Tito's

COMMUNISM

JOSEF KORBEL
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TITO'S COMMUNISM
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By JOSEF KORBEL

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Printed in the United States of America
TO THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE

who often in their tormented history
have shed blood for the common cause
of freedom and democracy,
which have been denied to them
FOREWORD

The story of the fighting in Yugoslavia during World War II has been narrated by several writers. More recently, the struggle of the Yugoslav Communists, led by Marshal Tito, against the Cominform has attracted attention of students of international affairs, especially of those of the Balkans. Less attention has been paid to the people of Yugoslavia in this crucial period of their history.

This book attempts to describe the life of the Yugoslav people under communism, the practices of the Communist government of Marshal Tito in the fields of internal and external politics, economics, and culture. In this sense, it is hoped that it may contribute to the study of communism in general. It also tries to throw new light on the real background of the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

To write the book in English was not an easy task for someone whose mother-tongue is Czech. It is thanks to Mrs. Mary G. Markham's invaluable work that I have overcome this obstacle. I would like to extend to her my deep gratitude.

I also wish to express my sincere thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation which facilitated the preparation of this book through a grant to the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver. My gratitude goes also to Professor Philip E. Mosely, Director, The Russian Institute, Columbia University, and to Dr. Ben M. Cherrington, Director, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, for their helpful advice; to Dr. Harrison S. Thomson, Professor, University of Colorado, and editor of the Journal of Central European Affairs, for having read the manuscript; and to Professor Allen DuPont Breck of the University of Denver for his friendly cooperation. Needless to say, their assistance does not imply any responsibility for the contents of this book.

My wife has gone with me through all the labor, from the beginnings of the manuscript to the preparation of the index.

JK
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NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

Most of the proper names in this book appear in their original spelling. Consonants are pronounced roughly as follows: c as ts; č and ě as tch; š as sš; ž as s (in treasure); dž or dj as j.
It was the end of September, 1945, when an old German Junker, captured at the Prague airport, made its first trip to Belgrade. I was a passenger, on my way to begin duty as Czechoslovak Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Yugoslavia. It was a strange feeling to be circling over Belgrade after four years of war.

My wife and I were met at the airport by only one official of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. It was a modest welcome. We soon started for the city, passing many heavily loaded trucks rushing noisily along bad pavements. Serbian peasants walked slowly beside their peasant wagons. Scores of tin coffins were being taken somewhere.

We reached the center of the city, every corner of which I had known well. I wasn’t prepared for what I saw. Could six years, even with four of them war years, really change a
city so much? Here had been the railroad station. Now there were only piles of rubble; a temporary wooden roof tried unsuccessfully to conceal the ruins. The Military Academy was gone and many other buildings had been destroyed by German and Allied bombs. There were wide, vacant areas where formerly small houses had been crowded together in the narrow streets of this semi-oriental town. Everywhere there were grass-covered heaps of bricks from destroyed houses.

I was struck by a feverish activity amid the destruction. People were at work repairing streets and buildings and constructing new ones. Among these workers there were many women and even some children. They looked undernourished and flimsily clothed. Cripples seemed to be everywhere. Many soldiers were in the streets, some in uniform, some with just military caps showing the Bolshevik star. We noticed a considerable number of luxurious American cars.

The Legation, at which we soon arrived, although it had been lucky enough to escape the bombing, had not escaped German pillaging. During the war the High Command of the German Army for the Balkan theater of operations had occupied the building. The tapestry, the pictures, the rugs, and the furniture had disappeared with the Command; only office equipment was left behind.

My thoughts turned, naturally, to my friends whom I had known before the war.

I had been here from 1937 to 1938 as the Press Attaché to the Czechoslovak Legation. After Munich I was withdrawn at the request of Prime Minister Stojadinović, who did not like my contacts with the democratic leaders of the opposition.

The government in Prague was only too glad to comply with this demand, as my service with the Czechoslovak Foreign Office had to be terminated. Berlin had already ordered that no "Benesite" be allowed to continue his diplomatic career.

Again, in March, 1939, when my country was occupied by the Germans, my first thought for safety went to Yugoslavia. A fortnight later I escaped from Czechoslovakia with my wife and baby, and found temporary refuge with my Yugoslav friends.

My function as Press Attaché in Yugoslavia began during
the rule of Prince Paul. I took part in organizing lectures about Czechoslovak history and literature and in arranging the showing of Czechoslovak cultural films. The halls were always packed and the meetings never ended without friendly demonstrations. Czechoslovakia and her President, Edvard Beneš, were highly praised and applauded and not a single occasion was missed by the crowds to associate themselves with the cause of democracy.

Also, during the period when I was Press Attaché I used to meet the leaders of the democratic opposition. This had to be arranged secretly. I conversed often with Dragoljub Jovanović, the talented and courageous professor with a peasant following. We used to meet in the apartment of Gustave Aucourtier, the director of the Balkan branch of the late Havas agency, and one of the top experts on Balkan politics. There I met also Milan Gavrilović, the chairman of the Serbian Peasant party. The official function of Milan Grol at the University of Kolarac made it possible to visit him from time to time without arousing suspicion. I enjoyed talking with this cultured philosopher of democracy and leader of the Democratic party. I learned a great deal from Miša Trifunović, the chairman of the Serbian Radical party.

I never failed to visit privately the leader of the Croat Peasant party and the Croat nation, Vlatko Maček, whenever I went to Zagreb. The conversations with him enlightened me about the profound abyss which existed between Croats and Serbs. He was the master of the situation in Croatia. His party had organized its own police, administration, and even courts which were dutifully attended by Croat defendants and plaintiffs, while the courts and administrative institutions of the state were ignored.

The leading figure of the Independent Democratic Serbian party in Croatia, Vječeslav Vilder, and a devoted friend of my country, was always willing to introduce me into the intricacies of Yugoslav political life. Archbishop Alois Stepinac was, as he assured me, not only the shepherd of his devoted Catholic children but also the protagonist of an intensive Croat nationalism.

In Slovenia I listened to the open-minded liberal, Albert
Kramer, and the Catholic leader, Anton Korošec, who never failed to picture the discouragement of the struggle between the liberals and deeply rooted Catholic clericalism. They found themselves united only in a common front against the centralized policy of Belgrade.

In April, 1937, the President of Czechoslovakia paid an official visit to Prince Paul. The democratic population made this an occasion to show their sentiments to the world. Though not a single announcement was made by official quarters about the coming state visit, people were prepared to receive Dr. Beneš with feelings of friendship and admiration.

A delegation of the students of Belgrade University (who were always ready to strike against the government) came to see me. It was led by Lola Ribar, a talented student orator, who was discovered only two years later to be an important member of the Communist party. The delegation wanted to know the exact time of Dr. Beneš' arrival so that they could mass in one place and, as Ribar told me, "take Dr. Beneš out of his car and carry him on our shoulders through the streets of Belgrade." They did not succeed in securing the information about his arrival, but the news spread, and the peasants from the vicinity of Belgrade tried to give the President of Czechoslovakia a special welcome. However, they were stopped on all roads and trains en route to the capital.

The Belgrade police managed the visit so well that the public did not see this chief representative of an allied country at all. He was lodged securely in the old Royal Palace, which was surrounded by a high wall. When he had to take the salute in the march past the Yugoslav Army, the platform was erected especially for this purpose in an adjacent street and a hole broken through the Palace wall so that he had only to walk from the Palace garden to see the marching troops and then was confined again to the official world.

The international sky was darkened by increasingly heavy clouds and the Yugoslav population was more and more anxious to manifest its feelings. In December, 1937, Yvon Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, made an official visit to Belgrade. This time, the adherents of democratic ideals were better prepared to receive the distinguished representative of France.
Thousands of them waited at the station and, despite severe police control, succeeded in unfolding hitherto hidden placards with slogans: "Long live France, Long live democracy." Moving slowly but irresistibly like a heavy avalanche through the streets of Belgrade, they shouted, "Long live the Alliance with France and the Little Entente," and "Down with the government of Fascists!"

I was preparing a message for my government about the reception of Delbos, when I heard some clamoring outside. I stepped to the balcony of the Legation and was greeted by a crowd of five hundred young people carrying French and Czechoslovak flags, shouting, "Long live Dr. Beneš and Czechoslovak democracy," and "Down with Prince Paul and Stojadinović's fascism." The first was a tribute to my country, but the second a demonstration against the recognized government and its responsible officers. I could not withdraw and offend friends. I could not greet them and offend my host, the Yugoslav government, either. I stood like a statue for several minutes. Suddenly, a truck packed with police rushed to the place and opened fire against the demonstrators. I saw someone drop like a log. The crowd dispersed, but the tension continued to mount and remained high.

