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THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

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FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE;

REVISED AND EDITED FOR THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

It is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Commentary gave to the world of scholars an *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, containing, amongst other valuable matter, a general outline of the contents of the treatise and paraphrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the *Introduction* as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circumstances however in which the pathetic interest naturally attending the publication of any posthumous work like the present, is in this particular instance, if I may judge of the feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large portion of an eminent scholar's life-time must now see the light without the advantage of his own editorial care.

Mr Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four years of his life his work on the Rhetoric, though it had nearly approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the two years that succeeded the publication of the *Introduction* in 1867;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of a long-expected edition of the Rhetoric by Spengel, which,
by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the most important aid to the study of the subject that had been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel's earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he appears during the last two years of his active work to have only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel's edition, refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly independent work.

In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope's death, his brothers took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Commentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and revision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a certain amount of general revision before they could be sent to press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracticable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from the necessity of reading several times over at various stages of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader's convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by recasting many of the more complicated sentences, and by endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and
striking out some of these repetitions, others still remain unremoved.

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation of style, something might without disadvantage have been done by the original writer; but such correction, I may remark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally certain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indicated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work proceeded) without my initial. Such insertions are generally very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to important works that have appeared since the Commentary was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson's edition of the Gorgias of Plato (1871); Grote's Aristotle (1872); Volkman, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, ed. 2, 1874; Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1868, '74; and Professor Jebb's Attic Orators, 1876. In testing the references to other parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and was therefore not available when Mr Cope's notes were written;—a fact that only increases one's admiration at the wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings which he had acquired by his own independent reading.

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I had happened to have lectured on several occasions during the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and indeed, as Mr Cope's manuscript unfortunately comes to an
abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter XVII of that book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who use this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope's representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty pages of the Commentary.

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of Mr Cope's own work, and in particular have paid attention to such slight indications of his intended treatment of that portion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of his own copy of Bekker's Oxford text of 1837. This volume and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascertaining Mr Cope's intentions with regard to the text on points of detail such as punctuation and various readings. But, holding as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any intention on his part to make an independent recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of Bekker's third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impairing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope's intentions, I have briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to some other reading as the one which he deliberately preferred to that of Bekker's third edition, or in which he was at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker's last
EDITOR'S PREFACE.

Octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in the Index Aristotelicus, in Spengel's edition, and often elsewhere.

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr Shilleto's Adversaria on the Rhetoric, which I have transcribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also constructed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehensive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illustrations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the head of 'lexicographical notes') a series of references to Mr Cope's incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. In the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, one of the undergraduates of St John's College.

I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated with the crowning work of his friend's career as if it had appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured name of the Editor of Lucretius.

J. E. S.

Cambridge,
2 July, 1877.
CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

VOL. I.

p. 40, line 14, for 'this ἄρετή, this special excellence', and on p. 49, last line, read 'the' for 'this' in all three cases.

p. 56, line 10, read ἐπανάρθρωσα.

p. 76, line 29, read νεφελημένων.

p. 93, line 1, for 'in' read 'is.'

p. 105, line 28, read ἀγχίνονα.

p. 153, line 30, read δολαρφιάν.

p. 161, line 23, read 'fortitude.'

p. 173, line 31, for 'he' read 'the.'

p. 190, below text, read ἐφίθυμα.

p. 239, line 32, insert (3) before διὰ λόγων.

VOL. II.

p. 56, note 1, l. 3, read 'Gorg. 522 D.'

VOL. III.

p. 12, line 21, read 'II 4. 9.'

p. 30, line 1, for 'by' read 'at.'

p. 62, line 19, read 'writings.'
EDWARD MEREDITH COPE.

Many of Cope's friends having expressed an opinion that it would be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this posthumous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task.

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of July 1818. He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at Trinity College Cambridge.

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: for he enjoyed extremely the society of his friends and loved innocent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the University, and Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extinguished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge.

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of vital importance for Cope's future career. Greek was the main and favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good
deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself.

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Knowledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal to those who were high in the school at the time when the change in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all overstated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to many others.

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was prepared, as few arc, to profit by the advantages the place afforded for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contemporaries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous to mention. All the while his studies were pursued with a constant and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good and judicious disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842; this Fellowship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Continental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future tastes and development.

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of
Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continuous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. In these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples; made a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during this 14 months' peregrination. The whole would make a good-sized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in walking them. He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or small.

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient acquaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very much for Italian literature, with however the very important exception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their own sakes.

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill-health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled him however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was
on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant-
Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation
of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in
residence for most of the year between October and June, and
left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suit-
able for some of the countries which he would have most liked
to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in;
Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get
again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and
October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller,
confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and
foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France,
then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate
that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was
compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six
years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of
1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer
of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865
when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he
travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these
years.

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the 12th to October
the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of
France, the Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South
Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he
was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th,
passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to
Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and
accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the
Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript
volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in
which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and
almost every hour during all these years' travel, with the exception
of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or
most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute
journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or
where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I
was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris,
seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the
Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can
learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done
so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals
of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his
life.
His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his Journal of September the 10th, the evening before he left that city: 'Altogether I dont think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; the weather has been delightful,' and so on. Again in 1851 he had a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, now Registrary of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice and found him thoroughly happy.

But as time went on and he continued year after year to pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to get his old friends for companions. They did not care to walk for twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an unnatural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that malady by which he was subsequently struck down.

In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort in the summer of 1869.

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre-
paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature connected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed.

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate lectures.

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the habit of doing with very great rapidity—, he found it quite impossible to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed to think there was something sacred in the printed text, as it presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. But with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable and highly valued lecturer.

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely dropped the Classical Latin writers, except for purposes not connected with the study of the language, and took up a position of benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the great French Classics.

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well; and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms. in the Journal
of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote’s famous dissertation on the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught Grote’s point of view, which in this country at all events has I believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. In 1864 he published a translation of Plato’s Gorgias. His translation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks to Cope’s translation of the Phaedo, a posthumous work which Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is the Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, published in 1867 and designed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Aristotle’s principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels perhaps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it incorporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour and genuine scholarship.

Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experience with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wymeswold, convinced him that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits were best adapted; and he contented himself afterwards with occasionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would make them a visit during a vacation.

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chancellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the time; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind
were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illustrate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public would care to know, or see paraded before them.

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues; and it cannot be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived.

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on the 5th of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Birmingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and dearest friends.

I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all the assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: 'Of all my old friends of King's and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without wishing to do so.' 'No one living', he adds with good reason, 'is more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness and depth of his friendship'.

H. A. J. M.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Α.

'Ὁ Βίος βραχὺς, ἢ δὲ τέχνη μακρὴν ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀζὺς, ἢ δὲ πείρα σφαλὴς, ἢ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπὴ.

ΠΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.
ΔΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α.

1. 'Η ρητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ ἀμ-

§ 1. 'Η ρητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ is translated by Cicero, ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, Orat. XXXII 114. 'Vox a scena ducta videtur. 'Chori antistrophe stropheae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophen cadit.' Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, Comment. ad Arist. de Anima, ii 11 5 p. 408. 'ἀντιστροφόν dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat;' Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Pr. i 2, 25 a 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Ἀστροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντίστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XIV § 4. Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Bk. IIII. c. I § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the ἀστροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic ἀντίστροφείων is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντίστροφείων and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, ἀντίστροφος does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντίδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. vi (iv) 5, 1292 b 7, καὶ ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding)

AR. I.
φῶτεραι γαρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν, ἂ κοινά

ἀυτὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις ὀσπερ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 a 33. c. 10, 1295 a 18. de part. anim. 11 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τῶις ἔρωις ἢ γλώττα τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν ἑστίν, ὀσπερ ἀντιστρόφοις ἔχουσα τὸ μυκτήρι τῶν ἀλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, 'res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,' in de Gen. Anim. 1. 6, 743 b 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνιστὴν ἀντιστρόφον (as a balance) τῇ θερμότητι τῷ περὶ τῆν καρδίαν τῶν ἐγκέφαλων. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Animā u. s., after defining ἀντιστρόφειν as above, adds, ἀντιστρόφος ex cadem chori similitudine significat ex altera parte respondere (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. 1. 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticam locum succeeder (i.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a convertible term), sed quasi ex adverse esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συστοιχία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 11 17, 42, specie magis quam genere different.

The term ἀντιστρόφος therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφύσες, μόριον and ὀμοίωμα (infra c. 11 § 7). παραφύσες and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: παραφύσες as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντιστρόφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὀμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντιστρόφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ἰτορικήν, ἢς ἀντιστρόφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικήν, not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, τουτέστιν ἰτορικῶν, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῖν ἀυτὴν ἐλγν ἀντιστρέφειαν (τεσσαρί εἰς), as Homer called Ulysses ἀντίδεον instead of ἵσιδεον. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon, Adv. of Learning Ibk 11 IX 3, has ἀντιστρόφη for 'correspondence', "and it hath the same relation or ἀντιστρόφη that the former hath."

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the
They are 1, that both of them are μη περὶ ἐν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or orerorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δὲ ἐνδύζων καὶ πεῖθανὼν, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστει, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δι’ οἰκεῖων ἀρχῶν, they have no ‘special, appropriate’ first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὰ κοινὰ, the κοινὸν ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are ὁμοίως περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἄλληλοι; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδίκως), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱσόστροφον τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφομένην καὶ καταγω-μένην λέγει. [koinâ âpatwou] See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5. ἀφωρισμένης] ‘marked off, separated by a limit’, from every thing else about it; and so ‘definite, special’ (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περὶ τι γένος ἵδων ἀφωρι- σμένον, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοξῆνος. Polit. 1 13, 126b 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινα δουλειαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). 1b. iv (vi) 4, 1290 b 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφωριζεῖται (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἑργῷ τούτῳ, “this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function,” de Anima ii 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is ‘to look away, or off’, from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and
Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, ii 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

εξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. η διαλεκτική εξεταστική, Top. A 2, 101 b 3.

§ 2. συνηθεῖαν 'habitation, familiarity, practice', acquired by association (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 b 27 τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς συνηθεία περιτεύον γνωρίζειν ἐκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων). See also on 110, 18. This συνηθεῖα is derived from the constant operation or activity, the ἐνέργεια, of the developed and acquired and settled εἴσις, or mental state (ἐἴσις from ἐξειν, 'to be in such and such a state or condition', τοῦ πῶς ἐξειν): by the constant exercise of the ἐἴσις, or established confirmed habit, and its ἐνέργεια, is produced by association that familiarity, or habitation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῇ ταύτα δράν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: ἀπὸ τυατομάτων, by a mere spontaneous impulse, and therefore 'at random.'

'Est autem dialectica,' says John of Salisbury, Metalogicus, II 4, 'ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipienda est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credatur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.'


ὑδοποιεῖν] 'to make a way'; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. ὑδος therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely a way, but the way, the best way; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple ὑδος, as well as the compound μεθόδος, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical 'method', or in any art or study. Hence we find ὑδὸς διήρησθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. vii 533 b: καθ' ὑδόν, in the same sense, Rep. iv 435 A, and Crat. 425 b. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. 1, 2 ὑδὸς δὲ μάλλον περὶ πάντων...διαφύσεως Λεύκυττρος καὶ Δημόκριτος. de part. Anim. 1. 4, 9 πῶς μὲν οὖν ὑποδεχόμεθα δεὶ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μεθόδον, καὶ τῶν τρίτων γένεσιν ἤν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὑδὸ καὶ ὑματα... Anal. Pr. 1 30 init., ἢ μὲν οὖν ὑδός κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁπισθούν καὶ μάθημα. Top. B 2, 109 b 14 ὑδὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν εὐπροσεις ἡ σκέψις. Eth. Nic. 1, 2 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐπι
3. the meaning of the subordinate, and the like. Where in
their respective offices, they see
more
the cause, as
the feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima i 3, 407 a 4 τινς γὰρ τοῦ παντός (ψυχῆς) τουατην εἶναι βούλεται οἶνον ποτ' ἐστίν ὁ καλομένος νοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δὲ ἤν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετηθείσαν... οὐ φαίνεται συμβαινόν ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἡ δὲ αἰτία τίς ἄνδρόν τιν κτείνει πόσιν; where ὅτι must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.

§ 3 seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἐξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τουατὶ πρὸς φαύλου γὰρ ἀκροαὶν καὶ τὰ ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούσαν ἐπεὶ ἄν μὴ τοιοῦτος ἢ, οὐδὲν δεὶ προσομικῶν—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμων.

πίστεις] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of belief, of things probable: all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probably merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθήκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of indirect proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere 'adjuncts' or 'appendages', like dress or ornaments to the body: 'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called 'the body', meaning
the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by 'the soul' in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologicum Graecae p. 110. Art. ἐνθύμημα) or παλαίω ὡστε τι ζευγν τῶν λόγων ὑπόθεντο ἐκ σομίτος τε συνετεχτο καὶ ψυχῆς: ψυχῆ ἡν καλοῦτες τὰ ἐνθύμημα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνιστάμενη σώμα δὲ τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὸ ἐξαθέν κάλλος, ὁ ποιεῖν εἴσώθησιν αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. xiv 44 nam et invenire et indicare quid dicam magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an art—αἱ πίστεις ἐντε χρύν ἐστι μονο— to the employment of the 'enthymeme', the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative 'syllogism'; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, 'beside the subject or real issue', all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbationi; unde quia indicem a veritate depelli micircendia vel ira similibusque non oportet: et voluptatem audientium petere, quam vincendi tantum gratia diecurur, non modo agenti superficim sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabatur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. 1.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. peri antid. § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 687 a 30. 'πραγματεύεσθαι peri τι, vel peri των is dicitur ab Aristotelc, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac rationem procedit; itaque conjunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν'. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of 'a special study', 'a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice' (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 15. Trendel. de Anima p. 199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135. § 4. διαβολή from διαβάλλειν 'to sunder or set at variance', and so
to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties’, in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite ἀπολύεσθαι ‘to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion’, forms one of the principal topics of the προοίμιον (see Introd. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as ἀλοι and ὀργή. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, ‘διαβολὴ non est páthos, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum év páthē.’

Topr. A 5, 126 a 31. [διάβολου] τῶν δυνάμεων διαβάλλει καὶ ἐξθροῦσ ποιεῖν τοῖς φίλουσ. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διάβολον in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see Introd. pp. 113—118.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστήν] Appeals to the feelings are ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος: they are ‘beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue’, which is the fact and the proof of it; and ‘directed to the judge’, intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ὡςτ’ εἰ περὶ πάσας—λέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. III 1, 4, it is said of the ornamens of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτείων; in well-governed states they would not be permitted at all.

§ 5. οἱ μέν...οἱ δὲ] ‘either...or’. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καί, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται.

ev’ Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ εἰ Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, ὃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὡστε
Lucian, *Hermotimus*, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ὀρέσπαυγίνας αὐτὸ ποιοῦσα, οὗ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικαίωσιν, ὡς μὴ εἰς τῶν λέγοντων ἀλλὰ εἰς τὰ λέγομεν ἀποβλέπουν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, *Anacharsis s. de Gyunn*, c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) ὦ δὲ (δικαιάσεως) ἐστὶ ἀν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγοντας ἄνεχεται ἡ βουλή καθ’ ἰστικίαν ἀκούοντα; ἦν δὲ τις ἡ φρομίων εἴπῃ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς εὐνοεῖος ἀπεργάσατο αὐτούς, ἢ ἀδίκως ἢ δεινοὺς ἐξεβον ἐπάγω τῷ πράγματι, οία πολλὰ ῥητόρων παίδες ἐτί τοῖς δικαστῖς μηχανατίον, παρελθὼν ὁ κήρυξ κατεσώπησεν εὐθὺς, οὐκ ἔως ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ.

There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X 1, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to,—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian’s carelessness in extending to all the law-courts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

**diastréfein** to warp, or distort, to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) line or proper direction, to pervert or ‘deprave’ the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλῶν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολίος, and ὀρθος, εὐθὺνει δὲ δίκαιος σκολίος, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423; σκολίαις ἐδοὺς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theact. 173 A &c. &c. So ἐλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἐλικτὰ κούδεν ὑψῖς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέρεξ φρονώντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, ὤ μὲν...τὸ τε εἰδὼς ὀρθὸς...ό δ’ ὑ’ σκολίος κ.τ.λ.


‘Crooked’ for perverse, immoral, wrong is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson’s Dict. Art. ‘crooked’.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of
the Ἱπτορική πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν δικαστῶν ἐπάνω τραπεζίσθωσιν, ὅς δικαστῖς δικαίως καὶ δεόντως εἶσην. συμπαραλλαπτέων δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἰ ποὺ τῶν ἀντιδικών καταδεικτέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἡ πράπτειν ἡ ἁλλα τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγώνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι ἐμβλητέον τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγωνας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

κἀν εἰ τίς...ποιήσει] The process by which ἄν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἄν εἰ, ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ, καθάπερ ἄν εἰ, οἴσευρ ἄν εἰ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (consopitum, 'gone to sleep', Buttm.), in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἄν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἀν, εἰ τίς ποιήσει, ποιήσει, 'as one would do, if he were to do'. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἄν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβοῦμενος ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 λ 'fearing as a child would': Ar. parva naturalia περὶ ματικῆς 1 2, 2 ὡσον ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἑστιν, 'whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἄν), talkative'; de Anima 1 5, 5. 409 β 27, ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the ἄν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, ἄν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jell, Gr. Gr. § 430, 1, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. s.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἀν εἰ with the subjective mood, as in Pol. Π 1 init. κἀν εἰ τυχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ σταθῆ λύον ἔλκυσθη, and ΙΙΙ 8 κἀν εἰ συμβαίνῃ, also Poet. Π 5, κἀν εἰ τίνης ἐστερα τυχάνωσιν. Κἀν εἰ μή τοι δοκῆς is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. ΠΧ 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Αξ. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἄν κἀν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. ΠΙ 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, I, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12, Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 Α, Rep. VI 493 Α, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to
those already quoted, Rhet. 11 20, 4, ὧσπερ ἢν εἶ τις. Eth. N. v 7, 1132, 11. 1b. v 12, 1137, 2; v 13 sub. fin., 1145. 2 and 10; v 8, 1150, 16, κάν εἰ ῥέσουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) κὰν εἴ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11. VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of ἢν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὧσπερ ἢν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1. ὥσ’ ἢν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὥσ’ ἢν κατὰ λόγον, where ἢν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Beiträge zu Ar. Poet, p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. dicendi ratione p. 61—64. 8.]

§ 6. On the ‘legal issues’, στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397; Appendix E to Bk. III.

§ 7. κείμενον νόμος] κείσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τίδημα. κείσθαι itself ‘to be placed, fixed, established’ = τίδεσθαι; συγκείσθαι ‘to be put together or composed’ = συν-τίδεσθαι; διακεισθαι ‘to be disposed’ = διατίδεσθαι; ποκεισθαι (as 1 2 13) ‘to be assumed’ = ὑποτίδεσθαι or ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.

[κείμαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τίδεμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: ὁ νομαθέτης τέθεικε τῶν νόμων. ἡ πώλε τέθεται τῶν νόμων’ ὁ νόμος κείται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infia chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἢν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενον ἢσιν ἄλλ’ ἡμιπράτως οἱ τίθεμενοι. Plato Leg. p. 793 B νόμων τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κείμενων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τεθεσμούν.] See also Cobet's variae lectiones p. 311. 8.

τοῖς κρίνομαι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνομαι] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κρίτης as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note 1: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1.

ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνομαι] ἐπὶ resting; and so depending, upon; hence peneis, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἐπὶ, (in this application of it,
λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ρίζαν ἢ πολλοὺς εὐθὺ εἰς φρονοῦντας π. 1354 ὅ.
καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικαίωσιν ἔπειθοι αἱ
μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεφαλιμένων γίνον-
tαι, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπῶν ἀποδι-
dόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τῶν κρίνου-

which represents the object of the preposition as the basis on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of ἐπὶ accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεφαλιμένων γίνονται] 'legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration'. Thuc. 1 58, ἐκ πολλοῦ πρᾶσσοντες οὐδὲν εὐρύτοτο ἐπιτήθειον.

ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογυῖον, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. vi 1, 43.) ὑπογυῖον πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογυίου παρ’ αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτος, ἐκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas.

By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀπὶ (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπο-

γυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδίαξεν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χεῖρ, (compare Theoc. Idyl. xxii 81 and 121; the 'hand' is the member, par excellence), from which likewise he deduces ἐγγυή, ἐγγῦα, and ἐγγυαλίζει; and ὑπογύον, ὁ καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγὺς φασὶ προσδόκιμον, ἢ παραντικα γεγονός, καὶ ὡς εἰπεὶν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v., to which add Rhet. ii 22, 11; Pol. vii (vi) 8, 1321 ὅ 17. ὑπογυῖατον (the readiest way or means)


It appears from all this that ὑπογύον means 'under the hand', as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. ii 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογύου, 'from under the hand', corresponds to our 'off-hand', or 'out of hand', and is used to express anything 'sudden and unexpected' or 'unpremeditated', 'extemporaneous' a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ χειρός, 'off-hand'.

ἀποδίδωνα] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of 'to give back', ἐπαναλαμβάνει, ἀπαντᾶει, ἀποπληθεῖν, (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is 'to give forth', or 'produce', as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as
when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or 'return' of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, a 27, b 22. τός ἐνέργειας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply 'to produce', but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 55, p. 132, 'ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.'

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, 'assign' (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, suum cuique; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, 'to render an account', to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, declarare. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐξήρα ποιούσας ἐν ἐξήρῳ μέρει κολαζέων ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) ὁ νύμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), ὁικ ἀντάσβοσεμον τὴν ἐναινία γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ τοῦτο χωλή (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται η ἡ φύσις; ἥ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοθεῖαι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 b 1, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἕλπν ἀποδίδωσιν, 'assigns' or 'applies', that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμων, in precisely the same sense, ib. v 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδίδωσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀπόδ. λειτουργεῖα de part. An. III 14, 9, 'duly to fulfil certain functions (services)'. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχῶ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαξαύσα ἐτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος. Top. A 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀπόδοθεν γένος, ἀποδίδωσιν γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὀρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere, de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀπόδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀπόδ. τὸ ὁστοῦ τὶ ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδίδωσι (to produce, effect everything) ὄμεν τῷ πάσατερ Ἀναβ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπειρῶν. Eth. Nic. III 11, 110 b 8, ποιά δὲ...οὐ ράδιον ἀποδοθέν, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is 'duly to assign, distribute, or apportion' and again I 2, 5. ἀποδιδόμεν τῶν κρίσεως 'we render our judgments'. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 a, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E. Phaedr. 237 c, Theaet. 175 D, Politi. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀτό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμων is used in exactly the same sense, 'to assign as a due'; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμων, Ib. v 35, τιμή ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9.
7. by this time, now that we have come to them, ‘they actually decide’... So in the next line, τὸ φίλειν ἡδι καὶ τὸ μισεῖν ‘this time’, in their case, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. Therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. *Rhet. Gr.* Vol. i. Pref. p. v. ‘paulo post alterutrum ἡδι abundat, puto prius.’

However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἡδι and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. ἡδι and its analogues επι, οὐκετι, οὐτω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of ‘already’, a definite time which we have just reached: ‘point’, or ‘stage’, or ‘degree’ attained being substituted by the metaphor for ‘time’ in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. *Arist.* περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ὀσπερ φύσις ἡδι τὸ ἔθος, ‘habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature’. Met. Δ 21, τοῦτο πάθος λέγεται, τούτων ἐνέργεια καὶ ἄλλωσις ἡδι, ‘one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these’. ἡδι, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, 4, ἤν αὐτίς ἐξώ ἡδι προσαγερεύοι, ‘which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a ἐξει’. περὶ ἐρμηνείας c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἀλήθη τὴν ἑτέρων, οὐ μέντοι ἡδι (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of), ἀληθῆ ἡ προειδο. Polit. II 8, 1268 a 20, ἐκεῖνος ἡδι ἐπισκεψαί. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δὲ ἡδι χαλεπὸν ἤκριβωσαί. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἐστι γὰρ ὀσπερ δήμοι ἡδι οἱ ὅμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δήμοι. Eth. Nic. v 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἑτέρων καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἡδι ὁ ἀρχων, ‘when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...’ in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society’. Rhet. i 6, 24, πάντες ἡδι ὁμολογούσατο. I 10, 11, ἡδι διαφέρει ‘it does make a difference’. c. II § 3, τὸ εἰδώμενον ὀσπερ πεφυκός ἡδι γίγνετα. Ib. § 26, ἐρωτόν ἡδι γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀντὶ ταύτης ἡδι Ἀγαπτός: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸς πόντων ἡδι κειμένον Σαραονικον.

It is found also in French, Italian and German—déjà, gia, schon. C'est
déjà quelque chose, 'and that's something'. das ist schon etwas. The Italian gia, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained.


Similarly in a negative sentence, *οὐτω* sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 11, *τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραξθῇ*, ἀδικμά ἐστι, *πρὶν δὲ πραξθῆναι οὐτω*, ἀλλ' ἀδίκων. Ib. 23, *ἀδίκων μὲν ἀδικμά δὲ οὔτω*. Ib. b 24, *οὐ μείναι τῷ ἀδίκῳ* —in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as 'not yet amounting to' the actual crime or unjust act: and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἀμφίθημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the *eīc*, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, *αὐτὴ γὰρ οὔτω φάσις*. Ib. 25, *οὐδ' αὐτῇ τῷ εὐδοκείλα, and 28.


*συνήθεται* (Bekker and Spengel. Alii *συνήθεται* 'with whom are connected...'. In πρὸς οὐς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, 'with respect to whom', 'in whose case'; and *συνήθεται* are often taken into, embraced in, the account', *σίν*, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for *συναιρέω* in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, *eis εν λογισμὸν συναρφάμενον*, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρὸς is certainly rather strained. Probably *συνήθεται* is right.
θεωρεῖν ἰκανῶς τὸ ἀληθὲς, ἀλλ’ ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει

8 τοῦ ἱδίου ἄν ἢ λυπηρόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων,

ὡςπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ως ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν

κριτῆν περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,

ἢ ἐσεσθαί ἢ μὴ ἐσεσθαί, ἢ ἐναι ἢ μὴ ἐναι,

ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν, οὐ γὰρ

δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην προδείειν. εἰ δὲ

ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος
tεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τὰlla διορίζουσιν, οἴον

tί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν

ἄλλων ἑκαστον μορίων οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο

πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὁπὸς τὸν κριτήν ποιόν τινα

τὸ ἀληθὲς] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests

are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 a ult. ἀλλὰ

μην εἰσάγονται γ’ ἐξ’ ἐαυτοῦ οἱ ἱστοὶ κάμωντες ἄλλους ἱστοὺς, καὶ οἱ πισεδρίζαι γνωσάμενοι παιδαιρίζασθαι, ὥσ οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρί

nev περὶ τῶν ῥοῖκων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὑπὲρ.

ἐπισκοτεῖν] 'to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow'.

Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, οἰκίαν ἀφιδώμηκεν ἐν Ἐλευσίνῃ τοσαύτην ὅστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκότειν τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. Infrr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, ὁ Εὐθυδημος ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θεᾶς: an odd and unexplained use of this

word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting

in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary

sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and σο darkening

by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (τῆς θεᾶς

gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr.
ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad


Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) τῶν οἴκων τῷ φρονεῖν ἐπισκότει; and in other

authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.


τά ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν infra § 11; comp. de Anima 1 3,

406 b 26 καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος (Plato, in the Timaeus) φυσιολογεῖ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ κινεῖ τῷ σώμα.

dιορίζειν] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42

dιαφημίζων 'Ἀδήν τε καὶ Διζήν'. Hence to separate a thing from others, to

mark off as a special province or domain, and so of 'the definition', which

includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and

excludes everything else. The word here of course means something

more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or 'determination'

of the proper contents of the προοίμιον.
Ἐντεχνων πίστεων] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and example, the σώμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the ἀτεχνων πίστεως of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such like, which we do not invent, but find ready to our hand to be employed in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the feelings (πάθος), and to evidence from character (ἡδος).

§ 10. Πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; see on § 3—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, 'more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen', more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, 'better and worthier'; secondly, 'more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician', larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινών, as opposed to ἴδιων and ὀικείων: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: "nobler and larger and more liberal (or 'statesmanlike', or 'more worthy of a citizen'), vid. not. ad loc."]

μεθὸδον περὶ τὰ δημηγορικά καὶ δικαία] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα] 'The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλλάγμα, συνδήκη, συμβόλαιον.' Meier und Schönmann der Attische Proces p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνδήκη and συναλλάγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 eti de πράττεται τὰ πολλά τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ ἐκοῦσα κατὰ συνδήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here only with the first and third of these, συναλλάγμα and συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary significiation of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συναλλάγμα), between two or more parties. They are then extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ἕδα συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίων συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78. π. ἀντίδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γεγονόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33. 34. Arist. Eth. N. 11 1, 1103 6 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γεγονότα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 eti de πράττεται πολλά τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκοῦσα κατὰ τὰς συν-
τείας ούσης ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἑκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, περὶ δὲ τὸ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρώνται τεχνολογεῖν, ὅτι ἤπτόν ἐστιν πρὸ ἐργού τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημογορικοῖς καὶ ἤπτόν ἐστιν κακούργον ἡ δημηγορία δικαιοθήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβολαία δικαιολογίαις.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on 1 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκοῦσια τὰ δ' ἀκοῦσια (the 'voluntary' being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas 'involuntary' are all of them crimes, λαθραία or βίας: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ιδα συμβολαία or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβολαία is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρῶτος ἄλλας πόλεως συμμαχίων καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἄστειροι τῶν λόγων οἷς δὲν χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς. Rep. 1 333 A τί δὲν δη; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτίσιν ἐν εἰρήνη φαινέσθαι χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ συμβολαία, δ' Σώκρατες. Συμβολαία δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλα; κοινωνήματα δήτα, and several others in Ast’s Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμαί καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρὸ πλείωνοι. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 b 12, ἄρχῃ ἦ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἅγιαν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἄρχῃ περὶ τὰ συμβολαία. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἐργοῦ] 'to the purpose'; anything 'for', or 'in favour of', and therefore 'likely to promote', any 'work' we may have in hand; and hence generally 'serviceable' or 'profitable' to any purposes. πρὸ ἐργοῦ (which also occurs infra I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προφήγον. Some examples in Fritzsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.


A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who
are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad captandum, tā ἐξω τῶν πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to create an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. 1 120, τὰς κακοὺς κρῖτας ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

ὁ κρίτης] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστῆς in the general sense of ‘judge’ or ‘critic’ of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀναλαβεῖν is to ‘bring back’, ‘recover’; hence to ‘gain over’, ‘conciliate’, as ἀνα in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιάκειν, ἀναδεικνύειν, ἀναδεχθαίναι κ.τ.λ. ‘Membranæ Balliolenses, capture: Muretus, accurare, excipere: Portus, recedere, recreare, ἀ μεταφορά ab aegrotis; vel conciliare. Omnes hæ notiones a primaria resumendi, ad se recipiendi, facile deducuntur.’ Gaisford.
The order is, (1) to ‘get or bring back’; thence, (2) to ‘bring back into the proper and normal state’, as of ‘recovery’ from a disease—the notion of something as due being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7—and thence again, (3) as here, to ‘restore’, as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, rescire, recreare, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. Thuc. ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

τούσιν, ἂλλ' οὐ κρίνουσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. ἐκεὶ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τούτο τηροῦσιν.

§ 11. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι τε μὲν ἐντεχνὸς μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις ἄν. (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπόδειξις χθαὶ ὑπολαβώμεν), ἐστὶ δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὤμοιος ἀπαντὸς τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν ἐνεισάγων, ἐκδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ὑποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, ἡθονὴ παραδούσι, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. Dit), ἐκδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.

§ 11. ἢ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις] ἀπόδειξις, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, parapλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικῶς τε πυθαγορευτῶς ἀπόδειξεῖν καὶ ῥητορικῶς ἀπόδειξεῖν ἀπαντεῖν, Eth. Nic. 111. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἐπιστημονικός, Anal. Post. 1 2, 71 b 18. ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἀρὰ συλλογισμός ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, c. 4, 73 a 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ δια τι, ib. c 24, 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρῶτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἢ, ἢ ἐκ τοιοῦτων ἢ διὰ τῶν πρῶτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχήν εἰληφεῖ, Topic. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Post. Vol. II p. 293 seq. πίστις therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than 'probable', cannot properly be said to be 'a kind of demonstration'. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a 'sort of demonstration' in this ; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So συλλογισθαῖν, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 65 17, 10 1, 11 23 and II 22 4, where συλλογισμὸς stands for 'Enthmemes'; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μαθήματα καὶ συλλογισθαί τί ἔκαστον. Phys. II 1, 103 a 7, συλλογιστικόν γὰρ ἐν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὀν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικὸς of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὀράμα, ὡς ἀποδεικτικὸς (conclusive) ἢ καὶ πιστὸς. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. The rhetorical enthymeme, again 'a kind of ἀπόδειξις', is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

It is justly not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. de parte de in apodosis p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 b 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 1 § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. 1 4 § 2, 1 10 § 4, 1 11 §§ 6 and 11, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with ἐπεί. Similarly Pol. VII (iv) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δν’ ἐστιν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεί δ’ ἐν ταῖς τέχνεσιν κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μὲν... ἵστασθαι δὲ. See also Stallb. on Phaedo 78 c. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δε, and in these cases may be translated by "I say": It repeats in order to recall the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init., ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μαχὴ ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαινόμενα δὲ κ.τ.λ. I 18 init., ἐπεἰ δὲ (ten lines) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.τ.λ. II 65, ἐπεὶ τοῦ πάλιν εἰς ταῖς πτολεμαίρες τοῦτος τὴν δυνάμειν. IV 132, ὃ δὲ Περσίδας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on I 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 c, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ δὲ καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ἐξίθετα. A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, 11, δοὺς δὲ—εἰ τὸ τούτο... τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 b 35, p. 353, 'opponitur τῷ λογικῷ τὸ ἀναλυτικὸς 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est.... Unde fit ut λογικῶν idem fere sicut quod dialektikon.' And this is its usual signification..." (Quamquam’ (he adds, referring to the present passage) 1 1355 a 13, quum logikos συλλογισμος et hic et in iis quae proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνδυ- μματι), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.’ To the same effect is what follows, where τῷ ἀληθείς exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the χωρικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, and τὸ ὁμον τῷ ἄληθε (probability. τὰ ἐνδοξο, which has only a resemblance to truth),
as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα] ‘things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty’; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. Α 10, 104 a 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἐνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ιb. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἐνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦσα πάσων ἤ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς συμφ. καὶ τοῖς, ἤ πάσων ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μᾶλτα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδοξος. Cic. de Orat. I 123, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera eius foresis nostrae dictionis:

διότι] ‘that’, = ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of ὅτι appears to be in Herod. ΙΙ 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturz’s Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ἐξέγονας § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler’s note, Prac. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, ‘Isocrates ubiqunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa’ [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμαμένος δτι is followed by καὶ διότι...]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 30 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waiuz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, Comm. Ι 495. For διότι = ὅτι, Steph. Thes. Vol. II 1544 cites Crito Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἄκονον διότι παραστή τόπος οὕτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθά κεκτήθαι δοκεί. Its ordinary sense is ‘because’.

It has also a third signification, ‘why’; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τι, as ἀνὴσ to πώς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσον to πόσο, ὅσον to πώ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast’s Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἢ καὶ ἔχοις ἂν εἰτέν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 40, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. ΙΙ 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 a 22. Met. A 1, 981 a 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ αὐτονεύσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de
12 τὸ δικολογεῖν, φανερῶν' χρήσιμος δὲ ἔστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ
dia τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττων τάληθι καὶ τὰ δίκαια
tῶν ἐναντίων, ὡστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἱ
κρίσεις γίγνονται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττᾶσθαι: τούτο

Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, φανερῶν δὲ καὶ διώτι οἱ ἔχοντες ἐφωνεῖν, οὐ γὰρ ἔχοντι
φάρογγα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by τὸ αἵτων. Cf. Amphis Dith.
Fragm. i ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. III 306; B. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς
tῶν ὀγχῶν αὐτῷ; Λ. διότι φυλήν περιμένο.

With διώτι 'that'. compare οὖνεκα and ὑδώνεκα in Sophocles, as Philoct.
634, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact;
because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. ὑδώνεκα.

ἐπονεῦεν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the
attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention
upon: ἀπὸ as in ἀποφλέσειν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theact. 165 Α, ἐκ τῶν
ψυλῶν λόγον πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἐπενεύσαμεν. In Plat. Legg. vii 815 Λ,
ἐκενεῦεις πληγάων καὶ βίων, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to
avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1153 Herm. οὖ δ' ἐς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ
γ' ἐξένευσα εἰκότως, ἐξένευσα is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann,
followed by Paley, derives it from ἐκεῖνω εὐστατοῖς, referring to Valckenier
on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable
that the orist belongs to ἐκεῖνως ἀνανεώσαντο, opposed to ἐπονεῦεις ἀνανεώσαν,
and that the meaning of the line is "It was natural, or reasonable, for thee
to decline, reject, their offer, εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ', looking to, in respect of,
in regard of, thy duty to the goddess". This sense of the word seems to
be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line
1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ἐξένευος ἀποστῆναι,
beckoned us off, "gave us a sign to stand aloof".)

§ 12. χρήσιμος—ἐπονεῦες This passage is cited by Dionysius,
Epist. ad Amm. I c. 6. He reads διὰ γε for διὰ τε, and διδασκαλία for
διδασκαλίαι (six lines below).

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 26, seq.
in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. αὐτίδ.
§ 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue,c. XI
456 a—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de

διὰ τε | τε is answered by the (irregular) correlative δέ in ἔτι δέ at the
beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2—6, οὗτε
(parenth.)...πρὸς δὲ τούτων.

ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, χρήσιμος δὲ—
ἐπονεῦες, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12)
Dind. ἀγιώταται δὲ πολλάκις αἰρθεῖσιν ἀνὴρ | δίκαιοι λέγει ήτοσον εὐγλῶσσον
ἀψεῖ. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority
over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to
assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect
and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do
ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned
themselves, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττᾶσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves
12. 

Metaph. eTricTijTov 23 TO and arevTfov, dfovrai, VI airraJ, intercourse) and tration. The be with wrong Pr. the less: Isocr. explaining this own right side said arguments, always medial of TOI)S dvdyKtj Kara el rrfjs 3. one, rfjs u their JC6fif?s 3ovT
ticm^fjaj their usage p-fv their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce this their natural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who asents to his view, Arist. Ars Rhet. Vol. II p. 26) in explaining di' aυτων by di' εναυτων, ἄστε becomes incorrect or meaning-less: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it follows from the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἄνάγκη is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and di' aυτων should be ἐπ' aυτων.

In the Introd. p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note of Anal. Pr. 55 a 14, who gives examples of aυτων &c. for the reflexive aυτων &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 b 24, ὥσ νοησαι μὲν ἐπ' aυτῷ, ὡς ταύτα βοηθήσαται, ἀναθέσονται β' οὐκ ἐπ' aυτῷ. Rhet. 1 4, 9, ὑπ' aυτοῖς, 'in their own power'.

πρὸς ἐνίου] 'in dealing with some'.

didaskalias] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 b 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete 'instruction' by demonstrative proofs. Top. A c. 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὐκ φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν (i.e. di' ἀποδειξεως) περὶ αυτῶν πραγματεύων, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν. ὃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμην defined έξεις ἀποδεικτική, Eth. Nic. VI 3. τὸ δ' ἐπιστητόν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθίλου καὶ δ' ἀναγκαίον, τὸ δ' ἄναγκαίον οὐκ ἐνδεχεται ἄλλως έχειν... ἡ δ' δόξα δόξα ως.

ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] A 2 101 a 30. τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντευξεως] Topic. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 a 17, ὡστ' ὡς οὗ τὰς αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντευξεως οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦσ διώσται, οἱ δ' διάσ, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἐντευξεις. Isocr. πρὸς Δημόκριτου § 20, τὰς ἐντευξεις μὴ πιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) πυκνὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. l. c. ἐντευξεις λέγει τὰς
τάναντια δεί δύνασθαι πειθεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γάρ δεὶ τὰ φαύλα πειθεῖν) ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντια συλλογίζεται, ἣ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἣ ρητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι υποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἰτεὶ τάληθη καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανότερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρόν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὁ μάλλον ἱδίον ἐστιν 13 ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μεγάλα πρὸς πολλοῖς συνισθαῖναι, οἰς δεί μὲν ἐντυχάνειν κωνωπικοῦς ύπότας καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυχάνειν ὀδυλίμως.

ἐντευξεῖς is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a ‘conversation’; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical ‘encounter’.

ἐτὶ δὲ τάναντια—λύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 24, ἔστι δ’ ὅσ ἐν πρὸς ἐπί εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ γραμματῶν του εἰδότος ἀνευδεῖν μὲν αὐτόν περὶ ὧν οἴδε, τὸν δὲ πενθομένων ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. τοι. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἵτιμα ταῦτα ἔστι, διελύμεθα δ’ αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵνα εἰδότες τὸ διεύθυνατα ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον χρωμέθα κατὰ τὸν καράν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἄδικον τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικαίοτας.

πῶς ἔχει] ‘the true state of the case’ (how things really are).

λύειν] solvere, diluere, ‘to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy’, or difficulty; and so to ‘solve’ as a problem. ἕ γάρ ἵππον ἐυπορία λύειν ὀπτέρων ἄποροι δέν ἔστι, λύειν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγνοιας τῶν δεικτών Met. B 1, 995 a 28. λύεις opposed to δείης, Pocct. τοι. 18, §§ 1, 2. Ον λύεις καὶ λύει see Introd. on 11 25, p. 267, note.

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.


τῷ σώματι μὲν...λόγῳ δὲ] On this use of μὲν and δὲ, Buttm. Gr. Gr. (Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 c, 56 d.

§ 13. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μεγάλα βλαψίεν ἂν (φύσει τις κτ.λ.)] On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 16, 5, Isocr. περὶ ἀνδρόσῳ
βλάψειν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τούτῳ γε κοινῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἄγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ψυχείας πλοῦτου στρατηγίας. τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ὑφελξήσει τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενον δικαίως καὶ βλάψειν ἀδίκως.

14 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένον ἢ ῥητορικὴ, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἢ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερὸν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πείσαι


§ 14. οὐκ ἐστίν ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένον ἢ ῥητ., ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἢ διαλεκτική] See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3.

οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rhetoricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq.

'Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 A, τὴν ῥητορικὴν πειθοὺς δημιούργον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ κεφάλαυν αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ τελευτάν᾽' Muretus. Cicero's definition follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. p 61, 260, accommodate ad persuadendum posse dicere.

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the result, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 b 25. τοιοῦτος δ' τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ τοῦ κλέπτου ὄρος, εἰπέν ἐστὶ ῥήτορ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ πιθανῶν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ' ὁ λάβρα λαμβάνων. δὴνον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὃν ἐκάστος ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός ῥήτωρ ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἐστιν' οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάβρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάβρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστιν. The art of doing anything is distinguished from the mere fact that the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the intention of the agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success. Comp. de Anima III 9, 8, καὶ ἄλως δὲ ὄρμον ὅτι ὁ ἐχόν τὴν ἱατρικὴν οὐκ ἰάται, ὃς ἔτερον τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of the successful result of the artistic process), ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12.

Toptic. Α 31, ἔρωμεν δὲ τελεύτη τὴν μεθόδου, ὡσεν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεως. τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων ποιεῖν ἀ προαιρεύμεθα. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, αὐθὸ δ' ὁ ἱατρικὸς υγιάσει. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἰκανὸς αὐτοῦ ἔχει τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν. Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 b 57, and 137 a 5.
ΠΙΣΤΟΠΙΚΗΣ Α 1 § 14.

ἐργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἐκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγία ποιήσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδεχέσθαι, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγείας ὑμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς. πρὸς δὲ τούτους ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τὸ τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἱδεῖν πιθανόν, ὁσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμὸν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν. ο γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει: πλὴν ἑνταῦθα μὲν ἑσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ὑπὲρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστής μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἢδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ ἐκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν οἶον εἴς ὑπαρχῆς ὀρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τὸν ἔστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπὰ.

Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, Adv. of learning, Bk. II x 2. 'For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. 'The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις (φανερῶν) ὅτι—κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν] The explanation and connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp. Met. Π 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τῷ βίω τῇ προαιρέσει, and Bonitz' note. 'Τορ. Δ 5, 126 a 35, πιάντες γὰρ οἱ φαύλου κατὰ προαιρέσιν λέγονται. Ζ 12, 149 b 29 u.s. ὁ γὰρ ὁ λάβρα λαμβάνως ἀλλ’ ὁ βουλήμενος λάβρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 15, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει β’ ἐστιν ὁ ἄλλως, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. Rhet. Ι 13, 10.


μεθόδου] Note on ἄδιστοιείν, § 2.

πάλιν οὖν—λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπὰ] 'Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest.'
§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. pp. 33—4; and note on paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36. On Rhetoric as a δύναμις, Ib. p. 14 seq. 

υποκείμενον] on I I, 12 p. 24 συρή.

υγιεινὸν] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A 15, 106 b 33, τὸ υγιείον πλεοναχῶς, τὸ μὲν υγιεῖας ποιητικῶν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικῶν, τὸ δὲ θηλυκοῦ.

τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι.] These are usually called συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὐτά in Aristotle’s terminology, i.e. absolute, necessary consequences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing. The ordinary συμβεβηκότα are separable accidents, qualities or properties, which do not form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the same. The συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὐτά are distinguished from the ordinary συμβεβηκότα in this; that although they are not of the essence, and therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately deducible from it, and inseparable from the subject, and are therefore the proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the ἰδα or προστία of the five predicables. The συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι in the text are accordingly ‘the inseparable properties of magnitudes’; as ‘the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles’ is a necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition, which is ‘a plane figure bounded by three straight lines’: still the property is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example is given in de Anima I i § 8, 402 b 19. See the whole section. And again de part. Anim. 1 3, τὸ συμβεβηκός γὰρ τι (καθ’ αὐτὸ) τὸ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύναμις ὅτι έχειν τὰς γονίας. See further in Trend. ad de Anima I i 1, 1, Comm. p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. Δ 30, 1025 a 30. Anal. Post. 1 7, 75 a 42, ἐν τοῖς ἀποδείξεωι...τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ υποκείμενον, οὐ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ’ αὐτά συμβεβηκότα δηλοὶ ἡ ἀποδείξεις...οὐκ ἐστὶ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀποδείξεις ἑφαρμόσατε ἐπὶ τὰ τοίς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα.

On πάθη see Introd. p. 114.
§ 2. On ἑνσεχνων and ἀτεχνων πίστεων, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase), and on the general subject, analysis of 1 c. 15, pp. 193—207.

τοις μεν χρησασθαι τα δε εὑρεῖν] The former lie ready at hand, and require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and indirect, πίστεις, ἰδος, πάθος, must be ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ for this occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of inventio from the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de Inventione (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, because ‘invention’ or proof of one kind or another is the σώμα τῆς πίστεως, 11 3, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) VII 9, quae materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristotelis visum esse diximus: partes autem haec quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciatio (invention, order and arrangement of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). Inventio est ex cogitatio rerum verarum aut veri simulium quae causam probabilem reddant &c. Similarly Quintilian, Inst. Or. I 12, 4. Quid? nos agendi subita necessitate deprehensi nomine alia dicimus alia providemus, quam pariter inventio rerum, electio verborum (style in single words), composicio (combination of words in sentences), gestus, pronunciatio, vultus, motusque desiderentur? XII 1, 30, bonos nuncquam honestus sermo (style) deficiet, nuncquam rerum optimarum inventio.

§ 3. πίστεων τρία εἶδον] Compare Rhet. III 1, 1. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de Lys. jud. c. 19, ἦρξαμαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν καλογμένων ἑντέχων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου μέρους διαλέξομαι. τρικάθε δὲ νενερημένων τοῦτων, εἰς τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἰδος κτλ.: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de Orat. I 19, 87, where only the ἰδος and πάθος are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. II 27, 115, ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiant; ut animos eorum ad quemcunque causa postulabim motum vocemus. This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the ἰδος and πάθος described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat. XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae XIII 46 the three πίστεις are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. Argumentandi duo
Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ἠθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of 'affectus'; § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ακροατῶν μοχθηρίαν, Ποι 1 § 5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas diserti docentur § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: ubi vero animis iudicium vis afferenda est, et ab ɪpsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est § 5.

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ἠθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's auctoritas—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, II 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ἠθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately by the speech δει δε και τουτο συμβαινει δια τον λόγον, ἀλλα μη δια το προδεδοξασθαι ποιων των εἰναι τον λέγωντα, Rhet. I 2, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as in Art: whereas in the other view the auctoritas exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether εἰς τον πράγματος, acting independ-
§ 4. On ἰδος, as auctoritas, see Introd. p. 151 note.

τοῖς ἐπιείκεσι] 'worthy and respectable people'. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιείκες ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἀνδρὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦτες μεταφέρομεν αὐτὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιείκεστερον ὑπὶ βιλ- πιον δηλοῦντες. The primary sense of ἐπιείκης is therefore 'equitable', one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the better disposition of the two, ἐπιείκης is 'transferred' by metaphor (i.e. the metaphorā ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of 'good'.

ἄπλως] has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) 'simply', opposed to συνθέσει or κατὰ συμπλοκὴν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἄπλα σώματα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἄπλως, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote 'singly, or simply, by itself' (καθ’ ἐαυτὴν Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἄπλος αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes 'simplicity' (or composition), 'singleness of heart and purpose, as opposed to 'duplicity', (Plat. Rep. III 397 E, οὐ διπλῶσ ἀνήρ οὐδὲ πολλαπλῶσ. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλῶ λέγειν τίληθησαι οἱ κοινοὶ διπλῶσ περίφικ’ ἀνήρ. Ruhnk. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) simpliciter et sine exceptione 'generally' or 'universally', as opposed to καθ’ ἐκαστον, 'specifically', 'particularly', 'individually', Eth. N. I 1, 1095 a 1. or to ἄπλως ἀνθρώπων (or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἄπλως ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, in general terms—we must now come to particulars. Hence it signifies 'altogether', 'absolutely', omnia, as οὐδὲν ἄπλως 'none at all', de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδύνατον ἄλως 'absolutely impossible'. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, Comm. on Organ. Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ’ αὐτῶν, and opposed to πρὸς τι, 'the relative'. In this sense it is defined, Top. B Β 11, 115 b 33, ὡ ὁ ἀν ἠλέινος προστιθεμένον δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν ἡ ἄλος τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἄπλος μηδήν εἰς τὸ ἄπλος καὶ ὕποπλος κατὰ συμβεβηκός δε κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. 1 3, 1093 b 3. Polit. IV (vii) I. 1323 b 17, καὶ ἄπλως (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ημῖν (relatively to us).
5. Κατά το ἄκριβές μή ἐστίν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιῶν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γὰρ ἀσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογοῦντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἱθὸς.  

5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυποῦμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἤ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὁ καὶ μόνον πειρασθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. περὶ μὲν ὦν τούτων δηλοθησεται καθ ἐκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγω·

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 a 21, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι... λιαν ἀπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν “treated the subject too simply”, i.e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient elaboration; ‘negligenter’, Bonitz ad loc. q.v. On the various modes in which ἀπλῶς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἱθὸς] ‘is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion’. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀριστοδίας §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony’s speech in Julius Caesar, Act III Sc. 2, “I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts,” &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the ’authority’ or ’influence’ exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our ‘sovereign’, as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, Comm. p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, ‘ratio e iudiciis et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui ἀκύρω oppistitus est, lex est quae rata viget &c.—ita hic κύρια ὀνόματα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.’ This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima II 8, 3, 419 b 19, οὗσ ἐστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀρ ὑμὲν ὅπο ὑδάς, where κύριος may be interpreted ‘absolute master’, the air and water are not absolute masters of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. 1b. 419 b 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθὸς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκοίνων.

§ 5. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν κτ.λ.] Comp. II 1, 4.
6 μεν' διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων [πιστεύουσιν], ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἡ φανόμενον (ἀληθὲς) δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἐκαστα 7 πιθανῶν. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερὸν

§ 6. διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων] In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of πίστεις or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or medium (διὰ with the genitive) of the speech. These three are then described scritum. The first, § 4, is διὰ τοῦ ἠθούς; the second (§ 5), διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ύπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν; and the third, § 6, διὰ τῶν λόγων, plainly in the sense of the direct πίστεις or arguments proper, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἡ φανόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἐκαστά πιθανῶν. διὰ τῶν λόγων is the reading of all the MSS except A, which has τῶν λόγων: but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the construction of the parallel expressions, διὰ τοῦ λόγου, τοῦ ἠθούς, τῶν ἀκροατῶν, and afterwards διὰ τούτων, seems to be self-condemned.

By these λόγων we may understand either the actual words which are the instruments or medium of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears to be sufficiently rational and consistent, and in accordance with the ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper über die Rhet. des Arist. (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. II p. 46, thinks that the text requires alteration, and would read δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ λόγου, or διὰ δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given is confirmed by the rendering of the Vetus Translantio 'per orationes autem ereditus', where 'orationes' plainly stands for the 'words of the speeches in which these arguments are expressed'.

ἀληθὲς ἡ φανόμενον] The second of these terms denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments, exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dialectics treated in the Σοφιστικὸι ἔλεγχοι. and appended to the Topics. The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an adversary. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φανομένη σοφία οὔσα δ' οὔ, de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 21.

§ 7. ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ πίστεις—καὶ πῶς] 'seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (λαβέω) is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties (ποιῶν τι), and from what sources (what motives and impulses, ἐκ τίνων,) it may be excited, and in what modes (πῶς),'—τάσσα...ἐστὶ λαβέω τοῦ συλλογισάσθαι διαμένου, lit. 'it belongs to the student of logic to get hold of them'.

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics,
which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious (ἐξεις), which constitute their characters (ἡθή), and the moral πάθη or 'emotions', which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, ἃστε συμβαίνει, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter 'which may fairly be called Politics' (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, ἥ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (Ethics) τούτων ἐφίσται, πολιτική τις οὖσα. Eth. Nic. I 11, 1074 b 11), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. Sed idem (Aristoteles) et de arte rhetoricca tres libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed et particularum civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat. Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4.

συλλογισμοῖσι] improperly applied here, as ἀποδείξεις above, I § 11 p. 19, to rhetorical reasoning. But as there the rhetorical πίστεις are called a kind of demonstration, 'a sort of', or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllogistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs.

παραφυσής] which usually appears under the form παραφύσις in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 'growing alongside' of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, ἐὰν ἀπὸ μίζης ἢ παραφύσις ἢ, though here also the hypothetical ἢ ἢ admits the other possibility. Also παραφύσεωσι, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, ἀποκοπέων δὲ καὶ ἐπικαυθέν παραφύσεως (grows from the root) καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει. This word and its cognates, παραφύσεωσι, παραφύσις, ἀποφύσις (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), ἀναβλαστάνειν, -βλάστη, -βλάστημα, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals.

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 21, παραφύσας γὰρ τοῦτον ἔσκε καὶ συμβεβρικότι τοῦ ὄντος; that is, τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ and ἡ οὐσία stand to 'the relative', τὸ πρὸς τι, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. 'Similitudo, explicantc Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graccis dicuntur παραφύσαις'. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear
⁷. Of (Itri, assumes of Si Sec of personates or XXar part) ta-Tiv O^OTTOUKIJ or pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of two others, but this general meaning is clear. That it bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.)

虚空 is υποδύεται υπό το σχήμα] 'creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form or figure'; 'assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a part)', 'personates', Plat. Gorg. 464 c. ἡ κολακευτική... υποδύεσι υπό ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων προσοπεύεται εἰναι τούτῳ ἀπ' ὑπέδει... υπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἱστρίκην ἡ ὑφοποικὴ υποδύεσικε... Σοπατερ, άρ. Stalib. not. ad loc. ἐ ποδύεται, τούτον ἐστιν υπεισέρχεται, ύποκρίνεται, ὡς εἴκειν ταύτων δοκεῖν εἰναι. Metaph. Α 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γάρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταύτων μὲν υποδύονται σχήμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

ἄλαζονεία implies both presumption and imposture; either a character between both and a mixture of both (as Theophrastus' ἄλαζων, 'the braggart', of which Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus, Thraso in the Eunuchus, and Captain Bobadil in Every Man in His Humour, are the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophistical Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which either presumption or imposture is characteristic and predominant. For example, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more prominently in this picture of the ἄλαζων drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. π 2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄλαζων ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁνόμα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσοποποιούμενοις καὶ πλούσιστέροις εἰναι ἡ εἰσὶν, καὶ ἀνδρευτέροις, καὶ ποιότεροις καὶ ἰδανικοὶ εἰσὶν ὑποχνυμένοις καὶ παύστα φανερός γεγομένος ὁ τοῦ ἄλαζειν τι ένεκα καὶ κερδίαν ποιούντων. This last mercenary element is not found elsewhere in the character of the ἄλαζων. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. Π 7, IV 13, empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics of the ἄλαζων. The vice is one of the extremes of which ἄλθεια, the social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, the opposite extreme being εἰρονεία, 'mock' in conversation, Socrates' habit. It is the extreme in προσποίαισ, 'pretension', of which ἄλθεια is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and ἄλαζων is 'a quack or a humbug'. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists are the great representatives of the class. Nubes 102, 1494, ετ passim. And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 c. Phaedo 92 D, ἤδεν... ἄπαντων ἄλαζονεστατων, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in the Platonic δρομ, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. ἐξ ἀντοστητικήν ἑγαθῶν ἢ ἑγαθῶν τῶν μύ ἑταρχήων. Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. Π 6, 11.

δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικά] 'incident to humanity', implying the infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which
The human condition is exposed, and from which the divine nature, which is tactily opposed to it in this conception, is exempt. ‘The other human causes’ here referred to are any other defects or imperfections to which the human nature is liable. Thuc. III 40 ἀνθρωπίνως ἀμαρταίειν, compared with III 45, περφύκασι τε ἄπαντες ἰδία καὶ δημοσία ἀμαρταίειν: ‘humanum est errare’. Plato, Soph. 229 A κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν, ‘ex humana opinione, quae obnoxia est erroribus. Ut apud Latinos homo fuit frequens erroris vel imbecillitatis humanae excusatio’ (Heindorf ad loc. Polit. 279 C, δείκσια καὶ δείκσιν et cæt.). Demosth. de Cor. p. 328, § 308, ἥ παρὰ τῆς τύχης τῇ συμβεβηκεν ἑνακτίωμα, ἥ ἀλλα τι δύσκολον γέγονεν—πολλὰ δὲ τάνθρωπινα.—Id. c. Lept. p. 506, 15, πάντα ὀ ἀνθρωπίνα ἢγείσθαι. Boeot. de Nomine p. 998, πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τάνθρωπινα. Ar. Rhet. 1 13, 17, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγενέσκεις ἐπικεκ. Eth. Nic. iv 11, 1126 α 31, ἀνθρωπικότερον (more humane) γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. VIII 16, sub. fin. χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικῶν μὴ διωκεῖσθαι.

In Rhet. 15, 10, διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, it has this more general sense of ‘all human affairs, business and enjoyments’: with which comp. Plat. Theaet. 170 B καὶ πάντα ποι μεστὰ τάνθρωπινα (all human society or affairs in general) ἥτοι τῶν διδακτοῦν κ.τ.λ. So Virgil, Axn. 1 463, sunt lacrimae rerum; et mentem mortalitatem languent: and in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, nec curare dem um credis mortalitam quemquam.

§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτοις ὀμοίως ἔχει. The variations are, δεικνυσθαί (hīs) for δεικνύα, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικόις for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the omission of ἣ ὡστινον, and of αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω; for ἔτερον τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ταῦτα εἶναι, we have ἔτερον τι διὰ τ. σ. παρὰ τὸ ταῦτ' εἶναι, also ἀναφέρεται κ.κ. τινι γὰρ ὀτι καὶ, further τὸ omitted before εἰδος, and γὰρ after καθάπερ, and lastly ὑποτείς για ὑποτηκῆς.

τῶν δὲ πίστεων.

ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς] Dionysius has ἀναλυτικοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, certe Aristotetes τῷ διαλεκτικῇ scripsisset (Rhetores Gracchi p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, über die Rhet. des Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristotelles sagt nur in τῷ διαλεκτικῷ, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. 11 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence
I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τα ἀναλυτικά, ήθικα, πολιτικα, μεθοδικα, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται—καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως] Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9, ὅτι δὲ οὖν μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προερχόμενων γίνονται σχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ καὶ ἅπαξος ἡττησῶν πίστεις καὶ καθ' ὁποιανῶν μέθοδον, νῦν ἣν εἰς λέκτων. ἀπαντά γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ εἰς ἐπαγωγής. Anal. Post. i 18, 81 a 40, εἴπερ μακρώνων ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ἡ ἀποδείξει. Eth. Nic. vi 1139 b 27, ἐκ προγνωσκομένων δὲ πάσα διδακτικα, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγής, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. The reference here is most unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others.

ἡ ὀντικών] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bokker's revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: and it is then added, ὡς δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοί συμπείδουσιν ἡ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὡς εἰς ἐπαγωγή, ἢ ὡς ἐνθυμήματων, ὡσπερ ἐς τὸν συλλογισμῷ, a statement with which the ἦ ὀντικῶν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin's Philologus iv 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.
§ 9. *ek tov tovnikov*] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. p. 154, and note on II 25, 3, in this Commentary. The reference to the Topics there made is precisely similar to this: that is, it is made to the work in general and its contents, and not to any particular passage: what is stated here may be gathered or inferred from the Topics.

§ 10. *phanevnon b' otii ekateron exei agadon to eidos tis rhotrikis*] *'It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the paraideigmatodes or the enphymematikov) has good in it,' that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage, Buhle construes the words to eidos tis rhotrikis exei ekateron agadon, 'Rhetoricen utroque bono frui, et enthymematet et exemploque.' (He takes to eidos tis p. for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it does occur in Pol. I 4, 1253 b 28, eis organon eidoi "in the shape of an instrument," de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, ev ulys eidoi—but eidos in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of agadon exew in Rhet. II 20, 7, eisv b' oii logoi dhmygorikoi, kai exousion agadon tuto, oti k.t.l.

*en tois methodikois*] *'Scheint eine mittelstellung zwischen analytik und dialekik eingenommen zu haben,' Brandis, u.s. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V 1, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings methodikai in eight books, and § 25, methodikov in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the 'Anonymous' author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. I p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, *'Analutikon, Prophylumatov, Methodikai,* Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. I p. 72), describes it thus; prós mev ouv tivn evrefoun, tā te topikā kai methodikā, parédoke
προτάσεων πληθος, ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων οἷοντε εὔπορεῖν: classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ἐπομνήματα, commentarii; ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδοκις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαφήμισι, καὶ ἐν ἀλλο ὑπομνήματι. Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40.

ῥητορείαν ‘rhetorical exhibitions or displays’ Probl. ΧVIII 3. The word is a rare one, and as distinguished from ῥητορική denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the ‘art’. It is found in Plato, Polit. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, ‘vox ῥητορεία a Platone flecta videtur ut Ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distinguenter a varia illa ῥητορική, cuius nomen profanaverant qui ad exemplas suas cupiditates absu erant.’

The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σαφιπτῶν § 21, for ‘the practice of rhetoric’ in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian: βραχέων, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35.

πιθανοὶ μὲν ὧν—οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοὶ] Anal. Pr. II 23, ult. φύσει μὲν ὧν πρὸτερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συνλογιμός, ἢμῖν δ’ ἐνεργότερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are ‘nearer to us’, more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, Top. Α 12, 105 a 16. ἔτι δ’ ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανωτέρον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τῶν σολλοῖς κοινῶν, ὁ δὲ συνλογιμός βιαστικότερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστιλογικοὺς ἐνεργότερον, ‘induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us’, the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τῶν σολλοίς κοινῶν; the syllogism and enthymeme are more ‘cogent’ and ‘effective’ against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore ‘more applauded’, ἀπομισθουσαὶ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοὶ.

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. ΧVIII 3. In the Problem the question is ὡς people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible (πιθανόν), whilst the conclusive
διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θερμότεροι δὲ μάλλον οἱ ένθυμηματικοί. τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἐκατέρτω χρηστέον, ἠρούμεν ύπότερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μάλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εὖθὺς ὑπάρχει δι’ αὐτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδὲμία δὲ τέχνῃ σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον, οἷον ἦ ιατρική τὶ Σωκράτει τὸ υγιεινὸν ἔστιν ἢ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τὶ τῷ τοιώδεὶ τὸ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐντεχνιον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητὸν), οὐδὲ ἦ ῥητορική τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον ἐνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἰππία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο ταθάπερ καὶ ἦ διαλεκτική. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is more striking, and therefore more applauded.

θηρβείσαθα, ‘to be applauded’, is a regular formation of the passive. For although the usual construction of θηρβείσαι is with εἶ and the dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast’s Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath. § 233, (ὁ λόγος) ἐπιμήμενος ἦν καὶ θερβείσμενός: and Rhet. II 23, 30, τῶν συλλογισμῶν θηρβεῖται μάλιστα τοιαύτα ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 49, quoted in Introd. p. 155.

§ 11. ἐρεύμεν [ὑπότερον] II chapters 20—24. πιθανῶν] ‘plausible’, that which readily persuades; πιστῶν, ‘credible’, that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree of trustworthiness. διὰ τοιοῦτων, πιθανῶν καὶ πιστῶν.

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the paraphrase, Introduction p. 155.

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes, not individuals; practice, ἐμπειρία, follows the opposite method. Rhet. II 19, 27, τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταύτα τι ὑπάρχει περὶ μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστίν: κυριωτέρα γὰρ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν (for use or practice) τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων. Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1143 a 32, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐχάστων πάντα τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. Met. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράγματι ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλλον ἐπιπεχύνονται ὀρόμεν τοῖς ἐμπειροῖς τῶν ἁνὴν τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόμενως. αὕτων δ’ ὅτι ἦ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστῶν ἐστὶ γνώσεις, ἦ δὲ τέχνῃ τῶν καθόλου, αἰ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἰ γενέσεις πάσαι περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν εἰαν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν κ.τ.λ.] Compare Top. A 10, 104 a 4, 11, 105 a 3—9, οὗ δὲ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἀπορήτειν ἂν τοῖς τῶν λόγων δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσως ἢ αἰσθήσεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορρίπτεται πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ οὐ,
12 λειτουργείαι εισθοτών. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἐργον αὐτῆς περὶ τε
τοιούτων περὶ δὲν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἐχομεν,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οὐκ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολ-
λῶν συνοράν οὐδὲ λογιζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα

1 αυτῆς ἢ

κολάσεως δεόται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ή χιὼν λευκή αἰσθήσεως, κ.τ.λ., καὶ Εθ. Ευδ. 1 3, quoted in Introd. p. 156, note.

