narrow lanes across which the besieged narrow lanes across which the besieged
carried walls; Diod. xvi. 76" (Newman). carried walls; Diod. xvi. 76" (Newman).

§ 7 29 τῶν ἀμπελῶν συστάσεως Unquestionably, vines planted in the fashion of a quincunx. Susen. (850)
§ 7 30 εὐτυχῶν Cut up, i.e. laid out, in § 7 30 εὐτυχῶν Cut up, i.e. laid out, in
straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-
straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-
πολιτικών Η. 11.  [IV(VII). 11. 7

σοτω γάρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἐξει καλῶς. (X)
§ 8 περὶ δὲ τείχων, οἱ μὴ φαύκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἄρετ-
tῆς ἀντιποιούμενα πόλεις λιαν ἀρχαῖοι ἐπιλαμβάνοντος,
34 καὶ ταῦτα ὀρώντες ἐλεγχομένας ἐργῷ τὰς ἑκείνως καλλω-
§ 9 πισμαίνας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τὰ 6
πλέον διαφέροντας οὐ καλῶν τὸ πειράζει σφέξεθαι διὰ (p. 111)
τῆς τῶν τείχων ἐρυμοντης ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ
ἐνδέχεται πλεῖον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιτοίχων [καὶ]
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλιγόνοις ἄρετῆς, εἰ δὲ σφε-
34 τε καὶ μὴ πάχεων κακῶς μὴν ὑφρίζεσθαι, τὴν
ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμόντητα τῶν τείχων οἰητέου εἶναι πολε-
331 μικτάτην, ἀλλος τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένοις τῶν περὶ τὰ
βῆλε καὶ τὰς μηχανάς εἰς ἀκρότειν πρὸς τὰς πολυρρίας.
§ 10 ὁμοίων γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεως ἁξιόντι

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by ΠΒ δ Bk. (perhaps rightly) } 37 καὶ before συμβαίνει omitted by Μ', [καὶ] Kores; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow τὰς ἐφεξή-

τα Stahr } 38 καὶ untranslated by William, [καὶ] Spengel } 39 [καὶ] Spengel,

wrongly } [καὶ τῆς] ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης <τε> καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλιγῶν Schmidt

1331 εἰς τὸν 5ον V5 and perhaps P6 (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἄσσα μὲν ὅν ὅσι κατα-
tέτημαι.
§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φαύκοντες δεῖν κτλ. Plato Laws vi. 778 B ff.: περὶ δὲ τείχων ἐγὼν ἄν τῇ Σικαρίᾳ ὑμεροίην τὸ καθέν-

δεν ἔσται ὅτι γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐκπαιδεύται. SUSEM. (853)
34 ἐλεγχομένας ἐργῷ] Here no doubt he is thinking more especially of Sparta: see P. (554) ον Μ. 9. 10. SUSEM. (854)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had walls like those of Babylon, they could have procured for her any greater protection than her strong position afforded in the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas, though he did not succeed in surprising it unawares, actually penetrated into the city, Xen. Helen. VII. 5. 11, Polyb. IX. 8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perin-

thus (340), although Thebes, in spite of its walls, was carried by assault (335).
§ 9 36 οὐ καλῶν] To skulk behind fortifications has been in all ages con-

trasted with courage in the open field. No of the remark of Archidamus, which Camerarius quotes from Plutarch, that at the sight of a catapult he exclaimed:

ἀπελθεὶ σφέξεθαι ἄρετα.
37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An

inversion which Mr Newman compares with II. 5. 27, 1204 b 18, μὴ τῶν πλείο-

των ἡ μὴ πάχεων. Translate: "but as it not only may but does happen that the superiority of the enemy is too much for the brave but not superhuman resistance of the smaller number, in such cases, if the defenders are to preserve themselves and be free from indignity and injury, we must hold that walls of impregnable strength are a soldiery precaution, especially when we consider the precision that has been attained in the manufacture of missiles and siege-engines."

1331 εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ βῆλη καὶ τὰς μηχανάς Possibly this indicates the two main divisions of Greek artillery ἔξοδος sc. καταστάτην for discharging arrows chiefly, with a range of 300 yards, and the heavier engines πετροβολίαν: see A. Bauer Griech. Kriegsartthümer in Iwan Müller's Handbuch d. K. Alt. IV. 1, p. 310 ff. H. Droysen Kriegsartthümer p. 190—204.
§ 10 οἱ ομοίων γὰρ τὸν ... ἁξιόν καὶ] "To insist on not building walls round cities is the same thing as to seek for a country easily invaded:" for καὶ 'as' after ομοίων see II. 8. 21, 1209 a 6. With ἁξιόν cp. II. 8. 13, 1208 b 5, τὸ κράνεων ἁξιόν.
IV(VII), 12. 1] 1330 b 31—1331 a 21.

καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ξητείν καὶ περιαρεῖν τοὺς (X) ὅρεινοι τῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἴδιαις οἰκίσεωι μὴ περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρον ἐσομένους τῶν κατοικουσιν.

§ 11 τῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδὲ τούτο γε δεὶ λαμβάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν περιβεβλημένοις τεῖχῃ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέροις χρήσαι ταῖς πύλεσιν, καὶ ὅσοι ἐχούσαις τεῖχῃ καὶ ὅσοι μην ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τούτον ἔχει τῶν πρότοτον, οὕτω ὅτι τεῖχῃ μόνον περιβλητέοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέοι, ὅποις καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχου τῇ πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τάς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε

§ 12 ἀλλὰς καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξεργαζόμενας. Ὅπερ γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ-τεῖχες ἐπιμελεῖς ἔστι δὲ ὅν τρόπον πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὕτω τὰ μὲν εἰρητὰ τὰ δὲ τεῖχε τεῖχε δεῖ καὶ ἀλλοπαθεῖς καὶ παρακεντήσῃς, τοὺς γὰρ ἐπιμελητέοις ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς εὐ παρακατασκευάζοντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συστάσεως κατανεμηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ τεῖχα διειλθόθαι φυλακτηρίους καὶ πύργους κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρακεντήσῃς.

§ 13 ὁμοίως ΠΡΠ 5 | ταῖς ἑξεκάτης ταῖς ἴδιαις ΠΡΠ 6 Βκ. | 10 τοῖς—κεκτημένοις Ἀρ. ταῖς—κεκτημένοις Γ Π Βκ. | 11 [μόνον] | Kornes, wrongly (cp. Pl. Smp. 179 b with Heg’s note) | 12 τῶν | τῶν ἄτων | Kornes | 13 χρεία <ἀναποκρύψες> | Schmidt, not badly | 16 δεῖ before τεῖχη | ΠΡΠ 6 Βκ., omitted by P6 (1st hand, supplied by corr.) | καὶ after φασίνουε untranscribed by William and Ar. (perhaps rightly) | 17 ἐπικαίρους | Schmidt | 21 δῆλον...22 φυλακτηρίους omitted by P6 (supplied in the margin by p6) | αὐτά Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 125 a 35 f.), certainly right.

§ 14. τὸς τῶν ἐπεξεργαζόμενος Diónysius the Elder invented machines of this kind; Diod. XIV. 41. 1, 50. 4 (Camararius). Cpx. Ristow and Köchly Gleich. des griech. Kriegswesens p. 207 f. Afterwards the campaigns of Philip and Alexander of Macedon led to many fresh improvements in the siege-engines and heavy artillery: see Ristow and Köchly p. 264, 307 ff. "It is possible" (see n. 1899 on viii(v). 6. 13) "that Aristotle was acquainted with the work of Aeneas Tacticus. (See c. 32.)" (Eaton). SUSM. (856) See also H. Droysen Kriegswirtschaft p. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention of καταπλήθου at Athens circa Ol. 105 or 106, 356—348: they were of course used by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthos, 340, 3391 and by Alexander against Halicarnassus 334. § 12 17 ἄρχων γὰρ οὖς ἐπικαίρους This is equivalent to the Latin maxim: si bellum vitare vis, bellum para (Con greve). SUSM. (857) c. 12 § 1 19 τὸ δὲ τεῖχη...21 ἐπι-καίρους So Xen. Cyrop. VII. 5 § 12, towers for guard-towers against θάλας τῶν πύργων, ὅπως ὅτι πλεῖστα φυλακτῆρα εἶχ Πολυ. VIII. 17, 5 of Cretan mercenaries at Sardis συνέβη καὶ τὸς Κρηταῖς πενετεινοῦσα τοῖς φυλακτηρίων τῶν κατὰ τούς διπλασίας τῆς ἵππας (J. G. Schneider). SUSM. (858) 20 διειλθόθαι] c. 7 § 1, 1327 b 27, διειλθόθαι τοῖς ἐν καίσα. 21 αὐτὰ] Vahlen on Pind. c. 15 § 12, 1454 b 17 out of several instances has
ΠΟΔΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 12.  [IV(VII), 12. 1

άξενον ἐνα τῶν συσστήματος ἐν τούτων τοῖς φυλακτηρίις (X)

§ 2 οὐς. καὶ ταύτα μὲν δὴ τούτον ἀν τις διακοσμήσει
τὸν πρότον τὰς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδεδομένας ἡµήσεις XI
καὶ τὰ κυρίωτα τῶν ἀρχείων συσστήματα ἀρµότει τούτων ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τοὺς αὐτούς, δόα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόµος ἀφορίζει χαρίς ἢ τὰ µαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθό (p. 115)

§ 3 χρηστον. εἰ ὅ ἁυ τοιοῦτον ὁ τόπος διὰτις ἐπιφάνειαν τὴν ἐκεῖν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσην ἰκανόν καὶ πρὸς τὰ γενικῶν 30 μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἔρµοντιρας. πρέπει δὴ ὅποτ ἁυ τούτων τῶν τόπων τοιαῦτης ἐχορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οίαι καὶ περί
§ 4 Θεσσαλίαν νοµίζοντα, ἣν ἐλευθέρω καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δὴ ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ἀνών πάνων, καὶ μῆτε βάπασουν µήτε γεγορηθῆν µῆτε ἄλλον µηδένα τῶν τοιοῦτον παρα-

24 θεοὶ Π Αρ., θείαις the other authorities and Bk. 1 25 τῶν κυρίωτατων ἢ Σουσεµ., τὰ κυρίωτα τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 133 b 6 ff.) ἢ ἄρχειον Π Λ Αρ. Αδ., ἄρχειον the other authorities ἢ [συστήσ] Σπένσελ Π φιλάνδιορ—θέσιν—ἐπιφάνειά Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἐκείν πρὸς 19 ἀρετῆς Ἰστιοτής ? Jackson ἢ ἀρετῆς θείας ? Θείου ἀρετὴς Lambin ἢ ἰεὐς Βότιλιγκ, ἐφευρέν Eaton, θεόν Schneider. If this letter be accepted, either with Σουσεµ. 1 read [ἐπιφάνεια τε] as a gloss, or with Bücheler transpose ἐπιφάνεια τε to follow θέαν 32 νοµίζοντα Lambin, ἀκοµῆς Σουσεµ. II Π Αρ. Βκ. 1 Σουσεµ. 1 in the text 34 τῶν τοιαύτων τοιαῦτα Μ ΙΙ Π Βκ., also P I (corr.) and apparently Ar. (perhaps rightly)

one similar: De anima 11. 4 § 12, 416 a 10 αὑτο ἀφειλεται μόνον τροφόμενον. Add Pol. III. 5, 1278 a 14.

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly: "Aristotle’s idea is that the messes of the several divisions of the citizens shall be held at the immediate sphere of their employment: those of the φιλάνδιοτα in the φυλακτήρια and τῆρων where they are on duty. Similarly the common meal of the ἀρχετέρων is in the town hall." Hence he proposes to read τὰ κυρίωτα τῶν ἀρχείων, which is open to the objection: non omnium magistratum sed superiorem tantum praetoria circa forum superius inces. Σουσεµ. 1

§ 2 27 µαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθοχρηστῶν

Thus Aristotle places all the regulations for religion and ‘cultus’ in his ideal state under the Delphic oracle precisely as Plato does Crv. IV. 427 B (Congreve).

Σουσεµ. (859)

§ 3 38 ἐπιφάνειών τε κτῆτορος ὕπ. Βιτριν. 1. 7 aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in excelsissimo loco, unde moenium maxima pars conspicuiatur, areae distribuantur (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato Lat. vi. 778 c, the temples to be built all round the Agora and the city around them πρὸς τὸν θηρίον τῶν τόπων εὐρείας τε καὶ καθαρότητα χαρὰ: VIII. 848 D (similarly in the twelve κώμα κώμων). Σουσεµ. (860)

Add l’Ausan. IX. 22 e τοις Ταταριώτοις νομίζει τὸ τοίς θεοῖς µάλιστα δοκοῦν Ελλήνων, χωρίς µὲν γὰρ αἰ νεκρία σφίζει, χωρίς δὲ τὰ λεία ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰ καθαρὰ τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀθρόων. Χειροτονίσως as Socrates’ opinion: µακὴ γὰρ µὴν καὶ βαµωιος χωρίς δὴ ἐν πραγµατεύµατι ἡ τε θεάτης αὐτὴν ὡς ἀστικὴς αἰτιατὴς εἰσ, Met. III. 8. 10.

31 περὶ Ὀθρευλίου] Also, according to Xenophon’s romance, amongst the Persians also: Σφυροφ. 1. 2. 1, εὑρίσκοντο εὐληθέρα ἀγορά καλοµιένη, ἔθη τα τε βασιλεία καὶ τὰλλα ἀρχεία πευκοῖον. Σουσεµ. (861)

See Blumen Frivatalli. § 18 p. 134 n. 3. ΄αγόρα was also used as a term for ‘harbour’ in Thessaly (Hesychius).
35 βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον υπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων (εἰς δὲ ἀν ἔχων τῆν τάξιν ἐνταύθαν, πρέπει γὰρ δεικνύσαν κατὰ τὰς ἡμίκαιν καὶ τούτων τῶν κόσμων, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεοτέριοις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρέβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχονται, η ἐν αὐτῶι ἄφθαρτοι τῶν ἄρχοντων παρουσία μᾶλτον ἐστὶ, ἐπεῖ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς ἑκείνων 3 εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συνεστία περὶ τὴν τάξιν. 

7 τῶν ἱερῶν ὀικοδομημάτων ἔχειν τῆν τάξιν. τῶν δὲ ἄρχοντων

39 ταῦτα—πρεσβυτέρας, τὰ—πρεσβυτέρας apparent M
1331 b 4 τῆς πόλεως after διαιρεῖται Π 2 Β Κ, thus avoiding hiatus, “there must be some mistake.” Congreve, Πολιτεύματα Sussem. || 5 ἐξ Κ, εἰς Λάμβιν Β Κ., [εἰς] <καί> Ἐκ Κ Sussem. But if 4 τῆς πόλεως is right, ἐπιθύμησαν or ὑποθύμησαν must have been dropped and εἰς may be a trace of this, [εἰς] <καί> ἄρχονται <καί> ὑποθύμησα—Weldon, combining these suggestions || τῶν omitted by Π 1 (supplied in Π 4 by corr.), untranslated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after ὀικοδομημάτων || τῆς—οἰκοδομημάτων] τα—οἰκοδομημάτων Ρ idiculam Sussem. || ἔχουσα inserted after ὀικοδομημάτων by Bas. It should be ἄρομα which may just as well be understood; ὀικοδομημάτων <χώρων εἰς καὶ τῶν ἁρχόντων ἐν τοῖς ἄρχοντες τῶν ἄρχοντων>—Spengel.


Tois de præsbytērōn] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: Introf. p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 n. (962). Sussem.

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπὶ δὲ καί] See c. 9 above. Sussem.

5 The repetition of εἰς before ἄρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double εἰς conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολιτεύματα, the governing body. See Quaest. crit. coll. pp. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1154 b 32, εἰς δύο μέρη, τὸ κάθ. εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμόν μέρος, and infra c. 14 § 12, 1133 a 30 ff. διήρητα...τῶν πρωτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀγαθακὰ καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά, how much harsher the text is than would be the following e.g. τὸ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἱερά τὸ δὲ εἰς ἄρχοντας.

With τῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ὀικοδομημάτων understand, from b 1, ἅρμανας as in b 11. See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 410. This removes one of Prof. Ridgeway’s objections (Transactions II. p. 143), but it is still strange that λειψὼν should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8.

6 ἔχειν τῷ τάξιν—ταῦθα, as § 4, 1331 a 37. So ἔχειν τῷ τάξιν τρισδημα,
οσα περι τα συμβολαία πωλεῖται την ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γερα- (XI) 
φας δικαίων και τας κλήσεις και την ἀλήνη την τουατύν 
διοικησιν, ἐτι δὲ περὶ την ἀγορανομίαν και την καλομένην 
10 ἀστυνομίαν, πρός ἄγορα μὲν δεὶ και συνόδον τιν κουίη 
κατεσκευάσαντο, τοιουτοῦ δ’ ὁ περὶ την ἀναγκαίαν ἄγοραν ἐστὶ 
tόπου· ἑσυχαλάξειν μὲν γὰρ την ἀνω τίθεμεν, ταῦτην δὲ 
πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.

§ 8 νενεμήσανται δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τα περὶ την
15 χώραν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἄρχωνσιν, οὗς καλοῦσιν οὗ μὲν ὑλοροῦν 
οὶ δὲ ἀγορόμοι, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συνοιτία πρὸς φυλακικὸς 
ἀναγκαῖον υπάρχειν, ἐτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμη-
μένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῦ τὰ δὲ ἥρων.

§ 9 ἄλλα τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογομένους καὶ λέγον- (p. 116)
20 τος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄρχων ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπτον ἐστὶ 
tα τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἄλλα ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
λέγειν εὐχὴς ἕργον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχες. διὸ περὶ
8 τὴν after ἀλήνη omitted by Ms. P1, perhaps rightly, [τὴν] Susem. 1 10 κα] Susem. 2 κατεσκευάσαντας P1, κατασκευάζαντας S1 V1b, κατασκευάζαντας M1 11 μεμοιράθη Μοναρ. Ar. Ald. Bk. 2 and P6+ (1st hand, note in P6 is written over an erasure), μεμοιράθη P4 (corr.) 16 ἀγορόμοι P6 S1b and P6 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand)
μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τὸ γε ἐπὶ πλείον ἀφεῖσθω τὰ νῦν,
13 περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν καὶ ποιῶν δει ΧΙΙ
25 συνεστάται τῶν μέλλουσαν ἔσθεσαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ
§ 2 πολιτείας καὶ καλός, λεκτέων. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἐστὶν ἐκ ὧν γί
νεται τὸ εὖ πάσι, τούτων δὲ ἢ ἐστὶν ὃ ποιών ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκο
τῶν κεῖσαται καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὁρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τάς
πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσα πράξεως εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωμείν ἀλλὰ λοιποὶ καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίοτε γὰρ
ὁ μὲν σκοτὸς ἐκκεῖται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ
χειν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσαι, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
πάντων ἐπιτυχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἐθευτο τοῦδε, ὡς ἐκ τῶν
tεἰς τέχνης καὶ εἰς τὴν ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τάς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις).§
31 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὐ δὴ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφείσει
35 πάντες, φανερῶς, ἀλλὰ τούτου τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυχὴν
τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τιμὸς φύσιν ἢ τύχη (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-
34 ἔτεις). Παραδειγματικά, εἴτε πλεῖον Π\(^1\) [perhaps rightly] || 24 εκ inserted before
ποιῶν by Π\(^2\) Π\(^3\) Ar. Bk.\(^1\) [εκ] Bk.\(^2\) || 25 συνεστάται Μ\(^*\) Π\(^1\) || 26 πολιτείας ἔσθεσαι Κορας Bk.\(^2\), πολιτείας Bk.\(^1\) [ἐσθεσι τέσανται...1332 a 27 τέχνην] Congreve, who
calls it an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning, [ἐσθεσι...1332 b 11 ἄκωσες] Broughton and Wilson, the latter considering c. 13 a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15:
see Introd. p. 88 f. and Comm. nn. (876, 879, 881, 948, 949) || 28 τῶν <βρῶσ>-
Π\(^4\) Π\(^5\) Π\(^6\) V L || 31 καὶ Π\(^1\) || 32 δὲ Π\(^4\), ἐσθεσί Π\(^6\) Bk. || 34 γὰρ omitted by
Π\(^1\), inserted by Π\(^2\) Π\(^3\) Bk. || 41 τέχνην ἢ φύσιν Π\(^2\) Ar. Bk. and perhaps M\(^*
like Νε. Eth. x., distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophic contemplation. In c.
13 there is no consciousness of what seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the
καλὸν ἡθοποιία. In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words
φανερῶς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν ζήσαντος, 1332 a 7, has more affinity for the Eudemon than the Nicomachean Ethics” (Journal of Phil.
x. 84 ff.).§
31 26—38 Eudemus reproduces this E. E. Π. Π. Π. 1327 b 19—22. The whole
period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently discussed by Bonitz Ar. Stud. Π. Π. Π. 94
sq. Susen.
§ 2 29 εὐρίσκειν = assequi. See 1330
b 5 f. So λαμβάνει. Yet below b 38 κρατεῖσθαν = to be won, secured.
1178 b 23 [Eaton]. These are the auxiliary causes or indispensable conditions (see n. 795) of Wellbeing. SUSEM. (871) § 4 1332 a 2 of 8 10. The δὲ answers μὲν of 1331 b 40, whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.¹ For this sense of ἐδόθη comp. 1. § 7. 1214 a 23 ἐδόθη ἐκ γενετῆς. Bonitz Ind. s. v. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16, 9. 1327 b 10, 1. 8, 9. 1266 b 9, καθ’ τὸν πρῶτον γένεσιν ἐδόθη; so vii. (IV). 11. 6, 1016 b 16, ἐδόθη ὁκεῖος, and viii. (V). c. 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. 5 § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, suapte natura, ὡς ὄφεισι ἐδόθη (ὑπάρχοντα), as in v. (VIII). c. 23, 1340 a 20: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as i. 13. 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4. 6, 1277 b a 11, iv. (VII). 14. 2, 1332 b 18, v. (VIII). 2. 2, 1337 b 2.

1 ἐνὶ... 7 λαυράνους It is pointed out in Exc. 1. (p. 559) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (i) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and (ii) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1339 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, ἀκαύματα, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (ὡς ὄφεισι ἐδόθη καὶ χρῆσαι τέλεσιν 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the Ethics. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we infer that the first chapter of our present work was not intended, in Aristotle’s final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the Ethics there (i.e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 ff. c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 2, φαμέν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμέν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804), 1319 b 41 n. (831). 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of ἔφαγεν, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also n. (807) and i. 2. 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (871) § 5 8 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς Nic. Eth. 1. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 14, 1098 a 14 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. SUSEM. (873) εἰ τίνων λόγων ἡθικῶν διδάσκει It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle’s love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [Dialogo, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. SUSEM. (874) With far less probability Grote in an essay on the Ethics (in Fragments p. 133 f.) connects this passage with Nic. Eth. 1. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and ii. 1. 3—5. 1104 a 11—11 (πειράτων βοήθεια) as an indication of Aristotle’s despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): “that Aristotle regarded..."
the successful prosecution of ethical in-
quiries as all but desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of ἐδωκιμάσαν. The definition in full is ἐνεργεία καὶ χρήσις ἄρετῆς τελείας, ὡς ἐς ἐνυπόθεσιν δικὸς ἄπλος. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks i. p. 575 f., ii. 385—401.

τελεία] We may paraphrase: 'matured and relatively permanent.' See Rassow Forschungen p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is no true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Wellbeing, because its virtue is not yet de-
veloped: Nic. Eth. i. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. Pol. i. 13. 11, n. (150). The corre-
sponding negative term, too, ἀρετάς, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: i. 13. 7 f. (cp. § 11); III. 11. 9 n. (572), V(VIII). 5. 10 n. (1533).

SUSEN. (876)

10—21] Respekt habe Eudemus VII. 42. 43 (56), 1238 b 5 sq. SUSEN.

10 ταύτην ὅν ός ἐνυπόθεσε] This is not to be found in Nic. Ethicis, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (681), he is the author of this chapter. SUSEN. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general. § 6 11 τάναγκαία] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, Journal of Phil.

X. 311, to which should be added that he justifies 'the rather abrupt use of the word τάναγκαία for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato Rep. vi. 493 a: ἄλλα τάναγκαία δικαία καὶ καλὰ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄναγκαία καὶ ἄναιμοι φύσιν, δοκεῖ διαφέρει τῷ ὁσίῳ, μὴ τὸν εὐρακίαν εἰς κλη.' Cp. i. 14 § 12, 1333 a 32: πρακτεῖται (1) ἄναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα, (2) καλὰ; and Nic. Eth. III. 8. 5, 1116 b 2 f. de δ' εἰς δὲ ἀνάγκην ἀνθρώπων ἐδωκιμάσαν, ἄλλα δὲ καλὰ.

τὸ καλὸν] sc. πρακτεῖται. But below, a 13, τὸ καλὸν, sc. ἐξαιρεῖ nobleness or beauty as a quality of actions.

13 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἄναγκαίας ἐξουσίαν] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil.' (Congreve.) SUSEN. (877)

14 τοὺς τοιούτους, sc. τιμωρούς καὶ κο-
lάσεως.

15 ἐνιατί to secure; the final sense of ἐνιατί is, that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSEN. (877 b)

al τοιούτου] sc. al ἐνιατί τιμεῖ.
χρήσαις δ’ ἄν ὥσπερ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄνηρ καὶ τευχή καὶ νόσος καὶ τοῖς ἀλλαῖς τόχαις ταῖς φαιλαῖς καλῶς; ἄλλα τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλήμεσις ἐστιν. καὶ γάρ τούτῳ διώκεται κατὰ τοὺς θηλικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, δ’ ἄν ὥσπερ τὴν χρήσεις τὸ ἀνήρ πάντα ἀγαθά. δὴ καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ἀναγκαίοις σπουδαῖοι καὶ καλῶς εἶναι ταύτα ἀνήρ. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἀνθρώπους τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκτός ἀγαθόν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῖς καθαρίζειν λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτίῳ τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῇς τέχνης.

22 δ’ ἀρετήν, omitting ὑπ’ Μ. P.1; hence [ὑπ’] Susem.1, perhaps rightly; 23 [τὰ] before ἀγαθά Reix Bk.2; 3 δ’ Sepulveda, 3’ Π’ III. Ark. Bk.1 Susem.1 in the text; 3 δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος William; 27 αὐτοῦ <τοῦ> P. Bk.3; 3’ λόρα Γ, perhaps rightly.

19 χρήσαις δ’ ἄν Comp. Nic. Eth. 1. 10. 11, 1100 b 16 ff., where this is presented as a special feature of Magnanimity (see, e.g., 7 7, 7, 700). Again in Post. Analytics II. 13. 18, 57 b 15 ff., this, τὸ διάδοσιν ἐνακούσει καὶ ἀνηκοῦσι, is mentioned as a second mark of the high-souled character (μεγαλοφειόροι) along with that adduced in κ. 700, τὸ μὴ ἀνηκοοῦσα ὑδραγωγεῖν (Eaton). SUSEM. (878) Comp. χρήσαις in N. E. I. 10. 11. 1100 b 27, χρήσαις 13, 1101 a 4.

20 τὸ μακάριον The decision in N. E. I. 10. 14, 1101 a 6, ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἀνηκοούσις ἑτερον ὡς ἀνηκοοῦσι, αὐτὰ μὴν μακάριον γε, αὐτὸ Πρακτικόν τάχυν περιστόρων. Comp. ib. 1. 10. 3, 1100 a 16 ff., and the absurd derivation from χαίρειν, VII. 11. 2, 1153 b 7.

21 καὶ τοῦτος θηλικοὺς λόγους] Nic. Eth. III. c. 4 [c. 5, Bk.].esp. § 4, 1113 a 25, τὸ μὴ σπουδαῖον τὸ κατ’ ἄλλης (sc. βουλήτου) ἐνακοούσαν τῆς σπουδαῖος τγ. ἀνηκοοῦσα ἐπ’ ἀκούσας ἐν ἑκάστοις δράκιν. It is quite true the statement is not made there in so many words: this is much more nearly the case in the two spurious treatises, Eth. Eth. VII. 15. 5, 1128 b 26 ff., Magna Moralia II. 9. 14, 1107 b 31 ff. SUSEM. (879) Comp. also Rhil. 1. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

§ 24 τῶν χρήσεων] The plural as ἄνθρωποι, in fact χρήσεις and ἄνθρωποι are both opposed to ἑτερον. The use which from time to time he makes of these goods (not of their opposites) attests his absolute virtuousness and goodness. Hence to consider external goods the cause of Wellbeing is the same as to attribute to the instrument what is really the result of the player's skill.

25 δ’... 25 ἀγαθῶν] Because external goods are just those which while absolutely good (ἄνθρωποι) are not good for every one, but only good at all times to the good man: Nic. Eth. V. 1. 9, 1129 b 1 ff., ἐν τῇ πλεονεκρίτη ὁ δικαίος, περὶ τάγαθα ἑσταῖ, ὁ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ διὰ ἀπελθαῖ καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον ἀπελθάντας ἀπελθάντας. Mota. Z. (v. I). 4. 7, 1129 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ ἀπελθάντα, δεῦτερ καὶ τοῖς τρίτοις τῷ ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ ἡκατὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐκατὸν ἀγαθῶν τὰ δώσαν ἀγαθά ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶ. SUSEM. (880) The distinction is drawn N. E. VII. 12. 1, 1153 b 26 ff. τὸ ἀγαθόν ἀναγόμενον τὸ μὴ ἀνηκοοῦσα τὸ ἕκαστον. See N. E. I. 3. 13, 1104 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are instances, since they have proved in some cases fatal (τινὶ δ’ οὐκ αἰτὶ ἀγαθὰ).

13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see Crit. note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26 ἐν τῇ ποιεῖσθαι τῷ τέλειον, τῇ τέχνῃ, as an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning. "What was said it (a 28, τῶν ἐργάσεων) would then mean what was said cc. 4—12; and that would undoubtedly serve to explain what according to §§ 9, 10 requires explanation τῷ τέλειον. But then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον καλ lacks all proper connexion unless it has been directly preceded by the statement that Wellbeing consists in the practice of virtue assisted by the requisite external conditions. This alone makes all follow in regular order: these conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend on Fortune, but if the external conditions present it is the governing intelligence that produces virtue. Hence the fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispensable for the context, and the atheasis of that passage is not the right way to re-
move the objection noticed in nn. (687, 871), although we do not deny, and in n. (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton’s objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in nn. (876, 879), which was taken by itself is far from decisive; while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 12 § 7, 1334 b 6 f. cf. cp. n. (931). SUSREM. (883)

28 [καὶ] It follows from what has been said; cp. cp. n. on 1254 a 31.

29 [τὰ μὲν] = εἴτε τῶν καὶ τῶν δεὶς συνεστάται τὴν μελέτην ἐκείνη τῆς κακοῦ = χρημά ἄριστη ἀνάλος καὶ τοιαύτα ἀνάλοις. To this is opposed the work of the legislator as in r. 10, 1, 1258 a 21 ff, ii. § 8, 1263 a 39, 11 § 15, 1273 b 31. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, χρηστή, is due to Fortun: the other, ἀρετή, is the legislator’s task (ἐργατεύειν). Cp. 1335 a 14 ἐργατεύειν, viz. by education. ‘Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.’

30 [τὴν τῶν πολέμων συνταχθ] The structure of the state—the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune’s disposal. The relative clause is the object of καταγγέλλω.

καταγγέλω γὰρ| For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. i § 10, 1333 b 27 f, nn. (707, 795, 871); Zeller 4th ed. c. ii. p. 333. SUSREM. (882)

32 ἐπιστήμης καὶ προορείσεως| ‘The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the ἐφίλος and προορείσεως of N. Eth. II. 4, 3, 1105 a 30 f. (Congreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further Nic. Eth. Ill. cc. 7—9, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also n. (121) on I. 13, 12. SUSREM. (894)

34 [ἡ καὶ πάντας] Here still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7, 1259 a 19, it is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal rights. Cp. nn. (816, 817); iii. c. i §§ 9, 10, c. 13 § 12, nn. (440, 599). SUSREM. (885)

35 τὸς ἐνδήμος πάντας σπουδαίος| BY this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 3, 3, n. (470), and n. (112) on I. 13, 6; further Nic. Eth. VI. 1, 7, 1139 a 15, 2 § 6, 1139 b 12 f. Comp. Walter 4th ed. c. p. 283 ff. In what sense the words τὰ πάντα ἐνδήμος εἰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐκαστὸν μέρος ἔχει ἀρετή καὶ ἐφίλος καὶ γνώσεως καὶ εὐδημοσύνης ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ, n. (563 b): c. 13 §§ 3, 4, 1283 b 37 ff. See further IV (VII). c. i.

34—2
532 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 13.  [IV(VII). 13. 10

36 νεατε σπουδαίοις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίοις (XII) εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτών, οὔτως αἰρετότερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τῷ πάντας.

§ 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαίοι γίνονται διὰ τριών. τὰ δὲ τρία δὲ ταύτ' ἐστὶ φύσει ἐθνὸς λόγος, καὶ γὰρ φονεύ δεὶ προϊόν ὅλων ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ξύφων, εἰτα καὶ ποιῶν τινα τὸ σώμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐνιαὶ δὲ ὀδεῖν ὅρθος

1133 b 1 ψυχή μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖν. ἐνιαὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἑπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθθῶν ὕπτη τὸ χεῖρον.

§ 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν ὅν ἀλλὰ τῶν ξύφων μάλιστα μὲν 7 τῇ φωτεῦ τῇ μικρά δ" ἐνιαὶ καὶ τοὺς ἑθεῖν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ 5 καὶ ἀλλ' μὲνον γὰρ ἔρχεται λόγον· ὅστε δεὶ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν.

41 εἶτα P5 (later hand) and Lambin, οὕτω Π5-2 Αρ. Susen.1 in the text and Π5 (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Π5, ιε Π5 Ar. Βκ.

1133 b 1 μεταβάλλειν Π5-2 Βκ. || ἐναὶ...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γαρ|| 7 Schneider || ἐστὶ διὰ ἕρωτι ἔνατον ἔστιν Κορας || [διὰ] Göttling, βία Lindau, against the sense || 7 φύσεως <καλ> in the margin || <δ' διάγειται> διὰ || Susen., <έ> διὰ and <δέ> περι ἡμί Schmidt, ἐθθῶν <π> μεταβάλλει || 7 Conring, ἐθθῶν || οὐδὲ ἔστε λαοὶ transposed by Bücke to precede 3 μὲν οὖν οἴνοι: see Intrad. p. 99., 5. Susen. had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλὰ γὰρ...7 βέλτιον || 5 μὲνον Spengel (sive Ar. Αρ.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(V), 9, 13, 1310 a 18 f. n. (1642), Susen. (888) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (11. 47) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες || οὐδὲ εκάστος, see 1. 3. 2, 1661 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(V).

8. 3, 1307 b 35 ff.

39 ἄλλα μὲν...40 λόγοι] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1324 b 6 f. n. (921). Comp. Ν. Εθ. X. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 l., γίνομαι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀνθρώπων μὲν φύσει δ' ἑθεὶ δι' ἀλλ' ἐπιτεί. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by ἐπιτεί, instruction, so in B. II. 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II. 8. 24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. Susen. (887)

41 ἐστὶ καὶ...42 ψυχήν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence 1. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., 1. 13. 2 f., 1259 b 22-28. In Ν. Εθ. vi. 13, 1444 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (αι ἔθεμα ἔξεις), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (ἐγείρει), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. Exc. ππ. on B. VII(VIII). Susen. (888)

43 ἐναὶ is subject to φώσα, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11, 1332 b 1 ἐναὶ γὰρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Arceitus translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam alia per naturam ad utrumque apta per mores ad peius vel melius convertentur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. Susen. § 12 3 μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κατ] In form this sentence recalls Μεθ. I. 1. 3, 960 b 24—28, Ν. Ε. VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 19—27. 4 μεκρά is accus., ἐναὶ nominative. The gender of µέκρων is a parallel to τελευτᾷν and χαρακτεῖν, I. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δὲ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν] Habit should cooperate with natural endowment. This

νεών ἀλλήλων. <τά μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μᾶλλον μὲν τῇ φύσει> (XII) 4<br>
<εὖ, μηκρὰ δ’ ἐνία καὶ τοῖς ἑδεσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ καὶ λύγης. μονὸν> <γὰρ ἔχει λόγον>πολλά γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἑθειοῦς καὶ τῷ φύσιν πάντως διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἐνὶ πεισθῆσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βλέπον.<br>
§ 13 τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οὖν εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλουσις εἰς χειρότοτος ἐξεσάμεθα τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσασθα πρότερον τὸ δὲ λατοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἂν παῖδειας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔνα ἔνα μαθαίνωσι, τὰ δ’ ἀκούοντες.<br>
14 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστικην ἢ ἀρχῶν τοῖς καὶ ἀρχημένοις, τοῦτο ἢδη σκεπτόν, εἰ ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχημένους καὶ τοὺς ἀρχημένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ 15 βίου. δέλου γὰρ ὧς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson's view (ταῦτα = reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 9 πρότερον In c. 7. Susem. (889)
10 τὰ μὲν γὰρ By habituation (ἐθ-

(890) άναλογοῖς) arises moral virtue, by instruction (ἀκούοντες) intellectual virtue, Nic. Eth. 11. 1. 1., 1103 b 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education: N. E. 11. 1. 8, 1103 b 22 ff., x. 9. 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). Susem. (889)
11 ἀκούοντες] Cr. N. E. x. 9. 7, 1179 b 17 οὐ γάρ ὧν ἀκούοντες λόγον. Apparently εἴθεσιν...ἀκούοντες corresponds τῷ λόγῳ...τῶν ἑθειῶν c. 15 § 7, 1134 b 18.

c. 14 The distinction between rulers and ruled; whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary: §§ 1—5.
§ 1 12—16] Comp. III. 4. 8 n. (477) for the distinction in education. Susem. (891)
13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see Crit. n.) Dr Jackson argues in the following note: 'Aristotle here con-

(891) strasts (e) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (δ) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase τοὺς αὐ-

(892) τοὺς ἑναὶ might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled"; or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, "the same persons rule and are ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses, Susemihl however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἑναὶ bears the latter of the two meanings above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the former of those meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in both places in the former of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intel-

ligible.'

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Susemihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: "vitium inde ortum esse videtur, quod deinde pro τοὺς ἀρχη-

(892) μας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχημένους ἑτέρους ἐκαὶ δὲ βίου potius dicitur αὐτός τοῖς τούς μὲν ἄρχειν τούς δ’ ἄρχειν καθάπες (v. 22 sq.) et pro τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἑναἰ accuratius tã-

(892) ραί ὁμοιοὶ κοινωνίαι τῶν καθα μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχειν (v. 26 sq.)." Qu. crit. coll. p. 412. Where the reasons on each side are so equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates no more than non liquet.
§ 2 κατά τὴν διαφάνεια ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοινύν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον (XIII) διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἡγομένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλῆς ἐχοντας ὑπερβολὴν, εἶτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡστε ἀναμφίβολην εἶναι καὶ φανερὰ τὴν ἑπεροχήν τῶν ἁρχομένων, ὡς γὰρ ἐνι αὐτοῖς τῶν μὲν ἁρχην τοὺς δὲ ἁρχηθαί 

§ 3 καθάπαξ ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὁ μάχηι λαβεῖ ὥσπερ ἄστιν ὥσπερ εἰς τὸ Ἰδιοῖς φησὶ Σκλαβῖσ εἶναι τὸ βασιλεία τοσοῦτον διαφέρονται τῶν ἁρχομένων, φανερὸν ὡς διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖοι πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἁρχην καὶ ἁρχηθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἴσον * * ταυτον τῶν ὁμοίως, καὶ χωλεπον μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκόμενον παρὰ τὸ § 4 δικαίου. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἁρχομένων ἆπροχυσε νεωτερεῖζεν 30 βουλόμενοι πάντας οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν τοσοῦτος τε εἶναι 

23 ὦσπερ ὥσπερ Ρείζ || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἁρχηθαι ᾿ Σχνειδερ, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἁρχηθαι], or else ἁρχηθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἁρχην ᾿ Spengeł (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἴσον <τῷ δικαίῳ> Τυρωτ, ἴσον <καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ> ὁ Σουσμ. from Dübner’s translation || 29 νεωτερεῖζεν βουλόμενοι transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Τυρωτ || 30 βουλόμενοι Vettori (in his translation), Reitz, rightly || τε ᾿ Spengeł

16 κατὰ = in virtue of. Cf. κατὰ ταῦτα λέγοντα Μετα. 1.6. 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz ad loc. Eutchen p. 43. This construction with ἀκολούθων is less frequent than the dative. But cp. N. E. I. 1. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην διαφοράσ ἀκολούθωσιν αἱ ἔξεσι, vii. 9. 6, 1113 b 34, κατα ὁμοιότητα ἑκατοσθένη, Hist. Animal. viii. 2. 13, μέν a 16, ἀκολούθωσιν αἱ βεβαι κατὰ ταύτης τὰς διαφορὰς, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13 (Ind. Ar. 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a double misprint, Π 2, 517 a 3).

§ 3 εἰ μὲν τοινύν κτλ] Comp. i. 5. 10, 1284 a 34—36 with n. (47). Cf. SUSSENI. (892)

Strikingly similar to Pl. Politicii 501 b, εἴνας δὲ τα ὅπως ὁι ἐν ιερῷ κατὰ τὰ τοιχοτεκνία κατά τὰ ψυχὴν διαφοράς εἰς, δὴ συνελθοῦσα εἰς γραμματεύματα γῆμεν. 

22 βέλτιον ἀν κτλ] This has been affirmed II. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the basis of the argument for Absolute Monarchy III. 13. 13. See nn. (601, 678).

§ 3 Σκλαβῖς τῶν ιερῶν τῆς Καριάς] This was sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the mouth of the Indus. Herod. iv. 44. We may conclude with certainty from this passage that he published an account of his expedition in a book of travels. But the geographical work, which has come down to us bearing the name of Scylax, is of much later date. Cf. SUSSENI. (893) Comp. Niebuhr in Phil. Museum 1. 245.

24 τοῖς βασιλείας κτλ] Comp. vi.(iv). 4, 4, n. (1166). In Ethiopia the kings were chosen for their stature. Cf. SUSSENI. (894) 

28 χωλεπον μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν ... 32 ἴστιν] This passage condenses the results of the inquiry into the stability and inability of governments in B. vii.(v) especially recognising the criterion of viii.(v). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff., and vii.(v). 13. 1, 1356 b 14 ff. ἴστιν κράτος ὅταν τὸ βουλόμενον τῆς πολιτείας. See n. (1307).
τοῦς ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ' εἶναι κρείττους τοῖς πάντων, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μήν ὡς γε δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχιμένων, ἀναμφισβήτη
tον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἐσται καὶ τῶς μεθέξουσι, δεὶ σκέψο-
§ 5 σθαί τὸν νομοθέτην. εἰρηταὶ δὲ πρῶτερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ 
φύσις δεδοκεί τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα [ἀυτῷ] τὸ γέγει 
§ 7 ταῦτ' τὸ μέν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἀρ-
χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἀρχεῖν. ἡγανακτεὶ δὲ οὖν ὅσοι καθ' 
§ 8 τῆς ἰκανομενῆς ἡμικλίας. ἔστι μὲν ἀρα ὅσοι αὐτοῖς ἀρχεῖν 
καὶ ἀρχεσθαι φατοῖς, ἐστὶ δὲ ὅσοι ἑτέρους. ὡστε καὶ τὴν 
πανδείαν ἔστιν ὅσον τὴν αὐτήν ἀναγκαῖοι, ἔστι δ' ὅσοι ἑτέραν 
eιναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν ἀρχηθναι φασὶ 
δεῖ πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἰρή-
§ 4 ται λόγοι, ἢ μὲν τοῦ ἀρχοντος χάριν ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχιμένου.

πολιτείματι ἔστιν ὅσον τὴν αὐτήν ἀναγκαῖοι, ἔστι δ' ὅσοι ἑτέραν 
eιναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν ἀρχηθναι φασὶ 
δεῖ πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἰρή-

§ 5 εἰρηταὶ δὲ πρῶτερον c. 9 §§ 

§ 6 1333 a 1 ἐστὶν ὅσοι καθ' τοὺς γὰρ μὲν ὑπὸ πολιτείματι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ'. εἰρηταὶ δὲ πρῶτερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δεδοκεί 
τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τὸ γέγει ταῦτ' τὸ μέν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύ 

πολιτείματι ἔστιν ὅσον τὴν αὐτήν ἀναγκαῖοι, ἔστι δ' ὅσοι ἑτέραν 
eιναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν ἀρχηθναι φασὶ 
δεῖ πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἰρή-

§ 6 1333 a 1 ἐστὶν καὶ τοὺς τε γὰρ 

§ 3 1332 b 16—1333 a 5. 535

(XIII)

πολιτείματι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ' εἶναι κρείττους τοῖς πάντων, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡς γε δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχιμένων, ἀναμφισβήτη-
§ 3 τοῦτον τε γὰρ With this whole passage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1777 a 25 π.

(490). This is one of the few instances in which τε γὰρ = etenim, as is allowed by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian usage of τε γὰρ generally in the paper just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 680. SUSEM. (886)

English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Dem. De Falsa Leg. § 176. He cites Herod. iv. 167, Aristoph. Pax 402, Ar. Rhet. III. 7. 11, 1408 b 17, and III. 11. 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates the similar usage of οὕτω γὰρ.

§ 3 έν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἰρηταὶ λόγοις] I.e. III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1778 b 30 ff. It is noteworthy that reference is only made to this passage, and not to the much more similar one quoted in n. (898). However, some such reference may have been lost, where the following context is defective.

See n. (900); also n. (902). SUSEM. (889)
ELÉVETHNAN. * * διαφέρει δ' ἐνια τῶν ἐπίπτατομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔρ-γοις ἄλλα τῷ τίνος ἑνεκα. διὸ πολλά τῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντον διακονικῶν ἑργῶν καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλῶν διακονεῖν. πρὸς γάρ τὸ καλῶν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλῶν οὐχ ὤντος δια-τό χείρεσιν αἱ τράφεις καθ' αὐτῶς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἑνεκεν. ἔπει δὲ πολιτικῶν καὶ ἀρχόντων τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου αὐρός, τοῦ δ' αὐτῶν ἀρχομενοῦ τε δείν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἀρχοντα ὑστερον, τούτων ἐν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματεύον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἄγαθοι γίνωσται καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἁρίστης ἐξουσίας.

§ 9 ΠΕΡΙΗΓΗΣΑΙ δὲ διὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, διὸ τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγον δ' ὑπακοείν δυναι-

6 * * διαφέρει Courning, ἐπ. B. III. c. 4 1377 a 29—b 30, and see Comm. n. (900) || 11 πολιτικῶν Rassow, πολιτεία M*, πολιτεία F Pl-2 P2 Atkins, Bk. Suscum.1 in the text, πολιτεία <ἀριστα> Spengel || αὐτῆς omitted by P4-6 C* (2) || 13 ἐν over an erasure P4, δὲi P5 SB | 14 πῶς Schnecker, πῶς <ἀ> | Koraes || 15 γίγνεσθαι P4-6 SB Vb Ald. Bk.1, γίγνεσθαι P3, γίγνεσθαι | Koraes

§ 7 6 διαφέρων[1] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use." 1377 b 5 ff. Suscum. (900)

§ 8 διαφέρει δ' .......11 τίνος ἑνεκεν] See ν(viii), 2, 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). Suscum. (901) The end redeems and ennobles apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse.

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1333 a 36. But the last clause τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχει carries us back further, to 1333 a 7 or the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-
tion; next criticise Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5. τῶν δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑπτα, τοῦτο δὲ δειβρεῖτον.

12 φαμεν] The present may well stand here also (see nn. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 § 5. Comp. n. (471). Suscum. (902)

14 τούτων ἐν εἴη .....16 ἱς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φρονέως has been clearly proved in III. 4—17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also ν(viii), 2, 1 n. (677), also n. (1034) and Exc. 1. B. ν(viii). Also Introd. p. 48, p. 50 ff. Suscum. (903)

Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the property rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence: §§ 9—14. Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which make success in war the goal of education: §§ 15—22. § 17 διερήσατο δὲ σει] See n. (40) on τ. 5. 6. Suscum. (905)

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μενον. ὃν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἄνθρωπος λέγεται (XIII) καὶ τὰ μὲν οὕτως

10 διαπρεποῦν ὃς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἀδηλήσων πάνω λεκτέων. ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ χείρον τοῦ βελτίωνος ἐστὶν ένεκεν, καὶ τούτῳ φανερῷ οὕτως έν (p. 130) ταῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν βελτίων δὲ τὸ λόγον έχου. [διήρθηται τε διῃρήσει, καθ' ὄπερ εἰδοθαμεν τρόπον δια- 25 μετέχει ὃ μὲν γὰρ πράκτικος ἐστὶ λόγος δ' δὲ θεορητικός.

11 ὁσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος διηρήσθαι δηλο- ώτι, καὶ τάς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐρόμενον έχειν, καὶ δει τάς τοῦ φυσι βελτίωνοι αἱρετοτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ- 

10 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων αἰτήματα αἰτήματα αἰτήματα ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων αἰτήματα αἰτήματα αἰτήματα αἰτήματα αἰτήματα αἰτήματα

12 τῶτατον οὖ τυχεῖν έστιν ἀκροτάτου, διήρθηται δὲ καὶ τάς ὁ 31 βίου εἰς ἀνθρώπου και εἰς σωλήνα και πόλεμον και εἰρή- 


13 σαμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά, περὶ ὃν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτήν αἰρέσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς φυσῆς μέροι καὶ τοῖς πράξει- 


20 τοῖς τῶι, γιὰ William || 24 [Διηρθητα...27 δηλοντει] Susem. || τε θ' δ' Γ' || διῃρήσει <ο λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation || 26 φυσι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αἰρετοτέρας ὁσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος διηρηθήσαται P' Bk. || δηλον οὖν Bk., omitted by Ald. Wb., while Ar. translates it after πράξεις: δηλον (ὁ) Bk., Syllburg, <καί> δηλον οὖν Bk., Spengel. Both Syllburg and Spengel omit 27 δ', which neither William nor Ar. translates || 29 ὃ πασῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων έστιν ἀκροτάτου. Εἰς τὸν ΓΕΙΤΟΝΑΝ ἐν τῇ ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗΝ τῷ ΚΗΙΝΤΗΤΟΝ Reiz || 31 [καὶ] πάνω έστιν καὶ τῶν έστιν ἀκροτάτου. Εἰς τὸν ΓΕΙΤΟΝΑΝ οὖ πάνω έστιν καὶ τῶν έστιν ἀκροτάτου. Εἰς τὸν ΓΕΙΤΟΝΑΝ οὖ πάνω έστιν καὶ τῶν έστιν ἀκροτάτου. Εἰς τὸν ΓΕΙΤΟΝΑΝ οὖ πάνω έστιν καὶ τῶν έστιν ἀκροτάτου. Εἰς τὸν ΓΕΙΤΟΝΑΝ。” Schmidt however conjectures that οὖ αὐτοῦ has been dropped after δυνατὸς δὲ (31 [καὶ] πάνω έστιν καὶ τῶν έστιν ἀκροτάτου.) Bonitz Ind. Ar. 42 b 26 ff., 632 a 39 f.: see however Vahlen Zitrbr. f. d. d. οὐ σκηνάτω συνεχίζεται, wrongly οὐ σκηνάτω συνεχίζεται, wrongly

§ 10 24 διῃρηταί] Sc. τὸ λόγον ἐχειν. The passage in brackets as far as τὸς έν δηλοντι is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate to raise here the further questions: In regard to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or the practical side that occupies the higher place? Is it the intellectual development of the former, or rather the cultivation of practical and political insight, which is the chief and final aim of Education? Yet these questions are not raised anywhere in the context and so the passage serves no useful purpose. What is worse, it interrupts the connexion in the most confusing manner: it must therefore be pronounced an interpolation by an alien hand. Susen. (905)

§ 11 27 καὶ τάς πράξεις] Cp. m. (71a, 71b, 73a, 73b, 74a) on c. 2 § 1, § 6, c. 3 § 1, § 3, § 8. Susen. (906)

29 τῶν δυνάμεων] Θείαν τήν ἀρετήν ἐργάσατον. Κατὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐργάσατον. Κατὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐργάσατον. Κατὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐργάσατον. Κατὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐργάσατον. Κατὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐργάσατον. The relation is expressed 1331 b 29, τὰς τούτως τὸν φορετά μοί πράξεις...