The war was approaching the Balkans. The democratic masses of Yugoslavia suffered from the defeat of France in June, 1940, as if it were their own defeat. The Communists called the war imperialistic. The government circles were worried about what would happen next. Trying to calm the insatiable imperialism of Berlin, they agreed to sign a pact with Hitler. But the proud Serbian fighters revolted on the memorable day of March 27, 1941, under the leadership of an airman, General Dušan Simović. The treacherous government of D. Cvetković was quickly disposed of, Prince Paul fled abroad, and the other two regents, Radenko Stanković and Ivo Perović, accepted the change of regime with relief. (Prince Paul lived in exile in the Union of South Africa. Stanković and Perović were arrested by Tito's Partisans in 1945, and in August, 1949, were sentenced to twelve and eleven years of prison respectively.)
Young King Peter took over the fate of the country. Yugoslavia has "found its soul," declared Winston Churchill in the British Parliament. The whole democratic world greeted this revolutionary move enthusiastically, for it heralded new and regenerated strength in a nation which never had missed an opportunity to face and fight tyrants.
But the enthusiasm soon disappeared.

On April 6, 1941, Belgrade was heavily strafed by German bombers. General panic seized the undefended town, and streams of refugees poured out of the city. The army was disorganized and technically ill-prepared. Its concentrations were an easy target for the experienced Luftwaffe. The Croat units refused to fight. General chaos prevailed. The capitulation came only a fortnight after the invasion of Yugoslavia began.

It was not sufficient that the majority of the nation was eager to fight the enemy which marched in from Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Yugoslav state completely broke down. The German master knew well all its weaknesses. The country was forcibly divided into several parts. The western part, Slovenia, was shared between Germany and Italy, and disappeared from the maps prepared in German geographic
institutes. The small Slovenian nation was to be eradicated from the world. Croatia was declared to be an independent state which seemingly satisfied the nationalist aspirations of the Croatian chauvinists, led by Ante Pavelić. Serbia was administered by the German-controlled Serbian, General Milan Nedić, but parts of it were given to Hungary and Bulgaria. Dalmatia and Montenegro were allotted to Rome and the whole country was occupied by German or Italian troops.

The local traitors put their armed units at the disposal of the Germans: the Serbian Army of General Nedić; security units of Dimitrij Ljotić; the Croat Army of Pavelić; the Croat home defense and Ustaše, which was a military and police organization similar to the Nazi Brown Shirts; the Slovenian Army of Rupnik, and many other small groups.

National and religious differences had always formed a deep abyss between the peoples of Yugoslavia. The problem of Croat-Serbian antagonism grew through the bewilderment and cruelties of war into great dimensions. The intolerant relations between the two Christian religions of the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs intensified the separation.

Soon after the official capitulation of the Yugoslav Army a name hitherto unknown was on the lips of everyone; that of Colonel Draža Mihajlović, an officer of the Royal Yugoslav Army. Only a few people knew that he had watched with anxiety, long before the war broke out, the poor morale and the technical unpreparedness of the army and that he had criticized the pro-German policy of the Yugoslav governments. He was an ardent ally of the West. I met him in Prague in 1936 when he was Military Attaché to the Yugoslav Legation in Czechoslovakia.

This man refused to lay down arms and started to organize a resistance movement led by officers loyal to the Crown and to the Allied cause. There was no village in Serbia which would have refused to offer him hiding from the German soldiers and local Quislings. There was no house or peasant family that did not long to give him food. Draža, as everybody called him, moved across Serbia like an uncrowned monarch. The officials of villages and smaller towns were at his disposal and what Draža ordered was done. He organized something re-
sembling a regular army, recruiting youngsters and giving them training. But then he sent them home again, as it was difficult to maintain a huge army in the wild mountains.

After costly clashes with the German Army, for which the civilian population paid heavily, Draža decided not to fight the enemies, unless attacked, but to prepare for the time when a simultaneous blow could be delivered to the Nazis by the Allies from outside and his soldiers from within.

This fundamental matter of strategy gave birth to a conflict with another man who suddenly appeared on the scene. His name was Tito. He was not known to the masses. Only a few people knew he was the top leader of the Yugoslav Communists. Tito's rigid appearance offered a warning contrast to the bespectacled, professorial figure of Draža, who, in his romantic devotion to the King, ordered that he and his followers should not shave their beards until their monarch returned to his liberated country.

These two men met twice in the autumn of 1941. One was the King's obedient officer, the other a Communist leader. Draža had behind him a considerable body of officers and soldiers, and the whole Serbian countryside was under his command. Tito had organized around himself some few hundreds of Communist agitators, members of the party who were spread all over Yugoslavia in small groups. They were all fanatically devoted to the idea of communism, and their supreme commander was in Moscow.

Draža and Tito had fundamentally different views about the strategy of war against the Germans. Draža did not want to seek armed clashes which would cost the lives of many of his unarmed fellow countrymen. Tito was firm in his opinion that the enemy should be harassed wherever there was an opportunity and he insisted on a common Yugoslav front formed by all Yugoslav nationalities.

The two leaders could not agree. They did not meet again, but before long their followers met daily on battlefronts, fighting each other and unleashing a fratricidal civil war.

Tito's movement grew from the underground. Small groups of unarmed Communist Partisans operated in the country and in the towns. No risk was too great to prevent them from
seizing arms on any occasion. Their number was soon augmented by newcomers. The fighting in the country grew in intensity.

It happened that villages changed hands several times. A case is known where a village was occupied forty times by different fighting groups. First the Germans would massacre innocent civilians because a Partisan group had attacked a German column passing through the village the previous day. Then the Ustaše would come and murder every sympathizer of Tito and Draža. When the village was taken by Mihajlović’s men, the killing of the Partisans and Ustaše followed, but other Partisans would come and dispose of all their opponents. The suffering of the civilian population was severe and the people lived in constant fear.

On October 20, 1944, the victorious Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, entered the capital. Beside him marched his comrades of the Red Army. By then his army had been increased by many thousand soldiers, mainly Croats who joined Tito’s movement after the capitulation of Italy in the summer of 1943. The officers were seasoned Partisans, covered with the glory of forest fighting during those four long, exhausting years. Much of the country had been liberated and placed under the administration of local committees which were a version of the Russian local Soviets. Tito organized the political life and administration of regions as soon as they were freed.

For the citizens of Belgrade, the date of Tito’s entry into the city should have been a day of deliverance. They looked, however, with fear and doubt at the fanatical faces of their liberators. Tito now enjoyed immense authority, and among some people certainly a considerable amount of respect also. The town was in his hands; its inhabitants were full of expectancy.

The nation was worn out. According to official statistics, 1,700,000 patriots laid down their lives before the altar of freedom—a heavy toll for a nation of 16,000,000. No historian will be able to ascertain how many were killed in action by the enemy from abroad, or how many fell in bloody fratricidal strife.

Thousands of villages had been wiped out or badly damaged, hundreds of bridges torn up, railroad tracks smashed, ancient
forests destroyed, mines inundated, and factories demolished. Hunger was a faithful companion of disease. Economic calamity was multiplied by financial chaos resulting from six different currencies becoming worthless over night.

Ruins and blood—those were the raw materials out of which a new Yugoslavia was to be constructed.
Peace was officially declared in Yugoslavia on the day of the general armistice, VE Day, May 8, 1945. This does not mean, however, that the fighting and the shooting stopped altogether. Masses of Ustaše who were aware of their crimes and the fate they must expect, and thousands of Mihajlović’s Četnici were moving about in the country or hiding in forests. There were regions in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia which were under their control for a long time after the war, but they were gradually cleared by the Yugoslav Army and police.

The fighting between the armed forces of Germany and Tito’s Partisans had hardly finished when another struggle started. It was a struggle for entrenching and strengthening the political power of the Communist party.

At first, political life in postwar Yugoslavia was based on the agreement which Marshal Tito, as chairman of the National
Liberation Committee, signed with Dr. Ivan Šubašić, the Prime Minister of the exiled Yugoslav Royal Government, on December 7, 1944 (Appendix 1). The purpose of this agreement was to provide a democratic regime in the country after the war, and to form a provisional representative government composed of democratic parties which would ensure political liberties and conduct free, democratic elections.

The principles embodied in this agreement were endorsed at Yalta by the highest international authorities at that time, the Big Three. A solemn declaration, issued on February 13, 1945, and signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, said,

"We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić that the agreement between them be put into effect immediately, and that a new government be formed on the basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that:

"1. The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) should be extended to include the members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupština) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament, and

"2. Legislative Acts passed by the Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly."