ἐξ ὑπό ποτέ τούτων ἢ ἐκ ἡμέραν τοῦ αἰώνος, κ.τ.λ., καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οὐκ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολ-
λῶν συνοράν οὐδὲ λογιζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα

§ 12. το ἐργον αὐτῆς] The proper office, the special function, business, 'work', ἐργον, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are
obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art
ready laid down to guide us.

The ἐργον of anything is that which it is specially appointed (by
nature) to do, its proper special work. It is in the execution, the carrying
out or fulfilment of this ἐργον, that this ἀρετή, this special excellence of
everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose
in view, πρὸς τέλος τι, everything has its own special ἐργον. This is
especially manifest in all 'instruments', ὑπογεί (things in which the pur-
purse is apparent); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut
(large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind
to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind
and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well,
the ἀρετή is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special
work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run
well, is the due fulfilment of its ἐργον. Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 16, ἢ δὴ
ἀρετή πρὸς τὸ ἐργον τὸ αἰκείον. This doctrine is first laid down by Plato,
Rep. 1 332 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1 6, and II 5,
where the theory of moral virilit is based upon it. Hence Pol. I 2, 1253
a 23, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἐργῳ ὑμᾶς καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. Eth. Eud. II 1, 1218 b 38,
πρὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἤ βελτίστημι διάθεσις ἢ ἐλυθμα ἢ δύναμις ἢ
ἀκάστων, ὡς ἐστὶ τις χρήσει ἢ ἐργον., which is there illustrated at length.

διὰ πολλῶν συνοράν] 'to take in at a glance through the medium,
or along the line, of many steps of proof or syllogisms', 'to take in a long
chain of arguments at one view'.

λογιζεσθαι πορῆθεν] expresses much the same thing as διὰ πολλῶν
συνοράν, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long
way off or back, 'to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms'. With πορῆθεν here, compare the similar use of it in II 22, 3, and Top. Α II, 105 a 8 οὐδέ δὴ ὑπὸ σύνεγγυς ἢ ἀπάδειξις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ λάμα πορῆρα.

βουλευόμεθα δὲ] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth.
Nic. III 5, VI 2 legēsōu δε τούτων (τῶν θ' ψυχής μορίων) τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημο-
νικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν, τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταύτων, οὐδὲς
δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. C. 5, 1140 a 32, βουλεύ-
εται δ’ οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
πράξαι. de Anima III 10, 4, 433 a 29, πρακτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ
ἄλλως ἔχειν. We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or
issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, ἀμφοτέρως); where the
event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other,
or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no
one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do
it. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν is usually expressed by τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα
ἄλλως ἔχειν, things contingent and uncertain in their issue; opposed to
τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, things certain and necessary, which can be
only in one way, which have only one certain issue, and cannot be in
one way or another, indifferently.

οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων] ‘on that supposition’, i.e. if he actually supposes
them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he
may have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did
not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance.

οὐδὲν πλέον] ‘there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it’.
Valckenae, Ditr. in Eur. Fragm. p. 150 (156), supplies numerous examples.
In three MSS (Bekker) the words οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον are followed immedi-
ately by ἡ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται συμβουλεύειν. They were first omitted by
Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this
interpolation, for such it seems to be, may be thus accounted for. The
words συλλογίζεσθαι and συνάγειν being very nearly synonymous, some
one may have added in the margin ἡ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν—
meaning that we might read συμβουλεύειν in place of συλλογίζεσθαι to
avoid the tautology, συμβουλεύειν referring to the deliberative branch of
Rhetoric, or public speaking: ἡ οὕτως, ‘or thus’, merely expressing the
possibility of a variae reading, ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν. The essential
stop after οὕτως was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally
introduced into the text as an appendage to πλέον, with the sense, as
rendered by Gaisford, ‘ nihil enim amplius proici potest, quam quod sic
deliberatur: i.e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio’.

§ 13. συνάγειν, (ratione) colligere. Rhet. II 22, 3 and 15. The σῶν
in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understand-
ing, as συνίειν, συμβάλλειν, (to comprehend, comprehendere,) and συλλογί-
ζεσθαι itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the
purpose of comparison, upon which either a judgment is founded and a
conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened.
συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are found again together as synonyms, Met.
H. init. 1042 a 3, ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίζεσθαι δει, καὶ συναγώνως
to κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιτίθεναι.
Similarly Trpwyroy ev^o^a. It is opposed here rather to the ‘complications’ of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity of character, and expresses ‘an elementary state of cultivation’. Similarly Pol. 11.8, 1268 b 39, to^s yap ^r^hvoi^v no^mou^s ^iavan aploivos einai kai ^arb^ari^koiv ‘rude and barbarous’.


ο πρώτος συλλογισμός] πρώτος ‘in its earliest, most elementary’, or ‘normal, typical, form’. πλήρωμα της πρώτης (primary, in its original form) πόλεως, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 17. - άρατοκρατίαν μιάστα των άλλων παρά την αληθινή και πρώτην. Ib. c. 8, sub fin. Pol. VII (VI) c. 4. 1319 a 39, την βελτιστήν και πρώτην δημοκρατίαν. On this passage, see note on 11.21.6.

οιον (προσ το δηλούν, συλλογίζεσθαι αποδείξαν) άτι. Infr. § 19, οιον άτι επέξεσθε κ.τ.λ. and c. 1 § 13.

Δωρείς] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes, to whom Pindar’s seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introd. p. 158, note 1.

στεφανίτην άγώνα] This is the title distinctive of the four great games, of which honour in was reality the prize, the garland being merely a symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from άγώνες χρυσατίται ή αργυρίται (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the competition. Pausanias X 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that the Pythian games became an άγών στεφανίτης. Add to the instances
κηκεν, ἵκανον ἐπείν ὅτι ὁ Ὁλύμπια γὰρ νεῦκηκεν·
tὸ δ’ ὅτι στεφανῖτις τὰ Ὁλύμπια, οὗδε δέι προσθεῖν

14 ναὶ· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστίν ὄλγα
μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐξ ὑπὸν οἵ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ εἰσὶ (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὑπὸν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις,
ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὑπὸν μὲν γὰρ πράττονσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα
πάντα τοιοῦτον γένους ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἐποὺς εἰπεῖν
ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτῳ), τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων
συλλογίζονται, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαῖων (δὴ λοιπὸν
d’ ἡμῖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερόν ὅτι ἔξ

from Xen. Mem., Demosth., and Lycurg., Aesch. c. Ctes. § 179, and
Isocr. Antid. § 301, τῶς αὐθητᾶς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς στεφανίασι ἀγώνων νικών

[Anon. vita Euripidis, init. ἤπαξε δε κατ’ ἀρχὰς παγκράτιον ἣ πνειμὴν, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ χρησμοῦ λαβόντος ὅτι στεφανηφόροις ἀγώνως νικήσει. S.] ὁ Ὁλύμπια νεῦκηκεν] The accusative in these phrases is an extension or ‘equivalent’ of a cognate accusative. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 564.

§ 14. A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 14—19, is given in the chapter on ὁμοία, II 25, 8—9.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστίν ὄλγα—ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] ὃν. II 22, 3, καὶ κύκλοι συνά-

γεων ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, ἀλλ’ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπί τὸ πολὺ.

ἐνδεχόμενα] ‘things possible’, as opposed to things necessary, not here to things impossible. On ἐνδεχόμενα and δύνασθαι, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. I 3, 25 a 37, (Vol. I p. 375 seq.) and Bonitz on Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 26, p. 387. δυνάτων according to Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses physical, ἐνδεχόμενον

logical, possibility: the latter implies the possible truth of an assertion, viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. ἐνδε-

χόμενα are therefore here ‘possibilities’ as opposed to certainties; things and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one

way or in another. In the ordinary language ἐνδεχόμενα and ἐνδεχόμενον

have usually some other words, as ἄλλως ἔχειν, γένεσθαι ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι, or something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. With the absolute use of it in this passage (and the general sense in which it appears in Waitz’s and Bonitz’s Commentaries) comp. I 4, 3, οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων ἀπάντων. Eth. Nic. VI 3, 1139 a 8, ἐν δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Ib. c. 12, 1143 b 2, τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχόμενου.

ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.] Anal. Pr. I 8, 29 b 29, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐπείρων ἐστὶν ὑπάρχειν

τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης υπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μὲν,
οὐ μέντοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὖν ἐπάρχει ὡς, ἐνδέχεται δ’ ἑπάρχει) δὴλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐκάστου τοῦτων ἐπείρων ἐστι, καὶ οὐχ
"ον τὰ ἑνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἐσται, τὰ δὲ πλείστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Λέγεται γὰρ ἑνθυμήματα ἡς εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὡστε ἀνάγκη τούτων ἑκάτερων ἐκατέρως ταὐτὸ εὑναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐστὶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ, καθάπερ ὀρίζονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνεδεχόμενα ἀλλως ἔχειν, οὔτως ἔχουν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ʰ εἰκός, ὡς ὁ μ. 1357. 16 τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τοῦ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ ἐκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἰσθι κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγει ἡς ἤν γίνεται συλλογισμὸς. διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιούτου τῶν σημείων ἐστὶν ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδεχόμεναι οὐνται λύσαι τὸ λεχθὲν, τότε φέρειν οἶνονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταύτων ἐστὶ κατὰ ὁμοίως ἔχοντων τῶν ἄρων, ἀλλὰ ὃ μὲν ἢ εἰκότων, ὃ δὲ ἢ υπαρχόντων, ὃ δὲ ἢ εἴνα ἑνθεμερέων. Anal. Pr. I 13, 32 b 4, where two kinds of possibility, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordinary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary; and the other, the indefinite, the purely accidental, τὸ ἀπὸ τέκμας, in which there is no natural order at all.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἐσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] 'It is plain that the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they are constructed, though they may be necessary, are most of them no more than probabilities, or things that usually happen'. [On μὲν—δὲ, see the references above given in note on 1 § 12 p. 24.]

λέγεται ἑνθυμήματα ἡς εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where παραδειγματα are added. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 a 10.

On εἰκότα καὶ σημείων, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 165 — 168).

§ 17. Λέσα τὸ λεχθὲν] On λέειν, λύειν, λυτὰν, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267 and note 1.

tέκμαρ] Eustathius ad II. H. p. 665, 45. τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ τελευτῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέκμαρ, ὃ δηλοὶ τὸ τέλος. τὸ μὲν τεκμαίρεσθαι ὡς τοῦ σημειούσθαι, ἢ ὁν καὶ τέκμαρ τὸ σημείον, ὃ μὲν ὁμοίως λέγοντο. 'Antiqua lingua, quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa.
18 την ἀρχαιαν γλωσσαν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὥδε, οἷον εἰ ἐπειεῖν σημείον εἶναι ὰτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γαρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημειών ἔστι, λυτῶν δὲ, κἂν ἄλθες ἢ τὸ εἰρημένον ἀσυλλογίστων γάρ, τὸ δὲ, οἷον εἰ τις εἰπειεῖν σημείον ὰτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν ὰτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖαν. ὀπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμηρίων μόνον ἔστιν· μόνον γάρ, ἃν ἄλθες ἢ, ἄλτυν ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐχων, οἷον εἰ τις εἰπειεῖν, ὰτι πυρέττει, σημείον εἶναι, πυκνῶν γάρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτῶν δὲ καὶ τούτο, κἂν ἄλθες ἢ· ἐνδέχεται γάρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστἀν. τὶ μὲν

1 πνευστὰν infra.


§ 18. τὸ δὲ, οἷον εἰ τις...ἀναγκαῖον. ] The auctor ad Heren. II 25, 39, gives two ‘signs’ of an opposite, fallacious, or refutable character, derived from the same sources, Necesse est quoniam palleat aegrotasce: aut, necesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet puerum infantem. These illustrations had doubtless become traditional, and commonplaces in the rhetorical books.

πνευστὰν] ‘to have an affection or disease of the breath’. A large class of verbs in ἀω and ωω are either desiderative (like those in εω and in Latin in urid) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of disease; the latter can be extended to a ‘mental’ affection. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 330, Obs. 3 ε and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desideratives in ἀω and ωω, and (2) verbs in ωω, which express a state of sickness [Kühner’s Ausführliche Grammatik § 328 S]. Buttmann also in his Gr. Gr. § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as
οὐν εἰκός ἔστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρονσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν: μᾶλλον δὲ φανερῶς τυραννῶν, to play the tyrant); “but,” he adds, “it is improper to rank verbs denoting diseases (the third), ὄφθαλμων, ὑδραῖων, ψωμίων, &c., in the same class (as the imitatives),” these belong rather to a preceding division, viz. verbs in ἀω formed from nouns, “and expressing, chiefly, the having a thing or quality, and performing an action; as κοφόν, χολόν, βοῖν, γοῦν, τολμῶν.”

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in Lobeck’s learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79—83. “Verbs in ἰν and ἰν,” (this is not true of all these verbs and requires qualification: ὄφθαλμων, γαστρών, περιν., for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily, or mental affection. It should be “some verbs” or “a large class of verbs in ἀω”) “in both forms, are properly used of affections of mind and body. στρεφόν, τῶν ἱππίων ἱχνει, λιθάνων, κρεθαίνων, μολύβδιαν express bodily ailments; δισταρτών, νυφίων, πασχών, and all ἀσθενείας (which have either of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form.” This is an amplification of what Lobeck actually says: and it is also I think implied that the bodily affection is the primary specification, which is extended by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given, chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobeck’s list, or in the grammars, I will here add.

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. ὄφθαλμων Ran. 192, βουζονοῦν ib. 1280. ληματίων 494, ὄραμαν 481 and Pac. 702, δαιμονίων, δαιμονίων Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur., Xenoph.), στρεφόν (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 965, Xen. Anab. vii c. 33, Dem. de F. L. § 337 “to have an itch or mania for commanding an army”), εἰρήνων Nub. 44, λημών 326, μαθητῶν 183. χείριαν 1387, σιβαλλίων Eq. 81. κορυβαστίων Vesp. 8, βουλιμάν Plut. 870, φορών Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. to ἐπί φώιον μανίσσαν, τομαί Λ. 589 (τομής ἐπαναφέρει, Schol.), δανατίων Schol. ad Phil. 1.c., δανατίων (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 b. νοτίων Theact. 191 Α, Legg. 1 639 b, κυσιίων Gorg. 494 Β, ψωμίων καὶ κυσιίων ib. c. (Arist. Eccles. 919), ποδαμάνειν Aleib. II 139 Β, 140 Α. In Aristotle we have στρεφόν (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. viii (v) 5 sub ēn., ἄγων, of mental distress or anxiety. Rhet. 1 9, 21. Many in the works on Νάτ. Hist., as ταριβάν, σκυλίων, ὑραγών, καπράν (or καπρίων), all implying a sexual impulse, Hist. Ann. vi 1 18 §§ 12, 14, 17, vi 20, 4; σιδηρογάν vi 21, 5; σιδηριάν de Gen. An. iv 3, 22, ὑδραῖων ib. v. 8, 13, ἐξερυθρίων ib. v 20, 5, στραγγωύριαν (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. xi 2, 916 Α, στραγγωύριαν, λιθάνων). Theophr. π. ἀλαξονείας, ὀντήσων, “to have a mania, or itch, for buying,” Diog. Laert. vit. Plat. iii 18 “οἱ ἱλοίς σου, φοινίκις (ὁ Δωμνιαῖος), γεροπτώσον” (are infected with, smack of, old age), καὶ ὡς, (ὁ Πλάτων), “σου δὲ γε τυραννῶν.” (If this is the passage referred to by Buttm. in quoting the verb τυραννῶν in his Grammar, above cited—no reference is given—he is wrong both in attributing to it the sense of “imitation”, and in assigning it to a separate class.)
καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίνι αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλ-
λόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀνα-
19 λυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν. παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι
μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποία ἐπαγωγὴ, εἰρηται:
ἐστὶ δὲ οὕτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὕθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς
μέρος οὐθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς
μέρος, ὁμοιον πρὸς ὁμοιον, ὅταν ἀμφῶ μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ
to αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρου,
παράδειγμα ἐστίν. οἶον ὅτι ἐπιβουλευει τυραννίδι
Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος
πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ἢτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβῶν ἐτυ-
ράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις καὶ ἄλλοι ὀσοῦς p. 10.
ίσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου,
όν ὁυκ ἵσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὕπο το ἄυτῳ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

ἐξ ὧν μὲν ὁυκ λέγονταi αἰ δοκοῦσαι εἰναι πίστεις Ρ. 1358. ἀποδεικτικάι, εἰρήται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμιμάτων μεγίστη 20 διαφορά καὶ μάλιστα λελιθυνά σχεδοῦ πάντας ἐστὶν ἦπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικῆν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν. τα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ρητορικὴν ὁσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν], τα δὲ κατ’ ἁλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὕστας τὰς δ’ οὕσω κατειλημμένας: διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσι τε τοῦ ἀκροατῶς, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι

υπὸ το ἄυτῳ καθόλου] "under the same universal", i.e. genus or species; which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respectively, in the relation of universal to particular. τὸ καθόλου is that which is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 29, τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα λεγόμενον ὡς ὄνομα τοῦ ἄνωτον ἐστὶν καθόλου ὡς πιλλὰ περιέχων τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καὶ ἔκειστο καὶ ἐν ἀπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἐκαστον, ὧν ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, βοῦν, ὃν ἀπαντὰ ἡμια. Ib. Ζ 13, 1038 b 11, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινὸν τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὁ πλείουσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. Anal. Post. I 4, 73 b 26, καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὅ ἂν κατὰ πάντως τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ’ ἄυτῳ καὶ γ’ ἄυτῳ (see Waitz, Comm. p. 315), of which the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of all three-sided figures; applicable to any one of them, τὸ τεχνὸν, ἄνθρωπον, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the ἰσοσκελὲς, for example, a subordinate species, being only secondary): τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸτε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ πρώτου δεικνύειται. Thus the καθόλου is equivalent to the γίνος under which all the species and individuals of the entire class are included, ὃ κατὰ πάντων κατηγορεῖται, and is opposed to καθ’ ἐκαστον καὶ κατὰ μέρος.

§ 20. κατειλημμένας] 'fixed, established, settled'. καταλαμβάνειν is 'to lay hold of, to get into one’s possession, or 'to occupy', as an army occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for examples of this, the primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the significations of 'binding' as by an oath, Herod. ιX. 106, πίστε το καταλαμβάνει καὶ ἀρκίωσι ἐμμενένιε τα καὶ μή ἀπουσιασθείαι. Thuc. ν 21 (σποουδᾶς) εὖρον κατειλημμένας (settled or concluded, 'confirmed', Schol. ιςχαρίας VI 63, 3, τα εν αὐτῳ το στρατεύματα ετε βεβαιότερον καταλαβον (they secured, established or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. VII 23, 833 λ, τα ταῖς ξημίσι ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα (comprehensa et firmata, Stallbaum). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 b 21, τα μὲν νόμων κατειλημμένων τα δὲ ἑσειν, (feste gesetzi, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X. 10, 1179 b 18, τα ἐκ παιδων τοις ἱδεσι κατειλημμένα λίγω μεταστήσαν.
κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον ἐὰς 21 σαφές ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων ρηθέν. λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικοὺς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἰναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν· οὖτοι δ᾿ εἰσίν οἱ κοινῷ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἰδεί, οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐσται ἐκ τοῦτον συλλογίσασθαί ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων

tοὺς ἀκροατὰς] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. The ‘oversight’ in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the audience.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπότομοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] μᾶλλον belongs to ἀπότομοι and μεταβαίνουσιν, “the more they handle their subject according to the ‘appropriate method’, the more they pass out of, or stray beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric”. κατὰ τρόπον is equivalent or nearly so to δεόντως, ‘duly’, ‘in the right and proper way’; and is often found in Plato opposed to ἀπὸ τρόπου. πάροικο τοῦ καθήκοντος, Schol. ad Theaet. 143 C. Gaisford from Steph. Thesaurus supplies examples from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum’s note on Rep. v 16, 470 B. δεόντως itself appears in three MSS after τρόπον, being doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed Mr Poste, Introd. to Transl. of Post. Anal. p. 20, n. 3, in translating κατὰ τρόπον, ‘the appropriate method’, ‘in the right way, or in due order’, and it may very well bear that meaning. It will therefore be equivalent to κατὰ τὴν ὁικείαν μέθοδον, the method which confines itself to the peculiar principles, the ὁικεία or ὁικεία ἀρχαί, of the special science which it investigates. μᾶλλον ἀπότομοι κατὰ τρόπον is equivalent to, and explained by, ὅσῳ τις ἀν βελτίων ἐκλέγηται τῶν προσόψεως, near the end of the next section, § 21; and the ἀρχαί, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, ἢν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαί, are the ὁικεία ἀρχαί, the special principles of each particular science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special principles, and their method is the ‘inappropriate’. Gaisford follows Muretus in inserting ἢ before κατὰ τρόπον ‘by handling them too properly’. The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no alteration. μεταβαίνεις is μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἄλλο γένος, technically used of passing from one science to another, and illicitly transferring its appropriate principles. Comp. 1 4, 6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the Organon. Add Top. Θ 11, 161 a 33. Anal. Post. I 7 7 treats of this subject.

On κοινὲ καὶ ὁικεία ἀρχαί see Introd. p. 73 note and the references there given.

§ 21. περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν] (περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν): to which we apply the term ‘the τόποι’, par excellence: the κοινὲ τόποι, namely. See below, § 22; and for this treatment of them, II 19.
RPHTORIKHΣ Α 2 §§ 21, 22.

η φυσικῶν ἤ περὶ ὀτονοῦν. καίτοι ταύτα εἴδει διαφέρει. ἰδια δὲ, ὥσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἐκαστον εἴδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστίν, οἶον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἐξ ὥν οὐτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τοῦτων ἀλλαὶ ἐξ ὥν οὐκ ἐσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὀμοίως δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐχεῖ ἐπὶ πάντων. κάκεινα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἐμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γάρ ὑποκείμενον ἐστίν· ταύτα δὲ, ὥσω τίς ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τάς προτάσεις, λύσει ποιήσασι ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γάρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἄλλ’ ἐκείνη ἐσται ἢ ἐχεῖ τάς ἀρχάς.

22 ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τοῦτων τῶν εἰδών λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδιών, ἐκ δὲ τῶν

ἰδια δὲ, ὥσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἐκαστον εἴδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστὶ εἴδος καὶ γένος, species or genus, whichever you please. In any classification the same member may be either genus or species, according as it is regarded from above or below: Physics and Mathematics, for example, are either species in relation to the genus Philosophy, or again genera in relation to the subordinate species, Psychology (so all the ancient philosophers) and Natural History of the one, and Geometry and Arithmetic of the other. Only the sumnum genus and the infima species are not thus inter-changeable.

κάκεινα μὲν—ἐμφρονα] ‘The former, the κοινοί τόποι, will make no one any wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about any class of things’. This is the διάσκελαι or genuine instruction that belongs to science, διάσκελαις γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος (1 1, 12; see note on p. 23); comp. 1 4, 4, διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰναι τέχνης, ἄλλ’ ἐμφρονοστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλληλούπως. Plato has employed the word in the same way, Legg. vii 14, 809 D τοῖς δε ἀνθρώποις περὶ αὑτὰ μᾶλλον ἐμφρόνως ὁμορράωσται.—ἐμφρόω belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with ἐμ,-ος, which in the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of something in something else, ἐμψυχός (with soul in it, containing life, animated), ἐνθεος, ἐννοος, ἐνθερος, ἐμπνεος, ἐμψυφος, ἐγχυμος, ἐντριχος, ἐνδικος, ἐντομα (insects), Ar. Hist. An. iv 1, 5., ἐστι δ’ ἐντομα ὡσα κατὰ τούνομα ἐστιν ἐντορίας ἐντοτα κ.τ.λ.

ἄλλος ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς] ἄλλος, a comparative in form as well as in sense, naturally, like ἀτερος, διάφορος, διαφέρων, et sim., takes the same construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of ἄλλος see Donaldson, New Crat. §§ 165, 166.

κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαφορέσσας τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἶδόν μὲν τάς καθ' ἐκαστὸν γένος ἱδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινῶς ὁμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ρητορικῆς, ὡπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστί, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς ἐλαβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

§ 22. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς—ληπτέοιν 'Cum tanta formarum (i.e. τῶν εἴδων) locorumque differentia sit, quantam ipse supra demonstravit: ut scilicet illac fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent: aliaque etiam discrimina sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas ab his qui loci vacantur, ex quibus illa ipsa promuntur: ut in Topicis factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruunt libris.' Victorius. 'We must here also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources and materials (ἐξ ὧν ληπτέοιν) from which the special and the general topics are to be derived.'

πρότασις, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism or enthymeme: προποσιτίον πραεμισσα; 'est enim προτείνων (Top. Θ, 155 b 34, 38), vel προτείνεθα (ib. c. 14, 164 b 4 &cc.) eas propositiones constituere unde conclusio efficiatur.' Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 2, p. 53. τὰ στοιχεῖα] On στοιχεία, 'the elements' of rhetorical reasoning, see Introd. p. 127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36 (37) 9, στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων, apparently in this sense.

CHAP. III.

The triple division of Rhetoric, συμβολευτικῶν, δικανικῶν, ἔπιδεικτικῶν, is, as we learn from Quintilian, ΙΙ 21, 23, ΙΙΙ 4, 1, and 7, 1, due to Aristotle: Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two genera, with seven species subordinate to these, ΙΙΙ 4, 9.

Almost all writers (prope omnes) on the subject, subsequent to Aristotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the 'highest authority' (ultice summae apud antiquos auctoritatis) ΙΙΙ 4, 1. Quintilian in this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those which were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow, both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also because it is the most reasonable.
§ 2. Theorôn ἢ κριτῆν] This classification of the different kinds of ‘audience’ is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhetoric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being defined or determined by its end (τέλος, Eth. Nic. ΙΙΙ 10, 1115 b 23), the number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds; either mere ‘spectators’, like the θεαταί in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest of a practical character or tendency; or else ‘judges’, where some real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a decision (pars negotialis, πραγματική Quint.). But these decisions, and those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the future, or (2) of right or wrong in respect of past acts or facts.

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the deliberative kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their ‘judges’, properly so called, the object of the forensic or judicial branch of the art; and thirdly the ‘spectators’, those who go to be amused or interested by the show-speeches, or ἐπιδεϊξεις, the Panegyrics (in two senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without practical interest (where the δύναμις, the faculty, or skill shewn, is only in question); or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become ‘critics’.

The term κριτῆς, ‘judge’, which belongs properly only to the second of the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they all have to ‘decide’ in some sense, to choose between opposite views, either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as ‘critics’. Comp. ΙΙ 18, 1, ΙΙΙ 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. § 10) κριταί seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of ἀκροσταί.

1 Thuc. ΙΙΙ. 38 (Cleon to the Athenian assembly), ἀφοεὶ δ’ ἡμῖν κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦσε, ὦτις εἰθῶθατε θεαταί μὲν τῶν λόγων γέγραπται, ἀκροσταί δὲ τῶν ἔργων, κ.τ.λ. “You go to the public assembly as you go to the theatre, merely in quest of intellectual excitement. You go as θεαταί or θεωροῖ, that is, merely for your amusement; and not as κριταῖ, that is, carefully weighing the matter of what is said, in order to adopt it in your practice or reject it.” Arnold.


§ 3. ἑπιδεικτικῶν]  "ea quae constat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus video et Aristoteles, atque eum secutus Theophrastus, a parte negotiali, hoc est pragmaticī, remotisse, totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, prōprium est! Quint. III 7, 1.

οἱ ἰδία συμβουλεύοντες] 11 18, 1, ἣν τε πρὸς ἑνα τοῖς τῷ λύχνῳ χρώμενος προτῆτη ἢ ἀποτρῆτη, ὅποιοι νομιζόντως ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες.

ὁποτερονοῦν]  Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. s.]

§ 4. χρόνοι—τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων]  I have already pointed out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds τὸ παρὼν, 'present time', to the 'future' of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise, 1 6 § 1, and 8 § 7.

κυρίωτατος]  On κύριος, in its secondary and metaphorical application, see note on I 11 § 4. The kind of 'authority' which this 'present time' is here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all the three the best right to be there; that it is most 'proper' or appropriate in that place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases κυρία ημέρα, κυρία ἔκκλησια, a day or assembly which has a special authority, as 'fixed' and 'appointed' for a certain purpose; opposed to all ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are σύγκλητοι, called together at a moment's notice on special emergencies.

τὰ γενόμενα—τὰ μέλλοντα]  The accusatives are here attracted by the participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative.

προεκάζοντες]  'with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presentiment', of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium.
§ 5. ὃ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρων ἀποτρέπει] 'Fr. A. Wolf's einleuchtende verbessung ὡς χείρων findet einige bestätigung in den ungrammatischen worten der paraphrase: ἑποτρέπει δὲ τῷ χείρων' (Brandis, ap. Schneid. Philol. p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally unnecessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the sense here intended is ἀποτρέπει: τινά τινος, or ἀπά τινος, as § 6, 'to divert or dissuade some one from something'. But it is plain it can equally well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, 'to divert the thing from the person—in the way of dissuasion—to turn it away from him, as (being) worse', i.e. 'to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks as well as ourselves usually say) as the less expedient course'. An author like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text—to be admitted I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand ὡς χείρων as an absolute case, nomin. or accus., ὃ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρων (ὅν τι), ἀποτρέπει (τινά αὐτοῦ). See similar examples in note on 11 8, 10.

πρὸς τοῦτο] 'with a view to, with reference to, this'; all the rest (τὰ ἀλλά) as supplementary and subordinate to this.

συμμεταραλμάτων] 'takes in as an adjunct, in aid of, as an auxiliary, subordinate and subsidiary, to his main purpose'; de Anima A 2, 1, τὰς τῶν προτέρων διάκες συμμεταραλμάτων ὃσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφεύγατο. Plat. Phaed. 65 A ἔως τις αὐτῷ (τὸ σῶμα) ἐν τῇ ζήσει κοινῶνυν συμμεταραλμάτων. Ib. 84 A, Lach. 179 f. Spengel ad Rhet. ad Alex. XXV 8. p. 192.

τοῖς δὲ δικαζόμενοι] τὸ τέλος ὁστί.

ἐπαυφέρουσι] 're-fur' (Ἀυφέρεως, το' (ἐπί).

§ 6. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀλλῶν κ.τ.λ.] On the 'legal issues' here intimated, the ἀμφιβολίστησες (Aristotle), or στίσεις (subsequent Rhetoricians and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; III 15, 2; 16, 6; 17, 1, and Introd. p. 397, Append. E to Bk. III.
καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προϊςενταί, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἡ ἀπ' ὁψέλίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσανεν ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλουῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἄδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὖνδε φροντίζουσιν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ἰέγοντες οὐκ ἱκοποῦσιν ὑπ. 1359 εἴ συμφέροντα ἐπραξέν ἡ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαινῷ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὁλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὐτῶν λυσιτελοῦντος ἐπραξὲ τι καλὸν, οἰόν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσίν ὃτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδῶς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτῳ δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον. 7 φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων

ὡς δ' οὖν ἄδικον] (i.e. τοῦ λέγειν ὡς, οτ' οὗς, 'the fact that'), οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this position of Aristotle, see Intro. p. 170.

ἐν ἐπαινῷ πολλάκις τιθέασιν κ.τ.λ.] Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian people, ἐν ἐπαινῷ τίθησιν, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὃτι ἐβοήθησε κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 179 ε πεπονμένοι παρὰ τής μητρός ὃς ἀποδαναίτη ἀποκτείνα "Ἐκτὸς, μὴ ποιῆσαι δὲ τούτο ὀκαθ' ἐλθών γηραιός τελευτήσαι, ἐτολμήσαι ελέοντα βοήθησαι τῷ ἔραστῷ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπισταθείνει τετελευτηκότι. Αριστ. 28 C ὡς τῆς θείτου ὁδός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κυνδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰτήριον τι υπηρείναι, ὅπερ ἐπεδή ζητοῦντ' ἢ χρήσιν αὐτοῦ προθυμομένη "Ἐκτὸς ἀποκτεῖναι. Θεὸς οὖσα, οὐτωσὶ πρὸς, ὃς ἐγάμαι, ὃς παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσῃ τιν' ἐπεταγμένον τοῦ φόνον καὶ ὑπεραποθανοῦσθαι τοῦτον εἰς τὸν ἑαυτόν, ὃς ἀποθανεῖ ἀποκτείνα αὐτικὰ γὰρ τοῖς, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτὸς τότος ἐτῦμος (Hom. II. Σ 98 et in/τα αὐτικὰ τεθηναίν κ.τ.λ. v. 104) ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας κ.τ.λ. comp. II. 1 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. II. p. u. s., but with a totally different purpose.

τούτῳ δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν (though life) συμφέρον Ἐθ. Νικ. Ἰ. 8, 1169 a 18, ἔλθεῖς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τῶν φιλῶν ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶ δὲν ὑπεραποθήκησε...τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθήκοντοι τούτ' ἱσος συμβαίνει: αἴρονται δὲ μέγα καλῶν ἑαυτοῖς.

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two kinds of τόποι is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric; (1) the εἴθη, or ἰδίων τόπων, or ἰδια, from which the rhetorical propositions or premises, the εἰκότα, σημεία, and τεκμήρια are necessarily derived, § 7: and (2) the four κοινών τόποι, here apparently reduced to three, the possible
and impossible', 'fact past and future', and 'the great and small (the topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative (degree'). §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. [dikaiōma] is used here and in c. 13 §§ 1, 3, as the opposite to 

adikia, in the sense of 'an act of justice'. So Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 8, 
diaφερει δε το άδικημα και το άδικον και το δικαίωμα και το δίκαιον'. άδικον
μεν γάρ έστι τη φύσει ή τάξει (i. q. νόμω, natural or of human institu-
tion.) το δ' αυτο δε τούτο οταν πραξῆν άδικημα έστι, πρίν δε πραξήσειν ούτω, 

άλλ' άδικον. άρμοιος δε και δικαίωμα. καλείται δε μάλλον δικαιοπράγημα το 

κοινόν, δικαίωμα δε το επαρμόθεμα τον άδικήματος: where in the first clause it is used in its ordinary accpetation as 'a just act', = dikaiopragyma, and 

contrasted with adikia, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more 
correct sense of 'a rectification of an act of injustice'. It is in this 
signification that Plato employs it, Legg. IX 8, 864 E, των δε άλλων δικαι-
μέτων άφεισθω, 'all other penalties', which are as it were 'amendments 
of a wrong or injustice'. In Thuc. 141 init. it stands for 'just claims', 
'rechtsgründe', Peppo: rechtanspruch', Heitz, l. c. In Arist. de Caelo,
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὃν μὲν οὐν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεὶ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἰρηταί: μετὰ δὲ ταὐτά διαιρετέον ίδια περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων, οἶον περὶ ὃν συμβουλαὶ καὶ περὶ ὃν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὃν αἱ δίκαιαι.

1 πρώτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποία ἄγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἀπαντά 2 ἄλλ' ὡσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὡσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, 3 περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὔδέ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἕνια

I 10, 1, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, an ἐπανόρθωμα of a wrong view or argument, μᾶλλον ἢν εἴη πιστὰ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθῆσθαι προακηκοῦν τὰ τῶν ἁμφισβητοῦντων λόγων δικαιόματα: or rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves. δικαίωμα 'actio iuris, exsequitio iuris, iustificatio, ex quâ (per arbitrum) status iustus qui erat violatus restituitur: nam δικαίων est facere ut quid sit δίκαιον'. Fritsche ad Eth. Eudem. Α 10, 1135 a 13 (p. 109) q. v., Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist. p. 253.

ὁδὸν] 'for example', one of several, is used here, as constantly elsewhere, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of τοῦτο ἐστίν, id est, videlicet, as a more explanatory repetition.

CHAP. IV.

§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν or δημογραφικὸν γένος.

§ 2. εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι] This 'fundamental antithesis' and cardinal distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophistic quibble! 'Has Sophistarum ineptias facete ridet Antiphanes apud Athenaeum, III 99 a.'


§ 3. καὶ φύσει...καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἄγαθά] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. I 3, 5, 1215 a 12, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γενομένωι ή τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλὸς ἢν ἔστιν, ἀνέξιστων ἢν εἰς πολλοῖς. These are opposed to those advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δὲ ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτίσεως οὐδὲ ἐπὶ αὐτῶς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγμάτειας compared with οὐσία πέμψεων ἀνάγκης: εἰς ημᾶς (to be referred to ourselves), καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἁρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν. The gifts of nature and the good things that result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages,
the ‘profitable’ or ‘expedient’, which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence.

πρὸ ἐργον] Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι (τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἐστὶ) περὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ἀκριβῶς διαρκημόσασθαι] ‘to make an exact numerical division’, or ‘to enumerate in an exact division or analysis’. Plat. Phaed. 273 E, Crat. 437 δ, Gorg. 501 λ, Legg. 1 633 λ, et alibi. It is used in a general sense of ‘accurate distinction’.

διαλαβεῖν] ‘to part, separate, divide, distinguish’, is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 E, τῶν ἀριθμῶν πίστα δίχα διελάβομεν, Symp. 222 ε, ὡς χορίς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ, Phileb. 23 c, πίστα τὰ τῶν ὅσα...διχῇ διελάβομεν, and numerous examples in Ast’s Index, s. v.; and still more so διαρέων in the same sense, and διαφέρειν, Sophist. 225 λ, διαφέρειν αὐτὴν δίχα, Polit. 262 δ, κατ’ εἴδη δύο διαφέρειν, ib. 283 δ, διελόμεν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη, Phaedr. 273 E, κατ’ εἴδη διαφέρειν τὰ ὅσα. διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη, ‘to classify by genera and species’. Similarly διωρίζειν.

περὶ ὅν εἰδότασι χρηματίζειν] ‘the subjects of ordinary business, i.e. deliberation (in the assembly)’. χρηματίζειν, which is properly to ‘transact χρήματα or business’ in general, is here ‘transferred’ by metaphor (of the class ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἴδος, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. vi (IV), 14, 1298 b 29, κατ’ περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν (of a general assembly as opposed to a βουλή or πρὸ-βουλή) περὶ ὅν ἂν αὐτὸν πρὸβουλεύσωσιν. Ib. c. 15, 1299 b 39, ἐν ταῖς τοιαύ-ταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἷς ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάσων (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts,
autōn diorísai kata' tìn álētheian, ou déi kata' tôn parónta kai'ren ἕπτειν diá tó μήτε tís ῥητορικῆς


κατὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν...ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς] of the scientific method which has 'certainty' or necessary truth for its aim and object, as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has no higher aim than probable opinion, πρὸς δόξαν. Top. Ἀ 14, 105 ὑ 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν (true philosophy, science) καὶ ἀληθείαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευόμενοι, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν. See references in Introd. p. 173, note i. Add, Anal. Post. 1 33, 88 ὑ 30, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμον καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξιστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι η' μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθολόν καὶ δέ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἔνθεξεται ἄλλος ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 4, 1112 a 8, δοξίζομεν ὁ οὐ πάντως ἀξίου. On δόξα in general, see Waitz Comm. ad Org. p. 444. οὖν ἐμφρονεστέρας, 'more intelligent, wiser, more instructive', see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50.

διὰ τὸ μήτε...πολλῷ δέ...] Wolf and MS A have πολλῷ τε, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of καὶ, δέ, and τε, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. 'Καὶ particula est coniunctiva', says Hermann; 'τε adiunctiva; δέ disjunctiva'. In the case of οὕτω and μηδὲ, οὐτε and μήτε, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other (δέ or τε) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a difference between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented merely as subordinate and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the adnexēν τε is employed, and the formula is οὕ...τε...τε, or οὐ...οὐτε...οὐτε, and similarly with μή: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, τε must be replaced by δέ, and the formula will be οὕ...οὐδὲ, or οὐδὲ...οὐδὲ, or οὐ...οὐτε...οὐτε...οὐδὲ, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of τε into δέ in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its
province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle’s sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

πλεῖον δεδόσθαι...τῶν οἰκείων θεωρήματων] ‘far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry’, refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who ὑποδύονται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. i 2, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 a 1, τὰ δὲ πολιτικά ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ’ οἱ πολιτεύομενοι κ.τ.λ., infr. v. 13, τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λιίαν φαίνονται πάροι εἶναι τοῦ διδάσκαλου ὁδὸς γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖον τι ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ ποία ἐσεαν’ οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ρητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρῳ ἐπίθεεαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης] See note on c. 1 § 11, p. 19, ὡς ἐπίστας ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ.

ἀναλυτικῶς, opposed to λογικῶς (which is equivalent to διαλεκτικῶς, Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 b 35, p. 353, Poste, u. s., p. 19), properly implies scientific demonstration; and ‘analytical’ reasoning follows that method: see Anal. Post. I 22, 84 a 7 seq. It is there said to be exercised ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις…ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ τῶν ὁσα ὑπάρχει καθ’ αὐτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν. On ‘Analytics’ comp. Trendel. El. Log. Arist. p. 47 sq. Waitz Comm. ad Anal. Pr. p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an ‘analytical’ science, either ‘analytical’ stands for ‘logical’ in general (which is Mr Poste’s view, l. c.), or else it represents and includes methodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of ‘analysis’, ‘resolving’ the objects of knowledge into their ultimate elements, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, l. c.); and the latter is the explanation that I should prefer.

τῆς περὶ τὰ ἡδη πολιτικῆς] Ethics being a department or branch of the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 11, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (ἡ ἡδική) τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα: the end of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. I 10, 1029 b 29, and c. 13, init. Ib. X 10, 1180 b 31, μόρφων γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. So that the two together make up the ‘philosophy of humanity’, of man as an individual and in society, ἡ περὶ τῶν ῥώπονα φιλοσοφία, X 10, 1181 b 16.
6 6ε τοὶς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. οὕσω δ' ἂν τις ἢ τίνι διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τίνι φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων

§ 6. καθάπερ ἂν] On καθάπερ ἂν (κατασκευάζοι), see above, note on 1 1, 5 p. 9.


It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which respectively entitle it to the name of ‘art’ and ‘faculty’. In so far as it is systematic, and follows a method—a logical method—and can look forward to results (implying a knowledge of causes and effects) in persuading its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclusions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a δύναμις, a faculty, capable of development and to be exercised in practice.

μεταβαίνειν] See on 1 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words τῷ μεταβαίνειν, as not properly applicable to the context ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγον. And his view is so far supported by the Paraphrast, who also rejects them. Brandis, u. s. p. 46. No one but himself, however, would prefer to connect εἰς ἐπιστήμας with ἐπισκευάζων rather than μεταβαίνειν—a much more natural construction, though this often is certainly admissible—and secondly, the two words, though not absolutely necessary to the sense, are at least in perfect accordance with it when the passage is properly interpreted. 'In proportion as...he will be unconsciously, unintentionally, effacing their real nature by passing over, in his attempt to reconstruct them (alter their formation or system), into sciences of definite special subjects, instead of those (ἐπιστήμας) which deal with mere words', i.e. instead of confining himself to these latter. This is in fact a case of that very common violation of an ordinary grammatical rule which is called the ‘figure’, ζένγμα (a mere carelessness of expression dignified by

1 Of this so-called ‘figure’, ζένγμα, the illicit conjunction of the two heterogeneous notions or expressions under one vinculum, there are in fact two varieties, explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Bötticher in his Lex. Tacit., Proleg. de Stili Taciti brevitate, p. LXXVIII sq., σώληψις and ζένγμα proper. The figure in general is thus described, 'qua aut genere aut personis aut allo quo modo diversa uno eodemque constructionis genere comprehenduntur'; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Bötticher makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the difference. In σώληψις the two terms are united in one construction with a third, to which one is referred literally, the other metaphorically, or at all events in different senses. This appears in the instances given, as dissimulationem nox et lascivia exemerat: nocte ac laetitia inculuisse: praeda famaque onusit: mixti
eis ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ 7 μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὡμος δ’ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἑστὶ
that name), ‘a figure of speech’, as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon,1 wherein two subjects are used jointly with the same pre-
dicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in II. A 533, where ἔση must be supplied with Zeis.’ So Herod. i 90, χρηστά ἔργα καὶ ἔπεσα ποιεῖτε, where of course λέγειν is required with ἐπε. Under this head comes the case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον (not τῷ μεταβαίνειν, but τῷ ἐπισκευάζειν ἐπιστήμας) λόγων.

ἐπισκευάζειν, ‘to re-construct or re-constitute’, is opposed to κατα-

σκευάζειν. The latter is ‘to lay down (kata), settle or establish a system’; the former, ‘to construct anew or afresh, to renew’. ἐπί, from the primary sense of direction to, in place, passes into a secondary one of direction or succession in time, ‘after’; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way of growth, as in επιδοθαν to augment or grow’. Hence ἐπισκευάζειν is properly to refit, ‘renew’, ‘repair’, ‘restore’, as walls, ships, bridges, roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence transferred to ‘reconstruction’ of a science or study. A similar sense of ἐπί appears in the verbs, ἐπησών ‘to say after, or add the words’, ἐπιαγρεῖν ‘to collect after or in addition’, ἐπιμαθαίνειν, ἐπικολουθεῖν, ἐπανεῖθει, ἐπι-


§ 7. ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἑστὶ διελείπετι, ἐπὶ δ’ ὑπολείπετι σκέψιν] Another case of grammatical irregularity and of the ‘figure’ ζεῦγμα. ὅσα in the first clause is the accus. after διελεῖν; in the second it must be repeated, as the nomin. to ὑπολείπετε.—On πρὸ ἔργου, see supr. c. i § 10 p. 17.

copiis et lactitia. To these I will venture to add from a modern English writer the case of Miss Bolo in Pickwick, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath Assembly Rooms retires ‘in a flood of tears and a sedan chair’; to which Eur. Hel. 182, αὐγάσθαι ἐν ταῖς χρυσαῖς ἐν τῷ δῶακος ἔργῳ, is an exact parallel. In ζεῦγμα proper, this third term will not apply in any sense to both of the others, and some other word or phrase must necessarily be supplied to complete the sense; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle.


rantur, quarnm unamque desideraret illud, si sola penetret. This use of the figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different from the other; but what? The ζεῦγμα in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another well-known example of this figure is the truly Irish epitaph on Boyle the Philos.

opher: ‘He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of Cork.'
§ 8. άφαρεθή [it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched].
προς τιν υπάρχοντα προστίθεντες κ.τ.λ. Not of course = πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρ-

The unaccountable difference between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) πόροι, supplies, ways and means, revenue, finance; (2) war and peace (possibly including alliances); (3) the defence of the country; (4) exports and imports (commerce, trade); and (5) legislation; with that which is found in Polit. vi (iv), 4, has already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects enumerated: religion, περὶ λερών; legislation, περὶ νόμων, (νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεως, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage); the constitution of the state (περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κατασκευῆς); alliances and commercial treaties (συμβολαίων) with foreign nations; war; peace; and revenue (περὶ πόρων χρημάτων).

In Xenophon, Memor. III 6, a conversation is reported between Socrates and Glaucon, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman’s care there enumerated are, the πρόσοδοι, Aristotle’s πόροι, the revenue: the state expenses, with the view of reducing them, τὰ ἀναλώματα: war, and the means of carrying it on: the enemy’s forces, naval and military, and your own: the defence of the country, ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας: mines, and the supply of silver (this is from the Athenian point of view): and the supply of corn and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 8—11, so that Gaisford may possibly be right in his suspicion, ‘respextit fortasse Aristoteles Xenophontis Mem. III 6.’

§ 8. ἀφαρεθή [it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched].
θέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταύτα δ' οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀδιαμερίσας εἰδέχεται συνοράν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίον καὶ τῶν παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικῶν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὀπόση τε χονσιν, 'by adding to present resources', but 'with reference to them', as πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, and συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταύτα. supr. c. 3, § 5. 'For not only in respect of their existing resources do they become wealthier by adding to them (προστεθέντες αὐτοῖς).'

ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀδιαμερίσας] 'from one's own personal experience'. τὰ ἀδιαμερίσας are the facts which have come under one's own personal observation, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at home; not these alone are to be 'inquired into', ἱστορικῶν εἶναι, by the statesman and public speaker, but also the 'inventions', the practices and policy of other nations in regard of these same matters.

συνοράν] 'to take a comprehensice view', 'to look at together', for the purpose of comparision. See note on συνάγειν, c. 2 § 13 p. 41.

ἱστορικῶν] The termination -ικος corresponds to the English -ive, and denotes a capacity for, or tendency to. ποιητικός productive, αἰσθητικός sensitive, δεικτικός receptive, πρακτικός active, εὐρητικός inventive, ἀσθενικός demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no corresponding English word actually in use. According to this analogy ἱστορικὸς is 'inquisitive', qualified and disposed to inquire into things in general.

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term ἱστορίη, he means no more than the 'inquiries' or 'researches' which he is now collecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, αἱ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἱστοριῶν and the note there.) It is not till we come to Polybius that the word assumes its modern signification, a scientific history, a systematic work that can be employed in education, Hist. i 1, 2. It is now defined, and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of πραγματική, i 2, 8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific character, which entitles it to the epithet 'demonstrative', ἱστορία ἀποδεικτική, ii 37, 3, ἀποδ. διήγησις, iv 40, 1, is derived from its method of tracing causes and motives of actions: ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλη, τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τόσον χάριν ἐπιράξη, καὶ τὸ πραξάν πῶς ἐκλογὸν ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλείπομενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δε λέγεται καὶ παρατίκα μὲν τίρσει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οἷδον ὥφθηλε τὸ παράπτων.

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybius' time. Thucydides' History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a ἰστορικός, see Poppo on i, 1, 2) is at least as scientific in all essential points as that of Polybius, or indeed any other.

On the distinction of λόγιος, λογοτοιός, and ἱστορικός, see some good observations in Dahlmann's Life of Herod. c. 6 § 2.
§ 9. *υπάρχει* ὑδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδεχεται *υπάρξαι*, καὶ ποια

The verbs *υπάρχει* εἰναι, *γίνεσθαι*, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The *aorist* infin. gives *υπάρξαι* here a future sense, 'to become or to be made', which does not naturally, ex *vi verbi*, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise *de Part.* ἄν ἑκ, *Opuscula*, Vol. 4), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infin. without ἄν, after verbs such as *δοκεῖ*, νομίζει, οὕτως, φάναι, ἐπιτείνει, προσδόκω, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as *δοκεῖ* πεσεῖσθαι, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with ἄν, πίπτειν ἄν, πεσεῖν ἄν, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infin. without ἄν, πίπτειν, or πεσεῖν, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, πίπτει and ἐπεσε, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; *caducum esse*. The distinction between the *present* and *aorist* infinitive is this: 'Præsentis autem et aoristī infinitīvis, sive accedat ἄν sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rci transeunti, præsens duranti adhibeantur.'

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. *Permanence* ('duranti') does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say 'this has been' up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infin. in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infin. 'to do' is the naked conception of 'doing' without any connotation of time (so the present infinit. with the definite article stands for a *substantive*; τὸ εἴναι is the mere notion of being). The aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of *habit*, implying *liability*, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, *δοκῶ* πεσεῖσθαι, 'I think it will fall', at some future time, and nothing more: *δοκῶ* πίπτειν or πεσεῖν ἄν, 'I think it could, would, or might fall', under certain conditions; *δοκῶ* πίπτειν, 'I think the notion of falling belongs to it', 'I think it may fall'; that is, that it is liable, or likely, to fall, *caducum esse*: and *δοκῶ* πεσεῖν, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by
representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such
a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untrans-
latable; as in such a case as νοεῖς ἡρᾶσαι (Soph. Phil. 918), 'what dost
thou intend to do', where the expression of the liability must needs be
omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we
can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when
Sophocles writes νοεῖς ἡρᾶσαι: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921,
ἡρὰν νοεῖς. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by
convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and aorist infinit., it may
be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation
shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be
between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and
to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordi-
nary phrase δεί λαβεῖν (it occurs, for instance, I I 8, 12). It is quite certain
that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly
be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition
to the abstract conception of 'taking up, acquiring'—as representing the
previous formation of the opinion, which has been taken ὑπ' before.
But at all events no one would think of translating δεί λαβεῖν in any other
form than that of the simple verb 'to assume or suppose'.

ἡ τις ἐνδεχεται] ἐνδέχεσθαι is here used, as is customary with other
writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an impar-
sonal. Comp. note on 2, 14.

ἡ καὶ οὐς ἐπίδοξον] 'or indeed of those with whom war may be ex-
pected'*. Supply for the sense. ἡ καὶ (δεί εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦτον) πρὸς
οὐς ἐπίδοξον (ἡμῖν οὐ ημᾶς) πολέμειν. ἐπίδοξος, 'subject to, liable to expecta-
tion', ἐπί ρευς, note on I I 1, 7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. Similarly ἐπίδοκος, sub-
ject to a δίκη, ἐπίζημος infr. I I 14, 7, I I 23, 21, ἑπάτωτος liable to blame,
ἐπάξιος, ἐπικίνδυνος. ἐπιθάνατος (Demosth.), ἐπίκληρος, ἐπισφαλές (liable to
trip) Pol. I I 5, ἐπίμαχος, ἐπίχαρος, ἐπίδρομος. This notion is more directly
expressed by ἐπ' in composition, ἐπισδίκος, ἐπικίνδυνος, &c.

ἐμφανίσται] εἰρρεύειν, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theact. 180 B,
and in other authors, is properly transitive, 'to bring into a state of
peace, pacificate, or reconcile' contending parties, and hence employed
here as a passive.

ἐπ' αὐτῶν] Note on I I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I I 1, 12 p. 22, δι' αὐτῶν: I I 7, 35,
τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλώς, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (τῶν ὄμοιων ἀναγκαίων εἰδέναι) πότερον ὀμοια ἢ ἀνώ-
καὶ ταύτη πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἐλαττούσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταύτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς ὦκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὦμοιών τὰ ὦμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ ἑίδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τούτῳ δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἐμπειρὸν ὄντα τῆς χώρας), ἵνα εἰτ' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἶ τις περίεργος ἀφαρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηθείους τόπους μοιον (εἰς ταῖς ὦκείαις). Τὸ πλαστὸ περιεχεῖν, 'to have too much or too little', 'more or less than your due'. So in Thucyd. I 77, ἑλαττούσθαι and πλεονεκτεῖν (the irregular passive of πλεονεκτεῖν) represent the same notion, 'to come by the worse, or to be overreached'. And so here, 'for in this point also we may be at an advantage or disadvantage'.

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὦμοιων κ.π.λ.] 'for similar circumstances are naturally followed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results'.

§ 10. ἵνα εἰτ' ἐλάττων (ἐστὶν ἡ φυλακὴ), ἣν προστεθῇ, οὐδὲ ἀπέχει, εἴδι τοὺς ἐλάττων (ἐστὶν ἡ φυλακὴ), (ἀντὶ) προστεθῇ.

περίεργος] is properly said of one 'who troubles himself over much' (περιεργασάμενος), either about his own affairs, or those of others; (these two significations will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires the general sense of 'superfluous', as here. Comp. Plat. Polit. 286 C, περίεργα λέγειν, and Apol. 19 B, Σωκράτης...περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τέ ύπό γης καὶ τὰ ἐποιήμαα (of an idle curiosity). Dem. ἱστ. Π. 150, 24, εἶ δὲ ἐργάζεται καὶ περιεργάζεται τοὺς ἐσχάτους ὄντας καυτοῖς. Ιb. 143, 17, περίεργος καὶ μάταιων ἀνάλογω, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators. Arist. Eccles. 220, εἶ μή τι κανὼν ἄλλο περιεργάζετο. See also in Ind. ad Fragm. Com. Graec. Meineke, Vol. v. Pt. 2.

καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηθείους τόπους τηρῶσαί μάλλον] Translate the whole passage, 'in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little, addition be made to it, or if superfluous, it be retrenched, and their attention be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of favourable positions'. ἐπιτηθείους τόπους are places favourable, defensible, suitable to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting the country. Thuc. Π 20, δ' χώρος ἐπιτηθείου ἐφάνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεύεις: Herod. IX 2, χώρος ἐπιτηθεῖτερος ἐνστρατοπεδεύεις: VI 102, ἐπιτηθείωσαν χώρων ἐνιπεύσαν, always apparently of a 'favourable' position, and this seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of ἐπιτηθείου and of the passage in general. And so Victorius, 'et ut relictis parum opportunis
11 τηρῶσι μᾶλλον. έτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἤκαντι τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἴ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγωγήμοις, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ίνα πρὸς τοὺς καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαί γίγνονται: πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαίον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τοὺς κρήτ-12 τους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταύτα χρησίμους. εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἀπαντα μὲν ταύτα ἀναγκαίον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν· locis magis idoneos tuecantur.' (There is another possible—but I think not probable—interpretation of ἐπιθέσεως τόπους. viz. loca commoda or opportuna, suitable or convenient to the enemy, easy of access, readily assailable: τρείς, as before, being to guard or defend.)

§ 11. πρὸς τοὺς] i.e. παρ' οἷς ἔστιν ὑπὸ δέονται: those that are capable of providing them with that they want.

συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ] On συμβολαὶ and συναλλάγματα see above, note on 1 11, 10 p. 16.

συνθῆκη is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, usually of a public nature, between two states, but also all private contracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. 1 15, 20—23, περὶ συνθηκῶν. σύμβολα—here called συμβολαὶ, apparently a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον in this sense; in Pol. III 9, 1280 a 38, συνθῆκαι and σύμβολα are contrasted—are technically confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of contract, international commercial treaties. Meier ii. Schömann, All. Process, p. 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, σύμβολα first occurs apparently in its proper sense, πάντες οίς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους: and then, as distinguished from συνθῆκαι, which here stand for commercial treaties in general, συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, seems to be applied to those special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made provisions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established a system of compensation which protected the contracting parties against mutual injury, σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἁδικεῖν. In the usual sense, Pol. III 1, 1275 a 9, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, 'even the members of different states who are connected by international commercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be ἰδιός which constitutes a citizen'. In Thuc. I 77, the ἕξυμβολαι πρὸς τοὺς ἕξυμ-μάχους δίκαιον ἐπικάλεσιν denote the actions at law which arise out of these ἕξυμβολα. Dem. c. Mid. 570, τά σύμβολα συγχέων. See Buttm.'s Ind., s. v.

πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν κ.τ.λ.] 'for there are two classes of persons between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily, persistently (διά, thoroughly, throughout), maintained'.

§ 12. περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν] 'to understand the subject of legislation'.

In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric
Ron the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin’s Philologus, u. s. p. 33. I will compare them in the order in which they stand.

On legislation comp. I 1, 7. That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. III 15, 1286 a 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287 a 18, τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἀρχέν αἱρετάτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν τινά κ.τ.λ. The different forms of constitutions, and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are treated, for instance, in Pol. III 6, and VIII (v) 1 et seq. And not only is the substance of the next sentence, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι κ.τ.λ., found in the discussions of the Politics VIII (v) 1, but the very same metaphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is employed there, 1301 b 17, as here; and in c. 9, 1309 b 18, the same illustration, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true character.

This metaphor from the screwing up or relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of ‘screwing up our courage’ Macbeth 1 7, 60), and depression or relaxation on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direction to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states.

Therefore means that forms of government are destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the ‘mean’ state alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to maintain its true character. For instance the ὤν, definition or principle, of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or carried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actually becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become
Now may I proceed to one point, viz., the relaxation and nervous strain, which occurs, whence enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, anemic to the constitution of its members. This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it occurs, Pol. viii (v) 1, 1301 b 16, ἵνα ἐπιθαύμως ἢ ἀνέβασιν. Ib. c. 8, 1308 b 2, τὰ τιμίατα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνέβασιν, ἡ ἢ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἐπιτείνεσθαι. 13 so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, anemic to the constitution of its members. Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. iv 441 E, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνειν ἢ καὶ τρέφοντα...τὸ δὲ ἀνέβασι παραμυθουμένη, vi 493 B, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκεῖνης γυμνάσια, III 412 Α, ἐπιτεινομένα καὶ ἀνεμένο, ib. 410 τ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιταθήν τοῦ δέοντος σκληροῦ τε καὶ χαλεπῶν γίγνοντ' ἀν...μᾶλλον ἀνεβάντος αὐτοῦ καλακότερον κ.τ.λ. Phaedo 98 c, οία ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνέβασιν. 86 c, 94 c and elsewhere.

13 This is a relaxation or exertion, as a ‘relaxation’ πρὸς διαγωγήν, that it is πρὸς ἀνεικόν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας (overstraining or exertion) ἀναινασίαν. Comp. Pol. vi (iv) 3, ult. ἀρμονίας συντονιστέρας καὶ ἀνεικέων; whence εὐτονος (intense), συντονος, ἀνεικεῖος, ἀνεικεῖος, are applied, the two first to braced nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, and effeminacy. In Pol. iv (vii) 17, 1336 a 30, it is said that children’s sports should be neither ἐπιτόνοινος καὶ ἀνεικέως; and c. 4. 1326 a 26, that no well-constituted state should be ἀνεικέων, uncontrolled, slack, loose, relaxed, i.e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. ii 4 sub. init. ὁρμαθηραν σφόδρας ἢ ἀνεικέων, ib. III 7, 1114 a 5, ἀνεικείως ἐν, open, easy, careless, dissolve life. Comp. Thuc. i 6, 11 39 ἀνεικέως τῇ διαίτῃ, ἀνεικεῖος διατάξαμενος. The corresponding Latin terms are intender and remilder, Cic. Orat. § 59, Quint. x 3, 24, doubtless borrowed from the Greek.

οὕτω διατίθεται ὡστε κ.τ.λ.] ‘it assumes such a condition or shape that it seems to be no nose at all’. 13 ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθοτῶν θεωροῖται] ‘by studying out of’, i.e. 13 ‘drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past’. 13 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle had already probably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of political study, by his work called Πολιτεία, a collection of the constitutions
ποίαι τοῖς ποίοις ἄρμόττουσιν. ὀστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νυμοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἐστὶ τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς of 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appendix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes, v 27, and of the Anonymus in Buhle, Arist. Vol. I p. 65. Diogenes’ title, which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: Πολείται πόλεων δυών δεουσιν ἐξήκοντα καὶ ἐκατόν, καὶ ιδία δημοκρατικά, διήγαρχικά, ἀριστοκρατικά, καὶ τυραννικά. The extant fragments of this work are collected in Rose’s Arist. Pseudepigraphus, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the Oxf. ed. of Bekker’s text, Vol. x p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics). The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz, Veroff. Schrift. Arist. p. 230, seq.

al τῆς γῆς περίοδοι] ‘Travels round the world’, ‘survey of the earth’. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, containing not only an account of the relative position of cities and countries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inhabitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politician. These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the reports of travellers; whence the name περίοδοι. Ar. Meteor. I 13, 13, δῆλον δ’ ἔστι τούτο θεωρέων τὰς τῆς γῆς περίοδους. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πυθανοσονθηον παρ’ ἑκάστων οὕτως ἀνέγραψε, ὡςων μὴ συμβείδηκεν αὐτότατα γενέσθαι τοῖς λέγονται (quoted by Victorius). For a similar reason books of the same kind were called περιπλοῦ, ‘circumnavigations or nautical surveys’, as those of Scylax, Hanno, &c. or περιγραφέσεις. (Διονύσιος ὁ περιγραφετής. Διόδωρος ὁ περιγραφετής, Athen. XIII 591 E. Πολέμων ὁ περαγή, ib. IX 372 Λ, XXI 553 B.) One of the earliest and best known of them was that of Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, IV 36 γελά δ’ ὁρεῶν Γῆς περίοδους γράψαντας πολλάς ἡδή...οἱ Οἰκεανοὶ τε ῥεόντα γράφουσι πείρξ τὴν γῆν ἐσώαν κυκλοσεῖα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεῦσας Ἰσόν. In v 49 the term is applied to Aristocrates of Miletus’ famous map, (by Strabo assigned to Anaximander), πίνακα ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περίοδος ἐνετέτημητο, καὶ θαλασσά τε πᾶσα, καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες. From the hints in Herod. IV. 36, Ar. Meteor. II 5, διὸ καὶ γελώσων γράψανθε νῦν τὰς περίοδους τῆς γῆς’ κτλ. (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the circular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and from Pol. II 3, 1262 a 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer, of Cnidos, was the author of one of these works, referred to by Athen. VII 288 C. ἐν ἑκτὸ γῆς περίοδον (Victorius), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus, Polemo. An account of Hecataeus’ περίοδος is given by Mure, Hist. Grk. Lit. IV 144, Bk. IV ch. 3 § 3.

at τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίαι] See note on ἱστορίαι, § 7. The addition ‘about men’s actions’ is still required to define the kind of ‘inquiries’ in which ‘history’ engages: ἱστορία has not yet become technical, indicating a special department of study.
CHAPTER V.

The analysis of Happiness.

The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in the future, and is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will include every object of προτροπή and ἀποτροπή which he can suggest to his audience, and every kind of political expedience.


ἐν κεφαλαίω εἰπεῖν] ‘to speak summarily’, to sum up in one notion, to describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase ‘happiness and its parts’.
2 ευδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὡστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ ευδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινοῦσων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτη οἱ προτροπαί καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαί πάσαι εἰσίν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἢ μείζον ἀντὶ ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεὶ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ 3 ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἐστώ δὴ εὐδαιμονία

§ 2. ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] speaking broadly and generally, without descending to particulars. Opposed to καθ' ἐκαστὸν. See note on 1 2, 4, p. 30.

§ 3. ἐστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) remarks upon this use of ἐστω as marking the popular character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; II 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the πάθη. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 13; and on this definition of happiness, p. 176.

Aristotle’s own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, θεωρία, the exercise of the highest faculty, the νοῦς, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the intellectual. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. χ), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, αὐτάρκεια ὑφὶς comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. i 5 (quoted below).