§ 12 30 διῃρηταί 64] As e.g. 1. § 10, 1354 b 31. There is an echo of this division in Plut. De lib. educand. c. 13, 166 c παί πέρι ζήσεως εἰς δύναμιν καὶ σωβάδα διηρήται (Newman).

32 τῶν πράξεων] Cp. 1332 a 10. With χρήσιμα comp. the utilitarian conception of a civic virtue as in Plato's Phaidon, Protag., Republic and Mr Archer Hind's Phaidon, Appendix i.

§ 13 34 αἰρέσεων] The correlation of αἰρέτωτατον a 28; so a 41, τὰς τῶν πράγματων αἰρέσεων the choice of one action in preference to another. The estimate of value is the ground of preference. Ατ
πολέμου μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολής, τὰ δὲ ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκεν. 

πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοῖνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετεῖν· φοβεῖν μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις

§ 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίων καὶ τὰ τέλη. τῶν 40 αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων καὶ τοῖνυν τοῖς θείοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων αἱρέσεις: δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην ἀγεῖν καὶ σχολαζεῖν, καὶ τὰναγκαία καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μᾶλλον. ὅστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἄρτι 4 ὀντας παιδευτεῖ ὁ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας, ὡσπερ δέονται παῖ

§ 18 δεῖς. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἁρίστα δοκοῦντε πολιτεύοντοι τῶν Ἐλ. 10 λήγουν, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταῖς καταστάσεις τὰς πολιτείας, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ βελτίων τέλος φαίνονται συντάκτες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτω πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἁρετάς τους νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἄλλα δὲ τρέφοντοι ἀπέκλεισαν 10 πρὸς τὰς χρήσιμας εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ πλεονεκτικότερα.

§ 18 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὑστέρον τινὲς γραφάντων 40 προαστῶν? Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense δὲ ἀπειράσεις Κονσ (cp. a 34), διαφώσεις (δὲ ἀπειράσεις P) Π II Ar. Bk. Susem, in the text δὲ omitted by Π P, hence μᾶλλον Susem.

1333 b 2 δὲ before πρῶτου added by Π Bk., before καὶ P8, δὲ ? Stahr: βέλτιων Π P Bk., possibly right, βέλτιων καὶ τὸ ὑστερὸν S Schneider: πάσας omitted by Π.

a later time ἀπειράσεις, φέλεται are technical Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. vii. 105. 35 πολέμου sc. αἱρέσεως ἐνεώς of αἱρετῶν δεῖ. ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολής] Comp. N. E. x. 7. 6. 1172 a 4 b, Plato Lato i. 628 b (Eton), and with the former passage n. (921) below. Susem. (907) 37 βλέποντας] Goes with πρὸς πάντα: an instance of hyperbaton.

§ 14 δεῖς. Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποῦν, § 14 1333 b 1 μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην ἀγεῖν] Cp. again Plato Lato i. 628 b, ὡσαυτὸς τις αὐτικὸς γέναις' ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἑξωθὸν πολεμικὰ ἀναφέρετος μᾶλλον δὲ ὡς μὲν ἑνεῖρησαν, μὴ δὲ χάριν εἰρήνης τὸ πολέμου νομοθεταὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eton). Susem. (908) 38 τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας] What these are, is plain from 1660 b 15 b, 1277 a 16 —20. See further n. (1024) on v.(viii). 5. 4. 1339 a 20 f. 


§ 16 11 καὶ τῶν ὑστερῶν τινὲς γρ.] Comp. vi.(iv). i § 3 with n. (1133) and Introd. p. 20 n. 1. Here we again clearly perceive how slight is our knowledge of such political literature before Aristotle. It is highly probable that among the writers here alluded to were those too who were the first to set up the theory of a mixed constitution, see ii. 6. 17, 17 n. (319—321) and B. iii. Exc. i. p. 449—450 since it was in the Spartan and Cretan constitutions that they found the realiza-

ἀπεφήμιντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἐπαινοῦτες γὰρ τὴν Δακε· (XIII) δαμαίνοιν πολυετεῖς ἀγαπάτε τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπὸν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πάλην ἐνομοθέτησαν. ἀν 15 καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑστὶν εὐθεικτικα καὶ τοὺς ἐργας ἐφή-
§ 17 λεγεῖται νῦν. ὧσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχου-
λοντο τὸ πολλὰ διστάζειν, ὅτι πολλῆς χρήσεως γίνεται

14 ἐνόμοθησαν ΤΜ διὸ 16 νῦν omitted by IP, [τὸν] Susem. 1 δῆγονι
Camosot Bk. 2, certainly right 17 τὸν πολ. ΠΠ ΠΒ. 3 πολλῆς ΤΜ 1 γίνεται
ΤΜ, γίνεται IP PB Bk. 2

tion of their ideal, 126 b 23 with n. (219). Thimbron, or Thibron, according to another reading, is quite unknown to us. There can scarcely be a doubt that Aristotle was also thinking of the work on the Lacedaemonian constitution which bears the name of Xenophon. At any rate its author, t. 1. f., makes the happiness which the Lacedaemonian citizens attained by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of their small number, they had proved themselves the most powerful and celebrated state in Greece; and Aristotle's next remarks sound exactly like a polemic against the opening words of this little work: ἄλλος ἔγω ἐνσώπων πολεί ἡ Ἑλλάδος ἐνθισματωπότατοι πάλαι ὀνοματεργάτη τοι καὶ ἐνυπηρετητη ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ὠφων, ἔνθαμα όντο ψευταγία τοῦ ἐφεύροντο ἔτη μένουν κατανόητα τά ἐντυβγεμένα τῶν Ἐπαρκειῶν, ὡκείς ἐναπατημϊν. The suggestion would therefore be natural enough that Thimbron, and not Xenophon, was the real author; but the true authorship of Xenophon has been lately demonstrated with such certainty by Naumann De Xenophontis libro qui Lacedaemoniorum Politiae inscribitor (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible to adduce any tenable argument against it.

Oncken's suggestion, too, ep. c. 11. p. 179, that Xenophon wrote it under the assumed name of Thimbron, is just as unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (Philologus XXXIII. p. 97) that he wrote the first part of the Hellenica under the name of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses themselves depend on an hypothesis, the falsity of which has been demonstrated by Nietzsche (after Morus) in a dissertation Über die Abfassung von X. Hellenica (Berlin 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypothesis, unquestionably dating from ancient times, that, according to his own statement, Hellenic 1, 3, Xenophon published his Anabasis under the name of Themistogenes of Syracuse. But the right interpretation of the passage is question is that Themistogenes also wrote an Anabasis, to which Xenophon refers because his own was not written at the time. Moreover there is no ground for the supposition that Xenophon ever published any of his works under an assumed name. Thimbron or Thibron is a well-known Laconian name, and the one alluded to here by Aristotle was doubtless a Laconian by birth, and this may have been the reason why Aristotle cites him by name, without mentioning Xenophon.

Susem. (911) v. Wilamowitz identifies the author Thimbron with the Spartan who commanded in Asia Minor B.C. (Xen. Anab., v. 17. 6. 24, 8. 4, 11. 4. 17). His words are: "Next there appeared on the scene a champion of Oligarchy, Thibron, an ambiguous character and incompetent official, but one of the ruling caste: he wrote in glorification of Lycurgus. Well might Agesilaus request his literary agent, Xenophon, to draw up a new version of the story of Sparta, "just as he had entrusted him with the task of justifying before public opinion the period from 404 to 388..." The foundation for the common traditional view of Sparta was laid in the half century 403—350; its author was probably Diocles of Megara" (Homeriche Untersuchungen p. 273 f.). He conjectures in a note that possibly Plato's strange authority for Sparta in the Laws (B. iii. esp. 683—693) was Thibron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν Conquest, 'to win victory,' as § 19, b 30, 1271 b 3. We find ourselves in the midst of a discussion similar to that of c. 2 §§ 8 ff.

15 καὶ τῶν ἐργας εὐθεικτικα τοῦν Comp. ii. 9 §§ 16 n. (308), § 34 n. (345) and n. (919). Susem. (912) § 17 πολλῆς χρήσεως As in ii. 9 §§ 35, γίνεται τά γάρ γα τὰ περιμένει δι' ἀφροτητικ.
τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θήμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (XIII) τῶν τῶν Δάκων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸς τῶν τοῖν φαράγτων περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγομένα ἦσαν τό <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν; οὐδὲ γὰρ στὸν αὐτόν τοὺς ἱμάρης ἢ ἐκείνης ἢ αὐτὸν μήτε διότι δὴ διὰ τὸν ἀρχηγόν, εἰ μένοις ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδένως ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρησιμοποιεῖ τοὺς νόμους, ἀποβεβλήθησαν τὸν καὶ ἦν καὶ

§ 19 ἄνω. οὐκ ἤρθαν δὲ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὐδὲ δὲν περὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς ἢν δὲ τιμωρίας φαίνεται νομοθέτην τοῦ νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ διεπίσκοπος ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν ἱμάρης καλλιον καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. ἦτο δὲ οὐ διὰ τὸ τὸν πόλιν[ν] εὐδαίμονα νομὸς ἢ τῶν τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἤχει βλάβην.

§ 20 δὴ δὲν γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολετῶν τοῦ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο περιτέθη διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκεῖας πόλεως ἄρχειν ὑπὲρ ἐγκαλουσία οἱ Δάκων Παυσανία τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ

35 περ ἐξοντε τηλικάκτην τιμήν. οὕτω δὲ τοῖς τοιούτων νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδές οὕτω ὕψθεμος οὕτω ἄλθης ἐστιν.

18 Θήμβρων Π Πλ. Αρ. Βκ. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Βκ. || γεγομένα αὐτῶν Μ Π1 || 21 ἐπεδῇ γε νῦν Μ Π1 || 23 ἔστι δὲ Κορέγον, Κορέγον ἡς ἡς Susem. || 26 δὲ Μ1, omitted by P4 Σ1 νῦν L. * || 30 [κρατεῖ] Reiz, καρπερέων ? Congreve, perhaps rightly || τεχνιτος Π1, τεχνιτος Μ1 || 31 τῶν τῆς Scaliger Βκ. || 36 λόγων (omitted by P4) καὶ νόμων Π1 Πλ. (7) and Βκ.

18 Θήμβρων] See n. (911).
19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephorus n. (910); and perhaps Critias.
20 γεγομένα αὐτῶν] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen: see Schömann. p. 255 ff.
§ 18 21 δὴ δὲν] That is, on their own premises such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of post hoc propter hoc.
23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. De Ref. Lac. c. 14. [Plut.] Init. Lac. c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1370 a 19. Possibly Plutarch’s authority for the ‘Life of Ages’ adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle’s criticism in B. 11. and in the Peléeis. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadeus and degenerate Spartans: (b) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Cryptea, or the treatment of the Helots: and (c) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τῶν γὰρ διεπίσκοπος κτλ.] Comp 1. § 2, n. (38 b); IV (vii), c. 3 § 2 n. (734). Susem. (913)
§ 20 32 δὴ δὲν γὰρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. Susem. (914)
34 On Pausanias see VIII (v). § 10, 7 § 2 nn. (1498, 1506). Susem. (910)
35 πολιτικός] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1374 b 26 νομοθέτης stands to νομοθέτης.
§ 21 ταύτα γάρ ἄριστα καὶ ιδία καὶ κοινή, τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην (XIII)
ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταύτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν τε τῶν
πολεμικῶν ἄδικαν οὐ τούτον χάριν δεῖ μελετάν, ἢν κατα-
δοὐλώσασθαι τούς ἀνάξιους, ἀλλ' ἢν πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸι μὴ
dουλεύσωσιν ἐτέρους, ἐπειδὰ ὅποιος ζητήσει τὴν ἄγεων λαὸς
ὁφελείας ἐνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-
τείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπότειον τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ ἐσ
§ 22 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ
tὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν (p. 132)
δὲ οὐκ ἄρα τὸν τις εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονότα τοῖς
λόγοις. οἱ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι
μὲν σφοδρώς, κατακατεύθυνεν δὲ τὴν ἄρχην ἀπόλυτον,
tὴν γὰρ βαρύν ἀυδαίως, ἄστερον τὸ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγομεν,
αἰτίας δ' ὧ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύεται δύνασθαι σχο-
λάζειν.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἰδία τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
tὸ τε ἁρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἁρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὅτι
dὲ τὰ τε αὐτὸς τὴν σχολὴν ἄρετας ὑπερέχειν τέλος γάρ,

37 ταύτα P2-5 Λ' Δ' Α' Αρ., ταύτα the other authorities, τὰ Σπενγελ. P2 A1. δὲ τὸν <τε> Θυρατ Susem. P2, <καί> τὸν Congreve π. 38 ταύτα omiss. by P2-4 Λ', [ταύτα] Βκ. ἄρθρωτους τὴν τε τῶν twice over in Π1 39 πολεμιῶν Π Π' M. 41 ἄρθρωτοι Π4-6 Σ' Β' 4' ἀράτως 1334 a 1 πάντως ? Oncken p. 2 τρίτον τὸν Joh. Brandis (Rhein. Mus. 11. p. 556), not rightly 70 τοῦ Vettori, τοῦ Κορασὺς 3 ὅπως...4 σχολάζειν omiss. by Π M. 5 ταύτα P1 (1st hand) and probably Π (ορινός William), τέτοιον 8 ἀράτως Π5-6 Βκ., perhaps rightly 11 δ' ? Susem., yet δ' is also tenable 14 ὑπερέχειν Σουσιν., ὑπάρχειν ΠΠ Αρ. Βκ. Σουσιν. 1

40 ἵνα followed by ὅπως See P. Weber Absichtsausdr. p. 20, who quotes 1167 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1320 b 11.
41 ἐπεὶ δὲ ὅπως ηὐτῷ τῇ ἕν.] This is a curious admission, which proves that
Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his
ideal state without external dominion, but
rather as at the head of a group of allies,
whom it has conquered in war, and pro-
tects, but also to some extent rules; like
Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this
dominion ought to be generously exercised,
so that it may be of even greater service
to the governed than to the governing
(917)
1334 a 3 τρίτον δὲ κτλ.] Comp. i. 8.
§ 1 εἰρήνη πολλάκις | c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. | SUSEM. (920)

§ 2 πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν | Besides its general meaning 'mode, or condition, of life' and the more special sense, extending beyond the necessary of existence, 'refinement of life' (Met. 1. 1. 15. 981 b 18, 1. 2. 11, 982 b 23), the word διαγωγὴ in Aristotle, with or without the attribute ἀληθινῶς (cp. v[vIII] 5 § 8 with n. 1097) or some similar expression, or δὲ τῇ σχολῇ "in a condition of leisure" (v[vIII] 3 § 3, 8, cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure worthy of a really free man, such as he attains when his political duties have been performed, or such as he always possesses, provided he is pecuniarily independent, and leads a life of true study or contemplation. The occupation of such leisure, i.e. in other words (see Nic. Eth. X. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. nn. 907, 549, and 923) the highest degree of human happiness and satisfaction, is however activity: according to Aristotle, the highest activity there is. It consists in the study of all branches of knowledge and the contemplation of all works of art: it confers the highest intellectual enjoyment and most nearly approaches to the divine blessedness, Metaph. XII (A). 7 § 7, 1072 b 14 f. and above nn. (703, 728). From this meaning of 'the highest intellectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes descends to the more commonplace one of mere occupation and especially 'social occupation or intercourse': N. E. IX. 11. 5, 1171 b 13, Fragm. 90. 1492 a 28; cp. also e.g. Pol. v[vIII] 2 § 9 with n. (995). Then it is used in the plural for societies whose object is such intercourse, especially refined intellectual culture (III. 9. 13, 1180 b 37, where it might be translated "social clubs," cp. n. 558 and v[vIII] 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even for regular feasts, gambling and drinking parties: Nic. Eth. X. 6 § 3, 8, 1176 b 13 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word becomes identified with the amusement, sport, or pastime, undertaken for recreation (cp. Nic. Eth. IV. §§ 1, 1127 b 33 f.); and in the former and stricter interpretation, the two are sharply distinguished: v[vIII] c. 3 §§ 3–8, c. 5 § 1 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. nn. (993, 995, 1093, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exe. v. on B. v[vIII]. See also Schweger ad Arist. Meta. Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz, Arist. Meta. II. p. 45, Ind. Ar. 178 a 26 ff., and especially Zeller ed. ii. p. 734 f. n. (5). | SUSEM. (921)

§ 3 πολλακις | Comp. n. (548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle’s sense of the word, as explained n. (921), is something quite different from recreation. | SUSEM. (922)

§ 3 φιλοσοφίας | Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investigatio,' as in III. 12. 3, 1185 b 23, or Phys. I. 2. 5, 185 a 20: and hence explains it as 'virtus intellectualis.' | Comp. Thuc. III. 82. 2: ὅ δὲ πόλεμος ὑδρῶν τὸν εὐπρεπέστερον τοῦ καθ' ἱμάρας βιον τῶν συμφώνων καὶ

19 ἐξήρ ΓΜ, perhaps Γ had σχολάζεσθι | [σώφρωνα] Susem.
28 δὲ ἔλησεν ἢ δὲ ᾧ ἡ θάνατος. 29 δοκεῖν, ὡς καὶ 30 ἀπολαύσασθαι Π', ἴδιον

—qui videtur—frat William 29 σοφροσύνης <μετέχεις> Korna, more satisfactory, if any change is needed 37 τῶν ἁγαθῶν omitted by P3 (1st hand, supplied by a later hand). τῶν...χαῖρεν omitted by Μ', τοί...χαίρεται omitted by Π', Π' Bk., <αἰχρός> τοίς ἀγάθοις, <νόημα> τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς, τὸν μὴ δύναται οὐ τῶν σοφροσύνης ἐρυθράς, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦσαν μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦσαν φαινεῖται ἁγάθοις, εἰρήνη 814 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (926)

§ 4 29 δοκοῦνται Porson discusses this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on Omertis 659. It is not confined to Attic writers (Valckenaer on Hærpl. 25): see Aesch. P. V. 86, and the comic fragment apud Herodianum Pierson, p. 450, ἐνυχυρώσησε δὲι, as cited by Porson.

31 οἱ ποιητοὶ First in the Odysseu), i. 561 ff., next the author of the episode on the gods of the world in Hesiod's Works and Days 167 ff., then Findar Olymp. ii. 60 ff., and others. The Isles of the Blest, or Elysium, are placed at the remotest ends of the earth: it is the land of privileged heroes who do not die but are taken alive from the earth: here, 'where falls not hail or rain or any snow,' where gentle breezes are ever blowing, they spend a most blessed life in undisturbed enjoyment of all good under the sway of Kronos or Rhadamnthus. See Preller Grisch. Mythol. 1. p. 636 ff.; cp. pp. 53, 69. SUSEM. (926)

μάλιστα γὰρ οὐτοὶ κατὰ This is the moral of Plato's fine myth respecting the

children of Kronos, Politicus 273 a—d. Though it is not there stated that the advantages of the golden age failed to confer greater happiness, there can be little doubt that this is Plato's meaning. Several expressions of the Politicus, παράσκευα αὐτοῦ ὁποιοὶ πολλά σοφρόνως...κατεχόντων τότε τοιαύτῃ ἄλλην εἴσοδον, seem to find an echo here.

32 πολιτικὸς] Culture, cp. Ππ. 1. 15, 166 a 40. Intellectual aptitude, a habit of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation in leisure and save the citizens from rusting. Liberal and refined pursuits such as music, literature, philosophy in the restricted sense, must in leisure hours replace the active business of life, τάδια καλαὶ καὶ χαῖρεσια.

33 σοφροσύνης] This conception of a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from work and recreation, as the ideal life (cp. 1337 b 30), which only 'philosophy' can train us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1367 a 11), is of primary importance for the discussions in Book v(viii). See esp. v(viii). c. 3 §§ 4—8 with noter.

§ 5 39 ἀθραπατικός] This term 'slavish' means to Aristotle 'sunk like beasts in low sensual enjoyments.' Plato traces out exactly the same line of thought,
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40 μή καθάπερ ἡ Δακεδαμωνίαν πόλις τὴν ἄρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἔκει— (XIII) νοεῖ μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὲν νομίζειν
ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἄγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τυχὸς ἄρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζον τε ἄγαθα ταύτα, καὶ τὴν ἁπάλαιν τὴν τοῦτων ἡ τῆς τῶν ἄρετῶν * *

<ὅτι μὲν οὖν * * τὴν ἄρετήν, καὶ ὅτι δὲ ἀυτὴν, φανεῖσθαι ἐκ τούτων πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.
§ 7 τυχάνοις δὴ διηρήμενοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ· τούτων δὲ ποιούς μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν

1334 b 1 γένεσθαι Schneider Bk. 2, γένεσθαι P4, γένεσθαι the other authorities Bk. 3
Susem. 4 In the text τῆς Welldon, who punctuates with a full stop at 3 ἄρετῶν, ignoring the lacuna τῇ τὰ P4. 5 τῆς (omitted by Μβ) τὰ τῶν (τοῦ omitted by Μβ) πολέμου added by Μβ. P4 before τάσα contrary to the sense, τὰ πολέμου, a similar addition, is presented as a gloss by P4 τῶν ἄρετῶν καὶ ὅτι] Camerarius first saw that the text was defective. Thurrot placed the lacuna after, and Spengel before, the words τῶν ἄρετῶν, supplying it conjecturally as follows: τῶν ἄρετῶν <ὑπολαμβάνοις, ἔφησον μὲν πολεμοῦσας, ἀποκλειστὸ δὲ ἀρέτας. δότι μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς ἄρετης καὶ σχολαζόμενοι ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δὲ ἀυτῆς κτλ Thurrot (cp. Π. 9 § 34. 1271 b 3 ff): τῶν <πολεμικῶν μείζων εἶναι ἀνάγκη. δότι μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην χρή ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολήν ἄρετῶν καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτῶν, κτλ Spengel; mistrusting the sense. Thurrot’s supplement requires a slight alteration to account for the loss: hence 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ σχολαζόμενοι ἀσκεῖν τὴν ἄρετήν, καὶ ὅτι κτλ Susem. Welldon supplies <ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἄρετὴν δεῖ αὐτῶν> κτλ> αὐτῆς ἐκείνης; Broughton, thinking it to be an interpolation by the author of the present redaction δὴ δὲ Susem.

though in a different manner, in the first two books of the Laza. See n. (43) on 1, § 8. Susem. (926)
§ 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα] Namely the external goods. Compare for the Spartan convictions Π. 9 § 24, 1730 b 34, ὅταν μὴ δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν ἄλλα λάθη...ἀπολαμβάνει τῶν γυμναστικῶν ἡμέρας, n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff, γενεσθαι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τά γαρ τὰ περικάθνη δ' ἄρετη κτλ with nn. (346, 346 b, 347).
Susem. (927)

2 διὰ τυχὸς ἄρετήν] That is, by means of valour or courage, which is a particular virtue: see Π. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347), esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἢ πάντα αὐτοῖς τῶν νόμων ἄτι, τὴν πολέμου· αὕτη γὰρ χρήσις πρὸς τὸ κράτεῖν. Comp. also Π(VII). 1 § 6, κτὼν καὶ φθάνοντων οὐ τὰς ἄρετα τὰ ἔκτις ἄλλα ἐκείνα ταύτας. n. (657).
Susem. (928)
Mr Newman well observes that this correction of the one-sidedness of Lacedaemonian training tells just as much against all systems which, like Stoicism and Puritanism, tend to develop something less than the whole man.

ἔπιτε δὲ μετα...3 ἄρετῶν] The passage is defective: we may supplement it from Π. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus: ’But as they esteemed these goods higher than the virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher than that of the virtues, <they maintained their state only while at war, and fell after they had acquired empire. (Thurrot.)> Susem. (929)
4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ> Thurrot further suggests as the sense of this opening paragraph: <That virtue must be practised in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is clear from this. Susem. (930)
§ 7 6 διηρήμενοι πρότερον] The result of our previous analysis: 13 § 10, 1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (888) on c. 13 § 8. Susem. (931)
7 τούτων] The Citizens of the best state (Susemihi): cp. b 8 παρουσία, § 5, a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.
8 Διώκομενα πρότερον [In c. 7. SUSEM. (922)] 9 τῷ λόγῳ κτλ.] Parallel to c. 13 §§ 12—15, and to the more general discussion of Nic. Eth. x. 9 §§ 1—12 (c. 10 Bk., 1179 a 23 ff.).

11 διημαρτητέον τῆς βελτιωτέον ύπερθέσεως To miss the truest (highest) conception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13 § 2. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may be led astray by habit as well as by reason. With ἅρμαται = drawn cp. N. Ε. 1. 4, 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὅμως is virtually, 'amiss.' Gotting is quite wrong in rendering "codem perduci moribus quo perdixeris et belaiothi epothesi."

§ 8 12—15 Mr Newman thinks much light is thrown on this difficult passage by De Part. Animal. 11. 1. 6, 646 a 30 ff. ἀν' γὰρ τὸ γνώσεσθαι ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεύειν τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀν' ἀρχηγία ἐστὶν ἀρχηγία, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κυκληθείς καὶ ἐχθροφόρου ἰδίᾳ τῆς φόβου ἐκ τούτων ἴδιον ἀδύνατον ἀλλ' ἀρχηγίαν. 13 τὴν γένεσιν ἀν' ἀρχηγία The sense of ἀν' ἀρχηγία is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n. (1377): ἀπὸ ἀρχηγία τὸν νομοθέτην ὡς δὲ ὅσων κτλ. "Obviously birth is the first or earliest thing which demands our care," i.e. we begin with birth. The next words mean 'the nearest or proximate end from any starting-point'—understanding ἀρχή with the gen. ἄλλον τέλος, 'belongs to [is referred to] another, or new, end.' The proximate end is but a means, subordinated to a higher end: Nic. Eth. 1. 1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature this higher end is intellect and reason. SUSEM. (933) 16 τὴν τῶν ἡθῶν μελέτην Somewhat stronger than ἔπειρελα, for which cp. N. E. x. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 (c.f. 1180 b 23 δι' ἐπειρελεῖς βελτιωτέον πιοει). § 9 18 διὸ μέρη κτλ.] See c. 14 § 9, 1333 a 17, n. (904), and esp. n. (49) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (934) 30 τὸ μὲν ἄρτων ὄριον τὸ δὲ νόσον In English, as in German, it is not easy to find two terms, mutually related as ὄριον and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in general, is the meaning of ὄριον [Hamilton’s connotation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes sense-desire, or appetite, in particular. This explains why ὄριον alone denotes ‘the motive force of the irrational soul’ (as I should translate ἐξίς; characteristic possession, or attribute, is not strong enough), while within the soul ἐπιθυμία, passion—see nn.
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πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ (XIII)

§ 10 λόγον ἐχοντος. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτοι θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γεγονόμενος εὐθὺς υπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὃ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὃ νοῦς προϊόνθυσι πέρονεν ἐγγένεσθαι. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειτὰ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ένεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τῆς τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ (p. 121)
tοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

16 έπερ αὐτῷ ἀρχή τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρὰν δει ὅπως XIX
30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνεται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by ΠΠΠ ΠΒ. || 24 πέρονεν after ἐγγένεσθαι (ἐγγέγενε-

σθαι) ΠΠΠ ΠΒ. || 26 τὴν after ὃ omitted by ΠΠΠ ΠΒ. || 27 τοῦ δὲ τούτοι τοῦ

δὲ ΠΠ || 28 τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τρίτου Μβ (huius autem corum quae animae William) ||
30 τὰ σώματα after βέλτιστα ΠΠΠ ΠΒ. || γίνεται ΠΠΠ ΠΒ.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished ; and further, why in i. 5. 6 the term ὀρέξεις is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθη-

τικὸν μόρον ’the emotional part,’ see note (40). The same trichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in De Anima ii. 3. 1, 414 b 11, 111. 10, 3, 433a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with De Anima ii. 3. 1, 414 b 11, 111. 10, 3, 433a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with De Anima i. 9. 3, 433 b 4 ff. and Topica iv. 5. 6, 126 a 12 ff., if the statement τῶν ὑπολογισμῶν ὑπολογίσεως be rightly interpreted, is shown by Susennh Zeller, i. Zehal. cxix. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise De Motu Animal. c. 6 § 4, 700 b 23, αὖ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ὑπερασπισθαι, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ νόμον καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and Eud. Eth. ii. 7, 2, 1233 a 26 b, ὀρέξεις δὲ καὶ νόμον καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν πάντα ὑπερασπισθαι... ὅτε καὶ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρέξεως καὶ τὸ δια-

νοθητόν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from Eud. Eth. more particularly proves, as ὀρέξεις = impulse, whetherrightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see N. Eth. i. 9. ii. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and Anger (ὕπαι) at revenge. See Walter Die praktische Vernunft pp. 194—214. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from De Anima is that here ὑπερασπίζεται and βούλησις are again drawn closer to-

together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θῦμα καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (op. c. ii. 11. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to ὄρνη than to ἐπιθυμία. Susem. (936)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; next the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρῶτον οὖν... 27 ὀρέξεως] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, Laws ii. 652 E—653 C. Susem. (936)

Add Republic 410 b, 563 a, 591 c ff. c. 16 Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.


ζητέω] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1330 a 33, ἀλλὰ δέ τῶν ἀληθινῶν δημητρικῶν ὄρνη ὑπὲρ κτλ.
ἐπιμελητέων περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποιοὺς τιμών ὀντας (XIV) χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμήλην ὀμολογ.

§ 2 — δει γὰρ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν τακτὶν τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τοῦ τῶν ἐνν διαφωνοῦν καὶ δίαφανῶς εἰς δυνά-

μες τοῦ μὲν ἢ τὴν δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,

ή τούτης μὲν τοῦ ὁ ἄνδρος μὴ (ταύτη γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-

σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς) ἐπείτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν

§ 3 τῶν τέκνων διαδόχησιν, δεί γὰρ ὡστε λιγάν ὑπολείπεται τὰ

τάκτικα ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν

πρεσβυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν

1332 πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις) ὡστε λίγαν πάρεγγυ 

εἶναι (πολλάκις γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδοί ὑπέλα-

χεῖ τούς τοιούτους καὶ διαφοράς, καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀλοκληρίαν

§ 4 συγκελαστικόν τὸ πάρεγγυ) ἔτι δὲ, ὃθεν ἀρχίσατε δεῦρο

5 μετέχετεν ὡστὸ τὰ σόματα τῶν γενειμένων ὑπάρχει

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βοήθειον. συχέδω δὲ πάντα ταῦτα

§ 5 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐνεργίαν. ἦτι γὰρ ἀρμαται τόκος

τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἦτι τὸ πλεῖστον εἰνάν ἄνδρας μὲν ὁ

τῶν ἰδίομασταὶ ἐνῶν ἀρμόδιος ἰχθάτος, πειτόκοιται δὲ

10 γυναῖκιν, δει τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν

ηλικίαν.

32 πρὸς ἀλλήλους omitted by ΠΜ', hence [πρὸς ἀλλήλους] Susen. || 33 γὰρ

Susem., Κ' Γ' Π' Ar. Bk. Susen. || <πρ> ταύτην Vettori, perhaps rightly || 34

πρὸς P1 (corr.) || 37 γὰρ omitted by Sb Β' Αρ. || 39 τῶν omitted by P1-2 ||

λακ omitted by Π1 || τὰ τέκνα after 40 τοῖς ἡλικίαις Π2 P3 Βk.

1335 π2 γὰρ after της omitted by Π1 || 5 ὑπάρχει M4 P5 || 6 σχέδω...11 ταῦ-

tov transposed to follow a 27 ὡς <ἡ μακρύς > Susen. 2-5. See Intro. p. 89

32 ἑμιρρυγήν] 'Nuptial,' not 'con-

jugal'; cp. i. 3. 1, 1525 b 9 n. Or, as

Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wedding,

not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Eur. Bacchid

1277 ἐκεῖτο | Πλάτων ἐν τε καὶ πατρὸς

κοινωνία.| For the vb. kata-

baian. § 5. 1335 a 11, see Schw. Lex. Heroi.

It is used, like ἱκανοθεία (cp. 1332

b 41), for 'suit': properly 'to meet in.'

The compound with πρὸς = to come simulta-

neously to an end, so producing a con-

vergence or correspondence.

§ 3 Johnson Karselas c. 29 affords a parallel. "From these early marriages

proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents

and children: the son is eager to enjoy

the world before the father is willing to

forsake it, and there is hardly room at

once for two generations.... Those who

marry at an advanced age will probably

escape the encroachments of their chil-

dren; but, in diminution of this advan-

tage, they will be likely to leave them,

ignorant and helpless, to a guardian’s

mercy. From their children if they have

less to fear they have less also to hope.”

41 ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων] The

gratitude due from their children. Cp.

Plato Laws ι. 717 b, C.

1335 a 1 1 βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις] Plato

Laws 717 C εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν έκεῖνοι with

Stallbaum’s note: βοήθεια τῇ λόγῳ Παμφ.

138C, Alc. 1. 116 a, τοῖς φίλοις.

4 συγκελαστικόν τὸ πάρεγγυ] Near-

ness, i.e. equality in age, produces bick-

erings, misunderstandings (π. 5. 4).

35—2
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§ 8 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνει τούτους. ἐστὶ δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνμισθώμενοι πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἐν γὰρ πάσι ζῷοις ἰδίαμεν ὑπὸ τῶν νέων ἐγκονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὅτι ἀναγκάζων αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐθεντικῶν. τεκμηρίου δ' ἐν δειαμίας ἡγαρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχειροῖτο τὸ νέος συνεφημνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτέλειας καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἐτί δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις οἱ νεανίτες πανοῦργοι τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθέρουσιν πλείονι διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσαι τινὲς φασί διὸ τοιαῦται αὐτίκα 20 τοῖς Τροιζήνοις, ὁς πόλεως διαφθειρόμενως διὰ τὸ γαμικούς οικούς καὶ νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' ὁ τὸν τήν τῶν καρπῶν κομμὸν ἐπίδειν. ἐτί δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφρονῶν εὐφεσίας τῶν εἰκονομοσύνης ποιέσθαι προεξοφλουρίας ἀκολουθοῦσα γὰρ δοκοῦσι νεά προσθετεῖν τῷ συννοισιοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρέσκοντος 25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξησιν, ἐδώ τοῦτο


11 ἐστὶν Ἡσυχλέτος; in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by Ἡσυχλέτος || 13 θηλυτόκα ΠΘ Bk. || θηλυτόκα Κανεώτας (wrongly), θηλυτόκα Κανέωτας || 14 πάον τοῦτο ΠΘ Αγ. Βκ., δοκεῖ δὲ οὖν Ἡσυχλέτος || 15 ἐπιχειροῖτο ΠΘ Bk., π' (in the margin) and apparently Γ' τοῦ ΠΘ Αγ. Βκ., π' in the margin || σιλανδος after τε ΠΘ Bk., 23 εἶναι inserted after γὰρ by Ἡσυχλέτος; Susem., wrongly

§ 6 θηλυτόκα. This point is not mentioned in Ἡσυχλέτος, v. 12, 1 (V. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. Susem. (388)

§ 7 θηλυτόκα. This statement reappears in the spurious B. VII. of Hιστ. Α. c. 1 § 16, 883 a 10.

§ 19 τοῦ χρησμοῦ. A gloss cites the oracle in the form μὴ τέμεν τέσσερα ἄλλα, "till not the fresh furrow." Gotting prop. to alter τέμεν to τέσσερα, thinking there was a play upon τέσσερα which he took to be gen. of a supposed τέσσερα = novales, fallow land [for which τέσσερα, Attic τέσσερα, is the received form]. Susem. (393) Comp. Eur. Πραγμάτεια τέσσερα τέσσερα Αλκας, Soph. Oed. T. 1210 (Ridgeway); also Antic. ἂν ἑστήκας γὰρ ἐξίσεως εἰσίν γέγονα. 20 διαφθειρομένων Comp. Frag. Αλκηθένος λαμπροῦ καμάκρος of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1023 P., π. 501 ΠΘ Dind. παράπληκτον φόρον λέγεται αὐτὸμον τορτίχες, ἄλλα καὶ ἐπὶ καθορίσων ἁπάντων, ὅσα, ὡς εἰσὶν, ἄραμοι ἐκδηλοῦ τῷ ἄνδρα. § 8 24 Comp. Aristocles Tarent. Fr. 80, F. H. G. II. 278.
σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιοῦται τήν συνυποσάν καὶ γάρ τοῦτον (XIV) 
27 τῆς χρόνου ὁρισμένον, ὅποι νῦν ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνον ἄτι <ἡ μυ-
κρόν.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδον δὲ πάντα ταῦτα 7 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν 
<επιμελείαν.> § 5 ἐπεὶ γάρ ἀριστήτως τέλος 8 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
<πλείοντα εἴπειν ἀνδράς μὲν ὃς τῶν ἐξομήκομα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς 
<ἐξαχοι, πεντάκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξι, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς σύζυ-
<γίου κατὰ τήν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τοὺς χρόνον καταβαινείν τοῦτον.> 

§ 9 διὸ τῶν μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τήν τῶν ὑγιείας ἐτῶν 
ἡλικίαν συνεφυγήναι, τοὺς δὲ ἐπειτα καὶ τρικοντα, ἡ μικρῶν. 

30 ὑγιόντι γάρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζυγοις ἠσταί, 
καὶ πρὸς τὴν παθών τῆς τεκνοποίας συγκαταβηθήσεται 
§ 10 τοῖς χρόνον νεκροῖς· ἐτέ δὴ ἡ διάδοχη τῶν τέκνων τοῖς 
33 μὲν ἁρμόττειν εἰς ἐτῶν τὴς ακμῆς, ἐὰν γάρ ἦν κατά λό-

26 σώματος Γ' Αρ. and P² (corr.), Δ'λος σώματος P¹ (in the margin), σπέρματος 
the other authorities || 27 χρόνος αφ' ὁρισμένον P¹, P² Π' Β' κ. || πληθύνον Β', πλη 
M', multum William Ar. 
6 de Susem., δὴ Γ' Β' κ. Susem.¹ || ταῦτα before πᾶσα M', untranslated by William 
39 συνεφυγήναι P¹, συνέφυγε P* || ἐρ γ' ἐπειτα all other authorities: τέντα? 
Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. u. (940) || [ἡ μικρῶν] Sepulveda, transposed by Götting Susem.² to follow 27 ετε|| 30 τούτων] τοῦτων P² Αρ. and P² (corr.) in the margin || ἀκμάζουν M', ἀκμάζων P¹, P² S² V² || 31 
<συγ> καταβηθήσεται Susem.³ wrongly following William (convenient) || 32 τοῖς 
μὲν ἁρμόττειν Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. ii. p. 567 || 33 ἀρχήνγον Γ' apparently 
(inchoante akmes William) Β' κ. and P² (corr.), perhaps rightly || γένηται 
P² Π' Β'; γένεται P¹.

26 καὶ γάρ τοῦτον κτλ] Sc. τοῦ σώ-
ματος: bodily growth has fixed limits of 
time which it does not exceed (or only to 
a small extent). Comp. note on v (vii). 
1. 11, 1337 a 13. 
§ 9 28 διὸ τῶν μὲν κτλ] In Rep. v. 
460 E Plato fixes the period for procrea-
tion amongst his guardians from twenty 
forty in the woman, and from twenty-
five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case 
in the man. His regulations in the Laws 
are not consistent. The marriage of the 
sons is at one time enjoined when they 
are between thirty and fifty-five (iv. 721 Α', 
vi. 785 b), at another time when they 
are between twenty-five and thirty-five at 
latest (vi. 773 Β'). Similarly the daughters 
are to marry before the age of twenty, 
but while the earlier limit is once fixed 
at sixteen (vi. 785 b), it is elsewhere 
raised to eighteen (viii. 833 b).

In the spurious B. vii. of Aristotle's 
Historia Animal, cc. 5, 6 there are state-
ments about the limits of age for getting 
offspring in tolerable agreement with the 
present passage. The limit is said to be, 
as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in 
the woman, with occasional prolongation to 
seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon 
(Anon. 7 § 5, cp. 3 § 13) fixes the earlier 
limit in the wife's case at fifteen. Susem. 
(940) 

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgeway, 
Transactions 145 f., Dr Jackson ib. pp. 
116-118. 

* Vide quae disseruit in Herm. xix. 
p. 592 sqq.; ubi etiam expositi cur pror-
sus recte olim Spengellum v. 29 τέσπρο 
ἐπετὰ postulasse nunc censeam' Quaest. 
crit. coll. p. 414. The substance of the 
paper in Hermes is given in Exc. ii. p. 
566. Susem.
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γὰρ εἰδὸς ἢ γένεσις, τοῦτο δὲ ἢδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλε-(XIV) 35 κλας πρὸς τῶν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἄρισταν. περὶ μὲν τόν τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συζευξίν, εἰδήματι τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνους δὲ χρύσαθαι, οὐδέ οἱ πολλοὶ χρύσαντα καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ἀρίστωτες χειμώνας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνακόλουθοι ταύτην.

§ 11 δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἢδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τὰ τε 40 παρὰ τῶν ιατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν,

οἱ τέν ᾽ἄρα τούτοις καιροῖς τῶν σωμάτων λέγοντος ικανοῖς, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοὶ, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-

§ 12 τῶν ἐπαινοῦτες μᾶλλον. ποιῶν δὲ τινῶν τῶν σωμάτων ὑπορχόντων μάλιστ' <ἀν> ὁμολογεῖ εἰς τοῖς γενομένοις, ἐπιστή- 

σάσις μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτών ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τῆς παιδονομίας, 5 τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανοὶ <ἀχ> εἰπέν τοι καὶ νῦν. οὔτε ἣ ἥ τῶν ἀθητητῶν χρήσιμος ἢς πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐθείαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄρειν

34 γένεσις Reiz Susem.2 || [ἡς ἡμεραὶ] Spengel. || 37 δὲ χρύσαθαι omitted by IP² P3 Ar. Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || χρύσαθαι Μ² P1 || αὐτὰς II² P3 Ar. Bk. || ὅτι καὶ νῦν καὶ λεγόντα Schmidt. || [δὲ χρύσαθαι ὅτι] Madvig. || 38 ποιεῖσθαι after τῶν σωμάτων IP² P3 Bk. || συνομολογεῖ Zwingler Bk.3 || 39 δὲ II² P3 Ar., & P3 (1st hand), ὅλοι other authorities Bk. and P1 (later hand) || 41 λέγοντος after καί τοῦ IP² P3 Bk.

1335 b 3 μάλιστ' <ἀχ> Koraes Bk.3, μάλιστα δὲ Μ² (?), μάλιστα the other authorities and Bk. || 4 μᾶλλον...τοῖς omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || παιδονομία P1 (corrected by p1 in the margin) || 5 <ἀχ> Susem., possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτών || οὔτε ἄρα ἢ omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || 6 ἢς omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || οὔτε πρὸς εὐθείαν inserted after εὐθείαν by Μ² || οὐδὲ Koraes, οὔτε Π2 || ἐπὶ omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied

§ 10 34 καταλελυμένης] On the analogy of καταλελυμένης πνεύματος, εἰδήματος, βίωσιν, κατάλυμαν συγκομιῶν, σταυρίων, τρῆρων (a crew), δέμων, πολεμιῶν, where 'dissolution' are the main ideas, we must render 'in the decline of their powers, or vigour.' So fructa etate Vict., etate iam decrepita Lambin.

38 χρήσιμος] more exactly, in the month Camelion (January and February), which derived its name of wedling-month from the custom: Theophr. Hist. Plant. vii. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippocr. peri áphroios (111. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains 'that the spring is the most suitable time.' Susem. (942)

§ 11 41 καιροῦ [Favourable conditions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεια] That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offspring is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his Historia Animalium and De generatione Animalium: c. g. H. A. vi. 19 § 4. 574 a 1 καὶ Βορεῖοι μὲν ἐχομένων ἀρρητοτεκι ζώνων, γενομένων ὁμολογεῖ. Susem. (943) 3 ἐπιτηδεύσας] Intransitive, as if τῶν γενόμεν ἂν had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. Ant. 277.

§ 12 4 ἐν τούτω περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (982), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (965), § 12 n. (969), 12 § 5 n. (862); vii(v). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13, vii(vi). 8 § 23 n. (1483). Also inst. p. 49 n. (41), p. 53. Susem. (943)

5 Bonita Ind. Ar. 166 a 54 ff. is in doubt whether it might be mentally supplied from λεκτόν, or must be added. The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est, quod est τῆς ἔρωτος λεκτόν. Susem.

8 οὖν γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀθητητῶν κατ] Comp. Plato Resp. ill. 404 A (Eaton) and below viii. 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015). Susem. (944)

καὶ τεκνοποιοῖν, οὕτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοποιητικὴ λίαν, (XIV)
§ 13 ἄλλα ἡ μέση τοῦτον. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν (γ. τ. 126)
ἔσειν, πεπονημένην δὲ πῶνοι μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα
10 μοῦν, ὦστερ ἡ τῶν ἅλητων ἔσεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν
ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὅμοιος δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀν-
§ 14 ὁρᾶσι καὶ γνωστὶ. Χρή δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύκλους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν
σομάτων, μη βαθμομούσας μηδὲ ἀραιὰ τροφὴ κραμέ-
νας, τούτῳ δὲ ὀφείλεται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς εἰς
15 ἔπλεγμα τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποθεοποιοῖ
τῶν εἰληφότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ ἐπι
τῶν μέντοι διά-
νοιαν τοποῦντο τῶν σομάτων βαθμομοτέρως ἀρμόστει δια-
γείναι ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φανεῖται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς
§ 15 ὦστερ τὰ φύσει τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ
20 τροφῆς τῶν γεννώμενοι ἐστὶ νόμος μηδὲν πεπονημένῳ
τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἡ τάξις τῶν ἔθων
cολύει μηδὲν ἀποκλέεισθαι τῶν γεννώμενον ἀφίηται γὰρ

by p1) || ὃγειαν Μ* P3-4 || 7 ἑπιστοιχόντως Μ* and apparently P4 (1st hand, corrected by p1), curis indicibus William || κακοποιητική Μ* and P4 (1st hand, corrected by p1), malo habere William || 8 ἔρεις omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || 9 ἔνα * = Susem.1, ἔν as a gloss by corr.5 in the margin of P2 and Schneider Bk.2; but πόνον should be understood || 11 ἕλε-
θερον Π P3, ἔλευθερον the other authorities Bk. Susem.1,2, || ταῦτα Π P3 Ar. Bk. || καὶ omitted by Π P3 Bk. || 12 ἔγγοις Π3 Ald. || 16 ταῖς εἰληφόται Γ Ar. Susem.1,4, perhaps rightly || 18 ἀπολαύοντα Μ*, ἀπολαύοντα Γ and perhaps Ar. || 
γενέσεωι Π Bk.1 || 19 καὶ added before τὰ by Π Bk.2. || 20 γεννώμενοι P1, γεννώ-
μοιν Π3, γεννώμοιν Μ* Bk.3, γεγονόμοιν Π Bk.1. || 21 ἔλοι added after τέκνων by Π P3 Ar. Bk. and P4 (margin), ἐὰν μὴ ? Scaliger. Schömann Gr. All. 11. p. 517 ὁ. (1) restores the passage thus: τέκνων (ἢ ἡ τάξις τῶν ἔθων κολύει μηδὲν ἀποκλέεισθαι τῶν γεγονόμενων) ὀφίμαθι γε δεῖ || ἔθων Π P4-4 B L C' Ar. || 22 κολύει P4-4 B L V B Ar. Ald. Bk. and P4 (corr.), κολύει apparently P3 (1st hand), perhaps rightly, κολύει Susem., καὶ ἧ (with preceding ἐδώ) Schlosser || γεγονόμενοι Kornes (who does not reject γεγονόμενοι), γεγονόμενων Scaliger, γεγονόμενοι Μ* Bk.2 Susem.3 in the text, γεγονόμενοι Π3 Bk.1. || ὀφίμαθα Γ Ar. P1 (margin) and P2 (corr.), ὀφίμαθα M3, ὀφίμαθα P1 (1st hand), ὀφίμαθαι P4-4 B Bk. P1 (corr. in the margin) and P2 (1st hand, emended by corr.), ὀφίμαθα Spengel || γὰρ] γοῦν Kornes, γε Schömann

§ 13 io "If any word is needed, read πόνον, but ἔνα refers to πόνοι with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly ν.iiiiii (viii). 4. 5, 1338 b 15" (Ridgeway). Comp. however Quant. crit. coll. p. 415.

§ 14 προστάται καθ’ ἱμάραν τινά...16 τιμήν Plato, too, Laws vii 789 e, prescribes in spite of ridicule, αὐτ. γελοεῖν φρίζομεν, that when eneince the wife should take walks assiduously (Eaton). SUSEM. (940)

15 ἀποθεοποιῶν] The force of the prefix is similar in ἀφοσιωθῆναι, to discharge one's conscience. Here, "to discharge her service."

18 ἀπολαύοντα] Prof. Ridgeway takes this to mean that the foetus is a drain on the woman's strength, just as plants draw the good out of the ground: τῆς ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσης.

§ 15 22 ὀφίμαθα... 23 πλῆθος] How this is to be brought about was stated 11.
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de τής τεκνοποιίας τό πλήθος, έδών δέ τις γίνεται παρά (XIV) ταῦτα συνδυασμένων, πρώτα αισθήματα ἡγεμόνει καὶ ζωῆς,

δέ ρεποιευταί δει τής ἀμβλωσίης τό γαρ ὅσιον καὶ τό μη

§ 16 διώρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τό ζήν ἔσται. ἐπει δὲ ἦ μὲν 11 ἀρχή τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρί καὶ γυναικεί διώρισται, πότε ἀρχεύσαι δει τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρμότει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὀρίσθω, τα γαρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων 30 ἔγχυσαν, καθάτερ τα τῶν νεανίστρων, αὐτεῖ ἔγνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίασι, τα δέ τῶν γνησίωτά ἀσθενή.