This agreement of the Big Three was nothing but a recommendation for the Yugoslav politicians. But since the document carried the signatures of the three war leaders and post-war policy makers it was a document of a very categorical nature.

There was another international agreement signed at Yalta which directly concerned Yugoslavia. This did not have the form of a recommendation but was a very definite obligation of an international character to those who put their signatures to it. This document, "Declaration on Liberated Europe," bound the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to help the liberated nations of Europe form widely representative and democratic governments and carry out free elections. This Declaration was not respected by Soviet
Russia; in fact, she did everything to destroy the representative and freely elected governments of European countries and to make future free elections impossible.

In the case of Yugoslavia, none of the quoted agreements were fulfilled. It is true that a new provisional government was constituted in Yugoslavia, on March 7, 1945. It was headed by Tito and composed of his Communist adherents and five representatives of the democratic elements: Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Dr. Juraj Šutej for the Croat Peasant party; Dr. Milan Grol for the Democratic party; Sava Kosanović for the Democratic Independent party; and Dr. Drago Marušić for the Slovene Liberals. The last two had been in political solidarity with Tito since the war. According to the agreement, the King was to stay abroad until the nation decided the future form of the state, whether it should be a republic or a monarchy. His prerogatives were transferred to three royal regents.

This government, however, lasted only a short time. Before very long the three democratic members of the government resigned. Minister Grol sent a long letter to Marshal Tito in which he maintained that the agreement, signed in December, 1944, and the Yalta declarations were not being observed and that there was no freedom in Yugoslavia. He, therefore, wished to resign. This letter was never published (Appendix 2).

After a short period, two more resignations followed. In October, a short official announcement informed the nation that Dr. Šubašić and Dr. Šutej, the only two Croats of non-Communist convictions in the government, had left the government. The reasons for their decision were similar to those of Dr. Grol.

From that moment on, the rule of the country was fully in the hands of the Communist party while a few insignificant non-Communists who were willing to toady to the new regime helped the Communist government. After the resignation of the three democratic members of the government, the governmental propaganda machine unleashed a ferocious attack against them, accusing them of plotting with reactionary circles abroad, usually in the United States, whose orders, it was said, they obeyed.
THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER

This kind of charge has since been repeated in all other satellite countries wherever the Communists resolved to liquidate the democratic leaders, not only politically, but if practicable, also physically. It worked in the cases of Nikola Petkov in Bulgaria, of Ferencz Nagy in Hungary, of Juliu Maniu in Rumania, of Stanislav Mikolajczyk in Poland, and of the twelve democratic ministers in Czechoslovakia. Democratic politicians in the countries behind the Iron Curtain were silenced by execution or jail, or forced to seek refuge abroad in exile.

The government of Yugoslavia was called the government of the National Front. This expression was a cunning device of the Communists. It was created during the time of the German menace, long before the war started. The Communist parties in Europe, trying to fuse with the Socialist parties in order finally to absorb them, agitated for the formation of the popular front which would lead to the creation of a government of National Front. The attempt succeeded only in France and there for only a short and uneasy period.

This version of a National Front reappeared again during the war after Russia was attacked by Germany. Communists of all European countries appealed to masses for the establishment of a National Front against the enemy. The expression had popular appeal in all occupied countries because it aroused everybody, regardless of his political creed, to rally under the banner of all-national interests for the common cause of freedom.

In Yugoslavia the Communist party followed the same political tactics. It never mentioned its program or aims. The Partisan movement was stressed as an all-Yugoslav national movement. Everybody who was willing to fight the enemy was welcomed in Tito’s ranks. Never was it admitted that the eventual aim of the group was to bring about the triumph of communism in Yugoslavia.

Even during the first two years after the war the Yugoslav Communists avoided emphasis on the merits of the Communist Partisans in the liberation of the country and on the role of the Communist party in state affairs. The leading power was supposed to be the National Front.

The National Front was an all-embracing organization. It
administered the local communities, it organized meetings, directed the redemption of wheat, constructed roads and railways, presented the candidates for the local and the national elections. The National Front spoke on behalf of the nation. In fact, it seemed that this description corresponded with the reality. Millions of people were members of the various National Front organizations—men, women, young people and even children. It was the Communist party which directed all the National Front activities and ordered people, through local Communist secretaries, to join the National Front.

In theory, there were and still are several political parties organized within the National Front: the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Republican party, the apostates of the Serbian Peasant party, the apostates of the National Peasant party, the apostates of the Independent Serbian Democratic party, the Croat Peasant Republican party (which forcibly liquidated the only representative Croat party of Maček who is now in exile in the United States), the apostates of the Democratic party, and the apostates of the forgotten Socialist party, which dissolved itself in the middle of 1948. It will be noticed that the number of apostates is overwhelming, a feature which has characterized the strategy of Communist parties, in Yugoslavia and in many other countries as well. To split the democratic forces, Communists encouraged some second-rate members of democratic parties to join the government, and the parties then divided into two wings. The purpose was achieved; the democratic elements were considerably weakened and the all-national character of the government was seemingly achieved. Then, the real democratic wings of the opposition parties were accused of reaction and plotting with American capitalists against the legitimate governments and the parties were dissolved or silenced.

According to the Yugoslav law, every political party was obliged to apply to the Ministry of Interior for a license. All parties did so, even the old traditional parties such as the Radical Serbian party and Democratic party. Licenses were issued to them. But I never heard that any one of them ever organized a meeting.

In the autumn of 1945, the Democratic party of Dr. Grol
began to publish a weekly, *Demokratija*. An insufficient quantity of paper was allotted to permit daily publication. There was no preventive censorship in Yugoslavia. But it happened regularly that, after the publication of a questionable issue of *Demokratija*, the Belgrade police confiscated thousands of copies in the streets, tearing the papers from the hands of vendors. To demonstrate the power of the government and the "wish of the nation," quantities of confiscated numbers were often burned in the streets of Belgrade. After some few numbers of *Demokratija* were published, the typesetters of the paper, who were compulsorily organized into Communist-governed trade unions, decided "spontaneously" not to print this reactionary publication, and it was so announced officially. The paper did not appear again.

The same fate met another opposition paper, this time in Croatia. It was the *Narodni Glas* (*National Voice*). Of this paper, only one number appeared, in the autumn of 1945, and again the typesetters refused to continue its printing. The voice of the democratic opposition has not been heard since.

Curiously enough, the only party which did not apply for its license was the Communist party of Yugoslavia.
This was the Yugoslavia to which I returned to take up my new diplomatic assignment.

Before departing for Belgrade, I was received by the President of the Republic, Dr. Edvard Beneš. "Keep your eyes open," he told me. "Personally, I have little confidence in Tito. He is, above all, a Communist who succeeds in concealing his real aims by temporary nationalistic propaganda. Return frequently to Prague and, whenever you arrive, call on me. I am greatly interested in Yugoslavia; she will again play an important role in European politics. Don't write down anything of confidential character; the Soviet Embassy would have it the day after your report arrives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You understand now the reason for asking you to report to me orally." These words of Dr. Beneš gave me grave concern.
Soon after my arrival I began to look for my former friends, especially those who were now either with the Tito government or in its service.

My first call was on Vladimir Ribnikar. He came from an old Serbian family which had founded in Belgrade a daily paper, *Politika*, which had grown into a newspaper of national importance and influence because of its adherence to the principles of democracy and freedom. On the front page of *Politika*, next to the title, were the names of Vladimir’s predecessors—his grandfather, his father, and his uncle who had died bravely during the Balkan wars and World War I. Vladimir, or Vlada, as friends used to call him, was co-proprietor of *Politika* and its editor-in-chief before the war. His wife was a Czech. Our families had been close friends before the war, and our children had played together. Hardly a single day passed without a telephone call from one to the other of us, and we customarily met in our homes at least once a week. I had no doubts about his democratic leanings.

After the German invasion, Ribnikar was arrested but finally secured his release and, with his wife, joined the Partisan movement. Tito was glad to have this man with him. He rightly valued the name he bore. Later, in liberated Yugoslavia, Ribnikar was entrusted with the Portfolio of Culture and Schools and when the government was constituted, he was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Arts and Culture. His position was not one of full ministerial rank but was, nevertheless, of great importance.

I phoned him some twenty minutes after our arrival. He had known I was coming. When I mentioned that my wife would return to Prague in two days, he proposed that he telephone me later in the day to arrange a time for our reunion. But he never called.

One week later I telephoned again. His wife was ill, he told me, and was awaiting an operation. I sent her a bouquet of flowers and asked her husband to give me a ring when the operation was safely over so that I could greet her. She never thanked me, and I was never invited to see her.