The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the εὐπραξία μὲν ἀρετῆς, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the αὐτάρκεια τῆς ὑφὶς, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life μὲν ἀσφαλείας, the happiness residing in θεωρία being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing from without (c. 7); and also ἡδιαστός, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of
every éνεργεία (active exercise, realisation in exercise, of any δύναμις or capacity), and ðεωρία being the most perfect form of éνεργεία, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὴ ὁ κατὰ τῶν νοῶν βίος (ἡδίστος καὶ κράσιστος), εἶτε τοῦτο μιὰτα ἀνθρώπως. οὕτως ἀρκεῖ καὶ εὐθαμονεστᾶτος. Eth. N. Χ 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the Ἐρίχειαν school.) The fourth definition, εὐθνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φιλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τοῦτων is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὐπροδίᾳ. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. I § 172, πρὸς Ηθικοὺς § 30.

eὔπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ἡ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἡ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἦδίστος, ἡ εὐθνία κτημάτων καὶ αὐτάρκεια παρὰ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ κατὰ ταύτα, ἐστὶ συνομολογημένον ἢμι, μάρτυς τὸ δεόν χρομένων, ὡς εὐθαμον καὶ μακάριον, δὲ οὕτως δὲ τῶν ἐξοτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄλλα δὲ αὐτῶν αὐτός καὶ τὸ ποιῶς τις εἶναι τῆν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐθαμονίας διὰ ταύτ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἔστερον εἶναι κ.λ. Βb. c. 3, 1326 b 12, ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν εὐπραγιῶν διότι, καὶ κοινὸς πόσης πύλεως ἅν εἶναι καὶ καθ’ ἐκακῶς ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of εὐπραξία in the latter must be limited to ‘well doing’, and not extended to ‘welfare’, which it, like εὕραμεν, is capable of including. Pol. IV (vii) 1, καὶ πῶλιν εὐθαμον, τὴν ἄριστην εἶναι καὶ πράπτουσαν καλῶς: ἀδύστον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν. Βb. c. 3 sub init. ἀδύστον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράπτουσαν πράττειν εἰ, τὴν δ’ εὐπραγιῶν καὶ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν εἶναι παύτων. Βb. c. 8, εὐθαμονία...ἀρετῆς εὐρήγεια καὶ χρήσεις τις τέλεων. Βc. 13, 1332 a 7.

αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς Eth. Nic. 1 5, 1097 b 7, φιάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐτάρκειας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὐτάρκεια leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλεων, previously applied to determine it). τὸ γὰρ τέλεων ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκεις εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες τίθεμεν ὁ μονώμενον αἵρετον ποιεῖ τὸν θείον καὶ μηθὲν εὐθεῖα. τοὐτὸν δὲ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν αὐτῇ εἶναι. Comp. Χ 6, 1176 b 5, οὐδὲνος γὰρ ἐνδεής ἡ εὐθαμονία ἄλλα αὐτάρκεις. c. 7, 1177 a 26, ἡ τε λεγομένῃ αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness) περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μιὰτα ἄν εἶναι (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in ἰθωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (iv) 11 init. In Pol. IV (vii) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ἑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθὲν αὐτάρκες.

εὐθνίας and εὐθνείας are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐθείας and εὐθνίας or εὐθένεια, and denote a ‘flourishing state’, or ‘prosperity’ in general. ἐυθείων enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐθειῶν subjectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Ajax alicius aut Hercules εὐθείνεια dicatur, sed vel
σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων. σχεδον γὰρ τούτων ἐν ἡ πλείω τὴν 4 εὐδαιμονίαν ὠμολογοῦσιν εἰναι ἀπαντεσ. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγενειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν πολυτεκνίαν εὐηρείαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς, οἰον ὑγιειαν κάλλος ἵσχυν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστι-tenerrima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, eidheinei dici possit. Et maximis quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospero rerum publicarum privatarnique successu, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur. (From an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, ad Phryn. &c. p. 465—7: Lobeck derives eidheine from eδ and θεο (τίθημι), comparing it with other verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes eivtheia and eidheinei, but generally eivtheia and eivthein. Lobeck's note may be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.)

κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] 'property' of all kinds, goods and chattels, including especially flocks and herds; and 'population'; here estimated by 'bodies', not by 'souls' as Christianity has taught us to reckon it.

§ 4. εὐτεκνία (εὐτεκνος, εὐπαιδος, εὐπαιδεύ, Aeschylus and Euripides), and εὐγενεία, εὐτεκνος, and εὐγήρως, 'blessing in children, and in old age', are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human race, in his works on Natural History: e.g. to birds, in the sense of 'prolific', Hist. An. IX 11, 1; 12, 3; 17, 1; IX 12, 3; εὐγήρως ὀρνιθες.

πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16, 'number of friends, worthiness of friends'. The latter is defined by Liddell and Scott, 'the love of good men or good deeds', [a slip corrected, however, in a subsequent edition. s.]

tás τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς] The ἀρετὴ or 'excellence' of anything is determined by its ἔργον or special function or business; that which it was made to do. On this notion of ἔργον, see the ref. given in note on c. 2, § 12. ἀρετή therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue, though it is applied to this κατ' ἔρχειν, that it may be extended to everything which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties bodily, mental, and moral.

μέγεθος] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. § 276, τὸς δ' ὅδε Ναυσικά μέτα καλὸς τε μέγας τε ξένοις; 1b. σ. 248, περίσσοι γνακών εἰδος τε μέγεθος τε. σ. 252, οὐδὲ τι τοι δουλείαν ἐπιτρέπει εἰσφάρσατε εἴδος καὶ μέγεθος. σ. 218. σ. 373. II b 58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. I p. 123 e, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages that a young man might be proud of, εἰ οὖν Λέγομεν ὅτι κάλλες τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλοῦτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς... Charmid. 154 c, βαυμαστός ἐφάνη τὸ τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος. So Ovid's Romulus, after his deification, pulcer et humano maius. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1323 b 7, εν μεγέθει
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PHILOKHIS A 5 § 4.

κήν, δόξαν τιμήν εὐτυχίαν ἀρετήν υ ν αὐταρκεστατος εἴν, εἰ ύπάρχαι αὐτῷ τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν ἄλλα παρά ταύτα. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἐξι τι δε εὐγνεία καὶ φίλου καὶ χρήματα καὶ τύχην.

1 ἡ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σοφροσύνην.

γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὀσπέρ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστείοι (pretty or neat) καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὖ. Pol. IV (vii) 4, 1326 a 33, τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσθε γίνονται. Poet. VII 4, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ, ἀρ. Zell, ad loc. Eth.

δόξαν] ‘reputation’, estimation in men’s thoughts or opinion. (‘Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble minds, to scorn delights, &c.’ Lyceids).—τιμή honours, substantial and externally manifested, which are conferred upon a man, offices, titles, proeunia, civil privileges, and such like. See further in § 9. On the value of τιμή in general, Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνον ἀ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποσχημάτωσι, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐφεξῆς οἱ ἐν αξιωματικ, καὶ τὸ ἐπί τοῖς καλλίστοις ἀθλον, τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τούτο τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν, 1124 a 17.

εὐτυχίαν] distinguished from εἰδαμονία, Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 b 20 seq., quoted above in note on § 3.

ἡ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σοφροσύνην] These words are omitted by ms A⁵, Improved in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [4to ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel.

αὐταρκεστατος] referring to the second definition, § 3. See note on § 3, p. 73. τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ] When Aristotle adds ‘besides these there are no others’, he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, the goods of body and mind under the first head, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. His usual division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds; goods of ‘mind, body, and estate’. This division, however, was not his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 b 17, τῶν τινιν δόξαν (the opinion in question) παλαιὰν ὅσαν καὶ ομολογομενὴν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων. Cic. Tusc. v 30, tria genera bonorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripateticis, nec multo veteres Academicici seuis. Eth. Nic. I 8, sub init. νοημημείων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τρίχ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτῶν λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώμα, τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά. Pol. IV (vii) 1 sub init. τριῶν ὁσῶν μεμιδῶν, τῶν τε ἐκτῶς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πῶς ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακράλοις δεῖ. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 8, 2, Cic. de Fin. III 13, 43, et alibi. Schrader ad h. 1. This division cannot be at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone. for it appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) 8, διαρκείς δὲ τούτῳ (τῷ συμφέρον τοῖς μὲν ἰδιόταις εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα: unless indeed this be taken as an argument of the later authorship of the Rhet. ad Alexandrum.

δυνάμεις] either ‘power’ of various kinds, ‘opos ac civilem potentiam’,
§ 5. eὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐθνεὶ μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἢ ἀρχαῖος εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρῶτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἡ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἥλιουμένοις: ἡδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἢ ἀμ-

Muretus, Victorius, ‘potentialia’, Vet. Transl.; or faculties and capacities, bodily and mental, ‘facultates’, Riccob. The first seems to agree better with εὐγενίαν.

ἀσφαλέστατον] referring to the third definition of § 3.

§ 5. eὐγένεια] in an individual or a family is defined in Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1204 a 21, ἡ γὰρ εὐγενεία ἐστὶν ἀρχαίος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴ, and VIII (V) I, 1301 b 2, εὐγενεῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οὐς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. Rhct. 11 15, 2, 3. Plat. Theact. 174 E, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ψυχών, ὡς γενναῖος τοῖς ἐπὶ πάπποι πλούσιοι ἠξὼν ἀποβῆναι, which seems to have been the current definition of εὐγενεία at Athens in Plato’s time.

αὐτόχθονας] Herod. I 171, Thuc. 1, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 29, 589, 737, of Athens; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens; Vaneg. § 24, 25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. III 7, 26, laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor; et multum auctoritatis afferit vetustas, ut iis qui terra dicuntur oriri. καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρῶτους ἐπιφανεῖς] ‘and to have had for their first rulers famous men’, like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς—ἐπὶ τοῖς ἥλιουμένοις] ‘and many men sprung from their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired’. ἐπὶ, ‘standing, resting upon’, ‘upon the basis, terms, or condition of...

ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] ‘privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father’s or the mother’s side’, i.e. from famous ancestors on either.

γνησιότης ἢ ἀμφότερον] ‘legitimacy on both sides’, in birth and citizenship. γνήσιος, opposed to νόδος, II. A 102, νίκα Ἱλίου πρώημα νόδον καὶ γνήσιον, Plat. Rep. VII 536 A, τοῦ νόδου τε καὶ τοῦ γνήσιου, and also to ποιητὸς, εἰσποιητός, ὑπὸ νόδου, Dem. c. Lecch. 1095, 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνήσιον ἐστὶν ὅταν ἡ γὰρ γεγονός, καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ λέγων, ἢ ἀν ἐγγυνηθῇ πατήρ ἢ ἀδελφός ἢ πάππος ἐκ ταύτης ἐστὶν παῖδας γνησίους...ποιητὸς δὲ ὀμολογῶν ἢ σαιναίται ὡς εἰσποιηθεὶς ὧδ’ τοῦ τετελευθηκότος αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ. and 1099, 19; and hence metaphorically ‘genuine’, real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. IX 587 B, μᾶς μὲν (ἡδονῆς) γνησίας, δυὸν δὲ νόδων. On the γνήσιον πολίτης, cf. Ar. Pol. III 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population. In the normal state no βάραιοι or βότις, no mechanics or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the γνήσιοι πολιτεῖς (legitimate by birth) declines, νόδοι are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule
prevails; and then, eιποροντες θυχλον κατα μικρου παραφνονται τους εκ δολου πρωτόν ή δουλης, ειτα τους απο γυναικων τελος δε μονον τους εξ αμβοιν αυτον πολιτας ποιουσιν—as was the case at Athens.

κα οσπερ επι πολεσι, and as in the case of a city (so in the private family, ἵδια), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or anything else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of the race, men and women, young or advanced in years.


ψυχῆς δε σωφροσύνη και ἀνδρία νέον ἄρεται] This is a statement of what young men ought to be; their character, what they actually are, is minutely analysed and described in II 12, under the second head of ἡθυ, c. 12—17. ἀνδρία appears as one of their characteristics in § 9: σωφροσύνη, self-control, is not characteristic of this age, and is therefore not mentioned.

εὐτεκνία] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied, though not directly expressed, in εὐτεκνία, especially characteristic of the Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses εὐτυχεῖν and δυστυχεῖν to express the possession and absence of a family, as though the possession of them was happiness, and the want of them misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley's note), and 713.

τουτων] 'such' as above described. On this use of τουτων, implying a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum's note on Plat. Phaed. 80 c, ειν μὲν τις καὶ χαριντωσ εξων το σώμα τελευτηση καὶ εν τουτων (i. e. χαρινομεν) ὄρᾳ. Compare, inter alia, 59 a, 67 a. Thuc. III 58, νομίζων εν γη το φιλια τιθεναι καὶ παρ' ἀνδρας τουτων (of the like sort, i. e. φιλιας). Dem. d. F. L. § 103, ἀλλ' ὅσον οὕτως σκεψαμενον, καὶ χάρων, ἄν ταύτης ἀρχος ἦ, καὶ τουναντίων ὑργην, ἄν τουτων ('of that kind' sc. ὑργης ἀρχα φαινεται πεποιηκος, ποιεσθε.) Arist. Pol. 1 8, 1256 a 36, οι δ'
καὶ θήλεα καὶ άρρενα: θηλείων δὲ ἀρέτῃ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας δεῖ ἵπτειν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων ὡσοι γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαιλα ὡστερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχέδου κατὰ τὸ ἠμισὺν οὐκ ἐν-7 δαιμονοῦσιν. πλοῦτον δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος,

ἄφ’ άλλειας, ὥσιν λήμα καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοῦ ἡ θάλασσα τοιαύτην (of the same kind, suitable for fishing) προσοκοῦσιν. 11 4, 1262 b 2, δεὶ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι, ἰ.ε. (from the preceding) less friendly, VIII (v) 10, 1310 b 12, τοιοῦτον γένους, ‘a similar family’ (similar to what had been just described).

φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας] ‘industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal) unladylike habits’,

τὰ κατὰ γυναίκας, κ.τ.λ.] ‘the character and conduct of the women’, Polit. II 9, 1269 b 12, ἐτὶ δ’ ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἄνειας (relaxation, laxity of manners) καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβέρα καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίας πόλεως...ὡς ἐν ὅσιας πολιτείαις φαύλως ἐχεῖ τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας, τὸ ἠμισὺ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δει νομίζειν ἀνομοδέθητον. ὡστ’ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta) συμβεβήκεν...ὡς γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερός.

On the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. II. p. 516 seq.

§ 7. πλοῦτον μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος κ.τ.λ.] In the discussion of wealth, in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of true wealth. Pol. I 9, 1257 b 8, καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέσα νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τούτ’ εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηκικήν. ἀτέ (sometimes) δὲ πάλιν λήρος (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμομα καὶ νόμος παντιζάσαι (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true nature, φύσις, in it), φύσει δ’ οὖν, ὅτε μεταβεβηκόν τε τῶν χρημάτων οὐθένας ἄξιον οὖν χρήσιμον πρὸς οὖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀτέ, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορρήσῃ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς’ καὶ τῶν άτομον τοιούτων εἶναι πλοῦτον οὐ εὐποροῦν λίμῳ ἀπολεῖται, καθόπερ καὶ τῶν Μίδων ἔκεινον...διὸ ἠτόκους ἐτέ-ρων τι τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὁρθῶς ἠτόκους.—πλοῦτος is defined, Pol. I 8, sub fin. ὄργανον πλῆθος οἰκονομικοῖ καὶ πολιτικοῖ, ‘a stock, or number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and public or political uses’.

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous ‘Mercantile Theory’, is exposed by Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. iv. See also J. S. Mill, Pol. Econ. Prelim. Remarks, Vol. I. p. 2 seq. ‘To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.’ p. 81.

1 It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics in which the germs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, already appear, with the corresponding passages of the Wealth of Nations. The


\( \gamma\), \( \chi\ \varphi\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \tau\ \eta\ \sigma\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \epsilon\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \nu\ \rho\ \upsilon\ \omega\ \nu\ \tau\ \iota\ \pi\ \lambda\ \omega\ \varsigma\ \kappa\ \iota\ \varsigma\ \iota\ \varsigm
κάρπιμα, ἐλευθερία δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν· κάρπιμα
from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of 'freedom
which is the ὅρος, the principle, and the end and aim of the demo-
cratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore
as expressive of character the term denotes 'that which a model free
citizen ought to be'; and connotes or implies those qualifications, parti-
cularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to dis-
charge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities
and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aris-
tocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion
depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the
ἀγαθοὶ, ἀριστοὶ, ἀριστήτες, the boni, optimi, optimates, &c., are the nobles,
the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this sub-
ject, Donaldson, New Cratylus, §§ 321—328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is
brought into view in the application of the term ἐλευθερία to distinguish
a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and
commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as
B. St Hilaire observes (note on Transl. of Ar. Pol. p. 36) was common
to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, Publ. Econ. of
Athens, Bk. i. c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions
applied to ἐμπορία, καταλεία, χρηματιστική, χρηματισμός, and all arts and
professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance.
Legg. IV 1, 705 Α, ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ δία καταλείας ἐμπιπλάσα
αὐτῆ, ἢ ἐκ παλίμβαλα καὶ ἀπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντικτωσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτήν
τὴν πάλιν ἀπιστον καὶ ἀφιλον ποιει καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὀσάτως,
where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918
D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of
trade, he makes the remark, διό πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καταλείαν καὶ ἐμπορίαν
καὶ πανδοκελαν γένη (in the actual practice of them) διαβεβήληταί τε καὶ έν
αισχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνείδεσαν, which results from their general tendency to
corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immo-
derate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no
citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must
be confined to metics and strangers, μέτοικον εἶναι χρεών ἢ ξένων ὅσ ἄν
μέλλη καταλεύσειν. VIII 11, 847 Β, καταλείαιν δὲ ἔνεκα χρηματισμῶν μήτε
οὐν τούτων μήτε ἄλλου μηδένος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ δή καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι. On
Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the 'Laws', see
Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of
interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making,
χρηματιστική. This is the accumulation of unnatural, artificial property:
the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, φύσις, is that which
can be applied directly to one's own use, πρὸς χρήσιν, and ultimately
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζων, and falls under the province of οἰκονομική, from which
χρηματιστική is excluded. Pol. I 9. Hence of the two kinds of κτητική,
the one, which may be called οἰκονομική, because it forms part of the
science of economics (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces-

AR. I.
de λέγω ἂφ' ὅν αἰ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἂφ' ὅν μὴ δὲν παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν γίγνεται, ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον.

sary and laudable; the other, ἡ κατηγορία or μεταβλητική, with its offspring usury, which breeds money out of money, and is thence called τόκος, 'is justly reprehended' and usury 'most reasonably the object of abhorrence'.

tίσ δὲ μεταβλητικὴς ψευδομένης δικαίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἀλλήλων ἔστιν, εὐλαχύσατα μοιετέα ἡ ἀξιοθαυμαστική διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτησιν καὶ οὐκ ἂφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. κ.τ.λ. I 10 sub fin.

On the character and tendencies of ἐμπορία, compare Xen. Ἐκον. ΧΧ 27, 28. In the same treatise, c. I 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήσις, wealth or property which you can use directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property in this sense. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Ἐκον. c. VI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ἐλευθερία as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce.

ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] Property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἂφ' ὅν αἰ πρόσοδοι 'from which one derives one's income', is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the enjoyment, which proceeds from using it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλών. Comp. I 9, 25, καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή τῶν καλῶν, ἀρέτα τε γὰρ ἄκαρτα ὅστα. § 26, καὶ κτίματα ἄκαρτα (καλὰ ἐστι). ἐλευθερώτερα γὰρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλύτηρος), καὶ οὐδὲ κεκτήθητε μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρτα τῶν καρπίων καὶ ωφελίμων—the contrast of 'honour' and 'profit'.

ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Metaph. Α 1, 981 b 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλείστων ὡς εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τάναγκαία τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν (πασσε-τεμῆσ, pastime, diversion) αὐτῶν, αἱ σοφοτερῶν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκείνων ὑπολογμαζομένων, διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are 'sciences', the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires 'leisure'; whence it happened that mathematics were first studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον] καὶ emphatic 'which is in fact at all worth mentioning'.

1 ἀπολαυσις is properly 'sensual enjoyment'. In Eth. N. I 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός or πολιτικός, and θεωρητικός are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has ἄξιον for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; the second has ἀρετή moral virtue for its τέλος; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.
The text is a page from a Greek philosophical work, discussing concepts such as ἐνταύθα καὶ οὕτω, ὑπό τοῦ ἕφ' αὐτῷ, ἕντον ἄνθρωπον, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑπτάοικον, ἠγείρεσθαι, ἀδύνατον, ἔργον, ἕργον, ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἔννοια. The page contains scholarly commentary and references to ancient authors such as Aristotle, Xenophon, and Plato. The text is a translation or commentary on these philosophers' ideas on ethics and metaphysics.
sound and true, to φαινόμεν, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a moral sense coextensive with ἀγαθός, and is opposed to φαινόμεν, Plat. Rep. VII 519 D, Legg. VI 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized (as in the parallel case of ἐπιευκής, Eth. N. v 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 10 b 7, óνων ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετῆν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ὃς παραώνιμος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς (i.e. the πολύς is derived from ἀρετῆς, but not the word itself). Plat. Ἀρ. p. 415 D (ed. Tur. p. 888) σπουδαῖος ὁ τελείως ἀγαθός.

There is however one point of difference between ἐπιευκής and σπουδαῖος, that σπουδαῖος is extended to every kind of excellence, like ἀγαθός, whereas ἐπιευκής is confined to the expression of excellence in human character. Also σπουδαῖος has another sense distinguishable from the preceding, as opposed to γελοίος, the ‘serious’ to the ‘jocose’ or ‘ridiculous’. Xen. Cyrop. II 3 1, τοιαύτα καὶ γελοία καὶ σπουδαία ἐλέγετο, and Symp. VIII 3, σπουδαία ὁφρυνε, ‘grave and serious’. σπουδή and παπλία ‘jest’ and ‘earnest’, ‘serious work’ and ‘play’ or ‘sport’, are constantly brought into contrast by Plato.

§ 9. σημείων ἐυεργετικῆς δόξης ‘a sign or mark’ (in the recipient of the honour) ‘a reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (ἐκδος) towards doing good’. All these ‘marks of honour’ here specified, being intended for the use of the public speaker, have themselves a public or national character. Eth. Nic. IX 16, 1163 b 4, τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἐυεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας...οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ διδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν ἐυεργετοῦντι, τιμῇ δὲ κοινών.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ‘not but that’, ‘though at the same time’, marks a qualification of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: οὐ μὴν (ὁλῶς) ἀλλὰ (τάδε). ‘Those who have already done good are fairly and more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or inclination to do good as a title to honour.’

ἡ ἀλῶς ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ποτε ‘either entirely, absolutely, or at particular places or times’.

πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ.] Trifles acquire importance, and confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimportant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum-
to poioi kai oi kairoi a' tioi. meri de timum thesiai, 
manymai en metroi kai enev metrwn, gera, tetemn, 
proedriai, taphoi, eikones, prophai demosisia, ta bar-
stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a 
renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different 
circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which 
does not naturally belong to it. 'For whosoever shall give you a cup of 
water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say 
unto you, he shall not lose his reward.' Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42.

mery timum'] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, II. M 310, 
Plaucke, tis de nooi tetumeseo maistota edrei te kreas f' hede pleios de 
besai en Luki; pantes de, theos ois, eisforwasi; kal temenos nemeseba mega 
Einwonu par' oixbas,—kalon, futalihsi kai aroyris puroforoio; comp. Z 194, 
Theta 161.

theis] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour 
of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1134 b 24, dion to yveun Brasiaida, Thuc. v 11, 
kal to loipton oi 'Amphopolites perierxantas autho to mulmein ois 'hrasi te 
eintemounai kai timas dekasean avgias kai etheusis thesias k.t.l. Victorius 
quotes from Plutarch, Vit. Flam. c. 16, p. 378 B, the honours paid by the 
Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flamininus, eti de kai kat' hymas ierious che 
tuneos apedeikunto Titon, kai buesto autw tov synonw nevomenon ydousi 
pianan pipoymenon.

manymai en metroi kai anev metrwn] 'Memorials in prose and verse', 
posibly epitaphs; but rather, as these may be included in taphoi, to be under 
stood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions in memoriam, such as 
the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious 
dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of Isocrates' speeches and 
 Xenophon's Agesilas. Philosophical dialogues too were sometimes 
inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as 
 Aristotle's Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus' Callisthenes, &c. 
Introd. p. 53.

gera] gifts of honour; as masbol, 'rewards of merit', not money, for 
mere use; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of disti 

tinction eti rytois gyrason patrikai Vasileiai, Thuc. i 13; constantly in 
Homer, (pars praecipa, donum praecipum, principi pra alis datum, 
Damm, Lex. Homer.) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives, 
koipny, h en apais mo (Achilles) geras eke/on vies 'Achaid, II. II 56, the largest 
portion of meat, or drink, at the banquet, II. M 312 (quoted above). 
Eth. Nic. v. 10, 1134 b 8, muothes apa tis dortos, touto de timum kai geras. 
Fritzsche, ad h. l., quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 c, timai kai evanwos kai gera, 
and Legg. XI 922 A.

temn] From temnein, something 'cut off' and appropriated, as a por 
tion of land, to the special service of a. God or hero; also to chieftains 
and kings during their lifetime for their own use. Frequent in Homer, 
as II. M 313 (u. s.). Z 194, kaiv thirooi temenos taman eko/oron alloi, 
y 184, 391.

proedria, proffai demosisia] The privilege of the 'foremost or front 
seat' at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c. 
(Herod. I 54, IX 73 &c.), and 'maintenance at the public expense'; at
βαρικά, οίον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἑκστάσεις, δώρα τὰ
Athens in the Prytancum or Ὑδός (Dem. de F. L. §§ 279, 361), σήτησις εἰς Πρωτανείο. Arist. Ran. 764, Πας 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s. and §§ 35. 259; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of meritorious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 573, καὶ στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ ἀν εἰς τῶν πρὸ τοῦ σήτησιν ἠττορ ἐρώμενος Κλαεώνεις· νῦν δὲ ἐν μὴ προερήμιας φέρεται καὶ τὰ σίτια, ό όμοιότεροι ὑποτάσσεται. Π. 702. Κλέων ἀπὸ την τὴν προερήμια τὴν ἐκ Πύλου. Ἀλ. ἰδοὺ προερήμιαν οἴον ὑφορμαί σ’ ἐγὼ | ἐκ τῆς προερήμιας ἐσχάτων θεώμενον. 709, Ἀλ. ἀπονυκίῳ σὺν τῶν Πρωτανείῳ σίτια.

τὰ βαρικά, οίον προσκυνήσεις] προσκυνήσεις, from πρός, and κυνή, ‘to kiss’, denotes the oriental and ‘barbarous’ custom of saluting by ‘kissing the hand to’ another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is applied to any act of servile obeisance or homage, or to worship and adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of Oriental barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. I 119, of Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. I 134, εντυχάνοντες ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὴν ὑδαίν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὶ τοῖς διαγόνοις εἰς ὑμοίοις εἰς τοῖς συντυχάνοντες. ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν ἀλλήλους, φιλέονται τοῖς στόμασι. ἡν δὲ ὑστεροι ὑποδέστεροι διέλευ τάς παρειάς φιλέονται, ἡν δὲ πολλοὶ ἡ ὑστεροι ἀγνώνεστεροι, προσπίνακοι, τῶν ἑτέρων, and the Egyptians II 80, αὐτὸ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν ἀλλήλους εἰς τὴν ὑδαίν, ἀράνοισσαν κατιόντες μὲν χρῆ τοῦ γονιμοῦ τῆς χειρά. Obeisance by prostration, the salūm or κολως, differs from this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that is referred to, as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, προσκυνῶ σ’, ἀναξ, νόμοις βαρικάρμοι προσπίνων. Plato distinguishes them. Legg. X 887 Ε, προκυλλάσεις ἀμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις. Stallb., in his note on this passage of Plato, cites, in illustration of the προσκύνησις, Lucian. Encom. Demosth. § 85, καὶ τὴν χειρὰ τῷ στόματι προσάγονται, οὐδέν ἀλλ’ ἡ προσκυνεῖν ὑπέλαβον. [Cf. Isocr. Pareg. § 151. (οἱ βάρσαροι) εὐεπταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλυθούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρόν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θητήν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ διάμοιρα προσαγορεύοντες, κ.τ.λ. s.]

ἐκκατάσεις is the abstract conception of ‘getting out of the way’. This ‘making way or room’ for the passage of a person of rank seems also to have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, Artax. c. 11, p. 1016 C, ἐπαιρόμενος δὲ (ὁ Κύρος) τῇ νίκῃ, καὶ μεστὸς ὅν ὁμής καὶ θράσους, διεξάγων βοῶν, ἐξίστασθε πενθροί· (*) out of the way, beggars, *), τοῦτο δὲ Περσικοὶ πολλάκις αὐτὸ βοῶντο, οἱ μὲν ἐξίστατο προσκυνόντες. Herodotus, II 80, says of the Egyptians, συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τάδε ἀλλ’ Ἀλιστίτα τοῖς Ἑλληνοῖς μονοίοις Δακαίμονοις· οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτῶν τοίς πραγματεύσασθα συντυχάνοντες ἔκκουσι τῆς ὄδοι καὶ ἐκτράσανται· καὶ ἐπιτύησαν εἰς ἐς ὑμής ὑπαναστάτην. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero vii 2, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, ὑπανστώτων δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν δάκων ὄδω τε παραχώρασι: and Aristotle of the respect due
\[ \text{from youth to age, Eth. Nic. IX 2, 1165 a 28, καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τῷ ἄνω τῷ καθ' ἡλικίαν, ἕπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Cíc. Cato Maior 18. 63. On the deference paid to old age, enjoined by laos at Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, ὑπανύσταται δὲ μοι ἦδη καὶ βάκαν, καὶ ὦδον ἔξισταν ὧδε πλοῦσιον\} \] and de Rep. Lac. xv 6, of the customs at Sparta, καὶ ἄδρας δὲ πάντες ὑπανύσταται βασιλεῖ, πλὴρ ὡκ ἐφόροι κτλ. Another illustration of ἔκστασις is the custom, once generally prevalent, of 'giving the wall' to a superior, as a mark of respect, cédier le haut du pavé. (Dict. Acad. Fr.) [Ovid, Fasti, v 67, (senex) et medius invenit, non indignantibus ipsi, ibat, et interior, si comes unus erat et Horace, Sat. II 5. 17, 'comes exterior'. S.]

**προσκυνήσεις, ἐκστάσεις** The plural of abstract nouns denotes the various individual acts or moments or states included under the general conception.

\[ \text{δῶρα τὰ παρ’ ἐκάστος τῆς ἁγίας | 'quae apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt', Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek games, and quotes Horace, Ep. II 2. 32, clarus ob id factum donis ornatur honestis, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the Roman Military service, assigned to 'Lucullus' soldier'. Of the words by themselves this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρον... they may be understood somewhat differently, and the παρ’ ἐκάστος referred to 'the individuals of the two classes' mentioned immediately after, the φιλοχρήσματοι and φιλότιμοι.}

\[ \text{§ 10. σώματος δὲ ἀρετῆ ὑγίεια] Health, as a bodily excellence, necessarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of the duties of life, without these it is no ἀρετῆ at all, and no subject of congratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the ἀρετῆ of the body, in reference to the doctrine of the proper ἐργον of anything; see note on p. 40 c. 2 § 12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth. Nic. I 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is concerned.}

\[ Ηρόδικος\] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the Propontis; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gorgias' brother, of Leontini, Plat. Gorg. 448 B, 456 B. On Herodicus and
his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 E, and Heindorf’s and Ast’s notes; also Rep. III 406 A seq., where an account of him and his system of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 E.¹

11 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἦ τῶν πλείστων. κάλλος δὲ ἔτερον καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστὶν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἐχει τὸ σώμα τοὺς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἣδ’ οὐτα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expression, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all circumstances. It is relative, not only to the three stages of human life, youth, prime (ἄκμη) and old age, but also to the habits and functions natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic exercises, in the way of training, to youth; military service, the imperative duty of an active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary and intellectual pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or ‘necessary’ labours—extraordinary exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is a constituent element of its personal beauty.

νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] When it is said that the beauty of a young man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the muscular development required for the one, and the indications of activity combined with strength, which appear in the outward form, necessary for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the person with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth.

πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by the sight of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpretation, concludes finally in favour of this.

οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι] The combination of a natural aptitude or

¹ Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, Edin. Rev., July, 1837, selects these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the Republic, as to the value of Herodicus’s system of medical practice, as one of the illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades the Platonic philosophy; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. xxiii 4 Νε in corpore quidem valeudinem medici probant, quae animi auxilium contingat. Parum est aegrum non esse; fortum et laetum et alacrem volo. Prope abiat ad infirmitate in qua sola sanitas laudatur.
The pentathlon consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. p. 791,

"Ισθμία καὶ Πυθοὶ Διοσκόρον ὁ Φίλωνος ἕνικα ἄλμα, ποδόκειν, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad II. Ψ. p. 1320, Anthol. επιγράμματα ἀδέσποτα CCCLIV,

"ἄλμα ποδοῦ, δίσκον τε βολῆ, καὶ ἄκοντα ἐρωθ., καὶ δρόμος, ήδέ παλῆ μία δ' ἐπετό πᾶσε τελευτή.

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. 1 35, and in the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. 135 D, πάλη, στίγμων (i. e. ἄκον), ἄλμα, δίσκος, καὶ δρόμος. On the pentathlon and its contents, see Krause, Op. cit. p. 476 seq. abschn. vi § 29.

Πυγμή, boxing, was therefore not included in the pentathlon; and we are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, ὅ δὲ πᾶσι πενταθλοῦ, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises, are one amongst many instances of Aristotle’s carelessness in expressing himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant. πᾶσι, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood simply to imply, that the pentathlon combines in one the greatest number and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion of Krause, Op. cit. p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the

The pentathlon however, though by the number and variety of his accomplishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain special excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only second rate. Plat. Erast. 135 E. The philosopher in the popular sense, Aristotle’s πενταθλοῦ, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accomplished athlete. "Αρ' ἐννοεῖ σωμάτων ἔλεγε τὸν ἑλέσθον ἀνήδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἶν ἐν τῇ ἄγωνῃ εἰσὶν αἱ πενταθλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς δρομεῖς ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἀθλα καὶ δευτερολ εἰσὶ πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄθλησιν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτοὺς."
πρός μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικοὺς, ἵδυν δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερότητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἰκανόν, ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐχειν δὲν 12 τὸ γῆρας λωβάται. ἵσχὺς δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ

notices which we find in the ancient writers. Aristoteles konnte hier in bekannten dingen die mehr worte bedürfende deutlichkeit einer gedrungenen präcisen, und in gemessener gradation fortschreitender redeweise, welche ihm eigen thümlich ist, auszuföpfen, da ja doch jedem Hellenen die fünf bestandtheile des Pentathlon bekannt waren.

ακμάζοντος δὲ κτ.λ.] The simplest way of filling up the elliptical construction seems to be to supply κάλλος after ακμάζοντος, and γέροντος in the next clause, and πεφυκέναι from the immediately preceding πεφικασὶν after πολεμικοὺς in the former clause and ἰκανῶν in the latter. The required sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the first words of the sentence, ακμάζοντος δὲ (κάλλος) (τὸ) πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικοὺς (χρῆσιµων ἐχειν τὸ σῶμα) ; but the consideration of the immediate proximity of πεφικασὶν seems more in favour of the other.

ἰκανῶν] fit for, strong enough for, capable of.

ἄλυπον] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in consequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements incident to old age.

ἀν τὸ γῆρας λωβάται] i.e. ἐκείνων ἀ τὸ γῆρας λωβάται. This unusual and irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent, where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been the nominative to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, οὐδὲν καὶ εἰδότες τῶν ἥν... Thuc. VII 67 ἄφι ἄν ἡμῖν παρασκεύασαι. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 c ἐν τούτοις οἷς μελλεῖ ἐδεσθαι, de Rep. v 465 Θ, εὐδαμούζοντα ἐκεῖνω ἀν τούτων ὑπαρ-χεῖ. Dem. de Cor. p. 318, 19, § 277, ὦν ὦ ἄφι ἀ συμφέρει τῇ τίλλει χρῆται. And from Aristotle, this passage, and Rhet. I 2, 11, ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν. In Dem. c. Steph. p. 1116, περὶ ὧν μὴ κατηγόρησα λέγειν, which has been cited as an instance, κατηγόρηται is the irregular passive ἢ has been accused', and therefore περὶ ὧν need not be interpreted as περὶ ἐκείνων ἀ; it is for περὶ ἐκεῖνων περὶ ὧν. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262, τῶν δούσα τ᾽ αὐτῷ βυγατέρ. ἢν τ᾽ ἐγήματο, where Seidler retains this (the v.1.), and regards ἢν as a case of attraction for αὐτῷ ἢ. An analogous case of this kind of attraction is Sophocles' οἷα γ᾽ ἔμοι, Trach. 443, for οἷα ἐγώ ἐμι.

§ 12. ἵσχὺς] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and perfunctory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter—as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more definitely expressed in ἁγωνιατική ἀρτη—as the power of moving some one else (ἐτερον may possibly be neuter, something else, anything whatsoever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by 'lifting' him off the ground into the air; or, if ἐτερον be neuter, by lifting any heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing; which seems to be intended for
kinein èteron ós boûletai, ánâgkh de kineîn èteron ἡ ἐλκοντα ἡ ὁδοῦντα ἡ αἴροντα ἡ πιέζοντα ἡ συνθλῖβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἵσχυρός ἡ πάσιω ἡ τοῦτων τισὶν ἐστιν ἵσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετῇ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ μῖκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσοῦτω μείζονώ ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετῇ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἵσχύος καὶ τάχους: καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἵσχυρός ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ δύναμενος τὰ σκέλη μπτεῖν

a complete analysis of the different ways in which a person or thing can be ‘moved’ by another.

§ 13. meizoun] agrees with τινι understood after ἀρετῇ: the accusative meizōna, with τινι understood in τὸ ὑπερέχειν, would be more usual. Two MSS read meizōna. ‘Excellence in size’ implies superiority over the average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only so much greater as not to make the body’s motions (slower than they otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) too slow. Μῆκος, βάθος, and πλάτος are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body; μῆκος or βάθος might possibly represent the abstract height. I have taken μῆκος in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent the ‘stature’ of a man, and μάκιστος for ‘tallest’. Odys. Χ. 309, Otus and Ephialtes, οὗ δή μακάστου θρέψει ἔσχερος ἄρονια, and 312, ἀτάρ μῆκος γε γενεάθην ἐνεργομαι. ν’. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, μῆκος δ’ ἐπορ’.Ἀρτέμις ἄγνη, and in Xenoph. de Rep. Λ. 51, εἰς μῆκος συνάνωθαί τὰ σώματα. Μῆκος therefore is the man’s height, πλάτος the breadth of the body, measuring from right to left, and βάθος the depth or thickness, measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. Βάθος, though it can be applied to vertical measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary language it represents only what is below us, and not what is above, could hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a tall man.

§ 14. ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἵσχυος] for boxing and wrestling; τάχους, for the foot-race.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἵσχυρός ἔστιν] seems to be added as a mere passing observation, or note upon τάχους: and the γὰρ, which implies that this clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and speed as genus and species, speed being only a variety of strength, is the reason for the introduction of τάχος into the list of agonistic virtues: the fact being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.)
πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλιβεῖν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὀσαι τῇ πλήγῃ πυκτικός, ὁ δ′ ἀμφοτέρως τούτως παγκρατιστικός, 

15 ὁ δὲ πάσι πένταθλος. εὐγνηρία δ′ ἐστὶ βραδυτής γηρως μετ’ ἀλυπίας: οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὐγνη-

235. Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Αj. 239, p. 177. This distinction, which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. μπισείν 
tὰ σκέλη is to ‘toss about’ or ‘swing the legs’, backwards and forwards, again and again.

κινεῖν πόρρω] ‘to take long strides’.

ὀσαι τῇ πλήγῇ] in boxing, to push or thrust away from you by the blow, so as aliquem de statu devicere; as when you knock a man down.

ἀμφοτέρως τούτως] These two last, boxing and wrestling; not running. Supply therefore, in explanation of ἀμφοτέρως, ὀξίζειν καὶ κατέχειν, καὶ ὀσαι τῇ πλήγῇ δυνάμενον. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) quotes Plut. Symp. 4, ἔτι γὰρ μεμίκται τὸ παγκράτιον ἐκ τε πυγμᾶς καὶ πάλης, 

οἶνω, and Quint. Inst. Orat. II 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle’s statement. Other ancient authorities are given in Krause’s notes.

On the pancratium, and the size, strength, and skill required by those who engaged in it, see Krause, u. s. p. 534—538, abschn. vi § 41.

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Llegg. viii 832 E seq. ἔτι γοῦν πάντων πολεμικότατον ἡ σωματικὸς ὀξίτης πάντως, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν φυγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἐλείν ἡ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς (the pugilstion, and especially wrestling) μαχὴ καὶ σύντασσες ἅχυσος καὶ μὼμες δεηομένη.

§ 15. εὐγνηρία] supr. § 4, ‘fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness in old age’.

βραδυτής] ‘tardiness’, i.e. slow approach or progress.

εὐγνηρος] occurs under the form εὐγγνηρος in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. Ανιμ. ΙΧ 12, 3.

1 Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the MSS readings, the distinction of the two forms of the verb being shown in most cases merely by the difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by either form. At the same time in the somewhat obscure summing up at the conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of a verb radically the same (he cites ἀλλω or ἄλλω and its numerous varieties as a remarkable instance) does express a corresponding variety in the signification; as in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of the general notion of ‘rolling’. 
§ 16. 

ρξε, οὐτ' εἰ μόνις μὲν λυπηρῶς δὲ. έστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης· μὴ ἁνοσός γὰρ ὃν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθὴς, οὐδ' ἀλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος ἐστιν τύχης διαμείνειν ἄν. ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ χωρίς ἰσχύος καὶ υγείας ἀλλα δύναμις μακροβιότητος· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακροβίοι εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ἀκριβολογία 16 χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰσ τὰ νῦν. πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα τοῦ φίλου ὁρισμένου, ὅτι ἕστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὁς οἶς, ἀ ὄντα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι

ἀνευ τύχης] in Muretus’ excellent emendation of v. 1. ἄν εὐτυχίς.

ἔστι δὲ τις κ.τ.λ.] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants and animals are further investigated in the little treatise περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, in the collection of tracts called the Parva Naturalia, appended to the work περὶ ψυχῆς. They all belong to the ‘Physical’ department of philosophy. π. μ. καὶ βρ. I § 4.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ἀκριβολογία κ.τ.λ.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless to the rhetorician. On the various senses of ἀκριβεία, see Grant on Eth. Nic. I 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhetoric, Introd. on the ‘materials of Rhetoric’, p. 11—14.

§ 16. ἕστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος κ.τ.λ.] ‘all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person’ (ἐκεῖνο, some one in particular, that particular person, whoever it may be) ‘are inclined to do it for his sake’. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is ‘rhetorical’, and does not give the ‘essence’ of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of φιλία as a πάθος, 11 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, viii 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθα ἐκείνον ἑνεκα. Accordingly φιλία is εὐνοα ἐν ἀντιπεποθήσι, reciprocal goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true φιλία or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be ‘fond’ of wine, φιλωμον, or ‘fond’ of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since ‘fondness’ is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding ‘friendships’ or ‘fondnesses’ are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently
the highest and perfect form of ‘love’ can only exist between the good, 
where one of the good objects is the good of the other. This is therefore the general conception of 
love according to Aristotle. The highest three forms of human love or friendship would be ευπαθεία, εύσυνεία, and ευγνώσθεια.

εύσυνεία] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

§ 17. ευγνώσθεια] ‘good fortune or luck’, accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to ευδαιμονία, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its αυτόπεφευμία or independence of all accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. II 5 (Bekk.), 1097 d 6 seq. X 7, 1176 a 27 (on theoretical as the highest happiness). Polit. IV (vii). I, 1323 b 23, καθαρά του θεού χρονίων, δι’ ευδαιμόνες μεν ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, δι’ αὐθεν δὲ τῶν ἐν θεοτέρων ἀγαθῶν ἄλλα δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τις εἰναι τὴν φύσιν, ἔπει καὶ τὶν εὐγνώσθειαν τῆς ευδαιμονίας διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαίον ἐτέραν εἰναι τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν αὐτῶν ταυτόμονα καὶ τῇ τύχῃ, δικαίου δ’ αὐθείας οὐδὲ σώφρον ἀπὸ τῇ τύχῃ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστὶ. Eur. Med. 1229, ὅλου δ’ ἐπιρροέντος εὐγνώσθειρος ἄλλοις γειτονὶ αὐτὸς ἀλλος, ευδαιμόνες δ’ ἂν αὐτὸς, where Paley quotes. Troad. 509, τῶν δ’ ευδαιμόνων μηδεὶς νόμιζε εὐγνώσθειρι πρὶν ἂν διαφ., explaining the distinction; and Androm. 420, ἰσον αὐτῷ δι’ αὐθείας δυστυχών δ’ ευδαιμονεῖ.


γίγνεσθαι καὶ υπάρχειν] ‘acquisition or possession’. As in this and similar cases is properly rendered by ‘or’. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly represent as an alternative.


1 καὶ τρῶσιν τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τύχη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησι, τέχνη τέχνην, κ.τ.λ.
RΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ A 5 § 17.

μὲν ὁν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὁσῶν ἡ φύσις. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι· ύψειας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγων ἁγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλὸς, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὃ δ’ εὗρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἐτυχε τὸ βέλος, τοῦτον δὲ μὴ, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος αἰεὶ φοιτῶν, οὗ δὲ ἴναι. These are illustrated in the text by two examples; health, which may be due to chance as well as art; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature.

ἀτέχνων] 'independent of art'.

οἷον ὁσῶν ἡ φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u. s., p. 223.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. § 14), 'chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal', τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα: on which see the reff. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. of φύσις in I 10, 13, δοξεῖ δ’ ἄν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τουτών, i.e. τῶν παρὰ φύσιν. In this case the colon should be retained after εἶναι, the connexion being carried on from οἷον ὁσῶν ἡ φύσις to ὑψείας μὲν κ.τ.λ. as examples, ὡν αἱ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία, and the note parenthetical.

Bonitz, however, Aristotel. Stud. I 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at εἶναι, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, 'of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature': regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of 'not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members', illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 b 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, 'quae natura efficientur, ita tamen ut etiam praeuter naturam evenire possint.'

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation: and the practice of introducing 'notes' of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by Bonitz.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγων ἁγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] Phys. 197 a 18, καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθός· ο γὰρ λόγος ἡ τῶν αἰεὶ όντων ἡ τῶν ἀν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γεγομένοις παρὰ ταύτα· ὁσ’ ἐπεὶδ’ ἄριστα τὰ του· αὐτα, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἄριστος. See further in Introd. p. 221.

τοῦ πλησίου] ὁτὸς, ἵσταμένος, 'one’s next neighbour', as ὁ πέλας. In Plat, Theact. 174 c, it is distinguished from γεῖτων, ὁ πλησίων καὶ ὁ γεῖτων, having a more extended and general sense, 'a fellow-creature'.

ἢ εἰ μὴ ἢ ἦλθε μόνος αἰεὶ φοιτῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'Or if one who was in the constant
habit of visiting a certain place' (φωτάν, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) 'was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (απαξ, once for all) all perished'. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination ἅν may be the origin of the other signification of 'disease' illustrated on the word πνευστάων, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.

§ 18. ἄτοιν περὶ ἐπαίνου κ.τ.λ.] i.e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic branch of Rhetoric.

CHAP. VI.

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177.

§ 1. ἡ ὑπαρχόντων] On this addition over and above the theory, see note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120.

βουλεύονται δὲ...τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12, βουλεύονται ὑπαρχόντων δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τέλων ἄλλα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. Βουλεύονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, 1112 a 31, ὥσα γίνεται δὲ ἡμῶν...περὶ τουτών βουλεύομεθα, 1b. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὕτε γὰρ ιατρός βουλεύεται εἰ ψύχασε, οὕτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὕτε πολιτικὸς εἰ ευνούχων ποιήσει, οὕτε τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν τέλων: ἄλλα θέματα τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, κ.τ.λ. 1b. b 34, οὐκ ἂν ὅν ἐν ἐν θεόν βουλεύοντο τὸ τέλος, ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i.e. τόπους, the 'Elements', the primary topics of the subject 'good'. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

ἀπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἀπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract
conception, opposed to καθ’ ἕκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering extra comparationem, if it means, as it seems to do, 'absolute good,' 'good in itself,' opposed to 'relative' or 'human good'—that which cannot be compared with, i.e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 'Absolute good' can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

§ 2. έστω δὴ ἄγαθον κ.τ.λ.] The 'popular' character of these definitions is marked by the introductory έστω, 'let it be taken for granted'; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, έστω δὴ ύπέρεχου κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and to § 3.

First, 'Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ultimate end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either for something or' (as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) 'everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to acquire the reasoning faculty' (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, ὁ λαξύντα τα πράγματα (anything) φρόνησιν ἔλουτ' ἀν ἕκαστον.\(^1\)

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as that to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Every thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξεις τε καὶ προαιρεσις, ἄγαθον τῶν ἐφιεσθαὶ δοκεῖ: διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφθάνω (it is a current, popular, definition of) τάγαθων, οὐ παντ' ἐφιεσται—εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δὲ δὲ αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τάλα ὡς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο (the means to the universal end) καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἄτερων αἰσθημάτων, (there is something, i.e. Good, which we desire only for itself,...δῆλον ὡς τούτ' ἀν ἔι τάγαθων καὶ τὸ ἓρματον, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ ἐναι δοκοῦντο ἄγαθον

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The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 ε, seq. particularly 54 c, where good is proved to be the ὁ ἐνεκά, or universal end. Sympos. 205 λ, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 ε, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασών τῶν πρᾶξεων τὸ ἄγαθον, καὶ ἐκείνου ἐνέκει δέν πάντα τάλλα πράττεσθαι, ἄλλος ἐκείνο τῶν ἄλλων. Eur. c. 8, 278 ε, seq.

καὶ ὁσα ὁ νοῦς κτ.λ.] 1 And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, that is good to every human being. That is, all that this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates general principles or rules of action, as contrasted with ὁ νοῦς ὁ περὶ ἐκαστῶν, mens quaer de singularibus decernit, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. ὁ νοῦς stands here in a general sense for the special faculty or part of it φύσις1, the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. vi. νοῦς in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the διάνοια or discursive intellect, and its special virtue φύσις or practical wisdom.

1 Or that, by the presence of which anything not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best for it to be) and made self-sufficient (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general. On αὐτάρκεια see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, αὐτάρκεια φύσις. It is thus briefly defined Pol. iv (vii) 5, init. τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχει καὶ δείσθαι μηθένως.

Or anything that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἄγαθά, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. i 4, 1096 b 10, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν ἐνδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμεναι καὶ ἀγαπώμεναι, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἡ φυλακτικὰ ποι ἡ τῶν ἐνατίον κολυτικά διὰ τὰ τὰ τὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

1 This is actually substituted for νοῦς in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21.
\\ \(\text{§ 3. } \text{άκολουθεί } \text{δὲ } \text{διχώς}}\) \text{`the term attending } \text{upon admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously'}^{1} \text{. } \text{άκολουθεί} \text{ and } \text{έποσθα} \text{ are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a `consequence' in the ordinary acceptance of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γὰρ πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον ἑπεται, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρῶτον ἑτέρον ἑτέρον λέγεται τετραχῶς. . . .δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἰναι ἀκολουθῆσαι, οἶνον τὸ ἐν τῶν δύο πρῶτον` δύοι μὲν γὰρ ὑστῶν ἄκολουθεὶ εὕθως τὸ ἐν εἰναί, κ.τ.λ. (2) a simultaneous concomitant, ἀμα: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a subsequent concomitant, or `consequent', ύστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. II. cc. (4) δυνάμει, a virtual concomitant, by implication, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes potentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule ομνε μαίου continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contradictories regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 b 25, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολούθησιν, οἱ πρὸς ἀντίκειτο ἀντικειμενίους, where two terms or propositions are `convertible', ἀντιστρέφει: such are ὁ ἀνθρώποι ἥον, and τὸ μὴ ἥον οἷς ἀνθρώποι: τὸ μὴ ἥον οὐ καλὸν, and τὸ καλὸν ήδο. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἄκολουθεὶν were to attend or wait upon, and that that of `following' is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἄκολουθος becomes πεδίσεχεμια, a constant attendant, footman, or `follower'. The `simultaneous' kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἄκολουθεί μετ' ἑμοῦ, Lach. 187 D, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄκολουθῶν: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σῖν. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχουσα πάντας ἄλλην, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. `Ponit tres species rerum conscientium quae ita distinguere possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a

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1 So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 75. Sed hoc consequentia dico, ἄκολουθα; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura...hoc temporis, illud naturae.
The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is to ύγιανεων, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by ύγιεια, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 a 4, ἕπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (αὐτὰ αἱ ἀρτεῖ) οὐχ ὡς ἠστρυκυ ύγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ύγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εἰδανυμοίναν' μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς όλης ὀρέτης τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμονία. Here ύγίεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (μέρος, ἔχεσθαι), and develops, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (ἐνεργεία), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ἤτεί. The second passage, X 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration: οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ἡ ἴδου τελείῳ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ ἀισθησία, σπουδαία οὖν, ὄσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ύγίεια καὶ ὁ ἠστρυκυ ρώμοις αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τῶν ύγιάνεων: on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὕσα (i. e. ἐνεργεία, not 'non-existent') τὴν τῶν ύγιάνεων ἐνεργείαν, ὃ δὲ συντηρεῖ κ.τ.λ. as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health ἐπὶ τῷ πολύ.

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; τούτων δὲ κειμένων κ.τ.λ. Application of the two topics of 'consequents', ἁμα and ύστερον ἀκολουθεῖν: the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is followed by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied simul taneously by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, ὃ τὸ εἰναντίον κακῶν, τούτ', ἁμαθῶν. Comp. also Top. I 2, 117 b 2, on λήψεις καὶ ἀποθελαί.

§ 5. ὃ γάρ ἐπερέχει κ.τ.λ.] 'for the amount of the excess of the greater
§ 6. Ποιητικαὶ...καὶ πρακτικαὶ virtues, besides being ‘productive of good’, like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by _action_. The distinction is, that whereas ποιεῖν tends to some ἐργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of πρατεῖν is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two τέλη. Ethics and Rhetoric are πρακτικά τέχναι, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικαί. Compare Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially ‘practical’ character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, _some_ of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some _positive benefit_ (as an ἐργον) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 §§ 3, 16; 6 § 2. Of the two, ποιητικὸς is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their actions and the results of these.

‘Each of them, its substance or true nature’ (the first Category, τὶ ἐστὶ, οὐσία, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), ‘and qualities’ (the third Category), ‘must be treated separately, ἄρα ἐστὶ, apart’. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἀρεταὶ are here confined to the ἰδικαὶ or moral virtues, the ‘virtues’ _par excellence_, and do not include physical, or any other, ‘excellences’.

§ 7. καὶ τὴν ἰδικὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily the good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus
and Plato, examined, Bk. vii, c. 12. seq. and x, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. x) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not the good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are some pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη ὁν τὴν ἱδονὴν ἁγαθοῦ τι εἶναι, and three lines further, ἀριστον τ' οὐδὲν καλεῖ ἱδονὴν τινα εἶναι. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταύτα μή εἶναι ἁγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστον, ἕκ τούτῳ δήλων. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. vii) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελείωσις) of the ἐνέργεια, but not our ἐνέργεια itself, and therefore not 'the supreme good'; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an 'unimpeded energy', ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See vii 14 init. and x 2, 1172 b 35, οἷς δὲ ἐνστάσεις ὅσον οὐκ ἁγαθῶν οὐ πάντα ἐφιεται. μή οἷς θεὸς λέγων τ' ἁγαθὸν πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φαρμακίν.

tὸν δὲ καλὸν τὰ μὲν ἱδεὶ τὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] This division of καλὸν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλὸν as ἱδὲν, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ' αὐτῷ αἱρέτων we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is 'fair' and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9. 3, δ' ἢ δ' αὐτῷ αἱρέτων ἢ ἐπαινετῶν ἦ (its being the object of praise 'confers upon it its moral character) ἢ δ' ἢ δ' ἁγαθὸν ἢ δ' ἱδονὴν, ὅτι ἁγαθὸν. Comp. ii 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβρέχων αὐτῷ ἁγαθῶν ἐστὶν. τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἅπατος. Eth. Eudem. vii 15, 3, 1248 b 18, τὸν γὰρ ἁγαθὸν πάντων τελεία ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα ἐστίν αἱρετὰ. τοῦτων δὲ καλὰ, ὅσα δὲ αὐτά τὰ πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν. On the καλὸν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. ix 8, 1169 a 6, seq., particularly 20—27.

§ 8. ὁς δὲ καθ' ἐν εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν 'to describe good things singly', in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

αὐδαμοσία] happiness, the universal τέλος, aim and end of life and
9 καὶ ἑνεκα αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἱροῦμεθα. δικαίοσύνη, ἀν-
δρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ
10 αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τουίαται ἐξεῖς· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ
ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τουίατα· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώμα-
action. See especially Eth. Nic. I 5, where happiness is defined by its
three principal characteristics; it must be τελειοι, αὐταρκες, τὸ τῶν πρακ-
τῶν τέλος. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given
in the Rhetoric: τελειοι corresponds to τὸ καθ’ αὐτό αἱρετῶν, its perfection
or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake.
Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 31, τελειώτερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δὲ
ἐτερον, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δὲ ἄλλο αἱρετῶν τῶν καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοὺθ αἱ-
ρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τελειον τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν αὐτὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δὲ ἄλλο.
τοιοῦτον δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκεῖ ταύτην γὰρ αἱροῦμεθα δὲ αὐτὴν
καὶ οὐδέποτε δὲ ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἱδονὴν καὶ νοον καὶ πάσαν ἀρετὴν αἱροῦμεθα
μὲν καὶ δὲ αὐτὰ...αιροῦμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμ-
βάνοντες εὐδαιμονίσησιν. τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρετὰ τοιοῦτον χάριν, οὐθ’
ἄλος δὲ ἄλλο: note on c. 5 § 1, p. 72. On αὐταρκεια, the second characteristic
of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic.
I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject.
The concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, τελειοι δὴ τι φαί-
νεται καὶ αὐταρκείς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος, which gives the
third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description
of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. x, cc. 6 and 7.

§ 9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere
extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself any-
thing but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list
is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues,
σοφία and φρόνησις, but still omits several of those which are distin-
guished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are
analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at
great length in the fifth book.

ἔξεις, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed,
confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three,
of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to διάθεσις, as a
settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable dis-
position. It is developed out of the πάθη by the operation of ἔθος, habit or
association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a con-
firmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar
evγείας, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency
to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the ἔξεις,
see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, E.s. on
Ethics, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. de Anima
p. 311, and 366. Kategorienlehre, p. 95.

§ 10. ὑγίεια...ἀριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι] This is one of many opinions.
So the ‘Delian inscription’, quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. I 9, and Eude-
mus, Eth. Eud. I 1, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255
(Bergk), καλλιστον τὸ δικαίοτατον, λάστον δ’ ὑγιάνειν | ἱδιστον δὲ πέφυκ’ οὔ
The distinction between these two is stated in note on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only ‘pleasant’ and therefore good in them-
καὶ γὰρ ἠδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ 14 αὐτοῖς ως ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ύπάρχειν ἐφ’ οἷς τιμῶνται. δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν: ποιη-
τικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εὐφυία,
selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them
from the respect of others, and so ‘good’ in this secondary or subordinate
sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ἀυτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] ‘and they are accompanied for the most
part by the actual possession of the things’ (natural gifts, qualities, accom-
plishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and
such like) ‘which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply’,
ἐφ’ οἷς τιμῶνται, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they
receive the honour paid, or ‘on which the honours paid them rest, are
grounded, or based’. ἐφ’ οἷς τ. might possibly be rendered ‘for which
they (the honour and reputation) are valued’; on which their value
depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems
more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when
honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that
a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expres-
sion of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended
on as true. With τὸ ύπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar,
must be supplied.

§ 15. εὐφυία] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or
both; εὐφυὴς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph.
El. c. 1, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυεστατος applied to ‘a topic’, in the sense
(apparently) of ‘naturally best adapted to a certain purpose’. And
in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφυία
tόπων occurs to denote the ‘natural advantages of situation’, opportunitatis
locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the
mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intel-
lectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχίσων. And so, infr. § 29 and II
15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληροσαρκοὶ ἀφνεῖς τὴν
dιάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφνεῖς. Top. Γ 2, 118 a 22, φιλοποιεῖν ἄρνου-
μεθα ἐν εὐφνείς εἶναι δοκόμεν, ‘we deny that we are industrious in order to
gain the reputation of cleverness’. In Top. Θ 14, 163 b 13, ἢ κατ’ ἀλή-
θειαν εὐφυία is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύναμαι καλὸν ἐλεύθε-
ρα τολμῆσαι καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεύδος: ὅπερ οἱ περικόπτες εὐ δύναντας ποιεῖν. In Eth.
Nic. III 7, 1114 b 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming
rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοῦτο περικόπτει ή τελεία καὶ
ἀληθῆ ἂν εὖ εὐφυία. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for
readiness in poetical invention. ἀφνῆς, the opposite, is ‘dull’ and
’supid’, Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic ὁροι, p. 413 D, it is defined,
tάχος μαθησῶς· γέννησις φύσεως ἀγαθή· ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει.

1 This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the
ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines
of his philosophy.
μνήμαι, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχύνοια, πάντα τα τοιαύτα: ποιητικά γὰρ αὐταὶ ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ 16 καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ ζήν· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίητο ἀγαθὸν, καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν ἔστιν· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον’ συμφέρον γὰρ τι κοινὴ ἔστιν.

Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Trans. of Vienna Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 103) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the faculty of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is ἀναμνήσεις, 'acts of recollection', de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσκυνήσεις and ἐκκαταστάσεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, μάθημα, ἀποψία, ἀμφελεία. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, ἐν τοῖς ὑπόνοια, I 1, 1103 b 19, τὰς ὀργὰς, 2, 1104 a 27, γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί, b 25 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τιμαί καὶ ἡμιαί. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, ἐλαυνεῖας τι καὶ πνευματικά καὶ δουλεία. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation thereof. Μνήμαι therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, Index Aristotelicius. 8.]

eὐμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὐφυῖα πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὐφυῖα ψυχῆς πρὸς τίχος μαθήσεως. "Ὅροι Platon. 413 D.

ἀγχύνοια] 'ready wit', 'quickness of apprehension', is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐβουλία (right judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφυῖα ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἐν ὧν ἐξων στοιχαστικός ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ τοῦ δεόντος’ ὀξύτης νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an intellectual (not moral) 'presence of mind', the faculty of seeing the point at once, or 'ready wit'. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ὑσκέπτῳ χρίνῳ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μέσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), οἷον εἰ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ τελείη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἐχεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἱλιον, ταχύν ἐνόησε διὰ τὸ τούτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱλιον’ ἡ διαλεγόμενον πλονοσίω ἐγὼ διὸτι δανείζεται’ ἡ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, readiness of apprehension, ταχύν ἐνόησε.

eἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κτ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, τὸ ζήν, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly 'productive of good', and rest their claims upon that alone.

§ 16. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κτ.λ.] The argument is, justice is κοινῆ συμφέρον, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of τὸ δίκαιον: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1,
§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of doubtful good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. συλλογισμός here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

§ 18. ὧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακῶν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθῶν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places amongst the topics which are ‘open to question’. So Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet (this does not hold) is the ‘redargutio’, in isis rebus quin vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt. Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon’s Works, ed. Ellis and Speeding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. 11 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ άκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἢ δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς άκραις. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 b 36, ἐναντίον δὲ ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν μὲν κακῶν τοῦτο δὲ δήλων τῇ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑμεῖα νόσος καὶ ἀνθρώπων δείδει, ὅμοιος δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, κακὸς δὲ ὑπ’ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὡτε δὲ κακὸν τῇ γὰρ ἐνδεία κακὸν ὑπ’ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακῶν ὧν ὁμοίως δέ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἐκατέρθη, οὐσα ἁγαθὸν. ἐπ’ ὀλίγων δ’ ἄν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδου τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 14 a 19, ἀνάγκῃ δὲ πάντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἰμι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένει εἰμι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστων ἐν γένει, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένει τῶν ὄντων. Cic. Topic. XI 47, deinceps locus est qui a contrario dictur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in codem genere plurimum different (Aristotle’s ἐναντία, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaeam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumantia talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem si malitiam. The dialectical topics of τὰ ἐναντία, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στέρησις, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Colours of Good
and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, hominum. 

§ 19. Victorious quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum educit hac de re posset indicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficeret posset, ocideret...Idemne igitur defecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimis atque sapientissimi viri indicabant quod illae importunissimae gladiator hostis republicae indicaret?

οὐ εὖντίον] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction ὄ ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἕτερος, ἄλλος, διάφορος, διαφερέων, διαφέροντως, ἄλλοις, ἄλλοτρος. See for examples Matth. Gr. Gr. 366, on ἐναντίον, Obs. 2.


ἐστι δ' οὐκ ἄτιοτο κτ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, happens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has often this effect of 'bringing' enemies 'together', or uniting them, as when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐξῆσθατος οἱ κοινοὶ φίλοις, Polit. viii (v), sub init. 'Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows', says Trinculo in the Tempest (Act ii Sc. 2), which illustrates the present. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common interests that produce sympathy, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, because in the given case the common danger had altered their original relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and antipathies.
**RHETORIKHΣ Α 6 §§ 21—23.**

21 ὅταν ἦ ταῦτά βλαβερόν ἀμφοῖν. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἂν ἦ μεῖζον ἦ δεῖ 

22 κακόν, καὶ οὐ ἑνεκά πολλά πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται: 

καὶ ἂν ἀγαθόν ἦδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν. ὂθεν ταῦτ’ εἰρήται, 

καὶ 

αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν: 

23 καὶ ἡ παρομία δε’, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τήν ὑδρίαν. καὶ οὐ 

§ 21. οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή] ‘that which does not admit of excess’, health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a mean state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which does admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no ‘good’.

§ 22. πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται] ‘much labour or expense has been incurred’.

Ηδη] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 ‘already’, for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shews already, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it seems at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an end to us, and all ends are good. ἀγαθόν, οὐ ἐφεσται πάντα, 6, 2. 

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν] because ‘every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in every case’. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from II. B 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the ‘boast to Priam’ is not in point. The lines applicable are these: ἄποιετε Ἀργεῖν Ἑλένην, ἦς εἰνεκά πολλοί Ἀχιλῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀπόλυτον φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αῖνη. The second line, αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν κενοῦ τε νέοσθα, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2, 6 (of the result of his son’s studies at Athens), ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis propectus, inanem redire turpissimum est.