23 δει ΠP Ar. and P1 (1st hand), δή P3<4>IP Bk. and P1 (corr. in the margin) P3 (a later hand); so Spengel | 24 συνδυασμένοι Spengel Susem.1-3 from a misuse of William’s translation aligubus...combinatis, <τῶν> συνδυασμένων ? Korace | 25 ρθο omitted by ΠP | 28 δει χρή ΠP Bk. | 30 τίς M1 and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.2) | 30 καὶ inserted after καθάτερ by Γ, if sint et iuniorum (William) is an accurate translation | τα omitted by M1, possibly by Γ | τῶν omitted by P1 | 31 γνησίωτάς M2 and P1 (1st hand, corrected in the margin with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12: see nn. (209, 211), also II. 7 § 5 n. (236). Plato, too, Rep. v 460 b, 461 c, orders exposure in the case of weakly or deformed Infants of the guardian class (as was remarked n. 140), and in the case of conception occurring where the law or the magistrates’ orders have been infringed, abortion, or (presumably if this has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he goes further than this by condemning the offspring of inferior guardians: τα δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἕν τῶν ἄνθρωπον ἀνά

dywos γίγνεται, ἐν ἀπαρακίτη τε καὶ αδίκῳ καταχώρεσθαι, 460 c. But even in the Timaeus 19 A his words convey the impression that he had not given any instructions for exposing the children of less qualified parents, but meant simply a secret transferece of them to the third class of the population. Under the guise, that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies his former regulation in this sense (see Zeller Griech. Phil. ed. 4 II. i. 909 n. 2, ed. 3 pp. 771 n. 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 n. 55, Susemihl Plat. Phil. II. p. 171). In the Laws (see nn. 192, 208) he drops the preventive means of abortion altogether, nor does he say anything about exposing illegitimate and deformed infants. Thus in the course of his own lifetime Plato gradually attained to a more humane view. In this respect Aristotle’s ideal state goes far beyond that of the Laws in the stringency and callousness, or rather, to give it its true name, the

abominable cruelty of its regulations. As to exposure, the example of Sparta has again had a determining influence on both thinkers. In all other Greek states it was left to the father’s decision whether he would expose his child or not: but at Sparta a committee of the eldest members of the Phyle decided, and in accordance with their decision the deformed or weakly infant had to be despatched to the place of exposure (Ἀπόθεα) on Taygetos. See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 266). Comp. also Introd. p. 52 f. SUSEM. (986)

Note that ἀργοθεία...πλῆθος is a virtual repetition of II. 6, 12, 1265 b 6 ff, just as c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17, in both cases without the conventional Δ τοῦτοι πόρεις (Newman).

23—25 Here the indignation of some honest reader found vent in the remarkable gloss on the margin of P3, τί λέγει ὁ δαμόσεως τούτωσι; Doubtless the same hand which scribbled φιλαρκή, φιλαρκή, against 1266 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether from this “thin end of the wedge” came the gradual depopulation of Greece, which Polybius (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another matter. Cp. Thirlwall Hist. viii. 463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.3 p. 28 ff shows that ἀγωρονεύς is the true Attic form. The usurping ἀγωρωνεύς does not appear before the third century B.C. When this ε was pronounced as ε, λι-
§ 17 διό κατά τήν τής διανοίας ακμήν, αὕτη δὲ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς (XIV) πλείστους ἦνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινας εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετρούντες ταῖς ἐρθομαίας τῆς ἡλικίας, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τοῦ πεν- τευκόντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέταρταν ἢ τέταρτον ὑπερβάλλοντα ἢ τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτην ἀφέσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννῆσαι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν υγείας χάριν ἢ τιμὸς ἄλλης τοιαύτης
§ 18 τῆς αὐτῆς φαινεῖσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένου τῆς ὀμιλίας. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλου, ἀστώ μὲν ἄπλως μὴ καλὸν 40 ὑπότομον φαινεῖσθαι μηδαμώς μηδεμώς, ὅταν γὰρ καὶ προσ- αγορευθήναι τόσα· περὶ δὲ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῆς τεκνοποίησις

339 a δάν τις φαινεῖται τοιούτων τι δρών, ἀτίμως ζημιούσθω προ- τούσα πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

17 γενομένου δὲ τῶν τέκνων ὁλεθρᾶς <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἶναι διὰ-XV

foro πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὡσποὶ 5 τοῦ ἄν γυν. φαινέται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκό- ποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τῶν έδών οἷς ἐπιμελῆς ἑστὶν εἰσάγειν την

35 ὧν ΠΓ, but δοθεὶς Πδ (corr.) 36 τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης omitted and a lacuna left by Πγ (1st hand, supplied by Πδ) 37 υγείας Μ, υγείας χάριν omitted and a lacuna left by Πγ (1st hand, supplied by Πδ) 38 τῆς omitted and a lacuna left by Πγ (1st hand, supplied by Πδ) 39 καὶ] ΠΓ Πδ Βκ., perhaps rightly

1336 a 3 <δεῖ> Sussem. Should it come before διαφανῆ; 5 δὲ ΣΓ ΠΣκ, τῇ Μ, τῇ ΠΠ2 6 εἰσάγειν ΓΓ, ἄγειν Μ, Π, δεὶ ΠΠ, ἄγεις Κόρης, ἄγεις οὐ Σουσεμ.

τοῦκος was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινας] Solon Frag. 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 18 (cp. ι. 971), and similarly in Hild. Animal. V. 12 § 2 (V. 14 § 3, 564 b 25 ff.), 17 § 16 (V. 20 § 3, 565 a 2 ff.), VI. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 ff.); comp. VII. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., VII. 13 (VII. 12 § 2, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the Scholia to Aristoph. Birds 494). Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo πρὸς κοσμικοῦ σε. p. 71 Pleis and Censorin. De die natali 14 (J. G. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in Rhet. II. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 f. the forty-second year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. Sussem. (947)

36 τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως] This means that if any license is taken, there must be recourse to abortion, so that no child is born. The key is furnished by Rep. V. 461 c, μὴ εἰς φαύς ἀγάλης κύψεις μηδὲν, 'to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light' (J. G. Schneider). Comp. ι. (946) and Introd. p. 63. Sussem. (948)


c. 17 Treatment and food of children during infancy.

§ 1 1336 a 3 ἄλφαθα... 5 ἔνθη] "Our next care must be for the proper quality of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are bound to believe, for the thriving of the body." Comp. Plato Rep. III. 404 b ff., Xenophon De Rep. Lect. 2 § 5 (Eaton). Sussem. (949)
§ 2 οὐκεία τοῖς σώμασι, ουσιότερα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ κενήσεις ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλεκουσῶν συμφέρει πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δὴ ἀπαλότητα χρῆσαι καὶ νῦν ἔνα τῶν ἑθῶν ὀργανῶν τιαὶ μηχανικοῖς, ἂ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραφές, συμφέρει δὲ εὔθυς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχή συνεδρίες ἐκ μικρῶν 14 παιδῶν τούτω γάρ καὶ πρὸς ψυχίες καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
§ 3 πράξεως εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθους τῶν μὲν εἰς πολλαμοί ἀποβάπτεσυν τὰ γενόμενα [ψυχροὶ], τούτω δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρόν αμπιξάνει, οὐν Κελτῶν. πάντα γὰρ δια δυνατῶν ἐθέλειν, εὔθυς ἄρχος μέγων βέλτιων μὲν ἐθέλειεν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δὲ ἐθέλειεν. 20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἥ τῶν παιδῶν εἶναι διὰ θερμοτήτων πρὸς τὴν τῶν


§ 2 9 κινήσεις…τηλεκουσῶν. “All the exercise possible at that early age.” So also Plato Latoz vii. 789 b 2 ff. Susen. (951)
§ 10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι. This passage, says St Hilaire, is the first germ of orthopedy. Camerarius understood it of cradles and swaddling clothes (cp. Plato l.c.): Vettori of irons to straighten the crooked knees of children, serpentera as Varro calls them L. L. ix. 5. 11. Susen. (952)
§ 3 15 διὰ…18 Κελτῶν. The same thing is said in an epigram first published by Brunck Amst. Det. poet. iii. p. 150 xxxii, θαραλέως Κελτῶν ποταμῷ ἤρλημοι Ἱθήνη | τέκνα ταλαντέον, καὶ οὐ πάρων εἰσιν τοιχησὶ πρὸν πάντων ἄθροισιν λελοκομῶν ὑπάτη σεμερίν., ἵσθαι γὰρ γεγονότα φεροῦσιν, πρὸν γού εσπιράρης | κεράμων λειτουργίας Μελεξίγμων ποταμοῦ: and by Nonnos Dionysi. xxiii. 95, xxxvi. 5 (Göttingen). Further compare Strabo iii. 165, Galen περὶ στηριγμῶν 1. τ. vi. p. 51 Kuhn, and Kapp Aristotle. Staatsphilos. p. 123 (Eaton). Galen however calls the people, of whom this is told, not Kelta but Germania. See on this point ii. 9 § 7 with Note c, p. 334 and iv(vii). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further Verg. Aen. ix. 603 f. There is a similar habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridgeway). Susen. (955) § 8 20 διὰ θερμοτήτων. Aristotle thus assumes that the vital heat, which by its gradual but serious decline causes old age, and by its extinction death, gradually becomes weaker and weaker from the moment of birth, so that it is most largely found in the embryo and the new-born infant, and in animals generally so long as they are growing, because growth is
ψυχρών ἀσκησιῶν. § 34 <τὰς δὲ διαπάνεις 35 τῶν παιδῶν κατὰ τοὺς (XV) <κλαυθμοὺς σοῦ ὅρθως ἀπαγορεύουσιν 36 οἱ καλλύντες ἐν τοῖς <νόμοις> συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν. 37 γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον <τὴν γνώμην τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ γὰρ 38 τοῦ πνεύματος κάθετι <ποιεῖ τὴν ἵσχυν τῶν ποιοῦσιν, δὲ 39 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παι-<δίοις διατεινομένοις.> § 4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεί-<ν ότι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτην παραπλη-<σίαν τὴν δὲ ἐξομήνυσεν ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν, ἥν ὤν τι πρὸς μάθησιν καλὸς ἦν προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν 25 ὤν τὸ πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὲ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποδίζωσι, δεῖ [δὲ] τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ἀποκαθαφράγμας τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, ἵνα χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δὲ<§ 5> ἀλλ' ἄρχειν πράξεων καὶ διὰ τὴν παιδίας, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρωσιν μήτε ἐπιτόνων μήτε ἀνελευθέρωσιν. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούεις δὲ τοὺς τηλικοῦς, ἐπιμέλεις ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἀρχουσιν οἷς καλουσί (p. 128) παιδικομόνοις. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδευθεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον διατηρήσας. διὸ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-<§ 6> λὰς μημύησες τῶν ὑστερον στουδασμόμενοι. τὰς δὲ διατή-§ 34—39 34 τὰς δὲ διαπάνεις...39 διαπάνεις τραυματισμών transposed by Susem. to follow 21 ἀσθενών, see Intro. p. 89 || 35 κατὰ Γ', καὶ ΠΙ' Αρ. Βκ. || τοῦς omitted by Π'I Π' Βκ. || 38 ποιοῦσιν | περιβολαί | Ridgeway
21 πρῶτων ἡλικίας. ?Sengel, Schmidt would transpose 23 ἡλικίας to this place; but it can just as well be understood || 22 τὴν ταύτην τοῦ τηλικοῦ τῆς ἁρμόδια Vb and P4 (corr.), ταύτη P4d L1 and P4 (1st hand) || 23 ἐξομήνυσε P4 Sb Vb and P4 (corr.) || 24 τὸν ἔργαν William || 26 δὲ omitted by Π'I Π' Βκ., but it should perhaps be retained || 29 ἄραν inserted before ἀνελευθέρωσιν by P4 || 31 τοῦς omitted by Π'I Π' Vb and perhaps by Sb || 32 δὲ καὶ καὶ | Susem. || 34 στουδασμένων Koraz, conditioned by vital heat. Comp. Probl. III. 71. XI. 14, De Inventione etc. cc. 3. 4 (Eaton). Susem. (954)
§ 6 36 οἱ καλλυνότες in τοῖς νόμοις | Plato Laos VII. 791 E ff. (Camerarius). Susem. (958)
38 Dr. Jackson defends τοῦ ποιοῦν by an appeal to Darwin On the Expression of the Emotions pp. 148, 236, 284.
§ 8 23 μέχρι τέλους τοῦ | Plato however in the Laos VII. 792 E ff. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, §§ 7—15. Susem. (986)
28 καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδίας | Plato ι. c. proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-}

garten under the inspection of the nurses (αἱ τραφεῖς) who for the most part leave the children to invent their own games (παιδικά αὐτοφωρία), but prevent them from growing too angry over them, the nurses themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. Susem. (907) || § 8 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων | Comp. n. (1970), and §§ 7—12 in regard to the παιδικά: above c. 16 § 12 ιιμ. (943), c. 13 § 5 ν. (862) with notes (952, 953, 956), and Intro. p. 52 ff., also VI. 15 § 9 ν. (1355), § 13, VII. 11. § 22 ιι. (1483). Susem. (958)
33 διὰ τὰς παιδίας... 34 στουδασμένων | Comp. Plato Laos I. 643 Β ff. Susem. (989)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 17.  [IV(VII). 17. 6

35 στις τῶν παιδιῶν κατὰ τοὺς κλαυθῆσθαι οὐκ Ἰρώθης ἀπαγορευόν-  

σιν ὑπὸ καλὸντος ἐν τοῖς νόμοις" συμφέρονσι γὰρ πρὸς ἀδίκη-

σιν" γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τίνα γνωμασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἣ γὰρ

tοῦ πνεύματος κάθες ποιεῖ τὴν λογίαν τοῖς ποιούσιν, δὲ
§ 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίσκοις διατειμονέως. ἐπισκεπτοῦν δὴ
40 τοῖς παιδευόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ

ὅπως ὅτι ἴκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἐσται. ταυτίνη γὰρ τὴν ἴλλην

1336 b κιαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτά ὠτών, ἀναγκαίου όκειν τὴν τρο-

φήνην ἔχειν. εὐθύνον  όν  ἀπολαίειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκοιμηθέτων τοῖς
§ 8 καὶ τῶν ὀραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλευκώμοις δύναται. ὡςος

μὲν οὖν ἀισχορραγίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὕσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεδο-  

5 τῶν νομοθέτης ἐξορίζεται (ἐκ τοῦ ἀρ. ἐνεργὴς λέγειν ὁτί οἰκὶ

τῶν ἀσχορτῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖσθαι συνεχῆς), μάλιστα

μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μετέ ἔλεγος μήτε ἀκώνισε μή-

§ 9 δὲν τοιοῦτόν. ἐὰν δὲ τις φανερῇ τις λέγει ἢ πράττῃν ἀπογραμμένος,

τὸν μὲν ἐλευθερὸν μητῷ δὲ κατακλίσεωσ

στοιδασμοῖς οί στοιδασμοῖς Γ τοίχων (στοιδασμοί) ποιεῖ στοιδασμοὺς Π, στοιδασμοῦς Ν, στοιδασμοῦς Μ πικ Π πυκ Βκ, στοιδασμός πυκ

39 δὴ Σους., δὲ ΓΠΒκ. Σους., in the text

1336 b <απολαίειν> μέχρι τοίχων Σους., but see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπο-

λαίειν Γ (ὑποθετέων William) Σους., ἀπολαίειν ΠΠΒκ. || 3 ἀνελευθερίως τῶν

ἀνελευθερίων Π Λ Αρ. Αλ. Βκ. and Π (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθερίων Π (corr.) || 4 ἀπο-

λαίειν] ἀπολάλειθαι Λαμβίκ Βκ. wrongly || τι αἰτία ἄλλου (so avoiding hiatus) ΠΠΒκ. ||

7 μὲν οὖν δὴ Σους., approved by Schmidt || 8 Μ δὴ Σους., μὴν οὖν Schmidt

(with colon after 11 χρόνο) 9 ἀπογραμμένος] τῶν ἀπογραμμένος ΠΠΒκ. Αρ. Βκ. ||

ἐλευθέρων <μὴ> τις Κορας

§ 41 δὴ ἵκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται] Comp. § 9 n. (652). Here then Aristotle  

refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take  

part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and  

briefer mentioned in n. (657). His refusal is  

on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year is reached, while he follows the Spartans in  

postponing it to the seventh year: see  


1336 b 2 εὐθύνον οὖν ἀπολαίειν καὶ τοῖς

This and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to  

many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen Poetica Π p.  

190 f., Busse Ῥο. e. p. 28, Sussemlih Quart.  

krit. coll. p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαῖειν, which William of Moerbeke mis-

took, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1335 b 31, for ἀπολαῖειν (in pronunciation y = l, v = v), is correct and means to  

drive influence of any kind, good or bad: Busse cites δόδοικα μὴ ἄπολαίθαι τι  

φλάδρων Ισορ. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὀσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the  

utmost vigilance. A variation upon the  

more usual ἐπείρα τι ἄλλο which recurs  

viii(v). 8. 2, 1327 b 31 in the same order, ὀσπερ ἄλλο τι, which Π gives here.  

7 ἄκοώταν] Plat. De recta ratione aut-  
dieniâ c. 2, 38 b, δι καὶ Συνεκρητήρι τοῖς  

ταῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλης ἐκείνης ἐκείνης πιγ-

ατέντες διαφοράς ὕστερον μὲν τὰ ἑκατέ-

τοις πληγαὶ, τοῦτἀν δὲ τοῖς λέγοντό τη ἣδη  

διαστρεβομένως.
Dikaiopolis sings a burlesque of one, as he himself says (561). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus xiv. 611 d—612 d, on the authority of Sosibios and Semos. Both writers mentioned certain reciters, called αὐτοκειμενοὶ, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (βιοιματα) from the stage crowned with ivy according to Semos, and were at a later date called ζυγιομα, like their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic lampoons in current use at the merry festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Dionysos and Demeter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Paros and her colony Thasos, where Archilochos settled. Comp. Homer Hymn to Demeter 496, Paus. X. 28. 11, Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v. Κάβαριος; Wolcker Kl. Schrifl. 1. p. 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular poetry that he fashioned his own artistic iambic poetry. Aristotle himself mentions directly afterwards (§ 11) the recital of such artistic compositions (ταμηματα), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in contests between rhapsodes. For it would appear from the pseudo-Platonic Ion 531 A that a contemporary rhapsode might include Archilochos in his repertoire; in any case his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the present passage: whether also his elegies, is doubtful. About that time also the burlesque epos and its recitation by rhapsodes were brought into vogue by Hegemon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of this kind. Susen. (966)
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 17. [IV(VII). 17. 10

σιν ο ο'μος τον την ηλικίαν ἔχοντας έτη την ἴκνουμένην καὶ (XV) 19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλβεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.

§ 11 τοὺς δὲ γεωτέρους οὖν Ιάμβων οὖτε καμιχνίας θεατάς θετέον, 9 πρὶν ἡ τῆν ηλικίαν λάβοντες έν εὖ κατακλάσεως ὑπάρχει (p. 129) ξει κοινωνείς ηδί καὶ μήτης καὶ τῆς απὸ τῶν τοιούτων γυναικόν βλάψεις ὑπαθείς ή παιδεία ποιεῖ ταῦτα.

§ 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδόμη τοῖσ' πατρόμη οὖν τόν λόγον. 25 ὑστερον δὲ ἐπιστήμων άδικα διώρισε μάλλον, έτει μὲν δεὶ πρῶτον εύτε έτοι διαπορήσαςται, καὶ πῶς δεὶ κατὰ δεὶ τὸν

§ 13 παρόντα καὶ οὖν έμνησθομεν ἢς ἀναγκασθοι. ἰσος γάρ οὐ 10 κακῶς έλεγε το τοιούτον Ἐθνωδός ο τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑπο-

18 τούτω... λεγομένων Μπ. δ. γραμματεύοντας Πε. Βκ. (Πελών P over an erasure), ές λαμίνης τετράγωνος Βας.3 in the margin, omitted by ΠΒ. Bas.1-3 and the text of Bas.3 || έτει ίδες ὑπεσ. Susem., ές λαμίν. Αγρ. ές ήτη Welldon || 19 αὐτῶν P. αὐτῶν GΜ. Πβ. || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by Πβ. (supplied by corr.1 in the margin of Pβ.), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.1 || τιμαλβῶν Μπ. δ. [τοὺς θεοὺς] ὑπενεργάντων Susem. || 20 άριστων βιοτήτων Μβ., τούτων Πε. Βκ., έδειξεν έαυτόν Jackson, probably right, || 23 ἀνάθετος Μβ. and apparently Πβ. (1st hand) || πῶς suspected by Jackson, τῶς ὑπενεργάντων Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν... 27 ἀναγκασθοι transposed by Susem. to follow 35 άνεμισθομεν || 27 [分化 ... 37 αὑτῶν] Böcker || 28 κακῶς Κλαντ Μβ. || έλεγε suspected by Camerarius, ἐγών ή δηλοθεί ? Schmidt\n
18 έτει] The word cannot have arisen from έτη, nor is it likely to have crept into the text. However dissimilar, this must apparently be added to the passages in which έτε means ίδες. Susem.

§ 1120 οὖν έμνησθομεν See n. (984) and n. (988) II(VII). 7, 8, 6. Susem. (985) 21 κατακλάσεως άδικα κτλ.] The term μήτης which recurs V(VIII). 5, 3, n. (1019) denotes the advanced stage of the banquet, at which men's spirits were more elevated and they began to drink wine undiluted (κατακλάσεως): cp. Plato Laxus II. 271 E, Ath. II. 40 a (J. G. Schnelder). Comp. also V(VIII). 5, 8, n. (1026), 7, 13 3. n. (1067), also n. (113). But, as was remarked in Introd. p. 55, καταλέπα, or admission into συντρήμα, in all probability commenced with initiation into military service from the seventeenth year onwards: see V(VIII). 4, 8, 9 Exc. I. 1-2. Εκκ. V(VIII): but when recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed for them (Exc. to B. V(VIII)) they certainly have syssitia of their own, and only when their education has been completed, from their twenty-first year onwards, are they admitted to the syssitia proper, at first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. Susem. (986) 22 καὶ τῆς έπι τῶν τοιούτων κτλ.] Plato on the contrary even in the Laxus VII. 816 D, E, 135 E wholly banishes comedy and T abolos, and only permits comic dances by foreigners or slaves. Susem. (967) § 12 25 ὑστερον δέ ποιεῖται έκπληκτος Another point the discussion of which is missing: see Introd. p. 49 n. (4), p. 53 n. (1). Susem. (969) § 13 28 Ἐθνωδός It is beyond all doubt that Theodore is here treated as one deceived; but I fail to see that he is spoken of Khet II. 3 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff. as if he were still living and on the stage, as Zeller II. 2. p. 131 n. (1) maintains. From the latter passage it is very clear that he was the leading tragic actor of recent times. Aelian, F. H. xiv. 40, relates a story of the powerful impression which his acting made on the tyrant Alexander of Thessal. Phistarch mentions him along with Polos as a famous protagonist actor in leading parts in De regim. 21, 816 F, and with Nikostratos, Kallipides, Myemmikos, Polos in De Gloria
κριτής ούτέν γὰρ πώστε παρήκεν ἑαυτοῦ προσωπέγειν, οὐδὲ (XV) 30 τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριστῶν, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς πρώταις ἁκοῖς συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτα τούτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν αὐθάρακτον ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων.

§ 14 πάντα γὰρ στήριγμον τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεὶ τοῖς νεοῖς πάντα ποιεῖν ἑξα τὰ φαύλα, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν 35 ἔχει ἡ μοιχήρας ἡ δυσμένεια.

§ 12 b 24 «κῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραθυροῖ τούτων πεποιθέμεθα τῶν λόγων» <35 ὠστερὸν δ' ἐπιστήμανας δεὶ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἶτε μὴ δεί <36 πρῶτον εἶτε δὲ διαπορῆσαι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν <37 παρώνα καίρων ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.> 35 διελθόντων δὲ τῶν 36 πεντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπὶ. δεὶ Θεορόν ἡγημόνεια 37 τῶν μαθησέων ἡ δεισεί μανθάνειν αὐτῶν.

§ 15 δύο δ' εἶπον ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἄναγκαιον διερήσασθαι τὴν παί 39 δεῖαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ μέχρις ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσώποις P₄⁺⁺ L'Ald, Wb and probably P₅ (1st hand) || <οὔδεν>, οὖδὲ
Bothe (on Terent. p. 619) || 30 σείας P₃ Ar. Bk. and (with γυ. prefixed) corr.¹ of P₁ in the margin || 34 ὀποίων after αὐτῶν P₁⁺⁺ P₃² Bk. || 35 δυσμένειαν II Bk. Susem.¹,³ in the text, in hacationem William, improbiatem Ar., dυσμένεια Schmidt, Susem.², dυσμένεια Koraes.

1386 b 24—27 24 τούτων P₁ and (transposing it before ἐν παραθυρῷ) P₄ Ald., τούτων Γ M* Ar. and (transposing it before ἐν παραθυρῷ) all other authorities Bk. || 25 διώρισαι P₄⁺⁺ L'Ald, Wb || 26 πρῶτον P₁ πρῶτον Koraes, needlessly 36 ἡβης omitted by P₁ wrongly, [ἡβης] Susem.¹ Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 || 38 τὸν omitted by M* and P₁ (1st hand, supplied by corr.² in P₁), [τὸν] Susem.¹ || 39 μέχρι P₃ Bk. Susem.¹

Athen. vi. 835 f (cp. also De Audendiis Poetis 18 c). Demosthenes De Falsa Leg. § 246 L. p. 418, 4. mentions him along with another great protagonist of the time, Aristodemos, with the remark that both shone in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but did not appear in the Phoenix of Euripides; that Aeschines acted under them as tritagonist and had represented Creon in the Antigone. In his private life Theodorus appears to have been very wild, to judge by the nickname given him no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych. s. v. πελεφόδες or πελεφοδῆς). An idea of his habits may also be gathered from Hesych. s. v. θεόδοτον ἔλεγον οἱ κωμικοὶ τῶν πρωτοστ. ἀπὰ θεόδοτον τῶν οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῷ ὁρᾷ χρησμόν. See also Hesych. s. v. Αριστόδοτον οἱ κωμικοὶ τῶν πρωτοστ. καὶ θεόδοτον καὶ Τριγυτάκιστον ἔλεγον. Diog. Laert. ii. 104 calls him a tragic poet; but this must rest either on a false reading or an error—more probably the latter, as Aelian also calls him ὁ τῶν τραγῳδείας ποιητής. Comp. also Athen. X. 482 D and Meinecke Fragmenta Comm. Crit. i. p. 533 f. Susem. (968)

26 30 μετὰ τὴν ἡβῆς... ἐν τῶν

The first period is to be wholly taken up with gymnastic, three years of the second with the remaining subjects of youthful training, the following years again with severer bodily exercises; see V (viii), 3 § 13, n. (1003), 4 § 9 n. (1015) Exc. Here Aristotle only partially follows Plato [see nn. (1015, 1016)]. In the Rerpubh the latter divides the educational course into three parts. The first begins with gymnastic, preceded by the narration of myths, legends and tales, much as Aristotle also prescribes (see § 20, n. 958); gymnastic is followed by music and poetry together with reading, writing and arithmetic, and certain elements of
mathematics generally; this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in n. (189) on II. 5 § 35. See Rep. II. 376 E, III. 403 C, VII. 534 C—535 A, 536—537 D, 539 D ff. In the Laws (see VII. 794 C—795 D, 805 E—813 C, 817 C—822 D, cp. 813 C ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. n. 946); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; finally, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in n. (193) on II. 6. 5 that even in the Laws the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the Republic by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. Susem. (970)

Eaton compares Phys. II. 8 § 8, 199 a 12 f. ἄνω τῆς τέχνης τά μάθητε λέγουσιν τά ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπομοιαί, τά δὲ μετέχουσιν: “and in general it is art which either brings to completion what nature is unable to effect or else imitates nature”: on which passage see Doring op. c. p. 81 ff. Further comp. Nic. Eth. I. 6. 15 (i.e. I. c. 4 Bk., to 1067 a 5) where we are told of all arts and sciences that each seeks to meet a definite want, to ἐνδείκνυται ἐνσίτην. Susem. (972)

“The context here, in its reference to education, limits the scope of τέχνη to useful art. Useful art supplements nature and at the same time follows her guidance. He who would be a master in any art must first discern the true end by a study of nature’s principles, and then employ the method which she suggests for the attainment of that end.” (S. H. Butcher, Some Aspects, p. 241). He adds: “in the passage from the Physics also it is probable that the distinction is not, as would at first sight seem, between useful and fine art, but between the aspects of useful art. The sentence is not quite logical in form, but the meaning is that useful art on the one hand satisfies those needs of man for which nature has not fully provided, on the other hand its processes are those of nature.”
EXCURSUS I.

O'I 'ΕΞΟΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.

Note on IV(vii). 1. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (οἱ καὶ φιλοσοφικὰ λόγοι, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see n. 584). But whether they are (1) discussions by others, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's dialogues and popular works, or to (3) dialectical discussions, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems, in his scientific writings, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in Physics IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) oral controversies and expressions of opinion are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, n. (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see n. 689) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and goods which follows has furthermore been laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions and does not require to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. n. (688).

H. 36
has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, Dialoge des Arist. p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze II. (Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susseimh. Philol. Anzeiger v. 1873. p. 673 ff.). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel that for a question discussed in the Ethics Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the Ethics the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, “What is the best life, or human happiness?” and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the Politics Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II. 1. 5, II. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI. (IV). 9 § 2, cp. IV (VII). 12 §§ 3, 4: see nn. 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the Ethics. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether non-existent, as is actually the case.

1 For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller op. cit. II p. 119 n. (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says — “as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods, and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (ἐξουσιωμένοι λόγοι) goes no farther: for the ordinary view regards mental goods, i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing.”

And more recently Dids: see below.

2 See Krohn op. cit. p. 37.
Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. n. (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. n. 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as “according to our previous inquiry,” and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the Ethics. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see nn. (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. n. 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the Ethics—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see nn. 876, 879, 881), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it¹, and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the Introd. pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer’s notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also n. (711). SUSEM. (887)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression Aristotle I. pp. 63—75, not content to understand by it ‘discourses outside the subject,’ thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to Phys. iv. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, Études p. 213, he can cite Alexander in Topica dialekton de pro óx dòxan, ós en tautê tê pragmatēia (the Topica) kai en tois phrōmorikoiç, kai en tois ἐξωτερικοῖς, 260 a 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἐξωτερικὰ—τὰ κωνά καὶ δὲ ἐνδόξων περαιτέρων.

¹ On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded: see n. (881).
² For the inconsistencies which Krohn thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.
Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in ἐξωτερικὸς more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to σκέψις Pol. 1. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase οἱ ἐξωτερικὸς λόγοι, Pol. 1. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own ἀπορίαν...ἀλλ' αὐ τρόπον λόγων Phys. 1. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν Simpl. in Physica 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit Phys. c. iv. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from Eud. Eth. ii. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with Nic. Eth. 1. 8, 1098 b 10 καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the Politics, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (Ind. Ar. 117 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles reported in Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad. 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, Rhein. Mus. XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susseml in Jahrb. f. Philol. CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' τὰ ἐξωτερικὰ λεγόμενα, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote and Thurow that the imperfect form or dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit a priori than to ἐνδοξά generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to λόγοι διαλεκτικοὶ? (cp. λόγοι ἐνδοξάιματικοί, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such ἐνδοξά we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with Nic. Eth. 1. c. 8, where a similar in-
tention is announced, 1098 b 9 ἀκαπτόν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν συμπερασμάτων καὶ ἐξ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθείᾳ πάντα συνόδευε τὰ υπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδει ταύτα διαφωνεῖ τάλιθες. The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our Politics passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (Laws III. 697 Α. β), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ff. ὡς τε καλὸς ἂν λέγω τοι ἄν διατηρήσῃ τὴν δόξαν παλαιόν εὐδαιμ. καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφόνων. "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the γ': 'at least this διάφορος is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in Pol. IV(VII). I. 3, 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5, 1323 a 34, τάντα μὲν λεγόμενα ὅσπερ πάντα ἄν συγχωρήσωσαι. That he had the Ethics in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 ἑτέρας σχολῆς, and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on λέγων:—believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in Outside Discourses, we must now also make use of it: καὶ νῦν, here in the Politics as before in the Ethics!"

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or οἱ ἐποδη λόγου and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (?Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in N. E. I. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato Charmides 163 Α for N. E. VI. 4, 1140 a 3: Hesiod, Homer, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the ἀριστεία concerning Time in Phys. IV. c. 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connections: not only is it external and referring to what is external, but in contradiction to οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, it would naturally be used for non-philosophical discussions. What all men say may be a part of the ἐξωτερικοῦ λόγου though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in Eud. Eth. II. 1 it is just='what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both Politics passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to Meta. 1076 a 22—28, Eud. Eth. 1217 b 22, and Physics IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not so much to λέγομεν as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method."

3 Torstrik's rendering of another disputed phrase οἱ εἰς κοσμή γεγονόμενοι λόγοι De Anima I. 4. 1. 407 b 29, is esse disputaciones quales homines elegantiores instituere solent. This at least does justice to the present participle.
EXCURSUS II.

NOTE ON IV(VII), 11, 1330 b 26.

δυσείσοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξεφεύρησος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν ὄν τῶν πολεμικῶν αὐτῶν μὲν εὐέξοδοι εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δὲ ἑαυτοῖς δυσπρόσωποι καὶ δυσπεριληπτοι 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect δυσείσοδος? and if so, would it not seem that δυσεξεφεύρησος should correlate with ξενικοῖς, δυσείσοδος with ἐπιτιθεμένοις, rather than δυσείσοδος with ξενικοῖς, δυσεξεφεύρησος with ἐπιτιθεμένοις? I conjecture therefore δυσεξεφεύρησος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσείσοδος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. H. JACKSON.

EXCURSUS II.

THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.


The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man’s age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father’s civic rights (so I take διαδοχή) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the
father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, 70⁴/₂ years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, 11. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, 11. 11. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in Introd. p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, n. (817).

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (Transactions of Cambridge Philosophical Society II. p. 146) would read ταῖς μὲν ἀρχομέναις, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 49). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (ib. p. 118), who in his turn retains ἀρχομένης (Γ and corr. Π), but, while rightly referring ἀρχομένης τῆς ἀκμῆς as well as καταλελμένης τῆς ἡλικίας to the father, takes τοῖς μὲν to be the older, τοῖς δὲ the younger children by the same marriage, and explains ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected τῶν μὲν...τῶν δὲ instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of τῶν πατέρων after τῆς ἀκμῆς and of ἐκκίνων after ἡλικίας would then have conducted to clearness. This however is a small
EXCURSUS II.

matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διάδοχη τῶν τέκνων; as if it meant that the children succeed (not their father but) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary. SUSEM.
§ 16 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τιμα
περί τούς παῖδας, ἐπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινὴ ποιεί
σταί τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἰδιον τρόπον (ὅ γίνεται
καὶ νόμον ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτων δὲ ποιαν
7 τινα δὲ ταύτην.

11 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον Π
περί την τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὔδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειν, καὶ
γάρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γνώμονα τούτο βλαπτέι τὰς πο-

§ 2 λειτείας (δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι) τὸ γάρ ἢ
θος

1327 a 3 πρῶτον...7 ταύτην first separated from B. v(vii) and rightly prefixed to
B. v(viii) by Spengel || 7 δεῖται M, δεὶ εὑρα Sussem,12 following William's trans-
lation (σπουδᾶς esse) || 14 παιδεύεσθαι Άτ., πολεμεύεσθαι ΠΠ Βk., πολέ<ταν παι-
δεύεσθαι> Jackson, yet at c 6 § 5, 1341 a 1 Γ M have πολεμομένους for παιδεύ-
εσθαι (cp. 1360 b 15, 1310 a 14)

B. v(viii). The same subject con-
tinued: the true system of state educa-
This book joins on so closely with the
preceding that it is not easy to make a
parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's pro-
posal to begin at πρῶτον μὲν is in full
accordance with the usage of Aristotle.
The same thing frequently happens at the
commencement of a chapter. Aristotle
recollects before starting a fresh sub-
ject. The worthy people who divided
his books into chapters ignore this: see
e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which
more properly should begin at 1337 b 23,
1338 b 39, and at 1341 b 9 respectively.
The alternative commencement has ac-
tually been marked in this edition at II.
c. 12, p. 314, III. c. 2, p. 359.
c. 1. Three points to decide: (1) Should
there be a systematic education? (2) Should
it be a public system? (3) What subjects
should it include? While (1) and (2) are
soon settled in the affirmative, B. v(viii)
leaves off before we are far advanced
§ 1 12 καὶ γάρ (Si nam et significat,
pro altero καὶ αὐτῷ post longam paren-
thesin adhibitum est ἐν δὲ, sed facilius
fortasse καὶ γάρ εἰμίνι esse sumemus:
certe altera earum inducit est; his, altera
δὲ non; etiam quae legis est a 21. SUSSEM.

13 σοι γνώμονα τούτο] The neglect
of this in Latin, hoc non servatum. Cp.
1324 a 36 n., viii(v). 8. 2, 1307 b 33 f.
§ 2 14 δεὶ γάρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύ-
εσθαι] What this means is explained
(164). Rhet. i. 8. 6, 1366 a 13 f. (Eaton):
ὅτως τὸ πάντα τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη
τὸ ἐκάστην ἢ μόνον αὐτῶν παῖδθ
παῖδθ; τὸ γὰρ ἢ μένον εὐεργεῖατον
πρὸς ἐκάστην εὑρα. SUSSEM. (973)

τὸ ἢ μένον πολεμεύεσθαι] As Plato in
Rep. viii. 544 D explains, any constitution
(e.g. a timocracy) is due to the preva-
ience of a certain (e.g. timocratic) temper
amongst the citizens: id. 549 A, ἢ ὅπερ ἢ
15 τῆς πολιτείας εἰκότης τὸ οίκειον καὶ ϕυλάττειν εἰσθε τήν (1) πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχής, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἢ τὸ βελτίονος αὐτοῦ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ δὲ πρὸς τα σάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναις ἔστιν ἀλλὰ προσπαιδεύσῃ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργαις, διότι δήλον § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τής ἄρετος πράξεως ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τέλος τῆς πόλεως πάση, φανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μιᾶς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίον εἰναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰναι κοινῆ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἱδίαν, ἣν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος στοι ἄνω ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἱδίας τε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίαιν, ἣν ἦν δόξαι, διδάσκαιν. δει γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν § 4 ποιεῖται καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. αἷμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρῆ νομίζειν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ τινα εἰναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντως τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἔκαστος τῆς πόλεως: ἡ δὲ ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον M P² A² L. βελτιστοῦ the other authorities (viz. Γ, Π στ. and Βk. Π) and Bk. 1

24 [κατ'] Ῥόγεν, needlessly το ἐκαστος after 25 τῶν Π P² Βk. 26 γὰρ Σουςμ., καὶ Μ, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Βk. Σουςμ. 28 αυτῶν Γ, ἀλλὰ P², αὐτοῦ P², αὐτοῦ P² Π P², αὐτοῦ Γ P¹, αὐτοῦ M 29 μέρισαι...τόλεως omitted by Π ²

δρόμο ποθέν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γέγονασιν, ἕνεκεν ἐνδέχεται εἰς τῶν ἱλίον τῶν τάς πόλεως, ἢ ἐν ὑπερ θάνατον, τέλη ἐϕελὼν κατασκέπασιν; Comp. also Κέφ. 541 α, Λατους IV 711 B. It is not the "spirit of the constitution," but the temper or character which originates and keeps up the constitution. Comp. the application of the term ὅσον to ἀρμόσαι and μισθοῦ c. §§ 27, 23, 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 το το βέλτιον ήθος] The nobler temper. In other words, where the constitution is such as to permit the excellence of the individual considered as a citizen to coincide with his excellence considered as a man: cp. III. cc. 4–6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8: IV(VII), 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10: VII(VII), 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684, 808, 1233). Also Plato Λατος 1. 644 b, δὲ δάλις ἑρωταὶ παιδείαν τῶν παιδεύοσαι, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὄντως, οὐ χαλεπῶς εἰπον, ὅτι παιδεύοσαι μὲν εἰς γέγονον ἄντερ ἄνθροπος. Σουςμ. (974) (21) to the argument, it is much the same as in 1, 5, 2, 12, 14 a 25. 22 ἐν πρὸς τ. τ. ὁ. π. Therefore there should be ἔργαι καὶ τῆς πολιτείας: the first of the three questions is settled. § 3 21 ἐν πρὸς τ. τ. ὁ. π. This corresponds to ἐν πρὸς τ. τ. ὁ. π. 23 το καὶ ἐν τῷ τ. τ. ὁ. π. Therefore this sentence gives one reason why the education is to be public. The second point is quickly dismissed, but the third takes up the whole of this book. § 4 21 ἀμα δὲ κατά] The sacrifice of the individual to the state was carried out most completely at Sparta, but Periclean Athens did not fall far short in this respect. Aristotle accepts the principle along with the other fundamental postulates of the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly as in 1, 13, 15 as here. Comp. L. 1 § 12 ff., 4 § 5, and Eucken Methodes p. 86. Also the conception of rearing a family as ἀγορηγημα, IV(VII), 16, 16.
30 The order ἂν τὴν τοῦ διόν βλέπειν would avoid the hiatus and conform to τ. 13, 15, 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ διόν δει βλέπειν ἄρετην. Cp. Plato Laxo 903 b, c.

31 εἰκόνας δ' ἄν τις] Comp. N. Eth. ν. 9, 13, 1180 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (976)

32 καὶ κοινῆ ταῦτα] On the ἀγωγή or public training of Spartan citizens see Schömann Eng. tr. 1 p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all v. (iv), 9, 7, 1294 b 22 ff. (except the king's eldest sons or next heirs, Ps.-Pl. Alc. 132 b, Plat. V. Agisii al. c. 1), and without mere birth from Spartan parents did not constitute any one a citizen: cp. the well-known story of the hostages: 'Επειξαγόρα αἰτήτως εἶπεν 'παῖς μὲν οὐ δόσετε, ἵνα μὴ φίλους τούρκοι γένουσι τῆς πατρίδος ἀγωγῆς ἀνεπλήρωτος σείτων: οὐκ ἔστω γὰρ ἡ ἀγωγή,' Plutarch Aep. 54, 235 b. Cp. Inst. Lact. 21.

c. 2. Conflict of views as to what should be taught: divergent theories of the end of education: § 1, 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life must be imparted, but only within certain limits. Even in scientific studies there is much which a gentleman would not pursue, or only as means to a given end: §§ 3—6.

37 οὕτω πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀριστοτ.] But Aristotle would not recognise any such dilemma as 'virtue or happiness,' unless we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2, a 42, see n. (978). SUSEM. (976)

38 οὐδὲ φανέρων—ἡδον] Cp. (iv) 7. 4 § 8 with n. (903) and Intro. p. 45 ff., 47 ff. As here τῆς ψυχῆς ηθος, 'character of the soul' is a fuller form of expression for ἡθος, so also in c. 5 § 16 we have τοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ηθος cp. n. (1043). SUSEM. (977)

§ 2 39 τῆς ἐμποδίων παιδείας] From the standpoint of the ordinary, current education.
partisans, supporters; literally 'umpires for decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. *Metaph.* 1. 8. 5. 989 a 6 ff.

1337 b 2 \( \text{περι} \) των προς ἀρετήν οὐδέν ἐστιν ομολογοῦμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶν, ὡστε εὐλογοὺς διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκήσειν αὐτής).

§ 3 οἷον μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαία δὲν διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, Π II 5 οὐκ ἀδήλου ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρήμενοι τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἐργῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανεροὶ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὡστε τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βιάναισαι. 

§ 4 βιάναισαι. βιάναισαι δὲ ἐργῶν εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὡστε πρὸς τὰς ἁμοίες καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀρχηγὸν ἀπεργάζοντα τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἤ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς ταὐτοῖς τέχνας ὡστε παρασκευάζοντες τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρινάς.

1337 b 4 δὲ omitted by Γ. Μ. 5 Π τινὲς ἀλευθέρων Schneider (perhaps the reading of Π Artem. and 6 ἀνελευθέρων Π and perhaps Artem.; both possibly right) § 11 [ἤ τὴν ψυχήν] Susen. § 12 made by M. Π and perhaps F, hence [τὰς] Susen.

paraskeuázoun after τὸ σῶμα Π Β κ.

§ 3 προσ] not προπ, after διαφέρονται, as after ἀκομφρησθοῦν in III. 13. 1. 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 12).

What is ἀναγκαία ἀρετή;? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1284 a 8. πολεμικοὶ καὶ πολεμικοὶ ἀσκ., 1337 b 30, 38. τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσεως: μελετῶν.

§ 3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of βαναύσως.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Rs. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV (VII). 14, 14. 1333 b 1—4. There is no need to limit the expression to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐργῶν as in 1. 7. 3. 11. 6. 5. III. 4. 11.

§ 5 δὲ] There is nothing strange in the repetition of δὲ after παρασκ. Comp. III. 13. 7. 1283 b 16 ff., where δὲ is picked up by ὅποι, as also in Phys. 1. 7. 9. 190 b 17. 19: other instances from Phys. 1. 2. 9. 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1. 750 a 23, 28 (Bonitz). We may render: "as to all not being required, in view of the distinction made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student." τῶν τιμῶν limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἐργῶν, because τοῦτο is predicate. 11 [ἤ τὴν ψυχή] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἔθος for ψυχή [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἔθος συνειτεί καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. Plat. θεατ. 173 b, τὸ σῶμα μένων εἰς τῇ πολεμίῳ κεῖται αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἡ διάνοια...παρακατεργέται, then ψυχή must be regarded as a gloss upon διάνοια, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 602 ff. Susen. § 5 13 [βαναύσως] What is meant by paraskeuázoun χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι comes out in I. 11. 6. 1258 b 37 τὰ σῶματα λαξιῶνται. See n. (109). SUS. (980) This is the best description of "sordid occupations": see Newman I. p. 111 f. τὰς μισθαρινὰς ἐργασίας "Trades plied for hire" including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (102, 103). But in I. 11. 4. 1258 b 25, μισθαρία is used in a different sense, "working for wage," to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from εὐρωπία and τιγκράδως, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUS. (981)
καὶ ἐργασίας. ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα· (Π) 15 πεινήν. ἦστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑλευθερίων ἑπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν ἵνα ἐνίον μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελευθεροῦν, τὸ δὲ προσέχειν λαν σὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐνεχομένων ταῦτα ἑιρμηνεύαι βλάβαις. ἤσοι δὲ τολμήν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἡ μανθάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φιλῶν ἢ δὲ ἄρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελευθεροῦν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τούτῳ πράττων πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλως θητικῶν καὶ δουλικῶν ἂν δύοις πράττειν.

15 <μὴ> ἑλευθερίων οὐ ἀνελευθεροῦν. Götling (wrongly), ἀνελευθερίων Ridgeway: but see Comm. n. (86) || 16 ἀνελευθερίων perhaps Γ' Ατ. || 16 ὁ…20 ἀνελευθεροῦν omitted by Π下属 in the margin of Π下属 || τὸ δὲ προσέχειν omitted and a lacuna left by Π下属 (1st hand), προσέχειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in Π下属 Βκ.) || 17 ἀκρίβειαν τὸ τέλεον Π下属, perfectionem William, extremum Ar., τὸ ἐντελές Vettori Βκ. || ἑιρμηνεύαις ἑιρμηνεύειν Π下属 || δὲ γὰρ Susem. (a very doubtful suggestion) || 18 ἔνεκεν χάριν Π下属 Βκ. || 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἀντίον ἂντίον μὲν γὰρ Π下属 Βκ. with hiatus ἐν ραίσα || αὐτοῦ Π下属 in the margin, ἂν Μ' || τῶν inserted before φιλῶν by Π下属 || 20 ἀνελευθεροῦν perhaps Γ' Ατ. || πράσινον Π下属 Π下属 p. 1371 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16 || πολλάκις (πολλάκις Π下属) after δὲ ἄλλως Π下属 Βκ. || 21 ὅ τι in Π下属 a correction by a later hand) after δύοις Π下属 Βκ.

15 ἦστι δὲ… 17 βλάβαις. The sense, which Götting and Ridgeway have misconstrued, is: "And even as to studies not in themselves illiberal, while (μὴ) there are some which is liberal to pursue [ἡ ἑπιστήμη ἔργα 1555 b 18] within certain limits, too close application to them with the aim of scientific mastery is subject to the drawbacks above mentioned." Aristotle is thinking more particularly of Gymnastics and Music, but also of Drawing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004a), c. 5 § 8, n. (1004), c. 6 §§ 1—8, §§ 15, 16, nn. (1065, 1060). But on the other hand consult Exc. i. p. 619. Susem. (982) Of the two clauses introduced by μὲν καί δὲ Bonitz' dictum holds: "prior sc. mem- brum, grammatico coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro."

16 προσεξεῖν] to work closely at: II. 5, 6, 1363 a 39; infra c. 4 § 4, 1238 b 25. Comp. ἀρχιπροσεξεῖθαν I. 11, 5, 1238 b 34. § 8 17, ἦστι δὲ τολμήν διαφοράν = πολὺ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference; cp. II. 11, 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below.


20 ὁ δὲ πράττων] Comp. n. (103) and Metaph. XII. (4). 10, 3, 1075 a 19 ff. (Eaton). Susem. (984)

πολλάκις. This word goes with ἄν δύοις while δὲ ἄλλως (= in obedience to others) goes with πράττων as contrasted with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φιλῶν, and accordingly Π下属 have transposed it. But the hyperbaton is not stranger than in many other passages. Cp. 1255 b 3.

21 θητικῶν] Cp. 1341 b 14. The strict conjunction between βάθυς and δοξας is laid down I. 13, 13, n. (122). The day labourer, θητή, was mentioned III. 5, 4, 1278 a 13; 18, 21; see nn. (207, 486). The word is used in De Rep. Ath. of the lowest property classes, as reconstituted by Solon: τὸν δὲ ἄλλως θητικῶν, οὐδεμιὸν μετέχουσας ἄρχην. διό καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα ἐργατό τὸν μέλλοντα κληρονομῆσαι τοι' ἀρχήν, τοίνυν τέλος τελεί, ὡδ' ἂν ἐν εἰς εὐνόης θητικῶν: c. 7. 5. 6: a very close parallel to II. 12, 6, 1374 a 21.

c. 3. Of the ordinary subjects of instruction Grammar (Letters), Gymnastic, Drawing have a practical value: § 1. A consideration of Music leads us to determine the higher end of all Education, which is the right employment of talents: §§ 2—7, as Homer attests: §§ 8, 9. Recapitulation: §§ 10, 11.