On the afternoon of the day of my arrival, a functionary of the Czechoslovak colony came to see me. We had known
each other before the war. He was a good man, I felt. He entered my room with some embarrassment. The conversation was vague and dull. Then, suddenly he took up courage and questioned me, "Are you a Communist, Mr. Minister?"

"God knows I am not," I replied laughing. His face brightened into a relieved smile and he stood up to leave the room. He said only, "That is enough for today, my dear friend," and disappeared.

In the evening, a very good friend of mine came to see me. The conversation lasted till four o'clock in the morning. He told me about his experience during the occupation of Serbia and of his joining the governmental service. He was not a Communist but defended Tito vigorously, giving as his reasons how badly Yugoslavia had been run before the war and how seriously everybody was working now. I was glad to hear all this because I believed in his democratic faith and esteemed his judgment.

The first shock came the following day. Newspapers published the official announcement of my arrival. A teacher whom I had known very well in the old days rushed to see me. We had hardly exchanged a word of what we had done during the war when he began a passionate monologue, "Do you realize what has happened in this country? You will soon find out for yourself. Have you seen people with coffins on your way here? Do you know what those coffins are for? Those people are Serbian peasants who are going to the other side of the river, to the region of Srem, to dig up and take home the corpses of their sons, if they ever succeed in finding them. One hundred thousand children, between fourteen and eighteen, were driven there by the Communists, unprepared, completely untrained to take part in the last offensive, and tens of thousands of them were massacred by German machine guns. For this, somebody will pay, one day," he said, and continued without waiting for any reply or question on my part.

"In prewar times, we criticized our bourgeoisie for its irresponsible behavior, for its way of living. Have you seen the big American limousines being driven through the streets? They carry the representatives of the new, better, people's democracy—ministers, generals, party secretaries, and their
'comradesses,' as we must now call our wives. They live apart in the villas they took from the former owners; they shop in special canteens at minimum prices, have plenty of servants and their incomes are beyond any control. This last week, I was not able to give my three children anything more than dry potatoes. Yet I work like a slave and have the highest possible salary. Women and children have to work 'voluntarily' on the construction of public buildings, roads, and factories, and we all must devote part of our Sundays to aiding them in this enthusiastic labor drive for our beloved leader and father of the nation, Josip Broz Tito, about whom we know nothing—where he was born, who his parents were, and what he did before he started this business of Communist Partisans.'

I could not believe it.

Another shock followed immediately. I heard that a very good friend of mine, Niko Bartulović, had been shot by the Partisans because he worked with Mihajlović and had been accused of collaboration with the Germans. He was a distinguished writer and, before the war, editor of a fortnightly review. During World War I he was arrested by the Germans for siding with the Allies. He was a proven Yugoslav patriot, a real democrat, and a man of personal integrity beyond a shadow of doubt. Issues of his paper were often confiscated because of criticism of the pro-German policy of Prince Paul. This man, a reactionary and a traitor!

On the other hand, the best friend of Bartulović and a writer of recognized ability, I. Andrić, who had been Deputy Foreign Minister to the pro-German government of Stojadinović and Yugoslavia's last Ambassador to Hitler, was now the Chairman of the Communist-controlled organization of Yugoslav writers. This was beyond my comprehension.

Later on I found that there were among the government people former adherents of fascism and even members of Ustaše gangs. I found that some former Communists were outside and some real reactionaries inside; that reliable friends had become spies.

The presentation of my credentials went off according to official routine. It was in this period that the prerogatives of the King, who had now postponed his return until the wish
of the nation could be ascertained, were transferred provisionally to three royal regents. One of them, Dr. Ante Mandić, a Croat, had played a more dignified role during the creation of Yugoslavia, thirty years before, than he now did in his present position. The second, Dušan Sernec, a Slovene, had been the Governor of Slovenia under the dictatorship of King Alexander. The third, Srdjan Budisavljević, a Serb, had been one of the outstanding figures of Yugoslavia’s political life for more than thirty years, always a good democrat and a very good-hearted man. He was the Chairman of the Independent Democratic Serbian party, the democratic record of which was very high. He must have realized into what an untenable position he had been drawn, trying to represent the King in a Communist administration.

Soon I established contact with members of the government, high officials, and generals. The theme of these discussions was always the same: all praised highly the man who had led them to victory and each of them became passionately descriptive when telling of his own war experience. Then followed the statement that Socialist Yugoslavia was preparing for a tremendous effort to repair the war damage and to march briskly up the road to prosperity. A note of consolation followed at the end of each of these discussions: “You Czechs have not yet achieved as much as we have in our people’s democracy. But do not worry; one day it will come and you will establish a really democratic regime as well.”

After these preliminary lessons, the day was fixed for my audience with the Prime Minister, Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. I drove to his palace in which Prince Paul, the Royal Regent, had lived before the war. Prince Paul had had to leave abruptly in March, 1941, but five years later I still found traces of his love for paintings in the palace. French impressionists of the most bourgeois period of France gave an atmosphere of intimacy to the spacious rooms in which the Communist ruler now lived.

The Marshal’s aide-de-camp awaited me in the hall. In the next room, I was welcomed by the Marshal’s famous dog, Tiger. I almost slipped and fell on the glittering floor but Tiger did not bark, a fact which I considered evidence of Tiger’s con-
fidence in me and of the good impression I had made upon him.

The Marshal was in his customary uniform and high boots. He was considerably fatter and smaller than his pictures had indicated. It took some time to get him talking in a conversation which was only moderately cordial. Talk turned to Hungary, a point of friction between the foreign policies of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia had territorial claims against Hungary and wanted to transfer her own Hungarian minority to Hungary. Tito objected to this policy which, in his opinion, was driving the Hungarians into the hands of the capitalistic West and helping the conservative elements to gain in power in Hungary.

"History will show," he said, "who was right, you or we," leaving no doubts that the judgment was to be in favor of Yugoslavia.

Ironical fate, however, prepared a disappointing turn for both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia only three years later: Hungary became Communist but anti-Titoist and Czechoslovakia was compelled to retain the Hungarian minority.

My experience based on first personal contacts was substantially enriched when soon after my arrival I was invited to a reception at which Tito was the host. There were five hundred guests. Uniforms were in the majority. Ladies wore street-length dresses and no make-up. They looked rather rough. Almost all of the guests were Partisans, proud of their warrior past and scornful of the gaieties and fancies of the western feminine world. Only the diplomats wore black ties and their ladies long dresses.

I was in the company of some Yugoslav generals when, suddenly, my former friend Ribnikar and his Czech wife passed. I was shocked by her appearance. This once elegant woman, who had used a good deal of make-up and had worn the most expensive dresses, looked shabby and weary. Her face was gray, her lips pale, her hair greasy. This time she could not avoid seeing me. Without giving a single word of welcome, she burst out, "Don't count me any more among Czechs. I have become a Yugoslav. The spirit of the Partisans has infiltrated me completely, and I have forgotten my Czech ancestors."
The generals were surprised by this tactless remark and I felt ashamed. I succeeded in answering, "I am sorry to hear this, but we have in our country so many good women that we can gladly make a present to our Yugoslav friends."

I left the reception soon. I began to grasp the meaning of various remarks which had been made to me concerning the reservations felt by official Communist circles in Yugoslavia for the still democratic government of Czechoslovakia.
I had arrived in Belgrade, at the end of September, 1945, just as the election campaign for the Constituent Assembly was beginning. This body was to decide whether the country would continue to be a monarchy or would be proclaimed a republic. It was to provide, as well, a new Constitution for the people.

Every day there were meetings in factories and every evening in other places. People were obliged to attend them. Every Sunday demonstrations on a large scale were arranged. In larger towns there was not a single house or wall which was not painted with big slogans. Secretaries of the National Front did not ask the owner of the house whether he was willing to have the walls of his home used for this propaganda, or whether he agreed with it. The Czechoslovak Legation, situated in the center of Belgrade, was painted with inscriptions.
I ordered them removed but the following day they appeared again.

Groups of young people marched daily through the streets of Belgrade from early morning till late at night shouting slogans. Newspapers and radio stations carried pictures and speeches of these "national rejoicings," emphatically stressing that all this was an expression of the free will of the nation.

School children were told that their parents were going to choose the leadership of the country and the issue was whether it would be led by Marshal Tito, whom boys and girls were taught to adore, or by "the rotten, cowardly King of Karadjordjević." They were instructed to listen to what their parents talked about so that "the old reactionary, dying world could not annihilate the great values of the national liberation movement." Fathers and mothers became afraid to speak freely to their children or in their presence.