§ 23. καὶ ἡ παρομία δε] This δὲ, introduced after καὶ—always (except in Epic poetry, II. Ψ 80, καὶ δὲ σοι αὐτῷ μοῦρά, Odys. π’ 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μέν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μέν implied in δὲ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δὲ in μέν, Don. New Crat. § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δὲ here may
The proverb, τὸ ἐπὶ θύρας τὴν υδριάν, 'to drop' or break the pitcher at the door,' after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of 'lost labour,' 'labour thrown away.' Erasmus, Adagia, p. 350, in foribus urceum, misinterprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλύνειν πλέων, laterem lavare (Terent. Phorm. i 4, 9) 'to try to make a red brick white.'

1 In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of break: if καταγνέναι ἱππαν (Pl. Phaed. 85 A) is to break a lyre, it is equally applicable to a pitcher. But when we try to render 'to drop' by a word exactly corresponding (ἀντίστροφος in its primary sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous Greek words (that I could think of), βαλλειν, μπετειν, εἶν ('to let go,' but intentionally), χων, and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the same vice, in respect of the representation of the word 'to drop,' viz. that they all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas drop is applied to an accidental and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an action at all. The notion may not be doubted expressed by a circumlocution, of which the Homeric ἐκπεσε, or ἐκψενε, χειρός (said however of the object, not the subject), comp. Lat. fugere, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the subject) περιτραβῇ τὶ πιπτὼν or πτιτειν, or (of the object) λαμβάνειν πετσόν. But these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek language has no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less surprising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency; the periphrasis laisser tomber being made to supply the place of 'to drop.' ἐκχεῖν, Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a conscious and intentional act. δλόγοι...ἐκπεσών οἰχήστται, Plat. Phileb. 13 b.
γὰρ πάντες ἐφίευται, τούτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
24 ὡσπερ πάντες φαινονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετὸν· ουδεὶς
γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἔχθροι [καὶ οἱ
φαύλοι] ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἦδη ὀμολο-
by washing it'. Thuc. Id. xvi 62, ἦνδατι νίχεων θυλερῶν ιοιεῖδει πλύθουσ', and answering to our 'washing a blackamoor white'. Compare also Eur. Iph. Taur. 116, οὐτοὶ μακρῶν μὲν ἠλθομεν καπη πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ 
νόστων ἀρούμεν πάλιν.

περιμάχητον φαίνομεν] 'apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with φαίνομαι in this sense, comp. ii 2, 1, bis) an object of contention'.

τοῦτ'] ἀγαθὸν ἦν] 'this is, as was said', i.e. in § 2. This use of the imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require no illustration.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ...φαινονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as convincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof to them that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, § 2, that it is the universal object of human aims: the sanction of 'the many' is as good as an universal admission.

§ 24. τὸ ἐπαινετὸν] The proper object of ἐπανος is virtue, any kind of practical excellence; ἐστὶ δ' ἐπανος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς, Rhet. I 9, 33. On ἐπανος as the test of virtue and the distinction of this from ἐγκώμιον and εὐθαμοσμός, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. I ch. 9, p. 212 seq. It is there said that ἐπανος and ψόγος are the equivalents of Butler's 'moral approbation and disapprobation'. This requires some qualification. When the 'intellectual' virtues are included as the objects of ἐπανος, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. ii 1. 18, the approbation loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. i 12, Aristotle together with the moral virtues, justice, courage, 'goodness' in general, includes also as objects of praise all kinds of ἀρετῆ or excellence, such as strength and swiftness, which are manifested in action.

καὶ οἱ ἔχθροι καὶ οἱ φαύλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. xi 282, Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. The prowess of Aeneas could not be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy Diomedes.

καὶ οἱ φαύλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed in the explanatory commentary that follows, ὡσπερ γὰρ—πεπονθότες.

1 θυλερῶν πλύθουν is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when it is washed.
γοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῦει ἂν, ὀσπέρ καὶ φαύλου οὐς οἱ φίλοι

Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the 'worthless and contemptible', φαύλου, who are least likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon actions—a fortiori it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

ὀσπέρ γὰρ πάντες ἡδή ὁμολογοῦσιν] 'for this is now as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission'. ἡδή, 'by this time', now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if they approve, all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερῶν...τὸ Ἐλιον] There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, ὀσπέρ καὶ... ἐπανώνων, and the example (from Simonides) which is said, δῶ, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is not an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best ms Λ*. This omits the words οὐς οἱ φίλοι φέγγουσι καὶ ἀγάθου, without which the sense is clear and consistent. 'For it must be owing to its being evident that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as' (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) 'those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless', (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule. 'And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, 'Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians' (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides' expressions: his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. xiii p. 78, who cites it, has μιμεῖται (?) for μεριφέται; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. 1 sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), ό Σιμωνίδης ἡρῴ τοῖς Κορίνθιοις οὐ μηνεῖν τὸ Ἐλιον ἐπιστρατεύσαι μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ὅτι κάκεινος οἱ περὶ Γλαύκων ἦ ἡρῴς Κορίνθιοι γεγονότες συνεχάσαν προβήγμως. Homer only says, II. 152 seq., that Glauclus himself attributed his origin to
ψίγνουσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὦς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. διὸ λελοιδορήθαι υπέλαβον Κορινθιοὶ ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοι δ' οὖ μέμφεται τὸ 'Ἰλιον. 25 καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οὗ Ὀδυσσέα 'Αθηνᾶ καὶ 'Ελένην Ἐθσένας καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἰ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλεᾶς Ὀμηρος. 26 καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρέται προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν

Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was 'not wroth', or 'found no fault', with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an insult: and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

§ 25. Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of 'authority' see 1 15, where it is exemplified under the head of 'witnesses', §§ 13 and 15. The φρονίμος, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the 'artist' or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ὀρθὸς λόγος, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a μεσότης...ἀρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἄν ὁ φρονίμος ὀρίσειν. Eth. N. II 6, init.

ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. XI 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. IX 4, 1166 a 12, μέτρον ἐκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος. III 6, 1113 a 32, διαφέρει πλείστων ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ὄρμον, ὁσπερ κανὸν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄρν. 

προέκρινεν] 'decided, distinguished by preference'. Ἐθσένας] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, παντελὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτησάμενον, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much cultured lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

§ 26. τὰ προαιρέται] 'objects of deliberate and voluntary choice'. The προαιρέσεις seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρέσεως and προαιρέσεις are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as 1 2, init. ἐπειδὴ πάσα γνώσις καὶ προαιρέσεις ἀγαθῶν τῶν ὀρέγεται. προαιρέσεις is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βολευτικὴ ὀρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἥμιν, 'an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed

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to things within our power'—no one deliberates about things beyond his power, oi'de'n yap pléon. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ἡ προαίρεσις κοινῶν διανοιας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητὸν, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ πάν \[ \text{de to diainoητων allα των πρακτων τελος. Thus the προαίρεσις is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong.} \]

1. Though the προαίρεσις in its general and wider signification of 'deliberate, voluntary purpose' is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is moral action alone that it originates and determines, οικετύτατων γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ὀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ σθη κρίνει τῶν πράξεων, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 b 31, οὐ γὰρ ἢ εἰ τῇ προαιρεσεί αὑραυ αἰτία τῶν ἀκοιμεσσον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθρείας. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be 'a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose'. The principal passages on the subject of προαιρεσεις are Eth. Nic. III cc, 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and ὕμη, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βουλήσις, βούλευσις and δύνα, on the other: ib. vi 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοίς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are ἄ ἀπεχθησατα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. 'This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. 1 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοίς ἐχθροῖς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάσσεσθαι τὸ τε γὰρ ἀνταποδίδωσι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρεῖον τὸ μὴ ἤττασθαι. III 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. 1 (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, ὅτι δὲ πολεμίους ὀράσαν κακῶς βλέπε τις, οὐδεὶς ἑπιμονῆς κείεαι νόμος. Med. 808, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φιλῶσιν εὐμενὶς κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Off. 17, Instillectum primum manus est ut ne cui quis noccat, nisi lacesstibus iniuria.

§ 27. ταυτα, sc. τὰ δυνατά. ——τὰ γεγονόμενα ἢν καὶ τὰ μήδεις γεγονόμενα.] Two kinds of possibilities; 'things which might' (οὐ, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) 'be brought to pass, and those which are easily attained'.
The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. II 36, 160. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of facilis.) Atque in istis omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit oportet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficillatibus, tamen, his suscepitis difficultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum perduci potest: an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

to γὰρ χαλεπῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'facility' is defined by the absence of pain or laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything or getting anything done, because difficulty is defined by the opposites.

όριζεται ἡ λύτη ἡ πλήθει χρόνων] A various reading in several of the earlier Editions is λύτη ἡ πλήθος. In this case ὀρίζεται is the middle voice, as it usually is in the sense of 'defining'. ὀρίζεσθαι however, as a passive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23, ὀρίζεται εἰκαστον τῷ τέλει, ib. IX 8, 1168 b 5, πάνθ' ὀς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται, Pol. VII (vi) 2, 1317 b 39, ὀλιγαρχία γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται, Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I 1, 6, ἢ μὲν ἀνομοίωτης ὀρίζεται σχῆματι χρόματι κ.τ.λ. It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from neuter verbs, the act of ὀρίζεων being transitive.

καὶ ἐὰν ὁς βούλοντα] sc. γενήσατι τι (οτὶ τά πράγματα) ἄγαθον ἐσται, 'anything that turns out as they desire'; any result, either of their own acts, or of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, 'nescio an in ὁς ἀν βούλοντα] (a various reading) 'lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, δο' ἀν βούλοντα.] This is not so suitable to what follows.] 'but what they do like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this (the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either unfelt (ἀναβάνη, escapes your notice, not the notice of others,) or trifling'. In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

§ 28. καὶ τὰ ἴδια] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, or accomplishments: anything that distinguishes a man from the mass. Of the three kinds of ἴδια distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (ὃν proper, the fourth predicable, prōprium), these are ἴδια ἄπλως; the second, are not absolutely and at all times ἴδια, but only at particular times, under particular circumstances of time, ποτὲ; the third class, to which those
πιμὴ γὰρ οὔτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύνα-
here spoken of belong, are ‘relative’ ἱδια, ἱδια πρὸς τι, special and peculiar, i.e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ἀ μηδείς (ἄλλος ἔχει)] This is only a particular case of the preceding: in that the advantage is shared by few, in this the possessor stands alone. Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 ὁ 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινῶν οὐκ ἀγα-
θῶν. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλο-
tιμοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκείον ἔστιν’ ὁ γὰρ φιλοτιμὸς ἔστιν ὁ μόνος βουλό-
μενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν.

περιττὰ] ‘things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished’ amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, ‘for by this they obtain greater credit’. περιττός is ‘odd’, singular, striking, remarkable’. From peri, ‘over and above’, ‘exceeding’, (Homer, peri ὁ ἄλλον φαινεται γενεσθαι, peri μὲν Δαναοῦν,) the derivative περιττός passes into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 a 10, in the well-known passage on Plato’s style, Ib. VIII (v) 10, 1312 a 27, πρᾶξεως περιττῆς (extraordinary, signal) καὶ δὴ ὑψιματος γίγνονται καὶ γραμμικῶν ταῖς ἄλλοις, ib. II 8 init. of Hippo-
damus of Miletus, that he became περιττότερος ‘rather odd, eccentric, extravagant’, in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 b 13, ἀκριβῆς καὶ περιττῆ διάνοια. Metaph. 1 2, 1053 b 3, of Protagoras’ dictum, (πάντων μέτρων ἄθρωτος), οὐθὲν δὴ λέγων περιττῶν φαίνεται τί λέγειν, Rhct. II 15, 3, Probl. XXX 1 init. περιττοὶ (‘distinguished’ in any art or science) φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες. (Waitz, on Top. P 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, bis, sub init. et sub fin. From peri again, in the sense of ‘over and above, exceeding’, comes περιττός as applied to an ‘odd’ number; the suppo-
sition on which the name is based being, that the ἀρίτιος ἄριθμος, or even number, was the primary number—2 was in fact considered as the first arithmetical number, 1 being the principle of unity—the odd number is an addition to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9, 25, 26, under the head of καλῶν. As ‘goods’ they are in fact all of them of the specially ‘questionable’ sort’, ἀμφιασθησίμαι; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἀρμόττοντα] ‘suitable, appropriate’, specially applicable or belong-
ing to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] ‘things that naturally belong to them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power’.

1 ‘Odd’ in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. ‘For our tyme the oddle man to performe three perftite,...is in my poor opinion Joannes Sturmus’. Ascham, Scholemaster, p. 113 (Mayor’s ed.). Richardson has omitted to notice this use of ‘odd’ in his Dictionary.
The things mentioned in this and the following section all of them designate what is considered good because men like to do it.

*tá eukatérgasta* ‘things easily effected, or easy achievements’, are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they belong to the second class of things ‘possible’, such as are ‘easy’.

**kataóbrhosai** aor. ‘ever succeeded in’; or indicating the notion of ‘habit’ which the verb ὀρβοῦν and its compounds acquire. The secondary and metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, Electr. 741, ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἄλλους πάντας ἀσφαλεῖς ὀρβοῦ, ὁ πλήμων ὀρβός ἐξ ὀρβῶν δίφρον. Oed. Col. 394, ἱσμνε, νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ’ ὀρβοῦσιν, πρόσθε δ’ ἄλλωσιν. Oed. γένομα δ’ ὀρβῶν φλάυρον ὡς νίος πίσγ.  

ἁ χαρίσω τοῖς φίλοις] ‘anything by which one will oblige one’s friends’. ἀ cognate accus. for ἀς χάριτας. In obliging a friend you may be said to obligate yourself, a true friend being ἔτερος αὐτός: Eth. N. ix 9, sub init. 1b. 1170 β 7. 1b. c.4, 1166 a 31, προς δὲ τῶν φιλῶν ἔχειν ὄσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν, ἐστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.  

ἀ ἀπεχθοῦσαι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] ‘or by which one may shew one’s hostility to (offend or annoy) one’s enemy’. As before, ἀς ἄπεχθειας ἄπειθ. τ. ἐχθροῖς. ἄπειθενοσθαὶ πρὸς τινα, or τιν, is ‘to make oneself odious or hostile to’, ‘to quarrel with’, or ‘to disoblige, offend, annoy’. Compare διαβᾶλλεσθαι πρὸς, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling towards one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from διαβάλλειν, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and proper objects of pursuit.

θαυμάζειν, ‘to look up to, respect, reverence, admire’. Valck. ad
PHTORIKHΣ A 7 § 1.

πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφνεῖς εἰσί καὶ ἐμπεροὶ. ἥδιν
γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται, καὶ ἃ μὴδεὶς φαῦλος ἐπαν-
νετά γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ἃν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυχανόουσιν.

30 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἢδιν ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ
μᾶλετα ἐκαστοὶ πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι, οἶον ὁ φιλόκοι
εἰ νῖκη ἐσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμῇ, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι
eἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ ἀλλοι ὁσαύτως.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἄγαθον καὶ συμφέροντος ἐκ τοῦτων
1 λιπτεόν τὰς πίστεις ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις όμολογοῦν—

eὐφνεῖς] 'clever', § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. II 28, Probl. XVIII 6,
there quoted.

[ἐμπεροὶ] those who have acquired skill by practice and experience,
distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the
attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one
has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good,
because it is more easily attained, § 27; 'more easily', either than by others
who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ἀ μὴδεὶς φαῦλος] (οὐδεὶς, no definite particular person; μὴδεὶς, no in-
definite person, no man whatever); sub. πραξεῖν ἄν. 'Hinc ducto argu-
mento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam
saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Acol. 14
(5. Dind.) μὴ πλοῦτον ἐὑπης οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεών ἢν χω κάκιστος ράδιος
ἐκτῆσατο'. Victorius.

ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of desire are supposed to be good, all
ἀὑπεία, and ὥν ἐὑφείσται, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not
only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you
suppose it (φαίνεται) to be good.

§ 30. καὶ μᾶλετα ἐκαστοὶ (ἀγαθὰ ἡγοῦνται ταῦτα) πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι 'to
which they are so and so', disposed in such and such a way. In the par-
allel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by φιλοτυποῦτος. Eth. N. I 9,
1099 a 8, ἐκατῷ δ' ἐστὶν ἢδιν πρὸς ἃ λέγεται φιλοτυποῦτος, οἶον ἵππως μὲν
τῷ φιλόπτῳ, βέβαια δὲ τῷ φιλοθεόρῳ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων καὶ τὰ δικαία τῷ
φιλοδοξία καὶ ἄλος τά τα κατ' ἁμέτρη τῷ φιλάρτῳ. Ib. III 13, 1118 b 22, τῶν
φιλοτυποῦτων λεγομένων. Ib. IV 10, 1125 b 15, πλειοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτυποῦτος
λεγομένου.

CIIAP. VII.

The κοίνων τόπος of μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον or degree applied to το ἱσμφέρων,
expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from,
or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical
Topics." Brandis, iüber Ar. Rhet. a.p. Schneiderwiß's Philologus, IV 1. pp. 14,
15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case
of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the
Rhetoric; but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared are, Top. Γ’ 2, 117 a 11, with Rhet. ι 6.3, and 7.5; Top. Γ’ 3, 118 b 20, with Rhet. ι 7.36; Top. Γ’ 1, 116 a 29, and 6.8, with Rhet. ι 7.8. Cicero, Topic. xviii 68—70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the topics of Comparatio, following Aristotle very closely: most of Aristotle's topics of this chapter are found in Cicero's list. The topics of comparison fall under four general heads. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaeam etiam ad res aliiquas affectio; which are there severally illustrated at length. First, some general principles are laid down; then we are referred back to c. 6. 2, for the various definitions of good; and then, (from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions are applied to the determination of cases, special τόποι or εἴδη, of comparison of two good things, so as to shew which of them in each case is the greater.

§ 1. ἄμφω [both]—of two things, left to be understood.

§ 2. ἕστω [See note on c. 5.3, 6.2, 10.3.]

ὑπερέχων—ὑπερεχόμενον [Hae definitiones possunt declarari duabus lineis parallelis, quorum una ultra alteram proponitur: item numeris, e.g. 6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et excurrat: minor vero inest in maioribus.] Schrader. On the passive form ὑπερέχεσθαι, see Appendix (B) On the irregular passive (at the end of the notes to this Book).

tοσοῦτον καὶ ἐτι [so much and something over],

tὸ ἐνπαράχω [that which is contained or included in the other].

καὶ μείζων μὲν ἀεὶ κ.τ.λ.] That all 'quantity', and all terms that express it, μέγα μικρόν, πολύ διλόγων, are relative, πρὸς τι, we learn from the Categories, c. 6, 5 b 15—29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of 'many' and 'few'. None of them is absolute αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτό: all of them are relative to something else, with which they are compared, πρὸς τι, πρὸς ἐτερον.

'And 'greater' and 'more' have always reference to a 'less', and 'much' and 'little' to the average, magnitude (τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with

1 If πολὺ καὶ διλόγων are here intended to include 'many' and 'few', πολλοὶ καὶ διλόγων, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are wanted to complete the list, we must extend the τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος to number, πλῆθος, as well as magnitude.
ka μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τὸν πολλὰν μέγεθος, καὶ ύπερέχου μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλειπον 3 μικρὸν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. ἐπεί οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τὸ τε αὐτὸ αὐτὸ ἑνὲκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ πάντι ἐφεται, καὶ ὁ νόν ἂν καὶ φρόνῃσιν λαβῶντα ἐλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἡ ὢ ἐπέται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὖ ἑνὲκα τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ, τέλος δ' ἐστὶν οὐ ἑνὲκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρός αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττώνων,

its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, τοῖς πολλοῖς, of mountains and men, in order to estimate its size): and that which is called 'great' exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls short of it is called 'small', and 'much' and 'little' in like manner'.

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical character of the construction explained, in Introd. pp. 177—8.

αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός] This clause contrasts the notion of good in itself, καθ' αὐτό, here expressed by the dative αὐτῷ 'to', or, 'for and by itself', with good as the universal τέλος, the object of all men's aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Buhle, and Bonitz (Aristotelische Studien, i p. 86), are in favour of αὐτῷ and αὐτόν, which would thus contrast 'good to the individual with good in general'. Eth. N. vii 13, initi. ἀγαθὸν διχός, τὸ μὲν ἀπλός, τὸ δὲ τιμ. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλός ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἰρετότερον. This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with ordinary Aristotelian usage, as ἤγειρα § 35, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπλός, and frequently elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives αὐτῷ as well as αὐτό: and Bonitz adds that Muretus' rendering, cuique autem bonum id quod ita est affectum ad ipsum, shows he that followed this reading. Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the change, and Bekker and Spengel have retained αὐτῷ and αὐτό.

ἀνάγκη...μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] Top. Γ 2, 117 a 16, ἐτι τὰ πλεῖω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττῶνον (αιρετότερα , ἡ ἄπλος, ἡ ὅταν τὰ ἔτερα τοῖς ἐπισφαρχη, τὰ ἐλάσττω ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσσιν. Two ἐντάσεις ('reprechens of the fallax' Bacon calls them. Colours of Good and Evil), objections, or instances opposed to the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, healthy practices for the sake of health; in this case the two together are in no way preferable to health alone: (2) and things not good accom-

1 Gaisford refers to Harris, Philosophical Arrangements ('arrangements' mean collections of notions under general heads; and the 'arrangements' that he treats of are Aristotle's summa genera, or Categories), ch. 9 p. 191. Harris merely repeats what Aristotle had already said in his Categories to which Gaisford does not refer.
panied by a single good (so Waits), may be preferable to several good things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, to justice and courage together, as τάυτα μεθ’ ἡδονῆς μάλλον ἢ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς (αἱρετώτερα ἔστω) καὶ ταύτα μετ’ ἀληθίας ἢ μετὰ λύπης.

ὑπερέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] On ὑπεροχὴ as a test of excellence, besides other topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. iv 8 init. there quoted. The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs Eth. N. ib. 1124 b 10, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δὲ ὑπερεχόμενον.

§ 4. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ 2, 117 b 33, ἐτι ἐάν ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτο βελτίων, καὶ τὸ βελτίστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βελτίων τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ βελτίστῳ, οἴνοι ἐν βελτίστω ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπον, καὶ ὁ βελτίστως ἀνθρώπος τοῦ βελτίστου ὑπον βελτίων. καὶ ἐτι τὸ βελτίστον τοῦ βελτίστου βελτίων, καὶ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτο βελτίων, οἴνοι ἐν ὁ βελτίστως ἀνθρώπου τοῦ βελτίστου ὑπον βελτίων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀνθρώπου ὑπον βελτίων. A practical application of this rule occurs in Pol. iv (VII) 1, 1323 b 13, ὅλως τε δήλω ὡς ἀκόλουθων φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀριστὴν ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἀλληλα κατὰ τὴν υπεροχήν, ἡπερ εἰκῆς διάδασσιν ὃν φαίμεν αὐτὸς εἰναι διάδεσεν ταῦτας. εἰτε ἐτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμωτέρον καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀριστὴν ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν.

ἀνάλογον ἐξουσίαν] ‘are proportional to one another’.

In Bacon’s Colours of Good and Evil, (‘a table of colours or appearances of good and evil and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elencences of them’), this topic is given in the form, catus excellentia vel exasperantia melior id toto genere melius. ‘This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax’; and he proceeds accordingly to ‘reprehend’ it. Bacon’s works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. vii. p. 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can always be argued on either side.

1 Some of the topics selected for ‘reprehension’ are identical with those of Aristotle, and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word ‘Colours’ in this application is thus explained by Erasmus, Adagia, s.v. fæces, p. 1915, ‘Qui ad exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur ‘rhetoricis coloribus’ uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententiis non fuerint conjuncta’. And by Bacon himself in his preface.
§ 5. *καὶ ὅταν τὸ δὲ μὲν τὰ ἐπηταί, ἕκειν δὲ τοῦτῳ μή: ἔπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἁμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει: ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἢ χρήσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἔπεται δὲ ἢ ἁμα μὲν τῷ ὑμιάνειν τὸ ζῆν, τοῦτῳ δὲ ἕκειν οὐ, ὑστερον δὲ τῇ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· ο γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας καὶ

§ 5. καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἔπηταί καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑκεῖν, δὲ τοῦτῳ μή· ἔπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἁμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει: ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἢ χρήσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἔπεται δὲ ἢ ἁμα μὲν τῷ ὑμιάνειν τὸ ζῆν, τοῦτῳ δὲ ἕκειν οὐ, ὑστερον δὲ τῇ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· ο γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας καὶ

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The use of the general topic of 'consequence' is explained, Top 1, 2, 117 a 5, ἦ τί ὅταν δύο τινὰ ἢ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς παραπλήσσατα καὶ μὴ δυναμέναι ὑπερ- αχθῆν ἡμεῖς συνεδρὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἐτερον, ὅμων ἀπὸ τῶν παραπέμενων· ὃ γὰρ ἔπεται μεῖζον ἀγάθον τῳθ’ αἰρετῷ τερον. ἄν δ’ ἤ τὰ ἐπομένα κακά, ὃ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἀκολουθεὶ κακῶν, τοῦθ’ αἰρετῶτερον. οὔτων γὰρ ἀμφιτέρων αἰρετῶν ἕνων κολατεί δυσχερές τι παρέπεσθαι. διαχώς δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπεσθαι ἢ σκέψεις καὶ. See note, c. 6, 3.

1 ἀποστερεῖν is properly 'to defraud or cheat', and especially applied to keeping back a deposit. Rhet. 11 6, 3, ὅ το ἀποστερεῖται παρακαταχθήκην. Gaisf. quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 172, ἀποστερεῖ ἐστὶν ὅταν παρακαταθήκην παραλαμβάνῃ· οἷς διαβολὴν χωρὶσκω καὶ νῦκ ἐδεῖλα δοῦναι αὐτῷ ἡ ἔλατον. [See Shilleto's note on Thuc. 1 69, 1, s.]
6 aποστερήσειες] καὶ τὰ ύπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι
7 μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ύπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος· καὶ Ρ. 24·
tα μείζονος ἀγαθὸν ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἢν τὸ
μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν μείζον,

§ 6. καὶ τὰ ύπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑκτ.λ.] 'anything which (all that, plural) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is the greater (of the two); because it must exceed the greater also (i.e. as well as the less)'. This with the mere substitution of μείζων for αἱρέτωτερων is taken from Top. Γ 3, 118 b 3, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ δύο τινα τῶν εἰς αἱρέτωτερα, τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρέτωτερον τοῦ θετον αἱρέτωτέρον. Let A be 9, B 6, and C 3. A (9) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B—must be (ἀνάγκη), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the other two. This is certainly not a good argument, though the fact is true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corruption. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only objection to the explanation is that the γὰρ, which professes to give the reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, meant by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his writings. On the application of the topic, see Introduct. p. 180.


τὸντο γὰρ ἢν τοῦτο 'this is what was meant by', this is what was (said to be) good; viz. in § 3.

τὸ...ποιητικῷ εἶναι] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. de Anima, p. 471 seq. and on I 1, 2; II 1, 8, also in Rheinisches Museum 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., Kategorienlehre, p. 35 with ref. in note, and Waitz, Organ. Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: τὸ μεγέθη εἶναι universum esse notionem, qua res constitutur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam—the λόγος of the thing—τὸ μέγεθος vero ad singula quaque pertinentes quae sub sensu cadant. Metaph. Z 15, 1039 b 25, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ
§ 8. καὶ τὸ αἱρετῶτερον καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸ] Τοπ. Τ 1, 116 a 29
cαὶ τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ δὲ ἐτερον αἱρετῶτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίων τοῦ
γεμαῖρου τοῦ μὲν γὰρ δὲ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, τὸ δὲ δὲ ἐτερον. Αἱρετῶτερον
καὶ τὸ ἀπόλος ἠγαθὸν τοῦ τυλικοῦ αἱρετῶτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαῖον τοῦ
τέμνεσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόλος ἠγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ τυλικὸ τὸ δεόμενη τῆς
tομῆς. Τέμνεσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόλος ἠγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ τυλικὸ τὸ δεόμενη
tῆς τομῆς.

The syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I
know, has attempted to explain, seems to be this:—The dative is in
apposition with a supposed τινὶ, τὸ τυλικὸ ἐναέριες καὶ, and the construction
is analogous to ὡστε συναχθοῦσι εἰς πίστει, 1 επ., 19. Other instances of a
similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are
such as Thuc. 1 24, εὐδείᾳ ἐπάλυστην τὸν ἑώρον κύλην: and others are to
be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388.

καὶ οὖ τὸ ποιητικὸν μείζων ὡσαύτως] ‘and that of which the productive
agent or producing cause is of a higher order, ‘superior’, follows the same
rule’, viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is super-
ior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which
produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which
are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to
the result of the latter, pleasure.

The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian techni-
cality, and its relation to τὸ τί ἐναι, is, it seems to me, less successful in his
grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions
of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case
of attraction, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes
nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly
prefers to call it, the ‘accective’) case, locative, instrumental, accceptive, selects
the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. τὸ μεγάλον
ἐναέριο express, according to him, ‘the abstract conception (τὸ ἐναέριο) belonging to
(given to and received by) magnitude’: making this dative depend solely upon
ἐναέριο, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypo-
thetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the ‘government’ of it. This is
all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg’s paper: in the rest he has shewn the
same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his
other writings upon Aristotle.
Rhetorikes A 7 §§ 9—11.

ισχύς υγιείνου: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ ἔργον. κἂν ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ, ἡμῖν ὁμοίως φιλοσοφήσας τοῦ εἰ δὲ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ὑπόκειον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων: αὐταρκεστερον γὰρ; ὑπόκειον δὲ προσδείται τὸ ἔλαττόνων ἢ ῥαόνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τὸδε μὲν ἀνευ τούτων μὴ ἢ ἢ μὴ δυνατον ἢ γενέσθαι, θατερον δὲ ἀνευ τούτων αὐ-σθαν. the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as the means to an end, δι' ἐτερων.

ισχύς υγιείνου] strength is more desirable in itself; the ‘wholesome’ only as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as absolutely desirable αἰρετῶν καθ' αὐτό, but only relatively to other things—more desirable in itself than many others.’ Brandis, Philologus, IV, 1, p. 44. ὑπέρ ἢν τὸ ἄγαθον] ἤν, § 7. The reference is to § 2 p. 97.

§ 9. κἂν ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ I, 116 b 22, καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πρώτων τὸ τέλος αἰρετῶτερον δοκεί εἶναι, καὶ δύναται τὸ ἐγγύον τοῦ τέλους. The end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end, as health and exercise.

§ 10. τὸ ὑπόκειον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων] ‘that which less stands in need of any subsidiary aid’ (to make it a good), ‘either of the other’ (when two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health,) ‘or of other things (in general)’. A topic, which may be brought under this of the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 a 37, where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative αὐτάρκεια, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in illustration Virgil’s comparison of the ‘olive’ and ‘vine’. Georg. II 421, 2 and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the original. It is not the ‘vine’ but ‘prosma’, of which is said, vi propria nituntur opisque haud indiga nostrae; and the example is hardly in point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark).

αὐταρκεστερων] ‘it makes a nearer approach to independence, self-sufficiency’: appealing to the definitions of good in c. 6, 2, of which τὸ αὐτάρκεια is one. On αὐτάρκεια, note on c. 5, 3, ν ὑδα τοῦτον τελειον χαὶ βελτιστον. Pol. I 2, 1253 a 1.

ῥαόνων] ‘easier’ to do or to get, to effect or procure, πράττειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ κτίσσασθαι.

§ 11. καὶ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] ‘and any case in which one thing cannot exist or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the other can without it’. As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen. (Econ. v. 17 (Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 13, Peloponnesio bello multa Thrasybulus sine Alcibiade gessit, ille nullam rem sine hoc. Schrader. He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Agesilaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10) Γ 2, 117 a 39.
§ 12. καν ἢ ἀρχή] supply το μέν, and with αἰτίων in the following topic. On the omission, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 288, Obs. 4.

ἀρχή] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an 'origin', or 'beginning', or 'source'. In this sense it may be regarded as the fountain of all good. ἐνακε δ' αὐτῶν ἔχειν (ἡ ἑδαμονία) καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχήν ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λουτᾶ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχήν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰτίων τῶν ἀγαθῶν τιμίων εἰ καὶ δεῖνον εἶπομεν (Eth. N. 1. 13 ult.). God himself is an ἀρχή (Metaph. A 2, 983 α 8, ὁ γὰρ θεός ἀρχή τις). The free will, one of the ἀρέσεις or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the human subject, and of moral action, the ἀρχή πράξεως, is an ἀρχή: the importance of this, as the origin of human action and the ground of moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of the Nicom. Ethics. It is more comprehensive than αἰτίων; ἀρχαι are not all causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence; it leads to something; in this respect it is 'greater', more important, superior to, anything that is not a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. Plat. Rep. II 377 Α, οὐκοῦν οἰσθ' ὅτι ἀρχή παντὸς ἔργων μέγιστον; μεγάλην γὰρ ἔργαν (αἱ ἀρχαι) ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα, Eth. Nic. I 7, sub fin. And the same applies to αἰτίων in the following topic. These two topics are well illustrated in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), 10, 11.

The importance of an ἀρχή for good or for evil is recognized by several proverbs. On the one side we have ἀρχή ἢμου παντός, (quoted in Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 122, ἀρχή δὲ τοι ἢμου παντός;) Arist. Eth. N. I 7 ult. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἡ ἢμου παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, Pol. VII (V) 4, 1310 b 29, ἡ δ' ἀρχή λέγεται ἢμου εἶναι παντός, de Soph. E. c. 34, 183 b 22, μέγιστον γὰρ ὡς ἄρχη παντός ὄσπερ λέγεται. Erasm., Adag. 29, quotes Soph. Fr. Inc. (715, Dind.) ap. Plut. Mor. p. 16 Α, ἔργων δὲ παντός ἢν τις ἀρχηται καλῶς, καὶ τὰς τελευτάς εἰκόν ἐεθ' αὐτῶν ἔχειν, Angliche 'Well begun is half done'. Dimidium facit qui coeptit habet, Hor. Ep. I 2, 40. The first step: Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte, see Rhet. II 19, 5, and note. On the other side, the importance of the ἀρχή in respect of the tendency to evil, we have Οίδ's well-known line, become proverbial, Rem. Am. 91, Principis obsta, soro medicina paratur. Fast. I 178, Omina principiis, inquit (Phocbus), inesse solent. (This is indifferent as to the issue.) Herodotus, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on the solicitation of Aristogoras sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the chapter. v 97, with the emphatic words, αὔται δὲ αἱ νεῖς, ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένετο Ἑλλησί τε καὶ Βαρβάρωι. This phrase became proverbial, see Rhet. III 11, 7 611, and Isocr. Paneg. § 119, there quoted.

On the different senses of ἀρχὴ in the Aristotelian philosophy consult Metaph A 1, where they are enumerated and distinguished; and Bonitz's Commentary. They are thus summed up; παντών μὲν οὖν κοινῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι οἶκον ἢ ἐστίν ἢ γίνεται ἢ γεγονότει τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 12.

τὸ δ’ οὐκ αἰτίου, διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ· ἀνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἐσπαρχοῦσαι εἶσαι αἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς, 1013 α 17. Ἀρχαί are ‘origins’, heads or starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, οὐσία, (2) of generation or growth, γένεσις, and (3) of knowledge, γνώσις. ἀνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχής ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι, Rhet. 1 7, 12. The six senses in which ἀρχή may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inherent (as the στοιχεῖα, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed); the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original seat of life); some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and mother, of child; abusive language, of a fight; or again the human will or deliberate purpose, and intellect, προϊόμενα, and διάνοια, in the case of ‘governments’ [ἀρχαί] and arts, all of which set things in motion and produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated by the ὑποθέσεως, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the major premise of a syllogism. Another ‘external origin’ is the οὗ ἐνεκι, or τέλος, the final cause, πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνώσεως ἀρχῆς τάγματος καὶ τὸ καλὸν, α 21. Comp. de Anima Γ 10, 433 a 15, καὶ ἡ ἀρχής ἐνεκα τοῦ πᾶσα· οὔ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή, αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ’ ἐσχάτων ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.

ἀρχή is not identical with αἰτίου, though, as all αἰτία (all the four causes) are ἀρχαί, the terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, Comm. p. 219; Waitz, Org. p. 458): but the converse is not true; as is shewn by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that ἵσαρίσ (τὰς ἀρχαίς) καὶ τὰ αἰτία λέγεται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰτία ἀρχαί (a 16) must be limited to what is directly stated, the converse is not included. On the point of difference between the two, and also the identification with στοιχεία, see Waitz, Organ. p. 458.

Another definition of ἀρχή occurs in de Gen. Anim. v 7, 23, 738 a 14, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ’ ἀλλο ἀνωθεν μηδὲν. See also Trendel. de Anima p. 187.

On scientific and logical ἀρχαί or first principles, ultimate axioms, κοιναὶ and ἓδαι, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemian Ethics, ΙΙ 6, three kinds of ἀρχαί, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, and some account given of them. [See also Index Aristotelicus, s. v. s.]

§ 12. καὶ ἡ αἰτία κ ἀ.ι.] Top. Γ, 116 β 1, καὶ τὸ αἰτίου ἀγαθοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτίων, καβάπερ ἡ ἄρετη τῆς τύχης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἰ τι ἀλλα ταὐτότων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου (τοῦ κακῶν) κτ.λ.

τὸ δ’ οὐκ αἰτίου] On οὐκ after ἀν, understood from the preceding clause, see Appendix (C) on εἶ νῦ, c. 15, 23.

1 The ἀρχή as essence, origin of being, οὐσία, is the primal cause, τὸ τι ἴν εἶναι. Bonitz.

2 στοιχεῖον "hoc loco eum (Aristotelem) non tam elementi naturam cogitasse, quam principem illum rei aliquius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas." Bon. Comm. p. 218.

3 This is an ἀρχή κακῶν.

4 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτής ἐστὶ τὸ ὅρκετόν. de Anima 1 10, 433 a 19.
PHTOPIKHΣ A 7 § 13.

And, again, of two origins or causes, the consequence and effect of the superior is greater. The following passage of the Topics will illustrate the preceding as well as the present topic. I 3, 118 a 29, ἐτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπὶ παρή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, τὸ ποιοῦν ἀφετέρον, καθάπερ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ θερμαίον τοῦ μη. εἰ δὲ ἀμφότεροι, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν ἢ εἰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ κυριώτερον ποιεὶ ἀγαθὸν, αὐτὸ εἰ τὸ μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ τὸ σώμα: c. 5, 119 a 17, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μή ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχων τουάδε, μᾶλλον τουοῦτο ὁ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὁ μή ποιεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἀμφότεροι, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν τουοῦτο.

καὶ ἀνάπαλεν] 'and conversely, of two origins; the origin of the greater consequence is greater...'.

§ 13. ἰδὼν οὖν κ.κ.λ.] 'It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχῇ), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the 'end' is greater (superior), and yet no beginning'. 'The end is greater', because τέλος ἐστιν οὐ ἕνεκά τα ἄλλα: and if 'everything else' is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. ἀρχὴ is here 'greater', 'more important', superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily 'better'. In the examples, first, the 'adviser' is the ἀρχή, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. Δ 2, 1013 a 31, ὁ βουλευτής is an αἰτίον, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the 'cause' of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (δοκεῖ) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not 'the beginning'); and, secondly, the converse (ἀνάπαλεων) is proved, that the crime, the 'end' of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnæ was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the 'grant', especially the ἀδέλεκα, made to Chabrias for his public services —οὗτος ἐγράφατο τὴν Χαβρίον δομεῖαν, a proposition which he failed to

1 This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to;
Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B.C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, Rhet. I 14. 1, and III 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, Hist. Gr. x p. 392; Smith's Dict. Biogr. Art. Callistratus; Clinton, Fast. Hell. II 396, note w. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's Biogr. Dict. may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, Ora.t. Att. Vol. III; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

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Χαβρίου, τον πράξαντα του βουλεύσαντος· ου γὰρ ἀν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἢν ο ὑ πράξων τοῦτον γὰρ ἑνὲκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν. καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδηρόν ἀχριστότερος ἄν μείζον γὰρ ἢ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἀφθόνον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρήσις preparatory to ‘suggesting’ or ‘advising’ it. ἐπιβουλεύειν retains its proper sense of a hostile design (επί ‘against’); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as ‘a plot’, a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that ἐπιβουλεύειν is (or can be) put for βουλεύειν or βουλεύσαντος. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment. εἰ μὴ ἢν ὁ πράξων] On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or γένος, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttmann, Gr. Gr. § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. viii. 564 A, that it marks quod præsens et in conspectu positum cogitatur, and (2) the genus. ‘Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis’ (the second describes the generic use). Herm. Praef. ad lph. Aul. p. xv. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3. ὁ σπείρων; xxv. 32. ὁ πωμῦν. In a subsequent passage of this work, 11 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μίσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλῆτην μαται κ.τ.λ.

I will render ὁ πράξων ‘anyone to do it’, carry it out, put it in execution. § 14. τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου] ‘The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more valuable or important, than the abundant’. This, as is implied in ἀχριστότερος ἄν in the example, is only true in a sense; it is in fact a paradox, which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, ἀντίδ. § 80, 81, on this ground of comparative rarity, ὅσον πέρ εἰς σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians who can speak worthily on behalf of their country’s interests are more valuable and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 b 28, τὸ ἐπιφανεστέρον τοῦ ἠττον τοιουτοῦ, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον μάλλον γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν ἔχοντες ἀ μὴ ἐστὶ βαθεῖον λαβεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἴδιατέρον τοῦ κοιμητέρου.

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον] This gives the true side of the alternative, that the value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this standard, ‘water’, as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian ode, ‘is the best of all things.’ Böckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle
**PHILORPHS A 7 §§ 15, 16.**

υπερέχει: τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλυγάκις ύπερέχει: ὀθεν λέγεται

ἀριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.

15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ βάονος: σπανιῶτερον γάρ. ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ βάον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου. p. 25.

16 ἔχει γάρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. καὶ ὃ τὸ ἐναντίον μείζον, καὶ οὐ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ

in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar's ἀριστον as 'best' because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life. Dissern thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great 'wholesomeness' of water, ἀριστον dicitur τὸ ὕδωρ quia saluberrimum est. A dry and hot climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Böckh in his interpretation of Pindar's thought.

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimating 'value', by use and price: Political Economy teaches us that the former is the true, the latter the false standard. In the one view air and water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. Plato, Euthyd. 304, 3, gives both sides: τὸ γὰρ στάνον, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τίμου τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐιονότατον, ἀριστον ἄν, ὡς ἐφι Πίνδαρος.

§ 15. ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον] See the passage of the Topics quoted in § 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand measured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is easier to do or to make or to obtain is more valuable.

§ 16. ὃ τὸ ἐναντίον μείζον] 'And one thing is greater than another when the opposite of the former is greater than that of the latter'. 'Exemplum accommodatum est valetudo ac divitiāe; quae ambo sunt bona: contraria eorum morbus et paupertas: maius autem malum corporis morbus quam paupertas; praestatigitur valetudo divitiis.' Victorius. On this, and the next topic, στέρησις, comp. supr. c. 6, 4, and § 18; and the passages of the Topics (Γ 2, 117 b 2.), and the Categories there referred to.

οὐ ἡ στέρησις μείζων] On the various applications of στέρησις in Aristotle's philosophy, see Met. Δ c. 22, and Bonitz's Commentary: Categ. c. 10, p. 12 a 26, and Waitz, ad loc. Trendel. Kategorienlehre, p. 103 seq. The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader. 'Peius est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus audītus praestantior est.

1 Pindar's own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the first three lines of the 10th Olympian Ode: note the word χρονιᾶς. In a speech, quoted by Spedding (Letters and life of Fr. Bacon, Vol. iii. p. 18), Bacon says: I liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox in the fore-front of his book, first water, then gold, preferring necessity before pleasure; and I am of opinion, that things necessary in use are better than those things that are glorious in estimation.
kakia μὴ κακιάς μείζων τὰ μὲν γὰρ τέλη, τὰ δ' οὐ 17 τέλη. καὶ ὅν τὰ ἐργα καλλίω ἤ αἰσχώ, μείζω αὐτά.

Gravius malum est fana quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio praestat divitiis.' 'Things of which the privation is greater' or more deeply felt, are those which are most necessary, essential to our existence or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view.

καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς—τέλη] 'and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and vice to non-vice; because the one is an end, and the other not'. The application of this seems to be to things compared as positive and negative: positive virtue and positive vice, which can be ends or objects to aim at, are in so far superior to mere negatives which can not. Moral considerations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not recommended) to take the immoral side of the question: vice may be regarded as an 'end' of human desire and exertion.

Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* 1. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ κακιάς καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων, 'positive, downright, virtue is greater (better or worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence of virtue': which he neither translates nor explains; but, it is to be presumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon its positive character. The morality remains constant; for vice is still represented as the object of men's aims: it is therefore no improvement in that respect. His reason for the change is, 'that it never could occur to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (Grösse) between ἀρετὴ and μὴ ἀρετῆ, and κακία and μὴ κακία.' Not perhaps if μείζων implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz's altered comparison appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and negative; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to non-virtue?

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of the ἀρετῆ of anything to its proper ἐργα or function, the work that it has to do, described by Plato, *Rep.* 1 352 E and foll., and taken up by Aristotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, *Eth. Nic.* 11 5, init. The virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, the eye, the ear, the mind, is shewn in and depends upon the due performance of its proper function (supra 2. 12; 5. 4; 6. 11). τὰ ἐργα therefore, though they extend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration—the comparison of ἀνδρεία and σοφροσύνη and their opposites in respect of their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, and everything which has a τόλμα, to which the ἐργα must be subservient, and in the approach to which the ἀρετῆ is shewn; yet the epithets

1 Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains μὴ ἀρετῆ and μὴ κακία as states of growth and development, which have not yet reached their 'end', the formed ἔτη, but are mere διαθέσεις, transient dispositions, and so far inferior.
καὶ ὅν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μεῖζον, καὶ τὰ ἔργα μεῖζον, ἐπείπερ ως τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ ως τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ. καὶ ὅν ἡ ύπεροχὴ αἰρετωτέρα ἡ καλλίων, οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὅραν αἰρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι: καὶ γὰρ ὅμως ὀσφρίσεως καὶ τὸ φιλεταίρων εἶναι. τοῦ φιλοχρηματον μάλλον κάλλιον, ὡστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτίων αἱ ύπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλίων καλλίους. καὶ ὅν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἡ βελτίους: αἱ καλλίων καὶ αἰσχίω shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost in his mind.

καὶ ὅν αἱ κακίαι κτλ. the converse of the preceding, the argument from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its function or proper work. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects stand to 'works' in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one produces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12.) and the less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things.

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the excess of something else, then the former in its ordinary state is preferable to the other. See the passage of Polit. iv (vii) 1, quoted in § 4. Top. I 3, 118 b 4, ἐτί οὖ ἡ ύπερβολὴ τῆς ύπερβολῆς αἰρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον, οἷον φίλα χρησάτων αἰρετωτέρα γὰρ ἢ τῆς φιλίας ύπερβολῆ τῆς τῶν χρησάτων. Omne minus continet in se minus.

tὸ φιλεταίρων...μᾶλλον κάλλιον] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, Org. 116 b 24, understand μᾶλλον κάλλιον as a double comparative, a form of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, Org. 116 b 24, II p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The μᾶλλον denoting the 'excess' of the two qualities, which is absolutely essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to φιλεταίρων and φιλοχρηματον, the compari
tion being conveyed by κάλλιον: and thus the topic is exemplified. 'Excess in love of friends being fairer, and nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is to be preferred to a similar average of love of money'. See also note on II 8, 3.

§ 19. καὶ ὅν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κτλ.] The objects of the nobler and better desires are themselves nobler and better: because all 'impulses' (ὑρέξεις, which include ἐπιθυμία, all natural desires and appetites, as well as θυμὸς and βουλής, Eth. Eud. II 7. 2, de An. B 3, 414 b 2; see note on Rhet. II 2.1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects
γὰρ μείζους ὑπέξεις μείζονων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιώνον δὲ ἡ καὶ βελτιώνον αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ. καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἐπιστήμαι καλλίους ἐστὶν διά τὸ πράγματα καλλίως καὶ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίως καὶ σπουδαιότερα. Ὁ γὰρ έχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἕκαστῃ, καὶ τῶν σπουδαιότερων δὲ καὶ καλλίωνον αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα. 21 καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἂν ἡ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἡ πάντες things 'greater', i.e. either better and higher in themselves, or more important. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in some sense. And the converse: 'the nobler and better the objects, the nobler and better the desires, for the same reason'.

§ 20. καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἐπιστήμαι κ.τ.λ.] The same rule is now applied to sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; τὰ πράγματα, 'their subjects'. ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὑπῆρε, τὰ ὑποκείμενα. Τὸν Γ 1, 116 a 21, ἐστὶ δὲ ἄπλος μὲν βελτίων καὶ αἱρετότερον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βελτίω ἐπιστήμῃ, τινὰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν νοείαν. The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science: ἀνάλογον, 'proportionally'; greater to greater, and less to less. 'For as is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be done, dictates, κελεύει) in its own special province'. On the order in invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter, Metaph. A 1. ἐπιστήμαι includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two terms being constantly interchanged. The word ἀληθὲς, from its strict and proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished, θεωρητικῶς τέλος ἀληθεία, πρακτικῶς δὲ ἐργόν, Metaph. A 1), might seem to confine the application of the topic to science pure, or the 'theoretical' department of philosophy, but it is plainly here employed in a wider and more popular sense: truth, theoretical or practical, is the common object of every kind of scientific or artistic pursuit. And the word κελεύειν, to prescribe or dictate, is alike applicable to the necessary principles and necessary conclusions of mathematical demonstration, and to a practical science like Politics, which not only like the other prescribes the method in which its investigations are to be carried on and rules of action, but 'orders and arranges' διοικεῖν, determines, and limits at its pleasure the provinces and extent of the operations of the subordinate sciences and arts. Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1094 a 26—b 7. On κελεύειν, Victorius quotes Eth. Eud. II 3, τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

§ 21. καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἂν κ.τ.λ.] 'the judgment or decision, upon any dis-

1 The terms 'subject' and 'object' from different points of view may be applied to express the same thing. The object of sense or of thought, material or mental, quod sensibus vel menti objectitur, is when looked at from the logical side the subject of all that is or can be predicated of it.

2 So printed in Beckler's texts.
... 

Top. 1, 116 a 14, καὶ δ’ μάλλον ἄν ἐλεύθερον ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἰσχίραιρ, ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ ῥήματος, ἢ καὶ οἱ στοιχεῖα περί ἕκαστα αἱρέσεως ἢ τοιούτω (στοιχεῖα) εἶσιν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ ὡσα οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες, ὁνίκ ἐν ιστορίᾳ ἤ τεκτονικῇ ἢ οἱ πλείους τῶν ἰατρῶν ἢ πάντες, ἢ ὡσα ἀλος οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες ἢ πάντα, οἱον τάγαθον τάστα γὰρ τάγαθον ἐφείσται. This passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It describes the authority of φρόνησις (practical wisdom, the intellectual virtue which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Eth. N. vi), and the impersonation of it in the φρόνιμος. In the definition of ἕρετή, Eth. N. ii 6, init. the φρόνιμος is the measure or standard, which fixes the variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, each in his own department. The ἄγαθος decides in moral questions, which is his special province. Comp. note on 6. 25.

καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν] ‘of everything else as well’, as good. κατὰ with the genit. is very common in Arist. in the sense of ‘of’, ‘in the case of’; derived from its proper and primary sense ‘down upon’, and hence, ‘applying to’, ‘of’. This use of it seems to come through the intermediate sense of ‘predication’, κατηγορεȋν, κατηγορεῖσθαι τινος, ‘to predicate, be predicated, of something’.—ἐπὶ, ‘upon’, ‘applying to’, ‘in the case of’, so and so, is similarly used (ἐπ’ ἄγαθον) in the same section.

τὶ, ποιῶν, ποιόν] are the first three categories; (1) the substance or true nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt with by the ‘practical judgment’ which may convey a popular and practical acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician.
βόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν ἐλοιτ' ἢν ἐκαστῶν
 ámbλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μειζῷν, ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.

καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίσσων ὑπάρχον, ὃ ἀπλῶς ἢ ὃ βελ-
τίως, οὖν ἀνδρία ἵσχυος. καὶ ὃ ἐλοιτ' ἢν ὁ βελτίων,
ἡ ἀπλῶς ἢ ὃ βελτίων, οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ

ὁ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει] If that is good in genera' which is pronounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more so, to be so in a higher degree.

§ 22. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίσσων ὑπάρχον] 'Animi bona bonis corporis praeva-
λεν quia animus est corpore praestantior'. Schrader. Courage and
strength is Aristotle's illustration; for the reason assigned by Schrader.

ἡ ἀπλῶς] 'ut viri' (man as the nobler animal) 'virtutes praestant mul-
eebribus simpliciter'. Schrader.

ἢ ὃ βελτίως] 'at quatenus meliores sunt; viri effeminati actiones de-
teriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminae'. Id. I prefer the other
explanation, as more direct and natural, 'either generally, in respect of
the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some special excel-
lence'.

καὶ ὃ ἐλοιτ' ἢν ὁ βελτίων] The better man will make the better choice
in general, ἀπλῶς, by virtue of his whole character; or 'in so far as he
is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special
virtue, in which his superiority is shewn. ἡ βελτίων ἔστι. So Victorius;
who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the pre-
ceding topic, § 21; in that the φρόνησις as a class choose between different
kinds of good: here the comparison is between two different kinds of
choosers, and the one who makes the better selection is the better in moral
character.

ὅν] (sc. ἀλεξάνδρος, or ἐὰν τις ἐλοιττο). The higher and nobler choice
is illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This,
though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and
prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. II 358 C, makes Glauc show
speaking of the opposite view, ἀκούων ὑπασιμάχον καὶ μυρίον ἄλλων:
and again, at the commencement of Glauc's exposition of the diad
vantages of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished,
he uses the word φασὶν, which seems to imply that this was the general
opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that
the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is
obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite suf-
cient to show how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the
adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before he could hope to
make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the
solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and
receiving injury and wrong, on which side the advantage, when rightly
estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in
the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower,
and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine. Ast, in his Comm. on Pl.
Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are superior.

This distinction of the two different kinds of kalon arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the 'pleasant' form or aspect of to kalon; the right is kalon to kath auton aireson, that is desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end in itself. In this latter sense the to kalon may be regarded as the end of all moral action, Eth. N. 1117, 1113 b 8, c. 10, 1115 d 24, 1x 8, 1168 a 34, 1169 a 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. 1.9.3, two definitions of it are given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again suggested: and again 11.13.9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profitable, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good.

Things are shewn to be good by our desire of them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we desire anything for ourselves or our friend (the friend is the 'second self', the alter ego, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we shew that we think it good: and the things we desire least to bring upon ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischievous things. The topics of Top. G 2, 118 a 1, are akin to this, not identical with it.

One measure of the use or value
of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption and the fear of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or wishing for it (καύλησε) because our wishing for it shows that we consider it a secure possession, one of which we are little likely to be deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it carries with it.

§ 27. καὶ ὅσον ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων] as the consequences would follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here 'in all the rest', in the particular case of the rhetorical application of them, the same consequences do actually follow. Perhaps the general application of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a tacit reference to the more general treatment of the same in the dialectical Topics. I think that only one topic is here intended; so far as σύστοιχα are distinguished from πτώσεις, the former includes the latter as the genus the species.

With this topic compare Rhet. II 23, 2. Top. I 3, 118 a 34—39. The instances of πτώσεις there given are the substantive and corresponding adverb, δικασώνη δικαίως, ἀνδρεία ἄνδρείως. σύστοιχα and πτώσεις are explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our information derived solely from this place.) and the use of them illustrated, in Top. B 9, 114 a 26—b 5. σύστοιχα are coordinate logical notions, as δίκαιον and δίκαιος with δικασώνη, ἀνδρεία and ἄνδρειος with ἀνδρεία; and again a 38, δικασώνη δίκαιον δίκαιος δικαίως are coordinates. Also, a 29, τὰ ποιητικὰ and τὰ φιλολακτικὰ are coordinate with the things which they produce and preserve, as τὰ υγιεῖα with υγίεια, τὰ εὐεξικὰ with εὐεξία. πτώσεις are these same coordinates in their grammatical aspects—terms that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things—and they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The πτώσεις 'inflexions' of the same word are not confined to the mere 'declension' of nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the casus rectus, or πτώσεις ὁρθῆ, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state or position, the casus or πτώσεις are fallings away, declensions, from that standard typical form by a change of termination1,) but include adverbs,

1 Περὶ ἐμφερείας 2, 16 a 32, τὸ ἐκ Φιλωνοῦ ἢ Φιλονοῦ καὶ ὃσα τιτᾶτα, οὐκ ὠφ- ματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ἐνδόματο. Phct. 20. 10, 1457 a 18, πτώσεις δ’ ἐστὶν ὠφματος ἢ ῥήματος ἢ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τοῦτο ὢ ἢ τοῦτω ἐμφανίσαται καὶ ὃσα τιτᾶτα (cases), ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐκ τὸ παλλός (number) οἶον ἀνθρώπως ἢ ἀνθρώπος, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἰον κατ’ ἐρώτησιν ἢ ἐπιταξίν (moods of verbs). Illustrated by ἐβάδισεν and βάδισε, indicative and imperative. πτώσεις are referred to the general head of παράφωμα.
the generic and numerical terminations, masc. and femin., singular, dual, and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle πτώσεις is a 'declension' from a root. This logical signification of σύστοιχος and σύστοιχία is transferred by metaphor, from the ranks of an army or of a chorus in the theatre (like ἀντίστροφος), to logic or grammar: but in either of the two senses, they always denote things on the same level, coordinates. Trendel. El. Log. Arist. 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 a 23. Xenophon, Conv. 2, 20, has ἀντιστοιχίαν in the sense of 'to be one's opposite, or partner in a dance'. Anab. v 4, 12, ἐστίσασιν ἀνὰ ἐκατὸν μάλιστα, ὅσπερ οἱ χοροὶ, ἀντιστοιχούντες ἀλλήλοις, 'in opposite, corresponding ranks'. In Met. l. c., and Eth. N. i 4, 1083 b 7, it is applied to the ten parallel rows or columns of the opposite ἀρχαῖ of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite members of the ten being in each case a σύστοιχία, or pair of coordinate conceptions. Hence σύστοιχα are notions of the same order: as the four elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same row, i. e. order in nature, de Caelo 302 a 29; and hence, notions which fall under the same genus, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are under different genera, so long as they have something in common, de Sens. c. 7, 447 b 30, 448 a 14 and 16.

In Aristotle therefore σύστοιχα and πτώσεις, though occasionally identified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: σύστοιχα are logical notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere of application than the πτώσεις, which are grammatical like the 'declensions', from which the name is derived, and include the various deflexions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root.

Cicero's coningata, which are defined Top. III 12, correspond to Aristotle's πτώσεις. Coningata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie communi tantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coningatio συγγίγια dicitur, ex qua huinemodii est argumentum: si commiscus aget est, iis est comparare.

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz on peri eπι. c. 2, 16 b 1; Anal. Post. ii 15, 79 b 6; Trendel. Kategorienlehre, p. 27 sqq.; Donaldson, New Crat. § 227. § 28. τοῦ μη (ὑντος) ὁ πάντες (αἱ ὅρυναι) The negative of the preceding: 'than that which is not what all prefer'.
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 §§ 29—31.

Πλείουσα ή οἱ ἐλάττουσαι ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ ἡν οὐ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὡστε καὶ μείζων οὐ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ή οἱ ἔχθροι ή οἱ κρίνοντες ή οὐς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαίνειν 29 ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὅτε μὲν οὐ πάντες μετέχουσι μείζων ἀτμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν 30 ὅτε δὲ οὐ μηδεῖς ή οὐ ὁλίγοι σπανιώτερον γὰρ. καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα καλλίω γὰρ. καὶ ὃν αἰ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὡσαντῶς η γὰρ τυμὴ ὀσπερ ἀξία τις ἐστίν. 31 καὶ ὃν αἰ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων

ὅν μὲν 'was' as we have said, c. 6. 2. οὐ μᾶλλον] (ἐφίενται).

ὁι ἀμφισβητοῦντες] 'rival claimants or competitors'.

η οἱ ἔχθροι] c. 6. 24. This applies especially to contested superiority in personal excellences or accomplishments. If rivals and enemies, (τὸ μὲν) who are most interested in disparaging their adversary, and most inclined to do so, if even these admit his superiority, we may take it for granted that every one else will do so, and therefore this is equivalent to the universal admission of it (ὅς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαίνειν). If 'judges', those that have the right to decide by reason of special qualification, the artist or professor, the expert or adept in any pursuit or study, or those whom they select as qualified to pronounce a decision. if such as these decide in a man's favour, then it is the decision (τὸ δὲ) of 'authorities', as it were, men empowered and entitled, or who have the right ('κύριοι) to judge and decide, and (or rather, 'because of') the special knowledge which the occasion requires (ὁι εἰδότες); and this decision is final. Compare notes on 6. 25, 7. 21.

Victorius and Schrader appear to confuse κρίνειν to its judicial sense of deciding a legal cause, οἷς οὖσιν κρίνοντι being those who are selected or deputed to try a particular case when the ordinary judges are prevented from being present themselves. If there were any doubt between the two interpretations, the question would be decided by the following passage: ἐκαστὸς δὲ κρίνει καλὸς ἡ γνώσει, καὶ τοῦτον ἐστίν ἑγαθὸς κριτής. Eth. N. 1 11. 1094 b 27.

ὅς ἂν εἰ] Note on καίν εἰ, 1 1. 5, p. 9.

§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, accomplishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes (οὔτε μὲν, ἐστιν ὅτε, ἐνώπτε), in some cases, the superior value of a possession of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of being without it (a case of στέρρωσις, § 16); in other cases the reverse may be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a superior value, § 14.

§ 30. καλλίω γὰρ] § 24. Virtue is the only true object of 'praise', ἔπαινοι. Introd. Appendix Ik. 1, c. 9, p. 212 seq.

ἄν αἰ τιμαὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'and things (especially actions) may be regarded as
'greater', or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, of a thing, ἀξία, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the comparative value of two things: and the opposite acts which involve a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. ζημία, not 'losses', ἀποθολαί, as it has been understood, but 'penalties', directly opposed to τιμαί 'rewards'. So Victorius.

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are manifestly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present themselves at once as such, φαινόμενα. A conspicuous instance of this common sense of φαινόμενος, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. II 2, 1 (see note) in the definition of ὑπόγη. Comp. I 9.32, 8.6; III 2.9.

καὶ διαφορὰμενα κ.τ.λ.] This and the following are purely rhetorical topics, and belong rather to the third book, On style. One mode of exaggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a whole. ‘The same facts or events’, when thus individually represented, will ‘seem greater’ than if they were all summed up together in one statement; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the summary statement, will seem to be shewn ‘in more points’, which are all brought severally into view. πλείωνον ὑπερέχειν is ‘to exceed in a greater number of points’, whether we understand the genitive as one of quantity ‘in more things’, which is probably right, or as the comparative genitive after ὑπερέχειν, ‘to surpass more things’, by which the meaning is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the number of things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. VIII 3. 61 sq., who however refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the ἐνέργεια or vividness of the picture. § 67, sic urbiurum captarum crescit miseratio. Sine dubio enim quid dicit expugnatam esse civitatem complectitur omnia quaeque tali fortuna recipit; sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis hic velut nuncius. At si aperias haec, et cetera. [then follows the description]. Majoragius refers to Cicero's description of Pompey's military experience in the speech pro lege Manilia, and Gaisford to Harris, Philol. Inqui- ries, p. 58 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. He assigns this to 'accumulation' and 'concatenation'. Shakespeare, in the Tempest, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [IV. i. 152]. Comp. Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues is heightened by the enumeration in detail of all the different nations whose language was spoken; 'Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites.' Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil (Vol. VII p. 81, Ellis and Sped. ed.), No. 5, is a good commentary on this topic in its most general application.
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**ΠΙΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ A 7 § 31.**


eis tā mērī tā autā meίξω faίνεται: πλειόνων γάρ υπερέχειν faίνεται. Ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς φησὶ πείσαι λέγοντας τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστήναι ὅσα κάκ' ἀνθρώποις πέλει τῶν ἀστυ ἀλώη.

Lαιο μὲν φθεῖνουσι, πόλιν δὲ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει, τέκνα δὲ τ' ἄλλοι αἴγονυσι.

καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὁσπέρ Ἐπίχαρ-


ὁ ποιητὴς φησὶ] Homer to wit, II. ix 592. The reading of the Vulg. is κρίνει ὧν ἀνθρώποι πέλει τῶν ἀστυ ἀλώη ἀνθρώπς μὲν κτείνουσι, and the rest quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spalding, ad Quint. VIII 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on II. xv 496, referring to the other passage of Homer: ῥήτορικός τὸ εἰν πράγμα, τὴν πόρθησιν, εἰς πολλὰ κατεμέρεσιν.

τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν] are added to the preceding topic of 'detail' as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be inferred from the identification of 'detail' with 'accumulation' by Harris, p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are 'accumulation' and 'climax'. ἐποικοδομήσας is the building up of one phrase upon (ἐπι) another, one rising above another step by step, like the rounds of a 'ladder' (κλίμαξ), or the stages of a building. Rhet. ad Alex. 3 (4), 9, ἐποικοδομοῦντι τὸ ἑτερον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτερον αὔξειν τρόπῳ τοὐσδε, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. An. 1 18, 34, 724 a 28, ἐπὶ δὲ παρὰ ταύτα ὡς Ἐπίχαρμος ποιεῖ τὴν ἐποικοδο-


§ 32. επεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ αὐτὸ τῇ διαφέρει (ὅ γάρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλὴν) καὶ ὅτι ἄρχη φαίνεται 32 μεγάλων καὶ αἰτίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ

[προσερ] Ἐπιχαρμος] Besides the illustration of the figure climax from Epicharmus quoted above from the de Gen. Anim., there is another and a more complete one in Athen. II 36 c. D, indicated by Schrader, ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοῖνη, ἐκ δὲ θοῖνης πόσις ἐγένετο, ἐκ δὲ πάσιος κώμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγένετο θυανία, ἐκ δὲ θυανίας δίκη, ἐκ δικῆς δὲ καταδικῆ, ἐκ δὲ καταδικῆς πέδαι τε καὶ σφάκελος καὶ ἔμμια.