3  
ai ἡν ὄνων καταβεβλημένα νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἰρή-
νο τῇ πρώτῃ, ἑταμφιετέοισι: ἐστὶ δὲ τῇ τάρα σχέδον ὡς παῖ-
δες εἰδοθαί, γράμματα καὶ γυμνουσίκη καὶ μουσική καί
σὲ τέταρτον ἐνοῦ γραμμικῆς, τῆς μὲν γραμμικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς
ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βιον οὖσας καὶ πολυχρόστους, τῆς δὲ
γυμνουσίκης ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδράις τῆς δὲ μουσικῆς
§ 2 ἦδο διασπορθέσθη ἂν τις, νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἠδόνις χάριν οἷ
πλεῖστοι μετέχουσι αὐτῆς: ὃς ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἐταξαῖ ἐν παι-
δία διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσιν αὐτῆς ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰρή-
ναι, μὴ μόνον ἄσχολον ὀρθὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-
ναιθαί καλῶς. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρχή πάντων, ὑπὸν καὶ πάλιν
§ 3 εἰσπομενεῖ περὶ αὐτῆς. εὶ ἄμφω μὲν δεί, μᾶλλον δὲ η
cirētvon τὸ σχολαζέων τῆς ἀσχολάς καὶ τέλος, ζητηθεῖν (p. 129)

23 εἰρήνη] Εἰρήνη Π' Βк. || 25 τῶν μὲν...γραφικῆς omitted by Π (supplied by Π in the margin) || 27 τῶν όμοιοι εἰρή
νῶν] τῆς μουσικῆς Π' and perhaps Γ (de musica autem dubitabit utique aliquis William) || 28 ήδο omitted by Π, untranslated
by William and Ar., [89] Susen.1, εἰ δὲ Κορας, needlessly || 33 3' Susen.,  γὰρ Γ Π Βк. Βк. Susen.1 in the text || 34 τῆς...35 σχολάζεων omitted by Π (supplied in the margin of Π), τῆς ἀσχολάς over an erasure Π', καὶ...σχολάζεων omitted by
Ar. || [τέλος] Susen.1, perhaps rightly, τελευταίοι Π', δεύτερον Vettor BK.

§ 1 22 καταβέβλημαν] Here and 1338 a 36 used for ordinary, current ἱερό
τά ἀγάλματα, ἰτ ἀγάλματα παιδεία. Ap
parently from καταβάλλεσθαι και ἀς "lay down a foundation" mid. So Pl. Laws 803 A. Late writers use the passive in the sense of
'to be published,' committed to writing, so already N.E. 1. 5. 8, 1096 a 10: crp.
Antigonous Caryst. De Mirabilibus c. 60 ἐξόδωσεν ως ἀπὸ τῶν καταβάλλεσθαι βιβλία.
23 πρᾶξιν] In c. 2 § 4, 1337 a 39
b 2. Susen. (985)
εἰσὶ ἃ...35 γραφικῆς] Comp. Plin.
Ν. H. xxxv. 10. 77 (Vettor) : hiatus (Famphili) affectio atque effecum est Sicyone primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut
pueri ingenii omnia ante graphicen, hoc est picturam in baxo, docentur, recipe-
returque ars eu in primum gradum liberaci
lum : Plato Protag. 325 D, Crit. 50 D, 
Lac. Rep. 2. 3, Pseudo-Plat. Thaeges 125 Ε
(Eaton). Susen. (886) Under γραμματα came reading, writing, counting (μαθηματά), and the elements of arithmetic.
Most of the authorities given above recognize the threefold division e.g. Pl. Prot.
1. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) κιναρίων, both in the didaskaloi (cf. εἰς διδασ-
κον πέμπτων) and (3) physical training
(ἐν παιδιστίου πέμπτων) at first in the
palaestra. So Theages l.c. οὖν (1) γραμ-
ματα τε καὶ (2) κιναρίων καὶ (3) παλαιών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγορῶν.
§ 2 30 νησιδ)] Nature, personified, is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as she is said to define, to make a division, to place at man's disposal: 1. 8. 5, 1356 a
26 f., IV(vii). 1, 5. 1332 b 35 f., 1. 10. 1,
1228 a 23. 
παλαιάς] E.g. Ι. 9. 34, IV(vii). c. 14
§ 9, c. 15 § 6. Susen. (887)
32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which
determines all." The pronoun is attracted
into the gender of the predicate. See
IV(vii). i. 5. 1338 b 15 n., Vahlen Aufs.
II. p. 34. Another instance IV(vii). 7. 5,
1327 b 41.
παλαιών] That is, after 1333 b 1.
§ 3 33 Qu. crit. coll. p. 418. Hoc
loco γὰρ (Γ Π Βκ. BK.) plane absurdum
est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino volui-
set haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae
et consecutionis comungere, certe multo
magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio.
Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius pecca-
tum est γὰρ καὶ δὲ coniunctionibus propter
compendiorum similitudinem inter se per
mutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituedendum est.
Susen.
35 δὲ τὲ δεί ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ παῖζοντας τέλος (II)
§ 4 ἀγακαίον εἶναι τοῦ βλου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῶν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον τᾷς παιδιῶν (ὁ γὰρ πονοὶ δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἢ δὲ παι-
δία χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶν τῷ ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει
40 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), δει τοῦτο δεὶ παιδία εἰσάγε-
θαι καιροφρολακύντα τὴν χρήσιν, ὡς προσάγοντα φαρ-
μακείας χάριν. ἀνέσις γὰρ ἢ τοιαύτη κίνσει τῆς ψυχῆς,
138 καὶ διὰ τὴν ἑδονὴν ἀνάπαυσιν, τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔγειν 5
αὐτῷ δοκεῖ τὴν ἑδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν
§ 5 μακροί χρόνοι. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς
σχολάζοντας. οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολοῦν ἐνεκαί τινος ἀσχολεῖ
5 τέλοις οὐκ ἑκάτορξοτι, ἢ δὲ εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστὶν, ἦν
οὐ μετὰ λυπῆς ἀλλὰ μεθ’ ἑδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἰναι.

35 τὲ τὲ Susem., τὲ PBas.3Bk. δὲ the other authorities δὲ after ποιοῦντας
Γ (if William has translated closely quad factiones operis vacati) PBas. Bk. Susem. in
the text § 36 <ὁ> ἀνακαίον Schneider, ἀνακαίον <ἡ> Spengel; one or other
seems needed § 38 ἢ τὲ Susem. § 41 καιροφρολακύνται II, which may also be
right, καιροφρολακύνται PBas. Bk. § προσάγοντας II PBas. Bk., which may also be
right 138 a 3 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk. Susem. in
the text

35—36 With the punctuation now
adopted (comma after τοῖς): “If both
are necessary but leisure more desirable
and more truly the end than occupation,
we must next inquire what should employ
our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or
else animation would be made the end of
life.” With ἀνακαίον there is the less
need to express ὑπάρχει.

x. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff.; οὐκ ἦν παιδα ἡ
ἐὐδαιμονία; καὶ γὰρ ἄτονον τὸ τέλος εἰναι
παιδαν καὶ πραγματευόμεθα· και κακοτατεῖν
τὸν βίον ἀπείρα τοῦ παιδευτὰ χάριν (Eaton).
Also infra c. 5 § 10, n. (1033), § 13 n.
(1038). SUSEM. (988)
§ 4 41 φαρμακίας χάριν] Cr. N. E.
vii. 14 § 4, 1114 a 26 ff., ἀλλὰ τὰς ὑπερβο-
λάς τὴν λύπης, ὡς οὐδὲν ἱπερατρία, τὴν ἡ-
δονὴν διὸννοι; §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff., ἐξελάβειν
ἐκ δεδομένη λύπην...κατὰ συμβεβηκόν ἡμᾶς τὰ
ἱπερατρίατα (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10,
n. (1031). SUSEM. (989)
43 ἀνέσις γὰρ...τῆς ψυχῆς] This is
seen most plainly in the case of sleep,
which is sweet because it affords pleasure
of this kind: c. 5 § 3 (cp. n. 1021).
Further comp. N. Eth. vii. 7, 7, 1150 b
17 f. ἡ γὰρ παιδα ἀνέσις ἄρτιν εἰρήν ἀν-
πωτερία· "amusement is recreation, and
consequently of the nature of relaxation.”
SUSEM. (999)
138 a 3 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here
καὶ is explicative; translate, ‘and indeed,’
‘and what is more.’ For the pleasure
here mentioned is not something apart
from Happiness (i.e. Wellbeing), but is
contained in it. It is incredible that
Döring cp. p. 155 (cp. p. 109 f.) should
have been satisfied with the absurdity
of "happiness," or as he says, the life of hap-
piness (which is much the same), “consists
of happiness accompanied by pleasure.”
To complete the logical absurdity he
should have added “together with the
sense of existence.” SUSEM. (999)
§ 5 3 The violent hiatus—ὑπάρχει
ἀλλὰ—can be removed by emendation, or
we may relegate the whole clause τοῖς...-
σχολάζοντας to the margin.
6 μεθ’ ἑδονῆς] Pleasurable. The use
of μεθὰ and a genitive as an equivalent
for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the
lexictons s.v. Ast II p. 310 f., Bonitz Ind.
Arg. 458 a 2 ff. Döring’s difficulty (see
n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the
fact that Happiness is a misleading term
for εὐδαιμονία. The English reader need
not be reminded that Welfare, Wellbeing
(of which ‘well-doing’ is the primary
tautηn µεντο την ἡδονην οὐκέτη τήν αὐτήν τιθέασεν, ἀλλα (Π) καθ' ἔαυτους ἐκαστος και τήν έξω τήν αὐτήν, ὡς ἄριστος τήν ἁριστήν καὶ τήν ἀπό τῶν καλλίστων. ὡστε φανερων ὡτι 10 δει και πρός την εν τη διαγωγη σχολην μονάδενεν ἀπτα και παιδεύονται, και ταυτα μεν τα παιδεύματα και ταυτα τας µαθησεις εαυτων ειναι χαριν, τας δε προς την 11 ανοχλιαν ὡς αναγκαια και χαριν ἄλλων, διο και την 6 µουσικην οι πρότερον εις παιδείαν ἔταξαν ουχ ὡς αναγκαιον (ων δεν γαρ ἔχει τοιοτον) ουδ' ὡς χρησιμον, διοσπερ τα γράµµατα προς χρησιμον και προς οἰκονομιαν [και προς µάθησιν] και προς πολιτικον πράξεις πολλος, δοκει δε και γραφικη χρησιμον ειναι προς τα κρινεν τα των τε-
χυτών ἔργα καλλίου, οὐδ’ αὖ καθάπερ ἢ γυμναστικῇ πρὸς (Π) 2οῦναίαν καὶ ἄλλην (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὄρωμεν γυμνόμενον § 8 ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς] λέστεσται τοιούν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν, εἰς ὧντερ καὶ ψάλλοντας παράγωντες αὐτὴν. ἢ γὰρ ὁμοίως διαγωγῆν εἰσί τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσι. διάστημα "Ομορφος οὖτως ἐποίησεν (p. 133) 25 ἀλλ’ ὅσον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίμονας δαίμονας, 9 καὶ οὕτω προειστῶν ἐτέρους τινάς, οἱ καλέοντοι ἄδικον, 27 φησίν, ὡς κεν τέρπεται στάσας. 28 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησίν Ὁδυσσεύς ταύτην ἀριστήν εἰναι διαγωγῆν, ὅταν εὑρισκομένου τῶν ἀνθρώπων 30 διαγωγῆν, δὲ ἀνὰ δόματι ἀκούοντας ἄδικον ἤμυνος εἶχες. § 10 ὅτι μὲν τοῖνοι ἔστιν παιδεία τις ἢν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδεία—III 33 τεϊν τοὺς νεὼς αὐτὸς ἔν αναγκαίοις ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐλευθέροι καὶ καλήν, φαινομένον ἡσύνετεν πότερον δὲ μία τῷ ἁριμήψε ἢ πλείονας, καὶ τίνες αὐτῆς. 25 osw Schneider | μὲν is corrupt, μὲν ?Schneider, μὲν γ’? Göttling, μὲν τ’? Spengel, τῆς μὲν Welldon, mēn thēxe ? Schmidt | κατείς (κατείς; ? Γ) after epith. 38 δαίμονας III | δαίμονας P1, δαίμονας P4, com. w. Bk. 26 os καλὸν or os καλότερα Spengel, rightly | 27 φησίν | φῆσιν Π | 38 ἐν III, σκέ Π4 | 31 χρησίμην P1 | 33 ἀναγκαίον P6, ἀναγκαίον P6 Bk. | 33 μὲν P | τῶν ἀθρώπων P1 P6 Bk., avoiding hiatus, and this may be right § 8 21 λέστεσται τοιοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν] See n. (921). Aristotelian seems mistaken in asserting that the only remaining end, which music can subsist, is to educate men for rational enjoyment in leisure. There is still the end of moral training, and below e. 5 §§ 1—8 he goes so far as to demonstrate that this is the only object to be considered in the education of the young. He has then expressed himself hastily and inaccurately. Comp. n. (1000, 1024). Susem. (999) 23 διαγωγῆν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων] Intellectual enjoyment worthy of free men. So a. 28, ἀρετήν ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γενήται, is not the noblest enjoyment. References to both passages will be found in n. (921) on IV(VII). 15, 2, 1334 a 17. Susem. (995) 25 Though not found in our texts, nor cited in Plato Rep. 389 d, in Aristotle’s Odyssy this line must have followed xvii. 383 (Spengel). Susem. (996) § 9 27 φησίν] This is Od. XVII. 385.

Our present texts give ἐδίδων instead of ἀπαντᾶς. Susem. (997) We may conjecturally restore Aristotle’s text as follows: τῆς γὰρ δὴ ἐξον ταύτην ἐξουσίως αἰτίως ἐπελθὼν | 383 ἀλλ’ ἔτι εἰ μὴ τῶν ̣οἰκεῖων ἐκείνον ἢ ἐκείνον Π | <ἀλλ’ ὅσον μὲν τ’ ἐστιν καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίμονας δαίμονας> 384 μάταιν ἢ ἰσθήμα κακῶν ἢ τεκτώνα διδόμων | ἢ καὶ θαπτόν ἄδικον, δὲ κεν τέρπεται στάσας. The discrepancies in the Homeric citations (indicated by Bonitz Ind. Ar. s.v.) are numerous enough to exclude the hypothesis that slips of memory would sufficiently account for all of them. See Wachsmuth De Arist. Stud. Homericis p. 12 ff. 28 Ὁδυσσεύς] Odys. IX. 7 f. With all this comp. n. (1031). Susem. (998).
§ 11 ΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΩΝ ουστερων λεκτεων περι αυτων, οιν δε τοσουτων ημιν (III)
35 ειναι προ οδου γεγονεν, ητι και παραι των αρχαιων ξομενων
tuka μαρτυριαν εκ των καταβεβλημενων παιδευματων η γαρ
μουσικη τουτο ποιει δηλων. ητι δε και των χρησιμων οτι ε
12 δει του παιδευσθαι τους παιδας ου μονον δια το χρησιμων,
39 οιν την των γραμματων μαθησιν, αλλα και δια το πολ
12 λας δε αυτων ενδεχεσθαι γινεσθαι μαθησις ετερας, ομοιως
41 δε και την γραφικην ουχ ινα εν τους ειδης ανωτες μη δια
μαρτυριων αλλα ουτω ανεξαπατητο προς την των σκευων
138 b ωνη τε και πρασιν, η μαλλως ητι ποιει θεωρητικων τον
περι τα σωματα καλλους. το δε ξητειν πανταχοι το χρησιμων
ηκιστα αρμοζει τους μεγαλοψυχους και τους ελευθερους.

36 * * εκ Comring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs
any alteration; but this is extremely doubtful. <δει το καλον ουχ εξωγ> εκ
?Susem. || 37 των χρησιμων αφετε δει Γ (if William has translated accurately
quod kertet utilium) P6 || 40 δε αυτων αφετε γεγονεσθαι (γινεσθαι Βκ.) P6 P8 Βκ. (in
P1 ενδεχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 αλλα | Reiz || [ἀλλα..., b1 f] Korases
1338 b ι f transposed by Postgate to follow μαλλως || δΗ] αλλα Αγ. (? Reiz
Thurat || πρασιν. η μαλλως...3 καλλας ; Jackson formerly || θεωρητικων (θεωρητικων
S9) P6, θεωρητικως P6 || 3 αρμοζεια P6 P8 Βκ. || Ελευθερων ?Susem.

§ 10 34 ουστερων] Another of the un
fulfilled promises. See Intro. p. 49 n.
(4). Susem. (999)
§ 11 νον δε τοσουτων. . . . 37 δηλων] The sequence of thought here is liable to be
misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has
proved, or tried to prove, that the an
cients had regarded poetry and music as
being preeminently a means to intellectual
training, which in his eyes is more im
portant than moral training, and to the
highest intellectual enjoyment associated
with it. It is true the evidence he has
produced suffices for no more than the
inference that the ancients considered
music and poetry in the light of higher
rational amusements for men of riper age,
but not that they adopted music in the
education of the young with the view of
training them for this rational enjoyment
in the future: cp. nn. (993, 1024). He
does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the
question, see n. (993), whether this art
may not be utilized for the development of
character: this he discusses later on, c. 5
§ 1, where he expressly states that he will
resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11,
which had been left incomplete: see nn.
(1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrast
ing the intellectual and theoretical aim
of education not with its moral aim, the
development of character, but only with
the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of
what is absolutely necessary and prac
tically useful. All three aspects are more
intimately concerned with the mental side
of education. The third is disposed of in
§§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the
difference between intellectual and moral
training, without however pursuing the
inquiry more precisely into particulars,
his attention being at present especially
directed to the proper development of
the body. Susem. (1000)
32 ειναι] Lobeck in his ed. of Phry
nicus p. 275 treats this as a case of the
absolute inf. See n. on 1330 a 37.
§ 12 43 προς] This prepositional phrase an equivalent for the
adjective 'corporal.' So Plat. Timaeus
35 a, Phaedr. 246 d. See Ast Lex. s.v.
of whose exx. Soph. 251 c πεινας τωι πειν
φοινην κεπηηων = 'poverty in mental en
dowment' is perhaps the best.
1338 b 2 περι τα σωματα] The pre
positional phrase an equivalent for the
absolute inf. See n. on 1330 a 37.
3 τοις μεγαλοφυσιων Editors comp.
N. E. IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. Susem.
(1001)
§ 13 ἐτεί δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον τω ἐθεσιν πατέρετνην ἢ τῷ (III)
5 λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν,
δὴ οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁτι παραδότεν τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικὴ
καὶ παιδοπρίβικη τοῦτον γάρ ἢ μὲν πολὺ τῶν παιδῶν τὴν
ἔξω τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἄργα.
4 νῦν μὲν ॐν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε-κ
λειποῦν τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξω ἐμποιοῦσι, λα-
4 πρότερον IV (corr.), πρότερον Λγ. with all the other authorities || πατέρετνην
after 5 λόγῳ Πέθος Βκ., avoiding hiatus || 5 ἐτεί omitted by Π || 6 <πρότερον>
παραδότεν ? Susen.

§ 13 § 13 πρότερον] IV(vii). 15 § 13—10. 10
SUSEM. (2003)
7 τοῦτων γὰρ κτλ.] From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 2, compared
with IV(vii). c. 14 § 9 f., c. 15 § 8 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics
does not conduce merely to physical development, but also to the moral education
of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοπρίβικη καὶ
γυμναστική see also Galen De valet. turcica
II. 9. T. vii. p. 143 Kuhn, where the relation
between trainer (παιδοπρίβη) and teacher (μάθασκαλος) is compared to that
between a cook and a physician. See
vi(vi). 1. 2 n. (1115), and for this passage
generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e.
παῖν τόν ποιεῖ The phrase recurs
κ. 5 § 3, 1333 b 13 f., § 24, 1340 b 11,
c. 6 § 16, 1341 b 18. Like παῖν τόν (see
n. 1. 8. 7, 1326 a 37) the precise import of
πολεμός ἐπιστήμην = "of a definite character" is
determined by the context: in 1339 a 24
δύναμις ἑαυτῶν ἡδονής (cp. 1339 b 24);
in 1341 b 18 = βάφωνωσι simply; while
in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as ὑπομνηματικαὶ
πολεμικὰ 1340 b 3. In our present
passage it is substantially βελτίων ποιεῖν,
πρὸς ἀφέσιν (τῷ ἓξος) συνεργεῖ: in short,
παιδεύειν, "develope," "influence." A
correlative phrase, παῖν τῶν γυμνήθη, occurs
c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 7 f., where see
note. Comp. N. E. 1. 9. 8, 1099 b 31,
Rhet. 1. 1. 9, 1354 b 30.
4. 4 Athletic training. Two errors to
avoid: we do not desire to make professional
athletes, or to realize the Spartan type:
§§ 1—7. Bodily exercises to be relaxed in
favour of other studies for three years
after puberty: §§ 7—9.

The censure of an athletic training was
passed 1v(vii). c. 16 §§ 12, 15, 1335 b
2—13. The censure of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation
of their political system in general on the lines
of B. ii. c. 9, iv(vii). c. 14 §§ 15—
22, c. 15 § 6.
10 καὶ αὐτοῖς ἰμποτιστέων] Some endeavour
to make their sons professional athletes.
Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is βάφωνωσι: cp. § 6, b 33.
n. (1012), § 9. (1015), i.e. Exc. 1., and
iv(vii). 15. 16. 15, 1335 b 5 ff., n. (944).
SUSEM. (2004)
In his condemnation of the mania for
sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophanes Frag. 3, Euripides Anticyr.
Fr. 1, as well as Plato Rep. III. 404 a,
407 b, 410 b — b. VII. 535 b, IX. 551 c.
The judgment of poets and philosophers
was confirmed by practical soldiers like
Epaminondas and Alexander, and later
Philopoemen (Plut. Vita Phil. c. 3, p.
357 c), by medical authorities like Galen
(Προφ. Λόγος cc. 9—14, 1. p. 92 ff. Κ.);
cp. Plut. De sanat. turcica c. 16, p. 130
A ff.), and by the Romans. On the
degradation of the athletic sports, see
P. Gardner New Chapters pp. 302—303;
Mommsen The Provinces i. p. 269, 287—329 Eng. tr. The chief causes for the
prominence of the professional element
were (1) the increasing popularity of
the heavier sports, boxing and the pancra-
tium; (2) the change of diet, see n.
(1015); (3) the progress made in
the science and art of training. "But it was
Herodicus of Selymbria who ruined ath-
letics, by introducing elaborate rules for
eating and drinking and exercise. He
first discovered that the human body can
by scientific tending be made, not healthy
and beautiful, but muscular and adapted
to this or that special service: he im-
proved the speed of the races and the
skill of the wrestlings, but spoiled ath-
letics as a means of education for life
and happiness." (Gardner). The evil
increased until in Roman times no pro-

37—2
βοίμεναι τά τε εἴδη καὶ τήν αὔξησιν τῶν σομάτων, οἷ(III)
12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τῆν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριωδίς δὲ ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, οὐς τοῦτο πρὸς ἄνδριαν
§ 2 μάλιστα συμφέρων. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἰρήνα τοιλλίκις, οὕτε (v. 134)
15 πρὸς μιλαν οὕτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον
tίν ἔπιμελειαν εἶ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὕτε τούτο ἐξευρισκοῦσιν, οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴους οὕτος ἐπὶ τῶν ἔθνων ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδριάν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγροτάτοις, ἀλλὰ§ 8 μᾶλλον τοὺς ἠμεροτέρους καὶ λεοντάδεις ἔβδεσιν. τοπλὰς
20 δὲ ἦστι τῶν ἔθνων ἅ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εἴρησον, καθαπέρ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τῶν Ποίων Ἐχοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνων ἔστερα, τὰ μὲν ὄμως τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἀ λητρικὰ μὲν ἔστειν,
§ 4 ἀνδρίας δὲ οὐ μετεληφάσαις, ἣτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοῖς Λάκωνας

15 μᾶλις ∆έρματος> Susem. (after Alb. and Ar.), μᾶλις <ἐκ> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταύτην § 20 87' πορ γάρ Susem., quæ Ar. § 23 ἀγροτακτίκα M* PL* Ald., ληστικα Bk. with all the other authorities § 24 τοὺς omitted by P*L* Ald.

vince of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

13 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the pancratium is found in Plutarch V. Lyc. 19. Apotheosis. Lycurg. 4. 180. Seneca De Benef. v. 3. i. Philostr. De Gymnast. 9. 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἃ διὰ τὸν ἔμων ποτὸν ἐν συμβάλλωμι, Rep. Lec. 4 § 6. Epaminondas saw the difference between the corse athletic and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plat. Apol. 48. Ep. 3. 102 c.

13 τοὺς πόνους] Cr. 11. 9. 24, 1720 b 33, ὑπέρβαλλε (ἡ θανατ) ἐπὶ τοὺς θληρόνοις.
15 With μᾶλις understand ταύτην: 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἄρτας to be found i. 13. 9. 1360 a 24.

18 λεοντάδειν] The character of the lion is given Hirt. Animal. IX. 44. 2—6: δεραὶ b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βρόσῳ μὲν χαλασματάτοι ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρώμως πραξάτος, ἔστι δὲ τό θήριον οὗτος ὑπάντησεν οδύνομαι οὐδ' ἐφορμαίμενος οὐδεν, πρὸς τα ταύτα σύντροφα καὶ συνόροι σφόνδαι φωνείοις καὶ στρεφομένῳ. ἐν δὲ ταύταις ὁρώμενοι μὲν ὁδότεν τε θείες τε φθορὰς ὁρώμενοι μὲν ὁδότεν ψεύςεις, ἀλλ' ἔνων καὶ διὰ πλῆθος ἀναγκασθῆ τῶν θηριώτων ἐφορμαίμενος βάθος ἐν θροχείᾳ καὶ ταῖς σκέπαις, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐνεπροσφέρομεν. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treatment and criticism of gymnastics (see Rep. III. 404—412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in Rep. II. 375 c ff.; comp. also III. 410 e, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(VII). 7. 5. n. (789. fl.). Susem. (1090)
§ 3 21 εἴρησον [ἐκ] (“are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and canni-balism.” These wild races lead the 'natural' ληστεύομαι Blos. i. 8. 7. 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν ...24 μετεληφασίαν] Comp. Nic. Eth. VII. 5. 2. 1148 b 21 ff. (Νέγους δὲ τάς θηριώτητας) . . . οὐκ ξηραίνησεν πολλοὺς τῶν ἀπογιγμένων μετὰ τῶν Ποίων, τούτο μὲν ὄνομα τούτο δὲ ἄνθρωπον κράσατο, τοῦ δὲ τὰ ποιμεν δεινοῖς ἀλλάζομεν εἰς εὐθὲνίαν; Herod. IV. 106. 106, Ἀνδρόφαγος δὲ ἀγρυπνάτα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχων θέσεις, ὅπως μὲν νοοῦσθαι εἰς νόμον ὀδυνίτωι χρεῖον, νομίζεις ὅτι εἰς: Sevias Perid. 75. f. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416. A (colonists of the Orchomenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), XI. 495 f. φασὶ δ' αὖτι τὰς ἰδιόσεις στατάτα τοῦ μὲν διδασάμενος Ἰλάμον τὴν εὐθύς Ἀχαιόν οἰκείαν (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue
25 έσμεν, έσες μὲν αὐτῷ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοποιίαις, ύπερ- (ΠΠ) ἑγούμενα τῶν ἄλλων, καί δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγάπη καὶ τοῖς τοιελεμοίκοις λειτουργούσι έτέρων οὐ γάρ τῷ τούς νέους
28 γυμνάζειν τῶν τρόπουν τοῦτων διεφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνῳ πρὸς μηδένας αὐτοκράτειν. 26 ή δὲ οὐκ εκ τῶν προτέρων 37 ἐγγυνούντων ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστάς γάρ τῆς 38 παιδείας οὐκέτα τὸν πᾶσαν μηδένας
25 αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ ὡς οὖν ἔχουσι, πρὸτερον δὲ οὐκ ἔχουν. 39 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θρήνος. 30 ὥστε έστε αὐτοκράτειν οὐδὲ γιαρ λικός οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀνὴρ αὐτός ὁ καλόν κάθισμα, οἵ δὲ λαίοι εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέμνετε τοὺς παιδίσκους

(see Nic. Eth. iv. 2, 7, 1122 b 6, and often), the motive must be purely the noble, the beautiful, the good: the virtue must be exercised τῶν καλῶν ένεκα, cf. § 5, n. (1009). See N. E. i. c. 7 § 6, 1115 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17 (Congreve). SUSEM. (1007)


25 αὐτὸν] By themselves, alone: αὐτοίς = μηδένως. Very near to this is the sense αὐτοί (but is it right?) would bear, II. 9, 19, 1270 b 8 “iam per se” and I. 1. 2, 1262 a 14, I. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSEM. Add 1255 a 30. 27 λατρεύοντος έτέρων] This criticism repeated from II. 9 § 16, § 34, IV (VII) 14 §§ 16—18; see also T. 308, 345, 913.

SUSEM. (1008) The simple verb here in the sense of υπολειτούσα, IV. (VII) 16, 3, 1334 b 39.


§ 5 29 τὸ καλὸν] With this and b 30 καλὸν κάθισμα, cp. n. (1007). SUSEM. (1009)

καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαίδευσιν ποιήσατε, βασιλεῖσιν (III) κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἄλληθες, πρὸς ἐν τε μόνον ἔρ-35 γονὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησιμοῖς ποιήσατε, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ χει-
§ 7 θερος, ὡς φησίν οὐ λόγος, ἐτέραν. δι' ὡς οὖκ ἐκ τῶν προτέ-
ρων ἕργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀναγκανοτάτης γὰρ τῆς
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὖκ εἴχων.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστῶν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστῶν, ὁμο-
40 λογόμενον ἐστὶν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κοινοτέρα γυμνάσια
προσωτέραν, τὴν βλαίον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους
§ 8 ἀπείρηκονας, ἵνα μηδέν ἐμπόδιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάξιον, σημειοῦν
1339 α' γάρ οὖ μικρὸν ὅτι δύναναι τούτῳ παραπευτεῖν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
ἀθλητικοῖς δύο τις ἄν ἢ τρεῖς εὕροι τοὺς αὐτῶν νευκηκότας
ἀνδράς τε καὶ παιδίας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκούντας ἀφαίρεται
§ 9 τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων οὕτως δ' ἄφω
5 ἡβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένεσθαι, τότε
ἀρμότερε καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκαφηγίαις κατα-

33 ἀπαιδευκότατος P2 Bk. Susem.1-8, perhaps rightly || 34 ἀπαιδευκότατος P1 ||
40 μὲν omitted by Γ M, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.1 || κοινοτέρα Π Μ Αρ., κοι-
κοτέρα P2-4-7-7 Β-7 Λ', κοινοτέρα Αδλ. W3 || γυμνασία P2, γυμνασία Μ-7 Β-7 Αδλ.
W3, γυμνασία Λ' || 1339 α' δύνασθαι Π1 Λ' Αδλ. W3, δύνασθαι P2-4-7-7 Σ-7 B Bk. ||
ταῖς Π2 Π2 || 2
diaphasiascatēs P2 and P1 (later hand) || δ' ἄφω P1 (corrected by P2) || 3 ἄφω
τα] ἀσκούντας Π1 || 5 γένεσθαι Π1 || 6 ἀναγκαφηγίαις Χροφαγίαις Π, from a gloss
which is retained as such in the margin of P2 from corr.9.

not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed
part of the prescribed course of study.
Many too must of their own accord
have learned to play the lyre and flute, or
else it would be difficult to explain how
the choralists of whom Aristotle tells a
story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have
attained such mastery of the flute. From
Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7; it may be
inferred that the Spartans who simply
listened to others, as well as those who
could themselves play, held music to be
a means of moral training, and not sim-
ply a source of pleasure and amusement.
Susem. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαιδεύγατος appears
N. E. iv. 1. 35, 1121 b 11.

βασιλεῖσιν] Comp. nn. (103, 1004).
Susem. (1012)

35 οὕτων ἐτέρων] Comp. again the
passages quoted in n. (1003). Susem.
(1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἡβης] Comp. Plato
Laos viii. 533 c: τριτὰ δὲ ταύτα ἀδήλ-
μετα διανοηθέρει, ἐν μὲν ταφείῳ, ἐν δὲ
ἀγελίας, ἐν δὲ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν
ἀγελίας τὰ δύο τῶν τρίοι τοῖς μέλησις τοῦ
δρόμου θρόμοι, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα ἡμέρας.
Eaton). Susem. (1014)

To the “lighter” course are opposed the
“heavy” or “violent” (βίας) con-
tests: ἡτοι τῶν ἄθλων ἐξωμοσύνη ταύτης
μὲν κοίρα ταύτα στάδιον, δέλχος, ὀκτά-
ται, διαλώσοι, ἄλαθα τὰ βαρότερα δὲ, παγ-
κράτος, πῦλος, πόλις, τόπαθος δὲ ἀν-
φοῖο συνεργάσθη Φιλοστ. De Gymnasticis.
3. These terms are also applied to the
athletes, ‘heavy-weights,’ ‘light-weights,’
Galen vi i. 487 K.

§ 8 1339 a 2 δύο τις ἄν 
η τρεῖς εὕροι] The order is artistic; four short syllables.

§ 9 5 ἀρμότερε Π1, ἀρμότερε Π2,
ταῖς ἀναγκαφηγίαις] The compulsory
diet of the athletes consisted principally
of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge,
cheese. Only in later times was meat
allowed: Dromeus of Stymphalus in
Arcadia is credited with the change,
Pausan. vii. 10 (according to Pliny
N. H. xxiii. 7 (63). 131 and Diog. Laert. viii. 13, a trainer named Pythagoras, ἀληθῶς τινὰ, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. viii. 13, λοικά ταῖς τε καὶ τυχόντι τιγγίζων καὶ τυχόντι συμμετακύων. Plato Rep. iii. 424 A says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to long and serious illness. Aristotle himself states De Gen. Animal. iv. 3: 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In Problems xxxvii. 5, 967 a 11 ff., viii. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἐξορρ. ὁρμήνυς); and Protol. i. 26, 863 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bonitz). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), IV(vii). c. 16 §§ 13, 16 n. (944) and Exc. i. p. 619. 

Susem. (1016)

7 ἢμι χαρᾶ... ἵστως Plato practically lays down the same principle: Rep. vii. 537 B. ἐν πᾶσι δέ τοῦτο τοῦ τε πάνω καὶ μάθησιν καὶ φόβου διὰ ἐν τούτοις ἐπικρατεῖ τινὲς πάντων ἐκφείξεται, καὶ ἀρκετῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνωσθῆναι ἀνενεγήθησαν, οὕτως χάρης καὶ θλίψεως ἐν τῷ δὲ ἔναν τε πάνα ἐν τῇ εἰς τῆς ἄκμας, ἀδήμονα τοῖς ἄλλοι πάθοις. κάτω χαρᾶ κἄντι καθά μάθησιν πάλαισι. He differs slightly in his mode of carrying it out; see IV(vii). 12, 15, n. (990) and Exc. I. SUSEM. (1016) cc. 5—7 discuss the place of Music in education. See Anal. p. 119.


12 καὶ νῦν αναλημμένον κτλ] The discussion breaks off, c. 3 §§ 11, 1338 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning ἐν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἠμῖν ἐνάθρη πρὸ ἀδύνατον γέγονεν ὑμῖν κτλ. See n. (1000). SUSEM. (1018)

13 ὅψι] The variant from MPP is valuable for the treatment of elision and crisis in the manuscripts.

14 αὐτοφάνεςμον] For the absolute use Bonitz Ind. Ar. 8. v. quotes I. 13, 16, 1260 b 23, vii(iv). 1, 5, 1288 b 35. With οὕτως 1289 b 5: with the direct object τῆς αὐτῆς δήλως, IV(vii). 14, 16, 1333 b 12. In II. 12, 1, 1273 b 27, there is a variant. § 2 15 διελθὼν] As in iii. 13, 6, 1283 b 11, "decide." Ex distinguendi significatone abit in notis disputandi, explorandi, explicandi: Bonitz s. v. who quotes 1399 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also v(vii). 7—9, 1341 b 31; but see note.

16 The first use: for amusement and recreation merely.

\S\ 3 παλεῖ, ὃς φησίν Ἐυρυπέδης: διὸ καὶ τάπτοντις αὐτὴν καὶ (IV)
20 χρῶναι πᾶσι τούτων ὁμοίως, ὑπνω καὶ μέθη καὶ μουσική
τιθέασε δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἐν τούτω καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον οἴνοις ἔ
προς ἀρετήν τι τείνει τὴν μουσικήν, ὁς δυναμένης, καθάπερ
ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιοῦ τι παρασκευάζει καὶ τὴν
24 μουσικὴν τὸ ἐδῶς ποιών τινὶ πασχάζουσαν δύναται χαί-

pected by Vettori, ᾧ Παλεῖ μένων Ἡν Ὡκτά P. Bk. 4, avoiding hiatus, Ἀπαθεῖα μέρων
Göttling Bk. 4, not badly; άμμα transposed by Schmidt to follow 19 διό καὶ: [.RowIndex] here,
but 19 f. καὶ <ἀμμα τούτων> τάπτοντις αὐτὴν καὶ χρωμα πᾶσιν <τοῦτοι> ὁμοίως
Flach, not badly || 19 τάπτοντες <ἐν τῷ τάπτῳ τῶν> αὐτὴν Λambin, τάπτοντις
αὐτὴν <ἐν παιδίδ> Reic, τάπτοντες <ἐν> αὐτῇ Koraes: cr. Comm. n. (1200 b)
20 ὡς Αρ. and a marginal note in a codex of William's translation, ὑπνω P. Bk. 4
21 οἰνοῖων (οἰνοῖων P) after 22 μουσικὴν M P. 4, after 22 τείνει τί Γ 22 τι after
τείνει Π, omitted by M. P. 4 || 23 παρασκευάζεις Γ. M., perhaps rightly || [καὶ τὴν
μουσικὴν] Flach, needlessly || 24 δύνασθαι omitted by Γ. M., hence [δύνασθαι]
Susem. 1-2.

19. The quotation is from the Bacchae 381, ἀπόστασις τε μερών. The preceding
line is μετ᾽ αὐτῶν γελάσας, and the choral ode continues ὡς Παλεῖ βάρτος ἔθνος
γάς ἐν δαίμονι τεου, καθώς δ᾽ ἐν θαλάσσαι ἄδηλας κρατήρ ὑπὸν ὄμω
βάλλει. Susem. (1200 b)

§ 3 διό καὶ τάπτοντις κτλ] The sense of this
 corrupt passage is quite plain. Lambin has perhaps made the best attempt
 at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάπτον-
τις = prescribe, recommend as in vi (IV).
2. 18: "and so it (music) is also ap-
pointed for the purpose of recreation
alone, and all these things are employed
in like manner." But then the words in
italics have to be supplied. With Flach's
transposition άμμα τούτων τάπτοντες = "and
so they rank music with all these, and
employ them all alike." Susem. (1200 b)

21 τὴν ὀρχήσιν] Reic correctly quotes
Ath. 1. 9 f. ff. in illustration of the passage,
but he should not have added Od. i.
151 f. ff. for in Homer's description
of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the
feast" (Σα θεοί τα ανάμφια δαιμονίων) Ari-
stotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995—998),
a higher estimate of these arts as means
of refined amusement and the best intel-
llectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato Ait. i.
128 c the term μουσική is used if the
widest sense to embrace the whole of the
rhythmic arts, music, poetry, and dancing:
but Plato himself only uses the word to
include music and poetry. He makes
dancing a part of gymnastics, Lys. ii.
673 Α. VII. 795 Ε. 813 Α. Β., and distin-
guishes between imitative dancing and
non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing
in the narrower sense of the term. 795 Ε
τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἀλλὰ μὲν Μοῦσαι λέξει μουσι-
κῶν, τὸ τε μεγαλητρεῖτο φαινομένων ἀμμα
καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλὰ δὲ εὔφορος εἰκονομητός
τε ἐγκακος καὶ κάλλους των τῶν ὥφθηκας μελῶν
(Eaton). Aristotle Poet. i. 5. 6. 1447 a
27 f. finds it necessary to lay special
stress on the fact that either this first kind
of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing
properly so called—or else (as I have
assumed) all dancing belongs to the group
of imitative arts of the rhythmic or
musical class (the defective text of the
Poetics admits of more than one explana-
tion, and one explanation can be extorted
from the words as they stand, see Vahlen
Beiträge zu Arist. Poet. i. p. 3 (167)). As
to sleep, see n. (990). Susem. (1202)

24 ἔδειξαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς] According to
Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant,
moral virtue is only found where love of
the good is present, and where the moral
activities are really exercised with plea-
sure and delight. The main thing in
the formation of character, as Plato teaches,
Lys. ii. 673 a, c, is to awaken and
render habitual this right feeling of plea-
sure: see Nic. Eth. ii. 3. 1, 1104 b 3 ff.,
X. 1. i. 1172 a 10ff., x. 9. 6ff., 1179 b 23 ff.,
and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with n. (1044).
Compare Nic. Eth. iii. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff.,
11. cc. 11 and 12, iv § 13, 1130 a 26,
§ 4 πειραίες, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τε συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τούτο τρίτον θετέων τῶν εἰρημένων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὲ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιάς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἀπέλατον (οὐ γὰρ παῖζοντες μαθάραντες μετὰ λύπης ἢρ ἢ μάθησις) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παίσιν ἀρμόττει

30 καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδίδονα ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐδὲ γὰρ § 5 ἀπελεῖ στροφήκει τέλος). ἀλλὰ ἵσως ἄν δοξεῖν ἢ τὸν παῖ.


Either may be right

§ 24, b 30. c 2 § 8, 112 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see Nic. Eth. III. 4. 4 f., 1113 a 29 ff., vi. 5. 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 ff., n. (1039). Cp. Döring op. c. p. 106 f., 110 f. SUSEM. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz Ind. Ar. 831 b 4: φρόνησιν latiore sensu, syn. γεωργία, ἐπιστήμη. The passages cited, amongst them 1188 b 23, 1289 a 13, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while c. § 8 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting εὐφερμέας καὶ before διαγωγήν ἔλευθρον: see n. (1077). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion εἰφορομοίων, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is εὐφερμέας and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as οἰκήματα. SUSEM. (1023)


28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is оῶ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μετῆ ἴδωμι, c. § 5, 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. Rep. 345 B, 518 C: and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities DeSoph. Et. 33 § 17, 184 a 2—8 (Butcher). On the pleasures of learning see Kled. 1. 11, 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, Poet. c. § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See IV (VII). 3. 1, 1325 a 19, n. 30 καὶ γὰρ ἐπιδέλλου τροφής τέλος Döring p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying art either as an amusement (παιδαῖς) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification: although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. § 6 § 2, n. (1062). In IV (VII). 14 § 9 ff., 15 § 1 f., cp. n. (993). Aristotle says intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while v (VIII). 3. 6 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adducing (c. § 3 § 2 f.) the fact that the ancients considered Music in this sense a part of education: cp. n. (993), n. (1000). This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (α) that in the passages from IV(VII),—παιδαῖς 1333 b 4, τίν τῶν θεῷν μελέτην 1334 b 16, τίν εἰκόνας b 25—he does
δινών στουδή παιδίαν είναι χάριν ἄνδραίν γενομένοι καὶ (IV) τελειωθέαν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἢ ἕνεκα δέοι μαθαίνειν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ (p. 139)

Μύθον βασιλέως, δ' ἄλλων αὐτῷ ποιοῦντος μεταλμάτων §6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθῆσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργων καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοιούτων χρόνων ἐπιμελουμένους δορὰ πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲι διαπονεῦν αὐτοῦ, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄφθονον πραγματείαν αὐτοῦ ἀν δέοι παρακενναί. ἀλλ' §7 άταπόστολον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀποκρίναν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἡγημ. βελτίω ποιεῖν ταῦτα γὰρ τι δὲι μαθαίνειν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' 1339 τὸν. ὑμᾶς ἔτερον ἀκούοντας ὀρθώς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὅπερ οἱ Δεκάοοι; εἰκενοί γὰρ οὐ μαθαίνοντες ὀρθῶς δύναται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὦς φασί, τὰ χρηστά καὶ τὰ μὴ §8 χρηστά τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτῶς λόγος κάν εἰ πρὸς εὐθυμ.

33 δεό] δει II (emended by corr. of P) || 35 δ' omitted by P8 Bk. || 36 καὶ <ἀνευ> Susen., καὶ Spengel, καὶ Madvig || 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα after δει II P8 Bk. || 40 ἠρ omitted by III.

1339 b 1 καὶ transposed to follow δύνασθαι Spengel, perhaps rightly if § 3, a 24 δύνασθαι is to stand || 4 εἰ II P4, εἰν P2-3-5 SB T4 Ar. Ald.

not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (9) that, as appears from c. §§ 5, 6, n. (1026), §8, n. (1027), §11, n. (1030), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ἦδος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also §7 n. (1026), Excursus 1, and n. (875) on IV(vii). 13, 4. Susen. (1024)

§5 32 παίδας χάριν ἄνδραίν γενο-

μένων] In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. §§ 5 n. (1025). Susen. (1025)

35 βασίλεως] So Philip of Macedon:

Plut. Vita Periclei c. 1, p. 152 s. f. 5 δ' ἂν Φιλιππος πρὸς τῶν ὦν ἐπιτετρικόδ τινι πόσῳ ψήματα καὶ τεχνείον εἰπέν "Οὐκ αὐξάνει καλὸς ὁ κρινός οἵτως;" ἀρκεῖ γὰρ, ἂν βασίλεως ἀκούοντας ψυχράτων σοφώ-

λήνην καὶ τοὺς νόμου τῶν Μεσοταύτων ἄγωντος τὰ τοιαῦτα θεαθη γεγο-

μένοι.

§ 6 37 ἀπεργάζεσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that παρακενναί is perfect of the middle παρακενναί (ἔργων).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ἄφθον] We find ἄφθονοικαί an example 1. 7, 1. 25 b 26, and condemned as δυσλακή ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11, 14, 1282 a 17—23. III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle v (viii). 3 §§ 3—6.

§7 41 δύνασθαι] The subject is ἦ μονοϊκη, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 24—48, though it is obscurely indicated a 37 by αὐτὸν ἀπέτυχο, i.e. the execution.

1339 b 2 ἀκούοντα γὰρ κατὰ] See notes: (1011, 1024): also c. §§ 17 nn. (1022, 1044, 1045); comp. c. 6 § 3 ff. with nn. (1061, 1066). Susen. (1026)

§8 4 δ' αὐτός λόγος καὶ] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly
serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in riper years. Cp. also nn. (921, 1023). Susem. (1027)
7 ἐπιλήψις. See Bonitz ad Meta. 1. 1. 2, 981 a 7, b 6, p. 41, p. 47 f. Waltz ad 66 b 19, Orig. 1. p. 523. Such unproved assumptions, like other ἐνδείξεως, contain a germ of truth.
8 ἐς Ζέας. Schlosser thinks that here Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As to representations of Apollo and other gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. n. 1071), see particularly L. van Jan De fidibus Oracorum (Berlin 1859), pp. 17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the number. Susem. (1026)
ὅλα καὶ κτλ. See n. (981), Exc. 1. to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with n. (1067). Susem. (1029)
10 Plato Laws ii. 665 d φιλόσοφος πρεσβύτερος ἄκουσε πρὸς τάς ὑφώς μετάφρασε καὶ χαριζεὶ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερων τούτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγαντεύειν αἰσχὺν ἀν μᾶλλον.
§ 9 11 ὠστερον]. I. c. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b 20 f. Where this point is again taken up. See n. (1060). Susem. (1030)
13 παυδιάν]. The end to which Plato confined all poetry and all art: see Butcher Some Aspects p. 317 ff.

"Aristotle allows that for childhood the use of poetry and music is to convey moral instruction"...but "for the grown man the poet's function is not that of a teacher, he is only so by accident" p. 322 f.