In one family a tragedy almost occurred when a boy came home from school one day and insisted that his name should be changed. He even threatened to denounce the family for being against Tito if the father did not agree. The son said that children in the school attacked him as a Royalist and anti-Titoist and threw stones at him shouting, "Nećemo kralja!" ("We do not want the King!") The boy's name was Kralj (King).

In the villages the campaigning was somewhat different. On Sunday mornings the agitators came from the towns and waited for the villagers in front of the church until the service was over when they began to speak against reactionaries. Peasants dared not leave the meeting because they would be branded as reactionaries.

As in other Balkan countries, the young people were accustomed to gather on Sunday afternoons in an open space to dance. Now the entertainment was often interrupted by the sudden appearance of a man who made a short speech, saying that there was no time for dancing when people ought to be working on reconstruction projects, and that the elections would show where everybody stood.

Rumors were spread about the country that those who would not vote would be deprived of their land. Soldiers were
given trucks to drive through towns and villages in order to shout threats to reactionaries. This was only six months after the war when the army was composed of many Partisans, and many people still feared even their appearance.

The agitation was concentrated on the main issue: monarchy or republic. With the first, all evils were associated; with the latter, all advantages. The National Front organized meetings and made proclamations, but the whole campaign was planned and manned by the Communist Politburo.

During the days before the election the atmosphere was thick with hatred. One could not escape the drum-fire of the propaganda. The thousands of flags, placards, slogans, political songs, speeches, and articles must have wrought fear in everyone's mind and led the people to abandon any idea of expressing their views freely. "Down with the King! Down with Grol! Down with black reaction! Down with the monarchy! Long live Tito! The nation will vote for Tito and the republic!" Those were the slogans which gave the tone to the campaign.

The King and the democratic politicians had no opportunity to answer these attacks. According to the Tito-Šubašić agreement, young King Peter had no right to return to the country "until the people have pronounced their decision in this respect." But there was not a single person who would have dared to say a word in his favor against this avalanche of anti-monarchist propaganda. The democratic opposition was deprived of every means of expressing its opinion and of defending its political program. It had no newspapers and it did not arrange any meetings, although in theory it could do so, because in this atmosphere of coercion and intimidation such a meeting would have been smashed by the Partisans, or people would have been afraid to attend it.

Under the circumstances the opposition decided not to take part in the election, and thus to demonstrate to the whole world that it was only a farce. Many observers and other democrats argued whether this was a wise decision and whether it did not facilitate the Communist efforts to arrange and secure complete victory. Some were of the opinion that it was a major political mistake. But there is little doubt
that under the psychological pressure to which the voters were exposed, only a few would have had the courage to vote for the democratic candidates. The consequences would have been very unfavorable for them, and thus the strength of the National Front would have been only confirmed in this false manner.

People felt that not only the question of monarchy or republic but something much more serious and important was at stake.

One Sunday, I went to see some friends in a village in Vojvodina, a place with a mixed population of Slovaks, Serbs, and Hungarians. I met a teacher whom I had known before the war. I remembered he had been a Communist fellow traveler, very radical and against the prewar political regime. The discussion turned naturally at once to the election. I expected the teacher would be enthusiastic about Tito. But to my great surprise he said, "I am sure you think I am a Communist. It is true I sympathized with the Communist movement before the war, and I was even against the democratic opposition as I reproached them for not fighting persistently enough against our fascists."

"But things have turned out quite differently from the way I expected. You will certainly not suspect me of being for the King. But this is not the issue. Something more important is at stake—liberty. I do not say that the monarchy would give us more freedom, and if I could choose freely, I would prefer a republic. But it is foolish to simplify the matter in this way. I was against the regimes before the war, because I wanted democracy first of all. Now I can see that we have another dictatorship. And what makes me crazy is that we are going to vote for it."

"During the war I saw many tragedies in this district. When the Hungarian Army occupied us, many Hungarians in our country denounced the Serbs and Slovaks and thousands of these innocent people were massacred. To my great surprise, there were among the Hungarian traitors people whom I had considered always very progressive, and among the persecuted Serbian and Slovak families were many whom I had considered reactionary bourgeois peasants who, I thought, would be willing
to collaborate with anybody who would not touch their property. But they turned out to be patriots and the others traitors.

"This was not all, however. After the war, many of the Hungarian traitors started to serve the Communist party, and today they boss the district, run the administration and, as judges, even condemn our people for collaboration with the enemy. But many Serb families whose sons and fathers were killed by the Hungarians are today branded as reactionaries. I can't take it. Black is white and white is black. For twenty years I have been persecuted by the royal regimes as a Communist and sent forcibly from one school to another until I ended up in this forgotten corner of the county. But now, I am on the same platform with those who secretly would like to see the King return. I know that the coming election does not concern the question of king or no king, but the question of certain slavery or a very slight hope of freedom. And the tragedy is that we all are going to vote for slavery."

I discussed the pre-election situation with Marshal Tito when I met him on October 13. He said, "We shall have to face many difficulties. Just now the opposition in Bulgaria is developing a campaign which was initiated abroad to make our policy in Macedonia impossible, though we had agreed to solve this question with good-will and frankness.

"Similarly, our opposition and foreign elements try to make our election impossible. Šubašić resigned on the instruction which he received from abroad. But I do not expect any direct diplomatic intervention. So far we have not received any diplomatic note. The opposition's tactics are transparent. However, we shall carry the election through, and at this moment we cannot make any radical concessions. Šubašić objected, saying I did not keep the agreement. That is not true. We have given to the nation a democratic electoral law and the opposition can take part in the election freely. It prefers, however, to abstain because it realizes that it would lose.

"I admit that we are committing mistakes, many mistakes, but that is only natural in a period of revolution. Our people are afraid that they might lose the great values which they acquired in the difficult struggle that lasted four years. We are doing our best to put the wrong things right and we must
endeavor to remove those subordinate organs which are commit-
ing injustices. Šubašić reproaches me that we are proceeding too severely in Croatia and that there is no ‘freedom from fear.’ But we can only deal strictly with the Ustaše, who have committed the most terrible crimes in history, and it is only just if a criminal is afraid that he will be punished and does not enjoy ‘freedom from fear.’ The old Yugoslavia cannot return and people do not want it. I do not know what would happen, but I think that Yugoslavia would cease to exist if the opposition came to power. Therefore, there is no intrigue, no intervention from outside which could compel us to postpone the election.”

One can see that Marshal Tito fully realized that his government was only provisional from the point of view of international law and that the change from monarchy to republic would require international recognition. He was rather surprised that there was no official intervention on the part of the Allied powers.

The Soviet Ambassador Sadčikov shared Tito’s view on the political situation. I saw him on the previous day. His opinion disclosed that at that time, only six months after the war, he considered the international and internal political questions from a purely Soviet angle. “The western Allies are very dis-

satisfied with the Yugoslav government,” he told me. “First, they thought that it would lose its position if and when Grol resigned and if he went independently to election.

“When they found out that the opposition had no public support and that it would lose the election, they reached an agreement with Šubašić that he should resign, too. As you know, the Allies granted recognition to the Yugoslav govern-

ment on the basis of the Tito-Šubašić agreement, mentioned also in the Yalta Declaration. When Šubašić now declares that the agreement was not fulfilled by Tito, the Allies may take it as a pretext not to recognize the government which will come out of the election. They could even go as far as to break off diplomatic relations. The truth, however, is that before his resignation Šubašić never protested that the agree-

ment had not been fulfilled. On the contrary, he agreed with all the laws, including the electoral law, which the government
had prepared and for which the Parliament voted. If he gives as the reason for his resignation that Tito did not keep his promise, it only reveals that he is acting upon instructions from abroad.

"I am convinced that the government will not retreat, that it will carry the election through and will not shrink even from the possible consequences after the election. It enjoys the full support of the masses and also of the Soviet government."

Though Sadčikov and Tito were only slightly worried about complications which might arise if the West did not recognize the election, the Yugoslav people were expecting an intervention with certainty. Every evening they turned to the Voice of America and the BBC. They read in every bit of news that Washington and London were following the situation very closely and that they were resolved to evoke the articles of the Yalta Declaration.

The election for the Constituent Assembly was based on two laws, about the electoral lists and the election. From a formal point of view, both laws would stand, on the whole, the most severe examination and could be compared with an electoral law of any truly democratic country.

In the electoral lists, which constituted the legal basis for ballot rights, were inscribed all Yugoslav citizens regardless of sex who had reached eighteen years of age. Members of Partisan units or the National Liberation Army had the ballot right whatever their age (Article 3). Excluded from this right were persons who had been members of armies of enemy occupation or their local supporters; those who had fought actively against the National Army of Liberation and the Allies; members of the German organization Kulturbund and of Fascist organizations, including members of their families; active functionaries of Quisling organizations; persons who had voluntarily helped the enemy; and, finally, persons who had been deprived by a tribunal of civilian and political rights (Article 4).