διὰ τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαφέρει] Two reasons are now given for the impression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same as that which accounts for it in the case of διαφέρεις; the accumulation of particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and so producing the impression of superiority, ἕ γάρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλὴν: and secondly, you make that which you are endeavouring to magnify appear to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, which you seem to multiply by detailing them. The following passage of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this and the entire section: συλληβδήν δὲ, ἐὰν πολλῶν αἰτίων ἀποφαίνη, ἐὰν τέ ἄγαθον ἐὰν τέ κακῶν, μέγαλα φανεῖται. οὐκοπέταθεν δὲ καὶ τὸ πράγμα ὑπόθεν φανεῖται κατὰ μέρη διαφαίνεσθαι ἡ καθολος λεγόμενον, καὶ ὑποτέρως ἢ μείζον ἢ, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον αὐτὸ λέγειν. τὸς μὲν ἄν αἰξίμελεν καὶ μετὰ πλείον ποιήσεις καὶ μεγίστας, ταπεινώσεις δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὰ ἄγαθα καὶ τὰ κακά τῶν ἑναιτίων τρόπον μετώπων, ὡς εἰρθαμένον ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἢ μηδένος αἰτίων ἐπιδεικνύσει, εἶ δὲ μή ὃς ἐλαχίστων καὶ σμικροτάτων.

§ 32. επεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μείζον] supr. § 14. An exemplification of this topic is found in Eth. Nic. VIII 15, 1163 a 12, οἱ μὲν γάρ παθόντες τοιαῦτα φασὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν ἐνεργείων ἢ μικρὰ ἢν εἴκοσι καὶ ἔξιν παρ᾽ ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασκιμικοστερείς οἱ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἂ παρ᾽ ἄλλων οὐκ ἢν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἡ τοιαῦται χρεῖαι. The additional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the Topics), in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and occasions (καιροί), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties that are called into exercise (δυνάμεις), is derived from the scarcity of such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing them. The καιρός in two aspects is exemplified in the Topics, Π 2, 117

1 Müllach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. p. 143, gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, Dindorf, and Bochart.

A. ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοῖνα, ἐκ δὲ θοῖνας πόσις ἐγένετο. B. χαρίεν, ὡς γ' ἐμίν δοκεί.
A. ἐκ δὲ πάσιος κώμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγένεθ' θανία, ἐκ δ' ἀναίας δίκη, 'κ δίκης δ' ἐγένετο καταδίκη, ἐκ δὲ καταδικᾶς πέδαι τε καὶ σφάκελος (the stocks) καὶ χαρία.

The other passage, in the de Gen. An., Müllach attempts to correct himself, and produces this melodious verse, p. 144,

ἐκ διαβολάς κώμος ἐγένετο, πολλοῦ δ' ἐκ μήμον μάχα.
σπανιώτερον μείζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα; p. 27. εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρὶ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ ὀὕτως ἡ ἐνταύθα ἡ τοῦ, ἐξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. οἴτε καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκη;

a 26—b 21. Add Prov. xv. 23, a word spoken in due season, how good is it. χρόνοι is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: δυνάμεις, as Aristotle himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something ‘beyond his powers’, above his ordinary level, and more than you would expect from him; and παρὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους is exemplified by the epigram and the saying of Iphicrates.

καὶ εἰ ὀὕτως κ.τ.λ.] ‘and if such things be done (οὕτως), at particular places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things (i.e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites’. ὀὕτως may however mean under particular circumstances.


Eustathius l. c. explains ἀσίλλα, σκεύος τί ἱχθυρον. It is described by Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. ἄστυπολεῖ, as a ἰμχυμ, a sort of wooden yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the fish-baskets.

πρόσθε μεν ἀμφ’ ὠμοισὶν ἔχων τραχείαν ἁσίλλαν ἰχθύς εὖ· Ἀργοὺς εἰς Τεγέαν ἐφερον.
καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκώμιαζε λέγων εὐδής τὸν ἔπικτήτον χαλεπώτερον γὰρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμὶ.
34 καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν
Alciphron 1, 1. p. 6, εἰπὼς οὖν ὄψιν πλήσιων, καὶ τὰς ἁσίλλας ἐσωμίους ἀνελόμενα, καὶ τὰς ἐκατέρθεντας σπινθάρας ἐξαρτήσατο (quoted in Anthol.). Otherwise called τύλη. Arist. Ach. 860, 954. Diog. Laert. ix 53, of Protagoras, who was ἐκπειράσας, εἶπεν, ὁς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης εἰς τὸ περὶ παιδείας φορμοφόρου γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Ἐπικούρος ποι ἐκπαιδεύει. So that Protagoras may be added to the examples of εὐδής τῶν εἰς οἷα, I 9, 31, or εὐδής τὸν ὑπήρχε ταῦτα.

The exclamation of Iphicrates ‘from what I rose to this’ (from what an origin this my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form (Buhle) in c. 9, 31, εὐδής τῶν εἰς οἷα, as is also part of the Epigram. Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphicrates, Nos. 1 and 5, has these notices of him. ‘Ἰφικράτης δοκοῦντοι εἶναι σκυτοτόμοι κατεφρονεῖτο’ δοξάσαν δὲ τούτῳ πρῶτος ἐτέχει ὅτε τραυμάζον πολέμου ἀνήρ μετά τῶν ὀφελῶν ζωνην συναρπάζατο εἰς τῆς ἐναύου τρήμη μετέγεγεν. Νο. 5, πρὸς δὲ Ἀριστοτέλην τῶν παλαίων Ἀρμοδίου ἄπόγονων εἰς δυσφένειαν αὐτῷ λοικοφούμενον ἑφη, τὸ μὲν ἐμοὶ ἀπ’ ἐμοὶ γένος ἀρχέται, τὸ δὲ σοὶ ἐν σοὶ παύεται.

§ 33. τὸ αὐτοφύες τοῦ ἔπικτητον] ‘native superior to acquired talents and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to come by’; nature being rather chary of such gifts, and the acquisition of them comparatively easy. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 10, καὶ τὸ φύες τοῦ μη φύες, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύει τὸ δ’ ἐπίκτητον. This topic has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 a 7—10. Comp. Pind. Ol. ix 152, τὸ δὲ φυά κράτιστον ἄταν. 1155, σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὸς φυά μαθὼν χεῖ αὐξανεῖ σοφός γαρ νῦν τὸς ὁμώνυμος Ὀμήρος. Ncm. iii 69, συγγεγενεῖ δὲ τις ἀρετὴ μέγα βριθεῖ ὃς ὁ διδάκτης ἕξει φεβρύον ἀνὴρ. Specie autem comparantur ut anteposantur quae propter se expetenda sunt iis quae propter alium: ut in mata atque insita assumptis et adventitios et seq. Cíc. Topic. xviii 69.


§ 34. οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον κ.τ.λ.] This celebrated simile does not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles’ mouth by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, may have omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Herodotus, vii 162, attributes nearly the same identical words to Gelo, it seems more probable that it was erroneously ascribed to the other: at all events it is quite clear that it could not have been original in his mouth. It appears, likewise, in a somewhat altered form, in Euripides (Suppl. 447, πῶς οὖν ἄτρ’ ἄν γένοιτ’ ἐν ἰσχυρὰ πόλε, ὅταν τε ἃς λειμῶν ἡμῶν αὐτὰρν

Λ. Α. I.
§ 35. Tā ἐν χρείᾳ...μείζονι χρήσιμα, (μείζον ἐστί;) A friend in need is a friend indeed. Ἅυγετ manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaque corum qui beneficium accipiant, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinum significavit (p. 471, 1), πάντες μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἰσος ἰδίων ἀνώπολομβάνειν οἱ προφαρχουστέ το ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς εὗ, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ παρὰ τὰς χρείας. Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 a 16, in estimating the value of services to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that they are τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς (the best you have to give), καὶ ἀ παρ’ ἄλλων οὐκ ἢν, καὶ ἐν κυδοῖς ἢ τοιαῦται χρείαις.

Tō αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς. The comparison in the expression of this topic is left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxtaposition by καὶ, one and the other are laid before us, in order that we may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, or good in itself, καθ’ αὐτό, or good in general, need not be the best for us (to a man’s own self), any particular individual, αὐτῷ, though theoretically, from the higher point of view, it is superior to the other. Top. 11, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἅγαθὼν τῷ τινὶ ἀμετώτερου. Alexander, in his Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 b 26, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀδυνάτου), illustrates this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as

1 The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained.
well to the ἀπλῶς and αὐτῷ as to that for which it is immediately intended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable in itself, but it is out of our reach; for us therefore a long life, which may possibly be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus’ dictum, quoted in Eth. Nic. x 5, 1176 a 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse (ἀὔριματα) to gold; because it is pleasanter to him. Comp. I 15, 12, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

αὐτῷ (al. αὐτῷ) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhle, Gaisf., Bekker, Spengel, and Bonitz, Arist. Stud. I p. 88. It is the equivalent of τίνι in the familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the Topics above quoted; comp. I 9, 17 αὐτῷ, I 15, 19, II 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἄγαθον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καθὸν ἀπλῶς: and as in the repetition of the antithesis, I 15, 12, it assumes the form of αὐτῷ, ‘good to a man’s own self’, i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form can in many cases be substituted for the other. On αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ and the rest, see Waitz, Ὀργ. p. 486, 54 a 14. Rhet. I 1, 12, ἀνάγκη δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡπάσαμα. Also, Buttm. Excur. x ad Dem. c. Mid. p. 140, de formis αὐτῶν et αὐτόν. ἦ for καὶ, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested by Bonitz, l.c., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary.

τὸ δυνάτων τοῦ δυνάτων] Top. Γ 1, 116 b 26. See Alexander’s example in the last note but one. Another occurs in II 2, 2, on anger, ἦδον μὲν γὰρ τὸ οὐσθαί τευχεσθαι ἢν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινόμενον ἄδυνατων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὃ δ᾽ ὀργίζομενος ἐφίεται αὐτῷ. We deliberate, with a view to action, and that which is to be preferred of two courses of action, only about things which we believe to be possible, and possible to us; κἂν μὲν ἄδυνατο ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται...ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνεται ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Eth. Nic. III 5, II12 b 25.

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the only good for us, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ.

τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου] The end in question is not the temporal end, but the final cause. The τέλος is in itself good, 7, 8, 9; 6, 2; the higher or nearer to the end (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλει) are any of the means employed for the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the end itself; hence τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου, the means included in, or those which subserve, the end of life—happiness, or whatever else the end of life may be—are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 23, τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετάτερον μᾶλλον ἦ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὔδαιμον ὑποτείνου ἦ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν.

§ 36. τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the apparent or sham; τὸ εἶναι and τὸ δοκεῖν, τὸ ὑπὸ καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον; the solid, genuine, substantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and ‘appearance’; or truth as absolute certainty, and probable opinion. Top. Γ 3, 118 b 20,
And The Amphiaraus of Soph., p.r. but his appearance will suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can be 'made to appear' that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better than to receive a benefit.

§ 37. ἂσα εἶναι μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] The difference between this and the preceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the general rule, and refers to 'every thing' that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to, πρὸς αἰλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον, as the warrant and foundation of this. The second is a special variety of the first, 'what men wish to be'; the qualities, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess. Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external appearance of the virtue. 'And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular opinion (ἡφαίστ. Plat. Rep. 11 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the vulgar, οἱ πολλοὶ, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thrasymachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality, whereas in the case of health it is the reverse'. Victorius quotes, in exemplification of φαίνει, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 τοῦ μὲν δικαίου τὴν δόξην ἄρνον, τὰ δ' ἔργα τοῦ πάν δρόμων ἑγα κερδανείς. Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30, 8. Another fragment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenaeer 'Diar. in Fragon. Eur. p. 160, to Euripides' Ixion.
διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἡ εἶναι αἱρετῶτερον τὸ δὲ υγιαίνειν οὐ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμότερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν ἥδονήν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλὰ. διὸ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ υγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπαντῶ

§ 38. τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμότερον] Τοπ. Γ 3, 118 b 27, ἐτι διελέσθην ποσεῖδος τὸ αἰρετῶν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ ἡ τοῦ ἠδονῆς τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἀπαντὰ πρὸς τὰ πλεῖον χρήσιμον αἱρετῶτερον ἄν υπάρχῃ τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως. Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions.

§ 39. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ’ ἠδονῆς] Τοπ. Γ 2, 117 a 23, καὶ ταῦτα μεθ’ ἠδονῆς μᾶλλον ἡ ἄνευ ἠδονῆς καὶ ταῦτα μεθ’ ἀλυπίας μᾶλλον ἡ μετὰ λύπης. The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any pleasure that accompanies such things; so the εὐεργείαν are completed and perfected by the accompanying ἠδονή in each case, Eth. N. X 3, 4, 5. And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may be regarded as a positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric combines the two, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being ‘more than one’ are superior to either of the two separately. καὶ is therefore ‘together with’; and ὡστε υπάρχει κ. τ. λ. ‘and so (in the case supposed) we have (there are there, υπάρχει) the positive pleasure and the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good’.

καὶ δοῦν...τὸ ὀλον ποιεῖ] A + B is greater than A + C, therefore B is greater than C. Τοπ. Γ 5, 119 a 22, ἐτι ἐκ τῆς προσβέσεως εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστίθημεν τὸ ὀλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο, ἡ εἰ τῷ ἄτομο τοιοῦτο προστίθημεν τὸ ὀλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο. In the second of these two cases, if the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity x, to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that x is less than 8.

§ 40. ἡ λαυθάνει] a has been omitted, either by the author or a tran-
scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 273 Α, τονυντίων εἶτες ἢ δύναται. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. 'Things that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and may therefore lay claim to the preference'.

διὸ τὸ πλούτειν φανεῖν ἄν μεῖζον ἄγαθον τοῦ δοκεῖν] This, the vulgar reading, which Victorius found in all his MSS, is no inference or exemplification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, the show or appearance, τὸ δοκεῖν, of wealth is said λανθάνειν, not to be seen; which is absurd. It does follow from the topic in § 37, and may possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the Greek Scholiast give πλούτειν...καὶ δοκεῖν, but it seems unlikely that the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be so widely separated: also καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν would be required. This was corrected by Muretus, τὸ πλούτειν καὶ δοκεῖν φανεῖν ἄν μεῖζον ἄγαθον τοῦ πλούτειν, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, διὸ τὸ πλούτειν καὶ δοκεῖν φανεῖν ἄν μεῖζον ἄγαθον τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν (Schneidewin's Philologus iv i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek Schol., who explains it, καὶ τὸ πλούτειν καὶ φαίνεσθαι μεῖζον τοῦ πλούτειν καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the interchange, viz. of τὸ and τοῦ, τοῦ πλούτειν...τὸ δοκεῖν. The meaning of this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the possessor would lose all the credit of it—but this involves perhaps rather a non-natural interpretation of πρὸς ἄλληδεαν τείνει. I am indebted to Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention: the substitution of τῷ, for τοῦ, δοκεῖν: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented by the addition of the prominent and conspicuous display of it. Beckler and Spengel retain the vulgar.

§ 41. τὸ ἀγαπητὸν κ.τ.λ.] not here 'to be acquiesced in', 'that which one may be content with', (as in Eth. Nic. i, 1034 b 19); nor in the reputed Homeric sense of 'unique', 'only', but 'highly valued', 'dearly prized'.

1 Of the four places in which ἀγαπητὸς occurs in Homer, and is interpreted μονογενῆς, unicus, one, Od. β 365, has the addition of μοῖνος, which seems to show that there, at any rate, ἀγαπητὸς cannot mean μοῖνος or μονογενῆς; and in the others the translation 'dearly beloved' is just as suitable and probable. It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the Interp. of Matth. iii. 17, Mark i. 11, Luc. iii. 22, and other places where Christ is called ὁ ἀγαπητὸς νῦν ὁ ὕπο. Dr Lightfoot, in Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philol. Vol. iii. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of ἀγαπᾶν 'to welcome'—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it expresses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated
The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest
in Homer rather by 'fondled or caressed', than 'beloved'. Fritzsch, on Eth.
Eud. iii. 6, 1233 b 2, renders τοιόν ἀγαπητὸν, filii unice dilecti. See the references
in his note. Heinsius, Exercit. Sacr. in Marc. i. 11 (quoted by Gaisford),
pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. unicus, unigenitus, prater
quam alius non datur; referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to
Homer, and to Hesychius ἀγαπητὸν, μονογενῆ. Victorius more in accordance with
facts says, "carum valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit 'si
quid carius est oculis' quo uno se aliquid consolatur, in quo omnem spem
saorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere
poteat:" which exactly defines it. The use of the Latin unicus is precisely
similar.
authority, carries most weight, κυρίωτατον) of all in conferring the power and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the exact (analytical διελέον) knowledge of all the existing varieties of constitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and interests (συμφέροντα) which respectively belong to them'. Ad consilium autem de republica dandum caput est nosse rempublicam; ad discendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civilitatis, qui quia eredro mutandur, genus quoque orationis est sacre mutandum. Cic. de Orat. II 82. 337. § 2. έτι δέ κυρία κ.τ.λ. Not only must the public speaker be acquainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expedient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also with the nature of the governing body (τὸ κύριον) in each; it is by the declarations or proclamations (ἀποφάσεις) of this supreme authority that the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and as these are various under the several constitutions (τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται—κυρία ἑστὶν), so he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing varieties.

ἀποφάσεις] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: ἀποφάσεις is found in two MSS: ἀποφάσεις also occurs, with a varia lectio ἀπόφασις in two MSS, in the sense of ‘a declaration or utterance’ (as here) in II 21. 2. ἀποφάσις is no doubt used in the common language in two different senses, (1) ‘denial, contradiction’, as usually in Aristotle, from ἀποφαίνει, and (2) ‘a declaration’, from ἀποφαίνειν, as in Demosthenes and Polya- bius, vi 3. 1, τὴν ὑπ’ θου μέλλοντος ἀποφαί, 9. 11; 12. 10. But Aristotle most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the περί ἑρμηνείας, as c. 1, 16 a 1, δεῖ διότι...τι ἑστὶν ἀποφάσις καὶ κατάφασις (negative and affirmative) καὶ ἀποφάσις (an enunciation) καὶ λόγος. c. 5, 17 a 8, λόγος ἀποφάσικος κατάφασις, ἐστι ἀποφάσις; c. 6, 17 a 25, κατάφασις δὲ ἑστὶν ἀπόφασις τινος ἀπό των: and in very many other places. Is it possible that the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the language: and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manuscript authority included, that the question cannot be positively determined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, ‘equidem iure meo ἀποφαίνειν reposei.’

1 As φάσις is derived from φαίνειν, so of course may ἀποφάσις be formed from ἀποφαίνειν.
§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. vi (iv) 7, init.

τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρίνον κ.τ.λ. [the sovereign power, the highest authority, τὸ κύριον; or the 'power' which 'decides', τὸ κρίνον, with which rests the ultimate decision, τὸ which lies the ultimate appeal—this sovereign power 'is always either a part of one of these four or the whole of it'; the 'part' in the three latter cases of the forms named: the 'whole' in the democratical form alone.

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are determined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by each of them; this is the ὁρος, the characteristic mark, or determining principle, of each, that which severally 'characterizes' them; and this is in each case a special conception of political justice, τὸ δίκαιον. Pol. III 9, init.

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people by themselves (διανίκομεναι, mid.) and by lot, each member of the entire body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equivalent to saying that the ὁρος of a democracy, its determining principle, that which gives its special character is 'equality', ἰσότης, which is the foundation of the ἐλευθερία (usually assigned as its ὁρος), and therefore its proper τέλος. This is laid down in Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 30 seq. 'Liberty' and 'equality' are the catchwords of a democracy. δύν γὰρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὀφίσθαι, τὸ τὸ πλείον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ὅσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅσον δὲ ὁ τι ἄν δόξη τῷ πλῆθει τούτῳ εἶναι κύριον, ἐλευθερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅσον τὸ ὅ τι ἄν βουληταί τίς ποιεῖν (Pol. VIII (v) 9, sub fin.). Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (Ib. 1290 b 7 seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 10, ἀριστοκρατία μὲν γὰρ ὁρος ἀρετῆς, ὀλγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δὲ ἐλευθερία. Another current ὁρος of democracy is the will of the majority: where that is sovereign the state is democratical. Ib. vii (vi) 3, 1318 a 18, φανεί γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅτι ἄν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσιν. But this again rests upon the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are individually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher right, and therefore prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because all barbarians are naturally inferior to Greeks. The use of the 'lot',

1 This however is common to all three, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy; in all of them alike, ὅτι ἄν δόξη τῷ πλείον μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ' ἐστι κύριον. Pol. vi (iv) 8, 1294 a 13.
which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplification of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 14 seq.

The 'ôros of oligarchy is πλούτος: and therefore property, a census, τίμημα (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, εν η' οi απο τιμημάτων (διανέμονται τας αρχας, they likewise distribute amongst themselves, keep to themselves, all offices of state, all the powers of government). Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1290 b 1: the different kinds of oligarchy, Ibid. c. 5, the first is το απο τιμημάτων. The oligarchical theory of 'justice' is therefore οτι αν δουλη τη' πλείον οὐσία' κατα πλήθος γιαρ οὐσίας φασι κρίνεται δειν, VII (vi) 8, 1318 a 19. A complete definition of δημοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχία is given, VI (iv) 4, 1290 b 17. In the popular Rhetoric oî απο τιμημάτων is the general designation of the privileged class: but in the exacter Politics vi (iv) 5, two kinds of τιμήματα are distinguished which characterise two different kinds of oligarchies; one in which the property qualification is only so high as to exclude the poor, and acquired property procures admission into the privileged class: the other in which the qualification is high, and the governing class, which is therefore small, fill up themselves the vacancies as they occur. Again, απο τιμημάτων is too wide a term, and therefore not properly characteristic: it includes more than oligarchies, one form of democracy, το τας αρχας απο τιμημάτων είναι, βραχέων δε τουτων άυτων, Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 39. Plato has the same phrase to describe an oligarchy, η απο τιμημάτων πολιτεία. Rep. VIII 550 C. Legg. III 698 B, πολιτεία και εκ τιμημάτων αρχαί τεττάρων, of the Solonian constitution.

The 'ôros of aristocracy is in the Politics ἀρετή and not παιδεία. The two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the apparent discrepancy. 'Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean that which is established by the law of the land: for it is those who have lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the aristocracy'. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies under different forms of government. The system of education must therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to its established institutions. This is the 'education established by the law' of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. x 10, 1179 b 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. v (viii) of the Politics. "Such men as these must necessarily appear 'best', and it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name". Since παιδεία therefore is the necessary preparation for ἀρετή, either of them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of ἀριστοκρατία are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 a 34, where two explanations of the ἀριστον in the name are given: either δια το τοις ἀμιτοις ἄρχεν which is adopted here; or δια το προσ το ἀριστον τη' πόλει και τοις κοινωνισταν αυτής: c. 15. 1286 b 4, των πλείων ἄρχην ἀγαθων δ καθόν, Bl. vi (iv) 8. 1294 a 9. δοκει δε ἀριστοκρατία μεν είναι μάλιστα το τοις τιμάς νενε-
γαρχία δὲ ἐν ἣ ὁ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἣ ὁ κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κειμένην· ὁ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἀρχοῦσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων φαίνεσθαι ἀριστοῦς· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα εἰληφεῖ τούτο. μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦνομα ἐν ἣ εἰς R. 1366 d. απάντων κύριος ἐστὶν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινα βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυράννις. τὸ δὲ τέλος μὴθανα κατ' ἀρετὴν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅροι ἀρετή. But, c. 15, 1299 ὅ 25, ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις (αἱ ἀρχαί) ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.

μοναρχία[...] the sole government of one, includes βασιλεία κατὰ τάξιν τινα, a monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, constitutional monarchy, ἐπὶ ἄρισταις γέραισιν πατρικῇ βασιλείᾳ, Thuc. I 13, and the 'indefinite', unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or the absence of it. So in Pol. III 14, 1285 a 27, ὁ μὲν γὰρ (βασιλεῖς) κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων, ὁ δ' ἀκόντων ἀρχοῦσιν. The second of these two distinctions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 ὅ 2 (βασιλείαι) διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικά εἶναι διεσποτικά, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικά. 'Usurpation', as the distinctive difference of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (Eth. N. VIII 12), is insufficient. The government of the hereditary monarchs of Persia is 'tyrannous' in respect of the nature and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian monarchies are κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί, Pol. III 14, 1285 a 18 and 22, ὁ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεῖς τύραννων γίνεται, Eth. N. VIII 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a mercenary 'body-guard', φύλακτη (this is distinctive of 'tyranny'; see Rhet. I 2. 19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, by a national guard of citizens, III 14, 1285 a 24. But the true distinction between them is determined by the end of the government of each: with the one it is his own interest, τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον: with the other it is the interest of the governed, πρὸς τὸ καυνὸν συμφέρον, III 7, 1279 a 27—31, VIII (v) 10, 1311 a 2, ἵ δὲ τυράννις...πρὸς οὔθεν ἀποβλήτει καυνὸν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδιᾶς ὀψελείας χάριν. ἐστὶ δὲ σκοτὸς τυραννικὸς τὸ ἱδί, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καυνὸν.

§ 5. The 'end' of each form of government may be identified with its ὅροι, because 'everything being determined by its end', the end does determine (ὁριζέται) or characterise the special form which each kind of government assumes. These ὅροι or τέλη have already been considered in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be acquainted with it. 'Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and interests should be conducted, because it is to this that the motives and actions of the body of men that we have to address are ultimately directed'.
ékáστης πολιτείας οὐ δεὶ λαυθάνειν· αἰρόνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἑστὶ δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλυγαρχίας δὲ πλουτός, αριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δὴλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης ἐθή καὶ νόμμα καὶ συμφέροντα διαμετέτον, ἀπερ ἔαρονται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι' ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου

tyranntidos de phylakhe phylakhe is here 'precaution', 'self-defence'—a form of self-interest. το ίδιον συμβέρων, characteristic of 'tyranny'—and hence, as a means to this end, the phylakhe in its other sense, the mercenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. But as a phylakhe, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, or revolutionists,—the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the personal danger; in governments of many, where the members are numerous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, and consequently it is not made—so here basileia or monarχia is included under the general head of tyranwis: so Schrader. Failing to see this, some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast1, had inserted the clause basileias de to evnomos epistatain, which being wanting in all the MSS, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius' and Schrader's view, thinks that some words descriptive of the telos of the basileia have dropt out; and Spengel, by 'indicating a lacuna' (Rhct. Gr. Praef. vi), appears to be of the same opinion.

Upon the whole I think that Brandis' view of the question is to be preferred (Philologus iv i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he has already subdivided monarχia into basileia and tyranwis in § 4. Consequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and something to represent the telos of basileia has been lost.

§ 6. On this kind of ηθος, one of the three by which an ethical character is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argument or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182, and on the ηθος in general, p. 110 seq.

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as determined by the end of their special form of government; a democratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oligarchical audience, and vice versa.

1 It is Brandis' 'Anonymus.' See his paper in Schneidewin's Philologus, iv i p. 43.
7. ἀλλὰ καὶ δὲ ἡθικοῦ (τῶ γὰρ ποιῶν τινα φαινεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τούτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαινηται ή εὑνουσ ή ἄμφω), δέοι αὖ τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἡθος πιθανῶστατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ ληφθῆσαι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθῆσαν κ.τ.λ.] These ‘political characters’, he says, ‘will be found by the same means’, by the same kind of observation and study, as the other ἡθη, the individual characters: ‘in both, the characters are manifested in the choice or purpose’, which is always directed to the end (which we desire to attain). As the individual character is shewn by the purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, as a body, is manifested in their choice and purpose, which is directed to the general end, aim, and object, or the general pervading principle, of the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which gives them their national character; and to this the speech must conform in order to be acceptable.

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the analysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. ‘We have treated of the general objects of the public speaker’s aims and efforts, viz. of what is good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4—7); and we have further pointed out the channels and modes (διὰ τῶν καὶ πῶς) by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the characters and institutions of the various forms of government; but only so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, because (γὰρ) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if required) in the Politics.’

1 ἡθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. Rhet. 11 21. 16, ἡθος δ’ ἐχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, ἐν οἷς δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις. Poet. vi. 24, ἐστι δὲ ἡθος μὲν τὸ ταοῦτον ὁ δῆλον τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅπολα τις διάσερ οὐκ ἐχοντιν ἡθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδὲ ὀλος ἐστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἡ φείγει οἱ λέγων. Schrader.
The following passage of Cicero, de Or. II 84. 342, will serve as a commentary on the treatment of 'good' and 'virtue' in this chapter and c. 6; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their utility, § 6:

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virtuti uni putatur; sed tamen quod ipsa virtus in carum rerum usu ac modratione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes quae videntur in moribus hominum et quaedam comitata ac beneficentia posita; aliae quae in ingenii aliqua faculitate aut animi magnitudine et robore. Nam elementia, institia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus incunda est auditu in laudationibus; omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis qui cas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur.

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic functions.

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the ἴδη, characters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. This is to be effected by producing by the speech (artistically, not by any evidence of character previously acquired, 'authority') the impression upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity; of our practical wisdom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our goodwill towards themselves; this being 'the second mode of persuading' (ἦν 'was said', cf. c. 2 §§ 3, 4): because the same materials can be employed in representing ourselves as well as others as 'trustworthy in respect of virtue', as men of such a character as can be depended upon.

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the ἐπιδεικτικῶς γίνος of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and delivered 'with or without a serious purpose (σπουδή)'; the latter are burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in general, see Introd. p. 121–123. In the burlesque kind, anything
however mean and trifling, ‘inanimate things, or any insignificant animal’, may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the way of examples or illustrations.

āψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ᾣφων τὸ τυχόν] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on 11.24.2); and others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. §12). As an extant specimen of these trifling productions we have the μνίας ἐγκώμιον of Lucian (cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. §189). S.

§ 3. καλῶν] See note on c. 7, 24. Eth. Eudem. vii 15. 3, τῶν γὰρ ἄγαθὸν πάντων τῆς ἐστὶν, ἂν αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα ἐστίν αἱρετὰ. τούτων δὲ καλὰ ὅσα δὲ αὐτὰ ὅστα πάντα ἐπανετά ἐστιν. τούτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἱ τε πράξεις εἰσίν ἐπανεταί καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπανετά, δικαίωσὺν καὶ αὐτῇ καὶ αἱ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπανετῶν; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἐπανος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, ἃ αὐτῷ; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure.

Virtue therefore must of necessity be καλῶν, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general ‘approbation’.

§ 4. ᾑρετῇ] The definition of virtue here given compared with the celebrated one of Eth. Nic. 11 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon the popular mind. Instead of a ἓξις it is a mere δύναμις, an undeveloped faculty or power—this is most expressly denied in Eth. N. ii 4. 1106 a 5,
The doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by which this relative mean is to be determined.

Regarded as a δύναμις, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in ‘providing and securing or keeping good things’—for oneself, apparently, by the exercise of any ἀρετή, excellence or accomplishment bodily or mental—and secondly, ‘a power of conferring benefits, or doing services, many and great, in fact all in everything (on all occasions)’. πάντων περὶ πάντα is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to Cassius (ad Div. xv 17, 1, sed expectat πάντα περὶ πάντων¹). This is the moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society.

§ 5. μέρη ἀρετῆς| Comp. 5 § 9. The list of virtues here given differs from that in the Nic. Ethics ii 7, and iii 9—iv 15, in the following particulars. All the moral virtues from δικαιοσύνη to προφήτης inclusive appear in the Ethics, δικαιοσύνη being treated separately in Bk. v, and the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the intellect, φρόνησις practical wisdom, and σοφία speculative wisdom or philosophy, in Bk. vi. σοφία is omitted in the detailed explanation of the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, and would be useless to the rhetorician. προφήτης, which in the Ethics is ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there ἐξεις, here διεύμενες, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a πάθος, so that it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished in Eth. Nic. ii 4. The anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἄφιδος-τημία is omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an accomplished gentleman, viz. ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, and φιλία, and also the two virtues of the πάθος, viz. αἰθός and νέμεσις. No notice is taken here of ἔγκρατεια, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk. vii, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument in favour of ascribing that book to Eudemus, which on all grounds is most probable.

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held in honour amongst mankind: and in the next degree liberality, because it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (ἀντιγωνίζομαι) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything besides.

¹ Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the text it means ‘all kinds on all occasions’, in Cicero it is ‘all the news about everything’.
§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and
in this shews obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following,
which are all specially characterised by ‘obedience to the law’, are
thereby invested with a political and objective character, and dis-
tinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and indi-
vidual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens
good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the
laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the
perfect citizen varying under various constitutions.  

§ 8. ándría] In the chapter on this virtue of ‘gratitude’ in the Nic.
Ethics, III 11, ándreia (as it is there written) is first defined in general
terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire con-
fidence, or encouragement, or boldness, tà tharráðia, on the one hand,
and fear on the other: its sole object and aim in choosing a course of
action and encountering danger being tà kalóv, the right and noble as
an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies
also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgraceful. This
is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pain, labour, danger,
in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and noble object, when
the opposite course would be base, mean, disgraceful1. From this are

1 Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate and voluntary, δὲ δ’ οὐ δι’ 
ánagkhev ándreiov einai, ἀλλ’ ὑπὶ καλὸν (1116 ὧ 2).

AR. I.
then distinguished five popular notions of 'courage', ἀνδρεία in a narrower sense, none of which can be properly called 'fortitude'. The first of these is political courage: the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, and living under and directed by its laws, described in 1116a 17—b 2. And this seems to be the view of courage which is taken here, the terms employed in each corresponding very closely, διοικεῖν γὰρ ὑπομείνειν τῶν κινδύνων (this restricts the virtue to facing danger and gives it a narrower sense than 'fortitude') οἵ πολίται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιστήματα καὶ τὰ ἀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμᾶς, a 18. δὲ αἰδὼ (it is due to a sense of honour) καὶ διὰ καλὸν ὀρέξειν, τιμῆς γὰρ καὶ φυγῆν ἀνείδους, αἰσχρῶν ἄντων, a 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this form of ἀνδρεία reappears in Eth. Eudem. III 1. 13, as belonging to political courage, μία μὲν πολιτικήν οὕτη δ' ἐστιν ἢ δὲ αἰδὼ ὀὖσα, and another § 16, διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by ὑπομείνειν τῶν κινδύνων in the one, and by ἔργον ἐν κινδύνοις § 8, and ἕν πολέμω § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience to its laws being again made the ground of the obligation to practise this virtue.

§ 9. The third virtue, σωφροσύνη, temperantia, is likewise represented under a political aspect. It is a virtue by which men's bodily appetites are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, 'are so disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins'. In Eth. Nic. III cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which consists in a state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, (pains having less to do with the virtue); and in a due measure or estimate of the value of them. It is thus a 'mean' between ἀκολασία, 'excessive indulgence in them', and ἀναιαθησία, total 'insensibility'. 117, 1107 b 4.

§ 10. Ἐλευθερία] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary πάθη out of which they are formed and developed. They are 'relative means', μεσοτάται πρὸς ἡμᾶς, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the πάθη out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the φρόνησις or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the φρόνιμοι. Consequently here 'liberality' in expense is represented as a dis-
§ 11. _megaloφυχια_] ‘high-mindedness’ is represented in the same way as the preceding, as a virtue which is ‘productive of benefits’, shews its utility, ‘on a large scale’; to which ‘little-mindedness’, meanness of spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. Eth. IV 7—9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end of c. 9, ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοφυχία περὶ τιμῆν ἐστὶ μεγάλη, and defined c. 7, 1123 b 2, δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλοφυχὸς εἶναι ὁ μεγάλον αὐτῶν ἄξιων ἄξιος ὁν. The μεγαλοφυχὸς of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn and contempt for all that is beneath him, man and things, and with a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity χαυνότης, an undue sense of one’s own merits.

_μικροφυχία_ ἀπὸ τοῦναντίου_] is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the following sentence; and also if it be retained, μικροφρέπεια and _μικροφυχία_ are both contrasted as opposites with _μεγαλοφρέπεια_, which in the latter case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted the repetition of _ἀρετή_ is quite equally objectionable.

§ 12. _μεγαλοφρέπεια_] ‘magnificence’ in expenditure, is distinguished from ‘liberality’ merely by this, that whereas the one is _περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήματι πρᾶξεις_ (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is _περὶ δαπανήσεως μόνων_, ‘those alone in which a large cost is involved’. Eth. N. IV 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputation, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable—in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 b 30. Plato and his _dramatis personae_ sometimes add _μεγαλοφρέπεια_ to the four cardinal virtues, the classification which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 E, 494 B, VII 536 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly correspond with Aristotle’s interpretation, but has a wider and more general signification. See Rep. VI 486 A, where it is applied to the _δίανοι_. It seems from the definition, (_δραμ., 412 E, ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθῶν τῶν σεμιότατων_), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle’s _megaloφυχία_.

§ 13. _φρόνησις_ appears much in the same character here as in Eth. Nic. VI 5—9, where it is analysed at length. It is ‘practical wisdom’ which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and particularly moral good and evil, in general, δοκεῖ δὴ _φρόνημον_ εἶναι τὸ δύναμθαι καλῶς _βουλεύσασθαι_ περὶ τὰ αὐτῶ _ἀγαθά_ καὶ _συμφέρουσα_ οὐ κατὰ μέρος, ὅσον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγείαν ἦ _ησχύν_, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ _ἔξω_, 1140 a 25. ἔδει τούτῳ _Περικλέα_ καὶ τούς _τοιουτοῦ_ _φρόνημος_ _οἴμεθα_ εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτῶ _ἀγαθά_
καθ’ ἡν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἶρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καρδόν ἰκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δύνανται βεβαιὸν εἶναι δὲ τουχότους ἡγομένα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς, ἱβ. 1140 b 7. ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ τέχνη, b 24. δυοὶ δ’ ὑποῖον μεραίν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγων ἐχόμενων, βατέρων ἐν εἰς ἀρετῇ, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ; (οὐ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, ἢ τοῦ διάνοια ou reasoning, the facultative, the discursive reason, as opposed to the νοé, the speculative, intuitive reason, the organ of the other intellectual virtue σοφία: ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἐχειν, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, b 25. ἢ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική, c. 8, 1141 b 31. τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ ἐστίν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώμηα εξ ἑμετέρων, c. 9, 1142 a 14.

§ 14. τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καρδόν] ‘the present (instant) time’. ἐνστάσις, ‘to place in’ a position: ἐνστασθαί, ἐνστήσαι, ἐνεστηκέιν, ἐνστάσαι, ‘to be placed, set in, stand in’, a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things ‘standing in the way’, and so either (a) close by, ‘present’, ‘instant’, ‘instans’ (tempus, bellum, &c.), ‘impending’, ‘threatening’; (for instans, ‘present’, Quint. v 10, 42, praeteritum, instans, futurum). In grammar, ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, ‘the present tense’, ἐνεστῶσα μετοχή, ‘the present participle’, instans tempus (Facc. Lex. s. v.); or (2) ‘to stand in the way’ as an obstacle, impediment, or ‘objection’; as the logical ἐνστῆσαι and ἐνστάσαι, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also ‘instance’, something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical ‘instance’ or objection. See Introd. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] ‘The rest are easily discerned’—‘the rest’ are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (πρός), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς γνώμενα), is estimable, and an object of praise (καλῶν). Such things are (the first) the ‘signs’, (the second) the works of virtue (and therefore praiseworthy).’ The σημείων (Introd. p. 161—163) is the probable—or, in the case of the τεκμήρων, certain—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the ‘signs’ of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακῶν, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker’s 4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle’s account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ἐπανετὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ καλά, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγομένα αἱ ἀρεται, τῶν δ’ αἰσχρῶν αἱ κακία. ἐπανετὰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄτια τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὰ παρεπίμενα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς (these are the τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς and ‘signs’), καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἅπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἐργά αὐτῶν, ψεκτά δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐνεστά, 1249 a 26.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων...ιδεῖν] for the more usual τὰ ἄλλα ἰδεῖν. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the
verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of *eis*, on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of *peri* and *ampi*, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 c (in which place *peri* κάλλους takes the place of the nominative); likewise of *peri* and ὑπέρ by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14. 18 (ap. Schäfer Ἀρρα. Κριτ. ad Demosth. I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. I 17. I; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth century B.C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, ἐν δὲ μοι τέλος αὐτοῦ γένοιτο τῇδε τής μάχης πέρι, and Aj. 684, ἀμφὶ τοιοῦτον εἰς σχῆμα. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 b, βουλεύθαι περὶ τινος, Rep. IV 427 a, εἰδὸς νόμων περὶ καὶ πολιτείας (a good example), Ib. 436 b, καθ’ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν πράττομεν, Phaedo 249 c (this use of καθ’ ἐκαστὸν for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. II. cc.), Ib. VII 533 b, περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, Theaet. 177 b, Gorg. 487 a. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the de Fals. Leg. alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιθραμεῖν, Ib. § 27, περὶ ὅρκων...διελέγων, II 4. 30; 5. 21, τοιοῦτον περὶ ὅν (i. e. οὗ) φαδοῦσθαι, a good example. 18. 4, περὶ μεγέθους (i.e. μέγεθος) κοινῶν (ἐστὶν), Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 a 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. I 9, 1257 a 5, II 1 init., Ib. c. 4, 1262 b 25, περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν. Eth. N. IV 4 init., περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελέγων, X I sub init., 1172 a 26, ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων—παρετέτον εἶναι, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 a 29, ἐπί τῶν φερομένων—κινεῖται, would be more regularly τὰ φερόμενα.

§ 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεία κ.τ.λ.] An exemplification of the preceding rule, and application of it to the special virtues. Seeing that the signs of virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections (properties, qualities, attributes—on πάθη and its various senses see Introd. pp. 113—118; on the special sense here, p. 114) 'of it are καλά', the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as ἀνδρία. The πάθη of virtue are illustrated in the examples by ἀνδρείας, δικαιῶς, ἀδικῶς: these are πάθη, 'affections', of courage, justice, and injustice, in the sense of 'what happens to them', some change they have undergone, consisting in a modification of them in form and signification; as δικαιῶς 'justly', denotes a certain mode of action, viz. just acting. An exception occurs to the general application of the rule to the special virtues in the case of δικαιωτός: in this alone, though it is true of the ἔργα, it is not true of the πάθη: in other words, in the rest of the virtues the πτώσεις are
§ 16. ἐφ' ὁσιός τὰ ἄθλα τιμή, καλά.] The καλὸν is an end in itself; it is independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of which honour alone, and not profit (ἐφ' ὁσιός τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἡ χρηστικά) is the prize, is καλὸν: the prize aimed at, or the end of the exertions and efforts, determines the character of those efforts or actions, which are therefore fair and noble like the end at which they aim. τιμὴ is an end of this kind. Eth. N. 14, 1096 ὅ 16, καθ' αὐτά ἄγαθά) δὲ ποῖι θείη τις ὑ πω; ἢ (are they not?) ὁσα καὶ μονοθέματα διωκεται, οὖν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁμήν καὶ ἡμοίᾳ τινες καὶ τιμαὶ: ταῦτα γάρ εἰ καὶ δὲ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ἄρος τῶν καθ' αὐτά ἄγαθῶν θείη τις ὑ πω; c. 3, 1095 ὅ 22, τιμῆ is the end of the πολεοδόμοι, pursued by the χαρίσματε καὶ πρακτικῶν, v. 30, θῆλον ἀπό κατὰ γε τούτου ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. In iv 7—10, τιμή is represented as the end of the μεγαλοψυχί and φιλότιμο, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 ὅ 18, μεγίστων ὑπὲ τὸν ἑαυτημὲν ὁ τῶν θεῶν ἀπονείμων, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφείσηται οἱ ἐν ἄξιωματε, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν καλλαστοῖς ἄθλοι. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή.

καὶ ὁσα μὴ αὐτότι ἐνεκα κ.τ.λ.] The general characteristic of all the following topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness; unsel̄fis̄h acts, of which the object is the good of some one else, and not one's own. Any act of this kind, where there is no ulterior end of profit or advantage to oneself, which is done therefore for its own sake, and 'because it is in itself desirable', conforms to the definition, § 3, and is καλὸν. So the highest and purest form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish; true
friendship is disinterested, οἱ βουλόμενοι τᾶγα θά τοίς ψίλοις ἐκεῖνων ἐνεκα μᾶλλον ἥμισα, Eth. N. VIII 4 init.; and the true friend is άτερος αὐτῷ, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 b 6, or ἄλλος αὐτός, c. 4, 1165 a 31, 'a second self' (not one's own self) alter ego. And on the other hand, ἐπιτυμῶνι τοῖς αὐτούς μᾶλλον' ἀγαπώσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαυτοῦ ἀπακαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαύλος ἀντοῦν χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὁ σφ λοχθρότερος ἣ τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον' ὁ δ' ἐπιεικῆς διὰ τὸ καλὸν, κ.τ.λ. IX 8, init. And in the Politics, III 7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, ὀρθοὶ and παρεκδασεῖς (deviations from the true standard), is determined by the end of each, according as it is τὸ κοινὸν οἱ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον: the public interest of others, or the private interest of the governors themselves, one or several; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state.

§ 17. ὥσα ὑπέρ τε—τὸ αὐτῶν] This clause seems certainly out of place here, though Schrader defends it as an example of τὰ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθά. 'Qui enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligent, is bonum simpliciter praefert illi quod hic bonum foret': that is, he prefers general to special or particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the τε, which if the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inexplicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for by transferring the clause so as to follow τὰ τοιοῦτα (§ 17 ad fin.) The passage will then run thus: 'and all absolute (or general, see note on ἀπλῶς, c. 2 § 4) goods: and all natural goods (things which are naturally good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or καί, 'that is') things which are not (specially and particularly) good to oneself (αὐτῷ), appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with them the notion of selfishness or self-interest'. Here the clause comes in as the first example—'anything, namely, which a man does either (τε) for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, or (καί) anything that a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who is living (such as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory); because such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is alive, involve or imply more self-interest', and are therefore less καλά.


καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἁγαθά] Comp. 7. 33, τὰ αὐτοφώνες. 'Sunt profecto laudationibus minime incongruentes materiae, genus, parentes, patria, pul-
18 γὰρ ἐνεκα τὰ τοιαύτα. καὶ ὁσα τεθνεώτι ἐνδέχεται
υπάρχεις μᾶλλον ἢ ζωντει τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα
19 μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζωντει. καὶ ὁσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων
ἐνεκα. ἤπτον γὰρ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ὁσαι εὐπραγγια περὶ
ἀλλους, ἄλλα μή περὶ αὐτοῦ. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὐ πουϊ-
σαντας. δίκαιον γὰρ. καὶ τὰ εὐφρετηματα. οὐ γὰρ
20 εἰς αὐτοῦ. καὶ τὰ εναντία ἢ ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχύνονται: τὰ
γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦν-
tες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὡσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν,
eἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου

• critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenita animi
  magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.  Schrader.
  αὐτὸ ἀγαθά] 'good for him', that is, for this or that individual. See
  note on c. 7. 35, τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and Schrader (quoted above on τὰ
  ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά).

§ 19. τὰ εὐφρετηματα] 'any benefits conferred', because they are
  necessarily conferred on others, and therefore, so far, more praiseworthy
  than acquisitions. These are distinguished from εὐπραγγια περὶ ἄλλους(ante),
  which are 'any good and noble deeds done in the service of others,
  and not for oneself', for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. 14
  1163 a 1, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν μή ἵνα ἀντιπάθη, ὡφέλιμων δὲ τὸ εὐφρετεῖσθαι.

§ 20. τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ κ.τ.λ.] 'for shameful things we are all ashamed of,
  when we say, do, or are intending to do them'. Sappho's verses, for
  instance, in answer to Alcaeus.—'something I would say, but shame
  prevents me'—she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of,
  αἰσχρῶν, and replies, 'Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair,
  and had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed
  thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right'.
  The third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there
  is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian MSS. In the first,
  Blomfield, Mus. Crit. 1 p. 17, reads ἦκε τ᾽ ἕσλον: and Hermann (much
  better), El. Meir. Gr. III 16, de stroph. min. ἦκε α" ('reached thee', the
  Homeric ἦκε), from the reading ἦκες of one MS. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr.
  Gr. p. 607, follows MS Aε in reading ἦχε and the Aeolic ἕσλον. The third
  line, which in the MSS appears as αἴδως κέν σὲ οὐκ εἶχεν ὀμματ',
  without varia lection, is written by Blomfield, u. s., αἴδως κεν οὐχι τ᾽ ὀππατ' εἶχεν:
  by Hermann, αἴδως κέ τευς οὐκ εἶχεν ὀππατ': and by Bergk, αἴδως κε α' οὐκ ἀν ἦχεν ὀππατ' (surely κε and ἀν thus repeated in different forms and
  almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to
  be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. [In Bergk's 2nd
  ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: αἴδως ἦχεν ἔσλον ἵνα ἔρων ἦ
  κάλον, καὶ μὴ τί ἡ ἐκίνησιν γ λῶσον ἐκέκα κάκων, αἴδως κέ σ' οὐ κίκανεν
  ὀμματ', οἶλλα ἔλεγεν περὶ τῷ δίκαιως. s.]

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the manifestation of
§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβοῦμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν
πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τούτω πᾶσχονσιν. καὶ
αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαίστερων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ
τὰ ἑργά, οἶον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναῖκὸσ. καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυ-
στικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖσ· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τούς ἐχθροὺς τιμω-
some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often
elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that ‘shame has its seat in
the eye’. Compare the proverb in II 6. 18, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ ἐἶναι αἰθῶ,
where see note.
§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβοῦμενοι] ‘and things about which we
are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear’: the acquisition
of which causes us a violent mental struggle (ἀγών), distress, or anxiety,
‘agony’ in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addi-
tion of μὴ φοβοῦμενοι is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant
of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. II 31, ἣ στὶ
ἀγωνία φόβος τίς ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρχὴν ἑργον (Vic.). ἀγωνία belongs to that class
of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body;
see note on πνευτικὸν, I 2.18.

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things
that ‘tend to our reputation’; and this is why they are praiseworthy.
§ 22. ‘The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things
naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in
woman’.
§ 23. αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ (ἀρεταί)] ‘those which contribute to the gratifi-
cation or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is
an instance’. ἀπολαυσις is not here confined to sensual gratification, its
proper meaning. In Eth. N. I 3, Sardanapalus, the type of sensuality, is
taken as the representative of the bios ἀπολαυστικὸς: note on I 5.7. Here
again it is the unselfishness that is laudable.
§ 24. καὶ τὸ τούς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον] ‘and the heavier venge-
ance on, punishment of, one’s enemies’ (μᾶλλον may be either to punish
them in a higher degree, the more the better; or as contrasted with κατα-
λαπτεῖσθαι, ‘rather than the reverse’), and ‘refusing to be reconciled, come
to terms, with them’. The reason being, that ‘retaliatory’ or ‘reciprocal
justice’ (note on § 7) requires this, and therefore it is right, and of course
laudable; and also because ‘not to be beaten’ (an unyielding resolution)
is a sign of a 'manly character'. Comp. 1 6. 26 (ἀγαθὰ) τὰ τοῖς ἐξθροῖς κακὰ, and § 29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad Alex. 1 (2), 13. 14. Again in Aristotle's Rhet. II 5. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7, Med. 808, Cic. de Off. 1 7. 2.

§ 25. ‘Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things; for they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5. 7, note infra § 26), and manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue’, i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain without them: a man may be good without them; with them he must be better. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιόνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦστες ἐν ύπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ύπερέχον πάν ἐντύμωτερον. Comp. infra § 39.

μυμονεύτα] ‘things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, remembered’; as εὐμυμονεύτα (infra) is ‘easy to be remembered’. μυμονεύτα, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is monumenta, memorials, elogia, et quae memoriam alieuis ornant. He does not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubtless did, though he does not say so, that μᾶλλον can be construed with the adjective μυμονεύτα, but hardly, or not so well, with the substantive μυμονεύματα. 

ἄμη ζωντι ἐπεται] ‘things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond the grave’, as posthumous fame.

οίς τιμῆ ἀκολουθεί] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with profit (infra § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is itself καλόν and a thing to be praised (§ 25, infra). It must therefore convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which it is attended upon or accompanied.

τὰ περιττά] (see note on 6. 28) are καλά as well as ἀγαθά. They are thus illustrated by Schrader. ‘Quae alii sui generis praestant. Gellius I xiii P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quinque habuisse rerum bonarum maxima et praeclara, quod esset ditissimum, quod nobilissimum, quod eloquentissimum, quod turis consultissimum, quod Pontifex Maximus. Velleius (de Pompeio), II 53, l'irin id epecut super quand ascendi non potest.

tὰ μῶν ὑπάρχοντα] τὰ ἑδα καὶ ἄ μυθεῖς, 6. 28. The difference between the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excel-
lencies, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to
peculiar actions, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in this sense καλλίω: ἐκ πρᾶξιν ὁ ἐπανος, § 32.

'In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. vii 30. L. Metellos tribuit populus Romanus quod nunquam ulli alii ab condito ævo ut quoties in senatum iret currum veheretur ad curiam. Plin. vii 43.' Schrader. I have quoted these instances because from Schrader's point of view they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are not exactly subjects of 'praise', which the topics of this chapter deal with, exclusively or more immediately. τὰ περιττά and τὰ μόνα υπάρχουσι are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree than the former. τὰ περιττά are distinguished and exceptional (as Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. τὰ μόνα υπάρχουσι are a step beyond, 'unique'.

§ 26. κτήματα ἄκαρσα] note on 5. 7, ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον. A pleasure-garden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approbation than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. iv 9 (quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the self-sufficiency or independence (αὐτάρκεια) that it implies; here by its being more in accordance with the gentleman's character, in contrast with the vulgarity of trade and money-making.

τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἔδια] These are special pursuits, modes of action, manners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, 'national' and 'peculiar to them'. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contempt, and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. iii 7. 24, Minus Lacedaemone studia literarum quam Athenis honoris meretur; plus patientia, fortitudine.

ἐστιν ἄκαρσος ἔστι τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπανομένων] 'all signs, or distinctive marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is a 'sign' of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any menial task1, and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. xi 3, ἐφῄκε δὲ (Lycurgus sc.) καὶ κομὼν τοίς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμιτικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζων ὧν καὶ μείζους ἄν καὶ ἐλευθερωτέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι. [Aristoph. Aves, 1282, ἑλακωνομάνων ἀπαντεῖ ἀνθρώπων τότε, ἐκόμων κ.τ.λ. s.]

1 οὗ γὰρ οὖν τ' ἐπιτρέπεται τὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς ζωτα βίου βάναυσον ἡ θετικήν, Pol. iii 5, 1278 a 20.
§ 27. μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην] This again applies to Lacedaemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. vi 6, βάναυσον δὲ εἰδέναι τέχνην ἀνάμεσα Δακεδαμίμοιον οὐκ ἔχειν. Xen. Oeccon. iv 2, καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἐν βαναυσικαὶ καλοῦμεναι καὶ ἐπιτήρητοι εἰσὶ καὶ εἰκότως μὲντοι πάνω ἀδοξοῦνται πρὸς τῶν πόλεων (add vi 5).

βάναυσον] Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated in Pol. vi (iv) 4, the first is the πρῶτη τῆς τροφῆς πλῆθος, τὸ γεωργικὸν: the second, τὸ βάναυσον: ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτο τῆς τεχνᾶς ὧν ἀνευτὸν ἄδυνατον οἰκεῖσθαι: τούτῳ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ὑπάρχουσι δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τροφῆν ἡ καλῶς ἔσχεν, 1291 a 1. So that here the fine arts, as well as the necessary, indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class βάναυσον. See on this subject Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. (Cab. Cycl. 2nd ed.) c. 18, Vol. iii p. 64, note. Pol. vi (viii) 2, 1337 b 8 seq., βάναυσον ῆ ἐργον εἰσὶ δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μᾶθειν, ὅσα πρῶς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἐρείσεως ὑπεργάζοντο τὰ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τῆς διάνοιας. διὸ τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ώσπερ τὸ σῶμα παρακεκεφαλίζεται καταφάκτεθαι βαναυσίους καλοῖς, καὶ τῶν μοθαράκια ἐργασίαις ἀσχολοῦν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινω. 1 11, 1258 b 37, (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) βαναύσωσται ἐν αἷς τὰ σῶμα λοβώτατα μάλιστα. Eth. Eudem. i 4, 1215 a 39, λέγω δὲ
\[28 \text{ álloyn \(\xi\)yn. \(\lambda\text{ηππέεον \(\delta\)ē kai \(\tau\)α \(\sigma\)\(\nu\)νεγγυς tois \(\upsilon\)\(\varphi\)ρ-}
\]

This and quae ijdvs, affingens Independence, Cic. cenary).

native and a\ov man proximo, their statecraft Phileb.

... to that in independence, worthy censure, F.

the liberalem, illud \(\text{pro} \) \(\text{álloyn \(\xi\)yn. \(\lambda\text{ηππέεον \(\delta\)ē kai \(\tau\)α \(\sigma\)\(\nu\)νεγγυς tois \(\upsilon\)\(\varphi\)ρ-}
\]

is quodf... To the the libera, quoqtie, fond injury is

To your eVtcrTTj/zcoi Theaet. 25. to the

of the \(\text{pro} \) \(\text{álloyn \(\xi\)yn. \(\lambda\text{ηππέεον \(\delta\)ē kai \(\tau\)α \(\sigma\)\(\nu\)νεγγυς tois \(\upsilon\)\(\varphi\)ρ-}
\]


\[\text{\(\chi\text{ρηστως for} \(\overset{\circ}{\text{H}}\text{λιβος is one of those ironical euphemisms which Plato is so fond of employing; as also are} \(\gammaλυκ\)vs, \(\overset{\circ}{\text{H}}\)νε, and \(\varepsilon\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\varphi\)θης, this last belonging also to the common language. \(\gammaλυκ\)vs, Hipp. Maj. 288 B; \(\overset{\circ}{\text{H}}\)νε, in several places, Theaet. 209 E, Gorg. 491 E, Rep. I 337 D, VII 527 D, and elsewhere; Lat. stuavis, lepidus. \(\chi\text{ρηστως, Phaedr. 264 B, Theaet. 161 A, 166 A, Rep. V 479 A, &c. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 131. [On \(\overset{\circ}{\text{H}}\text{νθεια, cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. \S 169, and Rep. 400 E, quoted infini, p. 175. S.]}\)\]
§ 29. καὶ ἐκαστὸν κ.τ.λ. “and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come next, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀκολουθεῖν and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) derive ἐκ a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, interpretatio in melius, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, ‘simple and straightforward’, and self-will (headstrong, stubborn, obstinate temper; αὐθαίρης, one who pleases himself, αὐθάίρης, ‘self-pleaser’, and will have his own way), ‘magnificence’, or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity: σεμνον’.”

On ὀργίλος Victorius compares Hor. Sat. 1 3. 51, at est truculentior atque plus aquo liber: simplex fortisque habeat, with Cic. de Legg. 1 7; solent enim, id quod viverum honorum est, admodum irasci, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανικὸς represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Charephon, Socrates’ intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates’ death, Phaedo 117 D.

On ἄπλοος, as expressive of character, see note 1 2. 4.

αὐθαίρης. In Eth. Eud. 11 3, 1221 a 8, 111 7, 1233 ε 34, σεμνοτῆς, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one’s bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἐτερον ζηρίς, is a mean between the two extremes, ἄρεσκεια the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αὐθαίρεια the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρόνησις, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. 1 29, it is likewise the excess of σεμνοτῆς, as ἄρεσκεια is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐντευξίας, in the ordinary

1 It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλοπρεπὴς is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόψυχος. The two have already been distinguished in this very chapter, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλοπρεπεῖα, when it is distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αὐθαίρης, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale: whereas the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is precisely what αὐθαίρεια might be represented to be by the figure ὑποκομίμησις, by bestowing on it a ‘flattering’ designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. 11 7. 8: it will be found that σεμνότης, another false interpretation which is here put upon αὐθαίρεια, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος. Plato points out the true ὑποκομίμησις in the case of μεγαλοπρεπεῖα, Rep. vi 560 E, ὑποκομίμησις... ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρεπεῖαν.
Rhetoric A 9 § 29.

ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασύν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸν ἁσωτὸν ἐλευθερίαν δὸξεὶ τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἀμα παραλογιστικῶν ἐκ τῆς intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character ὁδο μηθεῖ ἐνυχεῖν μηδε διαλεγῆια, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτο-άδης, 'self-pleasing'. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόψυχος and σεμνός to one who is really αὐτάδης, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐτάδεια is one of Theophrastus' 'Characters' defined by him as ἀπήνεια ὤμιλια, 'social brutality'.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑποκορισµῶς, when it takes the favourable side, and interpretatur in melius. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (πρὸς κόρην ἥ κόρον λέγειν ἄσομικρώτα, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 175 § 126, ταύτην εὖ ὑποκορίσματος τιτθῆς ἐπώνυμων ἐχό, Theophr. περὶ ἁδίκα: ὑποκοριζόθαι ποπτιζόν (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. ὶ 474 Ε., ἡ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζόμενον, Arist. Plut. 1012, νησταρίων ἃν καὶ φάθτων ὑπεκορίζετο (whence it stands for a 'diminutive', Rhet. III 2. 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, ἀνοιχτο ὑποκοριζόμενο καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθεια. Alexis, Tarantini Fr. 3, Meineke, Fragm. Comm. III 484, ἄρ' οὐκ ὁδή ὅτι τὸ καλοῦμενον ἃν τοῦτο διατρῆξα χάριν ἄνω' ἑστὶν ὑπόκορισμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μοίρας: Ovid, Ar. Am. II 657, nominibus mollire licet mala, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. I 3. 44—54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, καὶ τὴν εἰσαίων ἀξιῶσιν τῶν ὀνόματων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀνθηλλαξιν τὴ δικαίωσι κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI I.c.—Quintilian calls it derivatio verborum in the passage above quoted; and v 13. 25, describes it, si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, candaem rem nostris verbis mitigoribus praferre: which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12. 4, est praeterea quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso acqicitur. [Farrar's Chapters on Language, p. 281 sqq. s.]

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκορισµῶς is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. ἵπρατής is the ὑπερβολή ἀνδρεία, Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 3, 8, 1108 b 20, 1109 a 3, and ἀσώτια, prodigality, the spend-thrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 b 10, c. 8, 1108 b 24.

παραλογιστικῶν ἐκ τῆς aitia] 'liable to lead to a false inference', Rhet. II 24. 4, 'suberit fallacia manans ex causa', Portus. 'The mis-reasoning
PHILOPIKHS Α 9 § 30.

aiétas: eι γαρ οὐ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδύνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειν ὅπου καλὸν, καὶ εἰ προετικός τοῖς τυχούσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις: ύπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ 30 πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οῖς ὁ ἐπαινος: (παραλογιστικόν), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause’, is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The cause of an action is the προαίτησις, the voluntary and deliberate purpose of it; otherwise represented as the ‘motive’ (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (οὐ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδύνευτικός), and of an act of virtue, true courage, which has a noble end, τὸ καλὸν, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class ‘bad’, the other that of the ‘good’. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the ‘false inference’, that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do a fortiori from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is inferred that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, omne majus continent in se minus.

ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς] Cic. Tusc. Q. v 26.105, exsuperantia virtutis. ὑπερβολὴ and ὑπεροχὴ are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of ‘excess’, of mere ‘superiority’; without the additional notion of a ‘vicious’ excess, a deprivation or deviation from a true standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle’s theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral vices. ‘Non significat hic nimum sed prae- stantia.’ Victorius.

With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. 11 2, sub fin. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπότερον ἄδι καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, ‘good becomes better’, in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 b 3, κεκοσμημένως εἰς υπερβολὴν, lines 8 and 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, c. 4, 1326 a 21, lb. 1 12, τῆς υπερβολῆς ὁρος, b 24. Pol. VI (iv) 12, 1296 b 19, ποιῶν δὲ (by ‘quantity’ I mean) τὴν τῶν πλέοντας υπεροχὴν. This sense of the word is also common in Demostenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσαῦτην υπερβολὴν ποιῶμαι, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, ἐστὶ δὲ υπερβολὴ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα. υπερβολὴ συκοφαντίας, κακίας, δορεῶν, αναιδείας, ἁμάρτιων, ὀμφαρῶς, &c., in all which υπερβολὴ denotes not the vice, but merely the ‘measure’ of it.

§ 30. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οῖς ὁ ἐπαινος] Compare III 14.11. The same illustration of the topic, from Plato’s Menexenus, is there repeated, with the addition of εὖ τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ‘in the funeral oration’, meaning the Platonic dialogue. Socrates, Plato’s principal character, or hero, or
§ 31. οὐσπερ γὰρ ο Ἔωκράτης ἐλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὼν Ἀθη-

| 31. | ναιοὺς εἰς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπανειν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ’ ἕκασ-
| | τους τίμιον λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οὗν εἰς Ἐκθέας ἡ
| | Λάκωσιν ἡ φιλοσόφοις. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἀγεῖν
| | εἰς τὸ καλὸν, ἐπείπερ δοκεῖ γειτνιάν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ
| | τὸ προσῆκον, οἰον εἰ ἀξία τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν
| | spokesman, is here taken more Aristotleio as a substitute for Plato him-
| | self, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent.
| | The passage of the Menex. 235 D runs thus, εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ Ἀθηναίοις ἐν
| | Πελοποννησίοις εὐ λέγειν Ἡ Πελοποννησίοις ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἄγαθον ἄν ἤτορος
| | δεῖ τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκήσωσιν. οὐτός δὲ τις ἐν τούτοις ἀγνωστά
| | ὁπότερ καὶ ἐπανεῖ οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖ εὐ λέγειν.
| | On this passage, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7, 23, Interesse tamen Ari-
| | stoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum
| | refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio: ut illu
| | maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra
| | quem dicemus ea quae oderunt. Ita non dubium erit judicium quod
| | ortationem praecesserit.
| | τὸ παρ’ ἑκάστος τίμιον κ.τ.λ.] These are appeals to national and class
| | prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our
| | encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which
| | happens to be esteemed by the particular audience that we are address-
| | ing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address our-
| | selves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our
| | hero for his skill in hunting or strength or bravery; at Sparta for patience
| | and fortitude (Quint. u.s.); at Athens for literary accomplishments.
| | ‘And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one
| | before an audience of this kind) what they highly value to the καλὸν, since
| | they appear to border closely upon one another’. ‘To refer τίμα to τὸ
| | καλὸν’, is to invest them with a moral character, τὸ καλὸν being the moral
| | end, the right, the end of action. This is as much as to say that these
| | things, which are so precious in their eyes, are not only valuable, but
| | right in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high
| | esteem.
| | § 31. ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον κ.τ.λ.] ‘all that seems naturally to belong
| | to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents’, qualities, actions, achieve-
| | ments; ‘such things as were to be expected from him’.