§ 10 17 λατρεία τις]. This has been set forth c. 3 § 4, φαινομένως χάρις: cp. n. (989). Susem. (1031)
18 μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κτλ]. The highest intellectual (or aesthetic) enjoyment implies the highest nobleness (τὸ καλὸν), because it is the highest activity of soul: it implies the highest pleasure, because from this highest human activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it: see n. (992) on c. 3 § 5. Susem. (1032)
§ 11 20 ψυλήν]. Instrumental music, unaccompanied by the voice: cp. 17, 1340 a 12 ff. ἀφορέμενον . . . χαρὰ τῶν κυκλομάτων καὶ τῶν μουσικών ἀστέρων.
Comp. Nic. Eth. 1. 9. 9, 1108 b 25, IX. 8. 9, 1169 a 20—25; also VII. 11. 2, 1153 b 6, c. 13. 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).
§ 12 ἀν τις παθείαν δεύτερην αὐτὴν τοῖς νεωτέροις. ὄσαι γὰρ ἀξίωσις τῶν ἡδειῶν, οὐ μόνον ἀρμότερον πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναπαύσιν ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μέν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶναι ταῖς παθειαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἄλλα καὶ 30 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἄν εἴη διαναπάυειν εν ταῖς ἀπὸ

§ 21 τρίτη, ἐπί τοῦ Π" βκ., δὲ Π" || 24 ὑπολάβοις, after 25 ἀν τις Π" βκ., avoiding hiatus || 28 γενέσθαι? Susem. || 29 καὶ διὰ δέ οὖν ἀπὶ τῷ Spengel, but the text can give the same sense

§ 21 Μουσικὸς Not an historical character, but a mythical personage. Under this name went a variety of ancient poems, the real authors of which were unknown, including (a) hymns—Pausanias, iv. 1. 4, maintains that a hymn to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the only genuine fragment of his which has been preserved—(9) oracular responses (χροσσίων); collected by Onomacritus of Athens under the direction of Hipparchus and esteemed of such importance that Onomacritus was banished from Athens for the interpolation of a single line, which was discovered by Lysis of Hermione: Herod. vii. 6. viii. 96, ix. 42: also (γ) a gnomic poem addressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to by Plato Repub. ii. 363 c, called 'Eumolpia' by Pausanias, x. 5. 3, but 'Ὑπο- θήκαι, Precepts or Advice,' by Suidas. Susem. (1034) 13 Διαγωγάς The plural has a concrete meaning: 'social gatherings,' 'the more playful forms of social intercourse,' approximating to παιδίας, from which δια- γωγή is in general carefully discriminated. Comp. n. (1021), and iii. 9. 13, Nic. Eth. x. 6 § 3 there cited. Susem. (1036)

24 καὶ ἐντεύθεν] In order that in mature life they may find in music a recreation: cp. c. 5 § 5 with un. (1024, 1055). The difficulty there raised, as to why in that case boys should learn to sing and play themselves, has been postponed for future discussion: § 9, n. (1030). Susem. (1036)

The order of the words in Π" must be modified. There is authority for ὑπο-

§ 14 της. δὲ ἕν μὲν οὖν αὐτία ἤγγοισι τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν γένεσθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδωνῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβη τῷ αὐτίῳ περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖ τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μὴ ποτε τούτῳ μὲν συμβεβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ᾽ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δὲ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἦς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησις ἡμέραν γὰρ ἡ μουσική τῆς ἡδονῆς φυσικῆς, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πάσαιν ἤθεσαν ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν προσφυσίζως, ἀλλὰ ὅραν εἶ πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡδονὸν συνείλη καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. ἡμέρας δὲ ἄν εἰς δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡδή γενόμεθα δι᾽

37 ὅσον omitted by Π¹ (supplied by corr.¹ in P¹), [ὁδὼν] Susæm.¹ perhaps rightly || 39 εἴκοσι after αὖ τις Π¹ and Bk. || 40 τῶν αἰτίων transposed by Flach to follow 41 μόνον || 41 διὰ...42 ἔκκεν supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Sylburg conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Koraces one after 42 εἴκοσι, Schmidt the loss of <φαίνει αὖ δεῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Susæm. II of <φιλολόγον αὐτήν> after 41 μόνον.<br>Yet it may be sufficient to understand ἤγγοισιν (αὐτῆς) from the preceding || <πάπαν> μέλαντον: χρήσιμον οὐ χρησιμοτατόν Flach, perhaps rightly 1340 a 1 ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς εἰσὶν Π¹, εἰσὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ Μ Σusæm.¹.² || 6 τῆς Π¹ and P⁴ (corrector) || The second τῆς is omitted by M⁴ P¹, [τῆς] Susæm.¹, perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 δὲ ἕν μὲν συμβεβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ᾽ κτλ.] See § 3, 1339 a 24 f. n. (1022). SUSEM. (1039)<br>Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the omission of a verb with περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν. It is best with Flach to repeat εἴκοσι αὖ τις ὑπολάβη; understanding θυσίαν οὐ γένεσθαι. See Quæst. crit. cell. p. 419.<br>§ 15 42, μὴ ποτε τούτῳ μὲν συμβεβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ᾽ κτλ.] For the use of μὲν=while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337 b 15. "Let it be granted that such service is incidental to Music. Still we must ask,—Does not the nature of Music range above this sphere of service?" (Jebb). The real complement to θυσίαν is the clause introduced by δὲ. 1340 a 3 έχοντι...αἰσθησιν] = αἰσθησιν. 1 2 1253 a 17.<br>4 διὰ πάσας...προσφυσίζως] Cr. c. 6 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n. (1069). SUSEM. (1060) The pleasure is natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense used of self-love n. 5, 8, 1203 b 1; and n. 11. 6, 5, 1278 b 36.<br>6 οὐ τῆς καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡδονὸν συνείλη] "Whether Music has not somehow a bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 10. καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν] Evidently an emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,' 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere pastime of recreation music also affects the soul: it is the soul and not the body which feels pleasure [cp. N. Ε. x. 6, 3, 1173 b 10, ἐν τῷ ἑαυτήριῳ πρώτῳ ὥς ἦν καὶ ἡδονὸν τῷ σώμα θρά' ὡς δὲ εἴκε δὲ], Cr. n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt. After the preceding comparison between this sensuous pleasure and the highest contemplative enjoyment of elevated mental satisfaction, it is strange to find that nothing is said about the latter as an effect of music, but the question is raised, whether Music is capable of producing a higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγή; and whether it is thus qualified to promote the moral education of the young: for it is this with which Aristotle in the context is chiefly concerned. SUSEM. (1061) § 16 7 ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡδή See c. 6 § 10, 1341 b 18, ποιοὶ τινες τὰ τῆς σύμφωνα. Cr. also II. 5, 23, 1204 a 32, where τά τόπων τινες εἶναι τούτων=whether they are to be communists or not. The idiom

αὐτὴς. ἄλλα μὴν ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοὶ τεινεῖς, φαινεῖσα διὰ τοῦ πάλλων μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἢ κατὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὄλυμπος τοῦ μελῶν" ταύτα γὰρ ὁμολογομένων ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθυσιασμοῦ ὁ περὶ τήν ψυχήν ὅροις πάθος ἐστίν. ὅτι δὲ ακροιομοῦν τῶν μυθῶν γίνονται τὰντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν μυθῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαθείκει τὴν μούσικὴν ἐνιαία τῶν ἡδῶν, (p. 138)

15 τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὅρθως καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μυστεῖν,

<καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δὲι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθείσοσθαι μυθῶν οὐν ὅς

8 παρ. 9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P\\upvari. 10 Ar. Ald. and P\\upvari. 11 (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P\textsuperscript{4} and by a later hand in the margin of P\textsuperscript{3}, afterwards erased) || φανερόν δῆλον P\textsuperscript{6} || 9 ἐπεὶ δὲν P\textsuperscript{12} || ἄλλων P\textsuperscript{6} || 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπειδὴ Susem. who transposes 13 ἐπεὶ δὲν with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long proasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἐν ὅ ἐπεὶ <ἐπεὶ> ἦν. ἐπεὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν. P\textsuperscript{13} Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἔργον, δῆλον ὅτι Bk., δῆλον οὖν Π\\upvarii 14 Ar. and P\textsuperscript{16} (corri.), δηλώσας P\textsuperscript{17} (1st hand)

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. πάντως παῖς ἡ ρήγανος, ἀνθρώπος ἡ θεία (Newman).

9. διὰ τῶν Ὅλυμπον μελῶν] On this exciting cosmic music, see Exccursus II. p. 621 and c. 7 § 4, 1343 a 8, n. Susem. (1042)

10 ταῦτα γὰρ κτλ] "It is undeniable that they rouse the soul to ecstasy, but ecstasy is an emotional state of the moral nature." On ecstasy and unbreakable excitement generally as wrought by Greek music, see Exccursus III. p. 632 ff. Susem. (1043)

§ 17 The clause ἐπεὶ δὲ...ἀυτῶν is not a further reason for inferring τοιαῦτα τιαν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γνώσεως: it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstasy, that is because they express ecstasy: quod rhythmim et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? Quia eodem omnino semper in auditoribus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimuntur, rhythmico atque modulationibus": Quaest. crit. coll. p. 420. Hence ἐπεὶ requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking χωρὶς as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (ϕιλή). Susem. There is possibly a tacit correction of Plato who in Lacos 11. 669 κ. condemns instrumental music without words: ἐν οἷς δὴ σαχέλεπτον ἀνευ λόγου γεγονόμενον μυθῶν τε καὶ δριμυλῶν γεγονότων, ὅ ποτε τὸ βοθείται καὶ ὅτε ἔσω τῶν ἀξίωσεων μιμητῶν.

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα κτλ...b 13 νέους] This is all one portentous period (monstrum periodi), perhaps the most extended in Aristotle, employed to formulate the second reason for the inference τοιαῦτα τιαν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γνώσεως.

The first clause ἐπεὶ...ἀυτῶν finds an echo § 25, 1340 b 15—17. The succeeding clauses are continually interrupted by parenthetical remarks: still the logical connexion, if harder to detect in a 14—18, is plain for the remaining links of the chain. Music can give most realistic imitations ( bindActionCreators) of certain feelings, love, hatred, courage, temperance, § 18; habituation to feel pleasure in the imitations tends to create sympathy with the realities, § 19: it is peculiar to the sense of hearing that it can thus be the channel of a moral imitation (forms and colours are not expressions but only symbols, σημεία), §§ 20, 21: melodies are imitative expressions of character, § 21: hence, there is a definite affianction of the soul produced by Music, and if the music be rightly chosen it can be used to educate the moral nature, § 24.

15 τὴν δ’ ἀρετήν...μυθῶν] With this and what follows comp. n. (1022). Observe that moral, not intellectual, virtue is here intended. Susem. (1044)

16 δει μανθάνειν κτλ] "and clearly
no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term μαθήματα is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of ἕθος, character, still no ἧθικὴ ἄρετα, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from φύσις, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, *Nic. Eth. vi. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 a 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, n. (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, n. (1061, 1066), and Excursus i. Susem. (1045).

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς* Cr. *Nic. Eth. x. 9. 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὅσπερ οδικὸ...τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς μέγεθος, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν. ὅμως ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕως κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἄγων (results: in music, the performances).

χειρισμὸν τῶν ἔπεισθήντων κτλ.* Comp. n. (1101); i.e. Excursus v. *Susem. (1046).

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τῶν ἁλφιανῶν φόντων* The real things, objects. As in 1250 b 14, ἄλφαντος φόνον (see n.), the content of φόνος is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν* Music can give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (Lieberprecht). Cp. *Excursus iii. and n. (1086). *Susem. (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics respecting Music. He appears to be contempoing in his De Musica the arguments of Theophrastos and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is μαθήματα and musical strains ὑμερίματα τῶν ὕδων. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fr. 53 Kemke tās ἰδιαιτεράδες...τὰ πάθη (which shows how little care he had for the performances).

12 ἐπείδη Σουσέμ, ἐπὶ δὲ ΓΠ ΠΡ Α.Κ. Σουσέμ. in the text. See Comm. crit. coll. p. 419 ff. = untransliterated by William, ὑποδιείγεται omitted by the 1st hand of M', leaving a lacuna, supplied by a later hand = 13 τῶν before ὑμερίματα omitted by Γ and M (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), τῶν ἀργῶν δὲ = τῶν ? Susem. 1—2, perhaps rightly.
V(VIII). 5. 20] 1340 a 17—1340 a 33. 593

χαίρειν έγχρων ἐστι τῷ πρός τὴν ἀληθείαν τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν (V) 25 τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινός θεομενος μὴ δὲ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτῆς, ἀναγκαίον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὔ τινες εἰκόνα θεορεῖ, § 20 ἡδείαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοιόμορφα τοῖς ἤθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γενατοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἤρεμα (σχήματα γάρ ἐστιν τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τὰς τοιαύτας ἀισθητεῖς κοινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μικρὸν, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ταῦτα ὁμοιόμορα τῶν ἤθεσεων, ἀλλὰ σημεία μᾶλλον τὰ γινόμενα

27 καὶ εἰς Μ. Π. π, καθ' Γ γὰρ τὴν ἐκέφαλα θεωρεῖ: τὸν εἰσανδρόν ἑυθείαν, ὁμοίως ἐμπροσθον τὴν ἐικόνα, ὡς οὐθεν ἔρημα κατ' ῥήματα. William translates 27 καὶ αὐτής...28 εἶναι in this order: illam visum, cum visi videi imaginem secundum se esse delectabilem. 32 ἄλλα ἐπὶ μικρὸν after 31 τοιαῦτα Ἡ II Arc. Bk. Susem., transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦν by Spengel, Susem. 34. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the error, but conjectured <οἴ> πάντες without any transposition. Welldon transposes 31 καὶ πάντες... 32 κοινωνοῦν to precede 28 συμβέβηκε, wrongly ἐτι δὲ ΓII Ρ. Bk. Susem., εἰς Heldenhlm cp. cit., ἔτιδε Susem., see Comm. n. (1050) || 33 [τῶν ἤθεν] Flach Susem.

foreign to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὸν θεωροῦν (ἐκέφαλον) οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the Problems: XIX. 20. 920 z. 3, ὅτι ταῦτα φανεραί σύν αὐτοὶ μαρτυροῦσιν; οὕτως καὶ ἔφαβεν τῇ μορφῇ τούτῳ εἰς τὸν ἄλλον καὶ αὐτὸν πάντας ἔχει τῷ μέρους τοίς ἀποτοῖς: so XIX. 37. 919 b. 36 ff., esp. b 35 al ὡς κατὰ πρακτικόν εἶναι, αἱ πράξεις ὑδατικά σημεία ἐστίν. This points to an exaggeration of the rhetorical element: see Butcher cp. c. p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἤθεν] For the meaning see Exc. iii. p. 622 ff. Comp. also generally n. (1084). Susem. (1908) 30 ἄλλα εἰς τοῖς ὀρατοῖς] We may translate "The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present an image of moral affections]—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not images [of moral character]: forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters on which they usually attend." It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32] The words ἄλλα ἐπὶ μικρὸν are a poor qualification of τοιαῦτα, which they follow in the MS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to ὡς πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχήματα, viz. forms, gestures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματιζεῖν). Statuarily, it should be remembered, imitates by forms only: painting by forms and colours, Phet. c. i § 4. 1447 a 18 ff. with n. (14) of my edition. Cp. also Athen. xiv. 659 b, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων δημοσιογράφων ἄγαλμα τὴν παλαιὰν ἀρχηγοῦσα λείψανα. Susem. (1909)

32 εἰς τῇ δὲ] To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐρεθίθη makes it the explanation of the preceding unlikeness. Susem. (1905)

οὐκ ἐρεθίζωμαι. ἄλλα σημεῖα] "Painting and sculpture working in an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their frozen
and arrested movement they fix eternally the feeling they pourtray...Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, Some Aspects p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, Phaedrus 250 a ff. makes the most lustrous copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight; Thompson ad loc., "by δε τιμα γνωρισμεν he seems to mean moral ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."


καὶ τούτῳ...τὰ πάθησιν] i.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring op. c. p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (Post. c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (γελασια, Post. c. 5 § 1). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds:—"and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;" he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However, both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint likeness to similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naiveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. Sus. (1002)

δει μὴ τὰ Πάθησιν...τὰ Πολυγραφοὺς] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the 'art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausanias was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, Achar. 854. Themis. 949. Plut. 666. See Post. c. 3 § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολυγραφοὺς μὲν γὰρ κρατουσάς, Πᾶσας δὲ χεῖρας, Διονυσίου δὲ δυνατοῖς εἰςβεν: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In Post. c. 6 § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφῶν Ζευκίδος πρὸς Πολυγραφοὺς πέτασαν ὁ μὲν γάρ Π. ἄγαθος θεογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζευκίδου γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει καλὸν. Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of character and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 όλες must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. III.
V(VIII). 5. 22] 1340 a 34—1340 a 41.

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§ 23 λεσιν αυτοσ ἐστι μεμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ έστι φαινομένον εὔθυδε γὰρ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διείσθηκε φύσις, ὡστε ἀκουόντας ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μή τῶν αὐτῶν ἐχειν τρόπον

41 ἔχων after τρόπον P1 and perhaps Π, ἔχει P4

n. (1943) p. 624. As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Phidias among sculptors. Pausan however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, or satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Brunn Gesch. der griech. Künstler 11th pp. 14—46, 49—51; Vahlen Aristoteles Lehre der Rangfolge der Thelie Tragödie in Symb. Philol. Bonn. p. 139 ff. Comp. also IV (VII). 17. 10 with n. (563) and Introd. p. 52. SUSEM. (1058)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς καλὸν "Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character." Prof. Butcher has written an able commentary on this οἷς εἰς p. 207 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as μίμησις "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character. . . . Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 ἐν τῶν ἀρμονιῶν φύσις Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 23 below; the soul assumed to be a 'harmony') ἀρμοσια has a special musical signification: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations: as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is συμφωνία. The best rendering for the technical term ἀρμοσια is not 'key' or 'scale,' but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp. the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, Paradise Lost 1. 550 ff. "to the Dorian mood | Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised | To hight of noblest temper heroes old | Arming to battle, and instead of rage Deliberate valour breathed, firm and unmoved | With dread of death to flight or foul retreat; | Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage, | With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain." See further Excerpts IV on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUSEM. (1058)

Tran. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the mixed Lydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode: while the Phrygian excites to ecstasy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.

38—2
πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας δυντικότερος (V)
καὶ συνετηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μεξολογιστὶ καλο-
μένην, πρὸς δὲ τῶν μαλακτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς
τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς
4 ἐτέρων, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δοξιστὶ μᾶνὴ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθοῦς
(π. 130)
§ 23 συνετηκός δ’ ἡ φρονησί—ταῦτα γὰρ καλὸς λέγοντι οἱ περὶ 9
τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πειθοεισφορῆς: λαμβάνοντο γὰρ τὰ
μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων,—τῶν αὐτῶν
dὲ τρόπων ἐξει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχου-
sιν ἂνοιγμώτεροι οἱ δὲ κινητικοὺς, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν

1340 b 1 συνετηκότως Π Π (1st hand), συνετηκότως Madvig, συνεφθησαν Schmidt
μεξολογιστὶ M4, and perhaps Γ. Similarly b 4 δοξιστὶ M4 Π Π and perhaps
Γ = 5 φρονησί S1 T1 M1 (1st hand) and perhaps Γ != 6 παιδεία Ar., παιδὰρ Γ Γ
Π = 7 d2 Π Π Π Bk., untranslated by Ar. = 8 omitted by IP Π
and Π (1st hand, supplied by corr.), untranslated by Ar., [rå] Bk. = 9 έχουν after
9 έγισα IP Π Bk.

1340 b 1 συνετηκότως Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively'. For
this effect of the mixo-Lydiand mode
Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, Kep. 398 i τί περὶ ὧν ἢρπνωτὶ ἡ ἁρ-
omia: Μεξολογιστὶ, ἡρᾶ, καὶ καθησυχαστὶ καὶ καθησυχαστὶ τιμῆς. Ὑπὸ τινῶν αὐτῶν,
τίνος ἐγὼ, ἁρμονικῶς: ἄριστον γὰρ καὶ γνωστῶν, οὐ δὲ ἐπικεκεῖσθαι μὴν οὔτε ἀν-
δράσει.

3 τὴν διάνοιαν Not the subject of the
indefinite (ἐχεῖν or διαθέσασθαι) but the adverbiale acc. after it.

3 τὸς ἄνεμος[.] The modes called here 'relaxed' are obviously those those
Plato calls χαλαράν, Kep. 398 b 1: τίνες ὧν μαλακὰ τις καὶ συμποτικὰ τῶν ἁρμο-
νίων; ίσατι, ὃν τίς, καὶ λεύκης, αἰτήν χαλαράν καλοῦσαν. The terms refer
to pitch: ἀνεμίζεσθαι (χαλαράν) = low, low-
pitched, στόχοις = high, high-strung. See Pratinas Πραγ. 5: μῆκος στόχων ἔκα
cει, μῆκος τοῦ ἀνεμίζεραι ισατί μινάσατα, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέσας...πάντως ἀνομίαν αἴδητε τοῦ
μελών...πρεπῇ τοῦ πάνω ἀναδύεται λαμβάναται ἀνοιχτὰ ἁρμονία (Аθεμ. xiv. 624 f).
Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is
described as intermediate to 'high-pitched
Ionian,' and 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 § 23 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην
π. Amongst others, no doubt, Aristoc
to refers to Damon mentioned in n. (1054),
i.e. Exc. iv p. 630, whose inquiry into
the different effects (ἐπισύνες and πάθος) of
the various modes and rhythms, proba-
bly a special work on the subject, is
quoted as an authority by Plato Kep. III.
402 b (ср. IV. 424 c). Also to the author
of that arrangement of the Modes which
he has adopted c. 7 § 3 (? Aristocles,
see n. (1083); probably also to his fellow-
pupil Heracleides of Heraclea in the
Pontus Athen. xiv. 624 c, who preferred
to call the three chief Modes by Greek
names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon
was also a politician, an associate of
Pericles: most probably it was he who
started the idea of providing pay for the
Dicares and Bouleuates (μαθηταὶ δικαστικῶν,
μ. βουλευτῶν), as Wilamowitz Heracleis
XIII. 1886. p. 318 ff. has shown. Ср. II.
12. 4. 6. (408). See 'Aθ. Pol. c. 37 § 4,
p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν
χορήγην (κ. τ. τὴν Κίμωνος) ἀπολαμβάνων
μὲν ὁμοία, συμβολοδέσατο αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου
τοῦ Οίλεθος (δὲ ἔλθεν τῶν πολλῶν καθε
tηῆς εὐθυς τῆς Περιπλεύς, βιοὶ καὶ ψυχράκιαν
αὐτῶν ἔστερον), ἐτελ τοῦ ἄδηλον διδότοι
πολλῶς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατειχέσασθα
μαθησοφόρος τῶν δικαστήρων: also Πραγ. 364,
368 Rose in Phyt. Per. c. 4, c. 9 and Phyt.
Plutarch however may have confused
Damon the musician with a Damonides,
the politician (Gompers).

7 τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων κτλ.] "As with
the different Modes, so is it with the
different times or measures. Some
measures have rather a grave character, some
a brisk one: of the latter, again, the
movements are sometimes less, sometimes more
refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music,
see Exc. iv p. 635. С. Susem. (1066)
V (VIII). 5. 25] 1340 a 42—1340 b 16. 597

10 φορτικωτέρας ἐχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). (V)

11 <καὶ τῆς ἑοκείς συγγενείας ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ

12 τοῖς ρυθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασί τῶν σοφῶν, οἱ

§ 24 19 <μὲν ἀρμονίαις εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ ἀρμονίαις > ἐκ

11 μὲν ὁμοταινών φανερῶν ὅτι δύναται ποιῶν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς

12 ἤδε ἡ μουσική παρασκευάζει, εἴ δὲ τούτο δύναται ποιεῖν,

δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παθέντων εἰν αὐτῇ τῶν νέων.

§ 25 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρμόττουσα πρῶς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαῖτην ἡ δι-

15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς οἷς μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἠλικίαν

ἀνήγευσαν ὑπερέκοιτον ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσις τῶν

16 ἐλευθεριωτέρας apparently Γ Αρ. || 17 καὶ τα...19 ἀρμονίαις transposed by Böckler to follow 10 ἐλευθεριωτέρας. See Introd. p. 90 || 17 cognatio ad animam one codex of William's translation, as if Γ had <πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν> τάς ἀρμονίας ||

18 <ὁμία> εἶναι Αρτ., <μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς> εἶναι Conring, <πρὸς ἡμᾶς> εἶναι (? Reiz,< πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν> εἶναι Bk.2, adopting another conjecture of Reiz, perhaps the best || 14 ἐστι Γ Αίδ. ἐστι Π1, ἔχει all other authorities || γάρ Susm., δὲ Γ Π1 Bk. Bk. Susm.1 in the text || ἀφόβωτος Π4 L'Ald. || 16 ἐν ἔνθεντος Π4, ἔν ἄνωτερο Π4 L'

17 καὶ τῆς ἑοκείς...19 ἀρμονίαις] The transposition is recommended by Böckler for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be ample justification: see Böckler's own remarks p. 32 (cited above Introd. p. 95 n. s).

17 συγγενεία Butcher compares Pl. Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία ἑγγεγενή ἔχουσα φόρος ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιοίδεις. 'Musical tones and measures have a certain affinity'—the context plainly shows the meaning to be 'with the soul': but the extraordinary brevity and allusive-ness of Aristotle's style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text-books, οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, were composed, it should be remembered, for the members of the school; in their peculiar terminology, Diels observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils possess the key: and he compares Galen De sophism. xiv. 885 K. συγγενέσθη δέ τὸ τοιαύτα τάχος τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σχετικῶν ἐκφράσεων τὰ πολλά καὶ δὲ τὸ πρὸς τούτο ἀκροατά ὑπὲρ γράφεται.

18 πολλοί τῶν σοφῶν] This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, Aristothenes, who had previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and Dioclesarchus held this same view without any essential difference: see Zeller Phil. d. Griechen 1.8 p. 444 (ed. 4 p. 413), II. ii.3 p. 888 ff. Eng. tr. Pre-Socratics t. p. 476. Susem. (1887) The earliest evidence is Plato Phaedo 85 e, on which see the note of Mr Archer Hind who thinks Simmias must be the exponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in De Anima 1 c. 4 assumes that ἀρμονία = κράτος, a blending of diverse or opposite elements (Λεων τα τῶν μυθών σύνθεσις): and so Simmias in one place of the Phaedo 86 b, though again he compares the soul to the music of tune i.e. something immaterial played upon the material lyre, which answers to the body. The present passage certainly favours the latter interpretation of the ambiguous term ἀρμονία.

19 οἱ δὲ ἀρμονίαις] Pl. Phaedo 93 c; the soul has in it virtue, which is a harmony. Cp. Susenbhl Plat. Phil. 1. p. 440 L. 442. Susem. (1888) § 24 11 φανερῶν ὅτι κτλ.] The problem of § 15, 1340 a b, is thus solved. And in b 16 we have an echo of 1340 a 14.

§ 25 14 ἔστι γὰρ] Quae secundum causam afferunt, car ad juvenem pote stirium etiam aptissima sit musicae exercitatio. Quare hoc quoque loco γὰρ pro δὲ scribendum esse erediderim. Susem.

15 η δὲ μουσική φύσει κτλ.] "Music
has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. Susam. (1059)
c. 6 Practical instruction in music is indispensable: §§ 1, 2. Nor is some measure of skill in execution unstrictible or degrading: §§ 3—8. provided sound instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course; §§ 9—16.
§ 1 20 χειρουργούντας Apparently only here and c. 7§ 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 κεύ
νοιτά τος ἑργών, where ἑργά = musical performances, as below b. 36 f. and in Nic. Eth. x. 9, 1181 a 20.
§ §§ 9, 10 with n. (1050). Susam. (1060)
23 πολλὰν ἔχει διαφοράν] See c. 2 § 6. Here 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: multum praestat.
23 ἐν γὰρ τι κτλ.] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. § 7, 1239 b 2 ff. cp. n. (1016, 1045). Susam. (1061)
§ 2 26 διατριβήν] Occupation; something analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4 n. (1024); cp. Döring p. 137. Susam. (1062)
Δραχύτα] A famous Pythagorean phi-
losopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see vii (v). 7. 2 n. (1592), for its fortunes Ib. § 7 n. (1517), for its constitution vii (vi). § 10 n. (1441); also n. (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times στρατηγός, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. viii. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. vi. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. viii. 79, 21). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. xii. 519 b). The battle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. l. c.), cp. Aelian Var. Hist. xii. 15, Suidas s. v. 'Ἀρχύτας, Poll. ix. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-

οικεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἢν διδασαί τοὺς παιδίους, ὅπως (VII) χρώμενοι ταύτη μνήμη καταγρώσοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν
οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡμυγάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἔστω ἄρ-
29 φούτοι τοῖς ἁπτομένων τῶν παιδίων, ἵπτο τοῖς αὐτών
τῆς, καὶ λόγια πρὸς τοὺς

§ 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδιστεῖν τὴν μονοκείμενον ὁποῖος ὁπότε καὶ κοι-
νωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φαινομέν ἐκ τῶν τοιαύτων τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ 2
31 τὸν ἐπιμέλεια, πρωτότοκον μὲν γὰρ, (p. 160)
ἐπει τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεὶ τῶν ἔργων, διά τοῦτο χρὴ νέων
μὲν ὁποῖα ἡμῖν παιδιομένων τῶν καὶ ἀφείδεσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ

27 γίνεσθαι Γ Π, λέγεθαι Κοραίων, wrongly || 29 ἀρμόδιον ἀπὸ τοῦ πα-
τός Π II 30 Bk. || 30 παιδίων Π, παιδίων Λ', ΛΤ., Παίδιων with all other authorities

Ar. Bk. || 32 καὶ omitted by Π, [καὶ] Susem., || 37 γενομένων Rez Bk.3, perhaps M, γενομένων Π, γενομένως with the other authorities Bk.3 and perhaps Γ (factor William)

tainly not genuine, see Westphal Μετ. 2. ed. Π. p. 71. But at any rate the science of Geometry was substantially adv.
anced by him (Procl. on Eucl. p. 19).

In particular we know his interesting at-
tempt at solving the problem of squaring
88. 83). He was also the first to treat Mechanics methodically according to geometrical principles (Diog. Laer. I. c.,
cp. Favor. in Gell. x. 12. 9. L., Vitruv. vii. Praf.). See Harstein De Archytas Tran-
scendit fragmentis philosophicis (Leipzig 1833), Gruppe ʻOn the Fragments of
Archytasʻ (Berlin 1840), Zeller op. c. Π
p. 257. 111. ii. p. 88 f. 91 f. 113 f.
Susem. (1063)

30 Learning to play an instrument will keep them out of mischief.

§ 3 33 τὸ βιβλίον τρέπον] The fortific-
ations of the city are to serve as an
The Lydian Mode suits youthful singers

Δὲ τὸ δύνασθαι λόγῳ ἔχων ἑαυτὸ καὶ πα-
θιδα, c. 7 § 15, 1342 b 30 f. Aristotle's
own account of Properity Topics v. 5. 8,
135 a 13, is vague: ταύτω ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν
tο κρίνειν. The above usages in this
treatise seem to justify the writer of Eth.
Encl. (πi. 1. 1. 1233 a 34. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
πρέπον ἐν λόγῳ ἔστιν, εἰπ. 1233 b 7 καὶ
ἀκρίβει ἐστὶν) in making grace or charm
the leading feature.

34 διορίζει καὶ λέγει] Define and
refute the objections of those who maintain
that to take up music practically is de-
grading. The absolute use of λόγος
instead of λέοντος λόγον, ἄριστον recurs b 41;

cp. Μετ. N. 2. 5. 1089 a 3, λόγος καὶ
ὁμαλα βαδίσαι τὸ ἕνα, κριτ. 11. 25. 1,
1402 a 34. 26. 3. 1405 a 36. Aristotle's
own explanation of this metaphor is
explicit enough: ἡ γάρ ἐστερον εὐγραμμά
λόγος τῶν πρότερον ἀπορομένων ἑστὶν.
λόγος δ᾽ ὁμαλὸν ἄριστον ἄριστον τοῦ δικαίου
Μετα. B. 1. 2. 995 a 28.

35 βιβλίον] Repeated § 5, b 41,
§ 6, 1234 a 7. Comp. notes (103, 984,
1080). Susem. (1065)

§ 4 Some degree of skill in execution
is needed to make a connoisseur.

36 τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν] Comp. nn.
(1016, 1046, 1061). Susem. (1066)
37 προβάλλεται δὲ γενομένῳ) Ex-
cept at a drinking party, or in jest c. 5
§ 8 n. (1027). See also c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with
n. (1113); iv (vii). 17. 11 n. (966). Comp.
Intro. p. 56. Susem. (1087)
39 χαίρειν ὅρθος διὰ τῆς μάθησιν τὴν γενεμένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι (VII)
§ 5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἢν τινες ἐπιτιμῶμεν ὡς παιδεύσεις τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσουσιν, οὐχ ἑλπίζω σκέψαμενοι μέχρι τε πόσων τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τούτος ἀρετήν
1341 α' παιδευμένων πολιτικῆς, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐν ποίησις ὄργανοι τῆς μάθησιν
§ 6 ποιητῶν, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός, ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως, οὐδὲν γὰρ καλλεῖ τρόπον τινάς τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τῷ λεχθεῖν.

οὐκ ἔστω τούτῳ ὅτι δεὶ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μὴν ἐμποδίσωσιν πρὸς τόσον πράξειν, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάπαναυσον καὶ ἀξιόσηδον πρὸς τὰς πολημικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀξιόσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς μάθησις ἴδιαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρῆσις ὡστεροὶ. οὕτω μεταβάνοι δὲ ἀν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τούς ἀγώνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συνείσπουν διαπονοῦν, μὴ τὰ βασιλεία καὶ περίττα τῶν ἔργων, ἀν δὲν ἐλλειπεῖν eis τούς ἀγώνας, εἰκὸς ἐν τῶν
§ 8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ ἄν δύνονται χαίρειν τοῖς καλῶς μέλεις καὶ ῥυθμωῖς, καὶ 15 μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅστε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνας ἔφοιτον ἐς δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

39 γνωμένων Μ' Ρ' Π'
1341 α' παιδευμένων  πολιτικῶν Μ' Ρ' Π' ἢ μαθησί¬  ὡς δῆμος—χρῆσις Bojesen, χρῆ¬
σεις—μαθησίας Π' Αρ. Βκ. Συσεμ.1 in the text. But Spengel transposed ἱδή and ὡστερον, which is also possible. Schneider, who discovered the error, proposed to transposo 8 πολημικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀξιόσεις and 9 χρῆσεις; [χρῆσεις] and [μαθησίας]
1342 Götting || 13 παιδίων Μ' Ρ' Π' καὶ inserted after ἄλλα by Π' Ρ' Βκ., “probably right, though hard to interpret” Newman, ἄλλα <κατὰ> Madvig || 15 κοινοῦ Μ' Ρ' Π' (corrected by p')

§ 5 The censure passed on music implies that the pursuit of excellence as a performer degrades the youthful citizen into a professional. It is remarked in Exc. I. p. 670, that the feeling of the Greeks in the fourth century towards artistic specialists seems to have varied with the eminence of the artist much more than it does amongst us. While the artists of genius were recognised as great men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic, who had left the true political life for a bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.

1341 α' τὰ παιδεία ται καὶ περιττὰ
"Brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty." Even in the present day it would be sound advice to leave these out of the musical education designed for the young. SUSEM. (1068)
12 καὶ τὸν ἐλλειπεῖν εἰς τοὺς ἀγώνας κτλ. Comp. Athen. XIV. 629 b, καὶ τὰ σχῆματα μετάφρασεν ἐπείδη (sc. ἐκ τῆς κεραμουμαίας) εἰς τοὺς χοροὺς, ἐκ τῶν χορῶν εἰς τὰ παλαιστράς.
§ 8 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] i.e. the practice of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited μὲχρι περ. = only until.
14 Comp. with this stock phrase c. § 17—19. This tends to form character.
15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. c. § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1040) on τῷ
The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. 

The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined. The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined.
Aristotle's view that music should be used as a form of recreation and as a means to improve the hearers of music in respect of their musical or general education.

31 The change of ἐτι to ἐκεῖθεν is thus defended Quaest. crit. coll. p. 421: Aristotles dixit quidem v. 17 sqq. δήλων δ' έκ τῶν καί τῶν ὁρισμάτων καί διά τούτων καί τῶν ὁρισμάτων καί τῶν έκκεντρών. Secundum hunc habet causas. Ergo hunc quoque loco non etsi scrisserit, sed εκείθεν. SUSEM.

32 ὄργανοι] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3, 4, 5, 6. Cp. also c. 5 §§ 22, 23, Excursus IV. p. 628 mm. (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ὅλων = expressing character, ὄργανοι should mean expressing orgies or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music interprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 3 § 17.

33 κάθαρσιν] Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instuct."

34 κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or currying emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1339 a 16 ff., b 13 πό¬ τερον παπαλεια ἧ παπαλεια ἡ διαγωγήν sc. δόμαται? For the present we are only told that it differs from παπαλεια, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no information as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (παπαλεια, ἀράγωγος), or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγή, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus v. n. (1101). SUSEM. (1073)

Besides its literal meaning cleansing (καθαρσις) which is necessarily vague, κάθαρσις has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, purifying=iuslatoio, expiatio; (2) medical (or rather pathological) purging. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle: but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, emotional relief followed by repression of the emotions. See the passages cited in the Note on κάθαρσις" p. 641 ff.

35 κάθαρσις is ακολυφικός. "Besides, it happens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here Νομος approximates to the meaning of φωνή. cp. n. (26).

36 Probably έκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withdrew it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1331 a 25.

§ 11 28 σπολαγκάτες] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligently: cp. viti(v). Il. 5 κατάδονος σπολαγκάτες. 'Better fitted by their increased resources for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they began to lay hold on every form of learning without distinction, pushing their research onward. "To this stirring generation, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus" (Newman).
30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, (VI) πᾶσιν ἦπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλὰ ἐπιζήτουντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλιτικὴν ἔγγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.  § 12 καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονί τις χορηγός αὐτὸς ἤλθησε τῷ χορῷ, καὶ περί Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχοριάσας ὠστε σχεδὸν οἱ 35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς ὁδήγον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος ὁν ἄνθηκε Ὁράστιππος Ἑκατηνίδη χορηγήσας. ὅστερον δὲ ἀναδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πειρᾶς αὐτῆς, βέλτιον ἔργον. 31 ἦπτοντο Μ΄ and apparently Γ, ἦπτοντο Σβ || 33 αὐτοῦ omitted by Π (supplied in the margin by p1), [αὐτοῦ] Susem. 3 || 35 Ἐλευθέρων Schneider, perhaps rightly 36 Ἑκατηνίδη Ροσσ., Ἑκατηνίδη Λ.  § 12 33. The χορηγός was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 χορηγήσας. Susem. (1076) τῷ χορῷ This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For dramas proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. Susem. (1076) 34 ἑπχοριάσας As in 1335 a 16 n. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre. 35 ἔδωκαν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος. There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Diphilus. 36 πίνακος δὲ ἀνέθηκε κτήτης The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magnes, Pind. 3 § 5, 1443 a 34 (cp. s. 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantes and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book IV of the Nic. Eth. (IV. 2. 20. 1173 a 13 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast; but we know the title of one of his works 'the Satyrs' (Athen. 1. 96 c). See Meineke Fragm. com. Gr. 1. p. 35 ff., 11. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasippus was his choragus, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word πίνακας refers to the custom which compelled the victorious choragus to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a brazen tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (πῖνακος) the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Paus. 1. 20. 1 ff., cp. Plut. Them. 5, Demost. xxxi. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actor are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choragus belonged and the species of drama represented. Susem. (1076) See however Haigh Attic Theatre p. 32 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choragi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (πῖνακας). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the man in Theophrastus, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden scroll (Char. 22 ταινία ξύλινη) in commemoration of his victory." 37 ὅστερον δὲ ἀναδοκιμάσθη] Plutarch, Vite Alcib. c. 7, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words ἀδελφός μοι ὁ Θεόλαος παῖδας οὐ τῷ ἱππεῖ διαλέγεσθαι. He adds that both by jest and earnest Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of learning the flute: ἵνα ἐξεπεσέ, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων διετριβάτων καὶ προσηλθηκέν ταινίαν ἐλάλησα. The connexion of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous ἀδελφος who were applauded at Athens as were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Antigenidas and Timotheus, were Boeotians.
§ 13 συντείνον ὅμως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὄργανων τῶν ἄρχων,
40 οἷον πριγίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἕδων συντείνοντα
tῶν ἀκούσας τῶν χρομέων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
σαμβδικά, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπίστημῆς.

§ 14 εὐλόγος δὲ ἤγετε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχων
μεμβραλογμένων. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὴν Ἀθηνὰν εὑρίσκας ἄπο-

§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχων, sc. ἀντίθε-
kωμάθην.
40 οἷον πριγίδες κτλ] All foreign
to the similar reference to legend 11. 9. 8, 1369
b 28, n. (288).

εὑρίσκας ἄποτβαλεῖν] The Satyr Mar-
syas is said to have picked up the flute
which Athene threw away, and to have
played upon it: and for this the goddess
punished him. The earliest extant allu-
sion to this legend is in a dithyramb
'Marysai' by Melanippides Φράγ. 2. 3 µὲν Ἀθήνα | τούτων θρήσκευς θῷς ἀπὸ
χειρῶν | εἰς τοὺς ἄρχον ἀλεξά, σάμωτα Νέας:

§ 14 6 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κτλ] "But not
what a more likely reason is the fact, that
instruction in the flute contributes nothing
to the culture of the intelligence. For
to Athene we ascribe science and art."

SUSEM. (1079) For δάσκου επ. n. (1033) on φάτνης: it has been
opposed to ἔθνος c. 2 § 1, and
in III. 11. 2, 1281 b 7. With περιτεύομαι in this sense Bonitz joins Ῥήτ. 1. 9. 40,
1368 a 29, μέχρις περιτεύειν (ταῖς πρᾶξεσι)
οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐθήσεως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ τῆς ἔποιτα (VI) στήμεν περιστερέων καὶ τῆς τέχνης.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ἐργασίων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζοντες ἑπάνω τῶν τεχνικῶν παιδείας (τεχνικὴ) δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἐναποτελεῖσθαι χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῶν ἀκούοντων ἱδεῖν, καὶ ταῦτας φορτικὰς, διότι οὔ των ἐκεῖθεν κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν.

16 ἀλλὰ θετικά ἐποιεῖται, καὶ βασιλικοῦς δὴ συμβαίνει γένεσθαι πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοτὸς πρὸς ὑμῖν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· σοφὸς (p. 140) ἐκατότητι φορτικὸς ὁμοιαλλὴκα πρὸς τὴν μοναστικὴν, ὡστε καὶ ταῦτα τεχνικά τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοῦ.

7 τε ποιοῦσιν τινὰς ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα δίδακτυ τίνας κινήσεως; σκεπτόμενος [δὴ] ἦ, πέρι τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τός ὑσθαμόν, 2 καὶ πρὸς παιδείας πώτερον ταῖς ἀρμονίαις πᾶσαις χρηστῶν.

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk. Susem.1 in the text, cist Ar. || 10 παῖδαν II (emended with yr. prefixed by P1 in the margin) || 11 τῆς τῷ P45 L2. Alm. || αὐτῷ Γ, αὐτόν II || 13 δεδεικεῖσθαι, Susem. || 14 βασιλικοῦς Korases, omitting the comma before καὶ || 15 ποιεῖ τοὺς Lindau (a very rare word), illius modi Ar. as if he had read τοῦτον for ποιεῖ τοὺς, τοῦτον; or φορτικὸς? Susem. || αὐτοῦ τέ ποιοῦ τινας διότι σικείταται Flach || 19 δὲ omitted by P4, [δὴ] Schneider Susem.1, 2, δὲ M* Reiz, δὲ P3, δὴ Susem. But it is a repetition of δὲ in the protasis || 71 τῷ P3, τῷ Reiz || 20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδεία] Bonitz, παῖδαν? Orelli Aristot. Pidagypp. pp. 110—116 || ταῖς ἀρμονίαις after χρηστῶν Π3 P5 Bk.

§§ 15, 16 With these two sections cp. nn. (103, 483, 1065): also c. 7 §§ 6, 7 n. (1097), and supra III. 11 2 f., 1381 b 3 n. (505 b). Susem. (1980).

12 φορτικῶς] Because the spectator is φορτικός, b. 16. Comp. Pseudo. c. 26 § 1, 1461 b 17 ff. el. γὰρ ἡ ἑττήσεως φορτική (sc. μέλος) λοιπόν, τοῦτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων θεταί: also Lato III. 655 D (quoted in n. on 1341 a 15).

14 ὑποκειμένως] Supra III. 1337 b 21 n. §§ 14 συμβαίνει γινέσθαι Cr. σφάδειν γὰρ διελάθη κατά c. 6 §§ 6, 1341 a 4 f.

17 αὐτοῖς τε] This is rightly opposed to τὰ σώματα. But whether ποιοῦ τινας 'of a certain character' should be emended to τοῦτοις τινας φορτικοῖς is altogether uncertain. See Quartz. crit. coll. p. 421. Susem.

C. 7 Which musical modes and measures are to be accepted, (1) in general §§ 2—7, (2) for education, §§ 8—15. Which is more important for educational purposes, melody or rhythm (time). The latter question is not considered.

19 With σκεπτομένος commences the apodosis corresponding to a protasis ἔοις βλ. κακοῖσιν, b 9—18: so that unless δὲ is changed to δὴ, it had better (with Schneider and Bonitz) be omitted: Quaer. crit. coll. p. 421. The difficulties of this long period are discussed by Bonitz Arist. Stud. III. pp. 95—99 (61—63). Susem.

Bonitz suggests b so the exclusion of καὶ πρὸς παιδεία, (1) because no satisfactory sense can be given to καὶ, (2) because two questions are distinguished, and it is the second one, beginning at ἐκεῖνα, which has to do with Education. Further he is inclined to extend the period as far as b 23 πρὸς, reading ἐκεῖνος ὅταν at 23, and making ὑσθαμὸν τάς χρηστῶν begin the apodosis to this (secondary) protasis b 23 ἐκεῖνος ὅταν... κακοῖσιν, on the ground that it is impossible for ἐκεῖνος to introduce a second protasis referring to the preceding apodosis σκεπτομένος ἐκεῖνα.
21 καὶ πάσι τοῖς μυθοῖς ἢ διαμετέρεσι, ἐπείτα τοὺς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπανοῦντε, πότερον τοῦ αὐτῶν διορισμῶν θέσουμεν ἢ τινὰ ἔτερον, τρίτον δὲ, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ μυθῶν οὔσαν, τούτων δὲ ἐκατέρων σὺ δὲ ἑγεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον προαιρετέων μᾶλλον τῇ εὐμελῇ μουσικῇ ἢ τῇ εὐθυθείᾳ.

§ 2 νομίσαστες δὲν ποιλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἐνίου καὶ τῶν έκ φιλοσοφίας σῶσει τύχανοσιν εἰμπειρίωσιν ἐνσώτους τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν 30 καθ ἐκάστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδοθὸς ἥσσεν εἰς τοῖς βουλομένωι ταρκέτοις, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλομεν, τοὺς τόπους

21 καὶ πάσι τοῖς μεθομοῖς omitted by P4 P5 S 50 T 31 L 32 || 23 τρίτων δὲ (ἢ P4 L) before τινὰ ἔτερον Γ II Bk., τρίτων δὲ with the transposition Susem. δὲν untranslated by Ar., [dei] Koraeas; Bonitz (Arist. Stud. iii. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be corrupt || 25 δόκως after ἔχει P5 31 P3 Bk., cp. i. 1339 a 15 || [καθ] ? Susem. || 31 νομικῶς in genera Ar., γενικῶς Bas. in the margin, logikos Koraeas, συντόμως Flach || δέλομεν P4 S 50 T and M* (1st hand), δέλομεν or διέλομεν apparently Γ

21 τοῖς ... διαπανοῦσι.] The dativus commodi, not the dative after τῶν άδρατων. "Whether for those whose work is educational we shall make the same division." After this ἢ τρίτων δὲν τινὰ ἔτερον Γ II Bk. seems hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be understood by τρίτων? Not to speak of the harshness, if not impossibility, of supplying an infinitive for δέν from θερμός.


25 καὶ τότερον κτλ.] In the Introd. p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the discussion of this question is no longer extant in our present treatise. Susem. (1082)

The whole passage may be rendered: We have still to consider the question of musical modes and rhythms: whether all the modes and all the rhythms should be employed or a distinction made between them: secondly, whether the same distinction will serve for those whose work is teaching, or whether we shall make a new one: thirdly, as we find Music to consist of melody and rhythm, and the influence which each of them has upon education ought not to be overlooked, [also] whether the preference must be given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.

§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention to the close similarity of phrase between this passage and iv(vii). 1. 2, 1323 a 22. 28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ.] See snn. (1055, 1058, 1103). Perhaps intended to intimate that Plato passed judgment on these matters without sufficient musical knowledge. See § 9. Susem. (1082)


The passage from the Metaphysics runs thus: ἦσαν μὲν τά ταῦτα χαριν περὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων αὐτῶν ἄνυπα καὶ διὸν νόμου χάριν. Here ἀνυπα seems to mean 'in general terms,' much as καθόλως (so Eudemus συντόμως in the parallel passage E. E. 1. 8, 1317 b 19), and not with Bonitz = simply (a sense nearly akin to χαριν : quaestione de numero et de principiis cum hac de ideis quaestione nonnullam vult coniungi). The precise reference in νόμου too is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's own practice of criticizing his predecessors: Bernays rendered νόμου χάριν by διὸς causae: Dios disapproving of this remarks that νόμου is not διὸς, nor does the phrase διὸς χάριν, and prefers to render it "to comply with the prevailing custom, the fashion." It seems best to modify Bernays' interpretation a little. The original meaning is "only so far as to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e. 'under compulsion and reluctantly.' Other authors use the phrase thus, of what is
\[ § 3 \text{μόνον εἰσόθεντες περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαφοράν ἄποκρι-}


χρήμα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαμορφοῖ τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἡδικά τὰ δὲ πρακτικά τὰ δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, 35 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἐκκατα τοῦτοι οἰκεῖαι


done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilus Ζαγηρόφος Fr. 2 l. 13 apart Athen. vii. 392 a.: ἄφθιν ἡμέρας τοιοῦ ἐγὼ πτινη, ἕλαν δὲν ἔναμ χάρα, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays Die Dialoge p. 150, Forchhammer Aristotelis und die exozr-}


ischen Roden p. 54 f.; Diels Monatsh. der Berl. Akad. 1883, p. 486, Susemihl in Neue Jahrb. f. Philol. CXXIX. 1884, p. 273. τοὺς τέτοιους With the plural comp. Nic. Eth. x. 9, 1. 1776 b 19 n. "Containing ourselves with a formal discussion in outline only." \[ § 3 \] The construction is ἐξε τὸ...ἀπο-}


dεξιάμεθα... ὡς διαρριμφε... καὶ τὰ... τοιαύτα, φαμέν ὡς μὲν... χρήσιν (καὶ γαρ... ἄν-}


δαιμον... all of which is the protasis, the apodosis beginning with φαινεται. Trans-


late: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, scenic, ecstatic (literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy), as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by purga-


tion will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, thirdly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."


34 τὰ μὲν ἡδικα κτλ. This division is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. ἤδος, πράξει, πάθος: characters, actions, emotions (c.f. §§ 18—22, iv[VII]. 17, 10, ep. n. (963), Post. c. 1 § 5 § 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with mm. (1060, 1096, 1101), ep. nn. (1047, 1054). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions as such, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Py-


thian νόμος (see Hillel "Sakadas the flute-


player" Rhein. Mus. XXXI. 1875, p. 79 ff., Gahrmaier Der pythische νόμος fährt. für Philol. Suppl. N. S. VIII. p. 309 ff.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the πρακτικὴ ἀρμονία express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that πράξει includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. iv[VII]. 17, 10. 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSM. (1984)


The second of the three classes (πρακ-


τικὴ ἀρμονία) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious: the third the wild excited airs, at once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian νόμος, or arming for the fray, as in a lost tragedy: Probl. xix. 48, ἢ σε ἔξη ἢ μὲν ὑπορρυμως πρακτικαὶ, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἔραινῃ Πυθαγόρ. [cp. Nauck, Fragm. p. 765 a ἢ ἔδωκεν καὶ η ἐξέσολα εν τῷ γε ἔραινῃ].
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Θ. 7.

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ἀλλαν πρὸς ἄλλο μέλος τιθέασι, φαμέν δὲ οὐ μιᾶς ἐν ὀψελείας τῇ μονοκή χρῆσαι δεῖν ἄλλα καὶ πλειονῶν Ῥμ. (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ γομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς 40 ποιητικῆς ἐρόμεν σαφέστερον—πρὸς τὸν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγά

πρὸς ἄνευς τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν διαφέρον ὦν χρήστεοι μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸν πάσας χρήσης ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν παιδείας ταῖς ἡθικῶταταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκράσιας ἐτέρων

36 μέλος Tyrwhitt (on Poet. c. 6), μέρος ΠΠ Πκ. Susen. in the text; Koraes


39 πάλιν δὲ [ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the Poetics is no longer extant. Vahlen gives good reasons for believing that it came after the discussion of comedy now lost: see Arist. Aufsätze III. p. 13 ἐκ. (Wiener Sitzungsber. LXXXVII. p. 293 f.) SUSEN. (1088)

40 τρίτων δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν] At first sight there is a difficulty, if κάθαρσις and διαγωγή constitute separate ends. What else than διαγωγή, as described above, see n. (1000), could express the aim of the concerts and musical exhibitions which are productive of κάθαρσις more than μῦθος (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that it is strange to find, in the received text, διαγωγή apparently explained by ἀνάπαυσις with which it is so often contrasted. Nor is it possible to reconcile the three advantages attendant on the use of music here with the three ends of musical education enumerated c. 5 §§ 3—4 and easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp. Bernays Rhein. Mut. xiv. 1889 p. 371 f., Ueber die tragische Katharsis (ed. 2) p. 125 f. See however Exc. v. p. 638. If the two passages in c. 3 refer exclusively to music as a means of education, all the three ends there given (διαγωγής, παιδείας ἄνευς, ἀνάπαυσις ἀνάπαυσις) are summed up under the single phrase παιδείας ἄνευς of our context. That is, though preparatory to

διαγωγή (since those who have not learned when young can never fully enjoy music), the educational use must be considered as distinct. Then there is further, an emotional or pathological use (ἐκθέτης now introduced for the first time. Plato that does not attend on the music played in education. It should be noted that Zeller (c. p. 771 Π. 1) insists fourfold use here: he would separate (3) πρὸς διαγωγήν, the following c. (4) πρὸς ἄνευς τε καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν.