Thus the law refused the basic political right to vote to whole families if one member was guilty of collaboration with the enemy.
The provisions of Article 4 of the electoral law assigned to the local Communist secretaries the duty of inquiring as to the political reliability of the voters. They entered every house and apartment and investigated the past of every potential voter. They asked about his whereabouts during the war, and if he or a member of his family had not served in the Liberation Army or had not given active support to it in some form, it was left to the arbitrary will of the Communist secretary to decide whether his name would be inscribed in the ballot register. If the voter did not succeed in proving his political integrity, the whole family was branded publicly as reactionary.

On October 11, the Central Ballot Commission announced that 8,020,671 voters were listed and only 253,108 persons had been deprived of this right. This means that not more than 3.06% of the voters were excluded from voting. The regime wanted to convince the world that the democratic provisions of the law were strictly adhered to. But it is generally known that the official announcement did not correspond with the facts. There were, in fact, whole villages where the only voters were some few functionaries of the National Front.

Other articles of the electoral law guaranteed the secrecy of the vote. Others provided for freedom of speech and prohibited any intimidation. They established a legal basis for the control of free balloting by establishing impartial commissions which would supervise the balloting. But these were rules in theory only; they were not observed in practice.

It would be wrong to judge the integrity of elections in any Balkan country according to the standard to which the people in western countries have been accustomed. Even before the war, the governments of those countries took advantage of organizing elections. The party which had the Ministry of Interior in its control had a chance to “convince” the population through local administrators that it would be advantageous to vote for the government party. The governments exploited all the technical and material means which they had at their disposal to take a lead in the electioneering campaign.

But even under such circumstances, the elections were free in the sense that people had, first, the opportunity to choose one list or one candidate among several; and, second, that they
did not need to be afraid of consequences which they and their families would have to face if they voted for the opposition.

This cannot be said for the election which took place in the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito.

The opposition parties were eliminated by psychological pressure; their leaders refrained from taking part in the election. Thus, people were given the choice to vote only for the governmental list of the National Front candidates, or to express their dissatisfaction by not going to the polls. At the last moment, to create the impression of securing for everyone a free and alternative choice, the government introduced a non-governmental ballot-box and voters were told that if they did not agree with the program of the National Front or its candidates, they had the right and means to express their discontent by dropping the ballot-ball in this box. But the propaganda machinery did not fail to make it clear that only reactionaries and enemies of the progressive, democratic Yugoslavia could vote in this way. The box became popularly known as a “blind urn” (Čorava kutija).

Under these circumstances, people went to vote on November 11, 1945.

From the early hours on Sunday, the day of the election, groups of Partisans marched through the streets shouting that every democrat votes for the National Front and every reactionary stays at home. This was a very eloquent invitation for everybody to participate in voting.

The voter going to the polls had no list of candidates in his hands. Often, he did not know for whom he was going to vote. The names of the candidates were announced only in the newspapers. As a high percentage of voters were illiterate, all voters were given a rubber ballot instead of a candidates’ list. This technique was actually used before the war as well.

But this time, the voter was properly instructed that he should first approach the urn provided with the inscription “National Front,” put his hand deeply into the wooden urn, pull it out closed, then go to the “blind urn” and do the same. Before each urn stood either a member of the national militia
or an official of the National Front who repeated with the proper emphasis that "this is the urn for the National Front and the other is the 'blind urn.'" The whole act was watched by the members of the election commission, composed exclusively of National Front functionaries, who also counted the number of votes after the election was finished. There were places where the "blind urn" was distinctly different from the National Front urn, and if the rubber ballot was dropped in the first it could be heard.

Soldiers took a very active part in the voting. They went to the polls in formations and even in trucks. I did not understand why soldiers on a nice Sunday should drive to voting places in trucks until that evening when I heard a drunk corporal in a small Belgrade inn boast that he had cast his vote not only in Belgrade but also at two other places in the vicinity.

The name of every voter was checked on the electoral list when he arrived. Since people were urged to fulfill their duty as soon as possible, the election commission soon knew who had abstained. In many places, especially in the villages, the national militia went from one house to another to urge the citizens to go and vote.

In such an atmosphere and under such circumstances it was not surprising that the government list succeeded in receiving from 80 to 99 per cent of the votes in individual districts. It probably was not even necessary to falsify the results of the voting, though technically nothing would have been easier to do. People were mentally and even physically tired, and they went to the polls without thinking of casting their votes in the "blind urn." Everybody was aware that any sign of opposition either by abstention from voting or by dropping the rubber ballot into the "blind urn" might mean losing his job or at least his ration card. It would have meant an open struggle against the state authorities and an invitation to them to make the opponents' lives unbearable.¹

¹A new election was held on March 26, 1950. Its course and result were the same as four years earlier. Although an electoral reform provided for nomination of candidates who would be supported by a minimum of 100 people from at least half of the localities of an electoral district, not a single list was submitted of candidates who did not belong to the National Front. The election was as totalitarian as before and procured for the Communist government 94.23 per cent of the votes.
The official result of the election was naturally celebrated by the press as the greatest victory of the nation over reaction and was greeted as unmistakable proof that the nation stood firmly behind Marshal Tito and rejected the return of the King to his country. The rule of the dynasty of Karadjordjević was over.

Five days after the election Marshal Tito declared to the foreign and Yugoslav journalists that "everybody could convince himself before and during the election that rumors about violence and terror on the part of the state organs and members of the National Front were untruthful and malicious . . . . everybody had been free to vote or not to vote. . . ."

Sixteen million people knew that this statement was not true, but no one dared challenge it.

The leading Communists themselves realized that this was a grandiose deception, but as they had been taught to use any means to achieve their Communist aims they did not care what the percentage of votes given to their party or to the National Front would have been if the election had really been free and democratic. The newly elected Parliament had the mandate to change the form of the state, to declare a new constitution and to give legal sanction to totalitarian methods of rule. The gate for an uncontrolled Communist regime was wide open and all over Yugoslavia there was not a single person who could have raised his voice to protest that this was not a Parliament of the nation but a gathering of four hundred men and women who were chosen for clapping and pre-arranged ovations for the self-imposed leader of the nation, Josip Broz Tito, and his Communist party.

Two days after the results of the election were made officially public, an artist came to see me and characterized the freedom of the election in these words: "You know that I hate communism just as much as fascism and nazism, and you have even sometimes reproached me, saying I failed to understand the fundamental changes which the war has brought. But you can imagine how free the election was and how many people voted spontaneously for the National Front if even I cast my vote for the government. But I am sure this cannot last." Then he added, "Now, I must rush home. I
want to listen to London. I am sure the Allies will not recognize this comedy. You will see that they will announce that they are not going to grant recognition to this republic of Marshal Tito.”

This man expressed the last hopes of Yugoslav democrats who expected salvation to come from Washington and London.

The State Department expressed its reserve toward the election. In a diplomatic note of December 25, 1945, it asked the government of Yugoslavia to accept responsibility for the international obligations of the previous Yugoslav governments and to confirm the existing agreements and conventions between the United States and Yugoslavia. Only in case of a declaration in this sense was the United States government ready to accredit its ambassador to the new Yugoslav government.

In the same note the State Department expressed its conviction that the nation of Yugoslavia had the right to expect the fulfillment of the Yalta Declaration about political rights, but that these rights had not been respected and the election did not give the possibility of a free choice of national representatives.

The opening of diplomatic relations with the new regime did not mean, according to the diplomatic note, the sanction of the policy of this regime or its methods.

In times when certain moral and political values were still respected and obligations in international relations fulfilled, such a diplomatic note would have stirred public opinion, and the government to which it was addressed would have had something to worry about. But in the jungle which the Nazis and Fascists have planted in the international world and which the Communists cultivated with such masterly care, the note of the State Department was nothing but a document which gave a clear conscience to the authors and a contemptuous laugh to those to whom it was addressed.

The government of Yugoslavia was firmly established. All the western powers recognized it tacitly or explicitly. The regime was strengthened in its internal and external position. It could now begin with full vigor the extermination of the remnants of liberalism and of any organized opposition and
bring about the realization of the Communist program. This was an historic moment. The Yugoslav election and its international acceptance were a signal to all Communist parties behind the Iron Curtain that they could follow the Yugoslav example without fear of opposition.
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

It must have been clear to every observer that there was no hope for young King Peter, who lived in exile, to return to his native country. As expected, the election resulted in a clear victory for the idea of a Communist republic.