1 Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad Eth. N. vi 13. 3) remarks, on Eth. N. III
| 8, 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks
| of him as Plato’s interlocutor and representative, and omits it when he has the
| real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says,
| invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in Pol. v (VIII) 7, 1342 b 23,
| where we find Σωκράτης without the article in a reference to Plato’s Republic,
| III 398 E. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from
| history, as τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην (the Aristophanes of the Symposium), Pol. II 4,162 b 11,
| and ὁ Τιμάως (Plato’s Timæus, not the real personage), de Anima A 3, 406 b 25.
προώπηργήμενων ευδαιμονικῶν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσεπικτάσθαι τιμῆν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσηκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἶνοι εἰ ευτυχῶν μὲν μέτριοι ἅτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλοψυχος, ἡ μείζων γεγονόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικότερος. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, εἰς οὐ̃ων εἰς οἶα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφὶ ὦμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου

η πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων.

32 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἐπαινος, ἱδιον δὲ τοῦ

προώπηργήμενον· 'res antea virtute alicuius studioque possessas, laudes quas sibi quispiam laboro suo comparaverit.' Victorius, 'his own previous acquisitions or possessions'; such as a stock of previous good, noble, great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is καλοῦ, must also have a tendency to happiness (εὐδαιμονίκον) and be right itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy.

But not only conformity with a man's antecedents may be added in praise of an action, but also the opposite, 'if he surpass them, namely, and improve upon' his own early condition and actions, or those of his ancestors, not acting in accordance with the past and what he was born to, but contrary to it, i.e. beyond it.

καταλλακτικότερος] This does not necessarily contradict the topic of § 24; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends: or if not, in Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience.

τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους—τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου] Both of them already quoted, 1 7.32. q. v.


§ 32. ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἐπαινος] 'praise is derived from actions', i.e. if it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of ἐπαινος, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινος τῆς ἥρετης, Ἐθ. N. 1 12, 1101 b 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of ἐπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and εὐδαιμονισμός and μακαρισμός, Introd. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34, p. 212 sq.
σπουδαῖον τὸ κατὰ προαιρέσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύαι πράττοντα κατὰ προαιρέσιν. χρῆσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα τοῦ σπουδαῖον τὸ κατὰ προαιρέσιν] On προαιρέσις, see note, c. 6. 26. The προαιρέσις, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive characteristic of moral action. 'Acting in accordance' with this is consequently said to be 'peculiar to', the proprium, characteristic of 'the man of worth', or good man. In 'praising' any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose'.

φαίνεσθαι] 'that he should be shewn to have'... 'that it should be made clear that he has'... Note on 1. 7. 31, p. 141.

διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.τ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and therefore, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, ὥσ ἐν προαιρεσί, any 'accidental coincidences' and 'pieces of luck' (which may have happened to him); 'for if a number of them can be brought forward 'resembling' the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for a sign of it and of the moral purpose or intention' (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the προαιρέσις or choice, and a certain ἔξις or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. συμπτώμα is a 'concurrency' or 'accidental coincidence' of one thing or act with another, between which there is no necessary connexion, and, like τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, purely accidental. 'σύμπτωμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extrinsecus quippe excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem desicere: ἀπὸ τύχης vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicius rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.' Victorius. On τύχη as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius's instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. infria, and Met. Δ 30, 1025 a 16. 8.]

On σύμπτωμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, χρή οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν, ἢ λόγον ταῦτα ὑπώρειν, συνάπτεσθαι αὐτῷ τὸν γενέσθαι. Δημοσθένης μέντοι ἐν τῷ κατὰ Διονυσοῦδορον (p. 1295, 21) ἔπαιξε εἰρήκη τῶν τούτων. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. iv 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an 'unfortunate accident'. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμβάν, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 c, in the sense of 'a disease' (morbus, Ast), apparently as a special kind of 'calamity'. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (v) 4, 1304 a 1 (where it means 'an accident', as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 b 6; II 12, 1274 a 12]; Top. Δ 5, 126 b 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 b 27, 31, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκείνων τῶν

12—2
33. The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds done (ἐγκυμιάζομεν πράξαντας, after they are done, the results of actions; ἐπανω being of the actions themselves) and the surrounding circumstances (such as noble birth and cultivation) serve for confirmation. These 'surrounding circumstances' are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for the picture, of which the real subject is the 'deeds' of the hero of the panegyric; what he has done himself;—nam genus et proaret et quae non fecimus ipsi, ut ex nostra voce. The 'confirmation' consists in this,—for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of such and such a character (fortes creantu fortibus et bonis: ὡς ἀληθὲς ἦν ἡμᾶς ἀνδρῶν ἤπειρον ἑαυτῆς γίγνεσθαι τίκα, καθὼς ὁ ὁμοιούς τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ πατρός, Eur. Alem. Fragn. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our praise is the ἔοις, the confirmed habit of virtue, the character and not the mere act; 'because we should praise a man even if he had not done the (praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline him to do it.'

τὰ κύκλῳ occurs in the same sense, of 'surrounding' (or accompanying) 'circumstances', Eth. Nic. III 12, 1117 b 2, ou μὴν ἄλλα δόξειν ἂν ἐναὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἑν, ὕπο τῶν κύκλῳ ὁ ἄφαντιςθα, where τά κύκλῳ are to λυπηρῶν καὶ πόνων, the pains and dangers by which courage is sur-

1 The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have agreed with Ovid i.e. as to its comparative value.
The image contains a page from a book written in Latin. The text is fragmented and appears to be discussing philosophical or literary topics. Here is a possible transcription of the text:

παίδειαι. εἰκός γὰρ ἠγαθῶν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὸν οὕτω π. 33. τραφέντα τοιούτων εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἐγκυμιάζομεν πρά-ζαντας. τὰ δ’ ἐργα σημεία τῆς ἑξεως ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἐπανοίμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραχότα, εἰ πιστεύομεν εἶναι 34 τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονίσμος αὐτὸς μὲν ταύτα, τούτοις δ’ οὐ ταύτα, ἀλλ’ ὄσπερ ἡ εὐδαι-μονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονίσμος περιέχει ταῦτα. 35 ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἐπανος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαὶ· ἀ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἂν, ταῦτα μετατε- P. 1368. 36 θέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end’; again, Rhet. III 14. 10, οἱ δολοῖς οὐ τὰ ἑρωτῶμεν λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλοι. § 34. μακαρισμὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονίσμος αὐτοῖς μὲν ταύτα] It is quite true that the two terms are sometimes identified, (as in Eth. N. i 12, 1101 b 24, τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τοὺς θεωτάτους μακαρίζομεν); but they are also distinguished, and then μάκαρ and μακαρία represent ‘blessedness, bliss’, a higher degree of happiness than εὐδαιμόνια and εὐδαιμονία, which is the human form of happiness, while μακαρία is the divīnē. μάκαρες is specially applied to θεοὶ by Homer and Hesiod; as well as to the denizens of the μακάρων νήσου, the abode of the blessed after death.—αὐτοῖς is for ἀλληλοίοις. τούτοις δ’ οὐ ταύτα] ‘but not the same with the other two’, viz. ἐπανος and ἐγκώμιον: these are included in εὐδαιμονίσμος as virtue is in happiness. § 35. ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.] ‘There is a community of kind’ (the two may be referred to one species, one of the three kinds (εἴδη) of Rhetoric, c. 3. 1, either the συμβουλευτικόν or the ἐπιδιευκτικόν, as the occasion requires) ‘between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be converted into panegyric’. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. III 7. 28, totum autem habet (laudativum genus) aliquid simile suasorii; quia plerunque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent. § 36. ‘And so, when we know what we ought to do in any given case, or to be in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge (of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by changing and converting the language’ (twisting so as to adapt it to our purpose; lit. turning them by the language). The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation—‘Now when thus expressed, it amounts to (has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes laudation, “Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions due to himself alone”’.—The example in the laudatory form from the Evagoras runs thus in the original, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς δὲ τύχην, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς δὲ
In J. 140, the power of flight of the avenger also appears primary to the just. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. XIII 140, Nam genus et proaves et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco.

37 oϕα τίν τόπων αυξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ αυτὸν γεγονόμενον. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

38 χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αυξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ αυτὸν γεγονόμενον. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.
RHETORIKHΣ A 9 § 38.

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μόνος ἡ πρῶτος ἡ μετ' ὀλίγων ἡ καὶ μάλιστα πε-ποίηκεν· ἀπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσηκόν. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γὰρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τὺχης ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτὸν ἀν δὸξειν. καὶ εἰ τὰ

1 +§ infra, cum libris. 'Recte Wolfius apud Vaterum p. 209 δ delit.' Spengel.

various modes of αὐξησις, which with the opposite, μειωσις, constitutes the fourth of the κοινοὶ τόποι. See Introd. p. 129, and (on 11 26) p. 276.

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of αὐξητικά have been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the Rhet. ad Alex. 35 (36), 12, 13, under the general head of 'Comparison' with others for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. de Orat. 11 85. 347—8, and Quint. Inst. Or. III 7. 16. With καὶ δὲ μάλιστα πε-ποίηκεν, εἰ πεποίηκεν must be supplied for the sense after καὶ.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν 'circumstances of time and opportunity' give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already occurred, c. 7. 32: and with παρὰ τὸ προσηκόν, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for in-stance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he is then doing something παρὰ τὸ προσηκόν, beyond what could naturally be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit for it. Similarly Victorius.

καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν] This topic is not to be confounded with τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα of § 32. That is a 'repetition of the act', this denotes the 'repeated success' in any attempt, the constant success is an indication—not infallible, or certain as a proof—of special skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special knack or skill in throwing dice. 'The constancy of the success gives it importance, and it will seem not accidental but due to the agent himself.'

καὶ εἰ τὰ προστέρευσα κ.τ.λ.] 'And any one' (on whose account, in con-sequence of his actions and distinctions) 'to commemorate whom in-centives, stimulants, to virtue ('encouragements' to do the like), or marks of respect for it, have been invented or were ever 'instituted', must be a praiseworthy character'. This is the general case of the invention or establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example.

The next clause, εἰς ὅν πρῶτον, is a particular example of the former of the two preceding cases, the 'invention', the first appropriation, of some-thing in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that κατεσκευάσθη is espe-cially applied to the permanent establishment of an enduring monument, as a temple.

This topic again is afterwards applied to crimes, in c. 14. 4.
προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶνα διὰ τοῦτον εὐρηταὶ καὶ κατεσκευάσθην. καὶ εἰς ὁν πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη,

eὐρηταὶ...κατεσκευάσθη] We may note here the juxtaposition of the perf. and aer., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have elsewhere noticed (Pref. to Transl. of Gorgias, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference of idiom between the Greek and English languages which obliges us sometimes to translate the Greek aerist by the English perfect. Other examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else it is to be called, occur, i 3.8, where πραχθήναι in the same sense and in the same opposition is repeated in the form πεπράξθαι, Top. ix sub fin. p. 184 a 8, Βεβοηθηκε μὲν...τίχνην δ' οὐ πορεύοντες. Many instances are found in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language might lead one to think that he at any rate distinguishes them with a meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 676), λόγοι μὲν ἐξίκονον ὅπωσα δ' οὐ μάλα, 927—8, οὗ μ' εἰργάσω, οὗ ἡπατήκας. 1172, τί μ' ἄλεσας; τί μ' εἰργάσας; Antig. 496 (Dind.), present and aerist, καὶ πῶς ὅρατο κάποιπτος ἡμεθῇ; 1228—9, Αι. 31, Trach. 364, 5, Arist. Ran. 1010—11 (Dind.), πεποίηκας...ἀπεδείξας, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, ὁ τε καὶ δεῦτεντο, καὶ ὁ πεποίηκας εὐθ. Dem. de F. L. § 228, οὔτ' ἡρώξησα αὐτε...Βεβιάσσαμαι.

εἰς ὁν πρῶτον...] The novelty of the distinction, invented expressly for the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate.

ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη] ποιεῖν is here loosely used, by the so-called figure εὐκίνημα (on c. 4. 6, note i), in connexion with ἐγκώμιον and the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application must remain uncertain—of writing the panegyric, and ‘setting up the statue in the market-place’.

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended the ἐγκώμιον to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or at least a comma after ἵππολόγον, in order to connect the panegyric and the statue with those that they severally concern: εἰς is to be repeated after καὶ. ‘And one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; (and as the setting up of their statue in the market was ‘done’ first, ἐποιήθη, i.e.), and as the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for the first time to Harmodius and Aristogeiton’. Thucydidès in his episodical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, vi 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. viii (v) 10, where the attack on Hipparchus is spoken of. Παυσανίας, 18. 5, says, οὗ πίμην δὲ ἐστάσατε Ἀρμοδίοις καὶ Ἀμασταγείτων οἱ κτείνατες Ἰππαρχον αἰτία δὲ ἦτις ἐγένετο κ.τ.λ. He is describing the ἀγορά, though he does not expressly name it. (See Smith’s Dict. of Geogr. Art. Athena, p. 293 b.) ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναυσίων ‘in the opposite cases’, of men to whom any reproach or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. ‘cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis flagitium admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebimus.’ Victorius. On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii 7. 19—22.
The and comparisons secondly, had two affairs of Sir Tórso Kalryco. This is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4). 6. ὁπερ Ἰσοκράτης—δικολογείν] ‘which was Isocrates’ custom, owing to his want of practice in forensic pleading’. Read ἄνωνθείων [with A'] for two reasons. First, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of actual practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are altogether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing, into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. Secondly, this is what Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3, ἕως γὰρ εἶδος ἐνίου τῶν σοφιστῶν βλασφημοῦτας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ως ἐστὶ περὶ δικογραφίαν… αὐτὸς δὲ παίρνα τούτο πεποιηκέναι φανερῶν ὅτι προφήμια καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἱδιων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων κτλ. Panath. § 11, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πολιτεύσαται διήμαρτον ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ γράφειν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαιρέσει ποιομένου οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἱδιων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτού τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἐλληνικῶν κτλ. 1b. § 39 seq. ἦγοιμα δὲ χρήσις τοῦς βουλαμένους ἐγκωμία των πόλεων ἀκριβῶς καὶ δικαίως μή μόνον περὶ αὐτῆς ποιείσαθαι τοὺς λόγους ἢ προφητευμένοι τυγχάνοντος, ἀλλ’ ὀπερ (here follows a simile) ὁτα καὶ τας πόλεις παριστάναι μὴ τὰς μικρὰς ταῖς μεγάλαις, κτλ. [Cf. note on Paneg. § 11. s.]

Here we find, first, that he failed in public life; secondly, that he withdrew from the law-courts and their ἱδία συμβολαία, the cases arising out of the ‘private dealings’ of the citizens with one another in their ordinary business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public affairs; and thirdly, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was, just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, παριστάναι, the object of his laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished as themselves, πρὸς ἐνδοξοὺς συγκρίνειν. The two first of these statements seem to put the reading ἄνωνθείων beyond question, συγκρίνειν being contrary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With this reading, δικολογεία must be confined to speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process.

This is one of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds
his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, pp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading ἀσνηθειων), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions of later writers on the subject.

συγκρίνειν] Pol. vi (iv) 11, sub init. 12, 1206 b 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 a 24, 26, Top. A 5, 102 b 15, II 3, 154 a 5, 9, Θ 5, 159 b 25. ὥσπερ γκρίνιν, ἀδῶκιμος φωνή. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὸ συγκρίνειν τὸν ἕκατον καὶ συνεκρίνειν ἡμᾶς· θρήσκευται, χρῆ ὧν ἀντιτάξειν καὶ παραβάλλειν λέγειν. Phrynichus. See Locke's note ad loc. p. 278. In all the passages quoted, except the two of the Metaph., συγκρίνειν and σύγκρισις denote comparison; in the other two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition of elements, opposed to διάκρισις.

Victorius quotes in illustration of πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν, Catullus, Carmen 64, 344, non illi quisquam bellum se conserit heros, seq. Cic. de Or. ii 85, 348, est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laude praecella.

§ 39. The κανός τόπος of αὐξήσις or amplification naturally falls under the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable to all forms of 'praise': because its object is to establish a certain 'superiority' of the person panegyrized over others, and this 'superiority' is an honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in itself, is thought to be an indication of 'virtue'. Eth. Nic. iv 8, sub init. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ή οἱ πλουτοῦστες εἰς ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ, τὸ δ’ αὐθαυτὸ ὑπερέχον τῶν ἐνημέρων.

§ 40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persuasion αὐξήσις, or amplificatio, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric (and the opposite μειώσις, vituperatio, to the censorious critical extenuatory kind of it): for in this the actions are taken for granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To the deliberate orator examples are most serviceable; because people

1 ἔχομενων γὰρ τούτων (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered these) τὰ ἐναντία τούτων φανερόν: ὃ γὰρ φόρος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστιν, § 41 infra.
RHEORIKHES A 9 § 41, 10 § 1. 187

άπασι τοῖς λόγοις ή μὲν αὐξήσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς. τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὀμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντεύομενοι κρίνομεν· τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικαίοις· αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸδειξὶν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές.

41 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἐπαινοὶ καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεὶ βλέποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίγνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταύτ’ ἐστὶν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερὰ· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἑστὶν. περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ

are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial oratory: in that there is most room for the application of direct proof, the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, in clearing up the obscurity of 'past facts', which are the objects of forensic oratory, c. 3. 2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3—5. τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν] This seems to be a division, for the nonce, of rhetorical πίστεις as a γένος, into three εἰδῆ or species, each specially adapted to one of the three branches of Rhetoric. The division has no pretension to a regular scientific character: αὐξήσις is not a logical kind of argument at all, and the three members of the division are not coordinate.

καταμαντεύομενοι] μαντεύουσαι and ἀπομαντεύουσαι, both of them not unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 'divination', the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, III 17. 10, Eth. N. i 3, 1095 b 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. vi 13, 1144 b 25. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. I 349 A, and many more in Ast's Lex. sub νν.—καταμαντεύουσα, besides this place [the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. ἐπισφ. p. 1400. 2, Polyb. ii 22. 7, in Longinus and Athenaeus.

CHAP. X.

We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, being peculiar to this branch, (ὅπειρα τῶν δικαϊκῶν), 15. 1, are added as an appendix in the fifteenth chapter. For the general connexion of the contents of these chapters, and the illustration of some special subjects which seemed to require a more detailed explanation, I refer to the ana-
πόσων καὶ πόσων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς,
2 ἐχώμενον ἂν εἶη λέγειν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἐν μὲν
τίμων καὶ πόσων ἐνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς
αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποιοὺς καὶ πῶς
3 ἐξοντας. διωρισάμενοι οὕν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἔξης.

ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρά
τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἰδιὸς ὁ δὲ κοινὸς.
λέγω δὲ ἰδιον μὲν καθ’ ὑν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,
lysio of the Introduction, pp. 185—207, and the Appendixes to Bk. I,
C. D. E.

§ 1. The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and
nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the pre-
misses) of which our 'syllogisms' are to be constructed, in accusation and
defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term 'syllogisms' as marking the
especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this
branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme,
see note on I 1. 11, p. 19.

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order
to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of
the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrong-
doers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render
men most liable to wrong and injustice.

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest
in order.—ἔστω, of a popular or merely provisional definition; comp.
5. 3; 6. 2; 7. 2.

'Wrong' or 'injustice' is defined 'a voluntary injury contrary to law'.
The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which
are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law
of the land—this is the political view of injustice—and that to be a crime
the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full
knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the
action. It is thus distinguished from a merely accidental injury or harm
which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere
mistake or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of universals,
or general moral principles, but of the particular circumstances of the
case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil
or malicious purpose. No bad προαίρεσις, which constitutes the immorality

νόμος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἰδιὸς ὁ δὲ κοινὸς] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd.
p. 239, Append. E. to Bk. I.

λέγω δὲ ἰδιον κ.τ.λ.] 'by special law' I mean the written law under

1 This application of the term ἰδιος to νόμος is to be distinguished from the
ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211,
which the government is conducted and the citizens live, the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: 'by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted.' This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these κοινά, ἀγαρφα, are described, Introd. p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see lb. p. 242.

'Now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes.' Eth. N. III 3, init. ὅτας δὲ ἀκούσιον τοῦ βία καὶ διὰ ἄγνωσιαν, ποῦ ἐκούσαν δοξείν ἂν εἴην οὗ ἡ ἁρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἴδοτι τὰ καθ' ἐκαστά (i.e. with special knowledge of the particular circumstances) ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις. ἵνα γὰρ οὗ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἴην τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαιν. I 13. 6, τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἴδοτες.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες κ.τ.λ.] 'now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes.' Eth. N. III 4, 1111 b 7, ἡ προαιρέσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτῶν δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεῖον τὸ ἐκούσιον' τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιον καὶ παιδεῖ καὶ τάλια ζῷα κοινωνεί, προαιρέσεως δ' οὖ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαιρήσεις ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαιρέσιν δ' οὖ. Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, διὰ θυμὸν, or of appetite, δι' ἐπιθυμίαιν, are voluntary, but not κατὰ προαιρέσιν.

§ 4. δι' ἀ δὲ προαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.] 'The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (μοιχηρία καὶ ἀδικία) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (μυθυμία), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of φρόνησις, practical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong,
beta\'ptewv kai fa\'yla poiein para\' tov v\'mou, kakia es\'ti kai akra\'si\'ai] edon y\'ar tines e\'xwosi mo\'xhriain h mian h pleious, peri tou\'to o mo\'xhrioi twn\'kano\'s\'in ont\'es, kai adkoi ei\'sin, oio\'n o men anelev\'hros peri\' xrimata, o d' akolaustos peri\' tas to\'v sa\'matos i\'dov\'as, o de\' malakos peri\' ta\' ra\'thuma1, o de\' deilos peri\' to\'u\'s kiv\'\nuou (to\'us y\'ar s\'ugkiv\'\nuoun\'tas e\'gka- talmpa\'nou\'i dia\' to\'v f\'o\'bou), o de\' filo\'timo\'s dia\' t\'m\'\nu, o d' o\'xu\'bimos de\' o\'rgh\'\nu, o de\' filo\'nikos dia\' p. 35- n\'i\'k\'\nu, o de\' pikr\'\deltas dia\' timar\'\nuan, o d' a\'fr\'\nu dia\' to
1 ra\'thuma in\'fria.

the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others.  

peri\' de\' tou\'to] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's Philo-
logus, iv i, p. 42, object to de\', which is omitted by Brandis 'anonymus' and one ms. See the note on e\'xw\'s on de\', 1 1 11, p. 20.

ta\' ra\'thum\'a] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, 'things comfortable', which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So r\'a\'st\'o\'n in Plat. Gorg. 569 c, ou\'koun polli\' y\'a\'st\'o\'n g\'i\'ne\'tas: 'isn't it a great comfort...?' Crit. 45 C, ta\' ra\'thuma\'s a\'r\'e\'i\'s\'\nu, of 'careless, easy-going, indifference'.

e\'gkata\'limpa\'n\'es, 'to leave behind in the lurch', desert a comrade in danger [ Cf. ii 4. 26, 5-7; iii 16. 5.]. e\'n sc. to\' kiv\'\nu. Europis D\'h\'\nuo Fragm. vi (Melanc., Fragm. Com. Cr. ii 458), of Pericles' eloquence, m\'\nu\'as to\'v\' y\'et\'\nu\'on to\' k\'e\'ntr\'o\'s e\'gkata\'le\'i\'pi\'te to\'s\' e\'k\'r\'o\'v\'o\'n, 'to leave the sting behind in the wound', (e\'n to\' e\'l\'kei). Plat. Phaedo, 91 c, o\'\'as\' pe\'r\'i\'l\'\nu\'ta to\' k\'e\'ntr\'o\'s e\'gkata\'le\'i\'pi\'as o\'r\'h\'\nu\'o\'n. 

pikr\'o\'s] 'Translato a tristi sapore nomine, pikr\'os\' Graeci appellant qui accepta in\'unia non facile placantur sed diu simul\'atum gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster. Eth. Nic. iv (11, 1126 a 20, o\' de\' pikr\'o\'s d\'\'e\'d\'al\'u\'t\'o\'s, kai pol\'\nu\'n xrh\'o\'n o\'r\'g\'i\'o\'n\'a\'s\'i\' kat\'e\'x\'o\'u\'i\' g\'a\'r t\'o\'n y\'\nu\'m\'a\'n. p\'a\'i\'\nu\'a\'\nu\' d\'\'i\'e\'n\'a\'\nu\' ati\'an a\'\nu\'t\'o\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'an y\'a\'r\'i\' a\'\nu\'t\'o\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'an k\'e\'n\'t\'o\'n e\'gkata\'le\'i\'pi\'e to\'s\' e\'k\'r\'o\'v\'o\'n. 
[Vic.] to\'u\'t\'o\'n o\' de\' bi\'\nu\' g\'e\'m\'e\'n\'o\'n to\' b\'a\'r\'o\'s e\'x\'o\'n\'a\'n] dia\' g\'a\'r o\' de\' bi\'\nu\' e\'p\'h\'a\'n\'e\'i\' e\'n\'a\' y\'o\'d\'e\' su\'m\'e\'\nu\'e\'i\' a\'\nu\'t\'o\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' to\' b\'a\'r\'o\'s e\'x\'o\'n\'a\'n. 
[Vict.] y\'a\'r\'i\' h\'e\'m\'a\'n\'o\'n to\' b\'a\'r\'o\'s e\'x\'o\'n\'a\'n] dia\' g\'a\'r o\' de\' bi\'\nu\' e\'p\'h\'a\'n\'e\'i\' e\'n\'a\' y\'o\'d\'e\' su\'m\'e\'\nu\'e\'i\' a\'\nu\'t\'o\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' ati\'s\'a\'\nu\'i\' to\' b\'a\'r\'o\'s e\'x\'o\'n\'a\'n. 

The Latin amarus, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian pikrat\'h\'\yn, in which the particular 'bitter- 
ness' of this form of \'org\'\nu is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the 
wrath is nursed 'to keep it warm' (pe\'\si\'m\'a \'\nu\' \'o\'r\'g\'h\'\nu) —and this gives it a ma-
lignant, spiteful, implacable character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, 
the irascible temper, \'org\'\lo\'\d\'\s\'\nuh, ir\'as\' e\'c\'e\'\nu\'s, tu\'n\'\nu e\'t \'p\'a\'c\'a\'b\'i\'\nu\'s \'e\'c\'e\'\nu\'s. 

apata\'\nu\'a\] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong 
action, may be regarded as a kind of 'deception' or 'delusion'; when 
a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong.
First and ii. 
which

Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διαπαθηματὸν. Ignorance is not a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn by our not applying the term ‘ignorant’ to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

PERI ἕΚΑΣΤΟΝ ΤΩΝ ὙΔΟΚΟΥΣΙΝ, KAI ΤΙΝΑΣ. ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΔΙΕΛΟ-when e does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them (has no φράσεις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διαπαθηματὸν. Ignorance is not a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn by our not applying the term ‘ignorant’ to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

§ 5. ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ἈΡΕΤΑΣ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ] ΤΑ ὙΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ, RES SUBIECTAe, SUBIECTA MATERIES; THINGS THAT FALL UNDER THE SAME HEAD OR GENERAL NOTION, AND SO ARE MEMBERS OR SPECIES OF THE SAME GENUS: ETH. N. ΠΟΙΟ ΤΟΙΣ ὙΠΟ ΤΗΝ ἈΡΕΤΟΝ, ‘ALL THAT FALL UNDER THE CHOICE’, AS ITS OBJECTS, OR MATTER TO OPERATE UPON. THESE ARE THE SIX THINGS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, ΚΑΛΩΝ, ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ, ΗΔΩΝ, AND THEIR OPPOSITES.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, ‘each in the things which are specially subjected to it’, which come under that particular head, as money is the ‘subject-matter’ of illiberality, dangers of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius understands it as the ‘object’ of the aim or desire of each.

§ 5. ἘΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ἈΡΕΤΑΣ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ] SC. IN C. 9; ἘΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΘΗ ΡΗΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ SC. IN II CC. 2—11. ‘IT REMAINS NOW TO DESCRIBE THE MOTIVES AND DISPOSITIONS OR CHARACTERS OF WRONG DOERS, AND THE DISPOSITIONS AND CHARACTERS OF THEIR OBJECTS OR VICTIMS’. IN POLIT. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 9, THERE IS A DIVISION OF CRIMES BASED UPON THEIR RESPECTIVE MAGNITUDE OR DEGREE, INTO GREAT AND LITTLE, CRIMES ON A GREAT SCALE, ACTS OF OPPRESSION, OUTRAGE, INSOLENCE, AND CRIMES ON A SMALL SCALE, MEAN AND PALTRY, WHICH APPEAR IN FRAUD, CHEATING, AND ANY PALTRY KNavery OR TRICKERY. ΓΕΝΝΟΝΤΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΨÙΜΑΣΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΝΗΡΟΙ ΜΑΛΛΩΝ, ΟΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΚΟΥΡΓΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΙΚΡΟ-ΠΟΝΗΡΟΙ ΛΙΑΝ: ΤΩΝ ΟΥΔΗΣΚΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΓΥΡΝΕΤΑΙ ΔΕ ΨÙΜΑΝ, ΤΑ ΔΕ ΔΙΑ ΚΑΚΟΥΡΓΙΑΝ.

§ 6. FIRST WE HAVE TO DISTINGUISH OR ANALYSE THE VARIOUS MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES, WHETHER IN THE WAY OF PURSUIT OR AVOIDANCE WHICH LEAD MEN TO ATTEMPT (TO Undertake, Take in Hand, ΕΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ) WRONG DOING: FOR IT IS Plainly the ACCUSER’S BUSINESS TO INQUIRE (HOW MANY AND WHICH KINDS,) THE NUMBER AND THE KINDS OF THESE UNIVERSAL INCENTIVES TO WRONG DOING TO WHICH THE ADVERSARY, WHOM HE CHARGES WITH A CRIME, IS LIABLE: AND OF THE Defendant, How Many and What Sorts of Them are Not Applicable to His Case. ‘HUNC LOCUM COPIOSE PERSECUTUS EST Cicero pro MILONE ET IN CRIMINANDO Clodio et in Milone purgando: CUNCTA ENIM in Clodio fuisse ostendit quae persuadere IPSI POTUERINT UT INSIDIAS FACERET Miloni; Cademque a persona Milonis aquisse,’ Victorius.
§ 7. This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is without us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) external force or compulsion; over these we have no control; the causes which spring from within us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Appendix C to Bk. I, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 a 32, αὕτα γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσει καὶ ανάγκης καὶ τέχνη, ἤτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πάντα τὸ διὶ ἀνθρώπον, and VI 4, in the definition of art, 1140 a 14, οὕτω γὰρ τῶν ἔχαρηγκῆς ὡς αὕτη ἡ γεγομένη ἡ τέχνη ἑστιν, οὕτω τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταύτα τὴν ἀρχήν. And in 1110, 1099 b 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

§ 8. ἐστὶ δ' ἕ μὲν βούλησις κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 b 26, ἔτι δ' ἕ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρῶς τοῦ τέλους, ὅποιον ύπαίτιν υβολόμεθα, προαρούμεθα δὲ δὲ ὅποιον ύπαίτιν, καὶ εὔδαιμονεὶς μὲν βούλησις καὶ φαίμες, προαρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν ὡς ἁρμόζει· ὅλος γὰρ ἑαυτὸν προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἑμῖν εἶναι. This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. 'In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the nius or conatus—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire
μὲν βούλησις, ἦν ἀγαθὸν ὁρέξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἄλλ' ἦν οὐθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν), ἀληθὸν δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἐπτα, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν,

9 δὲ ἐπιθυμίαι. τὸ δὲ προσδιαρείσθαι καθ' ἥλικίας ἦν ὀρέξεις ἦν ἄλλ' ἀττα τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκε τοῖς νέοις ὀργῆς ἦν ἦν ἐπιθυμητικὸς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πραττόμενα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα δὲ ὀργῆν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἄλλα συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἐνδεικτικὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαῖων ἱδιουμ[...]

a blind and fatal, tendency to action'. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. XI Vol. 1. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βούλησις here means not 'will', but 'wish', as appears from the definition ἀγαθὸν ὁρέξις—which the 'will' is not always directed to good—and from the analysis of it in Eth. N. III 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is Conative. Impulsive means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κτ.λ. This question of the end and object of 'the wish' is discussed in Eth. Nic. III 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 a 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ τὰῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει (the two opposite views that it is διὰ ἄγαθον and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν). ὥρα φατέων ἀλῖκος μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀληθεὰν βουλήσεων εἶναι τᾶγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν.

§ 9. τὸ δὲ προσδιαρείσθαι κτ.λ.] What he says is superfluous (περιέργον) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. II, and this apparent contradiction has raised a suspicion that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book II. The treatment of these ήθη is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the πάθη: here it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the causes of human action; and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or πάθη, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as effects of causes, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are not the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they do accompany them they are accidental, not essential.

ἀναγκαῖον ήδονῶν] These are thus defined by Plato, Rep. VIII 12, 558D, AR. I.
καὶ οὖτοι οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ τὰς ἐξεις πράττεις, διὰ τὴν πάθος· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δὲ ἡθή καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τάναν-

§ 10. Συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἔξεσι τὰ τοιαύτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαίσδε τὰ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἰσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώφρονα εἶναι δόξαί τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ ὅπου τοὺς ἀφ' οὐκ ἀν οὐδὲν ἀποτρέφει δικαίως ἃν ἀναγκαίαι καλούστο, καὶ ὅσα ἀποστελεύομεν ὁφελοῦμεν ἡμᾶς; τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρματέρων ἐφίσθαι ἤμων τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη, comp. Philoeb. 72 E. They are therefore pleasures that are forced upon us by nature, and therefore 'necessary' or 'indispensable' to us. Of these the 'bodily pleasures', the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. vii 14, 1154 a the pleasures which are first called σωματικαί, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of ἀναγκαία, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholast and Paraphrast both explain ἀναγκαία by σωματικαί. Plato more frequently speaks of the ἀναγκαία ἐπιθυμίαι in the same sense.

§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—ίτας happen, συμβαίνει— that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are not 'states' in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (ἴσως), as self-control, does generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, good ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding.

εὐθὺς...[ἐπακολουθοῦσι] 'there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the σώφρον in virtue of his self-control, and certain good opinions and desires in respect of pleasure', εὐθὺς in the sense of 'at once', 'straight off', and corresponding sometimes to the Latin statim and ulter, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. v 14, 1137 b 19, σαφτε νατυρα, εὐθὺς τοιαύτη τῇ τῶν πράκτων ἐλή εὐνύχτε; see Bonitz on Metaph. Π 3, 1004 a 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 a 32, Anal. Pr. 116, 36 a 6, Eth. N. vii 5, 1130 b 18, εὐθὺς οὖν φαίνεται, ὀμνίνον non appareat. Polit. III 4, 1277 a 15, τής παιδείας εὐθὺς 'from the very first' ἐπίφεραν. Ib. vi (iv) 11, 1295 b 16, καὶ τούτ' εὐθὺς ὠκειάν ὑπάρχει παιαι ν οὐκιν (from their very earliest home associations).

Ib. VIII (v) 10, 1310 b 8, εὐθὺς εἰς ἐκαντῶν (at once, from direct opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. μη βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὖν ἐσταὶ βασιλεὺς (he won't be king at all, ομνίνο). Eth. Eudem. II 5, 1222 a 37, διδεὶ ἡ φύσεω εὐθὺς οὖν πρὸς ἀπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίστηκε τοῦ μέσων. See Fritzche, note ad loc. Phys. vii 4, 2 bis, 248 a 21, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, and 23. Hist. Anim. II 13, 2, 17, ἕρατι ἐπί το διάζωμα εὐθὺς, statim, at once, immediately under. V 17, 5,
τῶν ἰδέων, τῷ δ’ ἀκολάστως αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν 
II αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαφέρεις ἐὰ-
τέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῦ ποῖος εἰσβολὴ ἐπεσθαί: εἰ μὲν 
γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται 
tῶν τοιούτων ἀκολούθειν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ 
dίκαιος ἢ ἅδικος, ἥδη διαφέρει. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν 
συμβαίνοντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἦθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 
οἶν πλούτειν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ 
eὑτιχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν, 
νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.

12 ἐστι δ’ ἀπὸ τὐχῆς μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα γιγνόμενα,

de Gen. et Corr. II 11, 2, de part. Anim. IV 5, 1. Like ἦθη its connotation is 
transferred from time, its natural and proper 
signification, to place.

§ 11. ‘And therefore’, (because they are inappropriate as not assigning 
causes of human action,) ‘such distinctions as these may be dismissed for 
the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which 
subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes’;
(the general subject deserves investigation;) ‘for though in respect of the 
qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or 
accompaniment’ (between them and any particular persons or classes), ‘yet 
when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or 
injustice, then (by this time) there is a difference’. That is to say, that 
although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular 
classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet 
there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it would be 
worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. ‘And in 
general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the 
characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or 
poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference’. So after 
all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between 
qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an 
inquiry—the reason being already given—‘we will postpone it for the pre-
sent’, and wait till we come to the πάθη, where it will be in its proper 
place: ‘And now let us proceed to what remains’ of the subject on which 
we are at present engaged.

πλούτειν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old 
Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has 
πλούτειν δοκεῖ, which Buhle retains. δοκεῖ τῷ, a conjecture of Victorius, 
is also found in some MSS.

§ 12. On τὐχῆ see Appendix C to Bk. I, Introd.; on αἰτία ἄδορωτος see 
ib. p. 221 seq. ‘Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definit oriuntur 
ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 196 d 6, εἴτε δὲ τινὲς οἶς δοκεῖ 
ἐναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τὐχῆ, ἀδηλος δὲ ἄνθρωπον διάνοια ὡς θείων τι οὐσα καὶ δαιμο-
νιώτερον.’ Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle’s own definition.)
όσων ἢ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἑνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως· δὴλον δὲ εκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων.

13 φύσει δὲ, ὀσων ἢ τ' αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη; P. 1369 ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὀσταύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἀλλὴν αἰτίαν γίγνεται· δόξει δὲ

14 ἄν καὶ ἢ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. βίᾳ δὲ, ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δὲ

15 αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἐθεί δὲ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολὺ

16 λάκεις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται· ἐνα γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δὲ ἡγοῦν.

17 διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὅργην τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ

καὶ (ὅσα) μὴ ἑνεκά του...μήτε τεταγμένως] 'in any fixed, regular, prescribed order'.

§ 13. φύσει] Introd. p. 224.—ἡ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, 'either constantly, or as a general rule': the latter alternative allows for the possible objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the perfect regularity of the operations of Nature.

καὶ ἢ τύχη αἰτία] The καὶ admits that chance as well as Nature may be the cause of these unaccountable monstra, these deviations from the ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

§ 14. βίᾳ] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instrumentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said to be done βίᾳ, by compulsion.


§ 16. λογισμῶν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of utility; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλὸν the moral end, 'the right', and τὸ ἥδω; see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 30, τρίτον γὰρ ὀσων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις...καλὸν συμφέροντος ἥδεος,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

§ 17. θυμὸς and ὅργη. Ib. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, 'acts and feelings of
revenge, are prompted by passion and anger. I have translated θυμός ‘passion’ and ὀργή ‘anger’ to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμός being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. ὀργή, if Damm’s Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast’s (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. s.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμός the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργή ‘anger’ is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, ὀργαί. In Aristotle’s psychology, the θυμός is one of the impulsive faculties (ὀρέξεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμός or θυμοειδείς represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt ὀργή is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 b. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, αἱ κολάσεις...ιατρείαι γὰρ τινὲς εἶσιν, αἱ δὲ ιατρείαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασα γίνεσθαι.

§ 18. For further particulars about ὀργή we are referred to the treatment of the πάθη in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐπίθυμα. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ἐστίν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐπίθυμα it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σωφθέως and ἑμποτόν. The former represents a natural familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on I 1. 2, the derivation, σώ ν ἤδος, ‘the haunting, herding together’, the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so σωφθέως, of a man’s ‘familiar associates, habitual companions’ I 11. 16;
the other is an acquired habit, a practice to which you habituate yourself by study and attention; of which virtue the settled ἑις formed by ἑός is the best example. 'In priore vero,' says Victorius, 'nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum actate crevisses, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.'

ἑισθῶσιν] Spengel has adopted συνεισθῶσιν from συνεισθῶσιν, the reading of MS Λ. ['ἑισθῶσιν ceteri ut p. 1370, 13' (c. II. 4). 'Resititum passivum.' Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κτλ.] 'Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πάσα συνῆθεια' καὶ νεκὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν ὁ χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) ὁ τὴν πρότιν δεξάμενος εἰς τὸν βιον ἥλικιαν' Gaisford.

ὀστε συλλαβῶντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τω, 'as for one summing up to say'. An analogous phrase is ὥς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Xen. Mem. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on 1 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικὸ ἐίναι, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. I 5. 1097 b 13, ἐπεκτείνοντι ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἀπειρον πρόσεων. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἐκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἐκόνως and ἐκόνως. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἐκόνως, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἐκόνως, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἐκόνως, 'not-intentional'; neither intentional nor 'unintentional'. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or
apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are αἰρέτα (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (ὡσαίτως) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician's business to discover the number and kinds (so Aristotle, but the number of kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for rhetorical purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, or philosophical, 1 4. 4—6, &c. Accordingly,

CHAP. XI

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all natural desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, φαραγία, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis
§ 1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: ἐποκείσθω, 'let us assume', as a definition, 'take it for granted': there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly ἔστω, 5, 3, 6, 2, 7, 2, 10, 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. 1, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασιν...εἰς τὴν ἑπάρχουσαν φύσιν] This characteristic of pleasure, 'the resettlement of the soul', i.e. the vital and sensitive system, 'into its normal state' after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21. εἰν τῷ μυθάλαιν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθάστασθαι. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of pleasure: not, so far as I remember, of learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. 11 963 (there quoted).

§ 2. καὶ ἦδον ἐστὶ τῷ ποιητικῷ] by the ordinary rule, 1 6, 2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. Ν. 1 4, 1096 b 10, quoted on the above passage.

ἡς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως] pleasure is here properly called a διάθεσις, 'a temporary and passing disposition', as opposed to the 'confirmed, complete, and permanent state' which constitutes the εὐς. On the distinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p. 8 b 27, διαφέρει δὲ ἐσι ἡ διάθεσις τῷ πολυχρωμωτήρῳ εἰναι καὶ μουσακωτήρῳ. τοιοῦτα δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρετα...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγομαι τὰ ἐστιν εἰκώνα καὶ τὰ υπὸ μεταξύλλογα, οἷον θερμίτης καὶ φυγρίτης καὶ νόμος καὶ νύμφα καὶ ὀφείλει καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τουλίτων διακοινώται γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος, ταῦτα δὲ μεταξύλλογα ἐκ θερμῶν ψυχρῶν γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature φύσι
being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the *normal nature*, nature in its best and completest condition), then all 'passing into a natural state' must be pleasant, 'and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature', i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by *silim restituisse, didiciisse*, which not only does not give Aristotle's meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

*ἀπειληφότα* has attained to, acquired as its *due*, the opp. of *ἀποδίδων*, see note on 11.7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of *ἀπολαμβάνειν*, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, Π 130 E, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις ἀπειληφθεί (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἑδονικαὶ ἐκτός ἑαυτῶν (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (γεγένηται) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (τὰ) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition'. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 a 27, ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἡ ὑδάτων τὸ ἑδονικαί, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσαν ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 Α, τὸ ἑδονικὸν τὴν ἑστίν ἡ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν.


§ 4. καὶ τὸ μὴ βιαον· 'and freedom from constraint, freedom of action' by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. 'And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful'. This marks the distinction of *ἀναγκαίον* and *βιαον*. Fate, for example, is *ἀναγκαίον*, and Necessity ('Ἀνάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on τὸ αναγκαίον which includes *βιαον* as a species, in Metaph. Δ 5. There are four kinds of 'necessary' things'. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to Ἐγίνα to recover a sum of money: under this head comes *βια* (and τὸ βιαον), an external force that controls us,
something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). *Biaia* is thus described. 1015 a 26, τούτο δ' ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαιρέσειν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικὸν. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαίον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρὸν, ὥστε καὶ Εὐρώς φησι, 'τὰν γὰρ ἀναγκαίον πράγμα ἀναρὸν ἐφι.' καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκῃ τις, ὅσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει 'ἀλλ' ἡ βία μὲ τοῦτον ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν' (this is incorrectly quoted; memoriter, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταύτ' ἀναγκάζει μὲ ὀρᾶν, Electr. 256). The third species of ἀναγκαίον includes τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλωσ ἔχειν; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, ἀπόδειξις, of which the conclusion 'can only be in one way'—which shows that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 b 38, Comm. 11 p. 358.


'And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful' (supply ἀνάγκη εἶναι λυπηράς), 'for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but then the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, πρὸς) necessity'.

τῶν ἰδεῶν τι] Comp. 1 9. 25, νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, I 11, 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with τι omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle τι or ἐν τι is sometimes expressed. I have not noted it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 c, τῶν γενναίων. Thaec. 164 b, τῶν αἰθιωτῶν τι ἔμφασιν φαίνεται. Phaed. 68 b, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaurn's note), Iib. IV 424 c, δές τῶν πεπεισμένων, 437 b, IX 577 b, ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἀν κρίνατ. ΑEsch. c. Tim. § 143, ἐν τι τοῦτο
§ 5. υδέων ουδὲν γάρ πρός ἀνάγκην τούτων. καὶ οὐ ἄν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνή, ἀπαν ἦδυ. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἰδέος

§ 5. καὶ οὐ ἄν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνή] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, 'the object of any of our natural desires or appetites', the definition of desire being 'an impulse towards pleasure'. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 b 2, ὤρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βουλησις, b 5, τοῦ γὰρ ἰδέος ὄρεξις αὐτῇ (ἡ ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις τις ἑστίν; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 b 6, κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῷοι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἰδέος ὄρεξις. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ἡ ἐμφύτευσις αὐτὰ ἐπιθυμία ἰδέων.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγον ἐκαθα and the ἀλόγον—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I 1. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικοῖς (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, ὄσα λέγονται φύσει, (these are Plato's ἀναγκαῖα ἐπιθυμίαι; Rep. VIII 554 Α, 558 D, 559 Α, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖως, ἀλλὰ παιδίας τε καὶ καλλωπιστάνυν ἑνεκα γεγονέναι; and have corresponding ἕδοναι, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 Ε), and are not prompted by any 'supposition', ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium of (διὰ) the body, sensual, at σωματικὰ, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἀναγκαία τὰ σωματικὰ, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes taste,'gustus', with feeling in general, τὸ δὲ γευστάν ἀπὸν τι, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to
'persuasion' of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn \( \tau \alpha \ \varepsilon \omega \nu \tau a, \phi \nu \sigma \zeta i \alpha \) —because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

\( \dot{o} \sigma a \ \dot{e} \pi \iota \nu \mu o \alpha \pi o i n \] sc. \( \dot{e} \pi \iota \nu \mu i a s \), is a cognate accusative; \( \dot{e} \pi \iota \nu \mu e i n \) is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

§ 6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at \( \dot{e} \lambda \pi i \zeta i \) [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of ms \( \Lambda \) \( \dot{a} \dot{e} i \varepsilon \) for \( \kappa a i \).) With this punctuation, \( \kappa a i \ \tau \delta \mu \mu \nu \mu \mu e i n o \) —\( \dot{e} \lambda \pi i \zeta i \) must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: 'If pleasure consists in sensation, and \( \phi \nu \tau \varsigma a \sigma i a \) is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there is pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated'—pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to show; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, \( \dot{e} \pi \iota \iota \kappa a i \tau a, \kappa a i \dot{a} \delta \mu \nu \nu \mu e i n o \) is, in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop: retain \( \kappa a i \varepsilon \) for \( \kappa a i \varepsilon \); and understand the first three clauses \( \dot{e} \pi \iota \iota - \dot{e} \lambda \pi i \zeta i \), as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows: \( e i \ \dot{d} \varepsilon \tau o t o \) is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, 'if all this, I say, be so', \( \dot{d} \varepsilon i \) is appropriate in a \( r e v a u m p t i o n \) of what has been just said, note on 11.11); if pleasure is a mode of sensation, \( \phi \nu \tau \varsigma a \sigma i a \) is a feeble kind of sensation, and \( \dot{e} \mu \nu i \mu e i n o \) and hope are attended by a \( \phi \nu \tau \varsigma a \sigma i a \) or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because \( \phi \nu \tau \varsigma a \sigma i a \)
τῶ αἰσθάνεσθαι πινος πάθους, ἢ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν
does, which is a form of sensation, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἰσθησις. In this case κἂν
is to be retained in preference to ἀλλὰ εὖ. The latter necessarily makes
the clause that it introduces, the apodosis; καὶ εὖ merely couples this with
the preceding premisses. The mood ἀκολούθοι ἂν, which might seem
objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered
as a qualified statement of the fact, ‘will be likely to attend’; only so
much can be affirmed.

φαντασία] which is here called a ‘sort of feeble sensation’, is described
otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined Γ 3, 429 a 1,
ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ἥπα τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς καὶ ἐνέργειαν γενομένην (for
γενομένην, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sen-
sation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise:
and again 428 a 1, φαντασία καθ᾿ ἡν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι:
‘the presentative faculty’ (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate
between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the
intellect; the seat of memory is τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικοῦ, viz. the heart, where
the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted
to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 a 15,
φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνων ὡθ̣ φάντασμα, ἔξεσ; which represents it as a state
(in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression of φάντασμα, trans-
ferred by the faculty of φαντασία from the sensation itself, which (the
impression) is the representation (the εἰκόν) of the real object of sense, that
of which it is the φάντασμα. The office of the φαντασία is therefore to
convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by
sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their
reception; when thus impressed or ‘represented’ they become memory,
and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in
the Rhetoric, of this φαντασία being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in
the de Anima, Γ 3, 428 b 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it. ἐπείδη...
ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾿
αἰσθανόμενοι καὶ οὐν αἰσθήσεις ἑστίν, ἐστὶ δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας
τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμολαχανάν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴναν αὐτὴν
ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενοι ὑπάρχειν...καὶ
εἶναι καὶ ἀλήθη καὶ ψευδῆ. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and
dependent upon it, the φαντασία is not a faculty of mere sensation, but
belongs equally to the intellect, φαντασία ἀπάσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητική, de
Anima Γ 10 ult. 433 b 29, (being apparently intermediate between them
and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take
the whole of it, the διάνοια as well as the νοῦς, into account, the φαντασία

1 That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in Eth. Nic.
x 4, 1174 b 21, κατὰ πασῶν γὰρ αἰσθήσεων ἐστὶν ἄδου ὑδη, and again, line 27, καθ᾿
ἐκάστην δ᾿ αἰσθήσῃ ὅτι γίνεται ἄδου ὑδη. But this is not the same thing as the
statement of the Rhetoric which identifies the two, just as Eudemus in the 7th
book of the Nic. Eth. identifies pleasure with the ἐνέργεια, of which in Aristotle’s
10th book it is only the concomitant. And there is a precisely similar overstate-
ment here of the nature of the φαντασία, as compared with the description of it
in the de Anima, where it is said to be a kind of sensation, instead of closely
connected with it. See the following note, on φαντασία.
When and pars good, consequently not whence tvtp-67T6L7r6p iv 283, c.iv the TOVTO, therefore e 7, ei• actual greater fj.6vois those pleasures Anima, various natione actually facts pany, according Waitz Aristotclcs. was tniserum, ei essun z.1. anticipation toibus; quanto dromcd. was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or advantage)1; whence the saying, ‘nay truly, pleasant it is to remember past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them’. Fragm. Eur. Andromed. xv (Dind. xxxvi), Wagner, Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr. Vol. ii p. 75, 1 When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past suffering is painful. Ovid, Metam. ix 290, quin nine quoque frigidus artus, dum loquer, horror habet; pars est meneissae doloris. xiii 283, (Ulysses) me miserum, quanto coger meminisse dolore temporis illius, quo Graiam munus Achilles precabitil. Virg. Aen. xi 10, sed si tanta amor casus cognoscre nostros...quamquam animus meminisse horrid latitue refugiat, incepiam. Dante, Inferno, c. v 121, Necum maggior dolore, che riordinarsi del tempo felice nella miseria. Shaksp. Richard ii. Act 1 Sc. 3. 300, Oh no! the apprehension of the good gives but the greater felling to the worse.
cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, suavis laborum est praeclariorum memoria. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. v 12. 2 habet enim praeteritum doloris secundum recordationis delectationem. Wagner adds, 'ex hoc loco et altero Archiphi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, profecisse Epicetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, 'erat idem quem diabantur apud yvs yps yps, autos idem to sophentia meumvsthai ponon, monuit Meinic. ad Menandrum p. 86.' Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippus, yvs—yvs, d mipte esti, y ypliota ypdamou, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous suave mari magno. The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, feev fev, ti tou to charma meizou av laaiov to yis evpsiavanta kath upo stege ypskhis akousa yekiodos evdoe yfrev;—to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fast-falling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut at tuus amicus Sophocles, kaiv upo stege et cet.

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. o' (xv) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 203, revocate animos maestumque timorem mitigite. Forsan et haec olim meminisses inuvabit. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. I. c. Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines: quae et si nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamem erunt incundae.

tou to ou' aition k.t.l.] 'And the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil'; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable.

§ 9. ta' ou ev elpidi (iideia esto) k.t.l.] 'Everything is pleasant in anticipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; and to do this without any accompanying pain', 'and in general, all that
Most of]...retained, see note on III 2. 1.

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain pleasure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under (lit. held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and composing verses in his honour (so Victorius and Vater; else, γράψωντες 'writing of him', and πουσάντες τι αἰεί 'in anything that they ever do which has any connexion with him', περί τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ 'so as to recall him to their recollection'); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their fancy (αἰσθήτα) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable reminiscences. The pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, followed by Spengel, has put ἐμωσων, but as γέγεν it. It may be retained and explained as I have translated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its omission. ἐμωσων if retained implies that the passion is already conceived. Gasford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5; 1167 a 4, ὅσκε δὴ (η ἐννοια) ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὅσπερ τοῦ ἐμών ἡ διὰ τῆς ὑπερετίης ὑδατινής μὴ γὰρ προσθετεῖσ τῇ ἑδει αἰθεῖς εἴρῃ, ὅ τε χαίρων τῷ ἐδεί κακεῖν μῖλλον ἑρᾶ, ἓλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα πολύ καὶ τῆς παρονίας ἑπίθετο.
Victorius inquires here whether ἔχομενοι should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἔχομενοι, or with ταῖς δīγαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

ταῖς δīγαις] their thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the possessive use of the definite article.

§ 12. 'And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way into (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings: for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but with that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (αἷς what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i.e. conduct). The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. 'Hence the appropriateness of the saying',—meaning especially the use of the word ἵμερος, which implies eager desire, in relation to γόος—'thus speake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing'. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's Lexicon, s. v. ἵμερος. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, διακρόνει γελάσασα, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (II. Ζ 484).

§ 13. 'And revenge is sweet', by the logical theory of convertible
And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar fondness for it (tois philovnikou), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (gýnetai, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. l 9.39, ἐν δὲ ὑπεροχῇ τῶν καλῶν... ἐπειτερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μνῆμεν ἀρετήν. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of ‘virtue’. This is one of the modes in which the ‘love of power’ manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain’s Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. ‘The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of superiority.’ This is the ὑπεροχή in question.

This love of victory, as an evidence of superiority, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a combative character, μαχητικά, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or ‘wit-combats’, intellectual and dialectical encounters (ἐρωτικά); games of knuckle-bones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS. Q, Y, Z here add αὐλητικά, (tac μαχητικά καὶ τὰς αὐλητικάς καὶ ἐρωτικάς), to represent ‘musical’ contests, which spoils the antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification.

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports. comp. Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61. On παιδικά ἐρωτικά, Probl. xviii 2 (referred to by Gaisford). Διὰ τί οἱ ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι γυμναστικοὶ εἶσαι; ἢ δὲτι ἔχουσι τὸ νυκτί ἡ ἡπτάδια πυκνών; φιλονείκως οὖν εἶδος παι-ούσιν καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἥρισει καὶ ἦττο-
eiiwv tás mawhtikás kai tás éristikás (pólláikis γαρ P. 1371.
én paútais génvetai to vikáν) kai ástiragáliseis kai
sfaírítēseis kai kúbeías kai peptéias. kai peri tás
menoi ós ánamachómenoi. kai oi en tòis állois égōs tautó dìo kai maχómenoi
kai éktonous òttes pólláikis ói boulwntai diwulùsevbai.

éristiké here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of
dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however,
almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional
connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. iv
(de Soph. El.) 11, 171 b 24, the éristikoi are defined as oi pántos vikáν proai-
ρρρομένων, and again 25, oi mén ouv tis vikítis árhtis chárís tovóstoi éristikoi
ánvrosai kai filérēdes dakoúvnon éiwna. Here there is already the imputation
of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines
30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction
—they both argue unscrupulously, 'but the criteria do this to gain an
apparent victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom'; -the definition
of the sophist being, c. i., 165 a 22, χρηματιστής ápò fainoménhs sofías
ouìs d' ou. Again, c. 2, 165 b 7, they are distinguished from the genuine
dialecticians, who deal with τā évôca réal probabilities, by this sophistical
habit and mode of arguing, éristikoi de oi èk tōv fainoménωn évôçvnu μή
òntων δὲ συλλογιστικοί ἢ fainomένοι συλλογιστικοί. ψευδής λόγος καλείται
πετράχως' éiwa mēn trópos όtan fainítta συμπεραίνεσθαι μή συμπεραίνομεν, ó
kaleitai éristikòs συλλογισμός. Top. Θ 12, 162 b 3. In Rhet. II 24. 10,
tá éristiká stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, génvetai
fainoméνον συλλογισμόν 'lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion'.

ástiragáliseis] The game of ástirágála, 'knucklebones', cut into rough
dice with only four flat sides (talus), and so distinguished from the kúboi
(jesserae), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in
Rich, Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq. p. 64, Smith, Dict. Antiq. s. v. talus,
III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the
same authorities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der
Griechischen Privatalterthümer, ed. 2, § 55. S.]

σύντονον καὶ καματηρόν τήν peri τήν σφαιριστικήν ἀμίλλης κ.τ.λ.

kúbeías kai peptéias] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. II
374 c, (on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4,
Rom. p. 272 1, Zákōroς tès...ἀπολαλών σχολῆς ἔδος εἰχεν εν peptéi kai
kúbou ta póllá diapherénev. The peptoi in particular was an old and
favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek
literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od. a' 107. The
corresponding Latin game, latrunculi, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. II
208, III 357.

The same is the case with 'serious' games (games that require study
and attention, such as chess, and peptéia and kúbeia, according to Plato,
l. c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere
amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in
the one case must be acquired, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are naturally agreeable, lit. at once (ευθὺς, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chase.

Various ‘kinds of chase’ are enumerated in the Politics, 1 8, in the description of the ‘hunting stage’, the second. according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. οἱ δὲ ἑπικρατεῖσα ἔτερα καὶ ὑποκριτικῆ, ὁπον γὰρ ἄμικλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἑστίν. διὸ καὶ ἡ δικαική καὶ ἡ ἐρυθηνική ἱδεια τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμενοις. καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἱδιστῶν διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαν-

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the φαντασία, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as ὁ σπουδαῖος, to whom alone such things are really ἀδικοῦται, and a φαντασία, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the φαντασία becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (ὅτι τοιοῦτὸς ἐστιν οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (ὁι δικαστές ἀληθευέων) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, συνήθεις, note on 1 1.2.10.18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (γὰρ; i.e. the preference, expressed by the μᾶλλον in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for something else.

τῶν ἱδιστῶν] Note on § 4, supra.
The fact that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, Δινάν τοϋ κατὰ τούτον οὐς οὗτος τῶν τῆς. See many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold's Thucyd. s. v.) are seen, are, κατωθεν, κατωθεν, κατωθεν, κατωθέν, and such like, in phrases where the termination seems to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder's note, Antig. 519, and Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, ευχαίρετον ενίκωθης ενίκως πυρας νομιμονούς πυρας γαλακτος, 'solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri': they reverse our order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, olim vel barbatos magistros absurde fecit. (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the fact; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. i 15. 16, οί δ' ἀπωθεν, Ποιημάτων πρόσωψεν δινων ἐγγύδειν δ' ἀρμενων, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of ἐγγύδειν ἀρμενων be, 'seen' not 'from a near point' where we are, but 'seen', the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where they are. Arist. Pol. vii (vi) 4, 1319 a 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of the land: ἐν τὸ ὀλος μη ἐξεινα κεκτησαν πλειον γῆς μετρων τινων ἄπο τινος τοπου προς το ἀντυ και την πόλιν—or, as we say, 'within a certain distance from the city'. Plat. Theaet. 165 δ, ἐγγύδειν ἐπιστασαθα πόρρωσεν βη μή (not, as in English, at a distance, but from a distance, as seen from a distance), Rep. vii 523 b, τα πόρρωσεν φανομενα. 1b. c, ειτ' ἐγγύδειν προσπίπτωσαν εἰτε πόρρωσεν. 1b. 514 b, ει το πόρρωσεν, φως πυρως ἀνωθεν και πόρρωσεν κιομενον ὡπωθεν αὐτων. Soph. Oed. Col. 505, τούκιδειν ἄλλους, Philoct. 27, δικαίω χάρι σοι εἴτε ἀντετοι εἰσοραμ. 'Οδ. ἀνωθεν, ἡ κατωθεν; οὐ γάρ ἐννοι. Eur. Iph. T. 41, σφαγα δ' ἀλλοις ἀρρητε' ἐσωθεν τῶν' ἀνακτορῶν θεας. Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 8. 38, 9. 12 (Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr.), ἐγγύδειν ἑστάμενοι. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards ἂπωθεν and ἄπωθεν, the former is condemned as formed on a false analogy from an imaginary ἂπω by Göttling on Ar. Pol. ii 1, p. 311.—See Lobeck on Phryn. p. 8—10, who shows that both forms are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but ἂπωθεν is found in verse (Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantees its existence.
§ 17. ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδῶν] § 16, τῶν ἡδίστων, note on § 4 supra. 

§ 18. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι] 'And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)'. αὐτὸ the honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there is no more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). τιμή is pleasant, § 16.
Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the phantasia (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (γινε) in c. 10. 18. Probl. XIX 5, ult. ἐτι καὶ τὸ σύνθες ἤδυ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀνυψηθος.

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: ‘the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state’. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial μὴ δὲν ἀγαν, ἢ γινδί namis, ‘toujours perdrix’. When we have reached a ‘settled state’, as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be viti- ated; and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 a 4, ἀναπληρωμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκίας, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrase explains it, πληρωθέντες ἡδόμεθα κ.τ.λ.: and similarly ἐν τῇ καθεστηκίᾳ ἠλικία, Thuc. II 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, all excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic; μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γυμνότατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ ποιηρίαν τῶν ἡμέρας (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a ‘complete state’). ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὑμεταβολος ὁ ποιητός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεμεριμένη μεταβολῆς οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ’ ἐπικείμης. The ‘poet’, referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, ἢ κατι γαίας ἀρμόδια πόδια θεῖες χρόνον ἵνα τείπῃ; μεταβολὴ πάντων γυμνί: The ‘change-ability’ of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παυνο�άσως δὲ κακοὶ: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is taken, Eth. Nic. II 5, ult. 1106 b 29, ἐτὶ τὸ ἀμαρτάναιν πολλαχῶς τὸ δὲ κατορθῶν μναχαῖ τοι ἀκατορθῶν κ.τ.λ.

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things pleasant that present themselves to us or happen ‘after an interval’;
because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare': but rarity makes things 'better', c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition'. φύσει here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II 1, 3, Polit. 1 2, 1252 b 32, οἷον γὰρ έκαστον ἐστὶ τῆς γενεσεως τελεθείας φομὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι έκαστο, ὄσπερ ἀνθρώπον, ὢσπον, οἰκίας. This highest condition of our nature is θεωρία, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the 'normal condition of the intellect', the noblest part of the entire ψυχή. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § 1, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theact. 155 d, to whom the observation is due, μάλα γὰρ φιλοσοφὸν τούτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ δαμαξέων· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτὴ, κ.τ.λ. From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12, διὰ γὰρ τὸ δαμαξέων οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ κῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἥρασμα φιλοσοφείν... οὐ δὲ ἄπορως καὶ δαμαξέων ὕστερον, Ποικ. IV 4, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον. ὅτι δαμαξάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἕδη- στον ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁμώιοις· ἄλλα ἐπὶ βραχὺ κανωνώσαν αὐτῶν, and Coleridge again, Aids to Reflection, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, 'In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.' See also Sir W. Hamilton's Lect. on Metaph. Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. πάντες ἄνθρωπον τοῦ εἴδους ἄρχονται φύσει, κ.τ.λ. Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian Nil admirari, &c., followed by Pope, "'Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to
§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of conferring favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (έχειν) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (υπερέχειν) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἀρχεῖν is said to be ἡδίστωσι, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of 'setting our neighbours right' (rectifying, restoring their fallen fortunes or character to its normal or upright state) either in their property, when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (παρεκβάλειν) from the right path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. ἐπιτελεῖν is 'to put the end upon', (as ἐπιστάφειν, ἐπιστραγίζειν, ἐπιγράφειν, ἐπιχρωματίζειν Plat. Rep. X 601 A, ἐπιτειθέναι, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or 'fill up'.

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the 'imitative arts' is next traced to the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here with Vater γραφικῆ &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the 'art' in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the 'product' or result of the art); and especially any exact imitation, even when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the mere imitation, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an inference or 'conclusion (συλλογισμός) from this to that'; which is a reasoning process, and a kind of learning.

The inference is from the copy to the original, which must have been
seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, αἰτίον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον κ.τ.λ. insīria. The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, σύμβουλον, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1, 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. 'Εσόκαι δὲ γεννήσαι μὲν ὅλος τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν δύο τινές, καὶ αὐτὰ φυσικά, τὸ τε γὰρ μιμεῖται σύμβουλον τοῖς ανθρώποις ἐκ παῖδων ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ἄνων ὥστε ὅτι μεμικτικάτατον ἐστὶ καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τοιαίτερα διὰ μιμήσεως τῶν πρῶτος, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήσας πάντας. ομοιόν δὲ τούτο τὸ συμβαινόν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀ γάρ αὐτά λυπηρῶς ὑμῖν τούτον τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μιμίστα ἡμιμη−
μικτικά χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον ὅμηρος τοὶ μιμήσας τῶν ἄλλων τῶν (the lowest and most degraded) καὶ νεκρῶν. (§ 4) αἰτίον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ὃτι μανθάνειν ὕπο μονόν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδονῶν ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλως ὑμικῶς ἄλλα ἐπὶ βραχὺ κανονοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τούτο χαίροντες τὰς εἰκόνας ὑμῖν, ὃτι συμβαινεῖ θεωροῦνται μανθάνειν καὶ συναλλογίζεσθαι τὶ ἐκατόστου, οἷον ὃτι ἄνευ ἄνευς, ἐπεὶ ἐν μὲν τυχεῖν προσωρικὸν ὡς ἐνίας μιμήσας τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄλλα διὰ τῆς ἀπεργασίας (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. vi 504 1) ἡ τὴν χορὸν ἦ διὰ τοιαύτη των ἄλλων αἰτίων. In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are imitatives, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, μάθησις τις—between the word 'transferred' and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν μετατράπηκαν ἡδονὴ φύσει πάσην ἐστί, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. iii 10. 2. Comp. iii 8. 2, ἀνάδει γὰρ καὶ ἄργους τὸ ἀπετέρων. iii 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Prosbl. xix 5, the same principle is applied to music: διὰ τί ἡδονὴ αἰκιάωσιν αἰοίων ὅσα ἐν προκειμένῳ τυγχάνοισι τῶν μολῶν ἡ ὧν μὴ ἐπιταταίσαται ἂν... ἢ τί ήδον τοιάστων τούτων δὲ αἰτίων ὃτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ αἰνογορίζειν ἐστὶν.