1342 a 3 ταῖς ἡθικῶταταις] In the class the Dorian Mode stands first according as Aristotle says himself § 8. But Excurs. IV n. (1012) it seems strange should speak of more than one ἡθική ἀρμονία, since only the Aeolian and Dorian can go with the Dorian; indeed even the Aeolian forms a transition to the ἡθικῶταται: cp. n. (1103). P1 in Excurs. IV it would appear that Lydian, Hypo-Phrygian (Ionian), and properly Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (ϕρύγιον) this was identical with the Mixolydian see pp. 630, 631. Susen. (1086)

πρὸς δὲ ἀκράσιαν ἐτ. Χ.1 "But listening to while other people πάλιν δὲ ἀκράσιαν is a conveniently genera
under which καθαρός and διαγώγη can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς Here καὶ = 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαὶ and εὐθυναστικαὶ ἄριστοι such others as, though ψυχικοί, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἰδιωματικά would be exceptions: yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes, as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see n. (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in Jährb. f. Phil. 1863, p. 416 is admitted by Döring Philologus xxvii. p. 774, though I regret that in Kunstwiss. der Aris. p. 183 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared Philol. xxv. p. 201.) Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἰδιωματικὰ should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. n. (1054), and § 5, παράθυρον with n. (1096). Susen. (1087, 1088)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Zeller, p. 774. n. (5).

§§ 4, 5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic 'modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 156): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in παράθυρα, the 'ecstatic' in καθαρός [see however n. 1097], the πρακτικαὶ perhaps as military music. Besides this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two species ψυχικὰ and πρακτικαὶ are concerned: in respect of ecstatic music it sounds a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term καθαρός as well, Aristotle proceeds with §§ 4, 5. This enables him to give the explanation of καθαρός in general terms (αἵλως) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, κορμάσματι. The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristides Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 332. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seizure by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take τε τῶν ἱερῶν μελών with διάφορα: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hagsor p. 143 f. 7. οἷον ἰδιωματικὰ καὶ πρακτικὰ. From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here added not with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my Intro. to the Poetics pp. 36—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See c. § 18. n. (1047), 7 § 3. (1084), § 5. (1096), § 8. (1101). Susen. (1089)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: Intro. p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fruited spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Bernays in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror
8 ταύτης τὴς κυνήσεως κατακόχυμοι τινες εἰσίν ἐκ τῶν δ' Ἰερῶν μελῶν ὀρμών τοῦτον, τοὺς χρήσαντας τοῖς ἐξοργαμα-τίζοσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθιστάμενοι ὀστήρα τιταίρεις τυ-χώτας καὶ καθάροις. ταύτο δ' τούτῳ ἀναγκαίον πάσχειν ε


(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακόχυμοι 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, κορμυμαθής. Plato uses κατακόχυμοι for inspiration, Παραδ. 245 α, ίοεν 536 C. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the ms. agree here and 1969 b 30 in an irational form. But in Νεὶς Εἰθ. x. 9. 3, 1179 b 9 K gives κατακόχυμοι.)

ἐκ τῶν χ' ἱερῶν μελῶν] Join with καθι-στάμενοι, not with ὀρμῶν. See Bursian's Jahresber. LVII. p. 174 [and Bonitz Ind. Αρ. 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. § 16. See Exc. II. p. 651. Susem. (1080)

9 δὲ τῶν χρήσαντας "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 G. Susem. (1092)

Like κήπης, καθιστάμενος, κορμυμαθής, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. τῆς φαρμακείας χρέσεις, III. 869 εἰμιγιάς χρέσεις, I. 81 τὴν αὐτὴν χρήσαν (remedy, treatment) δὲ προεξε-χεισθάν (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τὴν μονείην χρέσαιν above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maldinin strained strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; Ἰεροταύτης (sc. τὴν ψυχήν) φαίνει εἰς τῇ μελωδίᾳ, ἤτοι καὶ αὐτοῖς μιμήσει τώ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλογών ἀναμνηστέομεν,... ἢ καὶ δή ἀκοὴ [ὀρμῶν] φάςιν τῶν τοῦτο ἀπορητεύομεν. 'The soul must, they say, be wonted by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation of (the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening.'

ζεροταύτης] See ἱεροταύτης, 1341 a 29, n. (1072), and ἱεροταύτης, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). Susem. (1092)

10 καθαρτάμενοι The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Steph. i. u. L. and S. quote only et τε χρήσαν καθ. Hippocr. 97, add i. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle καθαρτασθαί simply means 'to calm oneself,' to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense: e.g. De Memor. c. 2 § 29. 453 a 271, δοκι καὶ ἡγαλ καὶ φάεια, ὅταν τὴν κυνήσεως, αντικειμένων τῶν τοῦ καθαρτασθάντα, De Somm. c. 3 § 25. 461 a 25, δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντο ἀναθροματίζησαν καταφέροντο συνεπεκτάσει. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. κατάστασις Rhet. i. 11. 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1095), p. 640. Susem. (1093)

δότερα λατρείας τυχώτας καὶ καθάροις The δότερα marks the introduction of a metaphor: both λατρεία and καθάροι then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the exciting and not the purgative side of this homoeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homoeopathic element will be least represented. Susem. (1096)

Comp. i. 7. 11, 167 a 7 ff., δὲ τῆς ταύτης (sc. ἐπιμηκίας) ἀδιάφοροι λατρεῖαι. § 8 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in
general, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantism) come only morbid patients: here the world at large is included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as these passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficial effect which frees the 'o'er fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure (μεθ’ ἱδρυῆς).

13 καθ’ δὲντον έπιβάλλει. In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1260 a 19, 1261 b 35 n. Bernays p. 88 (188) shows that the principle of the cure of Bacchic delirium (Corybantism) was observed by Plato (Laws vii. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle," observes Butcher, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion, Bernays p. 46 (164) f.

14 των καθαρων] This implies that the catharsis is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The catharsis of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm' or morbid ecstasy. See the note on καθαρων p. 641. Susem. (1006)

κονφιζέσθαι] For the medical sense see Probl. i. 17, 873 b 29 (of the disease): ii. 21, 868 a 36, b 5; iv. 30, 880 a 33 (of the patient). Cf. Hippocr. i. 177, iii. 715 K. (Döring).

§ 6 15 τα μελη τα καθαρμα] Thus the authorities. Sauppe's emendation τα πρακτικα was adopted in Susem². See Exæequius v. p. 638 f., especially p. 640 n. 1, and generally n. (1086). Susem. (1086)

In handling a locus classicus like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the mss. leaves the sentence enigmatic. (1) Does it merely emphasize τα μελη as opposed to άρμονια, a 4²? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For μελη are mentioned a 9 f., not with. with Thurot Etudes p. 103 that Aristotle as little distinguishes between άρμονια and μελη as a modern critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with μελωμα; see e.g. δ §§ 5, 1341 a 1, 7 §§ 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4—15 must be καθαρισμα. The new species should be πρακτικα—of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is alluded to § 5, a 14—15, and this apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (χρυ άρμαθη) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—15? If so, the 'harmless delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. 2 says that music purges the παθητικας, and affords enjoyment to all. Döring p. 260 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, καθαρας άρμας, of morbid patients (whether suffering from the malady of Bacchic frenzy, or hypochondriac through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music heard at concerts under ordinary circum-

39—2
§ 6 χει χαρά χαθή τοις ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἄρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι • • θετέουν τοὺς τῆς θεατρικῆς μουσικῆς μεταχειρίζομένους ἀγωνιστὰς (ἐπεῖ δὲ θεατὴς διττὸς, δὲ μὲν δεδήθησα καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, δὲ δὲ ζῷον τὸν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συν-

§ 7 Κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγώνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν εἰσὶ δὲ ὅπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παραπεριστρέφονται τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, ὡς τοῖς ἄρμονίαις

16 χορέων Π III (emended in P by corr.) and P (corr.) | 17 θεατέων P S T L Ar. Ald. and Po (corr.) P (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), χρησκο Ed. Müller II, p. 63, χρησκο > θεατέω Sp engel, both plausible: Korees detected the error: νεώτερος J ebb | τοῖς πρὸς S T and P (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed); omitted by M | 18 θεατρικῶν written above the line as a gloss by P, omitted by P Ar. and P (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities t Π 19 δεδήθησα | 21 εἰ ἂν Bk, 3

stances. Bernay translated (from Bekker’s text): “now in the same manner as other means of catharsis the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre” which is intended to provide innocent delight “should come forward with such modes and melodies.” The objection to this is that it is the forced meaning of ψυχα. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in τοῖς τοιούτοις. Busse moreover of this p. 49 accepts the correction προτέτοια.

§ 6 “Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation.”

16 τοιαύταις Namely, καθαρτικὰς: see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 211 f.

17 θεατέων The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if ψυχαθῶν were supplied, or διωκήσατο in place of διωκῶσι. Still the meaning is clear. In τοῖς...μεταχειρίζομένου it is not hard to discover τοῖς αὐτὸ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐργον καὶ τέχνην of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The case shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the Κεραμίκη.

20 in βαναυσών...συγκεκριμένοι As an attribute of θεατρικῶν this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. De Finibus II. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negoti est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or ad Att. iv. 15, 1, ut est ex me et ex te junctus Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 αγώνας καὶ θεωρίας] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 “Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music.”

22 διωκήσατο...συγκεκριμένα) Comp. n. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, n. (105). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art III. 11, 1, n. (165 b). Suskm. (1007)

23 καὶ τῶν ἄρμονίῶν παρεκκλήσεως] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the ‘wailing and mournful’ music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the ‘lax and effeminate’ low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 21, also Exc. iv. n. (1054). Suskm. (1008)
παρεκκλήσεως εἰς καὶ τῶν μελών τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακαλεών

χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν

οἰκείοις, διόστε ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσιάν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς

τὸν θειότητι τῶν τοιούτων τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς

μουσικῆς.· πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὡσπερ ἐχομεῖν, τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τῶν

μελών χρηστῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις, τοιαύτη

ὁ δὲ ἄρμος, παθώσας ἐπίσχετον δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ

κἂν τινα ἁλλὰν ἡμᾶς δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ

διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείαν, ὁ δὲ τῆς τὰ

πολεμεῖα Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρονιμία μόνην


44 παρακεκλήσεως III (emended by p1 in the margin with γρ. prefixed) and P2

38 παιδείας II (emended by p1 in the margin) and P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.)

30 δινάσκει P3-5


44 παρακεκλήσεως] A technical term for varieties of the three genera—
diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See Excursus IV. p. 636. SUSEM. (1899)
25 ποιεῖ δὲ κτλ.] Apell: Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Phil. p. 315 (1) thinks this, in

connexion with N. E. viii. 14, 2, 1154 a 13, points to a division of pleasures into

φυσικόν and ἀναγκαῖον. He compares Epicurus’ division of ἔποιημα and

Nemesis De Naturti Humanae c. 18 γιὰ τὴν

diastēmatōn. 27 τοιούτω τινὶ] I.e. a corrupt, de-

praved style, in which ‘colourings’ and

πινακίδες i.e. transposed scales abound.

§ 3 28 ὡσπερ ἐχομεῖν] In § 3, 1342

8, πρὸς μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην ταῖς ἀθροισμέναις. See Exe. v. p. 638. SUSEM. (1200)

We have now reached the end of the long digression, §§ 4—7, following on

the mention of modes suitable for public performance πρὸς ἀκροατῶν ἐπίτροπον χαρμο-

γοῦστον: we have in fact answered the first

question of c. 7 § 1 πάσαις χρήσιν χρη-

σετοῖς. The connexion of the whole pas-

sage, and the best way of meeting the
difficulties presented by the text, is dis-

cussed Exc. v. p. 638 ff. SUSEM. (1201)
30 πρότερον] In c. § 22, 1340 b 3 ff.

Comp. κ. (1904) p. 638. The previous

statement (ὅτι ἑάν ἐκεῖνος καὶ καθετῆ-

τὸν καὶ καθὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλα πρὸς ἐπίτροπον, ὥσπερ
tοιοῦ ἢ δ. μοῦ ἀρμονία) is not quite to

the same effect. In one sense it includes

more than is found here; cp. κ. (1109).

What has been pointed out n. (1089)
agrees with this. SUSEM. (1102)

δέχεσθαι δὲ δὲ κτλ.] See κ. (1206) for

a conjecture as to the modes here in-


tended. SUSEM. (1108)
katαλείπει μετά τής δωριστή, καί τάτα ἀποδοκυμάσας (VII 1342 b τῶν ὀργάνων τοῦ αὐλῶν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτήν δύναμιν ἢ
φρονιστὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων ἱστεροὶ αὐλῶν εν τοῖς ὀργάνων
§ 10 ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὀργαστικά καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δὲ ἡ ποίη-
σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βασικεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κύριος
ς μᾶλλον τῶν ὀργάνων ἑστὶν εν τοῖς αὐλῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀρμο-
νίων ἐν τοῖς φρονιστὶ μέλεις λαμβάνει ταύτα το πρέπον.
οὖν ὁ διδυμάμβας ἀμολογομένων εἶναι δοκεῖ Φιλόμον.
§ 11 καὶ τούτῳ πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσι οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-
σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόδενος ἐγκεφήρισε ἐν

1342 b 2 φρονιστῇ Γ ‖ 8 δέλματα P4-5 L.

ἐν ὀργάνῳ τε καὶ μὴ βιωμέν ἄλλῳ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ
φρένεις δοτος, ἢ τινὶ τε κεφαλαία τε καὶ
δεόμενος, ἢ τρύχηθεν ἢ διδόψακι καὶ νοεῖ
τόνως, τὸ τοῦτον άλλον δομημένον ἢ
διάδοκοι ἢ μετατίθεσιν ἐκείνον ἐκέχο-
τα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξας ἀπεκτεῖναι, καὶ
μὴ δεμοβάσαν ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνες τοιαῦτα
καὶ μετῆραν εἰς ταύτα τούτους πράσσοντα τοιαῦτα
καὶ τὰ ἀμβλέκοντα ἀνεγώνυμα. ταῦτα δὲ ἀρμο-
νίας βιωμα, ἐκκλησία, διακριτῶν, εὐτυχοῦμεν,
εὐφοροῖς, καὶ ἀόρωπος αὐτὴν 
συγγίγον ὑμεῖς ἄρπασον μᾶλλον ταύτα
καὶ ικέτει. Άστις δὲ μὲν τῶν μουσικῶν
instruments, n. (1971), so in the case of the modes
Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in
truth—see nn. (1086, 1101, 1104, 1109)—
the Dorian Mode is the only one which he
retains for the purpose of moral
education. SUSM. (1106)

§ 34 ἀποδοκυμάσας...τῶν αὐλῶν) Pl.
 kep. vii. 399 D. τί δε; αὐθεντοις ἢ αὐθε-
ντας παραδίδεις εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ ὁ τούτῳ
πολυχρόνωστας καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παραμορφώ
αὐλῶν τυγχάνει δια μέραν; The possible
complexity of its music. SUSM. (1106)

1342 b 3 ἀμφότεροι ὀργαστικά καὶ

We were told this before of the flute, c. 6
§ 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οὐκ έστιν ο αὐλῶν θυσίαν
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργαστικά; it has an in-
toxicating effect, tending not to form, but
to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode
again was described as relatively the most
maddening and ecstatic. c. 5 § 22.
The addition of the more general term
παθητικά = 'passionate' here is a fresh and
striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ
ἔθνουςατικά ἀρμονίαι, are not restricted
to the expression or impression upon
others of Ecstasy pure and simple.
On the contrary, like the flute amongst
musical instruments, they are adapted gen-
erally to pourtray and call up all emotions,
or at least all painful emotions:—in the
words of the text, 'all Bacchic frenzy
and similar mental excitement.' Comp. Exc.
iv, p. 628 and notes (1089, 1047), also
n. (1096) p. 643. SUSM. (1107)

§ 10 Poetry shows this. When the
subject is wild and delirious, as in a
dithyramb, the music is set for the flute
and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode.
The cogency of this illustration depends
on the fact, which must always be borne
in mind, that the Greek poet set his own
words to music (precisely as in the Wag-
erian opera): he also chose his own
dance measures.

§ 5 τῶν δὲ ἀρμονίων ἐν τοῖς...μᾶλλον] See
Thurso p. 103 (cited above p. 611
upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταύτα = βασικεία καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κύ
ριος (subject).

§ 11 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην]
An extraordinary phrase where we should
expect οἱ περὶ τὰ συνειδήματα ὅτε: i.e.
musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz'
words, συνειδήματα is used 'objective' = "ὁ μο-
νική τέχνη.

9 Φιλόδενος] Of Cythera, born 459
b.c., one of the most famous of the dithy-
rambic poets. He lived for some time at
the court of the elder Dionysius, who
imprisoned him in the stone quarries of
Syracuse, where (according to one ac-
count) he wrote his most noted dithyramb
Κόκλως. When brought out to listen to
Dionysus' own compositions, he is said
to have addressed the attendants in the
words Eīs λαρολᾶς, "Take me back to
the quarries," See further respecting
him Bernhardy Gesch. d. griech. Littera-
tur ii. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2). SUSM. (1106)
Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criti-
cism of the later dithyrambic poets, in-
cluding Philoxenus, specially mentions
their interniture of styles and license in rhythm: or did the dithyrambocriti and the prosōsioi inter-changeably, the third and fourth feet, the ετιος and the ἑκάστος, the long and the short, the hiatus and the enneasyllabon, also short. I. 3. 14, 984 b 9 f. On this see also 11. 18. 

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πάσα, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλε. (VII)
§ 14 κούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσαι καὶ τούτο <τῷ> Σωκράτους τῶν περὶ τὴν μαθητικὴν τινὸς, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας ἀπόδοκις μάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὸς λαμβάνων αὐτῶς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βαχευτικὸν γάρ ἢ γε μέθη τοιεὶ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκιᾶς. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἥλικιαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τινῶν των ἀρμονίων ἦπερθεία καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπὶ 30 δὲ εἰ τις ἐστὶ τοιαύτη τῶν ἀρμονίων ἢ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παιδείας ἥλικια διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τῇ ἕχειν ἄμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυξία φαίνεται πεποθεύνει μάλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὡστε <εἰ> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by William, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐν δὲ may answer to this καὶ 28 καὶ untranslated by William and Ar., [καὶ] Koraes || 30 ἤ Γ. Ald. || 31 παιδῶν C. E. Ch. Schneider (on Pl. Rep. III. 399 λ) || παιδῶν ὅσων P² (1st hand, corrected by later hands), δίανων III (οἷον added in the text and γρ. παιδῶν by p¹ in the margin of P¹) and P² (corr.)

§§ 13—16 17 ἐξι παρ. 34 πρῶτον
That this close of the chapter is a foreign addition is indicated by the square brackets, and must be admitted unless we choose to believe that Aristotle would again partially introduce by a side-wind the musical modes which he has already openly banished from education. Aristotle recommends Dorian melodies for the instruction of the young on account of their middle compass: all other modes, the 'most ethical' alone excepted, are excluded: also, he expressly warns us against any education for amusement, c. 5 § 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently restricts the introduction of 'practical' (πρακτικά) or 'ecstatic' Modes, as well as the less 'ethical' Modes, see n. (1087), to performances at which the citizens are auditors. The author of this addition, on the other hand, is anxious that the youth should also learn to sing in modes which, from the low compass of the melodies, are least suited to them and best adapted to be actually sung in riper age. Now it is no doubt true that these low-pitched modes do not belong either to the 'practical' (πρακτικά) or to the 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and appear to constitute the less ethical; see nn. (1054, 1087). It is further true that Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal state an occasional banquet for relaxation and recreation, IV(VII). 17. 11, cp. n. (966), and at such times probably also permits them the exceptional privilege of singing (see c. 5 § 3 with nn. 1028, 1067). It is true that the description of the low-pitched keys here given (ἀπειρηκιᾶς) points, like Plato's Rep. 398 ε, see n. (1112), to the appositeness of their employment on such occasions. Finally it cannot be denied that the idea of learning something in youth, which may afford amusement in later life, is not wrong in itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present instance inadmissible, because for mere amusement it is not necessary to learn to
33 áρμονιαν, ἢ * * δῆλον ὅτι τρεῖς τούτων ὄρους παιδεῖαν εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον * *]

33 ἢ after áρμονιαν added by P² and P³ (corr.¹), omitted by all other authorities Ar. Bk. * * * δῆλον Comming, δῆλον <εἰσ> ὃτι Schneider * τρεῖς after ὄρους M³ P² A P² Bk. * παιδας ἢ * * ὄρους omitted by P¹ (1st hand), the lacuna left being filled in with another ink, ὄρους omitted by Γ P² * * 34 παιδας P², παιδας P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹ in the margin) * πρέπον * * William (residuum huius operis in grece nondum inventi)

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, c. § § 8: cp. zkx. (1024, 1025, 1030). However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotle would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the 'practical' (πρακτικός) and ecstatic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction: "but in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see n. 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. This the interpolator has failed to recognize, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverse notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by gradations of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (κορμος ζωα καὶ παιδεια) grace (decorum) and moral culture. But, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended:—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 5, 1342 a 39, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in Exc. iv, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the πρακτικαί. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, κορμος ζωα καὶ παιδεια, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the Ethics, for in Aristotle's view the man of moral virtue and he alone behaves with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see Nic. Eth. iv. cc. 6—9 (12—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has κορμος a different meaning from decorum? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The ἢ pre-
served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (a) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (b) this $\pi$ marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, $\tau\omicron\mu\varepsilon\sigma\omega\nu$, which, as well as $\tau\omicron\delta\omega\mu\alpha\nu\rho\iota\varsigma$, $\tau\omicron\pi\nu\tau\omicron\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$, is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from notes (953, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1034, 1037, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. Susem. (1118)
EXCURSUS I.

ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστόν τῷ γυμναστικῷ, καὶ τῶν χρηστών, ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτι
(μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κοινότερα γυμνάσια προσωπικότεν)...ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἡβης ἐπὶ τριά
πρὸς τοὺς άλλους μαθηματικά γίνεται, τότε ἀρμάται καὶ τοὺς πάνω καὶ ταῖς ἀναγ-
κασαίς καταλαμβάνει τῆν ἐκμάθην ἡλικίαν. ν(VIII). c. 4 §§ 7—9, 1338 b
39—41, 1339 a 4—7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting
the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that
gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. n. (1003). He
makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year,
IV(VII). 17, 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17,
to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of
military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in
the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, n. (970),
in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other
subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the Introd.
p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31—34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a
29 f., n. (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in
Plato's scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects,
most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy
(παιδεία ἐλευθερίως καὶ καλι). These are the higher sciences (τὰ πρῶτα)
mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, n. (979), of which it is not true, as it is of
other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency
in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, n. 982) that, while not in themselves
derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point
without risk of βαρνοσία.

Aristotle's ideal state is not therefore, like Plato's Republic, in the last
resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality.
It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the
former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. Introd. p. 48 f. But in the
sequel wherever the word παιδεία is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 7,
1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, 20, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 25, 29, 38, 1342 a 3, 28, 32 etc.,
it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the
term, before the twenty-first year (even μάθησις is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a
23), and hence that development of character of which the young are sus-
ceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than
that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable
at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see n. (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with τεχνίται or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., n. (1057) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, "no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest" (και τὸ πρᾶτευν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύσοντος ἡ παύσωσις, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, n. 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (Nic. Eth. vi. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theocritus. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money's worth. "It is inconceivable," remarks Bradley, Hellenica p. 214 n., "that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of ἑλλανικά applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: 'If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies': καὶ οὐδεὶς εὖφυς νῖος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίει θεομάνοις Δία γενόσας Φειδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἡρακλῆς ἐν Ἀργεῖ Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ' Ἀνακρίνων ἢ Φαίτριας ἢ Ἀρχίλαχος ἢ θεοίς αὐτῶν τῶν ποιήσαν: Plutarch, Vita Pericleis c. 2, p. 153 A."  SUSEM. (1018)
EXCURSUS II.

THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τῶν 'Ολύμπου μελῶν' ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμολογούμενοι ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἑνθονταστικὰς, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f. Crp. δὲ τῶν δ' ιερῶν μελῶν ὁμοιον τούτων, ὅπως ἴδῃς τοὺς ἤπειροι καὶ τὸν κάθοιτο, καθαρά καὶ ἐκκλησίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάροντας, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—11.

Olympus, like Musaeus n. (1034), is not an historical character, but personified in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. IV. n. (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk Poet. Lyr. 4 p. 809 f.) or nothing but ἀληθικόν νόμον, as they were called; cp. n. (17) to my edition of the Politics. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, than extant (Glauce apud Plutarch. De Musica 5, 1132 E, F), and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music: Plut. op. c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. op. c. 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. L.c. But others were of later date than Terpander, and even than Thaleitas, see nn. (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those νόμοι of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a νόμος πολυκέφαλος, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Crates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the πολυκέφαλος. Another of these airs (νόμοι), called ἀρκάτης, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. L. c. 7, 1133 D ff.

Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV) in honour of Athenе, called ὀρθος, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. 1. ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch. op. c. 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. Crat. 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. op. c. 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called μυρτώς (Plut. L. c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. op. c. 19, 1137 D).

1 The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, ἀληθικὸν and ἀληθικῶν should be read in this passage, instead of ἀληθίδαν and ἀληθικῶν.

2 For the introduction of the paconian or eretic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaleitas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athenе ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.
EXCURSUS III.

As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV. p. 628 and n. 1107), are the ‘sacred melodies’ from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, n. (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle’s mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 f.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. SUSEM. (1042)

EXCURSUS III.

ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ὁ 8' ἔθος ἀριστορεῖ τοῖς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δός τόθεν στίν, v(vIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 335 ff. (Philologus XXVII. p. 705 ff; has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, n. (977), and elsewhere, the expression ‘character of the soul,’ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς) ἰδός, or ‘character’ only, must be taken to mean not the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. nn. (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, n. (1022), it appears that this ‘erotic’ soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that “because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices” is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

Plato Symposium 215 C: Socrates is like Marsyas: ὁ μὲν γε ὁ ὀργάνως ἐκείνη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν στόματος διαφέρει, καὶ ἡτοι καὶ τὰ ἔκτισιν ἀληθῆ. ἀ γαρ "Ολυμπίας ἡπείρε, Μαρσύου λέγει, τοῦ διδᾶς:

autos. τὰ δὲ ἔκτισιν ἐὰν τὸ ἀγάθος ἀληθι
tης ἀληθή ἐὰν τῇ βαθινή αὐλητρία, μόνα κατι
tιεθεῖται καὶ λαλήτας τῶν τῶν θεῶν τα
tετελεῖν θεαμάτων διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶπα.

1 ὁ ὀργανωμένος τοις περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δός τόθεν στίν, v(vIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

2 τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the ‘erotic’ soul.
be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (ἐξελθομένους) called moral virtues. ‘Influence upon the character’ means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us ‘attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character’ through the intervention of music (cp. Poet. 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.)

Thus the phrase ‘character,’ or ‘character of the soul,’ cannot mean that part of the soul in itself but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites, or (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, ἀρετής, but with emotional excitaments or feelings (πάθος, N.E. 11. 6. 10, 1105 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral ‘habit’ may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: ‘because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits.’ Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called ‘character’ precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character.

Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. n. (1032, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from Rhet. 11. 9. 1, 1336 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring’s explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. n. (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (ἠθικά) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. n. (1048) themselves characters (ἡθικά), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, Poet. 1. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. n. (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (πάθος),

1 παεοὶ των τὰ ἡθοί γνωμήθη, 1340 a 7.
2 εἰς δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡθοὶ παεοὶ των, κατὰ δὲ τὰ παράξενα ἐδοκίμασεν τὸ σύνορτιον οἴκουν δυναὶ τὰ ἡθοὶ μοιχήσωσιν πράσινοι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡθοὶ συμπαραλαβάνσαι διὰ τὰ παράξενα.
3 καὶ ἄρα τὸ πάθος (καὶ, ἐλεόν καὶ νέφως) ἄφθονος χρηστοῦ. [Döring argues thus: πάθος are in this and other passages ascribed to ἄφθονος, but Nic. Eth. 11.
5. 1, 1105 b 20, πάθος are said to be ἐν τῷ ῥοθῷ, while from Rhet. 11. 12. 1, 1388 b 30, we gather that ἄφθονος (like ψυχεῖ) includes more under it than πάθος only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating ἄφθονος with ψυχεῖ ῥοθεῖ, and would explain Poet. 7(viii). 5. 10, 1340 a 6, as a case where the more special term ἄφθονος is combined with the more general term ψυχεῖ.]
in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (ἦθος) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. n. (1052), an artist 'full of character' (ἦθως) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' Nic. Eth. vi. 13, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression το γενεί την ψυχήν ἠθεν γένει το γενεί την ψυχήν ἠθεν, suggests the radical meaning of ἠθος 'suffering.' Susem. (1048)

EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC: MODES, RHYTHMS, MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

MODES.

Ἐν ἐδοτοι μέλοιν αὐτοῖς ἑτοὶ μυθητικά τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτο ἑστι φανερὸν) ἐδέθη γαρ ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διεστάτη φώς; ὡς τοίνυν ἀκούσας ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἔκαστην ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ συνεσκότος μᾶλλον, ὅπερ πρὸς τήν μαθησιώτητα καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακότερὰς τὴν διδάσκαλον, ὅπερ πρὸς τὰς ἄνω κατειλήφθης ὅτι καὶ καθιστηκότος μᾶλλον πρὸς ἐκάστας, ὅπερ δεκα τοῦτο ἢ διαρκότα μόνη τῶν ἀρμονίων, ἐνθυμιστικὸς δὲ ἢ ἄμεσον. . . . c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive imitations of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lyodian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."1

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut), and

[1] This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see Translations p. 121.
[2] Do is often used instead of ut.]
so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (ἄρμονίας), or 'Species of Octaves' (μή τῶν τῶν διὰ παράστοι), as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:—

(1) BC D EF G a b², Mixolydian;
(2) C D EF G a bc³, Lydian;
(3) D EF G a bc d, Phrygian;
(4) EF G a bc d e, Dorian;
(5) F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian;
(6) G a bc d ef g, Ionian;
(7) A BC D EF G a, Aeolian.

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracl. apud Ath. xiv. 624 E), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-" and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal and Gevaert was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. Eq. 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (οὐρονοὶ) and low-pitched (ἀνωτάτων) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names,

1 Also called τῶν, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word species itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'Music,' for ἄρμονία or ἄλλος τῶν τῶν διὰ παράστοι: for τῶν the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see n. p. 637 f.]
2 Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart; for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.
3 ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si.
5 Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité (Gent 1875) 1. p. 145.
but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-
pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the
Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy
of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be ex-
pected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus
be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added,
a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. Harm. p. 18, Bacch. p. 19,
Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocrates of Locri (Callim.
in Schol. O. XI. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), com-
monly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out
of use (Heracleid. in Ath. XIV. 625 ε). As Gaudentius expressly states that
the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as
either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the
fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case rep-
resents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received
that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff,
that, as the ancients observed (Plut. De Mus. 16, 1136 e), it was the
counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the
one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a
sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones
descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending:

\[ BC \ D \ EF \ G \ A \ b, \ \text{Mixolydian (ascending)} \]
\[ b \ A \ G \ FE \ D \ CB, \ \text{Mixolydian (descending)} \]
\[ F \ G \ a \ bc \ d \ ef, \ \text{Hypolydian (ascending)} \]

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into
the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian
into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and
fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished,
and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented:

\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Fourth} & \text{Fifth} \\
BC & D \\
E & F \\
G & A \\
b & \text{diminished Fifth} \\
\end{array} \]
\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Fifth} & \text{Fourth} \\
F & G \ \\
a & bc \ \\
d & ef \ \\
\text{augmented Fourth} \\
\end{array} \]

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody
with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with
the ‘highly strung’ Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the
really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (Reπ. III. 398 e)
says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation.
Lastly in regard to the terms ὑψωτοι ‘highly strung’ and ἀνεμιστα ῥ ‘relaxed,’
which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the
tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to

\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Fourth} & \text{Fifth} \\
BC & D \\
E & F \\
G & A \\
b & \text{diminished Fifth} \\
\end{array} \]
\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Fifth} & \text{Fourth} \\
F & G \ \\
a & bc \ \\
d & ef \ \\
\text{augmented Fourth} \\
\end{array} \]
explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 f., though not by Aristotle (see n. 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian\footnote{That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan Die Tonarten bei Platonic im dritten Buch der Republik, Jahrb. für Philol., xcvi. 1865, p. 815 sqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, ef ga be de, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (ϕαράρας) half a tone higher (c♯); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (c♯); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (f♯, g♯, c♯, d♯) or lowering three (d♭, b♭, g♭); and for an Ionian there was a similar choice between raising three (f♯, g♯, e♯) or lowering four strings (c♯, a♭, b♭, d♭). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (c♯, f♯, g♯, a♯, c♯, d♯) or lowering b (ϕαραρας) to b♭, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not readily capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth f b. (In this assertion Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a Canzonetta in this mode; see Gevaert, pp. 137 f., 172, 175.)}, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed.
from the rest by ending on the third, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (Lach. 188 d), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato Republic, l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale:

A BC D EF G a = Aeolian;
A BC D E F# G# a = our A minor;

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (Ὥπος) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonic music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see nu. 1042, 1078). It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new ἄποστα, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh:

F G a bc d ef = Hypolydian;
F G ab c d ef = F Major;
G a bc d ef g = Ionian (Hypophrygian);
G a bc d e f# g = G Major.

[See note on p. 657 f.]

We hear even of a Phrygian tetrachord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetrachord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetrachord ef g a. See Helmholz Lehre der Tonempfindungen p. 403 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].
MUSICAL MDES.

DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).

\[ \text{Modern A minor.} \]

PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).

\[ \text{Modern G major.} \]

LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).

\[ \text{Modern F major.} \]

There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or authentic order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or plagal order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which ἄθος is a more correct expression than ἄθος) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our ‘major mode’ is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in Plut. De
Musica 16, 1136 c sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. ibid.), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis ibid.) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. Alcib. i. 118 c). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see n. (1053) (Plut. ibid. 1136 e). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato Rep. 1 c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see n. 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into ἡθικαί, ethical, πρακτικαί (Modes of action= scenic?) and ἐνθουσιαστικαί, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (πρακτικαί); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (Rep. 399 a ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see n. 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. nn. 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In Problems xix. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective πρακτικός applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (ζεθοσ ἐκεί μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as πρακτικαί, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

1 ἡ [ὑπο]φρυγια ἐνθουσιαστική (ὑποφρυγιαστική γάρ καὶ μουσική), κατὰ μὲν ὀφεὶ τὴν πάχος καὶ τὴν ὑποφρύγιαν πάσην γένους καὶ ὄντων ἑνώτον ἐνθουσιαστικοί πράσματα. The insertion of μουσική δὲ ἡ μουσική (from Gage) before κατὰ μὲν ὀφεὶ, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.
MUSICAL MODES.

with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, ἰθέος, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle’s pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see n. (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see nn. 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see n. 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the κούμοι, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. XIV. 638 f.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. De Musica 17, 1136 f.), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by vi(IV). 3. 4 (cp. n. 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental ἀπομοιοί, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydophrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. Susem. (1054)

1 The explanations given by Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Phil. xcv. 1867, p. 231 require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.
EXCURSUS IV.

Musical Rhythms.

τὸν ἀυτὸν θ' τρόπον ἔχει τὰ πείραται θηρῆ, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἠδὲς σταντρα-μάστερων ὁ δὲ κινητός, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικώτερος ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις ὁ δὲ ὑποθρικώτερος. V(VIII) c. 5 § 23, 1340 b 7—10.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeanian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of 1 1/2 : 1. The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeanian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure —— —— —— —— was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. De eloc. § 189, Metr. Ambros. p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mar. Vict. II. 8, 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 90, 19 sq. Keil, Schol. A Heph. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. De Demosth. vi admirabili p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and tripody correspond to our /MIT, /MIT, /MIT time. Cp. Westphal Metrik 2 ed. I. p. 534 ff. SUSEM. (1086) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, Griechische Rhythmik (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, Aristoxenus I. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in /MIT time.

Musical Instruments: Harps, etc.

ολὸν πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβητοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἴδον ἑπταήντα τοῖς ἀκοινωταῖς τῶν χρωμάτων, ἐπάγων καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβύκαν. V(VIII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.

None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 f) speaks of the φοίνικες, πηκτίδες, μαγαθίδες, σαμβύκαι, τρίγωνα, κλεφιμίδια, σκιαβάιοι, and ἐννεάχορδαi as uncommon (ἐκφύλα). The πηκτίς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. Fr. 102 in Athen. X. IV. 635 D, Soph. Fr. 375, ibid. 635 C and IV. 183 f, Telestes Fr. 5, ibid. XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. l. c., cp. Pind. l. c.). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho Fr. 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon Fr. 17, 22, by Plato Repub. III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.

the magadis, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aristox. in Athen. xiv. 635 β). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 β, ε that Sappho was the first to use1 the instrument, stating that he follows Aristoxenus in regarding it as the same as the magadis, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the μαγαδις and the πηκτίς (Ath. 636 α ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the μαγαδις seems to have been a modification of the πηκτίς. At any rate the μαγαδις also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 F and perhaps before him by Anacreon (ibid. Fr. 18), and the latter calls the πηκτίς (Fr. 17) and the μαγαδις (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 c, 635 c) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (ibid. 634 c, d), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristoxenus (ibid. 635 b), who quotes Pindar L.c. in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 Α) apparently describes the μαγαδις as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater L.c. we must suppose that the πηκτίς had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phyllis however (ibid. 636 F) says the πηκτίς and μαγαδις (which he distinguishes from one another), the σαμβωκή, λαμψίκη, τρίγωνον and κλεψαρβος, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphoniou (in Ath. iv. 182 Ε, xiv. 435 Α) the μαγαδις—or rather the σαμβωκή, a modification of it (see below)—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the πηκτίς this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Alcman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the μαγαδις (Fr. 91 in Ath. 636 F) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the βαρβώκαν (neuter), also βαρβώκασ (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo x. 471 says that all the names σαμβωκή, βαρβώκασ, πηκτίς, are foreign, and Pindar L.c. designates the βαρβώκασ as an adaptation of the Lydian πηκτίς. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar L.c. ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (Carm. 1. 1. 34) calls it 'Lesbian' and assigns its use to Alcaeus (Carm. 1. 34. 5 ff.). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphoriou in Athen. 182 F=Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacr. Fr. 143). Critias calls the βαρβώκασ Sappho’s favourite instrument (in Ath. XIII. 600 c); Neanthes (Fr. 5 in

1 So also Suidas 460. Σαρπδη, where the mention of the plectrum in the received text is due to corruption.
EXCURSUS IV.

Athen. 175 c) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon. Jan (p. 15 f) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcaeus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton:

The only particular difference between this instrument and the λύρα consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the πηκτής, as appears from Pindar l.c. Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (R. A. vii. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the κιθάρα and λύρα, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux iv. 8, 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 b mentions only three strings, Plutarch De Monarch. 4. 827 Α, and Theocritus XVI. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's Realencycl. iv. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of βάρβατος with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between βάρβατος and πηκτής on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the βάρβατος and even than the πηκτής and μάγαδις. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a σαρμένη:

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The τρίγωνον or triangle is called by Juba (Fr. 73 in Ath. 175 D) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians; by Ptolemy Harm. III. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles Lc. gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (in Ath. 636 A, see Nauck Trag. Gr. Fragm. p. 602 sq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (s.v. Σίβυλλα) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphyry. on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. Lc., Arist. Probl. xix. 23). The σαμβύκη was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas s.v. Σίβικος) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 f.). Euphorion represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the μαγιάς (in Ath. 635 A); the same writer (in Ath. 633 f. on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato Lc. The statement of Skamon in Athen. 637 B that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes Lc. says either of the τρίγωνον or more probably (agreeing with Suidas Lc. and Schol. in Aristoph. Thesm. 168) of the σαμβύκη—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but Juba (Lc.) attributed the (?) λυροφοίνικιν τα σαμβύκης, as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the τρίγωνον, and more especially the σαμβύκης, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the σαμβύκη by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 ff and the phrases "ballet girl and player on the triangle," τινα ποδοκρίτην τε καὶ

1 Heliodorus Ath. IV. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the πυρηνίν indulge in wild Assyrian dances.
2 In Kaibel's edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 175 D, between λυροφοίνικες and σαμβύκης.
3 Both were introduced into Rome, Dionys. Hal. R. A. L. 33, Ath. 183 C, Liv. xxxix. 6.
4 ὅ ἐν Γυμνάσσων ἐστιν ἀκοῦσαν ἐν κυκτείσιν εὖν μουχρὸς ἀλόματ' ἐκ-καλεῖσθαι γυναῖκας ἐχωταί σαμβύκην τε καὶ τρίγωνον.
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τρίγωνατρία τ' Λυκίαν Λετίφ. 5, Ἐρεθίτης εἰς ἄπολεκτριάς. Plat. Alcm. 9, ἄργος ἄπολεκτριάς εἰς ἄραμνον. Plat. Cleon. 33. ἀπαντῶν ἀργον ἐρωτολάκος Ποιλ. V. 37, 10. and others. Tib. Gracch. in Macrobr. Sat. II. 10, Arnob. II. 42. This explains what Epoclis meant by mentioning triangle-playing 'Fr. 1 in Ath. 183 c, f, in his comedy of the Αργον, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotyra. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly σωρίζει and not ἵππισσα, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The ἵππισσα was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the σωρίζεις being used when they were melodramatically recited (Phyllis Lc., cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. ἵππισσα). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the σωρίζεις among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh De metr. Pind. p. 260 ff., Lobeck Aclaophamus p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, De fidibus Graecorum pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister Denkmäler III. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1877)

Scales.

τῶν μελών τῆς σφόντας καὶ παρασκευασμένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The “colour” of notes (χρώμα) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or ‘genera’ of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order ef g a bc de. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. II.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. Prokl. xix. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. De Mus. 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

\[ ef \quad a \quad bc \quad e \]

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (Μείωσις):

\[ ef^*g^* \quad a \quad bc^*d^* \quad e \]

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

1 The suggestion, which D. Volkmann De Suicidie biogr. p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue On Poet) to attribute the original employment of the θητής, τρίγωνον, and σωρίζεις to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

2 See n. 10 on the Poetics (ed. Susem).
In the case of the former there is between f and g rather more than a whole tone (♯), and between g and a rather less than a whole tone (♯), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone (♯) and a diminished whole tone (♭), a tone being inserted in the minor third B D in the place of the C omitted by Terpander, which was separated from D by the first, and from B by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third E G the intermediate tone F was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes G and D, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive F♯ and C♯. Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of C, and with the enharmonic the omission of G, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. De Mus. 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

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e f ♯ g ♭ a b b♯ d e
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semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone.
The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or nuances (χρώματα) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. De Musica §§ 37—39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for chorus-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal Metr. 31 p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Helmholtz p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. See E. (1099)

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-
EXCURSUS V.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(VIII). C. 7

§§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the ethical (ἐθικαί), those relating to action (πρακτικαί), and the ecstatic (ἐνθουσαιστικαί). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of catharsis and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (ἐν οἷς ἡθωρία καθαρσιν δύναι τοῦλλον ἡ μίθουν). But now the question there left unsettled (see n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of catharsis to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (ἀνάσκωσις) and the highest rational enjoyment (διαγωγή). According to the textus receptus both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters διαγωγή and ἀνάσκωσις have always

1 See the translation of the textus receptus p. 607.
been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment: but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of ‘moral training’ (παιδεία) and ‘purification’ (κάθαρσις): consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (β 40, πρὸς διαγωγὴν &lt;ἡ&gt; πρὸς ἀνέστιον τε κτλ). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purification (κάθαρσις) the elements of διαγωγὴ and ἀνάπαυσις: and (4) grammatically the change from ἐνικα with the two first ends to πρὸς with this alleged third (τρίτον δὲ πρὸς) throws suspicion upon τρίτον δὲ also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a cathartic effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions: and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, catharsis is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to διαγωγή, or to ἀνάπαυσις. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration τρίτῃ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ὁ πρὸς ἀνέστιον τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the textus receptus) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (πρακτικαὶ) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of κάθαρσις (§ 4 f.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 τί δὲ λέγομεν κτλ) and is now added in the form of a reason (δ ὅπερ περὶ ἑνὶ κτλ a 4 ff.), proves by the very form in which it is cast that catharsis is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by ‘listening to the performances of others’ (ἀκροάς ἐπὶ τῶν χειρογράφων) merely this is meant. It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for catharsis, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies: the otherwise meaningless final remark ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ τε καθαρτικά ταιρείται χαράν ἄνθρωπος, a 15, can

1 Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in n. on § 3 b 41, he would separate ἀνέστιον and ἀνάπαυσις as a fourth end from διαγωγή, which he makes the third.

2 Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand ἀκροάς ἐπὶ τῶν χειρογράφων to mean κάθαρσις, yet the very term ἀκροάς implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less ethical) played and sung by others: that they never listened in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. Were this implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction κάθαρσις for ἀκροάς. But then arises the question whether 1342 a 4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθυσιασματικαῖς should not simply be translated ‘both those of action and the ecstatic,’ especially as, when afterwards κάθαρσις comes to be discussed and explained, these two classes of musical modes and melodies are alone taken into account.
only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word πρακτικά ‘melodies of action’ for καθαρικά ‘melodies of purgation’ 1. In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words ἵνα χρήσασθαι τοὺς ἐξοργίζοντες τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεια may be a gloss upon ἐκ τῶν ὀφείλων μελῶν which precedes. 2

From this investigation into the nature of catharsis it is inferred that the proposition 3 it was adduced to prove is really correct (ὅτι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις κτλ. §§ 6—8, a 16—29). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see n. 1100), in a less strict form, ταῖς ἰδιοκείμεναι τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις a 28 ff., i.e. ethical modes replacing the ‘most ethical,’ ταῖς ἱδιοκτήταις, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to ἀερός τῶν ἀεροχαμμάτων, i.e. to catharsis, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artizans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and “chromatic” scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to ethical, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (διαγωγή). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. n. 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression.

**SUSEM. (1101)**

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1 With this change the words will mean: “so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight.”

2 It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the ‘ecstatic’ (ἐκθονιστικά) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked n. (1084), with which notes (1054, 1089) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homoeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions “of action.” Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

**SUSEM. (1096)** Cp. Rhet. ii. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, ἀραράλλοις γὰρ ἡ ὑφή. If Heracleides is rightly reported Athen. xiv. 625 εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶτον ἕχειν ἐσθοῖν ἡ πάθους, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by πρακτικὴ μέλη insuperable. Cp. however n. (1084).


3 The proposition ἵνα χρήσω ὑπὸ χρηστοῦ μὲν πᾶσιν ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, ώς τὴν αὐτῶν καὶ τρόπων πᾶσιν χρηστῶν ἀλλὰ κτλ. § 3, 1342 a 1—4.
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

και γὰρ παυδεύοις ἔνεκες καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαμέν τῇ μονοτικῇ χρήσει δείν]—
νὶ δὲ λέγομεν τὸν κάθαρον, ὥν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρωτημ
σαφέστερον. 

(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38—40.

δ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἱσχυρὸς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσῃ ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ ἕτον διαφέρει καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἦλεος καὶ φόβος, ἢν δὲ ἐνθυσιασμὸς. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τάσης τῆς κινήσεως κατακάχυσις τινὲς εἰσίν ἢ ἐκ τῶν δὲ ιερῶν μὲλῶν δρᾶμεν
tούτων, ἐκατόρθωσαν τοὺς ἑφραγμένους τῆς ψυχῆς μέλει, καθωσταμένους ὡσπερ
λατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. § ταῦτα δὲ τούτο ἀναγκαίον πάσχει καὶ τοῖς
dείξιμοις καὶ τοῖς φοβητικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παθητικοῖς, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις καθ’ δόσιν
ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστως, καὶ τάσει γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κονίζεσθαι
μὲν’ ἐνοχῆς. c. 7 §§ 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. Comp. διότι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὕτῳ
[sc. τῷ αὐθείᾳ] καυμανθὴ χρησίμων ἐν οἷς ἢ θεωρίᾳ κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μάθησιν,
c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homeopathic treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the time and usually called by them κάθαρσις: in regard to this it is sufficient to refer to the Introduction of Susemihl’s edition of the Poetics p. 44 f. and to the fuller investigations of Döring. Two points have been properly emphasized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical colouring which a number of Aristotle’s expressions bear; and secondly, that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as κοροβαστίαμα, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other hand the subject of treatment by the musical catharsis is not compared to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is actually suffering from it. Even the term κατακάχυσις (§ 4, a 8), though it reminds us of ‘possession’ and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more, as Döring points out, than ‘liable to be attacked’ by a certain form of excitement. So too the phrase δ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἱσχυρὸς, a 4, “the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds” in itself ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle’s chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. n. 1094), and with their aesthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying

714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).

2 See 1341 a 8 καθαρσέως and the notes on κατακάχυσις, a 9 χρησίμων, a 10 καθαρ-
μένου, a 14 κονίζεσθαι.
dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the aesthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of aesthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term πάθος itself recalls τὸ πάθεια, suffering or ailment, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering "emotion"; see Excursus III. p. (1043). Aristotelian no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful "emotions," but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all "emotions" without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable πάθη (e.g. φιλία Rhet. 11. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., θάρσος, 11. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. aesthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (πάθη), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the 'violent occurrence' (τρομητὴς λαγχαύρας) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the 'employment' of melodies by those suffering from corybantism (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in n. (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical term καθαρτικά = recover (but see n. 1093) and λαρεία = regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (κομφίζεσθαι 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily 'relief' which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render κάθαρσις by 'homoeopathic purgation of emotions' (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music aesthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer "cleansing" to "purging." There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle's time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of κάθαρσις "cleansing" in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSEM. (1095).

1 Bonitz Aris. Stud. v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term πάθος applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (πάθος = πάθος).
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

Καθαρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connexion of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the Sophist 226 D—231 E. The Eleatic stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (καθαρσις) is the general name for any such process. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (a) the internal purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (b) the merely external washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver'. With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleatic is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (c) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as καθαρτις, and the elenchus as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

The liturgical or religious sense: lustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term καθαρσις was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablution and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and περραπτημα for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' Ion, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

1 πᾶσα ἡ γυμνὴ διάκρισις (sc. ἡ καταλείπουσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ ἀνίχνευτον ἀπὸ βέλτιον) λέγεται παρὰ πάσης καθαρσίας, Sophist 226 D. Hence the definition "Οὔτως 225 D, καθαρσις ἀπὸ καθαρσις χειρόνων ἀπὸ βελτιῶν. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between καθαρσις and καθαρσία.

2 τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶναι καθάρ-

σεως...τὰ τῶν χρώματων (ὡς ὅτι ὡς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμνασμοῖς ἔνειρυμα) ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων καθαρτίας, καὶ (υ) περὶ τὰκόσμ., εἰς τῶν μὲν φαιλλα, ὡς βαλαμυτίνου παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ὑπάρχοντων, ἑν ἀκρατείᾳ καὶ ἐξείται κοιμητικὴ τὴν ὑπώλειαν παρεχόμενον...πολλὰ καθαρτία ἀνέγχε, Sophist 225 E et f.

3 Düring Kunstliche p. 251.
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (περιψήματα) used to 'suck up' the pollution\(^1\), the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these καθάρματα (καθάρσια), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple\(^2\). In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, Odyssey xv. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the Aethiopis of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angery gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. l. 35.

Illustration as a cure for madness.