There had been for many years among the Serbian intelligentsia a strong tendency to discard the Karadjordjević dynasty and to establish a republic. Many Yugoslav democrats had been dissatisfied under the rule of King Alexander between 1928 and 1934. They would have preferred a republic.

Among the Croats the same feeling was almost general. They had no sentimental ties with the dynasty which was so closely linked with the history of the Serbian nation. They resented deeply that the King one-sidedly supported the tendencies of the Serbian hegemony. The largest Croat party, representing practically the whole Croat nation, adhered
to a republican program as formulated by its leader, Stephan Radić, during World War I. As to the Slovenes, they had no bias in the question of the dynasty, and they lacked any tradition in sympathy for a monarchy.

But young King Peter had won the admiration of everyone by his courageous and patriotic stand against the Germans in March, 1941. At that time the prestige of the Karadjordjević dynasty stood very high. It fell slightly again when King Peter married a princess of the Greek court in London.

During the war the Serbian fighters used to say, "Never in history was a good Serbian king separated from his nation, and especially from his army, in moments of fighting for liberty. This time, we are passing through the most terrible period of our struggle for freedom, and for the dynasty itself, and Peter is happy and gay somewhere in England and even marries a Greek princess. He should be with us on the battlefield."

However, as my friend the teacher said, the issue was not a monarchy or a republic when the people went to the polls, and as far as the Serbs were concerned the King's popularity was again high in 1945. Their sentiments were expressed with the characteristic Serbian political wit when inscriptions appeared overnight in the Belgrade streets: "We want the King even if he is not good." ("Hoćemo kralja iako ne valja.")

The great and historical day for the proclamation of the republic was fixed for November 29, 1945. The political machinery was all set up. Tito and his followers had seen to that.

In November, 1942, sixty-five delegates had met at Bihac and elected the first Anti-Fascist Committee of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, AVNOJ. A year later 208 delegates at a meeting in a Bosnian town, Jajce, put down the principles of a future republic. The AVNOJ declared that Yugoslavia would be built up on the basis of a federation and would guarantee the equality of all the nations: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The AVNOJ was constituted as the central organ of the national liberation movement and its highest legislative body. It elected a Presidium composed of one chairman, five deputy chairmen, two secretaries, and forty members. The Presidium had the power to
nominate a Committee of National Liberation entrusted with the functions of a government. Marshal Tito was its head and it was composed of six Serbians, five Croats, four Slovenes, one Montenegrin, and one Bosnian Mussulman. There were no tested democrats, nor widely known names among them, though the Communists did not have a majority. The structure of these legislative and executive bodies clearly indicated that they were shaped after the Soviet Constitution.

The Congress at Jajce also formulated its attitude toward the Yugoslav government in exile and toward the question of the dynasty. It declared that it deprived the government in exile of the rights of a legitimate government and of the right to represent the nations of Yugoslavia abroad. This principle was to be applied to any government which would be newly constituted abroad against the will of the Yugoslav people who were represented, according to the Jajce declaration, by the AVNOJ. King Peter II was forbidden to return home until the country was completely liberated, when it would be possible by a free expression of the will of the nation to decide the question of the monarchy.

This declaration of Jajce put heavy pressure upon the King and his government, as did the supreme interest of the Allies to see the Yugoslav fighting front united. As a result, in the summer of 1944, the Yugoslav Premier in exile, Šubašić, went to visit Marshal Tito. He negotiated with him the basic principles of collaboration between the two factions, the national liberation movement in the country and the Yugoslav government outside. Tito made the concession of recognizing the right of Šubašić's government to represent the country abroad, while the latter expressed its respect for Tito's committee to administer the liberated territory.

Aware of the difficulties which he might encounter when the question of international recognition of his future government would be posed, Tito met Šubašić again in December, 1944, and signed a secret agreement with him which would facilitate the transfer of power from the wartime institutions to a regular government. According to this agreement a Regents Council, subject to the approval of Tito's committee and Šubašić's government, was to be appointed by the King
to represent him until he could return to the country. The temporary government was to guarantee human and political rights and to safeguard private property.

This was a prelude to negotiations with the Allies who blessed the agreement and recommended its realization at Yalta, in February, 1945. The King hesitated but also expressed his consent after some pressure from the British Foreign Office.

In March, 1945, some Yugoslav politicians in exile returned to liberated Belgrade. Headed by Šubašić they joined Marshal Tito, whose Committee of National Liberation was transformed into a provisional government and AVNOJ into a Provisional Parliament.

Today it is clear that Tito skillfully handled the Allied governments and his Yugoslav partners in London in order to prepare his way to exclusive power. In Yugoslavia the democratic ministers were politically isolated and the country, to all practical purposes, was run by Communists. The election had given them victory and had prepared the way for the declaration of the Communist republic.

Belgrade was flooded with flags and people on the great day. Peasants from neighboring villages, wearing their national costumes, were brought by special trucks to town, adding to the solemnity of the moment a colorful gaiety. Every shop-window was decorated and not a one was without pictures of Tito and Stalin.

That evening the National Theater gave a festive performance of a Croat national play about Matija Gubec, an heroic figure of the sixteenth century who raised the banner of the peasants' revolt against the feudalistic oppressors. The analogy was obvious. When the Gubec of the present time, Marshal Tito, entered the theater, everybody stood up and the wild applause and rhythmical shouts of "Tito, Tito, Tito," reverberated throughout the hall. The sentiments of the official audience consisting of all the ministers, officers of the army, high officials, and party functionaries, were turned into an ecstasy of fanaticism. Whenever Gubec on the stage spoke
about the struggle for freedom, the performance was interrupted by a new wave of applause addressed to the Gubec in the box.

The diplomatic missions were present. After the performance, with half an hour’s notice, they were informed that the newly elected Parliament would meet at midnight to consider a matter of special importance.

Thirty minutes after midnight, on November 29, 1945, exactly two years after the session of Jajce, the President of the Provisional Parliament opened the session. He was Dr. Ivan Ribar. People who remembered the old days of royal Yugoslavia could not dissociate this picture from another session of the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly, twenty-five years ago, when the same man solemnly took the oath of allegiance to the Karadjordjević dynasty and defended vigorously its hereditary rights to the throne against the Communist members of Parliament.

According to the rules of procedure, the chairmanship was handed over to the oldest member of the lower House, Babić. He was a martial-looking man of eighty, with a typical Serbian white mustache, dressed in a colorful national costume. Certainly a very impressive figure to lead the Parliament at such an historical meeting. But just at the moment when I was being impressed by this representative old man, a Yugoslav whispered in my ear, “This Babić has been a member of many royal Parliaments. Today, he presides over a session of republicans. I am sure he will be the chairman again when the monarchy is restored. He is a tough bird and he will live another twenty years.”

In the Council of Nationalities (a sort of Senate) another octogenarian took up the chairmanship. He was the founder and leader of the Republican party, J. Prodanović, who had been fighting for the idea of a Yugoslav republic for a quarter of a century. This honest and respectable man must have been deeply satisfied at that great midnight performance when his lifelong struggle for a republic was crowned with success, even though it was brought about by the Communists. Many democrats were misled by the sight of Prodanović, one of the finest spirits of prewar Serbia and postwar royal Yugoslavia, serving
now as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers and sitting next to Marshal Tito. Later on, he saw for himself that he was nothing but a tool in the Communists' hands. His activities were limited to intercessions with the Minister of Interior on behalf of his former friends who came into conflict with the secret police. I used to see him from time to time in his villa and he spoke to me frankly about the disappointment he had experienced. He died in 1948.

The night session of the Parliament was devoted to procedural matters and most of the time was devoted to an enthusiastic welcome to Marshal Tito. Everyone present, the gallery included, stood up when he entered the hall and applauded for endless minutes, shouting slogans. The chiefs of the diplomatic missions were in the diplomatic boxes. The Soviet Ambassador took the lead in a completely unusual procedure by joining in the applause. The western ambassadors stood up, watching this spectacle emotionlessly. All Slav diplomats followed the path of their Soviet leader. I abstained, but on the following day I was told that it had not passed unnoticed. This extraordinary habit of the galleries to applaud with the House became quite a political affair and the satellite diplomats enthusiastically joined in whenever attacks against the reactionary or western imperialists were "on the agenda."

I issued instructions to the members of my Embassy that they might applaud when Marshal Tito appeared in the House but not during the discussion. The counselor of the Embassy, who was a Communist and was attached to my office to watch my activities, resented my ruling very strongly and reported it to Prague. But I silenced him and later succeeded in getting him to leave the Embassy service after I discovered that he inherited "the old bourgeois custom" of smuggling money illegally out of the country and of trading on the black market.