Twining in his note on Poet. iv 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that 'he does not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator' (or listener) from the mere identification of two objects, the inference that 'this is that'. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared with one already known conveys no new knowledge, which is essential to
the notion of learning. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you learn something new in this respect; that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of details introduced), enables you to discover or observe by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the 'inference' from the resemblance, which the сυλλογισμός, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. i 5, b 45, a 5. [καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰς ἄποστον εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦτες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργίαν τέχνην συνδεώριμαν, οὐν τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστάτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπάμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν, διὸ δεὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παράκος τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτυμοτέρων ζωῶν ἐπίσκεψιν.]

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) 'catastrophes' and 'narrow escapes from danger', which are all objects of wonder. Poet. XI init. ἦστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραστομένων μεταβολή,...καὶ τοῦτο δὲ...κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ἀναγκαῖον. The term περιπέτεια therefore expresses merely the 'sudden change or revolution of fortune' of the actors in the drama; the later appellation καταστροφή (Polybius) conveys the same notion of 'revolution' (στροφή), with the additional annotation of a 'downward' tendency (κατά) or downfall, to degradation or ruin.

παρὰ μικρὸν] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, παρὰ βραχὺ, παρ' ἀλγόν, παρ' οὐδὲν (ἄγειν, τίθεσθαι, ἤγεισθαι), is usually translated in English by 'within', 'within a little of', 'within an ace or an inch of', in reality implies comparison; two things when set 'side by side' being more easily compared together. (Rhet. ii 23. 30, παρ' ἄλληλα φανερὰ...μᾶλλον, III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φανερεῖν, lb. 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, 'about as much as, amounting to'; and so παρὰ μικρὸν becomes 'nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of'. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jell's Gr. Gr. § 637 on παρά, Vol. ii, p. 301, [Kuhnert's Ausführliche Grammatik. § 440, Vol. ii, p. 445] and Matth. Gr. Gr. 588 a, who does not properly explain it. Victorius quotes from Phys. B 5, 8, 197 a 27, a sentence which conveys a sort of explanation of παρὰ μικρὸν: διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν μέγα λαξεῖν ἢ δυστυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁς ὑπάρχων λέγει ἡ διάνοια τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρὸν ᾧσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ.
§ 25. καὶ ... τὰ συγγεγέν δὲ] Note on i. 11, p. 20. συγγεγέν are things that belong to the same γένος or family, congeners of all kinds, 'all things akin to and resembling one another': the συγγεγέν, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverb: they are 'class fellows', any thing of the same kind with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, ('κατὰ φύσιν inter se esse dict quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,' Víct.)—therefore all συγγεγέν are ἤδια; but only 'for the most part', not always: for sometimes 'a man's greatest foes are those of his own household', and 'two of a trade can never agree'; κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κυστές καὶ τέκτων τέκτων, Hes. Op. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. viii 2 init.


§ 26. Next from the principle of the 'fondness of like for like' is
deduced the universality of ‘self-love’. *tò òmion kai tò sýgyveneís òdè éautó ápav*, μάλιστα δ'
autōs prōs ēanvtōn ēkastos toupto pēpōneven, ānāγiκ
pántas φιλαυτούς ēianai ἡ μᾶλλον ἢ ἤττον. pánta
γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα υπάρχει prōs autōn màlistta. ètei
dὲ φιλαυτοί pántes, kai τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγικη ἤδεα ēianai
pāsiv, oĩn ērga kai λόγουs. διὸ kai φιλακόλαkes
ως épî tò polu kai φιλερασται kai φιλότιμου kai
φιλότεκνοι: αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. kai τὰ
ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ: αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἡδὴ γίγνεται.
27 kai ètei tò ārxein ἡδιστον, kai tò σοφόν δοκεῖν ēianai
or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of
others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are
recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and
evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere
pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the
parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man’s
own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying
a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22),
‘because now (by this time, not before, ἤδη) the work becomes our own’:
the perfection of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole.
Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of
pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in
the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action
in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure
is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the
pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power,
already indicated in §§ 14, 22, q. v. To this natural impulse or emotion
is traced the pleasure that is derived from ‘wisdom’, or the reputation of
it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowl-
dge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the
reputation of it carries with it—Now ‘wisdom’ may be understood in two
senses; ‘practical wisdom’, φρόνησις, to φρονεῖν, which is pleasant to
possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence
over the actions of others; and ‘speculative wisdom’, σοφία, which gratifies
our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all
sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of
wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or
finding fault with our neighbours and friends, ἐπιτραύρα, is directly traceable
to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here
however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its
real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault im-
plies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we
thus ‘tax’, a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to
find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate. MS A here adds καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν after ἦδυ εἶναι, adopted by Spengel. It would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of the special ἐπιτημῶν, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

§ 28. There is pleasure again in 'dwelling upon', lingering in (passing one's time in, διατρίβειν) any pursuit or occupation in which one is 'at one's very best'. διατρίβειν is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, 11 2. 2. This same topic is also applied to 'good', 1 6. 29; the difference being in the 'ends' or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem xviii 6, quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second: ἡ ὄτι ἐν εἰς οἷς οἰκεῖστος κρατιστεῖν οὐκ ἡμερῶν, ὃς ἀνείπθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτο ἐπείγεται (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,) ὡς ἐν τῷ άρχειν ἐνευμαθεῖ, καν οἷς ἐν συνεθεσθαιν, οὐδὲ κρίνειν δύναται τὰ βέλτιον διέφθαρται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια διὰ φαύλας προαιρέσεως: that is, men in these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in consequence of a deprivation of judgment arising from the familiarity created by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος] Matth. Gr. Gr. § 460. The superlative in these phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' Antiope (Fr. xx Dind., xxvii Wagner) is quoted also in Plato's Gorgias 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling variations. The second line there runs thus, νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος which, with αὐτῷ instead of τούτῳ, is also the reading of the Problem. The third line is quoted in Alcib. 1146 A, with κράτιστος. In the Problem also, κράτιστος stands for βέλτιστος. In the two following
29 όμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπεί ἡ παιδία τῶν ἰδέων καὶ πάσα p. 42.
ἀνεσίς, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἰδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα
ἵδεα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα: διό- p. 137.
ρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρίς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Peri μὲν οὖν ἰδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρά
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῦτοι φανέρα.

pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been
incorporated in Callicles’ speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations
of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to Translation of
Gorgias, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows:
‘Each shines in that, to that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better
part of the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself’]

§ 29. τῶν ἰδέων] Note on I 11.4.—ἀνεσίς, ‘relaxation’, metaphor from
unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering
the tone; and ἐπίτασις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνίναι are hence
extended to denote ‘intensification’ and ‘relaxation’ in general. See note
on I 4.12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment
of ‘the ridiculous’ is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on εὐπρατελία
the mean in the use of the γελοῖον), ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ τοῦ γελοῖον, καὶ τῶν
πλεῖστον χαρόντων τῷ παιδίᾳ καὶ τῷ σκόπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The
discussion of τὸ γελοῖον here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again
in Rhet. III 18.7, where we are told that the ‘kinds’ of it are enumerated,
cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5, 2,
which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the
second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted1; and
most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author
promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work.
Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene
Schriften Arist. pp. 87—103.

On the ‘Judicrous’, see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. de ridicule; Quint.
Inst. Orat. vi 3. Demetr. peri ἐρρησθῶν in the chapter—peri τῶν ἐν τοῖς
and Will, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, Essays &c., 2nd

εἰρήσθων] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this
most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person
of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes
at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and
sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely
gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need
be said or done about it. Thus εἰρήσθω, ‘let so much have been said upon
the subject’, means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be con-
sidered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now ‘have done
with it’, and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle,
though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs

1 The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes v. 26 has Ποιη-
for instance in Xenophon, Mem. iv 2.19, ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι, ‘be satisfied with my saying so much’, let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 c, εἰρήσθω, ‘let it be said once for all’, and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, μεθείσθω, and Stallbaum’s note on Phaedr. 278 B, πεπαιόθω, ‘enough of this joking’, Ib. 250 c, κεχαρίσθω, Theact. 197 D, πεποίησθω, Eur. Theog. 278 D, πεπαιόθω υμῖν. Thucyd. i 71, ἁρίσθω, ‘let this definition suffice’. Ar. Eth. Nic. i 1 ult. πεφρομιάσθω, ‘let so much suffice by way of preface’; Top. A 8, 103 b 1, and 13, 105 a 21, διωρίσθω: et passim.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the paulo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμχάνηται τοὺς γονέας, Philoloc. r280, πέταμαι, Eur. Hippol. 1457, κεκαρτέρηται τάμα, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεποίθεναι γάρ, Rhet. II 8.2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διατείμηται (Paley’s notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διασφερόωσι γαίος. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἰρηταί λέγος. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, μεθείσται. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ χαραλαέων εἰρήται, ‘so much for’, where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. Τροία fuit. Fuit Ilium.

Of the paulo post futurum a good instance occurs Theact. 180 Α, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, ‘and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἐτέρω πεπλήρει κανώς μετωνομασμένω, you will be instantly shot with (lit. another phraselet, ῥηματικὸ) another brand new word coined for the occasion’, i.e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are. The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf’s Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

CHAP. XII.

§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong.

First of all, the ‘possibility’ of effecting it must always be taken into account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and not only the general possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a special possibility to
of themselves, καὶ εαυτοῖς δυνατῶν; in other words, the moral possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally 'impossible'.

eiτε ἄν (οἰόνται) λαθεῖν πράξαντες [whether, that is, the intended wrong-doers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves].

§ 2. ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον] The subject of 'general probability and improbability' shall be considered hereafter, that is, in II 19, where the δυνατῶν and ἀδύνατων (one of the four κοινῶν τότων) are analysed. This is expressed by the κοινὰ γὰρ ταύτα πάντων τῶν λόγων of the parenthesis: 'because they are common to all kinds of speeches', (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their κοινώτης, elsewhere it is their opposition to the εἴδη, see Introd. on τότον, p. 128), 'therefore they shall be considered hereafter', viz. with the rest in II 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrong-doers themselves (αὐτοὶ δ' οἰόνται δυνατοί εἶναι...), and under the circumstances of any particular case.

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions; and
if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and followers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities make it possible for them (δια, the cause, the power is due to these) to do the things (this applies specially to the πρακτικοί), and to escape either detection or punishment.

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if brought before them: for friends are off their guard (λεγ. unguarded), and thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are inclined to come to terms or to be reconciled without ‘prosecuting’ the case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts).

οἱ...φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι κ.τ.λ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the theory of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently without regard to moral considerations: but in practice, though the rhetorician as such can employ immoral arguments, no honest rhetorician would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue; that must be learned aitainde. This is Aristotle’s view of the matter: the Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification for the immoralities of their Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy.

προσκαταλλάττωναι] ‘καὶ πρόσ, et praeterea. pessime vulgo προσ-καταλλάττωναι’. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate, to which there is no possible objection. καταλλάττεσθαι alone, it is true, conveys all that is necessary to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but πρόσ is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express ‘direction’ to an object, as προσευτείνειν πληγάς, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; προσευθοῦνειν, Ar. Pol. vii (vi) 8, 1322 b 93; and particularly with verbs that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as προσχωρεῖν Thuc. i 103, iv 71, ‘to come over to a side’, προσάγεσθαι, ‘to bring over to one, to conciliate’. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, θεραπείας προσαγάγεσθαι. Thuc. iii 43, ἀπάτη προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος, iii 48, μήτε οὕτω μὴτ’ ἐπεικεία, οἷς οὐδε ἔγω ἑώ προσάγεσθαι (to be won over). προσίεσθαι et similia. So here the compound verb καταλλάττεσθαι denotes the mutual settlement of the disputed points, and the additional πρόσ the conciliation, being won over, which attends it.
§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the ‘opposition’ of ‘contrariety’), the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with ‘assault and battery’, or a poor and ugly man with adultery.

The ἀσθενής charged with αἰκία was a stock example of the τόπος of τὸ εἰκὸς in the early rhetorical treatises. This τόπος was the staple of Corax’s τέχνη, Rhet. II 24. 11; and the case of the ‘weak man’ is quoted by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of ‘probability’ to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric τάναστια συλλογίζεται, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Π. Phaedrus 273 b, as an extract from Tisias’ τέχνη, where the τόπος of τὸ εἰκὸς is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. v 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man’s actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are ‘personal’ topics of argument, argumenta a persona, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from him: one of these is, habitus corporis: ductur cum frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum—the two cases given by Aristotle.

ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρός, the definite article marking the genus, the member of a certain class. See note on 1 7. 13 εἰ μὴ ἤν ὁ πρᾶξων, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32.

καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ ‘And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people’s eyes’. τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ‘things in sight’, qui sauent aux yeux. Polit. vii (vi) 4, 1319 b 18, ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ ποιημάτων παρορμάται, πολὺ δὲ γνώμην ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλον ἔστω. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (ἀφώλακτα here occurs in a different sense to ἀφώλακτον φιλοῖ in § 4: that is ‘unguarded’, from φέρεται, the direct passive; this is ‘not guarded against’, the passive of (the middle) φέρεται τι ‘to guard oneself against anything’, comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, ‘because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them’. Supply to complete the sense τῶν ἐν ποιήμα σαῦτα, οὐ εἴπηται αὐτὸς. This is a return to the original topic of ἀ δύναται πράττειν ‘possible actions’. τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ are therefore acts which are likely ‘to be carried into effect’—not, ‘to escape detection’, λαθητικά from the preceding clause, which is in some sort parenthetical.
6 ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν οἴεσθαι. καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οία μηδὲ ἂν εἰσ. ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰσθέντα ὡσπερ ἀρρωστίματα φυλάττονται καὶ τάδικήματα, ὦ δὲ μηδείς 7 πν ὑπρωστικευ, οὔσεις εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οίς μηδεῖς ἐχθρός ἢ πολλοὶ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λίσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαι φυλαττομένους, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν
§ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (τηλικάῦτα) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply ποιήσεις); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise): for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever takes precautions. ἀμφώστημα, ἀμφωστία, ἀμφωςτεῖω properly denote 'want of strength,' bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, ἀμφωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shown in his 'remissness' or 'disinclination' to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by 'he was sick of it.' In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. Ol. II p. 24. 5, ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν, ἐκαὶ μὲν ἐν ἔρρωμένοις ἢ τει, οὔτε ἐσπαρτάνται τῶν καὶ ἔκαστα σαθρῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀμφωστήμα τι συμβῇ, πάντα κυεῖται, κἀν δρῦμα κἀν στρέμμα κἀν ἄλλο τι τῶν υπάρχουσι σαθρῶν ἢ, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.
§ 7. καὶ οίς μηδεῖς ἐχθρός ἢ πολλοὶ is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply οἴοντα δύνασθαι πράττειν κ.τ.λ. or simply οἴονται δύνασθαι ἄδικείν. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (ἄν) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαι 'because they would not be thought (lit. seem) likely to assail', 'because no one would think them likely to assail'; and also, if they are suspected or detected (so Victorius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready that they never would have made, were not at all likely to make, such an attempt; that is, that their guilt is highly improbable; Corax's topic of τὸ εἰκός again.
§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any 'mode' (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, 'any contrivance or device') or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit of mind', (suggestive of ὑπόσωσις in the second sense, and μηχανή).

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, de furibus ac latronibus; and interprets κρύψεις καί ἕξεις καί μηχανή. Lastly, confining διάθεσις to the same subject, he translates ἐνδείκνυσι, as we say to dispose of a thing; adding, διάθεσιν ευνηκὸς αἰτία αἰτίαν λαμβάνει, and interpreting, quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 F., τῶν δὲ γενομένων διάθεσιν πρὸς ἕξεις ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἕξεις ἐκκλησίαν. Demosth. Olynth. 11, p. 22, οὐθ' οὔτον ἢν πορίσσουσιν οὕτως ὅπως ἢν δύναται ταύτην ἕξοντες ἔτη καὶ συνεκαταστάθωσιν. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου δὴ καὶ ἐπιφανείας αὐτῷ ὅπως ἐπιφανείας, (the word in this sense implies 'distribution', and so, 'disposing or setting out for sale.' Similarly ib. § 9, τοῖς ὀρῶμαις εὗτοι διαθέσεις 'to set out, or forth, in words'; and several of the best authors use it of 'disposing of' a variety of different things, property, one's own person, a daughter, goods for sale).

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, beyond the mere 'disposal' of stolen goods, to any disposition or habit of mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of διάθεσις. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius' limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between κρύψεις and τόποι here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34.

καὶ οῖς, εἰ δὲ γίνεται ζημία κ.τ.λ.] And those who, if they don't escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (lish. pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἷς, which is convertible with εἰ, τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with έξει). § 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong,
and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; quae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut perspici nequeant: Victorius), or remote.

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (dowej) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On τυραννίς, and the distinction between it and μοναρχία, see note on I 8.4 and 5, p. 155.

§ 10. 'And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace'.—λήμματα refers perhaps to pecuniary gain (lucrum).

'And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its need or reward; i.e. where what is a crime in one point of view, is likely to meet with praise in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters'.

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well-being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious.

Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. Fast. Hell.), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the other, Zeno the logician, of Elen, Parmenides' follower, may be the person
here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's Dict. Biogr.) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may possibly have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (viii (v) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an ἄξικμα, a 'wrong', either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy.

πλὴν] 'only', an exception or reservation; see note on i 1.14, p. 26.

§ 11. 'And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either failure or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts' (the opposite to the last); 'because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight'. οἷα for οἷον is due to Victorius in addenda. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem xviii 2, de Sophistis, καὶ γὰρ νικώντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγοντα μᾶλλον ἔριζεν καὶ ἑτερόμενοι ὡς ἀναμαχομένοι.

§ 12. καὶ οἷς] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς ταὐτὰ that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this and the following section as neuter, 'in all cases where'....

'And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the ἀκρατεῖς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations', to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the ἀκρατεῖς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of ἀκρατής and ἀκρασία is confirmed by Ith. Nic. vii 2, ult. ἐτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους, though, as the λέγονται shews, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in vii 6, 1147 b 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς, ἀκρασία proper being περὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀπολαύσεως, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολασία; and of τῶν τε ήδεων διώκων τὰς ύπερβολὰς καὶ
§ 13. And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (ἡδη), and the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of the ἐγκρατεία, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, φρόνησις), who pursue them in this order.

§ 14. 'And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime'. There is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action from that laid down in c. 10.7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our own will, (1) τύχη, and ἀνιγκή subdivided into (2) βία and (3) φύσις. ἐδος in the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are ourselves the causes of them. Here ἐδος is referred to the other class, doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a 'second nature', and action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. i 11.3, and de Memoria, c. 2, φύσις ἡδη το ἐδος.

ἀμαρτείν and ἀδικεῖν] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of wrong or criminality, (1) ἀτύχημα, accidental injury, (2) ἀμάρτημα, a mistake or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. III 2), and (3) ἀδικία, in which the προάρθεσις, the deliberate purpose, enters and constitutes an intentional wrong or crime, malice prepense. In Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is added, ἀδίκημα, distinguished from ἀδικία in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment, the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not prepense; it is without προάρθεσις, deliberate purpose; as an injury or death inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.

§ 15. 'And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful construction being put on their act by the judges'. On ἐπιεικεία, see I 13.13, and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. It is thus defined in Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 b 12, δίκαιον μετ, ο̣ν το κατά νόμον δε, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικέσθαι νομίμω δικαίου, a rectification, 'supply of the deficiencies, of the strict letter of the
The deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong—for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth. Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III. 45. 4 reads like a commentary on this topic, άλλα ή μεν πεν' άνάγκη την τόλμαν παρέχον- σα, ή δ' έξουσία υβρεί την πλεονεξίαν και φρονήματι 'great resources and the consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, την) by insolence and pride'. Comp. also Pol. II. 7, quoted in § 17.

§ 16. 'And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to incur the imputation of crime.' The first rely upon their character, either for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by which they may gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse position in the eyes of the world than they are already.

§ 17. 'Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong.' We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circumstances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:

§ 18. 'First, people that have what we want, either in respect of necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians'. 'We Greeks' are pirates. Comp. Pol. II. 7, 1267 a 2, ου μονον δ' οι άνθρωποι δια ταναγκαία διδοκουν...άλλα και άποι χαίρωσι και μη έπιθυμοι (this is the craving after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...ον τοινυ δια ταύτην μόνον, άλλα και άν έπιθυμοΙν άνα χαίρωσι ταίς άμεν λυπών ήδονάς. τι ουν άκος των τριών τούτων; k.t.l. The difference of the two last of these lies in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the
deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and δ' αὐτοῦ, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.

§ 19. "And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise" (λαθεῖν, lit. it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them).

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive.

So Leech, in Punch, Aug. 2, 1862. Infuriate Captain. "You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born". Cabman. "What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble". (Exit Cabman with 3s. 6d. over his fare.)

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not 'combative', inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. αἰσχυνθῆσθαι, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Euth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 20, πρεσβύτερον οὐδεὶς ἄν ἐπαινεῖσθαι ὅτι αἰσχυνθῆσθαι. Plat. Charm. 158 c, Legg. II 665 E, αἰσχυνθῆσθαι ἀδόντες. Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, καὶ σκοπεῖσι γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμ-νοκῶν, πλούσιοι καὶ μὴ πονηροὶ καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.

§ 20. "And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls Mysians' spoil', that is, an easy prey. Μυσίων λεία dicitur de possessione quae defensore caret et obnoxia est directori cuinis, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, Lex.; von allem durchaus preisgegebenen, Rost u. Palm, L. Harpocration and Suidas, s. v., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ἡ παραμία αὐτὴ ἐκ τοῦ Τηλέφου ἔστιν ἕωραδου, ἤκει γὰρ κ.κ. λ. Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not derived from Euripides' play: for Harpocration expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides ἐν ἰάμβοις. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a
very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have derived it from Euripides, since he died when Euripides was a child.

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the helpless condition of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their national character, because another proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be an easy prey to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, el sou Mysian ge hdoiou kalwv, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Mysian lexem to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Paostriae (in Meineke’s Fragm. Comic. Gr. II 11), Philemon, Scicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. VII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein. IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. IV 327), all in the words Mysian d’ evxar- tew, ‘the last and lowest—even of the Mysians’, worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, at ‘Mysorum ultimus’ esse dicitur. 1b. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, quum etiam Demosthenes, &c. ad Quint. Fratr. I 1. 6 hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius, (Erasm. Adag. Mysonum postremus, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, tiv Mysian leia kalowmen, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. Mysonum praedicta, p. 1774.)

§ 21. καί οὖς μηδεπόποτε καί οὖς πολλάκις] sc. ηδικήκασι. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἄφολακτα, § 5, supra), the one because they feel secure and are careless from ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future; that fornicure or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them.

οί μὲν ὃς οὔτιστε, οἱ δ’ ὃς οὐκ ἂν ἔτη] sc. ἀδικούμενοι. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph. Oed. Col. 965, τάχ’ ἂν τι μηρώσων εἰς γένος πάλαι expressing ‘likelihood’, and convertible with οἱ τάχ’ ἂν τι μηρόσει. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., Gr. Gr. § 599 c, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἂν with a participle signifying, ‘mere possibility
or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness, distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 b. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ὡς) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in διαβέβληται, "to set one man at variance with, or against, another"), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all that are hated and envied.

On the irregular passive, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).

§ 23. καὶ (ἄδικοις τούτοις) πρὸς οὖς ἐχουσί πρόφασιν] 'and those again liable to injury against whom there is (lit. others have) any available pretext' (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) 'of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against themselves or their forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villain only wants a pretext'.

For μελλησάντων Brandis' Ανωγμύνα (ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετήσαντων; no great improvement.

μέλεων, to be about to do, hence of something impending or threatening. Plat. Theaet. 148 e, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a threatening attitude or posture, μέλησις. Thuc. I 69, οὗ τὴ δυνάμει τινὰ ἄλλα τῇ μελησίᾳ ἀρνούμενοι, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the threatening demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλησιν μὲν ἐχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβερᾶν.

The proverb 'any pretext will serve a knave' is thus expressed by Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meincke IV 133), μικρά γε πρόφασις έστι τού πράξαμα κακόν, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἐπεὶ βραχεῖς προφάσας ἐδείκτει μόνον, ἐφ' ὡς ο' ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες αἰ λελεμονεῖ κεφαλῆς δεξίω θείων σε δέξατο καὶ ἵππον.

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the de serm numinis vindicta 557 b) of the Corcyreans, Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συρακοσίων τύραννος καὶ σὺν γέλωτι χλεινάζων Κερκυραίους ερωτῶντας, διὰ τί πορθοιή τὴν νῆσον αὐτῶν,
§ 24. ‘And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success’. Theognis 1219, ἐξήθιν μὲν χαλεπῶν καὶ δυσμενῶν ἔξαπατήσας, Κέρνες φίλον δὲ φίλω μάδιον ἐξαπατᾷν. Lysias, κατ’ Ἀνδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), ὁς τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐξήθους μηδὲν ποιεῖν κακῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὤτι ἂν δύνηται κακῶν. Victorius.

And the friendless. And those who have no skill and practice in speaking or action (business); (the opposite of them, οἱ εἰσεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοί, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); ‘for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they do make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they do carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)’. These are the ἀπράγμονες, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συνκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, τοὺς πατέρας τῇ ἡσύχῳ νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνυον, κατακλυμένοι τ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁπράγμοις ύπον ἀντωρμασίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γνώς (Clean) ἀπράγμον ὄντα καὶ κεχηρίτα καταγαγόν ἐκ χερμονήσου διαλαβόν ἡγήκεισαν... καὶ ἀκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὁσὶς ἐστὶν ἄμυνος, πλούσιος καὶ μή πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton’s case in Xen. Mem. 11.9, οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτόν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα ὁ χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος Ἀθηναῖος εἰς ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἐαυτὸν πράξειν. νῦν γὰρ, ἐφ’ ἐμὶ τινὲς εἰς δικαία ἀγωνία, οὐχ οὗ ὁτι ἀδίκουσιν ἵν’ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὁτι νομίζων ἢτοι ἂν μὲ ἀργύρων τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα ἐξειν. It ends by Criton’s taking one of these ‘sycophants’ into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his flocks.

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the country, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (ἐιλλέγουσα, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose-
diatribēs en epistirōsini ἡ δίκην ἡ ἐκτισιν, οἶνον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτομαρχοὶ· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γάρ διαλύονται καὶ 26 ῥαδίως καταπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἡδικηκότας, ἡ τοιαῦτα οὐ αἰδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄδικεῖν εἶναι, οὕταν τι ποιοῦσιν ἁδικηθῆ τις οἶνον εἰσδέχει καὶ αὐτὸς ἄδικεῖν· λέγω δ' οἶον εἰ τις τὸν
cution. ‘Strangers’, who are merely passing through Athens, and in-
cessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no
time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and ‘farmers’,
‘cultivators of their own land’, just as little, for the reason already men-
tioned. These αὐτωργοί, ‘independent cultivators’, constitute the δῆμος
γεωργικός, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. vii (vi) 4,
init. βελτιστὸς δῆμος ὁ γεωργικὸς ἔστιν, a statement often repeated. One
of the reasons for this, 1318 a 12, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πολλὴν οὐάτιαν ἔχειν
ἄσχολος, ὅστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησίας, and the same would prevent them
from sitting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919,
διηγάκις ἄπτει κάγοράς χραίνων κύκλον, αὐτομαρχό, ὥσπερ καὶ μῶνοι σαφῶντο ἤγαν.
To the same effect, Pol. vi (iv) 6, sub init., the γεωργοὶ, ἐχοῦσιν ἐργαζόμενοι
ζην, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης
...ἐργον ὑπὸ οὐκ ἀν δύνατο πρὸς τὰ κοίν ἀποβλέπειν. The praises of
agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. vi §§ 8, 9, 10,
 xv 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. ii 4.9, the αὐτωργοί are distinguished
from the γεωργικός, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural
labourers, αὐτωργοί being extended to all that work with their own hands.
See Thuc. i 141.3, and Arnold’s note. Thucydides does not observe
Aristotle’s distinction, the αὐτωργοί here are γεωργοὶ in the next chapter.
§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves,
or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost
no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he
himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for in-
stance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence or
outrage.

αἰκία and ὀβρις are thus legally distinguished. αἰκία is personal
violence, a blow, or an assault, εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκιζέων πληγᾶς; Pol. viii
(v) 10, 1311 b 24, and is the subject of a δίκη or private action between
citizen and citizen. ὀβρις is threefold, (1) δ' αἰσχρουργίας, (2) διὰ πληγάων
(this is further defined μετὰ προπηλακισμοῦ, which distinguishes it from αἰκία),
διὰ λόγων; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of
honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the
mental injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in
Aristotle’s definition of it, Rhet. ii 2.5, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς
αἰσχύνη ἔστι τὸ πάθωσι, μὴ ἢν τι γίνεται αὐτῷ (not for any profit to him-
self) ἀλλ’ ὅποι ὑσθῇ (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult
itself). So that ὀβρις is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness or
‘wanton insult’. To the same effect is the observation in 1 13, 10, that it
προσημαίνει τὴν προαιρέσιν, ‘implies deliberate intention’. This then is the
27 εἰςθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσατο. καὶ τοὺς ἡ πεποιηκότας κακῶς ἡ βουληθέντας ἡ βουλομένους ἡ ζημίσοντας: ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἱνὲ καὶ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μή 
28 ἄδικεὶν φαίνεται. καὶ οἷς χαριῶνται ἡ φίλοι ἡ 
θαυμαζόμενοι ἡ ἐρωμένοις ἡ κυρίοις ἡ ὀλως πρὸς οὖς ἔστων αὐτοῖ. καὶ πρὸς οὖς ἔστων ἐπιεικείας πυχεῖν.

ground of the distinction between αἰκία and ὑβρίς, and the reason for the latter being made the object of a γραφή, or public prosecution, the honour of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann Der Altische Process, p. 319 seq.

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. ΙΙ 8, 1267 ὀ 38. περὶ ὅν γὰρ αὐτὸ δίκα γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸν ἀμεθάν, ὑβρίς, βλαβῆς, δίκαιος, i.e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἔχει) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the moral object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. 'Retaliation' or 'compensation' is right upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the 'reciprocal' or 'retaliatory' is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, διανεμητική, 'distributive', and διορθωτική, 'corrective'; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, frauds and crimes, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions.

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς ὅς εἴρον —κύδωνα is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been provoked by previous injury.

§ 28. καὶ οἷς χαριῶνται] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury, they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct.

πρὸς ὅς εἴρον] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom they look for support or subsistence; as a 'dependant' does. 'To which is opposed in Ι 9. 27, ἐκνευρεῖτο τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἔσθ, 'independence', ἀυτάρκεια, where you don't look to any one else but yourself. See the note there, p. 173.
29 καὶ ὁɪς ἀν ἐγκεκληκτότες ὦσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἶνον Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα: καὶ γὰρ τὰ
καὶ πρὸς οὕς] 'those, in reference to whom', that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On ἐπισκεια, see Introd. p. 190—93.
Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, πρὸς οὕς ᾖσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ πρὸς οὕς κ.τ.λ. in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, καὶ οἶς ἀν τοῦ ἐπισκειοῦς τυχεῖν. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the expectation of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a disposition in the patient which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral ἕξωμι: taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.

§ 29. And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) appear to us (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent.

προδιακεχωρηκότες] διαχωρεῖν is used here as the neuter of διαχωρίζειν, to separate. In this sense it is almost a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a 'split', or 'separation', 'parting asunder' of intercourse and interests between two friends.

ἐποίει] The imperfect here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark ἐποίησε from mss Q, Yb, Zb.

Κάλλιππος...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. 1982, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety; partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life

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was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is the ground of his complaint and the occasion of the previous difference, or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III 2. p. 159, 160.]

§ 30. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ’ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἀν μὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκέτι εἰνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Ἀινεσίδημος

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἀν-δραπωδισμένῳ. The simple τινὸς or τινὲς πόλιν, will answer the purpose. Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case.

The person here called Αἰνεσίδημος, in Herod. Αἰνεσίδημος, and in Pindar Αἰνεσίδημος, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patācīrus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165. as the father of Thero, sovereign (μονάρχος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar’s second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, Ol. II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, 1st bm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus’ statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle’s narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in another’s service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him ‘tyrant of Leontini’, but gives no authority.
§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Pherae, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, pole. parargylo. 817 F (Buhle), it was always applied, ἐφ' οἷς ἐβιάζετο καὶ παρηρωχείς τυόσι δὲ λεγομένην, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, ὃς ἄναγκαιον ἄδικεν τὰ μικρὰ τούς βουλομένους τὰ μέγαλα δικαιοπράγειν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to persons prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of things or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of ἄδικαιματα. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association (συννηθεία) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if 'all or many' are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a natural defect is hardly to be called a vice.
§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74. of the Stoics, Alque ut reliqui fasces carum rerum quas eferunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiae nostriis (sc. Academicorum) pro suis velentur nomina hincquum rerum notas mutavertur. There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (q. vi.) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (effacer, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (lit. small places).

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), like others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another.

αἰδιάφορος, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a ἁπάξ λεγόμενον, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it  
Anal. Post. 11 13, 97 b 31, ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιάφοροις. Top. 
A 7, αἰδιάφορα τὰ εἴδος, ἀνθρώποσ, ἔπος; this is 'without specific difference', 'an individual'— or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things 'indifferent', without any moral differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived.

'And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one's own family, or one's self or one's children'. Victorius quotes Lysias. c. Simon. § 3. μάλαστα δ' ἀγαπάτω, ὁ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰπέω ἀναγκασθῆσαμαι πρὸς ἰμάς ἐπὶ ὅν ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόμενος, εἰ μᾶλλον πολλοὶ μοι συνείσεθαι, ἥνεσικύροι ἀδικοῦμενοι.

καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν ὅσα cognate accusative for ὅσα δίκας; or perhaps the local accus., 'the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious spirit is shewn', Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book.


\[ \text{CHAP. XIII.} \]

A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a particular account of επείκεια or equity, and of the relations of the different kinds of 'law', will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on p. 239 (Appendix E to chap. XIII).

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the strictly legal, and secondly from the equitable or moral point of view. Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects (επανορθοί) the strict rigour of the 'written law'.

§ 1. 'In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration' (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On δικαίωμα here 'an unjust act', the opposite of δίκημα, and its various senses, see note on 1 3. 9, p. 56. 'Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of "law" (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3). The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: πάντα δρίσεται τῶν τέλει.

§ 2. 'I distinguish therefore two kinds of law, the special and the universal; and by special, I mean that which is determined in each people or nation (separately or individually) by themselves, (ill. that which has for each class of people or nation its definition directed or referred to themselves,) by their own peculiar habits, customs, feelings, opinions, form of government, and this either unwritten or written' (see
in explanation of this. Introd. Appendix E p. 242—244); ’and by universal law, the “law of Nature”’. For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such as Sophocles’ Antigone evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, (right), though forbidden, (by the positive law of Creon’s enactment) to bury Polynices, implying (ὡς, on the supposition that) this is naturally right.

Not of today nor yet of yesterday
Is this, but everlasting is its life,
And none doth know what time it came to light.

And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not right for some and not right for others, ‘but this same law for all (this universal law) spreads without break or flaw’ (διηνέκεια, usually διηνέκεια, ‘continuously’) ‘over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth’.

Law universal of no human birth
Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth.


μαντεύοντα] of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive conviction, a sort of divination; see note on 19. 40, καταμαντεύεσθαι.

Ἀντιγόνη...Λέγουσα] Soph. Antig. 456.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει] Empedocles, Fragm. lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. p. 281 says, ‘Scaliger ad vocabulum αὐγῆς in margine annotavit lect. άδ γῆς. Codices variant the best including Α An appear to give αὐγῆς); hoc perperam receptit Bekkerus, quem plurès sancutí, qui loci sensum parum habuerunt perspectum.’ Spengel follows Bekker in reading αὐγῆς. In illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karsten cites Diogenes Laertius, de Pythag. viii 13, qui dicit, cum velut apotelemera τῶν ζῴων, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῖν ἐχύστων τῆς ἀρετῆς; and Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. ix 127, who says that the entire school of Pythagoras and
3. Τρπος in (I 247) τρπος της ἐπεξεργασίας της και αυτής της ἀπλότητος αὐτῆς.

Εμπεδοκλῆς, και όσο στρέφει νόμιμον διά τι εὐρυμένοντος αἰθέρος ἡμεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλήτου αὐτής.

3 καὶ όσ ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνικῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας...πρὸς οὕς δὲ, διά ώρισταί ν ὑ' γάρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἥ πρὸς ἑνά π. 46.

1 + διά, ὅστις ἵσταται infra.

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irrational animals; ἐν γάρ ὑπάρχειν πνεύμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου δυνάμεις φυσικὴς πρόσων, τὸ καὶ ἕνων ἡμῖν πρὸς ἑκεῖναν διόπερ καὶ κτείνωτες αὐτά... ἀκούομεν. On the interpretation of αὐγῆς Karsten has this note. 'Εργο commune illud ius pertinct διά τ' αἰθέρος i. e. per aerem (cf. annot. ad v. 105) quod omnes animantes vestuntur, διὰ τ' αὐγῆς per lucidum caelum (ut vs. 127) in quo Diī degunt'. The verse cited by Karsten in support of his interpretation of αὐγῆς seems insufficient for its purpose; the word there seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, 'sunbeam or sunlight'. I doubt if αὐγῆ could stand for 'heaven'; and perhaps it may be better to accept Bekker's reading.

On Alcidamas, see the article on the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. III. No. 9, p. 263 seq. and on the Μεσσηνικὸς λόγος, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, II 23. 1. Vater, and Spengel (Artium Scriptores p. 175), cite the anonymous Scholarist, who supplies the missing quotation thus: ἐκενθῶρος ἀφρέ πάντας ὁ Θεός, οὐδένα δυνὸν ἡ φύσις πεσοῖσκεν. It seems to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at all is at all events quite out of place here. Spengel (Praef. ad Rhet. Gr. 1 vi) says of it, fictum non verum: but being as it is so utterly inappropriate, it can hardly have been 'manufactured' for an occasion to which it is not suitable.

Of the 'Messenic declaration' the Schol. says that it was a μελετή υπ'ερ Μεσσηνίων ἀποστητῶν λακεδαιμονίων καὶ μη πεδιθομένων δουλεύων, Conf. Sauppe, ad Alcid. Fragm. 1, Oratores Attici III 154. [Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, (Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.]

§ 3. πρὸς οὗς δὲ διώρισταί, διχος διώρισταί, Vulg.—διά ώρισταί Λ', adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first διώρισταί: in Rhetores Graeci [1853] he reads [διώρισταί] διχος διώρισταί, in conformity with § 1. (I do not myself see why the first διώρισταται need be omitted without manuscript authority.) 'In respect of the persons to whom it is referred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and injustice, in acts, are referred to (severally determined by, divided in relation to) either the public, society in general, the whole community (against whom the offence is supposed to be directed), or an individual member of it. And therefore just and unjust acts are divided into two classes, according as they are directed against a single and definite individual, or the community at large. Adultery and assault are injuries or wrongs to the indi-
πῶν κοινωνούντων, ἧ δὲ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τά δικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἐστὶν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἦ γὰρ πρὸς ἑνα καὶ ὁρισμένον ἦ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ὄ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὁρισμένων, ὃ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινὸν.

4 ἀπαντῶν δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν

viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community or nation’. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence between the δίκη, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the γραφή, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be conducted by ὁ Βουλόμενος, ‘any one that pleases’. provided, that is, he be a qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in Introd. p. 187, and Meier u. Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, Bk. III. § 2. Buttmann ad Dem. Med. § 9.

Accordingly ὁ τίπτων is liable to a δίκη αἰκίας; ὃ μὴ στρατευόμενος, one that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to society and his country, or a deserter, to a γραφή ἀστρατείας or λειτουργίας. μοιχεία is here included with αἰκία in the class of wrongs that are the subject of a δίκη or δίκη ἱδία; under the ordinary classification it exposed the offender to a γραφή, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be called ἱδία. Meier u. Schömann, u. s., p. 163-4, 327 seq. In this case the state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victorius quotes Cic. in Verrem, v [III. 6], 161, quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fasisti iniuriam: susciperras enim liberos non solum tibi sed etiam patriae.

§ 4. ‘After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of which are directed against the entire community, and the others against one or more individuals, let us first repeat our definition of τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is, and then proceed to the rest’.

The introduction of ἄλλοις here leads to a new distinction: a civil action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in either case the offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from state offences.

ἀναλαβόντες] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a reference to 110. 3, where ἀδικεῖς, the exact opposite of ἀδικεῖσθαι, was defined.
5 τὰ λοιπὰ. ἐστὶ δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδίκα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὑρίσται πρότερον ἕκοισιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικοῦμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκονσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανερά εἰσιν τὰ γὰρ ἁγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διηρηταί καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ 7 τὰ ἐκούσια, ότι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὡστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire question of the voluntary character of ἀδίκημα and ἀδίκεια see Eth. Nic. v 11 (Bekk.); and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, III 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that which is here assumed to be the fact.

§ 5. 'To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary', 1 to. 3. And since 'doing' and 'suffering', action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same γένος, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 15, ἀντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδίκει μὲν καὶ δικαίωσαν οἵ τις αὐτὰ πρότρατη ὅταν δ' ἀκών οὕτε ἀδίκει οὕτε δικαίωσαν ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ... ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαίωσαμα διαρέσεται τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκονσίῳ... ὡστ' ἐσται τι ἀδίκων μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὕτω, εἰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῆ.

§ 6. 'Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (αἱ βλάβαι the injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad in themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge' (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. III 2). Spengel has adopted ἐνεπιτα from MS A', for διεπιτα the Vulg., which Bekker retains.

§ 7. 'So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second (ὅ καὶ, 'or again'), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior external force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότος) either with deliberate purpose, malice prepense, or under the influence of passion or excited feeling'. Bekker and Spengel have omitted καὶ with MSS Q, Yb, Z, before
250 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 13 §§ 8, 9.

иδιον ειναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνουόντος καὶ ἀκούστος ἡ ἐκώντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τουτων τα μὲν προελομένου τα δὲ διὰ 8 πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τα πάθη, ποιὰ δὲ προαρωνύται καὶ πῶς ἔχουντες, εἰρηται πρότερον. ἑπεὶ ἑ ὀμολογοῦστες πολλάκις πεπραξέναι ἡ το ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὀμολογοῦσιν ἡ περὶ

1 ἡ καὶ ἀγνουόντος ἡ ἱστρία.

ἀγνουόντος, or rather changed the order of ἡ καὶ into καὶ, ἡ, and substituted καὶ for ἡ after ἀγνουόντος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A", which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first καὶ is ‘again’, the second distinction: ἡ ἀγνουόντος of course corresponds to ἡ ἐκώντος: ἀγνουόντος ἡ ἀκούστος is quite defensible, the two don’t always go together; τὸ ἀκούσιον includes other things besides ignorance. ὀντος τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δ’ ἀγνωσ, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to ἐκώντος καὶ εἰδότος, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἐκώνιον δοξεῖν ἢ ἐν εἴναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχῇ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδοτι τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα ἐν ὅλῃ πρᾶξι. Eth. N., u.s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to ἐγκλήματι, τὰ προελομένου and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with προάφθαλη, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called πάθος, appetite and desire (ἐπιθυμία), and ‘passion’, any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (θυμός). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ καλὸς λέγεται ἀκούστα εἰναι τα διὰ θυμον δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. III 3. 111. 11 a 24, because though they are done in ignorance (ἀγνωσω πράττειν), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not due to ignorance, δὲ ἀγνωσ, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, Ib. III 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. v 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181—9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, ἱστρία.

§ 8. Of θυμός we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the πάθη or emotions in II 2—11, where the second chapter gives the analysis of ὀργῆ, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt with (in cc. 10 and 12).

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were subsequently called στίτους, status, the legal issues of cases, and by Aristotelic ἀμφισβητήσεις, see Introd. p. 189, 190.

'But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account for an imputed criminal act, admit the fact, but refuse to admit either the title, or name that has been applied to it' (by the prosecutor namely, who
...to ἐπίγραμμα, διὸν λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, P. 1374. καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐ υβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεύσαι, η' κλέψαι ἀλλ' οὐ χειροποίησαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἡ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ

has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a special penalty attached to it: this is the στάσις ὅρικη, status finitus, nomen, or finitio, of the subsequent classifications), 'or that which is contained under the title' (that is, the description of the act which is supposed to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): 'a man may say, for instance, that he 'took' the thing but did not 'steal' it, or that he struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no treachery—from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft is, and what ὑβρίς, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove that the fact is so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light the real merits or rights (τὸ δίκαιον of the case).

The distinction of the ἐπίγραμμα and peri to ἐπίγραμμα I have already indicated. The one is the στάσις ὅρικη, the name or title by which the act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of trespass: the other is the description given of the act, as may be seen in the instance that illustrates it, the trespass (the name) is acknowledged, but the detailed account described it as a trespass upon the public land, which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the στάσεις when they were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E to Book III), must be the στάσις of quality, ποιῶνς, quale: but it seems certain that in Aristotle's time they had not yet been systematised and arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the examples of both. Quint. III 6.49, where Aristotle's division of στάσεις is noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. III 16.6, and 17.1.

...to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise termed ἄριστος ἱπτιόν ἀδίκων, II 24.9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39.

éraγασάθαι] Donaldson, New Cratylus § 174, has introduced this passage amongst his examples of a large family of verbs compounded with ἐπι, in which the preposition corresponds to the Latin (and English) inter (in composition), implying reciprocity, or mutual right or association, as ἐπικοινωνία, inter-communion, ἐπιγραμμα, the right of inter-marriage, Rhet. I 14.5. It is quite true that ἐπεργάσαθαι and ἐπεργάζεσάθαι (see the examples in Donaldson, p. 296, and the Lexicons) are both used in this sense.
for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like έπισυμία the right of mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here επεργάσασθαι must mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who 'encroached upon' the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. i 139, and elsewhere; as well as έπισυμία and έπισύμευ, for a similar trespass on the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation. Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing, or only in the trespasser's imagination.

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in the Λεξον Εκτλύσεως.

έπαλλάσσειν, Eur. Heracl. 836, ποὺς έπαλλαχθέις ποδί, 'interchanged, interlaced': common in Aristotle, Pol. i 6 (quoted by Donaldson, c. 9, 1257 b 55, έπαλλάσσει ή χρήσις κ.τ.λ. Ib. vi (IV) 10, 1295 a 9, διά το την δύναμιν έπαλλάσσειν πως αυτών, Ib. vii (VI) 1, 1317 a 1, ποιεί τοις πολείσι έπαλλάσσειν. Parva Naturalia, de longitute et brevitate vitae, c. 1, 464 b 28, έπηλλάσσει τα νοσώδη την φύσιν σοφότα τοις βίους διοικήσεις, de oru anim. ii 1, 732 a 15, έπαλλάσσει. 733 a 27, έπαλλάσσωσιν ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ. de insomniis ii 18, 460 b 20, καὶ τῇ έπαλλάσσει τῶν διακτύλων το ἐν δύο φαίνεται, Theophr. Hist. Pl. i 3 2.

έπιμαγεσθαι, Thucyd. i 2 and 13. έπιμαγινεῖτες, έπιμαγινότων; Herod. i 68, έπιμαξθή; Thuc. v 78, Xen. Cyr. vii 4 5, Ar. Pol. iv (VII) 6, 1327 a 39: έπερχεσθαι, Thucyd. iv 120, έπέρχοντο, 'were going backwards and forwards paying one another visits': έπικοινωνεῖν, έπικοινωνία, Plat. Gorg. 464 c, Soph. 251 b, 252 b, έπικοινωνίαν, Protag. 313 β. Ar. Top. Δ 2, 123 a 6, έπικοινωνοῦν γὰρ οἱ τόποι. Anal. Post. Δ 11, 77 a 26, έπικ. πάπαι αἱ έπιστημαί ἄλληλας, Rhet. ad Alex. 5 (6). 5.

§ 10. 'In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute, disputed point, turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is criminal and vicious or not: for the vice and injustice (of the act) lies in the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as wanton outrage and theft, connote (signify in addition to their direct and literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of striking is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if it was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other for instance, or for his own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the insult itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, ὀπως ἡ σοβη, Rhet. ii 2 5). Nor is
surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was for the injury of the other and for the thief's own private use and advantage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like manner of all the rest'.

περὶ οὖν. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted by Λε and three other MSS, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, πάντα τα τοιαύτα, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to κατὰ πάντα, 'in all such cases'; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accusative here follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate the local seat of any 'affection' in its widest sense, and follow passive and neuter verbs and adjectives, (περφθέων τοῦτον, Eur. Ion 541, οἳ κατευγότες, Plat. Gorg. 515 E, τὰ οὓτα κατάγωνται, Protag. 342 B, ἀλγεῦ τὴν κεφαλήν, νοσεῖν ὀφθαλμοὺς, βοήν ἀγάθος Μενέλαιος, πόδας ὀκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς) and are themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate accusative; which passes first from the direct expression of the same notion as that in the verb, μαίνεσθαι μαίναν, τέρπεσθαι τέρψιν, to the indirect and general and indefinite neuter, μαίνεσθαι τάδε, τέρπεσθαι τοῦτο ή ταύτα (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and secondly into the expression of any equivalent notion almost without limit, of which the seat of the affection is one form. This is the explanation of Kühner [§ 410 annm. 5 of 2nd ed.], Jelf, Gr. Gr. §§ 545 6, and I think probably the true one. Here therefore πάντα τα τοιαύτα 'all such instances' are represented locally as the seats of the several ἀφιμησιοπήσεις, the points on which each case turns, or legal issues: in them the points in dispute or issue are said to reside.

ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοιχηρία] See note on 1 14, and the passage there cited. One of them is Top. Z 12, 149 b 29, οὗ γὰρ ὁ λαβρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ’ ὁ βουλαμενός λάβρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτεις ἑστών. Add Eth. Nic. 111 4, init. περὶ προαιρέσεως...οἰκείοτάτων γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μάλλον τῇ ἡμί κρίνειν τῶν πρίγισεων. Ib. 1112 a 2, τῷ γὰρ προαιρείσθαι τάγαθα ἡ τὰ κακὰ ποιοι τινες ἐσμὲν. Ib. ν 10, 1135 b 25, οὗ γὰρ διὰ μοιχηρίαν ἡ βλάβη. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδίκου καὶ μοιχηροῦ. 1136 a 1, ἣν δ’ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ ἀδίκε. Rhet. 1 14, 1, 5 (implied).

προσημαίνει] περὶ ἐρμηνειας c. 3, 16 b 3, ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσημαίνων χρόνων. Ib. lines 8, 9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, προσημαίνειν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τῷ πρῶτῳ δηλομένῳ κατὰ δεύτερον λόγον καὶ ἀλλ’ τι συνερμαίνειν. Eth. Eu- dem. II 3, 1221 b 18 seq. (where much the same thing is said as in this passage of the Rhetoric in many more words).

The two kinds of unwritten law are, first the universal law, the precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is meant by the 'excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice' above the legal standard, expressed in καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετὴς καὶ κακίας, quod extimum virtutem aut vitium indu contineat, Victorius), obedience to which law is rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the 'gifts' in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecuniary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation) and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment or any personal penalty, as the violation of a legal enactment, but by) censure, reproach, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a legal penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the return or repayment of obligations (differing from the feeling of gratitude),
the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one’s friends, and such like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the duty of interring and paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified by the appeal of Antigone against Creon’s tyrannous proclamation in the play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight generals after Arginusae.

The second kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, and is what is omitted by (i.e. intended to supply the deficiencies of) the written law.

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occasionedly mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is supposed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. i (2). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Aristotle’s in the Rhetoric, δίκαιοι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνώτερον ἢ τὸ τῶν πλείστων ἔδω ἄγραφον, διορίζουν τὰ καλά καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά. τούτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ γονέας τιμᾶν καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς εἰρεγέταις χάριν ἀποδίδοινας ταύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ὤμων οὐν προστάτουσα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖν, ἄλλ’ εὐθὺς ἄγραφον καὶ κοινὰ νόμον νομίζεται. Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXXVIII (Dind.), τρεῖς εἰσὶν ἁρεταὶ τὰς χρεὰς σ’ ἀσκεῖν, τέκναν, θεοὺς τε τιμᾶν, τοὺς τε φύσαντας γονεῖς, νόμους τε κοινῶν Εὐλείδος. Comp. Xen. Memor. IV 4. 19—24, where the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. VII-793 A, B, C; he says ἵναν αἰλίαν, οὐς πατρίους νόμους ἐπονομάζουσιν, ἔσορι οὕτω πάσης εἰσὶ πολιτείαι μεταξύ πάνων ὡς τῶν ἐν γράμμαι τεθεόντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τεθρομμένων, ἀετίδεων οἷον πάτρια καὶ παντόσπασαν ἀρχαία νόμιμα, ἀ καλῶς μὲν τεθέντα καὶ ἔθεσθαι πάσῃ σωτηρίᾳ περικαλύφαστα ἔχει πρὸ τούς γραφέντας νόμους, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the ἔθει καὶ ἐπι- δεόμαta, Aristotle’s second class of ἄγραφοι νόμοι, as I have mentioned in p. 243 of the Introduction.

§ 13. On what follows, see Intro. pp. 191—2, on equity; and the 14th chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book v. ‘For equity appears to be just (or a kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity (equitable)’. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 b 8, τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον τινὸς ὃν βελτίων ἐστὶ δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὃς ἀλλ’ ἔτι χένος ὃν βελτίων ἐστὶ τοῦ δίκαιου. 1b. line 12, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἕστιν, οὐ κατὰ νόμον δε, ἄλλ’ ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμων δίκαιον. Line 26, καὶ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθολίου.
This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but only true and fair for the most part; and so fail to provide for exceptional cases. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 b 15, ἐν οἷς ἄν ἄνγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθὸλος, μὴ οὐν τε ὑπὸ ὁρῶν, τὸ οὕς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνών τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἐκίνει οὐδέν ἥττον ὅρθος· τὸ γὰρ ἀμέτρητα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος εἶστιν εἰδής γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἦ τῶν πρακτῶν ὑλὴ ἐστίν. Pol. III 11, 1282 b 2, so in the administration of government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of justice; δὲ τῶν νόμων εἶναι κυρίως κειμένους ὁρῶν, τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ, ἐν τε εἰς ἄν τε πλείον ὅσοι, περὶ τῶν τούτων εἶναι κυρίως περὶ οἰκὸν ἐξαναπατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι καθὸλος δηλοῦσι περὶ πάντων. In Magna Moralia, II 1, the author, in treating of ἐπίτευξις, says, ἢ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαναπατεῖ καθ' ἐκάστα ἀκριβῶς διορίζει, ἀλλὰ καθὸλον λέγει, ὃ ἐν τοῖς παραχωροῖς, καὶ ταίθ' ἀφομοίωσα ὃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαναπατεῖ μὲν τὸ καθ' ἐκάστα διορίσα, οὐκ ἥδινηδ' δὲ, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπίτευξις, and concludes, τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσει καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς ὅστων δικαίων οἷς ἐπληστεῖται, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον, ὃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαναπατεῖς ἀπελίπεσεν. On the defects of the written law, see also Rhet. I 1. 7.

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in enacting the prohibition of 'wounding with an iron instrument', to define the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on this case, which is given also by Quintilian, VII 6, 8, see Introd. p. 191).

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particular and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law must be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iron
§ 15. ‘If then equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not equitable’. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the positive, in these subjects.

§ 16. ‘(The first of these), the kinds of actions which are suitable objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated with indulgence, and mistakes or errors (implying ignorance in particulars, Eth. Nic. III 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, accidental, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense as before); but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. deliberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and moral judgment’. This is the usual classification of the degrees of criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the particular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for which we are responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was not known to be loaded, we are not responsible: what makes us responsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an evil one, τὰ γὰρ δὲ ἐπιδομέαν ἀπὸ ποινών) and full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is introduced between the error and the crime.
This is the case of a wrong act, as a homicide, done in a fit of passion or the mind, and not after deliberation with malice prepense, is only an accidental, a wrong no doubt, and a thing which ought not to have been done, but not punishable like the deliberate act; a homicide not a murder. Compare the treatment of this topic in Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5): 9—11. It seems to have been one of the stock topics of the rhetorical books. The degrees of criminality are there, as here, only three.

§ 17. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγενώσκειν] the indulgent consideration of human accidents and infirmities, especially errors, in mitigation of the application of the strict letter of the law. On τὰ ἀνθρωπίνα, see note on 1 2. 7, p. 34. These human errors and infirmities in the culprit should be met by a corresponding humanity on the part of the judge, the opponent, and indeed men in general. Victorinus quotes ‘Ter. Adelph. III. 4. 24, persuasit nox amor vinum adolescentia: humanum est.’ τὸ δ ἐξαμαρτείν καὶ περὶ τῶν πράξεων ἀτυχεῖν οὐ μόνον εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἱδίον (φάδε), ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῶν καὶ τῶν δικαζόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, Rhet. ad Alex. u. s. § 10.

§§ 17—18. ‘And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words (the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator’; ὃταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν τῶν καθόλου, συμβῆ δέ ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὁρθῶς ἔχει ἡ παραλείπει τὸ νομοθέτη καὶ ἡμαρτεῖν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθῆν, ὅ καίν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτῶν οὔτος ἀν ἐπιεῖ ἐκεί παρών, καὶ εἰ ἦδει ἐνομοθέτησαν ἀν. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 b 20; ‘and (to look) not to the act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to the part but to the whole’ (i.e. not to take a narrow view of the criminality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it as a whole, to take into account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or surrounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, the purpose with which it was done), ‘and not merely to the present character of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore (to what sort of man he was, always or usually).’
§ 18. 'And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than those that you have conferred'.

μᾶλλον ἡ (ἂν, attracted, or ἃ) ἐποίησεν.—τὸ δίκαιον, strict justice, the letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, par pari) principle, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς, Eth. N. v 8.—ἐπιείκεια, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, forgets those that it has bestowed. έγὼ νομίζω τῶν μὲν εἰ παθῶν μεν μεμνημονευτίκα τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐπελεξάμην, εἰ δεὶ τῶν μὲν χρηστῶν τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροφύλου ποιεῖν ἐργον ἄνθρωπον. τὸ δὲ τὰς ίδιας εὐεργεσίας υπομνημάκειν καὶ λέγειν μικρὸν δεῖν ὁμοίων ἑστὶ τῷ ὑνειδίζειν- Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius.

καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικοῦμεν κ.τ.λ.] 'and to put up with injury or injustice', to endure it without retaliation, 'and, the disposition or inclination, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed'.

λόγῳ κρίνεσθαι] to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by talking the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather than proceed ἐργαφτεῖται, appeal, that is, to the ultima ratio, the voie du fait, and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an appeal to arms. 'Omnia prius consilio exeperiri quam armis sapientem deceat. Ter. Eun. iv 7. 19. Apoll. Rhod. iii 185.' Victorius.

§ 19. 'Or again—a particular case of the same kind of general disposition—'to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the case, whereas the judge looks to the law' (the letter, or literal interpretation of the law, which he is bound by oath strictly to carry out and interpret to the best of his judgment). 'In fact the very motive or intention of the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and social relations in general) was that equity should prevail'.

diwríśtho] note on εὑρίσθω, 1 11. 29 ult.

'And so let this manner' (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing,
The magnitude of a wrong varies with the degree of the injustice that prompts it. There is here the same distinction taken between ἀδίκημα, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the bad ἐξίς), depraved will and disposition implied in ἀδίκεια. The deliberate purpose, προαιρέσεις, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from vice, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 20, ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προσβολεύοντος δὲ (πράττῃ τις), ἀδίκημα, οἶνον ὅσο τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἅλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαία ἐφισικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀδικόποις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνάποντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικούσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματα ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι πο ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροὶ οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάζῃ· ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικοὶ καὶ μοχθηροί.

'And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest,' acts apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions and dispositions, 'as is exemplified in Callistratus' charge against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols'. Such a charge subjected the offender to a γραφὴ ἰερῶν χρημάτων, Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 335 [= p. 435 § 293]. The exact nature of the offence imputed to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (possibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts between himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration of a temple, the ναοποι. The word ναοποιοί appears to be an ἀταξιογόμενον. Stephens, Thesaurus s. v., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed τειχοποιός, μηχανοποιός, ἀγαλματοποιός. The office is described in Pol. vii (vi) 8, 1322 b 19, οἶνον ἱερεῖς καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζοντα τῶν υπάρχουσα καὶ ἀνορθουθαί τὰ πίστοτα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τίτακα ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν. The word ἱεροποιός, which follows immediately, in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of curator of sacred buildings, where he translates it 'tempel-baumeister'.

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege for three lalpheme, how great must be the depravity of his character and intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are mentioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. vi 2 and 3; and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 f.), represented as political rivals and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on 1 7 13.

παρελογίσατο] This verb has two different applications in conformity with the double sense of λογιζόμενοι and λογισμός; the two senses, though closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable;
The three temples were a gift to their owners; 

that is to say, they were given by the community.  

'Here (as in Dem. c. Aphob. a', p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple 'reckoning', and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for 'cheating', 'fraudulent miscalculation' in accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and usually, (at all events in Aristotle, as Rhet. i 9. 29, ii 23. 3, 25. 10 bis, iii 12. 4, et passim,) it denotes 'wrong, fallacious, false, reasoning', a 'fallacy' in argument. Lastly ierâ means 'consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of the gods or religion'.

In the case of justice, the opposite is true. That is, the magnitude or strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is shown, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it withstands. 'Ut qui intellegat vim aurum, apud se nullo teste depositam, cum iniitari impune possit, reddidit, iustior sit necesse est quam si idem in exigua pecunia fecit.' Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in fore- going it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it.

'The reason of this' (ταύτα is τὸ τὰ ἑλάχιστα μέγιστα ἐλαι) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal (lúd stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable of any other iniquity whatsoever.' The δύναμις, the indefinite latent capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the ἐνέργεια, any possible enormity, to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three half-obols, he is plainly 'capable' of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity, where the profit and temptation are greater.

On the subject of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, physical, moral, and metaphysical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is explained by Trendelenburg, Comm. on de Anima, ii 1, Elem. Log. Arist. § 6, p. 61. δύναμις is treated in Metaph. Θ 1—5, and ἐνέργεια, ib. 6—9, on which consult Bonitz's Commentary. Grant, Essays on Ethics, Essay iv, pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a complete and intelligible description of this antithesis and its bearings, but assumes the knowledge of it in all his writings.

'Now sometimes the degree of crime, the comparative criminality, may be determined in this way; in other cases it is decided, or estimated, by the (actual amount of the) harm or injury done.' ἐκ 'from', means
that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality proceeds or is derived from the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from the two acts.

§ 2. 'And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for it'; supply ἀδίκημα μείζον ἵστι.

'And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), or indeed impossible'. To fill up the sense either repeat ἰσθαν. 'to find any adequate remedy or compensation'; or, from ὃ ποθε τιμωρία, 'to devise any adequate punishment'. Otherwise it may be supposed (though it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote ἀδύνατον. having ἀμήχανον or some similar adjective in his mind, meaning 'a helpless, hopeless, irretrievable' case.

'And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because 'justice' (trial and sentence) and punishment are so many remedies'. On this doctrine of punishment, and the difference between κόλασις and τιμωρία, see above 1 10. 17, and Introd. p. 232. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 11 2, 1104 b 16, μηνύοσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολασίαι γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων ἰστρείαι γὰρ τινὲς εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἰστρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἕναστοις πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

'And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in pleading the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself; i. e. Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at death.

§ 3. δίκαιος κολασθῆναι] On this idiomatic usage of δίκαιος, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as δικαιὸν ἵστι, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with δῆλος and its compounds, φανερός, γελοῖος, and such like, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be observed that the case of δίκαιος is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To Matthiae's examples add ἀξίος, similarly constructed in Thuc. 1 70, sub init. ἀξίου νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας φόγον ἐπενεγκείν; some Platonic examples in
חיים, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἐαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν Π. 1375.  

4 ἐφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὑ ὁ παθὼν ἐαυτῷ ἔτιμησεν. καὶ ὁ

Stallbaum's note on Gorg. 448 D.; Soph. Aj. 634, κρέσσων γὰρ "Αἰδὰ
κεῦθων, and Lobeck's note; the proverb μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ
1241, ζεὺς γελοῖος ὄμνύμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 ὅ 34, γελοῖος φαι
νοῦτο ὁ μεγαλοφύσις μὴ ἁγαθὸς ὁν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 b, γελοῖος ἐσσωμαι...

Sophokles] Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life
at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόβουλοι,
Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in
413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII i, Grote's
Hist. Gr. Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of
the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the
same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as
an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u.s., that the
πρόβουλοι were an ἀρχὰ προσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν; and the 'charge' brought
against him (Rhet. I. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a
member of 'the thirty'.

τιμήσειν, ἐτίμησεν] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could
be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in
the judgment was the τίμιμα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind
or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in
civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into
ἀγώνες ἐτίμητοι and τιμητοί. In the former of these the penalty and
damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement
(C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore 'unassessable' by the judges; in the
τιμητοί ἀγώνες of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be
awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τίμωσεν, estimate, assess,
or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocrates, and Ulpian,
followed by Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 171 note, Böckh
Antiq. § 143. 7–12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this dis-
tinction, and make τιμητοί ἀγώνες the cases in which the penalty is already
fixed, and ἐτίμητοι those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier
& Schömann, u. s., p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R.
and cf. note on Dem. Select Private Orations, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. S.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already
fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the
judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called
τιμήσθαι, the second τιμᾶν, in accordance with the usual distinction of
the active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations
the functions of the judge and the parties in the case, δικάζειν and δικάζεσθαι,
κρίνειν and κρίνεσθαι, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the
question, whilst the others 'get this done for them' by the intervention of
another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for
reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἔτιμησεν

RHOTORIKHΣ Α 14 § 4. 263
is concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to τιμήσεων, Sophocles' own estimate. At the same time as τιμᾶν and τίμημα may denote an 'estimate' in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solcism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the συνήγορος, see Schneider's note on Pol. vi 5. 10, vol. ii, p. 391, and addenda, pp. 502—4. συνήγορος here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public συνήγορος, appointed by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν—ἐτίμησεν, is thus illustrated by Schrader: 'Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maurus est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleratum de L. Virginini filia iudicium eo sceleratus est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. iii. 48).'