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconsiderable evidence that καθάρσις, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells\(^3\). The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms καθάρσις and καθαρμός indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

\(^1\) Compare also Διδά καθαρίσω oν το τε- 

\(^2\) Porphyry. De Abstinenzia II. 19: δε 

\(^3\) The quotation from Bernays Theophrastos 

uber Frömigkeit p. 67 f.

lepsy were said to be cured by music; 

Theophrastus περί ἑνθουσιασμοῦ, Fr. 87; 

ὅτι δὲ καὶ νόσους λάτων μονοσκή θεοφραστώ 

ποιῆσαι εὐς τοῖς περὶ ἑνθουσιασμοῦ, ἵσχαλα- 

κοῦς φάσεως άνθρωπον διηλεξε εἰ κατα- 

λήσον τοι τούτον τῇ φυσικῇ ἀκομῇ 

[Atl. xiv. 624 Β], Fr. 88 θ. ἐν τῷ περὶ 

Ἐνθουσιασμῶν...φωνῇ...τὴν μονοσκήν κοιλιά 

τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸ σώμα γεγο- 

ψίων παθῶν ιατρεῖς καθότερον λειτουργεῖ 

φόβος καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ μαρτύρων γιγνομένα τῇ 

διανοιχήσει. Ηδος γάρ, φώνης, ὁ 

καταλίθμος καὶ ἰαχύδα καὶ ἐπιλήψεις (an 

instance is appended, Apollon. Ἡθ. 

Mirob. c. 49).
Cratylus. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἀπολυτόν, ἀπολύον, says: “the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.” The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; ‘the hair of the dog that bit you’ is but one instance of crude homoeopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the ‘lustrations and religious rites’ which for his malady are alone of avail. In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ἡ διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θεραπεία) referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure. The case of Orestes, Paus. II. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was ‘cleansed’ of matricide as well as madness. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the Wasp of Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in all seriousness endeavours to cure his father’s madness by initiating him in the Corybantian rites. Not less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus.

1 πρῶτον μὲν γάρ ἡ καθαρσία καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ιατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν καθαρτικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς ιατρικοῖς φαρμάκους καὶ τοῖς καθαρτικοῖς περιεχόμενοι ταύτα καὶ τὰ λουτρά τὰ ἐν τῶν τούντων καὶ αἱ περικομικταὶ, πάντα ἐν τὰ ταῦτα ἴσαν; ἂν, καθαρμὸς παρέχω τοῖς ἁθρανότοις καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, 405 λ. β. The translation is Jowett’s.

2 ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν παῖδων ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων, ἢ ἐκ παιδίων ἐκ μεγάλων παῖδων ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων, ἢ μακάρι ἐγγενεῖς μὲν ὧν καὶ προφέρεται ὡς ἐκεῖ ἀπαλάγησαι εὔρητε, καταμερισμὸν κράσι σκέφθη εὐθὺς τοῦ καὶ λατρείας, δέδοι καθαρμός τοις καλεῖ τῆς τελείως τοιαύτης ἐξάντες ἐπειδῆ τὸν οἴκου Ἐρέσσης, Πλατ. 244 δ. β. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Reitz, ο. c. p. 104, “expiri et lustrari dicuntur it dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo seclere, tum qui mysterius initiandi, aut qui rem sacram facturn sunt: non eiijm ii quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur.”

3 εἰς τούτο ἀναφεύγω τὸ σκόλλωμα τᾶς θυγατέρας τὰς Πρόφοτος μανίας λέγουσι καὶ ὁ Μολέκλης θύεται τοὺς ἀρρήτους καὶ καθαρμοὺς κατέργασεν καὶ χειρὸς καλοκευμένου Δούσου... καὶ ἱερσία τῆς μανίας ἐν Ἀρτέ-μιδος λείψα, Pausan. viii. 18. 3. The account of Apollodoros (II. 2. 2 ff.) makes the cure depend on counter-excitement, Μελάνων μὲν, μάτις ὦ καὶ τὴν ἀλλὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν καθαρτικῶν πρῶτον εὑρίσκειν παραλλοί παῖς διανοικάτων τῶν ποσινων μὲ αλαλαγμού καὶ τῶν ἔθνους. Χειρεσία τὰς συνεφαλίζει καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας καθαρτικῶς καθαρίζεται τελείως... Apollodor. 111. 5. 1. This is alluded to by Plato Laws 673 b.

4 The same remark applies to the cleansing of Alcmeon, Apollodoros 111. 7. 5. 2—4. 5 εἰς τὸν ἀπόλοις καθαράς, ἢ δὲ καὶ μάλα. μετα ταῦτα ἐκραβάτιζεν (156). Η βασιλική ἐν τῷ Πρόφοτος δὴ, τὰς καθαρτικῶς ἐκκαθαρίζεται αὐτὴ δεσμῇ, ἐπὶ καθαρμὸς τῆς μανίας: and to the same effect Hesych.: εἰς καθαρτικός καθαρίζεις μανίας.

6 ὡς τῶν καθαρτικῶν ἐνοι ταύτας καθαρίζεται ἡ κυμάξια καὶ γυμνάσθαι, καὶ τὰς καθαρτικῶς καθαρίζεται καὶ οἱ τὰς Σαββάδιστες καθαρίζοντες... with the ordinary explanation (which Abammon of course rejects)
The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in Aglaophamus, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, portraying various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe\(^1\), which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds\(^2\): then the wild frenzied dances\(^3\), the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient\(^4\), causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes\(^5\). To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details\(^6\), but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, Lawes 790 c—791 b, leave little more to be said: “this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet springs; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent

\[^{1}\text{From the expression βαγχείων ιδαεων During gr. c. 252 strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 c we find αi των Κορηβαστών λαμπατα τελεωνας τελεωνας joined to καθαρεως in Phaedr. 244 e (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not only ‘cleansed’ but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθαρεως υπο Ρεας και τα τελεωνας έκμαθη p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: Lawes 672, λόγος των αμα και φύμα υποκειται γεως, occ the ριχτη της μυθης 'Ιμπας δεσφορεως της ψυχης της γυναικης, δια τας τα βαγχειας και πατων της μαιας έμβαλλε χορειον τιμωρομενον, i.e. in retribution.}

\[^{2}\text{Lucian Deor. Dial. xii. 37, De Sull. c. 79, p. 157, Phut. Anat. xvi. vii. p. 758 e, 12, 759 a, Strabo x. 21, P. 473, all cited by Lobeck p. 1152 ff.}

\[^{3}\text{Ibid. 533 b, αι Κορηβαστες ουκ εμφαρον ενεργουν.}

\[^{4}\text{Lawes 790 e, αι μηνιες... στειροτης καταλουνει των παιδιων, καθαρει αι των εκφολων βαγχειων ιδαεων τατη της κυρης εκχορει και μονω ξροφει.}

\[^{5}\text{Ibid. 533 b, αι Κορηβαστες ουκ εμφαρον ενεργουν.}

\[^{6}\text{Ibid. 533 b, αι Κορηβαστες ουκ εμφαρον ενεργουν.}
internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. Corroborative testimony is borne by Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage cited above p. 609, f. 2.

Καθαρσία as purification or purging of impurity.

In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθαρσία is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to purge [the system] but to purge away [what is noxious]; accordingly καθαρσία denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications: e.g. 'separation' Plato Phaedo 67 C, and moral ‘purification,’ which is a sense frequent in the Phaedo 4. In the Sophist the elenchus is termed a purge. Socratic education, aped by the younger Sophists, was directed to ridding the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom. Other usages, e.g. λύσει τη καθαρμός ἀδικημάτων (Ref. 364 E, cp. Phaedo 82 B), support this meaning of riddance or removal. From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists: in Stobaeus Ecl. Phys. 1 c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus περὶ ψυχῆς,

1. Let us 790 c—791 b, Jowett's translation. Ed. Müllers Gesch, der Theorie der Kunst i. 121, II. 70 (ep. Jahrb. f. Kl. Phil. c. 1870, p. 405 f) called attention to this passage in connexion with καθαρσία. Especially noteworthy is 790 f. 1 ὅταν αὐτὸ ἑξένθη τὴν προφήτη τῶν τινῶν πάθεως σεισμῶν, ἢ τῶν ἑξέθη κρατεῖ κύριος προφήτῃ τὴν ἑραίαν φοβορὰν οὖσαν καὶ μακρὰν κύριον, κρατήσας δὲ γαλακτίνοις ψυχικάς τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπεργολασμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς κυρίας χρειάζει τεκνομανία ἐκάστων πρὸς ἀνέθεσεν, πειθαρχῶς ἀγαπήτων τοῖς τῶν μὲν ἐπτὸν λαγχαίνους τοιοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἡγομένος διέρχεσθαι τοῖς καὶ αὐλομένους μετὰ θεῶν, ὧν ἂν καλλίαροιντε ἐκάστοι θέωση, κατεργάσας ἁυτῷ μακρὸν ἢμιν διαθέσοντος ἔχει διαφοράν τοῖς.


3. καθαρσία...τὸ χωρίζει τι κάλλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς. Cp. Soph. 237 c, ψυχή καθαρμός = κακίας δορίσεως, ι. e. λακέων τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐκβάλλει δὲ τὸ φιλούμενον.

4. E.g. 65 cp. τὸ δὲ θεῖο τῇ καθαροτησίᾳ [ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν τινῶν πάνω...καὶ αὐτὴ δὴ φύσεως μὴ καθαρμός τι γίνεται: whereas in truth it is really a purgation from all such things...and wisdom itself is probably a mode of purification. See also 65 cp. ψυχή καθαρμός τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, 113 D, 114 C.

5. τῶν ἐλεγχον λεκτῶν ς ἄτοι μεγάλτα καὶ κυριωτάτο τῶν καθάρσεως ἐστι, 230 D. The sophist is δοξῶν ἐρμοδίων μαθηματικοὺς ψυχῆς καθαρσίας, 231 E. The analogy to the medical treatment is brought out fully 230 c—E.
which fully explains in what sense κάθαρσις was a technical term. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purified from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

The usage of the medical writers: purgation, discharge.

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen κάθαρσις as a technical term denotes ‘purification,’ i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foesius has well defined it: κάθαρσις purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura mollatur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four ‘humours,’ blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile. Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

1 Πλάτωνος δε καὶ αἱ πλείσται τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπέθεασαν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγώνιως, δέξις τῆς πάντοτε ἁγγείου ἔγκυος [καὶ τῶν ἐνέλειου διανοήσεως ἀπότασεως, πληροφορία τῇ ἁμάμῳ καὶ τοῦ δίκτου, ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῇ τῶν κατακαμάνων πρὸς τὰ κατακαίνω τῆς τελευτάτης καθάρσις ὑπολογιάσαντες π. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish ἐρπας, δίκτυς, καθάρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαῖοι assigns as the end of the last ἐρπας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλληληων, ἀπότασις τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, τελευτάς, ἀποκληρώσεως, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνάβας ἐπὶ τῆς γεγονημένης αὐτίκης; whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of λοιπά ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρραβώνων καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν καταδρομῶν καὶ φύσιν ἔλεγχωσι καὶ γενέσεως ἀρρενίως. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in Ἐπιτ. 1. 2 περὶ ἄρτηνων, and decides (1. 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyr, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικὰ) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικαὶ) ἄρτηα: see Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ΙΙΙ. ΙΙ. 661, 711, 757, 819 ν. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering “purification,” so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.


3 Ι. e. ἤργας μὲν ὕδωρ μάλαινα, δέκα μετρῶν ἢ τυπὸ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐκχήσει τε καὶ δύναμισι καὶ τοῦ πλέονος, καὶ ἐρπας μεγιστάναι ἢ ἀλλήλες δέ, ἄκτινα ταὐτων ἢ πλεον ἢ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἢ τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κραμασμένων ἢ τοὺς ἐναντιοτικός. Plato has a similar theory in his Τίτικας cc. 39, 40, 81 a ff. except that he has transferred the ‘unnatural excess and defect’ and the ‘displacement’ in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humors. Still he follows the Hippocraticans in referring fevers to the bile and catarh to phlegm (Tim. 85 b).
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΙΣΘΕΝ

reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, (2) their reduction, πέψις, itself a species of transformation, or μεταβολή, (3) their expulsion, κρίσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (ταράττει) without however effecting a purge. The induction of excitement (ταραχή) is somewhat of a parallel to homoeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated ἐνθυσσαμένος in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame. The medical process (ταραχή) goes on until the reduction (πέψις) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasizes between the sense of κάθαρσις and of κίνωσις in the Hippocratic corpus; the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: κίνωσις ἀπλῶς εἴσωθε λέγειν ὁ Ἰσποκράτης ὡσα ἀναργὺς ὁ χολής ἠκούσα, κάθαρσις δὲ ὡσα ὧν ὁ μοχθόρι κατὰ ποιότητα. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phases as κάθαρσις χολῆς κ. αἴματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague: Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocrates; but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense. Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

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1 ὁ γὰρ ἐπάθετο ἐρήμην τοῦ καθάρισμης ἐξεῖ τῷ ταράττει τῶν ἄγαγων, ἀλλὰ ἔνθεσις τῶν μετρίων διὸ, ταράττει, μὲν εὐθύς ἄν καθαρίσῃ. Plut. Quaest. comm. 111. 8, 8, p. 656 v.
2 Comp. Plato's reflections on the Corybantic rites, Lasus 11. 790 f. f. as quoted above p. 656 n. 4.
4 ἀνακάθαρσις χολῆς πάσας, ὡσα ὧν ἐπὶ διωκόμοις ἔσωσαμένην εἰρεῖν, 11. 49.
5 c. Conon. § 12, ex μὴ κάθαρσις αἴματος οὐκ ἔσωσέ μοι ὁ χολής οἰκεῖος Or. 54, p. 1260, 24.
6 Littre ed. of Hippocr. 1. 75: plus on examine comparativemént les écrits hippocratiques, ceux de Platon et d'Aristote, plus on trouve de conformités entre eux et de points de comparaison. Döring ed. c. p. 319 ff. collects a few instances of καθαρός, οἰκεῖος, ταράττει, ταραχή: e.g. 450 b 1, 70 b 9 ff., 1106 a 4, 1382 a 31, 1386 b 19, 23, 865 a 6, a 15 ff., 864 a 3, 873 b 31 ff. Add Probl. 1. 44, 864 a 34 (quoted below p. 659 n. 8).
7 See Bonitz Ind. Ar. s.v. 354 b 28 "syn τι καταράσσω." The references adduced take up rather more than a column.
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

Galen between κάθωσις and καθαρσίς is much observed by unprofessional writers.

Καθαρσίς as an aesthetic term.

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of καθαρσίς in reference to Music in the Politics, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the Poetics. All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation. Whether this aesthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corybantian frenzy in the manner above described. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context, certain points in the process of relief, and the consideration urged by Bernays that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato's 'psychiatry' in the Laws, but..." (64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is De gen. anim. 11. 4, 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περιτυμητῶν). Bernays 89, c. p. 91 (161) is able to adduce the parallels ἀνάφορες τῶν καταστροφῶν, ἀπεργεῖς. 1 E.g. Pl. Phaedo 69 c κάθαρσις as total removal. 2 μήνης πράξεως σταυλαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἑκάστου ἡδονής λόγος χωρίς ἑκάστου τῶν ἑκάστων ἐν τούτοις μορίων καὶ ὁ δὲ ἀπαγγέλλει, δὲ ἐλέος καὶ φόβοι περιείσθαι τῷ τῶν τοιούτων παθητικῶν κάθαρσι. Poet. 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

3 Pol. v(viii). 7, 5, 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the Poetics (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἱστορίας συγγεγραμμένοις, cp. n. 1085).

4 Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it Jahrb. f. Phil. cl. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susselehl Inscr. to Poetics p. 44.

5 Phil. d. Grisch. 112, ii. 775.

6 P. 643. Ed. Müller L.c. p. 406 n. 190 insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato Laws 790 b ff., and Aristotle Pol. v(viii). is so great as to be unmistakeable (τῶν ἐκφόρων βασιλεὸς λάσεις in Plato, ὅτι ἱππεῖας τεχνῶν καὶ καθαρσίων in Aristotle: ἀπειρίας ἔχων in the former, καθαρότης in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called κάθαρσις is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charm, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which is Susselehl remarks Jahrb. f. Phil. xv. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

7 See the notes ad loc. p. 610 f.

8 The operation of drugs is the subject of Proph. 1. 42, ἀλλὰ τὰ φάρμακα καθάρσει; The illustration conveyed in the words ὁ περίθετος δὲ ἀλλὰ κρατήσων ἐκπέμψει φράσον τὰ ἐρμοῦδα αὐτοῦ καὶ καλεῖται τόσον καθαρσίας 854 a 32—34 is very apposite. Cp. Pl. Soph. 295 c noμίζεται γὰρ οἱ καθαρότητας αὐτῶν, ὅτε πρὸς τὰ σῶματα ἑστάρας νομίζεις μὴ πρότερον ἄτρομα πρὸς αὐτὸν γιὰ τὸ προσφέρομεν ἔργον οἰκοδομῆς δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ἐκμαθή... The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

9 Zwei Abhandlungen 13 (143).
of Hippocrates' emetics and purges?" The incongruity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily cure, the attempt to explain the 'psychiatry' on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle's original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Corybantic frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homeopathic nature: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 645), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the Attis. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music. Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the Politics.

Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions." If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between "the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes" and "the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies"—there can be no question that the former is an erroneous view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the Poetics we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself: about its moral or educa-

1 Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homeopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his Samson Agonistes: "(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passages well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physic, things of melancholic hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours." 2 μια δὲ φόβοι τῆς μονοκλίας, κύμα τῆς ψυχής ἢ κατὰ ἀπόλυτας γνωμονές τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔριδα Frang. 89 ed. Wimmer. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (ἀρχαὶ μονοκλία λόγου ἐστὶν ὕπονομον): Fr. 80. 3 In Quaest. Conv. 111. 8 Plutarch is discussing the effect of wine: 2 § 10. 656 τὸ βαθύτατον ὁποῖον ἦν ἀλήθεια συνεχόμενον τὴν γνώμην ἀναλύειν τὸν περὶ τῶν κακά τῶν ἀποθέματα, ἐμφανίζονται, καὶ πρὸς τῶν συνεχόμενον τῶν ὁμοίων συνάδελφος ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἀκροβάτης τὸν μολὼν Ῥώμης ἀρχεῖον ἀρχαῖοι καὶ τράχιοι καὶ ἀκρόπολις ἐκεῖνος [cp. p. 646 n. 1], πράγματος δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ αὐτῶν· ὅτι κατὰ μικρῶν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἀναλύεται τὸ λυπητικόν ὁμοίων ὅπως ἀν τῶν ὁμοίων κτλ. With μαραλειθαί新浪. cf. Pol. (v/viii). 7. 14. 1342 b 27, ἀποτραπέζιας. Again the assuaging effect, but not the previous excitement, is mentioned Sept. 26. conv. 13. 150 c: αἱ δὲ Μοῖραι καὶ παντάτακται [μεμψαντ' ἄν ὅμως] εἰ τοιοῦτοι αὐτῶν ἑπιλέγονται καὶ ἀναλύεται καὶ ἀναλύεται καὶ ἀναλύεται τὰ παθή τῶν λυπητίκων μελέτει καὶ ἀρμοδίως. 4 Prof. Butcher's translation, op. c. p. 348. The Greek is given p. 650 n. 2.
tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama can must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt's made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted.

For there may be a total or a partial removal, a 'purging away' i.e. expulsion, or 'purging' i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements) 3: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the materia peccans? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as 'secreted' is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until saturated with over-indulgence they length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the purgation of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence 3 (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an important element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate 4 between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artifically excited by the action of the drama 4: (3) to

3 The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller Gesch der Künsth. II. p. 53 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret the τῶν τουτοῦν παθητικῶν λόγω τῷ τυχεῖν τῆς definition of tragedy as the "expulsion," i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing ραθμα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητικῆ ποιήση) from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, Arist. Studien v, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the Rhetoric (11 c. 5, c. 8) make each of these — fear itself and pity itself — a sort of pain (ῥόπη του) — although the emotions generally are defined as αἱ παθητικαὶ λογία τῆς ῥήτης. 11. 8, 1378 a 21, Nic. Eth. II. 3, 9, 1105 b 23.

4 The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that a real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: Rhet. II. 5. 6, 1385 b 33, 56 41.
associate the cure of the o'erburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of καθάρσις. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of De Mysteriis), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that “suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them” proceeds as follows: “hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others’ emotions we still and moderate and purge our own: and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring.” If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the Republic—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato’s—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says “it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied.” From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascetic with the compromise proffered by Aristotle. But while the dim outlines of the
theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (ἀπώρησις, ἀφοσίωσις, ἐμέτρως ἀποσπασμάτωσι τὰ πάθη), the rest is coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of καθαρσία.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato’s own aesthetic views in his dialogues. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy. His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds the emotional nature which ought rather to be starved. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: “If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, as having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another’s... Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.” Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: by granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means to their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate ‘the feeling kept under control in our own calamities’ with the pity of real life, and that which is ‘satisfied and delighted by the poets’ with the pity which (in Aristotle’s definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

2 Phain. 268 c, χρησίμως ποιεῖν...οἰκτρὰ καὶ τοσοῦτον αὐτοῖς φοβέρκως καὶ ἀπειλητικὰ, Rev. X. 606 a.
3 τρεῖς γὰρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητὰ τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἥδει αὐτῇ ἰδρύουν, ἐδὼν αὐχέειν, καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ ἠμῶν καθατηρεῖν] 
4 606 b. Cr. Laws 790 e.
5 606 b, v. 1: εἰ ἐνθυμεῖτο, ὅτι τὸ βίος ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἀλεξίασις ζωνομονεταὶ πεπειθων καὶ ἀποκριθέν τὸ διακρίνεται τε καὶ ἀποδιδότας λεικόνι καὶ ἀποφθεύσεις, φάσεις τοῦ ποιῆσαι τοῦ ἀποθητών ἔτημες, τὸ ἀπὸ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς πεπειθων καὶ μεροῦς τὸ δὲ φῶς ἔφατον ἡμῖν, ὅτι αὐτῇ πολλοὶ ἐν τῷ καταλαμβάνοντας λόγῳ ἠμῶν ἄγοντων παρά τὸν ἀρχηγόν τοῦ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεοροῦν...λογίζεται γὰρ οἷα, ἄλλοι τοῖς μετέπετε, ὅτι ἀπολογίαν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ὅποιον τωσοῦτον τὰς ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῶς ἱεροπλοῦ τῷ ἑνὶ ἐν ὅμοιοι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοι πιθοῦν εἰς χεῖρα.
6 The translation is Dr Jowett’s. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle Pol. vi (viii). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.
(1) to convey truth ‘in a glass darkly,’ as he himself does in his myths, and (2) to conduce to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle’s παιδεία: habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the Aristotelian κάθωρις is something wholly distinct from this. It might be defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and so transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive: it might be urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the principle of ‘that indispensable minimum’ of gratification which even Plato does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the Republic, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little but just enough to send it to sleep.

In an Eudeman book of the Ethics an even more advanced position is taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 16 χαίρω δύναμις), even artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such ‘intense’ pleasures being natural remedies for pains. But that Aristotle was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shown e.g. by his care for the education of the feelings in youth.

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points in the exposition. In the Philebus (47 E ff.) there is an interesting and valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful, which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable concomitants of various phases of emotion. We have every reason then to

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3 Ὅρη. Χ. 571 ε λ. τὸ ἐπιθυμητὸν δὲ μὴτε ἐνδεχεί τοῦτο μὴτε πληρωθῇ, ὅταν συν καυσθῇ καὶ μὴ παραμένῃ θρήσκευμαν τῇ βελτίωτον ἱπτάσσειν ἂν λυτομένου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν αὐτὸ [τὸ τέλεστον] καὶ τὰ ὀργία ὦ καρδίαν ἐκποιήσει καὶ ἀργιαλείηται καὶ μὴ ἀλθῇ... ὅποις ἐν τῷ ἰδιότητι παραδιώκει καὶ μὴ τὰ ἄνδρος ἢ ἀράμαν πεισθέντος τῷ θυμῷ καθοδεύτης, Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ποὺ ῥόος ἐγκόσια, ὅταν ἀνεπαληθηται. Καὶ ἔχειται, διὰ τὸ τέλος ἐν καταγωγῇ, ἀρρενοῦ ἀναιρεθηται. Καὶ λέγεται τὸν πάντας ἐκποιήσει καὶ ἀργιαλείηται. Καὶ λέγεται τὸν πάντας ἐκποιήσει καὶ ἀργιαλείηται.

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conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of folly, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also Pol. viii. 1. 12, 1390 b 25 ff, with Phil. 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little is said beyond the remark περὶ τῶν χαορτιῶν ἰσαρρησκεύασται τὸν θεάτην. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς θρῆσις οὐδὲν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν. Phil. 48 A. Cfr. 50 A.
ADDENDA.
INTRODUCTION.

Page 1, line 3. The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

P. 2, note 1. After θνοιας add: and 1721 a 27 (1722 a 3, b 34) φαλτία. Π. 3 Φαλτία Π.

P. 7, l. 17. As Plutarch Ἱπποτικὲς Ἐξερέμασις is a fabrication of the renascence, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Lugdun. apud Seb. Gryphium), the citations from the Politicus would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christopher Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorinus. In his preface to Vol. IV of Anecdota Graeca (Hamburgi 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the Ἱπποτικὲς Ἐξερέμασις which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, “membranae illae uno altero parte inventam typographiam saeculo, meo indicio, laculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscillatis librarib indiciis exaratae...Veterum scriptorum loca, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum suppletente...Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) confecta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi exstantem, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam...cum Graecis in lucem profero, additis si pauca exceperis, auctorum testimonii, quae non sive cura alique ex monumentis eorum adhuc exstantibus conquisseti.” Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 296]: “Aristoteles lib. 1. c. vi. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vertendo liberius versatur Interpres” i.e. Ferron “nisi in opuscule Plutarcho eum alia quae ad eum legisse censeas, quam quidem hodie apud Aristotelian extant. In ms. hic loco deest.”

P. 9, l. 29. Add: Gesammelte Abhandlungen i. 165 ff. (Berlin 1885).

ADDENDA.


Jowett. Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.

Gomperz. Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller; Wien, 1890.

Dias. Article in Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos. IV. 1891. 484.


Maehly. Article in Philologus LI. 1892. 197.


Niemeyer. Article in Jahrb. f. Phil. CXIII. 1891. 413 ff.


P. 14, n. 3. Add a reference to Birt Das antike Buchweisen p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of a book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δ in inserted after περὶ by Π° and Π° (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman op. c. II. p. xxi ff. xxvi f.

P. 15, n. 2. At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the atheesis of the last clause of B. i. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ πρὸν...σωλαίαν], f. c. 6 § 15, 1255 b 12—17 [θέδωρον...υπότερον], § 22, 1256 a 22—23 [ὠς...οὐκοῦν], v (VIII). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [διὰ...μὲνειμι], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (VI). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [ὁ δὲγάδειν], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τρίων...δηματέριον]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [ἐπὶ...τιμῷ;], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1356 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...πρότερον], Prof. Sussehilt is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οἴκεῖον]—the discrepancy between this passage and IV (VII). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—13 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (VII) —as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1307 a 28—37 [ἐκ...φειλόμεθα] in spite of note (126). On most of these passages see Sussehilt Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. Pars III, p. iii. Possibly even VIII (V). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. IV. 1891, p. 483 f.

P. 16, n. 3. Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. Γ. B. H. Θ. Δ. Z. E. Of these H. Θ. (and probably A. Γ.) were written earlier than the Constitution of Athens, the other four almost certainly later.

P. 16, n. 4. Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (§) = VIII (V) and B. 8 (6) = VII (VI) of St Hilaire and Bk. A.

P. 18, n. 3. Cicero's acquaintance with the Politics has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's Die mittlere Staaten (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannus provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero
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Direct acquaintance with the Politics is thus established for Panetius whose life (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apellicon of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala Die Studien des Polybios 1. (Stuttgart 1890) p. 162 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—151) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle's Politics. This hypothesis is combated by Sussemih Litteraturgesch. ii. p. 81 n. (4), p. 105 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

F. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the Ethics: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heybut 504, 8 ff., 530, 31 ff., 551, 5 ff., 610, 7 ff., 16 ff., 611, 10 ff., 615, 20 ff., 616, 6 ff., 619, 14 ff., 18 ff., 620, 10 ff., Anon. p. 190, 4 ff., p. 214, 36 ff.

The latter must commence with the Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Sussemih's editions (Leipzig, 1883, 1884). Similarly with the Oeconomica: see again Sussemih's ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book i and p. x n. (24) on the expansion in Book ii of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the Politics i. 11 §§ 7—13, 1259 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of Politics i. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. ii. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from Rhetorica ad Alex. 3, 1424 a 15 ff., b 3 ff., De animal. motu 7, 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] Erat 135 c, 136 c, Aristoxenus Fr. 19, 20, Philodemus De Musica (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3, Fr. 24, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kemke and Gomperz, B. 1, Fr. 16, 17: B. 3, Fr. 45, 55: B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 5 ff.; 16, 17 ff. Plutarch Vita Crassii c. 3, p. 544 A (esp. the words της γὰρ οἰκονομίας τιν άφθονης χρηματιστική οὔνας ἐν ἀθρόνοις πολιτείαις γεγομένης ὀρόμεν, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), Moralia 9 c, 537 A, 787 c—d, 813 b, d ff., 815 A—c: Dio Chrysostom, 3-115, 7, 167, 14, 439, 36, 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Sussemih holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the Politics, but hardly with the Politics. Even his direct acquaintance with the Ἀθήνας. Ἡθος. is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz Aristoteles u. Athen (Berlin 1895) i. pp. 299—303.

F. 20, n. 1. Add references to Blass De Antiphonte sophista (Kiel 1889), Dümmler Prolegomena zu Platons Staat (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz ὁσ. c. 1. 16 ff., esp. 169—185.

P. 35, n. 3. Gilbert's hypothesis, that Ephorus used the Politics of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 329 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the Ἀθήνας. Ἡθος, under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Androtion. See A. Bauer Forschungen zu Arist. Ἀθήνας. Ἡθος. (Munich 1891) p. 155. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical ὁσ. c. 1. p. 306.
ADDENDA.

P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 13 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία. See Diels in Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. iv. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in Des Ari. Politik u. d. 'Αθ. Πολ. (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the atheiese should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἄθρω...κληρον, and 1274 b 23—26 ἀντε...δια. Against this view see Susenihi Quaest. crit. et exeg. 1. p. xvi f.

P. 66, ix. The date of the Politics has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the Constitution of Athens, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the Constitution, which can confidently be dated circa 339—325, is separated by an interval of years from the Politics. Thus Mr Newman notes (in Class. Rev. v. 162) that in the first part of the Constitution of Athens "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the Politics is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer " of 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41 § 1 " Pol. 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in Die Solonische Verfassung (Berlin 1891) confidently assigns the Politics to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the Constitution. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susenihi has done Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. 11. p. x—xii, 111. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the Ethics and Politics were undoubtedly written later than the Physica, De Caelo, Meteorologica: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the Encyclopaedia with the exception of the Poetics, Rhetoric and Metaphysics. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the Ethics to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the Politics we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the Constitution of Athens, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books IV (vii), V (viii): possibly also to Books I, III. The rest of the treatise, B. II, no less than Books IV—VI of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the Poetics, Rhetoric, Metaphysics, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining Politics (other than that of Athens), the Νόμων βασιλεία, the διάσκεψεια, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on Politics. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books ΗΘ were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔΕΖ are based." I.e. he thinks that ΔΕΖ are later, or at least not earlier, than the Politics, which according to him they presume: Aristoteles u. Athen i. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman ii. p. xxxi: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics, and
yet he framed no fresh one to take its place:” a most important admission. Comp. also Birt op. c. p. 459 ff. If the transition from B. i is an editor’s addition, and δὲ an insertion of the family IP in 1260 b 27, the place of B. ii itself becomes doubtful, as Susemihl remarks Prolegomena ii to the revised impression of the Teubner text: “nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perfection, etiam libros ii. iii. vii sic retractasset, ut ii. locum magis idoneum inter iii. et novi ordinis iv. (veteris vii.) invenisset.” (This view is further developed in Quaest. Ar. crit. et cng. iii. p. iii ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz op. c. i. 360 n. defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, παράλειψιν ... τελευθήσθη as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.


P. 74, n. 4. Line 5. After αφορέσθων insert 1287 a 39 πανδημοσ. See Corrig. and Addenda to Critical Notes ad loc.

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that vi (iv) cc. 1—4 “are little better than a chaos.” See his appendix, Vol. i. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. ii. p. xxvi, xxxviii, liv, lxvii.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of Mr Newman’s volumes i. and ii.

CRITICAL NOTES.


P. 140. 1252 a 22 λφεν and 23 δευτερόν Machly, not rightly.

P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [τάδε] and (for πουείν) διασκοείν Gomperz.

P. 142. Add: No ms. gives the second article 1330 b i τάς πολιτικάς πράξεως καλ

P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 β μέν Χαρόπδας Χαρόπδας μέν IP Bk. Newman

P. 144, line 5. Add: Shilleto followed Giphius (p. 22 f.), who however preferred

P. 146, line 3. See Corrigenda. καθ ἐπιστ. after άντικα Γ M Susem.12


P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 πάροιν after έποιει added by Γ M Susem.12

P. 159, line 1. After Bk. add: avoiding hiatus.

P. 159, line 2. 1253 b 15 πάροιν...1254 b 39 κόμαρος noticed by Anon. in Eth. Nic. A f. 55, p. 190, 4 ff. Heylb. II.


P. 161, line 1. After Bk. add: (εισὶν Bk. 2).

P. 163, line 1. Add: See however Addenda to p. 7 above.
ADDENDA.

P. 176, line 1. After Ar. add: (but two Oxford mss. of Aretinus have genitivus: Newman ii. p. 71).

P. 180, line 7. After Susen. add: Diebitsch would omit καὶ altogether.

P. 188, line 1. 1257 b 13. For οὖν Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

P. 190, line 2. c. 11. 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr. Newman a later addition.

P. 194, line 3. 1259 b 31 δραμα Campbell, but see Dem. Prooem. 55, p. 1460, ἔνδομα τὸν ἐνῄεμον δὴ δημος, In Aristotel. XXXII. § 19 (δόραι), etc.

P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. See Corrigenda. After ιν' Μ' add: bracketed by Susen.1 2

P. 198, line 3. 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 1172) had in the margin δραμάτων καί, afterwards erased.

P. 303, line 4. 1260 b 20—24 [ἀνέρ...πολεμαίς] bracketed by Birt, as an addition of the publisher. Cp. Susen.3 Prolegomena p. xli: Neque tamen ipsi Aristotelis har ratione succurrò, sed compositorii, qui perperam ultima libri I' verba 1260 b 23 si mi τρόπων καί adiecit.

P. 332. 1263 a 4. The change in punctuation (ἐξα πάντων, τάς, see Corrigenda) is due to Mr. Newman.

P. 332. 1265 a 40 Add to line 12: δή for δν Mr. H. Richards. Class. Rev. vi.

P. 339.

P. 381. 1266 a 31 [φιλωσέφων] Zeller (Archiv f. d. Ges. d. Philos. vi. 153 n.): i.e. he would read at μην δοσιν αὐτῷ δὲ καί πολιτικῶν.

P. 399, last line. On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susenmühl in Jahrb. f. Phil. CXLIVIII. 1893, p. 192.

P. 370. 1267 b 26 εὐτελεῖσθαι εὐθελεῖσθαι O. Apelt.

P. 374. 1268 b 1 γνωρισθεῖσιν γνωρίσθητι δὲ οὖς Mr. A. G. Peskett (1891).


P. 390, line 2. 1270 b 8 Μ' omit τοίς.

P. 394. 1371 a 7 τοῖς δῷ ῥα, or τι δῷ ῥα C. Haberlin.

P. 396. 1371 a 20. Comp. διόπτα μην ει γε 1276 b 18, διόπτα μην εἰπωνει τα γε 1772 a 25 (Newman).

P. 306. See Corrigenda to 1772 b 9. δυναστῶν Π' Susen.1 2

P. 312. See Corrigenda to 1773 b 6. ἄρωαμεν Π' Mr. Bk. Susen.1 2


P. last line. 1724 a 20. Wilamowitz defends τρίπτοι τρόπου, but hardly with success, op. c. 1. p. 69 n. 41.


P. 334. Vm is Prof. Susenmühl's notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the Politics (Susen.3 nova impressio correction 1894), so that our fr. = Vm.

P. 358. 1725 a 23 κρίνεται καὶ defended by Wilamowitz op. c. 1. p. 205 n. 32.

P. 362. See Corrigenda. 1726 a 10—13 (τῷ...συμφέρων) εἴρητ η parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in Jahrb. f. Philol. CXLIII. 1891. p. 412 ff.).

P. 363. 1726 a 14 καὶ Niemeyer || τυγς κατά and comma after τροπων Niemeyer.
CRITICAL NOTES.

P. 363. 1276 a 15 ταύτη (before τας) defended by Niemeyer.
        Th. 1276 a 16 τυπωσείς; (with interrogation) Niemeyer, partly following
        Koraes.


P. 366. B. III. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon. in Eth. Nic. v. p. 214, 36 ff.
        ed. Heylb.


P. 370. 1277 a 30 [καλ] Spengel.

P. 372. 1277 a 32 τούς Ί.² fr. Bk.


P. 379. 1278 a 34 δορυφόροι Cod. Berol. Hamiltonianus 41 (merely on conjecture; the
        ms., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of Π². Possibly even in fr. the
        reading is conjectural).

P. 380. 1278 b 8. See Corrigenda. καὶ el. Π¹ Susem.¹—² (omitted by M⁴).


P. 383. 1279 a 20—16 [δια...ἀρχά] Stöhr (hardly right).

P. 387. 1281 a 41 ἡξε (with colon after λοίπων) Welldon (hardly adequate).

P. 401. last line. Add: But see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 539 b 18 ff.

P. 403. 1281 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers μὴ νεμων as avoiding hiatus. It is however
        in pausa.

P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert: τίτικαι Π¹.

P. 413, line 3. Dele Flutarch.

P. 431, line 10. See Corrigenda. That 1287 a 39 περιηθέντας is right (persuasos
        William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in
        Comm. phil. Monach. p. 103.

P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [τοῖς...σωκράτων] Widemann (not rightly).

P. 445, line 5. 1288 a 13. If Heylb’s conjecture be accepted, the punctuation
        will be changed: ἡδος πολεμεύτω, δουλέμενον

P. 473, line 5. 1323 b 8. Vahlen’s conjecture requires ἐκ τη. See Hagfors op. c.
        p. 43.

P. 475. See Corrigenda. 1323 b 18 καλ added by Π M* Susem.¹—²

P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Π M* is retained because neither the order of Π¹
        nor that of Π² will stand without Congreve’s emendation. Besides it is best suited by
        the context.

P. 489. 1335 b 34 [καλ πειλ...προέρει] would be bracketed even if the preceding
        chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.

        (cp. 531, 5 ff.) Heylb.

P. 496. 1336 b 40—41 σταθημ noticed by Mich. Ephes. ubi supra p. 520, 35.

P. 496. 1336 b 39 f. The punctuation (διὲ...Ἀμφιδώμου) is due to Mr Wyse.

P. 497. 1337 a 23 [πρὸς] Argyriades, rightly, in Διορθώσεις els τὸ Ἀρτατόλλου
        Πολύππα. Α’ (Athens 1893).

P. 503, line 8. 1338 a 16. See Corrigenda. πέρα...πέρα Nauck, perhaps rightly ||
        οὖν Gomperz, of δὲ with all other authorities Bk. Susem.¹—²

P. 503. 1339 b 30. See Corrigenda. μὴ τοῦτο after τὸν Π M* Susem.¹—²

P. 503. 1332 a 13. See Corrigenda. καὶ inserted before δρούχαλα Γ M* Susem.¹—²

P. 533. 1332 b 31. See Corrigenda. τάτοιν after 32 τοῖς Π M* Susem.¹—²

P. 537. 1333 a 26. See Corrigenda. θυρήσατω after μὲν Π M* Susem.¹—²
ADDENDA.

P. 642. 1334 a 8. See Corrigena. ἀκαῦν Γ Μ* Susem.12
P. 646. 1334 b 24. See Corrigena. ἐργίσεσθαι after 25 ἀφεσκένεις Γ Μ* St
P. 650. 1335 a 27. See Corrigena. ὀρφάκινον after χρῆσις Γ Μ* Susem.1
P. 659. 1336 b 34. See Corrigena. ἀνθῶν after ἰδα τ Γ Μ* Susem.12

COMMENTARY.

P. 138. 1252 a 8. Add after note (9): The identity of βασιλεία with ἀναστάσιμον asserted Pl. Euthyd. 291 c and Politics 259 d. The question, What is the object of this science, which in Euthyd. is left open, is answered in Politics. That στρατευτικόν is subordinated to it, is asserted Polit. 305 a as in Euthyd. 290 c, d (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν ἐφημερίναν μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to the participle against Bonitz here and c. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this sense.

 Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate separately, cp. De part. anim. 1. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐδε τῶν τῷ εἴσεθι κράτοσον, εἴ τις δόματο περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκάστον καὶ δύναμιν τῷ εἴσεθι θεωρεῖν ὡς περὶ τῆς ἀφαίρεσιν, οὔτω καὶ περὶ δικαίως (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well served ‘not only for killing the victim (σφαγῖς Eur. El. 811) but also for flaying and cutting it up (κοπίζει ibid. 837).”


P. 146. 1252 b 15. Add after note (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, δ ἕμοικοι, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion this term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to on the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. 1. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery late Aristote’s time: see Hiller in Rhein. Mus. xxxiii. p. 537 f.

P. 146. 1252 b 16. See again Quaest. crit. coll. p. 332. As in b 10, σπόμενο must be predicative, = as the first, primarily: συνεργειόν being unde from b 10. “From these two relationships the family is first formed.... F. number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the of every day is the village.” Both passages should be omitted from the ex. given by Bonitz Ind. Ar. 653 b 53 ff.


Mr W. R. Paton, Class. Rev. v. p. 222, thinks that ὀμογέλακτεs=those w ho was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked “What of the present tense (οἶς καλοῦσ ὀμογέλακτες)? For from Philochoros Fr. 94 (Suid. s.v. ὀργεῖσαι)...τοὺς ὑμ. ὂν: ἐταίρς καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it curial Aristotle’s time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the p cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διασύνθες ὑμῶν ἀρχοντος 346/
COMMENTARY.

Philochoerus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the Orators, having been expelled by γευσόμενοι. It manifestly assists Aristotle’s argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks ἰδιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων).... As to the remark,” p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, “that no place in the development is found for ‘associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,’ was not this just the aspect under which the γένος presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The γένος implied κοινοτος λεγεών.”

P. 145. right col. To the note on 5ο add: Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (σωματός) without any king, patriarchal or other, not of course ‘to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times,’ but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (ἐκ βασιλευόμενων).

P. 146. 1252 b 28. The place of τέλειος illustrates Dr Jackson’s remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton).


P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in Quest. crit. coll. p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, φρονήσεως καὶ ἄρετος. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susenthi’s conjecture), prudence and skill (on Freudenthal’s)².

Against those who, with Jowett, by φρονήσεως understand δεισιτης (N. E. 1144 a 25 ff.) and by ἄρετος φυσική ἄρετος or ξιδια (N. E. 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged l. l. that (1) such a use of ἄρετος is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals: N. E. 1144 b 8, Hist. anc. L. 1 § 32 ff. 488 b 12 ff., VII. 1, IX. 1.

Spengel, who understands by ἄρετος intellectual virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase φρονήσεως καὶ ἄρετος, but also by the fact that φρονήσεως is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term ἄρετος would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

² Quamvis recte monerit Montecattinus, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtute tamquam arma data esse dicerem voluisset, scribendum ei potius fuisse φρονήσεως καὶ ἄρετος, quid impedit, ne prudencia et id quod sub corrupto vocabulo ἄρετος latet non ipsa arma sed res sint, quibus arma offerantur, armis autem prae- sidia illa varii generis atque adiumenta significentur unicaque necessaria, quotienscumque opus vel iustum vel inustum tute perpetrare velit? Quo. cr. coll. p. 337.
ADDENDA.

Aristotle himself says Rhel. 1. 1. 12, 1355 b 4: τοῦτο γε (i.e. abuse) οὐκέτα ἐστιν πάντως τῶν ἀρχαίων πλῆρη ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again Zwei Abh. üb. d. aristot. Thorie (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who also Montecatino’s explanation (arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quo Seneca De erva 1. 17: Aristoteles ait adfectus quosdam, quis quis illis bene utatur, propius esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent indenit arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnans, non expectas manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: ns: surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the work they are ‘arms for insight and virtue.’ Not to mention the objection, stated a p. 151, that ἀδελφον ἄχρηστος δύνα shows the arms must be used by φηδρότης and ἀρετή not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests ‘language’ as one of these weapons, and admits that ‘certain emotions, anger especially’ are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]


P. 185. 1353 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἀθροί but of ἀείων the antecedent to ὅν. But in Greek idiom the generic case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence ‘The parts of Economic are of the constituents of the Household’ the meaning of the words supplied are of’s ‘correspond to,’ or ‘relate to,’ and not ‘treat of.’ Mr Newman compares 1128 b 17 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz Index Ar. 533 b 6—13, with Waitz in Anal. Pr. 1. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

P. 186. 1353 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμεθος is ‘nuptial’ and not ‘conjugial’: cp. n. on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 188. 1353 b 10. Lest the expression ‘speech delivered’ in note (81) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσσηνακός was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the ‘Archidamus’ of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 10 ff.): cp. Bias Attische Briedanskeit 11. 2 pp. 350, 289.

P. 185. 1353 b 21. Zeller Pre-Socratics Eng. tr. ii. p. 477 n. (3) observes the ὑβρίς γάρ μὲν δοῦλος δὲ ἐσθητόρως forms a trimeter, so that under τὸς δὲ, b 30, 31 poet may be included.

P. 188 f. 1353 b 23 ἄτει οὖν...33 ὑπηρέτως. The commentary may again be supplemented from Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἄτει. As οὖν introduces the apodosis to ἄτει in 1. 10. 3, 1358 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken De Aristotelis dicendi ratione 1. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1860), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὖν καὶ τὸ κτήμα. Spengel Ar. Stud. 111. p. 5 (57) f. and Thuot Études p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 31 καὶ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὅρισεν ἐστι καὶ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἔστιν). Eucken’s punctuation is as follows: ἄτει οὖν ἡ ἐκείνη μέρος τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστι καὶ ἡ παρακαθέτησις τῆς ἀκομοιοματικής ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ἐόν τίνι, ὡστε δὲ ταῖσ ὑπηρέταις τέχναις ἀναγκαίων ἐν εἴπῃ ὑπάρχειν εἰς οἰκεία ὄργανα, ἐν μὲλετι ἀποτελεσθεῖσθαι τὸ ὁργανός, οὖν καὶ τῷ ὕμμενοι, τῶν δ᾽ ὁργῶν ἡ

1 sc. ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα presumably.
COMMENTARY.

μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ’ ἐμφύσα (ὅσοι τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶκε ἄψυχος ὁ δὲ προφετὴς ἐμφύσων ὁ γὰρ ὑπερτείρη ἐν ὄργανοι εἶχε ταῖς τέχναις κατὰ 1) ὁμώς καὶ τὸ κτήμα ὄργανον πρὸς ἔμμιστε ἔστι, καὶ ἡ κτίμος πλῆθος ὄργανων 2 ἔστι, καὶ ὁ διὸς κτήμα τιμή ἐμφύσων, καὶ ὁ διὸς ὄργανος πρὸ ὄργανοι πᾶς ὁ ὑπερτείρης.

The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted in the text.

P. 165. 1353 b 35. τὸ = the Homeric Hephaestus (Bywater). “Aristotle’s rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue.” Cp. note on 1261 a 6.

P. 166. 1354 a 12. To the ref. from Eth. Eud. add Magna Moralia 1. c. 34, 1194 b 18 τοῦ γὰρ δυνῶν τι ἐστιν ὁ καθήκων.

P. 189 f. 1254 b 8. Add to note (68): What is called ἀριστείας in 1354 b 5, and τὸ ἄριστον ἀνθρώπον De Anima 111. 7, 2, 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος: comp. 111. 15, 5, 1336 a 18. Here as in IV(vii). 15, 9, 1334 b 18 ff., τοῦτο and τὸ μέρος τὸ λόγων ἔχειν are opposed to ἀριστείας and the irrational part (τὸ ἀλογων 1334 b 18 and 1360 a 71; here τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος). But in N. E. 1. 13, 1102 b 13 f., the latter is called φῶς ἄλογοι μετέχοντα ἐν λόγῳ.

P. 181. 1254 b 23. Cp. again Quaest. crit. coll. p. 343, where it is suggested that if λόγοι be kept, the genitive λόγου may be understood from it as the object of αἰσθάνομαι, while both datives are governed by ὑπερτείρων. Comp. however for the ellipse of the copula IV(vii). 14, 9, 1333 a 17 f. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καὶ άθόρυβον λόγου δ’ ὑπερτείρων ἄλογων.

P. 189. 1254 b 32. συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις κτλ. “But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men” [and thereby the former are after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Susenini’s second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated his position, which is that τοῦτο μὲν = actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοῦτο δὲ = actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but only the souls of freemen.

P. 189. Add after Excursus II: and the addenda to p. 209 below.

II. 1355 a 8. With τῶν εἰς τῶν λόγων = jurisconsults Dittenberger compares οἱ εἰς τῶν λόγων = dialecticians Meta. IX. 8, 20, 1050 b 35, οἱ περὶ φύσεως = physical philosophers 1006 a 3, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14, 1063 b 26. Nor does καὶ before a 11 εἴρων make any real difficulty in taking τῶν εἰς τῶν λόγων = qui de legibus philosophantur; for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From Quaest. crit. coll. p. 344.)

P. 188. 1355 a 15. With εἰς ὑπερτείρων ἄγαθον ταῦτα comp. III. 112, 2, 1382 b 24, κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπερτείρων ἄγαθον explained by κατὰ ἥματα, κατὰ μέγαθον.


P. 170. 1355 b 25. Note that ἄρχαῖος is an epithet of ἀρχαὶ in c. 26 § 2, and of ἄρχαῖον in c. 43 § 1 of the Α.Θ. τολ. (routine offices, routine of administration).

P. 172 f. 1356 a 13—19. See additional remarks on this passage, Quaest. crit. coll. p. 349 ff.

1 οὗτοι...ὑπερτείρων is the apodosis of apodosis of Spengel, καὶ δ’ ὄργανα...ὑπερτείρων of Thurot.

2 ἔστι καὶ δ’ ὄργανα...ὑπερτείρων is the
ADDENDA.

P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (11) add, that Aristotle is speaking of piracy (Bywater). See Journal of Philol. 11. p. 60 ff., Frag. 60 in Rose’s last ed. (partly given 1486 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato Menex. 327 E, ὅπως ἐκ μὴ τεκνῷ τροφή ἐξελε ἐπιγείους ἃ ἐν τῆς ὑπ’ ἐν καὶ τῆς δίκης τεκαύθεα τὰ ἄλλα τὸ καὶ μ. ἢ ὄνομαλλομένη, εἴη μὴ ἡ ἐν τῆς τροφής τὸ γενομένη.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῷ τροφής.] Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theopompus apud Porphyry De Abstinence 11. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.