§ 4. 'And any crime that is unique, or the first of its class (that has been committed), or has been seldom paralleled'. These three cases of especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise, i. 9. 38. See in illustration the references there given.

'And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it': because this shews the depraved habit, or confirmed state, the ἔγειρ, which constitutes vice. 'Nec enim is casu aut affectu, sed habitu et pravitate animi, delinquit.' Schrader.

'And any crime for which any checks and prevents or penalties have been sought and found (invented or discovered), as, for instance, at Argos a penalty is incurred by any one on whose account a law has been enacted (i.e. one of the κωλυτικοὶ, or (if 1 may coin a word for the occasion) ἐγματικοί, νόμοι), or on whose account the prison was built': supply ἐγματικοῦ νόμου. This same topic has been already employed in the opposite sense, to heighten the praise due to an action, c. 9 § 38. Schrader quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. xxii § 16 (καὶ τῶν σιτοφύλων, οὕτω δὲ πάλαι περὶ τῆς ταύτης πανωργίας καὶ κακονομίας ἡ πάλις ἐγνωκεν, ὡστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠνίοις ἀπασὶ τοῖς ἁγιορεῖσι φύλακας κατεστήσατε, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτη μόνη τῇ τέχνῃ χωρὶς σιτοφύλακας ἀποκληροῦτε; the appointment of a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signalizes the special rascality of the dealers.

§ 5. 'And the more brutal the crime is, the worse'; that is, the nearer approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 'inhuman' it is, more degraded below the level of humanity.

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, (1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. i. 2, 1253 a 27, it is
5. said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being all-sufficient to himself, that he is ἡ θηρίων ἡ θέως: in respect of this complete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, instincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on θηριότης at the opening of Book VII of the Nicom. Ethics, except that here the distinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the human standard, the gods above it.

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human virtue and their entire independence of it, see Eth. Nic. x 8. A fine fragment of Cicero’s lost dialogue de Philosophia sive Hortensius, quoted by Augustine, de Trinitate xiv. c. 9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe’s edition of Cicero, p. 1171, fragm. 35.

Here therefore ‘brutality’ consists in the absence of all capacity for virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to τῆς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετῆς, ἡρωικῆς τινα καὶ θείαν. This brutal nature, like the divine, is extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in Pol. III 11, 1281 b 19, καὶ τι διαφέρουσιν ἐνοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔποι εἰτείν; ἀλλὰ περὶ τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄληθὲς καλὺν ἤ λεχθὲν.) It is found chiefly in ‘barbarians’. ‘Barbarous’ and ‘barbarity’ in fact express pretty nearly the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of self-control is characteristic of the ‘brutal’ nature; Ib. c. 6, 1148 b 34, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐχειν ἐκαστα τούτων ἐξω τῶν ὑπον ἠστὶ τῆς κακίας, κυβίστερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης. And again, 1149 a 4, πάσα ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφρῶσην καὶ δείλα καὶ ἀκολούθα καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματόδεις εἰσιν. And these are then illustrated, ὅ μὲν γὰρ φύει τοιοῦτος οἷός δεδείνα πάντα, κἂν ψφηση μῦς, θηριώδες δείλαν δεῖλός...καὶ τῶν ἀφρώνων αἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστα καὶ μόνων αἰσθήσεις ζωτες θηριώδεις. (αὐθεσις is the characteristic of ‘animal life’ in general; that which distinguishes animals from plants. de Anima.) Brutal ‘tastes’ or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same chapter, 1048 b 20 seq. Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we have in common with the lower animals, the pleasures of feeling and taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lies, III 13, 1118 a 23—b 4. Gaisford refers to Magna Moralia II 5 init., ἔστι δὲ ἡ θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσα τις κακία ὅταν γὰρ τινα παντελῶς ἱδομεν φαίλον οὖθ᾽ ἀνθρωπον φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὥς οὖσαν τινα κακίαν θηρίοτητα. ἡ δ᾽ ἀντικειμενὴ ἀρετὴ ταιτη ἐστίν ἀνώχισος, ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον οὕσα, οἷον ἡρωική τις καὶ θεία: expressions directly taken from the passages of Eth. N. vii just quoted. Finally, the instinctive ὀρέξεις (θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμίᾳ) belong to this animal part of our nature, and are therefore not always under our control; Pol. III 16, 1267 a 28; where the divine part of our nature, the controlling, regulating, intelligent νοῦς, is contrasted with the lower instincts of the brute elements of our nature, the emotional and appetitive.
κημα μείζων. καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἄκοιντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἡ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ὡτι πολλὰ ἄνήρικε δίκαια ἡ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἶον ὅρκους δεξιᾶς πίστεις ἐπιγαμίας.

'And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought', προνοία is the 'forethought', the delib. rate vicious purpose which constitutes 'malice prepense', aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed; and converts an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The προνοία is that which distinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral προαίρεσις, distinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in the first note on this chapter. See the passage of Eth. Nic. v 10, there quoted. Comp. Rhet. 1 13.10. There ἐκ προνοίας is identified with the (in Ethics) more ordinary ἐκ προαίρεσις. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαίρεσις (ἡ βλάζη) ἁδικοὶ καὶ μοχθορῆς. δυὸ καλὸς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ (actions which are done in a state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται. The case quoted by Schrader from Magna Moralia i 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate malevolent intent, is a case of ἀμάρτημα (one of those in which the wrong done does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In Demosth. ὁ Aristocr. p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of ἀνθροφονία: in one sense the name is applied ἐπ' ἄκοιντη φόνοι, and to acts of this kind 'a wise and humane law', νόμος ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ καλῶς κείμενος, does not apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards distinguished οἱ ἐκ προνοίας (φονεύσατε). Aeschines c. Ctesiph. § 212, ἐλεήμονες τραίματος ἐκ προνοίας γραφῆς γρηψόμενως. Dinarch. c. Demosth. § 6, τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων. Compare Cic. de Off. 18, sub fin. Sed in omnī iniustītia permitītum interum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, un consūltu et cogitatione fiat inimia. Leviora enim sunt quae repentino aliqua motu accident quam eae quae meditata ac praeparata inferiuntur.

'And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather with terror than compassion'. An act which tends to consequences which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear expels pity; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. Comp. Rhet. 11 8.5 and 12, 'Amasis shed no tears when he saw his son led away to
5 πολλών γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὐ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ γενο-


‘And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations’ (such as αἴδησεις, δεινώσεις, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, enormity, of a crime), ‘for instance, that the accused (whose crime you desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand’ (pledge of faith, καὶ δεξιὰ ἤς ἐπετίθηνεν, II. B 341), ‘all confidence or good faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of many crimes over the one which has really been committed’; or ‘a multiplication of one crime into many’.

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enormity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of exaggeration as has been already referred to in 1 7. 31 (see note), the methods of διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ μέρη, συντιθέναι, and ἐποικοδομεῖν applied to the ‘amplification’ of good things; the object and use of them being stated in nearly the same words, πλεῖον τὸ γὰρ ἐπερέχειν φαινεται.

ἀναρέιν, ‘to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy’; here tollere, subvertere. The simple verb, as well as the phrase ἀναρέειν ἐκ μέσου—comp. Lat. de medio, e medio tollere (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato and Xenophon, with words like νόμους, τὸ δίκαιον, διαθήκην, ἐποικοδομεῖς (Plato), or τόλιν, πολιτείαν, ὀλιγαρχίας (Xenoph.).

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, πῶς δ' ἐτ' ἄν καλῶς λέγως ἄν, εἴπερ ἐπείσω γ' ἀπαξ οἴσων οὐτε βωμὸς οὐτε πίστεις οὐθ' ὄρκος μὲν.

ἐπιγαμία, ius communium, the right of intermarriage between different states, together with the rules and obligations which it entails, which are here in question. On the ‘reciprocal’ ἐπώ, ‘inter’, see note on ἐπεργάσασθαι I 13. 9, p. 251.

§ 6. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα (αἴδησεν) οὐ κ. τ. λ.] ‘and to commit a crime in the very place where offenders are punished’ is an aggravation of the criminality; ‘which is the case with perjurers or false witnesses: for where would a man not commit a crime if he is ready to do it even in the very court of justice?’ This is the argumentum a fortiori; the rule, omne
maius continet in se minus. 'Hinc P. Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, cum insidiis Gn. Magnum per servum tollere cun voluisse pro Milone dicens criminatus est: Insidiator erat in foro collocatus, atque in vestibulo ipso senatus' [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the still more striking Etiam in senatum venit, &c. of the first speech against Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. The atrocity of the murder of 'Zacharias the son of Barachias' was heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence 'between the temple and the altar' (Matth. xxiii. 35).

'Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by disgrace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (μάλιστα). This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the aggression, is what converts a mere assault, aśkia, into an act of ἀβρις, a wanton outrage. See Khet. 11 2. 5, definition of ἀβρις, and 11 13.10; also note on 11 12.26, p. 239. The wound inflicted on a man's pride and sense of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggravation of the offence. ἀβρις is, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ πιάσχων κ.τ.λ. In 11 6. 2, αἰσχύνη is defined, λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδυναμία φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν ἡ παρών ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων...ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοι τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ αὐτῶ ἡ ὁν ἐφορτίζει.

καὶ εἰ τούτων (ὑδίκηκε τις) 'and another is, when the victim of his wrong has been his benefactor; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he not only does what is wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero's criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ὅτι ὅσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. Illud tandem interest quod in servo necando, si adsit in- invia, semel peccatur; in pariis vila violanda multa peccantar; violatuar is qui proceavit; is qui aluit: is qui erudivit; is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit: multitudine peccatorum præstat (ὑπερεξεῖ), coque poena maiore dignus est.

§ 7. 'And an offence against the unwritten laws of right' (is worse than the violation of a written or positive law): 'because it is indicative of a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do right without compulsion'. (Any external force destroys the voluntary character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obe- dience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power to compel it, then the opposite is true, an act of disobedience to the unwritten law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition,
than the violation of the other.) ‘Now the written laws are compulsory, the unwritten are not’.

‘From another point of view’, (in another way of arguing or looking at the case; Rhetoric συνλογιζεναι τάνωτα, i §12) the crime is worse ‘if it be a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (a fortiori) he would do it when it is not’. This again is by the rule omne maius continent in se minus; the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessarily involves the less.

φοβερά] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable consequences. Supply the cogn. accus. αδικήματα.

ἐπιζήμα] Note on I 4.9, ἐπίδοσον, p. 66.


CHAP. XV.

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon τὰ ἀτέχνου πίστεις of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evidence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his statements and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called ‘unartistic’ or ‘inaartificial’ because they are not due to the artist’s inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. i 2. 2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term ἰνβεντίον by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of ἰνβεντοι πίστεις, and the title of one of Cicero’s rhetorical treatises, the de Inventione. The author himself, I. c., applies the term εὑρέω to the ἰνβεντοι πίστεις.

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allusion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Introduction.

§ 1. ‘Next to the subjects already discussed’ (the ἰνβεντοι πίστεις, the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4—14), ‘we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary of) what are called the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, because’ (γάρ, this is the appropriate place for them, because we have just been engaged upon the
§ 2. *χρήσιμον* ἦστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν. ἵδια γὰρ
2 αὐταὶ τῶν δικαικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
3 νόμοι μάρτυρες συνθήκαι βάσανοι ὄρκοι. πρῶτον μὲν
όν περὶ νομῶν εἰπωμεν, πῶς χρηστέον καὶ προτρέ-
ποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπο-
4 λογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, εὰν μὲν ἐναντίον ἢ
ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ νόμῳ χρη-
5 στέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοστέροις. καὶ ὅτι

forensic branch of Rhetoric, and 'these are peculiar to law proceedings
(or forensic practice'). On the treatment of these *ἐτέχνων πίστεις* by other
writers on the subject see Introd. 205—207.

**perὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν** See note on i 9. 14; on the redundant
use of *perὶ, ὑπὲρ, &c.*

*ἐτέχνων* with genit. *partitive*, 'holding, hanging, on by (lit. to a *part*
of),' 'clinging to', 'connected with', 'in succession to', 'following'.
Very frequent in Herodotus.

*ἐπιδραμεῖν* 'to run over', commonly in its literal signification takes
the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that *perὶ τῶν
ἀτέχνων καλομένων πίστεων* is substituted for the accusative: as it is also
in pseudo-Demosth. *perὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθήκων, 217. 7, μερα
ἐπιδραμοῦμαι* *perὶ αὐτῶν πολλῶν ὀντῶν*. This passage and Xen. Oecon.
* XV I* are the only two instances that are given by the Lexicons of the
*metaphorical* sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. III 15,
1286 a 7, *θεωρήσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνοπίας, Index Aristotetlicus. s.* Compare a similar use of *ἐπελθεῖν* of 'pursuing an inquiry' or
'going over, reviewing, a subject'. Pol. I 113, 1260 b 12, *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον ἐπελθεῖν*. 1b. VI (IV) 2, ult. *πειρατίου ἐπελθεῖν τῷς
φθορὰς κ.τ.λ. et passim.*

§ 3. *χρηστέων προτρέποντα* i.e. *πῶς δὲι τινα χρήσθαι αυτοῖς προτρέ-
ποντα.* The verbal adjective can be resolved into *δὲι* with an indefinite
object, with which the participle is made to 'agree'. Demosth. Olynth.
*β. 21, 24, πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεκτέον τὴν μεταβολὴν
εἰσφέροντας εξείστασα*. Other examples in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 447. 4.

It appears from the addition of *προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα* that
the first of the *ἐτέχνων πίστεις*, the laws, are not confined to *forensic* practice,
but can also be used by the *deliberative* orator in addressing a public
assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the
'authorities' appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as ser-
viceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the *συμφέρον ἢ
ἀσύμφορον*, as the *δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον* of a legal process in a court of justice;
see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ἵδια γὰρ αὐταὶ τῶν
dικαίων, requires modification.

§ 4. *ἐναντίον τῷ πράγματι* 'opposed to the facts on our side, to our
view of the case'. Comp. infr. § 12.

§ 5. With *ὅτι* here, and in the following topics, *λεκτέων* or something
similar must be supplied from *χρηστέων, §§ 3—4.*
προς τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς ἥρθοθαί τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐσίποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ὁ κοινὸς (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἐστίν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις ὅθεν εἰρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι έθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἀγραφὸν.

οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κάχθες, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ποτε.

ταυτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐμελλὼν ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἐστίν ἀληθὲς τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀφ’ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος: οὐ γὰρ Τρόιαν ὅτι ἀμέσως οὐδὲ ἀμέσως ἀπελευθεροῦσαν τὸν Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ’ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νομοῦ ἁγιοδοτείτο τὸν νόμον. ἦν δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἅγιον νομοὺς ἐφαρμόζοντας καὶ ἀπελευθεροῦσας τὸν νόμον ἦν ἀπελεύθησα τὸν νόμον ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοῦ οὐκ εὑρίσκεται περὶ τοῦ νομού τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ νομοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐπεξειπέτει τὸ νόμον ἀπελευθήσατο τὸν νόμον τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ νομοῦ.
PHTORIKIS A 15 §§ 8, 9.

ποιεῖ τὸ ἐργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὁσπερ ἁργυρογράμμων ὁ κριτῆς ἀστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον 8 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς. καὶ ὅτι βέλτιόνοις ἀνδρῶς τὸ τοῖς ἁγράφοις ἦ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρήσθαι καὶ ἐμ-9 μένειν. καὶ εἶ ποὺ ἐναντίον νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἦ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἴον ἐνίοτι ὃ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἄττ' p. 50 ἀν συνθῶνται, ὃ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive en-

acetments, see Cicero, de Legg. 1 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194.

'And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and the purpose for the distinguishing base justice from
genuine'.

ἀργυρογράμμων] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) ἁργυρομαζόι, 'Αττικῶς κολλαθησαί (money-changers, who change large coin for small, κολλαθείος), Ἐλληνικῶς. ἁργυρογράμμων. 'Αττικῶς δοκιμασθαί, Ἐλληνικῶς, and Pierson’s note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue περὶ ἀρέτης, 378 ν (Zurich ed. p. 867), ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ χρύσων καὶ τὸ ἁργύριον εἰσὶν ἡμῖν δοκιμασθαί, οὕτων ἀριθμοὶ κρίνουσε τὸ τε βελτίων καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Εἰσίν. Τίνας οὖν τοίς καλεῖς; ὁ ἁργυρογράμμων. Pollux, vii § 170. To the same family of words belong προβασιαγράμμοιν Ἀγαμ. 768 (see Blom-

field’s Glossary) a ‘discerner of the flock’, one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence ‘a judge of character’; ἵππογράμμουν in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. φυσιογράμμων. Ar. de Gen. Anim. iv 3. 32, and on φυσιογράμμονεν, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external pecu-

liarities), see Anal. Pr. ii 27, 70 b 7—38, and the treatise φυσιογραμμοκαί, printed with Aristotle’s works, Bekk. Vol. ii. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield’s note, as ‘De Nat. Deor. i 8’), Quid? Socratem nonne legimus, quemadmodum notarit Zephyrus, physiognomon, qui se proficiscatur hominim more naturasque ex corpore oculis vultu fronte pernoscer? Compare, lastly, the simple γρώμων, Xen. Memor. i 4. 5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Ἀγαμ. 1099, θεσφαίρων γρώμων ἄκρος.

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quota-

tion, Hor. i Ep. 16, 52, which should be, tu nihil admittes in te formi-
dine poenae: ‘tu’ is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, καὶ δυοίν ἄρχαίν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μεῖζονος μείζον, for its authority; the topic of § 16, καὶ ἀρετῆ μὴ ἀρετῆς...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος, τὸ δ' ὄν τέλος, is equally applicable.

§ 9. 'Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (πω) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts what-

soever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows). On this Victorius, 'Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnantis; αὐτικωμί
10 τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὡστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ’ ὅποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρ-11 μόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τοῦτω χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μικῆτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ máχεσθαι ταύτη 12 πρὸς τὸν νόμον. εἰώ δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omissit, ut rei sua vi satis notae'.

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος (ὁ νόμος, χροστέον αὐτῷ from §§ 3, 4, or λεκτέον), ὡστε (so as to, in such a way as to...) στρέφειν (αὐτῶν) καὶ ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. 'and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the letter of the law) or expediency, i. e., equity, ( whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ that'. τὸ συμφέρον here stands for 'equity', because by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more 'generally serviceable' than the stiff unbending letter of the law. ἀγωγή (τοῦ νόμου) 'leading', 'guiding' of the law. This 'leading of the law' represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the 'interpretation' or 'construction' that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to ducit in the phrase ducit litteram. The following passage of the Politics, vi (iv) 5, 1292 b 12, throws light upon this use of ἀγωγή, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. οὐ δὲ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβεβηκέν ὡστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μη δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἱδος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὅμως δὲ πάλιν παρ’ ἄλλους τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ’ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἀλγαρ’ χείσθαι μᾶλλον. Here again the ἀγωγή is τοῦ νόμου, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between the theory of the constitution as laid down in the laws, and the actual administration and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the 'direction' they give to, or the 'interpretation' they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which they wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare καθ’ αυτοῦς ἀγουσί στὶν πολιτείαν, c. 11, 1296 a 26, and Thuc. 11 65, of Pericles' direction of the state policy, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον υπ’ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ πλῆθους) ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγει. ἀμφίβολος] III 5. 4, ἀμφίβολα, 'ambiguous phrases'. Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26). 1, διαφείγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον, opposed to οἰκεία ύστερα. 1b. 36 (37). 22, 29. Comp. note on III 5. 4.

§ 12. The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing
how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed in extenso in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details.  

πρῶς τὸ πράγμα]
'in favour of our case' as τὸ πράγματι § 4.

τὸ ἀπλῶς. τὸ αὐτὸ] 17. 35. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

παρασφοξεσθαι] 'to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, παρά) the physician (note the generique τὸν; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the number of a class) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness'. The proverb, 'to be wiser than your physician', is applied to ἰδιώται who pretend to rival the professors, τεχνίται or σοφοί. men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for 'over reuinig' in the art of cookery, τὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ Δυκείῳ κρέας ταρχηρὸν εἰς τάρχην διασκευάσαντα μαςτικώθηκαί, ὡς παρασφιξόμενον πνηρός.

τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφότερον ἔτειν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφότεροι βουλοῦνται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: and a little before, πάσων δὲ δεινώτατον εἰ...μυδὲ γραφόμεθα ὅτι χείρισο νόμως ἀκιντός χρυσέβις πόλες κρατοῦν ἐστιν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύρως, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφρονεῖς ὀφελώτερον ἢ δεξιότητι μετ' ἀκολουθίαις, κ.τ.λ. Bacon, de Augmentis. Lib. viii. Aphor. 58 (Vol. i. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, 'hic enim non male dictum sit, neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiores;' on which Ellis has this note, 'Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, Stultus videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapientior videlicet. In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text on the pretence of equity—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to be doing here.'

Plutarch, Quint. v. 1 l. 36, Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec seculi Graecos, a quibus krisis dicuntur, iudicia aut indicationes vocant ... si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poëtis (all γνωρίμως) referri potest.

Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to ‘authorities’ mentioned in § 36), Neque est ignobile exortum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamin contendinger victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni edizione referitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse. The ‘versus’ or rather two verses here in question are, I. B 557—8, [Δίας δ' εκ Σαλαμίνος άγεν δυνακαίδεα νής, στήσε δ' ἡγών, ὦ ‘Αθηναίον ισταντο φίλαγγες] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an ‘authority’ in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope’s notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, IX 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (the second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo’s time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνωρίμως, or distinguished man, is the proverbial autós ἐφα, ipse dixit, of the disciples of Pythagoras.

καὶ Τενεδίου ἐναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, ‘recent’ at the time of Aristotle’s writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. ‘Ex verbis his colligo’, says Victorius, ‘Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus discipantibus usos et ipsos prisco teste Periandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuis esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepit quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποθήκη vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuuaret.’

Kleophon] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Smith’s Dict. of Biography, and other particulars respecting his habits and character in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gracc. I p. 171 seq., in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the Comic poet wrote to assail him.

Kratios] The person accused by Cleophon was the well-known oli-
garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E.

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote 'as from an authority' some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to show that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race.

[verse]


[verse]

This, and the following line of Solon’s elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E, ἐπείκριμαι Κριτίῳ εὐανθάτριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν’ ὃν γὰρ ἀμαρτιών πείσεται ἡγεμόνοι. the father of Critias being Solon’s brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to show that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether πτωμάταρχι is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, entre poil roux et séléonie s’entreportent grant compagnie, (Wace, Roman de Rou, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, Hist. of Norm. ii 721)—or Aristotle, quoting from memory, has misquoted, more sue, cannot now be ascertained. At all events it is unlikely that Solon intended any such imputation on Critias' character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for
14. Peri m'en onw twon xenomewon oI toioutoi marto1res, P. 1376. peri d'e twon esomewon kal oI xepxemoloi, oIow Theumstokelis, 6ti yamakhtewon, to xuliono teixos leyan. eti kai ai paromiai, osson eirhetai, mar-

Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocrit. Id. viii. 3, amw twv h'ton vuphphriko, amw ovnbwv, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote xanbtrixi, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it in deterus, or to Aristotle's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with xanbtrixi. The evidence of Critias' aselxemai derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 'the house of Critias', and spoke of its members as 'distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness', is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, eisvin moi, and eispenwai, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or eisvin moi a mere false reading of eispenwai, the one being very easily mistaken for the other.

Lastly, moi, if it were retained, would be a good example of the dativus ethicus corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of 'me' in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's Shaksp. Gr. § 220. S.]

§ 14. xepxemoloi] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, peri twv esomewon, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., vii 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, teixos Trigxenewv xuliono xwilou evaropta Zevs mouvon apbrhtov teldei, to se tekna 6e vnhsei. C. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called xepxemoloi by Herodotus.

ai paromiai, osson eirhetai] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of osson eirhetai, 'as has been already said', because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render osson as if it were osson, huiuscezvndi, 'proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned', viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed kai to osson eirhetai, '"and the 'as has been said'," any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that osson is used in any but its literal and proper meaning 'proverbs are evidence, in the way that has been stated', evidence (that is) of the future,
PHILOKHS A 15 §§ 14, 15.

Diet, 173

μῆτορ έν έρδεν γέροντα

καὶ το τοὺς νίνους ἀναρεῖν ἄν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

τυρια ἐστίν· οἶνον εἰ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι

φίλου γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,

μῆτορ έν έρδεν γέροντα

καὶ το τοὺς νίνους ἀναρεῖν ἄν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

νήπιος ὅς πατέρα κτείνας παιδάς καταλείπει.

15 πρόσφατοι δ᾿ οὗτοι γνώριμοι τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι

γὰρ αἱ τοῦτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφίσβητονα κτείνας· οἶνον Εὐβούλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο

μῆτορ έν έρδεν γέροντα] Suidas, s. vv. ἀξιωστα et μῆτορ έν έρδεν, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim εἰς ἀξιωστα μὴ ανάληκται. Gaisford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, μῆτορ έν έρδεν γέροντα, μηδὲ παιδὰ βάσκανον μὴ λαλητηθην γυναίκα, μηδὲ γείτονος κύνα μὴ κυξερὴθην φιλοτυφυν, μὴ λάνον κοπηλάτην.

νήπιος ὅς πατέρα κτείνας παιδάς καταλείπει] The verse is taken from Stasinus' Cypria: quoted by Clemens, Strom. vi 747. Dünster, Frgm. Epich. Gr. p. 16. It is repeated Π 21. 11. Herod. I 155. Cyrus to Croesus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, ὁμοίως γὰρ μοί νῦν γε φαίνομαι πεπορκέναι, ό γε έις πατέρα ὑποκείναι τοῖς παῖδοιν αὐτῶν φειδάτο. Liv. xi. 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, Postremo negare propalum coeptis satis tatum sibi quicquam esse nisi liberes corum, quos interfecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore aliam ait tolleret (Victorius). Eur. Androm. 518, καὶ γὰρ ἀνωτέρα μέγαθε λεπίτευς ἐχθρὸν ἐχθρῶν, ἐξον κτείναι καὶ φιλῶν οἴκον ἀφελέσασα. Comp. Toup. Emend. in Suid. Π 185 (G.). Comp. Herac. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eurystheus; and Here. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, νεκρος νυ δάκτυλο. § 15. Εὐβούλος] 'Αναφέστιος (ψήφισμα ἁπ. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political opponent of Demostenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's Dict. of Biog.; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent Index Nominum (Orat. Alt. 111. Ind. Nom. pp. 48. 9.), have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer, Demostenes und seine Zeit, I 173—191. s.]. He is attacked and apostrophized by Demostenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. 'Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that "the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city". Meineke, in his Frgm. Comm. Gr. (Plat. Frgm. Inc. xiii.) Vol. II 602, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr. I 161, note) he had proposed to substitute Ἀγυρήριον for Ἀρχιβίσμοι in the text of
κατὰ Χάρητος ὁ Πλάτων εἰπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὀμολογεῖν πονηροὺς εἶναι. 16 καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἀν δόξοσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιούτοι τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρες εἰσίν, εἰ γέγονεν ἡ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἡ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν οὐ μάρτυρες, οἶον εὶ δίκαιον ἡ ἀδικον, εἰ συμφέρον ἡ ἀσύμφορον ὁ ὁ ἀπώθεν καὶ περὶ τούτων πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἀδιάφθοροι γὰρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυρίων μάρτυρες μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεὶ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὃτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατηθεὶς τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὃτι οὐχ ἀληκεῖται

Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.

§ 16. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ψεύδεσθαι] 'Those who share the danger' (with the person for whom they give evidence, i.e. are liable to the penalties of ψευδομαρτυρία, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) 'if they be suspected of falsehood', sc. πρόσφατοί εἰσι, are reckoned amongst 'recent' or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. δόξοσιν. 'quia si credantur etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.' Victorius.

With εἰ συμφέρον η ἀσύμφορον, which recognises this kind of ἀπεγνωσμένος πίστις as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.

§ 17. οἱ ἀπώθεν] i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not at a distance (as we say) but from a distance, measuring the distance from the object to the subject. See note on 1 11. 16, p. 213.

πιστότατοι οἱ παλαιοὶ] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on.

πιστωμα, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 γρίδεα πιστώματα, abstr. πρὸ κοινῷ, for πιστοὶ γέροντες, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of 'pledge, guarantee, assurance') and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical πίστεις, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the πίστεις themselves, though 'proofs' of some kind is the meaning required.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατηθεὶς—ψευδομαρτυροῦν] Compare Hermogenes, περὶ στάσεων (Speng. Ῥηχ. Gr. 11 p. 144), ὅ δὲ καθηγορῶν ἀποφανεῖ τῶν διὰ
18 philosophers, or a few to whom the laws of nature or of convenience prescribes a certain course of conduct. The latter are often liable to error, but are not considered as being deluded by error. The former are more liable to error, but are not considered as being deluded by error.

For we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, 'is, tending to, to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness'. "omolologoumenis 'in agreement with', comp. II 22. 15, omologoumena and (the opposite) anomologoumena. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, 'admitted', as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. 113. 9 bis.
§ 19. "ek tov auton topwn...legeomven" *(the arguments on these subjects)* must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the *etkh*) as those from which we derive our enthymemes also*. See Introd. p. 198.

§ 20. *peri ton synethkon* On synethka see note on I 1. 9, *peri ta sunealagmata*. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the Latin *tabulae* of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. v 5.

*aipha* ‘for oneself’. Add this to the instances of aipto, &c. for aipto and the rest, in notes on I 1. 12; I 7. 35; and see the references there given.

On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage (their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) *(chrhis eter pneiv)* we must argue for their credit and validity (kupia, their *authoritative* character); in the case of (if they *apply to*, are on the side of) the opposite party, the reverse'.

§ 21. *katasekevaieiv* is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the constructive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to establish some *positive* conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and opposed to *anasekevaieiv*, which represents the ‘subversive’, ‘destructive’ *(anasekevaieiv ‘to undo’, comp. *luine* ‘to break up, or dissolve, a thing into its elements’), ‘refutative’ syllogism or reasoning which proves a negative. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) on the same page.

Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for according to the character of those whose names are attached to, subscribed to, (inscribed *upon*, as *epigrama*, the *title* of a crime or a legal prosecution, I 13. 9.) the document, or contract, or who have it in their keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract is determined *(lit. by them are the contracts made trustworthy)*.
The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not.

'The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 26), we must magnify it (cry it up; increase, exaggerate, its value and importance; for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)'. Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. 'And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand συνθήκη after ἀπαστεῖ) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with the laws'. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13. 2, νόμον...θιόν μὲν τὸν ἐκάστοις ὁρισμένον πρὸς αὐτοῖς. This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them.

Analogous to this view of a law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the Social Contract, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the 'laws of war', which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. 1 6, sub init. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογεῖ τὸς έστιν, εν δὲ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμεν των κρατούσιον εἶναι φαίνεται. Compare also Pol. III 9, 1280 δ 10 seq. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἐφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυτής ἀλλήλως τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔτε ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν εἰς ὄκαλος τοῖς πολίταις.

§ 22. ἦτι δὲ πράττεται κ.τ.λ.] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. πράττεται 'are transacted'. On συναλλάγματα, 'the ordinary dealings' of men with
one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1.9.

καὶ τὰ ἐκοῦσια] 'all voluntary transactions', in general, is added because συναλλάγματα may include τὰ ἐκοῦσια, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. v 5 sub fin., 1131 a 2, τῶν μὲν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκοῦσια ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ ἀκοῦσια' ἐκοῦσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πράξεις, ω疡, δανεισμός, ἐγγύ, χρήσης, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις' ἐκοῦσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχή τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκοῦσιος, τῶν δὲ ἐκοσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραία, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φορμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαστεία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, βάνατος, ἀρταγύ, πτήμωσις, κακηγορία, προσήλακσιμός.

χρεία] 'ussa as χρήσθαι 'uli', 'intercourse', the use that men make of one another.

ἐπιστολὴ ἰδεῖν ἔστιν] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16. 1, and Hist. Anim. IX 38. 2, ἧ μὲν οὖν μυρρήκαν ἐργασία πάσιν ἐστὶν ἐπιστολῆ ἰδεῖν. In Rhet. II 23. 30, τὸ ἐπιστολὴς εἶναι expresses 'superficiality'. It seems to be said of things that 'lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by everyone', ὥστε τώπι οἱ πάντες ἴδεν αὐτά. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of εἰδεθώρητα, to express the same notion, in § 25 ἀνθρώπος (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written ἔστιν, and not ἐστίν (for ἔστειν) as in Bekker's text.

ἐπιστολή is the genitive of a substantive ἐπιστολή 'a surface', only used by later and non-Attic writers; 'veteribus illis...ἐπιστολή adverbii vicem fuit. Herod. i 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. vi 96, et complures Xenophon. Neque eis substantivi alius tum casus in usu fuit'. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of place or position, after the analogy of Ἀθηνῶν 'at Athens', λαῖνας ΧΕΙΡΟΣ (Lesch. P. V. 720) 'on the left hand', &c.; see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jelf's Grammar, though there are articles on the 'genitive of position'; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases παρείλετε, denoting a point in space;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, οὖ, ὅπου, ὅμοι, οὐδαμοί, ποῦ and πού, ἀγχόν, τηλόν, πανταχόν. ἐπιστολὴ itself not being in use, the substantive 'surface, superficialities' is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Phileb. 46 δ, (ὁπόταν) τὸ...ἐπιστολῆς μόνον διαχείρ. Ἀρ. περὶ ἔννεπτων 2. 8, τὸ ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ ἐνοπτοῦρον, 'the surface of the mirror'. Its derivatives ἐπιστολάριον and ἐπιστολάζον (to be on the surface), have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) 'popular', 'prevalent', 'fashionable', 'current', like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and so 'prevail' over the rest, as δόξα μάλιστα ἐπιστολάζουσα, Arist. Eth. N. 12, 1095 a 30, ἐπιστολάζοντος τοῦ γελοίου, id. IV. 14, 1128 a 13, Hist. Anim. IV 1. 26, τὸ μάλιστα ἐπιστολάζον 'the most abundant kind', vi 37. 2, de Gen. Anim. i 20. 11, οὗ μὴν ἐπιστολάζοντι γε αἱ καθάρτες ὀνομ. ἀνθρώπων: or (2) if indeed there be any difference between this
μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπερ ἄν τις ἀντιτίθεται ἀστο
πον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἀν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὤσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πεί
24 θεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἰδ' ὅτι τὸν
δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὐκοιν τοῦτο
ςκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς δικαίωτερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον
οὐκ ἐστὶ μεταστρέψαι οὐτ' ἀπάτη οὐτ' ἀνάγκη (πε-

and the preceding) 'conspicuous', 'prominent', compared with such as are
deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. ὅσι, Hist. Anim. quoted above
ἐπιστάλης: and (3) 'superficial', opposed to βαθύς; either literally, de
Insomni. (περὶ ἐπιστῶν) 2. 12, οὐκ ὁμοίως εἰσδέεται ἡ κηλίς ἀλλ' ἐπιστο-
λαύτερον, or metaphor. as Rhet. III 11. 10, ἀληθές καὶ μὴ ἐπιστάλοιον. II 23.
30, above referred to. III 10. 4, τὰ ἐπιστάλαμα τῶν ἐνυμματών, followed by
the explanation, ἐπιστάλαμα γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἀ μοῦν δεῖ διῆ-
σαν, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and there-
fore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually 'superficial' (this I
think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an
intellectual process) or because it is 'prominent and conspicuous', μὴ
ἁμαρτείναι, and therefore is δῆλον πάσῳ, Top. A 1, 100 b 27. Similarly in
Pol. Ill 3, 1276 a 19, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστολαύτερα τῆς ἀπόρας δηθήσεις (the most
obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) περὶ τῶν τούτων καὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, and again, ib. c 12, 1282 b 30, ἡ τούτω ἐπιστάλαιον τὸ ψεύ-
δος; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense
of the word is uppermost.

§ 23. 'But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the
side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as
may be used in contending against an adverse law'. ἀπερ is a cognate
accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. ἤπερ μὴν μᾶ-
χέσαντο, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the conten-
tion, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. 'For it is absurd to
suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is
defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that
(in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey
or observe them)'. [For κείμενον...τελείμενον compare note on I 7. p. 10. 8.]

§ 24. εἰδ' ὅτι] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200.
βραβευτῆς] the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the suc-
cessful candidate, i.e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of
the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It
is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard
for the general principles of justice. Justice (ὡς δικαίωτερον) must pre-
vail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the
verb in the same sense, τι τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεῖεν. βραβευτῆς is the
prose form: βραβεῖς belongs to the Poets.

tούτο] is 'what we are talking about', 'that which is before us', δι-
κτικῶς; the contract, namely, and its contents.
25 φυκός γαρ ἐστίν), συνθήκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτων σκοπεῖν εἰ ἑναντία ἐστὶ τινὶ ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἐπειτα εἰ ἀλλαὶ συνθήκαι ύπότεραι ἢ προτέραι, ἢ γὰρ εἰ ύπότεραι κύριαι, ἀκυροὶ δ' αἱ προτέραι, ἢ αἱ προτέραι ὑπατηκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἄν ἢ χρήσιμον. ἐτί δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὅραν, εἴ πῃ ἑναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ τοιαύτα: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εἰθεορητα ὦμοίως.

26 αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστὸν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὐκοῦν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε υπάρχωσιν οἰκείαι αὐξεῖν ἐστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυρίων εἰσίν αὐταί: εάν τε P. 1377. ὑπεναντίαι ὤσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἂν τις τάληθι λέγων καθ' ὦλου τοῦ γένους τῶν

§ 25. 'And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of nature); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion. The two genitives in construction follow συνθήκαι, 'contracts of men deceived are made'.

οἰκείαις ἡ ἀλλοτρίαις] 'domestic or foreign'.

τὸ συμφέρον] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose 'interest' or 'advantage' (or the reverse) may be involved in them; when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding), too clear to need enumeration.


dιαλύοι ἂν τις] or λέον and διαλύειν, see Introd. p. 267 note.

τάληθι λέγων] These words have been variously interpreted. Mu rhetus omitted τάληθι, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed a priori, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with διαλύοι and not with λέγων. There can be no doubt that the latter is right, and that the words do express Aristotle's opinion upon the use of
torture, by asserting truth and right of the arguments directed against the use of it. [On ‘torture’ see C. R. Kennedy’s Demosthenes, Vol. iv., pp. 382–391, appendix. s.]

διακατεροῦντες (thoroughly, διά.) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, (holding out).

καὶ ἐδίωκας καταψευδόμενοι] ‘and ready to make false accusations (κατά ‘against others’) in the expectation of a speedier release’.

On the passage which in MS A concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker’s 1st ed., see in Introd. p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, On the Rhetoric, in Bav. Trans. 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin’s Philologus. iv i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. ‘Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars summa est (so Spengel), aut Scholin omim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;...Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinientia dicere voluerat iam explicantur: sententia vero quae his viribus expositur superioribus continctur; vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redoet, viz. λιθωτρόμου (this applies still more strongly to καταψευδέων): et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. ταῖς ψευδαῖς ὅτες δυνατοί, locutionis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur’.

§ 27. Περὶ οἰκίων...διελεύν] On perī, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on 19. 14, ‘oaths admit of a fourfold division’.

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian. V 6. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the Introd. pp. 202–205, to which the reader is referred; so
that we may confine ourselves here as before to the details that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression ('breviss esse laborat obscurus fuit', is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the third person; to avoid this, you may may be substituted for Aristotle’s he to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining.

On the technical expressions belonging to ὁρκον, see note in Introd. p. 202, διδόναι ὁρκον, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to offer or tender an oath, λαμβάνει (or δέχεσθαι, in the Orators), to accept, or take it.

ἐγὼ ὁμώμοσται ὁπῶς ὁ, ‘when this (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties’. ὁμώμοσται here is represented by γεγενημένος in § 32.

§ 28. οὐκ ἀπόδιδοι] Supply τὰ χρήματα (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss.

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. τὸν δὲ ‘but the judges, you think, if he do not swear, will decide against him’.

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that ‘this form of risk’, the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (ὁ κίνδυνος οὐτὸς ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείττων), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.

§ 29. ἀντὶ χρήματω] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it against money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and therefore it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive.

κατωμόσατο] κατωμίναι (ὁρκον) occurs in Arist. Ran. 395, 306, appa-
288 PHILOKIKHΣ Α 15 § 29.

φαίλων εἶναι ή μυθενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἑξει, μὴ ὀμόσας δ′ οὐ.

1. οὖτω δὲ δὲ ἀρετήν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ οὖ δὴ ἐπιορκίαν τὸ μῦρ᾽ 2 καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἄρμοττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἕστα πρόκλησις αὐτὴ ἀσεβεί πρὸς εὐσεβεί, ἀλλὰ ὀμοία καὶ εἰ ἑσχύρος ἁσθενὴ πατάξαι ἡ πληγήναι

1. οὖ· infra. 2. μη. infra.

rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ. καθίς κατόμοσον. Σ. νῆ Δῆ; Δ. ὀμοσον. Σ. νῆ Δία. With ὀρκον and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 833, ἀλλ' ἄγιουν ὀρκον σὸν κάρα κατόμοσσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. vi 65, but in a different sense 'to swear against', with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the κατά seems to have an intensive force, expressing the 'binding force' of an oath. This sense of κατά comes from the original, physical, notion of 'keeping down'.

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The obscurity is heightened by Bekker's punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading μὴ ὀμόσας δ′ οὐ (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause τὸ μῦρ. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon.

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker's motives in refusing to take the oath.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 d, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν 'Ελεατικῶν, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξῆμεν)—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, ἐν τὸ οὖ—appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved, Diog. Laert. ix 2. 18. The verse quoted here is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, Fragm. Phil. Gr. Xenoph. Fr. 25. p. 106, note, 'cuius versiculi hiatus in voce αὐτη caesurae excusationem habet, prima autem syllaba in ἀσεβεί producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἀλάντατος similitudinem'. So Karsten, Xenophanes, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle's reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes' maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson's notes and the rest; also Grote's Plato, Vol. i. pp. 16—19.
30 προκαλεσαιτο. ει δε λαμβάνει, οτι πιστεύει αυτῷ, εκείνῳ δ' οὐ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἵσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδώ, ο δ' εὐσεβῆς ὁμοῦ τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν
31 εἰκείνους ἀξιοὶ ὁμόσαντας δικάζειν. εἰ δὲ διδώσων, οτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ οτι οὐδὲν δει αὐτὸν ἄλλων κριτῶν δεῖσθαι: αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι
32 κρίνειν. καὶ οτί ἀτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὁμοῦναι περὶ ὧν

ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ) In this illustration of Xenophon's dictum, the parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to fight.

πατάζει δὴ πληγήναι] These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as the aorist active and passive of τύπτω. Eth. N. v 5. 4, p. 1132 b 28, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δει ἀντιπληγήναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχοντα ἐπάταξεν οὐ πληγήναι μόνον δει ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθήναι. Ib. v 4. 4, p. 1132 a 8, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγήναι ο δὲ πατάξει, καὶ κείνη ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 b 15, τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον followed by ἀν πληγήναι, ib. p. 420 a 24, τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον followed by εἴν πατάξει. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, Exciurus on the defective verb τύ-
πτω. S.]

§ 30. οτί πιστεύει αὐτῷ, εκείνῳ δ' οὐ) 'that he can trust himself (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other'. (In this case, if you accept the oath, or consent to swear) 'Xenophon's dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearing to take it; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). μεταστρέψαι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 'to pervert' justice; ' and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it yourself, in a matter in which (ὑπὲρ ὧν) you1 require those gentlemen (the judges, namely) to take an oath before they decide'. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide 'according to the best of their judgment', § 5, supra.

§ 31. 'If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (lit. you say this because, γὰρ) you offer him the decision of the matter'. Comp. Quint. v 6. 4, At is qui defert altoqui agere modesto videtur quum litis adversa-
rium indicum facti, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iuraverando stari quam suo mavult. Victorius thinks that this is borrowed from Aristotle.

1 I have translated this 'the adversary' in the Introd. p. 203, but I now think that it should rather be referred to the same person as αὐτόν.

AR. I.
PHTHIOKHS Α 15 §§ 32, 33.

"Allous àξioi ὠμνόναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν δῆλον πῶς λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζόμενον πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἶον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ διδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκείσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη συγκείσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἔαν δὲ ἡ γεγενημένος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστί, 32 τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια. ἐνταῦθα οὐν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἔαν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ἡ ὀμωμοσμένος, ὅτι

§ 32. ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] 'by yourself', supra, § 20, note on I 1.12, I 7. 33.

ἐκοιστὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense. ἐκ πρωνοίας, or with deliberate purpose, προμέρισει, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀπατη, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. ν 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βίᾳ as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix 'On the seven sources of action', Introd. p. 225.

The term 'injustice' or 'criminality' can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.

§ 33. συνακτέον] συνάγειν like συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλαμβάνειν, συλλέγειν, συνορᾶν, συνδέειν, συνέιναι, &c., and similarly comprehend, colligere, all convey the notion of 'gathering' facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of some kind. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are to 'draw logical inferences', from facts or premises which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them.

τὸ τῆς διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἢ δὲ φημὴ ἀνώμοτης, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this.
See Paley's note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal blot of Phaedra's false charge which brings about the death of the hero, one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides.

[periai] supra § 21, anairesin synbhekyn, tois noimos.
'At tois noimos chrwntai omosantes' 'the laws also (as well as other things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken', 'the laws in particular are only enforced after an oath has been taken'.

[ymas men] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. emmenoymen and emmenoyn, see Introd. pp. 204—5. MS A has emmynovyn; the rest emmenoymen, which Bekker retains.

eirhso] See on 11. 29.
The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93. [s.]

There are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these στοργή and ἔρως are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls πάθη, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

στοργή is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational, but moral; an ἀλογον πάθος, but ἱθικόν. ἤδι πατήρ τέκνων εἰ στοργῆν ἔχων, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* iv 63. Fr. Inc. 108. στέργειν, Oed. R. 1023, ἑστερξεν of parental affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. vi 754 B, καθάπερ παῖς...στέργει τέ καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησίμων. Ar. Eth. N. ix 7, 1168 a 2, στέργωντες ὁππερ τέκνα: ib. line 7, στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργων, τούτο δὲ φυσικόν, which describes an instinctive feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. viii 14, 1161 b 18, οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς: and line 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργοντον, for which immediately afterwards φιλεῖν is twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put up with, as αὐνεῖν and ἀγαπᾶειν); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. viii 14 and 21: and in Ar. Eth. N. viii 5, 1157 a 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλως στέργοντας, ὁππερ οἱ παῖδες: ἔρως, again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for στοργή, as Eur. Fragnm. Erechth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454. ἐράτε μητρὸς παῖδες: ὥς οὐκ ἔστι ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἄλλος. οἴος ἡδιῶν ἔραν.
éros differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of moral character: otherwise it is an ἀλογος ὑπερβολή, a natural, animal impulse; the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία, or natural appetite. ὑπερβολή τις ὃ éros παῦτι δὴν, Plat. Phaedrus 237 D. ἦδονή καὶ λυπή μεμεγεμένον (the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία) ἔρωτα, Tim. 42 a; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' similar to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says ἔρων μαθήσεως, φρονήσεως, τῶν καλῶν, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. ix 10, 1171 a 12, ἔρων...ὑπερβολή γάρ τις εἶναι βουλεῖται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἑνα, is an exception; here ἔρων is said to be a kind of φιλία: the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words—appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 c, τούτους μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὅν ἄν ἔρωτι, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 E, καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἶται οἷκ ἔρωτα ἄλλα φιλίαι εἶναι. Symp. 179 c, ὑπερβόλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, where ἔρως represents the στοργή, or natural affection. Ib. 182 c, φιλίας, δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ ὃ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. Ar. Polit. ii 4, 1262 b 12, ὡς τῶν ἐρωτῶν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦντων συμφέρει, Eth. N. ix 5, 1167 a 3, έσκε δὴ ἀρχῇ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἔρων, ἢ διὰ τῆς ὁφειός ἑδονή. The distinction of ἔρως and φιλία appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. ix 1, sub init., 1164 a 3 seq., ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ. The application of the word to a higher and purer love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. vix (Dind., Wagner), ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως, ψυχῆς δικαίως σωφρονός τε κάγαθῆς, καὶ χρῆν δὲ...τῶν εὐσεβοῦντων οὕτως γε σωφρόνες ἔρων: and Fragm. Oedip. iii (Dind.), vii (Wagn.), ἐνός δὲ ἔρωτος ὁντος οὐ μὴ ἥδονή οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἔρωτιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν οὗ δὲ εἰς τὸ σωφρόν ἐπ’ ἀρετῆν ἀγὼν ἔρως ἐξελοτός ἀνθρώπους. This is no exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the ἔρως in Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

φιλεῖν and φιλία are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of ἔρων, as Topic. A 15, 106 b 2, τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μικρότερον ἐνάστιν, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωφρατικήν ἐνέργειαν οἴδαν, where the τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωφρατικήν ἐνέργειαν is of course equivalent to ἔρων. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as φιλοτοιβότος, 'one
who is fond of so and so', φιλοωνος, φιλιστος, φιλοτιμος, φιλωνικος, φιλετιμος, φιλαντος, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. φιλα embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with στέγαν (viii 14, 1161 a 27, 28) and ἀγαπᾶν—see for example viii 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156 a 14,16), ἕραν, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, b 2, 4. In Plato, Phaedrus, 241 c, d, it comprehends even ἐρως, τίν ἔραστον φιλίαν, followed by ὦς παιδα φιλουσιν ἔραδαι: and in the same verse ἀγαπᾶν is used in the same sense (ὁς λύκον ὄρν ἀγαπῶσ', ὦς παιδα φιλουσιν ἔραδαι). In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that the friendship of two good men. The definition of φιλα in the Rhetoric, ii 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power'. This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin diligere, or deligere, to choose the object of your affection, which implies a judgment of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the πάθος in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of ἐρως, and in fact it is treated rather as friendship than as love.

We next come to the distinction between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν. Döderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their Lexicon, connect ἀγαπᾶν with the root of ἀγαμαι and its congener: this would make the distinctive character of ἀγαπᾶν an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high estimate of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. ii 7, 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃ ὅποις ἐνέργοι ὦς, αὐτὰ σου ἔκεινα φιλήσεις ὄρον ὀφελίμους σεαυτῷ ἔσιας ἐκείναι δὲ σε ἀγαπητοῦσι αἰσθάμεναι χαίροντα σε αὐτὰς. The same conception of value (estimation) and hence esteem, as the foundation of love—complete φιλα—appears in a passage of Plato's Lysis, 215 λ, ἦ, τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἐν ὑπ' ἄλληλων ἀγαπηθείη μηθείων
επικουρίαν ἀλλήλους ἔχοντα (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection); ὅ ἐδὲ μὴ τὸν δεόμενος οὐδὲ τι ἀγαπών ἄν. ὅ ἐδὲ μὴ ἀγαπών οὐδὲ ἂν φίλοι.

I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term ‘esteem’, and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite ἐρως, and the purely emotional, and usually moral affection, φιλία. In 1 3, init. 1095 β 17, the esteem which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a judgment about pleasure: and the same is the case with δι’ αὐτὰ ἀγαπᾶται at the end of the Chapter, ‘they are valued, prized, esteemed, in and for themselves’. In III 13, 1118 β 4, it is distinguished from χαίρειν, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to estimate or prize; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, ὅ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἥδωνας τῆς ἀξίας, where the ἀξία, ‘their value’, shews clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In IX 7, from 1167 β 32 onwards, four examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and 7, 1177 β 2, and 9, 1179 a 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμῶντας, another word which conveys the notion of ‘value’, are two clear instances. ἀγαπᾶν therefore as contrasted with ἔρων and φιλεῖν represents the Latin diligere as opposed to amare.

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of ἀγαπᾶν, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ἀγαπᾶξεῖν is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in ‘welcoming’ a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a father his child, Odys. π’ 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of ὀσπαξεσθαι. See the examples in Damm’s Lexicon, which all have this character; except Odys. φ’ 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with αἰνεῖν and στέργειν, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of 1


2 Dr Lightfoot in Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. 7, Vol. III (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary and original sense of the word.
welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from ἀγαμαι, and words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be left upon this question.

In common usage, however, it is, like φιλεῖν, by no means confined to a single sense. In Plato's Sympos. 180 b, it takes the place of ἐρατιν in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, ἐταν ὁ ἐρωμένος τὸν ἑραστῆν ἀγαπή ἢ ἐταν ὁ ἑραστῆς τὰ παιδικά. In Lucian, Ver. Hist. 11 25, we find similarly, ἐπιμανῶς ἀγαπῶσα τὸν νεανίσκον.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary language, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be thus distinguished:—

στοργή and ἔρως are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, and instinctive; but ἔρως is properly a sensual appetite, and στοργή a moral affection.

φιλία, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, belongs to the emotional part of our nature, includes all grades of the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a moral aspect.

ἀγαπών (ἀγάπη does not appear in any writers earlier than those of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the intellectual aspect of love, in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere emotion, but an affection acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in a valuation or estimate formed of the worth of the object of preference.
APPENDIX (B)

ON

A 12 § 22.

On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.

[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed to appear in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 93—97. The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr Cope’s own copy of the Journal, now in Mr Sandys’ possession. s.]

\( \phi \theta \omega \nu \epsilon \omega \sigma \vartheta \alpha \), \( \phi \theta \omega \nu \omega \mu \epsilon \nu \omega \), is an example of the irregular formation of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle’s writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation\(^1\), it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected.

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig’s *Latin Grammar*, Ch. iii. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl.; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a direct action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but indirectly—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin ‘govern’ other cases than the accusative (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into passives.

\(^1\) *Greek Gram.* § 431. Obs. h h, ii.
Speaking of the dative case, 'the object of reference', in Latin, Madvig says, § 244 b, "this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, invidetur, nemini nocetur." (I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, ἀμφράνεται is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few exceptions. "To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; invidior, Horace, A. P. 56, ereditor, Ov. Trist. iii 10. 25, medendis corporibus, Liv. viii 36," add regnavi, Tac. Hist. i 16, virginibus bacchata Lacacnis Taygeta, Virg. Georg. ii 487, regnata, Hor. Od. ii 6. 11, iii 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, imperor, Hor. Ep. i 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cie. de Off. ii 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions: most of those which he quotes are used as impersonals. [On Latin participles of this formation, see Munro, on Luct. ii 156, 363.]

Obs. 2, "Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and the dative (in applying this to the Greek, for dative, must be substituted, 'some other case with or without a preposition') without any perceptible difference in their signification, adnitor, aemulor, despero, praestolor." In Greek θορεβεϊθαι (ἦμας θορεβεῖτο), Plat. Phaedr. 245 b), ἀμελεύθαι (ἀμελεύω with accus. Herod. vii 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, 'do as you would be done by', or 'done unto', Locke, Essay, Bk. i ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, 'to be sent for', 'gone for', 'looked for', 'to be relied upon' (hence the vulgar reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh's Lect. on the Engl. Language, Lect. xviii § 14. "The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions...such a thing has been gone through with, to be taken notice of, to be lost sight of, are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c." [See Thring, Exercises in Grammar, p. 3, 'I am told'.]

1 I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides, Ion 87, Παρνησίαδες δ' ἄβατοι κορνφαί καταλματόμεναι, ib. 475, χρεωμέαν τρίποδι, Iph. Taur. 367, αἰλέοιται δὲ πάν μελαβρον.

Thuc. i 126, ἐπιτετραμένοι τῶν φθακόρυν, ("even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc. i 126. Xen. Anab. ii 6. 1, ἀποτρηθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς, &c." Donaldson, Gr. Gr. u. s.).
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The deponents αἴρείσθαι and ὄνείσθαι are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. ΙΙΙ 2, 3, Ar. Pol. ιτ (IV) 45, 1299 ι 19, αἰρόνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβεύσαι (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of αἴρειν, but in a different sense, the middle being necessary to the notion of 'choosing', or 'taking for oneself'). Plat. Phaedr. 69 b (in Ast's note several other examples of ὄνείσθαι pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. ἀπαρνεῖσθαι, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. ι 32, 47 b 2, 3, 4. ἀναβαθεῖς, Xen. de re equestr. ΙΙ 4, of a horse that is mounted (the regular constr. is ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππων, or ἐφ' ἵππων). ἀναβαίνειν in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, 'to go up to'.) ἀπειλεῖσθαι, Conv. ΙV 31. χαλεπαίνεισθαι, to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling, Plat. Rep. Ι 337 Α. σπουδάζεσθαι, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast's Lexicon s. v. ἄσπουδασμένος, Isocr. Panath. § Ι 44) ib. VI 485 Ε, ἀμελείσθαι (see above) ΙΙΙ 551 Α, καταφρονεῖσθαι, ib. 556 δ, καταγελασθῆναι, Euthyphro. 3 c, πλημμελεῖσθαι, Phaedr. 275 Ε, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). σπουδάζεσθαι, καταφρονεῖσθαι, Ar. Rhet. Π [2, 16], 3, 7, ὑπερέχεσθαι, Rhet. Ι 7, 2, 3, and Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 b 10, (ὑπερέχειν τι or τινά do occur, but rarely). θορυβεῖσθαι, 1 2, 10, Π 23, 30, Topic. Α 12, 105 a 16, Isocr. Panath. ἐπηνυμένοι καὶ τεθορυβημένοι (on θορυβεῖσθαι see above). Βοήθεισθαι, Rhet. ΙΙ 6, 6, ἐπικεχείρητα, ΙΙΙ 1, 3. ἐπιβουλεῖσθαι, Pol. ΙΙΙ (v) 10, 1311 b 35, φιλονεῖσθαι, ib. 11, 1313 a 23, πιστεύεσθαι, ib. 10, 1310 b 16. Xen. Symp. IV 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, πιστευόντες, π. εἴρην. § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622, § 4. μετέχεσθαι, 'to be participated in', Arist. Metaph. Α 9, 990 b 30, Top. Δ 121 a 12, τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγου, 126 a 18 and 21, Eth. Eud. 1 8, 2. προστάτεσθαι, Top. E 129 a 14, ἐπιτάττεσθαι, Metaph. Α 2, 982 a 18, ἐνπάρχεσθαι (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. 1 4, 73 b 18. (Waitz ad loc.) καταγορεῖσθαι passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad Anal. Pr. 47 b 1.) [Βοήθεισθαι, Rhet. ΙΙ 6, 6; παρμελημένοι, Eth. N. Χ 4, 1175 a 10; Plato, Crat. 404; ἐνθυθημένοι (Heindorf) Phaedrus, 246 c (with Thompson's note); ἀνάσεσται, Soph. Phil. 140; Homer, Od. ΙV 177; παραλογίζεται, de Soph. Elench. 165 a 169. κεχαρίσθω in Plato, Phaedrus, 250 c, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, Rep. ΙΙ. 375 Α.]

πειν and ἄποτέμενω are both transitive, and therefore the passive form is regular. The accusative is the local accusative, which expresses the seat of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs nenter and passive; Jelf (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 545, 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accusative and its varieties, ἁγαθὸς τὴν φυσιν, τὰ πολιτικά, ἄρετιν, &c. (Hat.), καθὸ τὸ πρὸσωπον, ἀλευνὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, τὰ ὀμίματα, δέρεα τὸ νύστον, τὸν τὰ ῥά κατεσαγόντων; Gorg. 515 Ε. βοῦν ἁγαθὸς Μενελαος, πόδας ωὐς ἅχιλλευς, and so on. By the same rule, τὴν φυλακὴν ἀρτίτεραμένα expresses the seat of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust (viz. the watch) committed to them. [Similarly πιστεύεσθαι τι, to be entrusted with something, the thing being the local seat of the trust, in that which the trust resides.]
áμαρτάνεσθαι certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. iv 9, 1125 a 19, in the form ἡμαρτημένος; and in some other forms which are undoubt-edly passive; Xen. Mem. i 2. 9, áμαρτανόμενα, bis, Arist. Eth. Nic. iii 3, iii 1 a 35, áμαρτηθέντα, (also áμαρτάνεται, as ii 5, 1106 b 26, and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to κατορθοῦται, line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle): but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as áμαρτάνεται áμαρτανόμενος, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. ix 512, áμαρτῆσεσθαι; and there seems no positive ob- jection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, áμαρτάνεσθαι &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which in this case becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the cognate, and not the direct, accusative. The object of the erroneous proceeding is the mistake that is made, áμαρτάνεν ἡμάρτημα; which becomes the sub- ject to the passive.
APPENDIX (C)

ON

A 15 § 23.

On εἰ οὐ.

Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. Med. 87, defends this combination of εἰ with the direct negative instead of μὴ against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in Soph. Aj. 1131, εἰ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ εἰς θάπτειν παρῶν; where οὐκ εἰς is equivalent to κωλύεις: in which cases the direct and not the hypothetical form of the negative is properly used to express an abstract negation.

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage of the Ajax¹ quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a different solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 A, we have in two consecutive sentences, first εἰ οὐδέποτε, and secondly εἰ μὴ οὖσιν ἑστι, and both after the same word θαυμαστόν. Now according to Hermann's rule this μὴ οὖσιν should be όὐχ οὖσιν, because the negative here is just as much an abstract negation of οὖσιν as οὐκ εἰς is of εἰς in the Ajax, the one 'unhallowed' as the other 'to forbid': the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this case breaks down.

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, is this. It is universally acknowledged that εἰ does not always pre-

¹ Eur. Ion, 388, ώς εἰ μὲν οὐκέτε έστιν, όγκωθη τάφυ, εἰ δ' έστιν, ἔλθῃ μὴ τρόπος εἰς οὖν ποτε, can doubtless be explained on this principle. And the same may be said of εἰ δ' οὐκ ἡμ, quoted by Herm. on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphan. ap. Athen. III 99 A.
serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of ὅτι or ὡς to express a simple fact; or of ἐπει, ‘since’, as a hypothetical consequence, where however no doubt is implied; or of πότερον ‘whether’, as an alternative, after ἵππον and similar verbs of questioning. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. viii § 6. 3, and the passages quoted by Hoogeveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 804. 9; Buttm. Ind. to Mid. εί προ ὅτι πότερον ἐτέκεια, αἰσχύνεσθαι (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only two instances of it in this speech of Dem.); Id. in Ind. ad Plat. dial. iv ‘εί in re certa, et citra hypothesis, valet siquidem (da) Men. c. 3. d (p. 72 l) εί ἀνεύρηκα.’ Now it seems to me that whenever εί is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is construed with the direct negative, just as ὅτι and ὡς, or ἐπει or πότερον, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to the passage of the Phaedo, where, as I think, in default of this explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the variation of ὧς and μή in the two cases after the same word, θαυμαστών.

In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the translation is, ‘perhaps it will be surprising to you that this alone...and that it never happens, &c.’; in the second, the hypothetical form is retained, though the sense is lost, and εί is still ‘if’; ‘it seems perhaps surprising if (as is the fact nevertheless, of which however there is no doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service’. Now there is a special class of words, like αἰσχρόν, δεινόν, ἀτοπον, θαυμαστών, θαυμάζεως, which are habitually followed (especially in the Orators) by εί in the sense of ὅτι, and are sometimes accompanied by its attendant ὧς: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as characteristic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite μή, with relatives for instance, ἀ μή πονεῖ, ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μή πανοῦν, Dem. c. Iept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority of cases the μή is retained. In Medea 87 (one of the lines on which Herm. writes his note) εί τούδε γ' εἰνής οὐκει oν στέργει τιμήρ; εί is certainly equivalent to ἐπει, and oν technically correct (though Hermann's rule might also apply; as is ἐπερ in the verse quoted Rhet. ii. 23. 1, ειπερ γῶρ οτεδ κ.τ.λ. This is so clear, that Elmsley, who condemns εί oν altogether, proposes to read here ἐπει for ειπερ. (Note ad Med. 87,) Hermann's example from Thucyd. 1 121, δεινόν ἢ ἑιη, εί οῦ μεν...οὖκ ἀπεριον, ἡμεῖς δὲ...οὐκ ἀρα δαπανήθομεν, which, according to him, are equivalent to κατερησοντων and φευσομεθα, is much more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, and with the second oν being justified by the meaning of εί, which is
On ei ou.

equivalent to ὅτι. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), “Obiter adicumus, etiam ubi ei an significat (‘whether or not’, a common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi ou, ut apud Plat. Protag. 341 b, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio,” ei ouk aisochnomai. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying his rule, Hom. Od. β' 274, ei δ' ou keioun γ' ἵστι γονός καὶ Πηνελοπείας. This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unexplained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted by Herm. l.c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his theory, (with one exception) are instances of ei ‘that’ after δεων. The exception is Andoc. peri τῶν μυστηρίων § 33, ei δε oudeν ἡμάρτημα ἐγώ κ.τ.λ. How this can be brought under Hermann’s rule I am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending himself, and offers an alternative; ei μέν τι ἡσύζημα ἥ...ἀποκτεῖναι με. ei δε oudeν ἡμάρτηται μοι κ.τ.λ. Who can doubt that in the latter member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, καὶ τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἀποδείκνυμι σαφῶς—and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore to be rendered, ‘but the fact being that I have committed no offence’, and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann’s rule.

In Dem. c. Mid. 581. 1, we have ei δε καταγγεῖν αδίκειν τότε διώ ταῦτ' oux ὑπήκουσε κ.τ.λ., where oux ὑπήκουσε forms no part of the supposition, but is stated as a fact of past time, and contrasted with what he may possibly do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 250, ἢ ou δεινον δοκει ὑμῖν...οὐ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων...ταῦτα τινες οὐκ εξαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ. Arist. Pol. ι 11, 1273 b 3, ἄτοπον γὰρ ei πένης μὲν ὑν...φανερότερον δ' ὄν ou βουλήσεται δαπανήσας.

I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in which αν with the optative is found following ei, contrary to the ordinary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, ei μέλλοντες μὲν ei πάσχειν συκοφάντην ἀν τῶν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἠγούσθε, ἐπὶ τῷ δ' ἀφελείσθαι κ.τ.λ., where the contrasted μὲν and δὲ (on which Buttm. Gr. Gr. and Index to Mid.) show that the first of the two members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. Timarch. § 85, ἄτοπον ἂν εἰη, ὃ 'Αθηναῖοι, ei μηδὲν μὲν...καὶ μὴ γενομένης μὲν κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἢλω ἂν κ.τ.λ.
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Aristoteles

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