P. 177. 1257 a 3 ἔκειθι.] “This last,” comp. VIII(v). 6. 10, 1256 a 10: ὅπως δῆτε τοῖς καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἄλλης καθιστά (Busse).

P. 180. 1257 b 18 δημο καὶ κωπον αὐτῶν, ἁραγγαίος ἃ τοιούτω οἷς ἐλεημον. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἁραγγαίος = ἀραγγαίος κατ’ “For the wise exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the changers’ own wants”: and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historian’s explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vico circle in the reasoning of § 10 see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 353 ff. As it stands, 1257 b 6 it is an idiom with a good enough reason: “owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chrematistik (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money because Chrematistik and Retail Trade are concerned therewith.” At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in ἀραγγαίος.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. IV(vii). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch De civ. divinit. 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch Πελόπις. 3. 379 b: τῷ γὰρ πολλῶν οἷς μὲν οὐ  ἄρνεται τὸ πλούσιον διὰ μικρολογίας, ἡ δὲ παραχύωνται διὰ ἀσωτίαν κτλ. See Frag. 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 188. 1258 a 10. Comp. Magna Moralia 1. c. 25. 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 1 c. Susem.).

D. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their ‘art’ a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find them: Hence the author of Oekonomica B. 11. cc. 23, 35, 26 records the devices of Timotheus Cabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud Athen. 531 B, F. H. 5. 1. 297.


P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους = starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. II. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

D. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take
meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is servile. In any case compare v(viii). 2, 5, 1337 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case where ὐλείθυς is of two terminations, the adjective = liberālis.


Db. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato Laws 843 c, d may have suggested this passage.


Db. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3: τρόχων εἶδος χρηματιστικής <υτισί ἐκλείμων> δότα κτλ.

P. 193. 1259 a 5 διὰ συνάντησιν. This has been done by the author of Oeconomica B. ii.: see Suselmil’s ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. ix ff. n. (25), and for the age of the writer (circa 260—200 B.C.) p. xii.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction ἐπίθεσιν ὑπὸ is found 213 a 25, Ind. Ar. sq.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Suselmil, defending the reading ὀποτέρον κατὰ τῶν φύσεων ἀρχηγον καὶ ἀρχηγῶν which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet. Transl. has γεωμετρίαν et natura principium et subiectorum (and so re. bl), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading ἀρχηγῶν κατʼ from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of Kp in the Nicomachean Ethics might with just as good reason be entitled ‘conjectures.’ If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather emendations) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are these latter?

If we do translate ὀποτέρον by ‘corresponding,’ we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the virtue of the rulers and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the virtues of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture καὶ <ὑπὶ> τῶν ἀρχηγῶν.

Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the Vet. Transl.? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written τῶν ἀρχηγῶν δὲ τῶν ἀρχηγῶν ἦσσα καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχηγῶν.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With δ ἡγομένως leader, chief, qui principem locum obtinet, comp. Dem. c, Aristocr. xxiii. § 113 διὸν ἄγαθων...τὸ μὲν ἡγομένων καὶ μεγάλου πάλιν, Plato Laws ix, 875 b, τὸ μὲν καυσὶν ἡγομένων τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἵππων...
ADDENDA.

ἄνθρωπος τῷ κοινῷ, Χεν. Συρ. Ι. 8 τὸ ἰηρόμενον τῆς στρατιᾶς φόλον = the corps of the whole army.

P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τὸ: the correct part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently read τῆς ἡμέρας ἄρετον, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ διασκαλεῖς ἐκοίτα τῶν ἑρμῶν διασκεδάζοντως, "it is the master γίνεται master, and not from the master as possessing the διασκεδάζοντως that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess (1) if so, ἀλλ' ὡς <τῆς> would be required. (2) It should be remembered c. 7 § 2, 1254 b 21 ff., teaching slaves their duties (διασκεδάζοντως) is called διασκεδάζοντως as opposed to issuing the requisite commands which is διασκεδάζοντως s.c. ἄρετον (ἐπισταθεὶς ἐπιστάτης). It is no part of a master's business to teach their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable duties are to be rightly performed.

Th. 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Boni λόγοι here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not preclude withholding reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper as to ἐπιστάτης 'rational conversation' does.

P. 206. Τὸ Ἐκκένθρον i on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no be accepted. Compare now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 1 s. f. 'Επισταθεὶς τὸ ἦν ἐπιτολοῦν τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the earlier of the two dates assigned him (circa 600 B.C., not circa 500 B.C.). See H. Diels Sitzungsber. der Berl. Ak. 1891 p. 387, Basolt Gr. Allt. p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. ii. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p. (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 τὸλαφοὶ τοῖς νόμοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 30, who hold all slavery to be conducive and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) εἰς ἀνεστω τοὺς λόγους as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (E) then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the part that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either the derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery f or claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman take with ἀνεστως. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the conflicting views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support an arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and which is so authorized is ipso facto just."


P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff.
independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman’s explanation, except that he makes τοιαύτης=probably Ἀθήνη, not ἄρμοντας ἱπερά. He translates: ‘for a hand when destroyed’ (by being severed from the soul, which is its αὐθίνα) ‘will be no better than a stone hand.’


P. 215. 1261 a 12 οὗ φασίντας συμβαίνων. To be rendered with Mr Newman ‘evidently does not result’ (not, as in the note διὰ a 11, does not appear to result). Comp. 1366 a 5, 1270 a 33 n.

 Db. 1261 a 13. The adverbial πρὸς is found in Aristophanes e.g. Frogs 345 κάψεις πρὸς, 611 ἀλεπτοῦσα πρὸς τὰλαργία, 597 πρὸς δὲ, τούτου εικόνι ἱμάτι...παρείδη, Aesch. 1229, Knights 578, Pax 19, Lycur. 665 ἀλλ’ ἰσχυρὰ ἱμάτι διαλύονται προτείνει κενοτηπομένες. Also in Demosthenes Adv. Lept. 20, § 112 a. f. p. 491, 7 πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὀοὖ δίκαιον, Adv. Leuctraet. § 13, p. 1084, 12 πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἐκ γνωστών.

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render μιὰ μᾶλλον by ‘more and more of a unity.’

P. 219. 1261 a 35. ὄφεις δὲ] According to Mr Newman the ellipse is thus to be supplied: ‘as (all would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations.’


 Db. 1261 b 7. On πέργυκε Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, ὄφεις ἔχει. Thus Rep. 473 a ἡ φάσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέγεις ὑπὸν ἀληθείας ὁφάστησθαι; 480 b ὃ γὰρ ἔχει φάσιν κυβερνήῃν πάντων δείκνυς ἀρχηγείαν ὕπ’ αὐτῶι. Comp. Demosth. xiv. 30 τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρατα ἐπίπεδων πέργυκεν, and for Ar. Politics v1(v). 12. 3, 1366 b 26 ὀτραία πέργυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates κατὰ τὸν λόγον in connexion with (or ‘in’) the expression i.e. τὸ λέγον πάντως ἀμα τὸ ἀσιόν καὶ τὸ μη. Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, τὸ λέγομεν=the scheme in question. For plainly τὸ λέγομεν, de quo sermo est, i.e. τὸ πάντως τὸ ἀπὸ λέγον, is not ‘the expression’ itself but ‘the general adoption of the same expression’: and so too with κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

 Db. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato Rep. 462 ξ by adding the words ἐνὶ δὲ, ὡμοίως, πάρχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπότον ἡ ἁγαθὸν ἡ κακοῦ τὸ τοιαύτης μὲν μάλιστα το φῶνες εἰσάρθη εἶναι τὸ πάρχον, καὶ ἡ ἐπιτηθηται ἡ ἐπιτηθηται.

 Db. 1261 b 26. Besides 1261 b 2 and 1192 a 11 f. (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of πάρχει is prominent also in v1(vii). 13-10, 1332 a 26 ff.


P. 225. 1262 a 7. After (Thurouot) add: Or this may be another instance of μὲν without δὲ following; see 1370 a 34 and Susenbahi’s Critical Edition (Susen. 1) index grammaticus i.e.

P. 226. 1262 a 19. Ἡ γὰρ περιλαῖος had been written by Hecataeus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

 Db. 1262 a 21 f. καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζηθῶν. Probably γυναῖκες=‘females’ both here and in the passage from Hist. Anim. 586 a 13, quoted in n. (143): καὶ δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἐσκόοτα ἀσύλθη γεννώσα, αἱ δὲ τὸ ἄτρι, ἄτρι ἐν τῷ φαράγγι ἢ πῶς ἢ διαίλει καλούνται. Mr Newman prefers to take καὶ...καὶ=both...and. He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. Cyrop. viii. 3. 38.
ADDENDA.

P. 227. 1262 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1262 b 23. The connexion between the two meanings given by Plato Euthyd. 304 b τὸ γᾶρ στάμαν, ὃ ἐθοδοκθὲν, τίμιον.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν see Quaest. cii Mr Newman is quite right in taking πᾶς with ἔξοι in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἑρωδοτοῦτοι is not, Mr Newman think, αἱ ἑρωδοτοῦται, but as other commentators have seen, αἱ ἑρωδοτοῦται ἐστὶ δημητριᾶς: for the increased traction which private ownership brings with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this advantage that they are merely means to the owner’s increased advantage ἔκαστῳ προσεξερεύοντος suits this construction alone, the other ἐρωδοτοῦται (adopted in the reprint of Susen) 1894, see Corrigenda with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ προσεξερευονται subject to ἑρωδοτοῦτοι.

Ib. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the In 431 a 10.

Ib. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which has escaped some critics, is that κἂν δέδωκαν ἔφοδον οὐκ ἔφοδεσκα, οὐ τὸν καταφέραν κριτάριῇ. ‘In case they need provisions on a journey’ imply have none of their own ‘they share them in common.’ Whose? we: Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 ἄρα καὶ χρείαν, For Bernays’ ingenious correction χρείαν, which has Mr Bywater’s approbation. Ges. Abhandlungen 1. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ χρείαν. ‘In his verbis χρείαν male de tempore in factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotae id fecerunt novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γεγενημένον τουτοι Aristotelem affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphanium secundum philosophum etiam si temporis Lacedaemonis retinendi illius instituti stat sed studium tantum (ἐγκύρον), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more dixit si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ χρείαν verum ἔτεκε καὶ cum ita sit, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe est eam cui Nυν enim saepissime id significat quod revera exstat’; even as it is, even actually. ‘Ficitae igitur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid si τοιχεον ἐνεγκύρωσαν, pro quo expectas τουτοιχον? Nil fallor, τοιχεον ἐνεγκύρωσαν eis duntaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dixi potest, quod faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituunt et qua haec res procedat et sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experimunt.” Quae locundum ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, quales apud Lacedaemonios inventae optimam esse ipsae postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1265 a 34—b 10.” Quaest. p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaeus viii. § 1: ἄρα καὶ χρείαν ἐγκύρωσαν which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.


P. 242. 1264 a 27. After πολλάκις is predicate add: αὐτοῖς ἄρχοντας in b 7, ὅτι ἄρα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφαίνω. Add the ref.: Plutarch Lyc. 8, Inst.
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P. 246. 1264 b 33. ἐκ τοῦτων. Mr Newman aptly compares De Part. Anim. II. 1 § 4. 646 a 20 δεύτερα δε σύνταξις ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ἡ τῶν ἄνθρωπων φύσις, and Plato Philebus 27 b πρῶτων μὲν τῶν ἄνων ὄψεως λέγεται, δεύτερα δὲ πέρασι ἐπηκρίντει ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τρίτων μετὰ καὶ γεγενημένην ὀφειλάν.

P. 249. 1265 a 13. πλήθος] Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ὑποθέσεις of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1325 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. II. and construction in B. IV(vii). see Intro. p. 32 n. (2), p. 33 n. (8).

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To n. (203) add the reference: Laws 625 e (Newman).

P. 251. 1265 a 28 ff. Comp. Quest. crit. coll. p. 368 f.

P. 252. 1266 a 40. On ὥς with future participle see Goodwin Moods and Tenses 2 §§ 197, 208, 210. He concludes: "The possibility of such a construction is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in Class. Rev. vi. p. 330.


P. 255. 1267 b 29. After "adapted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of κοινωνία is most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1265 a 3.

P. 258. 1266 a 5. ἀδελφὸς φίλεται=obviously presents no monarchical element either. Cf. Addenda to 1261 a 12.

1b. 1266 a 7. After VII (v). 7. 7 add: 1207 a 21 (cp. 11. 11. 5, 1273 a 5 ἐκ-κλέσεως). In ἀθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound παρα-γελασία.

1b. 1266 a 8. To the references at the end of n. (213) add: Laws 945 b. As is now clear from the Constitution of Athens, c. 8 § 1, Plato in the Laws is merely reviving an old feature of Solon’s constitution. Dr Sandys ad loc. has collected confirmatory evidence from Isocr. Arist. 23, Panath. 45, [Dem.] c. Neaerum

1b. 1266 a 11. After a 8 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1239 a 9—11).


P. 260. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to Busolt Gr. Aulterhämmer II. p. 137 n. 3.

P. 265. 1267 a 3 ff. "Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch De cupid. divit. 3, 524 λ" (Newman).

P. 266. 1267 b 2. Add to n. (243): As to the form, although διαβολάς occurs in the papyrus of Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28, yet Meisterhans p. 18 shows that the proper form is διαβολία. On Attic inscriptions ἐβέλεσι itself occurs only once with ε (in an inscription of date before 444 b.C.) but the derived forms preserve the older ε, unless the ending (as -βολος) includes an e. Hence ἐβλεπός, ἐβελεῖα, διαβολία: on the other hand τριβολος, πεντάβολος, δεκαβολος.

As to the introduction of the θεωρικοι, cp. now the passage referred to above, Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ λυροποίος, δι καί τὴν διαβολίαις ἐνορίζει πρώτος), not (as Plut. V. Pericl. 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The increase in the grants must be due to the increased number of shows, for Dem. De Corona § 28, εἰ τῶν δύον ἐμπορίων, shows the price to have been only two obols in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. I. A. 1. 188 where the Treasurer of Athene pays διαβολία from the funds in hand, ἐπέτειοι), just about
the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 10 of Archelaos, 400 B.C., of τοῦ δήμου τὸ τραπεζόμενον καὶ τὰς διαβολάς ἐπικεκλίμενον.


Id. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (159): The regulation in force at Athens, which Diog. Laer. 1. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the Constitution of Athens c. 24 § 3 καὶ δραματικὰ...ἀναστά τὸν τὸν τὸν τὸν τὴν διοικήσεις ἵνα. Mr Wyse refers to C. I. A. 1. 1, C. I. A. IV. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Id. 1268 a 13. "δήμου δ' ἐπολείμα τῆς μέρης τῆς πόλεως" is added because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

P. 374. 1268 b 5. Here ἀνάλως ought to have been rendered "couching in absolute terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀνάλως διακόσιον = "duly framed in an unqualified form."

P. 375. 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer."

P. 376. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in Lysias XII. 68, 70.


P. 378. 1269 a 2. παρακήλεμα is technical of witnesses: see Antiphon 5 § 20, 22, 24, 26, 30.

P. 379. 1269 a 31. Comp. Plato Laws 798 a, ὅτι γὰρ ἐν ὑπηρεσίαις κόμοι σεβέσται καὶ διαφέρει τάσα ἡ λογική τοῖς καθεστώσις. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (κόμοι, κόμοι) hold for him.

P. 382. 1269 b 10. This use of κατά is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. xxiv. § 109 κατὰ κατά διάκος.

Id. 1269 b 31. With τοιοῦτος comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, δοκεῖ δὲ γίνεσται τοιοῦτον.

P. 384. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καὶ> ἐν ἐπιφάνεια. See 1094 b 13, 14 οἷς ὁμοιότατος...ἀντί τοίς. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 πρὸς ὀδὴν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of service at Platea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in 111. 74, where he says of the Coreclyaeans: τολμηρότατον ἐπειρασμὸν...παρὰ φόβοις ὑπομένουσα τῶν ἄρρητον.

P. 385. 1270 a 8. Note that § 14 is strikingly like the language of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 s. I. οὗ γὰρ δίκαιον εἰς τῶν νόμων γεγραμένων ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς ἀλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖ τῶν ἑαυτῶν βουλήσεως.

P. 387. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in Philologus 111. p. 86.

P. 391. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great
plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. 

See A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes* 3.1.163 who refers to Arrian a. 13. 409: Curt. 4. 1. 37." If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of mice' in Arcadia.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With φ ο' τ υτον comp. 1267 a 15 ο' καταφυίας αμοράνων.


P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to note (346) a reference to Rhet. 1. 6. 23, 1363 a 8 ff. τοι περιπάτητον φαινόμενον (καὶ γὰρ πάντες δείχνοντα τοὺς' ἀγαθῶν ἄνω).


P. 301. 1271 b 35—39. This is Euphorus again (Fr. 61) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, *F. H. G.* 1. 249: πρώτοι δὲ Κρήτας φασὶ την Ἑλλάδα | ἄρει ταλαπάτης, ἀεὶ τε νεωτίδαις | πόλεις καταστέχουσι, ἀεὶ τε καὶ κυνοκέιαν | αὐτῶν Ἐφέσων εἶναι, εἶναι φοίνικες τε | ἐνώμονα τὴν ἐνυών ἀπὸ Κρήτας τίον, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότων μασκελεός αὐτήν ἑκατόν | πλοῖα ἡμέρας ἀπέχουσαν δὲ τῇ Δακονίκῃ. Mr Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds: "The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3—4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus."

Ib. 1272 a 18. φόρον οὗτος φρονοῦν] "The word φόρος need not have political associations. It can mean *rent for land* and nothing more; here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in *Bull. corr. hist.* v. (1881), p. 108 ff. and for the fact Dosadias apud Athen. iv. 142 (Wyse).

Ib. 1272 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this note by a reference to Plato, *Laws* 677 E, where Epimenides' device (μυχόεμαι)—apparently ἄλλως, i.e. pennmican—is mentioned (see Stahlbaum, *ad loc.*), and to F. H. G. II. 30, III. 40 (Newman). To the next note (367) add a reference to Plato's strong censure *Laws* 835 b—841.

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps ἔχουσαν sc. τῆς πολικῆς and for the ellipse appeals to *1266 b 1, 2*, where however it presents no such intolerable harshness.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of ἀραινύναι here is clear from the antithesis to ἐκ τῶν τιχόντων: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that ἀραινύναι ἀλεξίθαιεν = election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and
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"merit" or "capacity," as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Arm.* § 37 όλο καὶ
gεγονοῦτε καὶ πολλὰ ἄριστο πόλει ἐν τῇ βίᾳ ἐνδεξαμένοις. Philochorus *F. H. G.* 1:
προεισαγότας ἐν τῇ γένεσι καὶ πλατέα καὶ βίῳ χρήσιν (where προεισαγότας echoes ἄριστο
dén) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning
than that attested by Timaeus, *καὶ'ἄδικας ἄλεος*.

F. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τῶνων καὶ δὲ δήμος where all the authorities
give καὶ τῶνων ὅ ὦ, and the change was defended by Prof. Tylor in *Hermathene* Vol. vi., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seem
imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τῶνων in the text
and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman it
is shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τῶνων: "over the mean,
which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between Shofetes and Seneca
"as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity.
But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture?
In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative
assumption that ἡμεῖς ἰσόπεπλούνονται are unnecessary as to bringing or not bringing a
gift question before the popular assembly.

1273 b 13. Διδοῦσαν τικτήματι | Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render
"for it is not only fairer to all, as we said." sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: in *Constitution of Athens* cc. 5—13 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will
be found in Mr Kenyon’s and Dr Sandys’ editions. Amongst the numerous publication
which deal with the relations of this treatise to the Politics may be specially mentioned
Wilamowitz-Moellendorf Aristoteles u. Athen (Berlin 1893). See also the second
editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.*
Theil ii. *Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1897).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commenteary on B. ii. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention
Aristeides p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Db. 1273 b 36. ἦνιοι μὲν οἰσταί... b 41 οὐκετε δὲ... 1274 a 3 διὸ καὶ μέμφεται
tìn... a 11 φαινεται δὲ...] In general structure this whole account may instructive
be compared with two criticisms in ‘Αθ. πολ. (i) c. 9 § 2, ὅσον μὲν οὐκ ἔρημος...οὐ μὲν
eikós (cp. οὐκετε above)...οὐ γὰρ... (ii) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ἐν ὅσοι πειράται τις διαβάλλειν,
οὐ μὴν ἄλλα πειρατότητα δ τῶν δημοκράτων λόγος οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶ οὕτως...ταύτην μὲν 
occl λογίαν γε καὶ 
νομίζειν φεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν εἴρηei. Provisionally we may identify the ἦνιοι of 1273 b
with οἰσταί of ‘Αθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* xxvii. p. 267 f. would refer
μέμφεται tìn to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon’s constitution
‘Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ’ ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. ‘Αθ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) ἡ
μεταβολή, ἡ ἐνί Σλώμων, ἀφ’ ἦν ἀρχή δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτo
ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτη τοῦ Solon.

Db. 1273 b 37. ὧν ἀκρατοὶ κτλ] Compare ‘Αθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding
Draco and Solon: ἢ γὰρ [τίτε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀληθερίᾳ πάσι, καὶ
dὲ καὶ ἐκδολοῦσιν οἱ τέκνητα τοῖς πλουσίοις... ἢ δὲ τάσα γῇ δὲ ἀλλιῶν ἃν κτλ.: c. 4 § 3.
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c. 5 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν δυσλευκῶν τῶν ἔλεγε, c. 6 § 1 τῶν δῆμων ἡλευθέρως, and (what were undoubtedly the writer's authorities for his facts) Solon's verses copied in c. 12 § 4.

Db. 1273 b 38. δημοκρατίαν τὴν πατρίως Comp. the use in 'Αθ. θ. ι. c. 29 § 3 of οἱ πάρεις εἶναι τὴν Κλεαθένθη γίνεται with the comment subjoined οὐν οὐ δημοκρατίαν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν εἶναι τὴν Κλεαθένθη τον πολιτείαν τῷ Σόλωνι; also c. 31 § 3, τὴν πατρίως πολιτείαν (bis). Unquestionably πατρίως had become at the end of the fifth century a synonym for Solonian.

Db. 1273 b 41. δικαστήριον] Fully explained by 'Αθ. θ. ι. c. 9 § 1, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: δικαία δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία ταύτα εἶσι τὰ δημοκράτας: πρῶτος μὲν καὶ μέγιστος τὸ μὴ δανείζων ἐπὶ τῶν σώματι, ἐπειδὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸ βουλευτέρων [πολεμεύων] ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δὲ, ψέφων ἐξουσία ἵππηκέναι τῷ πλῆθος, ἡ ὲ τὸ δικαστήριον ἐξεῖναι κόροι γὰρ ὃν ὦ δῆμος τῆς φήμης, κόροι γένουσι τῆς πολιτείας.

Db. δικαστήριον] This, like εἰκὸς 'Αθ. θ. ι. c. 6, c. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the Constitution and not unknown in the Politics. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in J. H. S. xii. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the 'signals of this method' in style.

Db. 1274 a 1. τῷ βούλητι That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the Constitution of Athens. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἀρχαὶ πολιτείας c. 3 § 6; ὃ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγίων βούλη ὅσατα χάριν τοῦ δαπεδεύτων τῶν νόμων, διότι δὲ τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλις, καὶ κόλασις καὶ ἐννοια τοῖς ἀκομφόροις κυριοῖς. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (i.e.). Under Draco's constitution it was made φύλαξ τῶν νόμων and received complaints of their violation (ἰσαγγελία), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the νόμος ἱσαγγελίας, c. 8 § 4.

Db. 1274 a 2. τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρέσκει] According to 'Αθ. θ. ι. c. 8 § 1 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with sortition, τῶν δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀνειλέικα κληρονομαὶ ἐν προκρίτων, a statement which sets in a proper light the tolerably correct (but hitherto neglected) conceptions of the Solonian practice found in Isocrates Areop. §§ 23, 23, Panath. § 145, and [Dem.] i. Neumar. lxx. § 75. Since the lot was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristotle can perfectly well speak of the people, here and in 1281 b 33, as electing.

Thus Aristotle's own qualifications of the democratic panegyrics passed upon Solon's constitution amount to this: 'Solon did not found the Areopagite Council, though he confirmed it in its censorial prerogatives, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates.' The exact sense in which the last comment is taken to be relevant is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reform comes from 'Αθ. θ. ι. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ἀνειλέευος (not ἀνειλέευος ἐν Ἀρεόπαγος) μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τῶν ἐξαρχῶν παρεκθέντος ἡμῶν τὸς δὲ τῶν μὲν ὀρνεία ἀρχών. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in olden time the Areopagus
used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγω Βουλή ἀνακαλεσαμένη καὶ κοιναὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν τῶν ἐκτηθέων ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῖν τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐκ ἔκαστος διατάζει ἀνάτομον.

Dib. τὸν δὲ δήμον καταστήσας κτλ.] The importance of the appeal to the in court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἐν ἑαυτὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγένηται τούτων νόμων ἀπὸ δεδυναμωμένων...ἀκατέργατο πολιτῶν ἐμφασισμένη γῆ ἀποτελεῖ καὶ πάσα ἀραξία καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ θεῖα τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch V. Sol. 18 (τὸ οἰκείνωσιν καὶ δικαίωμα καὶ ἀρχαῖα μὲν οὐδὲν ὀστερον ἔτερον ἐπισήμως ἐφάνη τὸ γάρ κλείστα τῶν καθήμερων ἐνεπτυχεὶς εἰς τοῦ δικαστήριον (namely through appeal from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt Gr. Alt. 2 p. 150 n. (5).

P. 318. 1274 a 3. μεμφοται τους] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 3, 4 (πειρώται τους διαβάλλεις αὐτῶν...οἱ βασιλεῖς βιαστών). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz op. c. 1 p. 74 p. 165 ff.

Dib. 1274 a 8. Ἐμφαλήνως ἔκκληκται καὶ Περείκτης] The most remarkable novelty contained in Ἀθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes against the Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagian: c. 25. The ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagos lasted 17 years after Salamin (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens circa 463 b.c., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia circa 466 b.c. See Mr E. M. Walker in Class. Rev. vi. 95 ff. Few at this rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the Politics we have to decide whether one or the other attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys Constitution p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion (Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγίων ἐνα παρελθόν) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of Politics and Constitution would be reconciled. Hyd. Susmühl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the Politics Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in his famous attack: Quaest Ar. crit. et exeg. 111. p. iv. He goes on to infer (1) that the more likely correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. II. Politics later than the Constitution of Athens (comp. above ADDENDA to p. 660). (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of the work as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. II. only professes to deal with the Doxykidei politeía, 1250 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the Constitution of Athens, a plausible hypothesis in view of the fact (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

Dib. 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the son of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch V. Cim. 10, V. Peric. 9) Busolt Gr. Alt. 2 p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions must be paralleled from Ἀθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th are bold): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (11; a 11 φανεῖται δὲ κτλ.) agrees with the defence of Solon in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

F. 317. 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare Ἀθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ ταῦτα συνέβλαιες αἰνεῖται μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τῶν προβλήματος δημαρχογορίας. Ti
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mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in Ἄθ. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of προστάται τῶν δήμων: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophon; and in c. 23 § 3 ff., c. 24 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 26 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

Frag. 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch’s careless paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in Ἄθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

'Th. 1274 a 15. Τὸ τοῦ (411) add: This is supported by Ἄθ. πολ. c. 7 § 3, τοῦ δὲ τῶν στρατευτῶν τελευτῶν ἐκλεθαßαι καὶ διακατηγόρων μετέβαλε μόνον. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: Ἄθ. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in n. (411) is nearer the truth: neither is exactly right.

'Th. 1274 a 17. Νον ὥστε τοῦ ἐξοντος in Ἄθ. πολ. Νορ is ἐξοντος ἡκατεῖον σχολατεκοντας technical where it occurs in Solon’s fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines Δήμου μὲν γὰρ ἠδύνηκα πᾶτερ Fragg. 5 and 6 Bergk.

'Th. 1274 a 19. Τὸ τοῦ (414) add: From Ἄθ. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the clause χαθάκερ δὴμητριοτέρων τῷ πρότερον when Solon’s τιμήσεως are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in Philologus L. 393 ff.

P. 313. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to Ἄθ. πολ. c. 7 s. f. τοῦ δ’ ἄλλου [sc. ἰδιεῖ τελευτών] δημοῦ, ὁδεμίας μετεξήντος ἄρχως. See p. 573 note on 1337 b 21.

'Th. 1274 a 23. Add to note (415): In Frag. 505, 1561 a 5, Zaleukos is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with πολεμευόντες αὐτῶλ, § 1, 1273 b 32.

'Th. 1274 a 23. Add: The laws of Chairendras (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herondas 4, 48: from Strabo xii. 539 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger Syll. n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 133, Antigonus permits the people of Lebedos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (t. 65 n.) conjectures that the laws of Charendras, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was refounded, had spread from that place as a centre.

'Th. 1274 a 25. τῶν] Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo vi. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Rhadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, cp. Sceynus Chius v. 314 ff.

'Th. 1274 a 30. Τὸ τοῦ (415 b) add: Comp. the similar exposure of a chronological error in Ἄθ. πολ. c. 17 § 2: φανερῶς ληγοῦσιν οἱ φάλαξιντοί...οἱ γὰρ ἐνδίκηθαι τῶν ἰδιατέρων καὶ τοῦ τελευτῶν δήμου καὶ ὅτι ἑν οὐκ ἀνέθετον ἄρχοντος. Comp. Mr Newman’s remarks in Dr Sandys’ edition of the Constitution p. lvi.

ADDENDA.

P. 290. 1274 b 14. ταύ] In Archiv. f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. xi. 504 Prof. B remarks that ταύ is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, ταύ τινα at 1 times in inscr. : yet ταύ τινα does occur, see C. I. A. xlii. 3. n. 1559. In the Attic there is no instance of ταύ, τούς as feminine; but Menander Fr. 530 K ταύ διλήψασι ταύ διαν ταῦτα. On the other hand τά, τάσις, τάτος, αὐτά, ο, are found as feminine, although τά, αὐτά, τάτα, τάδε, with substantives of θέλεσθαι, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τά, τα nowhere attested, while ταύ is found more often than ταύ, e.g. in Plato τά ταύ δια τά ταύ four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Thesm. 566 has ταύ τινα ὅτι τά τάυτα δὲ ταύ τινα διὰ ταύ τινα. In Isaeus ταύ occurs six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.


P. 281. 1274 b 15 f. Δρακότος δὲ λόγοι μὲν εἶλε, πολιτεία δὲ ὑπαρχοντες λόγοι θεοί. Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle’s omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained in note 34, that Draco’s was not one of the ἐθνεκμοῦσα πολιτεία, especially in view of the sentence is spurious addition it is not surprising that it is in cedible with Ἀθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have no account for a glarant crepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in chapter which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam at E. S. Thompson in Class. Rev. v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in Revue Cruv. 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P.: op. cit. p. 31 ff. and Busolt in Philologus L. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes’ oligarchical pamphlet 404 B.C.: it was reconstructed from the ἱστοικος of Draco, upon inferences to which Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that Draco’s laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco’s work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato Ἀκολουθία 365 Ε.: ὅτι οὖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν κοινών ἡ Ἐλλήνων πολιτεία οὕτω περι σε καθά πρωτος.

P. 324, l. 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head Hist. Num. p. 372 states plainly that the federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual dissensions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Ataraxia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 380. To note (8) of p. 329 add after ύπαρξει: This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons Kin and Custom in Journal of Philol. xvi. 1887 p. 104. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry
Spartans and Celts respectively, the ‘Joint Undivided Family’ having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 534, line 5. To note (150) add: O. Apelt Beitrag zur gr. Philosophie (Leipzig 1891) p. 381 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamos [Hegesidamos apud Suidam].


P. 337, line 18. See Addenda to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. ‘Oxen’ would appear to be meant by καρπάσωδα, ‘cattle’ i.e. ‘sheep.’

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Πολιτείας and the Νόμοι βαρβαρῶν. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susemihl Quaest. Ar. cr. et exeg. 111. p. iii f.

P. 352. To note (493) add: Since the publication of the Constitution of Athens the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question: see Αθ. νόλ. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1175 a 10. To note (435) add: See now ’Αθ. νόλ. c. 59 § 6, καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰ πόλεις οὗτοι ευροῦσαι, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀνὰ συμβόλων εὑρεῖοι, where οὗτοι = οἱ θεσμοθέται.


To. 1175 a 15. ἐγγεγραμμένοιν. Comp. ’Αθ. νόλ. c. 43 § 1.

P. 357. 1175 a 25. οὐκ ἔστιν] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down ’Αθ. νόλ. c. 63 s. f. ἄρχειν δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πόλεις ἀρχαῖς ἔστιν πόλεισι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὖθεν πλῆρος βουλεύεται δια. Comp. c. 31 § 3, and Politics 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1175 b 8. At Acragas and Melite σύγκλητοι was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: Swoboda Die griechischen Volksbe-

P. 360. 1175 b 32. πρὶς τὴν χρήσει] See below, Addenda to p. 379. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from ’Αθ. νόλ. c. 42, μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἀἱμοφόροι γεγονότες ἀτόμων.


P. 362. 1176 a 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. 1. p. xvii, following Niemeyer in Jahrb. f. Phil. CXLIII. 1891, p. 413 ff. With the changes indicated in the Addenda to Critical Notes the passage runs thus: ἀποροῦν τὰς τοὺς πόλις ἡ πόλις ἐκράσα καὶ τότε οὖχ ἡ πόλις, ὥσ ποτέ ἔτσι διὰ γραφής ἡ πολιτεία ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ οὖν τὰ συμβόλα ἐννοεῖται διαλέστε, ὥσ οὖ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόστε, οὗτος ἄλλα τοῦτο ἄλλα τοῦτο, ὥσ ἐντὸς τῶν πολιτειῶν τῶν κρατῶν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ οὗ διὰ τοῦτο συμφέρον) εἴτε ἄλλο οὗ [καὶ] δημοκρατοῦσα τοιχὸς τῶν τρόπων τοῦτον, ὡμοίως τῆς πόλεως φανερῶς εἶναι νοτητὴν τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταῖς τράχεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς διάγραφης καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος; “Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny: some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by
the tyrant, and would decline many other such
the basis of certain forms of government is superior
suppose now men to be somewhere living under
state just as responsible for the acts of this govern-
the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 τούτων τῶν τῶν
ἀλέγχρας ἡ τυραννίδος γένεται δημοκρατία. They
have been put in the reverse way: is the state
deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts
them? But Aristotle's inexactness in such matte-
the ταύτῃ bracketed above, as if the question or
more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the
the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 ff. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent
Grammatica d. a. Insch. 2 p. 25 n. 2; Christ pref-
sery) p. xv, who cites the variants in the mss. 1
The whole question of orthography is complex:
(i) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions,
been content to reproduce faithfully the best man-
rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non p
sed suadente Stapfero ad Meisterhans grammatican
semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc fo-
μέχρι, γέγονεται, γεγονόσες, πέλαν et forsitam e
paratvorum species in om et w desinentes semp
Studien zu Aris. v. J. Seel (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff.
Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the man-
the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retenti-
(μαλάσιν 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1237 a 16, πράσασαν e
v. Wilamowitz, op. c. 1. 319, sees in Aristotle's Gr

P. 366. Το note (467)—comp. n. (455) p.
c. 39 s. f. (τά δὲ χρήματα δ ἐθανάσατο εἰς τόν τὸ
and c. 40 χ θα καὶ τά χρήματα ἀκεφαλικοὶ
κεφαλοὶ, ἀπόθεσαν καὶ τῶν συνήθεις
now informs us that there was a special clause
reconciliation (μαλάσιν) agreed upon between the t
justice that in the Ἀθ. πολ. the notice of the repa
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀλλαίς πέλασεν οὐχ ὑπὲρ προστίθεον τῶν
καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀναβάσαν ποιῶν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. Το note (470) add; Mr
ἀγάθον as the predicate with εἰσι.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εἶδος cp. Aristoph. C
παντυπώντω ἐπιλαττεὶ ἔδωκαν αἰκίαι.

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. Mid. p. 55
κοροφαῖοι and a ἴγγειον κοροφαῖον.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. Το note (490) add; A tra
XI. 29 ἐν τῷ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγράφεσθαι φροτέρων ἡ
of the Spartan military system is thus brought out
γράφοντες ἀρχοντῶν εἰσὶ.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων γνὼρι
P. 377. 1278 a 14. With φαντὸν cp. Ἀθ. πολ. 6
P. 379. 1278 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper antithesis to ἀρνήσεσθαι νολίσκην, viz. νόθος νολίσκης: see Scholia in Euripidem ed. Schwartz i. Orest. 903 καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργείου ὡς Ἀργείος ἃρ (see the line) εἰς τούτον βλέπει γα τονον βλέποντα [sc. Κλεοφώνα], οὖν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι ὡς ἄνθρωποι ὡς τούτων ἄλλα νόθου πολίτην παρῆσαν Θρῆκες ἐν Κλεοφών. Again in Schol. on l. 904.

Ir. 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρωται = thus apply the law.

Ir. 1278 a 32. Παραρθένας = (virtually) disfranchise: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 6.

Ir. 1278 a 34. Add to note (656): By Ὄλωμ. τολ. c. 36 § 4 this famous law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 εἰς Ἀρτάδόνα διὰ τὸ κληρὸν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἕτερον εἰσόδου, ἔγραφαν μὴ μετέχειν τῇ πάλαις διὰ μὴ μὲν ἄμφω ἀντῶν γηγενοῦν. An error in the date is not so serious as to have been maintained (with Duncker, Schenkl, Buermann and at one time Busolt) that no such law could have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see c. 42 § 1 cited in Addenda to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. Add a reference to the reverse process at Byzantium according to Oecomon. 11. § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. διὸς δὲ νόμου ἀνωτέρου μὴ έσται πολίτης διὰ μὴ μὲν ἀντῶν ἀμφότερον γηγενοῦν, ἢ ἀρχόμενοι διεκμείνει μάλιστα εἰς τῶν ἀντίκτων καταβαλόντα μάς τράκουντα εἶναι πολίτης.


Ir. 1278 b 22. See p. 457 n. (4). Add to the note on 1278 b 23. Dubito. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. Demosth. De Corona § 254, p. 312, 2 τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν εἰς ἣμᾶς μέρος: but it may well be that δων agrees with μέρος, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Bonitz Ind. Ar. 169 b 9 ff. who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with Pol. I. 10. 1333 b 21 and after adding 'ἀνδε ἐξπλικάδυτα μετέχειν τοι έσται τότε τῶν καταβαλόντον μάς τράκουντα εἶναι πολίτης.'

P. 382. 1278 b 27. ἀν μὴ κτλ = unless existence is overweighted with ['exceeds too much in'] the evils of life.


P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For "409 (or 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's Protagoras (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. ἡλεθρόν] Free birth; the abstract noun answering to ἡλεθρόν = free born. See Newman i. p. 248 n. 1. Compare 1281 a 6 ἡλεθρόνας καὶ γένος, 1283 a 32 ἐξ ἡλεθρον καὶ εὐγενείᾳ ὡς γένη ἄλληλον, 1290 b 5 ff. ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἡλεθρόνα διήλευσεν ὡς πληθύνων [καὶ μὴ ἡλεθρόνα] ἁχροσία; lastly, the locus classicus which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 ὡς μὴ ἐξ ἀμφότερον πολίτων ἡλεθρόν = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato Comicus Hypereides 3, 4 for ἡλεθρόνας καὶ ζύνου, and refers to Diog. Laer. vi. 1 and vi. 4 for Antisthenes.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (ii. 143) understands this differently: "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like έτι πάσων ἁθρόνων.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With βουλευομένως καὶ κρίνων cf. 1274 a 15 ff. and ref. there.

ADDENDA.

Ib. 1283 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetic colour of the δαιμονία (1338 a 30) and φαντασία (1324 b 39) in this line; with which νηματευκής, 1336 b 19.

Ib. 1283 a 25. The plural δήμων in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 1321 'Αθ. τ. ν. c. 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 82. 1, VIII. 65. 11.

Ib. 1283 a 31. ταμειωσοί. [Add to note (376): Cp. 'Αθ. τ. ν. c. 4 § 2 (On constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): συμείων δ' οτι κληρονόμοι ἔως διώκοντο εἰς τό τούτα περά τῶν ταμειωμένων, ὃς χρόνον διατεθέντο εἰς καὶ τούτο κολάει γὰρ κληρονομικά εἰς κτητοκοιμημένων, c. 47 § 1 εἰς τηντηθανομελείαν κατὰ τίνα Σ κόμων (εἰδοί γ. C. πέντε 330 B.C. ὃ δήμος κύριος).

P. 410. 1283 b 5. ἀναμφοβήτητος ἢ κρίσις. [Cp. 'Αθ. τ. ν. c. 35 § 3 το νομοφασκούσος την πολιτεία της]

Ib. 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, of περί τῶν πολιτειῶν ἡ πολιτεία

P. 418. Comm. left col. line 24. Add: The recent additions to our know enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly discussed in the fourth century the ist century had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin appear, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of VIII. 4. 3, 1321 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. i Plut. V. Ther. c. 24, Arist. ? Nic. 11. 11. 13 (επ. Nepos Them. B. C. Cim evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompos, i.e. of the school of Isoc. (a) the view expressed by Philochorus, Fr. 79 b (cited in m. 603), which is also in Androcles, Fr. 5 (quoted by Harpocrates i.e. Hipparchus). Both explain appear in 'Αθ. τ. ν. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well aware with the latest researches of historians and Archihistoriographers.

Ib. line 39. The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in ca ostracism: προχειροτοπεῖ μὲν ὁ δήμος τοῦ τής πρωτασίας, εἶ δεκαί τοῦ διαλεχθήσεσθαι διε συμείων ἢ ἁγορά καὶ κατεληφθῶσα εἰςοδού δίκαι, εἰσελθεῖσα κατὰ φυλᾶς ἐπίθεται τὰ ὀμοόπλα, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφήν. ἔμεσον τοι τούτων ἐξ οἵτων καὶ τὴν βολὴν διαρθρομετάστων καὶ τόν πλείστο γένους καὶ μη ἐξακασιλέως, τούτου εἶδε τὰ δίκαια δήκατα καὶ λαμβάνετο ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱδίων συναλλαγμάτων δίκαι ἡμέρας μετατίθεμα τής κύλους εἰς τὴν δίκα (ὁστερὸν ἀπὸ ἑνεκτέον πέντε) καρτοῦ τά εὐτυχεῖ, μη ἐξελευθεροῦσα ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέραμον Στέφανον δικαιοτηρίου· μένδες δὲ κυλ.

Ib. After note (603) add: Compare now 'Αθ. τ. ν. c. 22 § 1 εἰς οἷς [sic. εἰς οἷς την τήν οἰκεία καὶ τούτων οἰκείων νόμους seemingly about 507 B.C.], § 3 διακλειστῶς μετὰ τὴν κίησιν [Marathon], διαρροώντως τὴν τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρῶτον ἐχάρασος τῷ προτεταμωθέντος, δι' ἐπίθετος διὰ τῆς ὑποφίλαν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεις Πεισίστρατου δημαρχοῦσα καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τυραννοῦ κατέστης: § 4 καὶ τὸ θρασυκλῆς τῶν εἰκονος συγγεννυομενος Μεγαλῆς Χάρων Κολλύτου, δι' ἔνθα καὶ μᾶλν τῶν νόμων θείου ὁ Κλεαθήγης, ἔξελατα διακλείσατο αὐτῶν. εὐθέως δὲ τῷ ὣς ὅτι [i.e. 487/6 B.C. ...] οὐκ θείας Ἡρακλείδας Ἡρακλεύσας [a nephew Cleisthenes]. ἦτε μὴν ἐξ' ὅς τοῦ τῶν τυράννων φίλοις ὀστρακίζοντο, ὅπος νόμος ἐπίθετο, μετὰ τοῦ τήδε τέταρτον ἐπεις [probably 485/4 B.C.] καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων δοκεῖα μεῖον εἶναι μεθέλαιον καὶ πρῶτοι οὐκ ἔσπασαν τῶν ἕξων ἐπήφθη τὴν τοῦ κόσμου Σιδηρωτικός ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealous preeminence (Eph. Theopompos) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (And are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Andromachus in II creation runs thus: ἄλλος δὲ ἔστω Ἰππάρχος ὁ Χάρων, ὦ φρένι Λυκούργος ἐν τῷ
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Λευκάρτων περὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀνδρόνικος ἐν τῷ β’ φασὶν δι’ συγγενείας μὲν ἦν Πεισίστρατον τοῦ τυραννοῦ καὶ πρῶτος ἐξεστρακιζήθη τοῦ περὶ τῶν διστρακτῶν δόμων τότε πρῶτον πεθόντος δὲ τὴν ὑπόπολιν τῶν περὶ Πεισίστρατον, ὧν δημαρχεῖτο αὖ καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐρμίνυφος. The coincidence of language is unmistakeable, cp. VIII(v). 5, 6, 1305 a 7.

P. 437. To note (690) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 2: τῶν ἀναβαθμίσεις διπλωτωὲς έχοντα πλῆθος Χων καὶ Δαμήνια καὶ Σαμίων τῶν δὲ φόλακας ἐχον τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἐκεῖ τίς τε πολειτεία παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχῶν ἦν ἐν τούτοις ἀρχοντες. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in Class. Rev. v. 161.

P. 423. 1385 a 16. Add: Busolt Die Lakademonier p. 141 ff. compares the Tægeia in Thessaly, the βασιλεία of Arcadia (which is also a στρατηγία), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1385 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meisterhans Grammatik2 p. 23 n. (132) the true spelling is Μαυράιοι.

P. 426. 1385 b 14. Cp. 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 3 δραχμα δ’ ἐνηχεῖν μὲν...περισσοῦ δὲ. Πb. 1386 a 15. παρέχοντος] In 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 3 the word is παραχωρεῖν.

P. 426. 1385 b 16. Add to note (691): For βασιλεύσεις at Athens cp. 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 2 ἐκβασιλεύτητα ἡ πολεμαρχία διὰ τὸ γελαθοῦν τούτων βασιλεύσεως: But as to the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer Golden Bough i. 44 ff., 118 ff., 158—165, 217—235, an epoch-making work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1386 a 3. Add: This is the distinction between τάξις and θεσμός in Dion. Halicar. Ant. Kom. v. 167 a.

P. 431. 1387 a 38. In 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάρων happens to occur.

P. 434. 1386 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 41 § 3, after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἐξετάζων γὰρ αὐτὸν πενθοῦσιν τὸ δῆμον κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψυχράμως καὶ δικαιορροιαί, ἐν αὐς ὁ δῆμος ἐστίν ὁ κρατῶν, καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὴν βουλήν κρατεῖ εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐνθύμησε) the writer continues καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πολλῷ ὑθεῖαι εὐδαιμονίατερα γὰρ <ποι> ἄλγει τῶν πολλῶν εἷς καὶ ἐρωτεῖν καὶ χάρως.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out insert anyhow i.e.

P. 439. 1387 a 6. Comp. for this sense of διοικεῖται, 1331 b 9: also 1330 a 7 for διοικεῖ τῷ κυρίῳ άλλως, and 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 s.l. ἀναπαύει γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις (maintenance) ἄρη.

P. 442. 1387 b 19. περιλαβεῖν] In 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 περιλαβεῖν.

P. 444. Add to Excursus II. See further remarks on the date of Pictucus, in reply to Beloch, by Toepffer in Rhein. Mus. XLIX. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 5. See Corrigenda. Dele the sentence: Again, one might...πολιτεία

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Susenihls in Quaest. crit. et exeget. II. (1893) and Jahrb. f. Philol. 1893, p. 817 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in Classical Review vii. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Susenihls admits that 1372 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant διναστῶν by διναστεία in the next line, and accordingly
returns to δεδομένον Π, and Mr Newman 1263 a 32 now accepts ἔθεσε Π in Π, or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposite (which may account for Prof. Sussehih's surrender of 1256 b 7 κομίζουσα, 1 μεταβολή, 1258 b 7 νόμιμα ἐν νομίσματος in Quaest. II. p. iv. although he still regards these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Ne omission to count 15 passages on the side of Π, for which see Class. Κ, p. 306 m. 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book I. where "Π is certainly wrong 15 times" (text line 40): deduct three of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall in the uncertain class, and add seven, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 121 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this the total of errors in Π to 19. But again, in B. I. "Π is right 24 times" (text line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enum. Of these few are very slight changes and Prof. Sussehih now refrains from them: viz. 1257 b 28 (ὅξης), 1256 b 8 (δυνάμει), 1258 b 40 (Χαρμίφθη), 1259 b 1260 a 37 (ἅπα), but he adds few in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 125 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B. I. the problem works favour of Π by 23:19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants c as right readings for Π on the ground that words are omitted, and that this besetting sin of Π: these five omissions are 1253 a 9 (ἔδρα), b 20 (ὑψώθησον), 33 (ὁ), 1257 b 27 (ἔδρα), 1260 a 31 (ὁ). If these five claims were struck balance in favour of Π would be destroyed.

In B. II. the alleged superiority claimed for Π is still disputed. Mr Ne accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of Π in no less 64 cases.

Prof. Sussehih again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of Π over Π 69:40 to 67:48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extra cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Sussehih's figures for Book II. are thus explained. "Π changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32): deduct these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 30, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 36, 1270 a 21, a 27, 127 1274 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 23, a 6, a 17, a 34, 1265 a 28, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 17, 1274 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of Π is 48. Again of the 69 claimed as right readings for Π (p. 465 line 23) Sussehih is now disposed to nine, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 23, b 19, b 33, 1274 a 5, a 2 of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 (καὶ), b 5, 1264 b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain: but on reflexion he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. as few, but only two (or three at most). This brings out the final result for Π =67 (or 68 at most); Π =48.

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35 transfers nine others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of Π: 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by Π, together
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165 b 11, 166 a 35, b 26, 169 b 6, 1271 a 20: the remaining 23 he leaves doubtful, but strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for Π. Thus Π falls with him from 67 to 35: and Π rises by the addition to the 48 (which Susemihl really admits) of seven other variants, which Susemihl regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 21, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 32, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total of Π 2 = 35. Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Susemihl reckons for Π and Newman for Π and we get the result, Π 2 = 64, Π 3 = 35.

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, Hermathena Vol. vi. No. 14, p. 335. "The course taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, ποικιλῶν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐνεργείαν. Bekker having completely neglected Π 1 and Γ, Susemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and now Busse and Ditzenberger"—may we not add Newman?—"seem to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."


D. 1330 a 15. ἡα...ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τότων πάντως μετέχουσι] No one can fail to notice the striking similarity between this sentence and the following in the account of Cleisthenes' local tribes: δώσω ἑκάστῳ μετέχη τάντων τῶν τότων, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 21 § 4.

P. 530. 1330 b 11. For μὴ παράργοι see now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 26 § 5 τοῖς μὴ παράργοις ἀποφανομένοι.

P. 533. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and 111. 3. 2, 1276 a 14 ff.


P. 539. 1333 b 13. With ἀνεφείβατο comp. the passage cited in Addenda to p. 520 above, from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. To note (915) add: Comp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 23 § 4.

P. 541. 1334 a 5. Compare the parallel phrase of Meteor. 1. 2. 11, 983 b 22, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ συμβεβηκέναι.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. Crito 50 D etc. and Dem. De Corona § 205 (οἴκι τὴν πατρί καὶ τὴν μητρὶ διὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα).
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