The celebrations reached their peak on November 29. From the early hours of the morning groups of young people marched through the streets of the capital singing revolutionary songs and dancing the national dance Kolo. In the afternoon, the Parliament met to declare the birth of the republic. To give to the proceedings a cynical political flavor it was arranged
that the Serbian members, representing the traditionally monarchical nation, would present a draft of a declaration which blamed the Karadjordjević dynasty for all the misfortunes through which the Yugoslav nation had passed. It attacked King Peter for having fled when the country was occupied by the enemy during the war, leaving the nation to its fate.

On the basis of this, and in agreement with the "freely expressed will" of all the nations of Yugoslavia, the Constituent Assembly decided: "(1) 'The Democratic Federative Yugoslavia'" (as the country's official and provisional title had been so far) "is proclaimed under the name 'The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia'. . . . (2) by this decision the monarchy in Yugoslavia is definitely abrogated, and Peter the Second, Karadjordjević, with the whole dynasty of Karadjordjević, is deprived of all rights which he and the dynasty of Karadjordjević had."

King Peter the Second was in London on that day when he was deprived of his prerogatives and citizen's rights. He issued a declaration in which he labeled Tito's government as a tyranny and promised to continue to defend the interests of his country. But he was far away from his nation while his opponents were in the center of the scene and had the reins of power firmly in their hands.

Oddly enough, however, there was a Karadjordjević in Belgrade who declared himself a republican and gave full support to Tito. He was Peter's uncle, Prince George. He was the oldest son of King Peter the Liberator, and as such, an hereditary prince and the pretender to the throne. His story is still veiled in secrecy. King Peter thought that his first son, who had a weak mind, had no qualities of a ruler and had confined him to a castle with no contact with the outside world for some twenty-five years. If the Partisans brought liberty to anyone, it was certainly to Prince George. He was allotted a house and even a car and given full freedom to circulate in the streets of Belgrade. Fishermen saw him almost every day on the banks of the Sava River, and I believe he still continues to live harmlessly as a loyal republican.

I thought that the ovations which took place in the Parliament the previous night could not possibly be exceeded. I was
wrong. What I witnessed on the occasion of the reading of the dethronization act and the bill of the republic was something of a delirium of enthusiasm and devotion to Marshal Tito which reminded me of a medieval religious frenzy. Marshal Tito was acclaimed again and again, all the members of Parliament jumping to their feet repeatedly. The slogan “Tito-Republic” was chanted with fanatical adoration which, accompanied with a rhythmical clapping, gave an impression that those present were in an hysterical trance. Marshal Tito had to calm the masses.

Then prominent speakers, representing each of the six federal republics, took the floor and pledged wholehearted support to the draft declaration of their Serbian colleagues. Each speech was convincingly approved by protracted applause. Finally, first by acclamation and then by individual signatures, the Parliament approved the draft.

The same scene developed in the Council of Nationalities. Then both Houses met in a common session and the chairman announced, to no one’s surprise, that the “Declaration of the Republic” was accepted by unanimous vote. The celebration culminated in the singing of the national anthem “Hail, Slavs.”

The proceedings were transmitted over all Yugoslav radio stations and the new republic was greeted in all larger garrisons by artillery salvos. This was a sign for general rejoicing. Darkness was slowly covering Belgrade when fireworks started. The illuminations lighted the faces of the young dancers and their picturesque groups. The night offered a calming balm to older people, most of whom felt that their world and hopes had gone, perhaps forever.

The official circles continued to celebrate the occasion in the evening in the former royal palace, which was now the residence of Marshal Tito. He was the host to some five hundred guests: diplomats, politicians, and men of arts. The United States Ambassador, Richard Patterson, Jr., and the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, told me they considered the Yugoslav government’s decision as rather inconsiderate. I spoke also at some length with my prewar friend, Dragoljub Jovanović, who was one of the members of the newly elected Parliament. He dropped the first words of doubt. “I am certainly
glad that we have a republic,” he told me, “but I am very much worried that the leaders will lose their heads and think that everything has been won. You saw the scenes in the Parliament this afternoon. It was, in fact, a very sad show. These people will not fulfill their duties as legislators. They will just follow the government’s orders. As far as I am concerned, I am not ready to approve of anything blindly and I shall go into open opposition if I find that they only want to make us tools of the Communist party."

Tito felt that some opposition would appear within the ranks of the National Front and declared in an interview for the London Times that he was sure “that opposition would come from some parties which form the National Front . . . ,” and that, though “the country needs the unity of the National Front in basic questions, it does not mean that we expect an automatic agreement and unanimity of all its members.” But this declaration was made for the consumption of the West, the economic aid of which was very much needed. In November, 1945, subtle tactics were still required. D. Jovanović was true to his words and in 1947 went into open opposition. But not for long, for he was accused of high treason and put in jail.

The cornerstone of the republic having been laid, the next step to be taken was to give the country a new constitution. The text was drafted by the government, published, and all organizations and individuals were invited to discuss it and send amendments to Belgrade. This procedure must have impressed everybody as very democratic.

I read the Constitution with great care and found it was a perfect law providing for all the ideals for which mankind, and the Yugoslav nation in particular, have been striving for centuries. I still felt that here was a chance to build up a state which could lead all the Balkan countries and serve as an example to show how many intricate problems of this harassed part of Europe could be solved to the satisfaction of all concerned.

These are the principles of the new Constitution, which
was adopted on January 31, 1946: The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a community of nations with equal rights in which all powers come from and belong to the people who elect their organs on the basis of a general, equal, direct, and secret ballot. Every act of the state authorities must be based on law. National minorities enjoy the right of a free cultural development. Private property and enterprise are guaranteed and can be limited only by law. The land belongs to those who cultivate it. The state defends and helps especially the poor and middle peasant. All human and political rights are guaranteed. All citizens are equal. The state especially protects the interests of mothers and children. The freedom of conscience and religion are guaranteed; marriage and family enjoy the protection of the state; the freedom of expression and personal integrity are guaranteed. Nobody can be imprisoned for more than three days without a judge's intervention. The integrity of the home and the secrecy of letters are guaranteed. The tribunals are independent. There is universal military service. The freedom of scientific and cultural work is guaranteed.

The forefathers of the United States could not have objected to any article of this part of the Yugoslav Constitution, wherein the authors strictly respected all the rules of political and human freedom.

The second part of the Constitution frames the establishment and the organization of the country's public organs. It enumerates the central organs of the Yugoslav federation and fixes their powers. These include matters of national interest. All other public activities are left to the organs of the individual republics.

The People's Assembly (Narodna Skupština) of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is the supreme representative body of the country's sovereignty with the exclusive rights of legislation. It is composed of two Houses, the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities. In the first House every 50,000 voters¹ are represented by one member; in the second House, individual republics and autonomous regions are represented, each republic by thirty, each autonomous

¹An electoral reform of January, 1950, reduced this number to 40,000.
province by twenty, and each autonomous region by fifteen representatives. Both Houses are equal and their term of service is four years. The members of the Parliament enjoy the right of immunity.

The central executive body is the government appointed by the People's Assembly, to which it is also responsible for its activities. There are two kinds of federal ministries, those which administer the country in a central capacity, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Foreign Trade, and those which act through the corresponding organs of the republics. These republics have their own local Parliaments, consisting of one House only, and their governments. Similarly, the autonomous regions have their legislative and executive bodies as well. Villages, towns, and districts are administered by National Committees. All legislative organs and the National Committees are elected. The tribunals are separated from the executive. They are appointed by the legislature. Public attorneys see that the laws are respected.

These are the principal provisions of the new Constitution. They are certainly democratic and should have opened broad avenues to a fair and just rule of the country.
ONE COUNTRY — MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES

The Constitution: The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people’s state, republican in form, a community of people, equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state. (Article 1)

THE YUGOSLAV CONSTITUTION OPENS WITH THE SOLEMN declaration of equality among the nations assembled in the Yugoslav republic. It follows the Soviet example and pursues the idea of self-determination to the point that any Yugoslav nation is given the right to leave the community of Yugoslavia and, acting according to its wish, declare its independence or join a neighboring country.

It is a matter of opinion to what extent a country like Yugoslavia, composed of different but still very closely linked nations, should be federalized. The Yugoslavs have never
agreed on this question and endless struggles among political parties have been going on for long and exhausting years, weakening the structure of the state and finally leading to its breakdown, on the day of the German attack in April, 1941.

History and historical reminiscences are not the purpose of this book. But to understand the present position of Marshal Tito and to be able to pronounce judgment about the vitality of the solution as offered by his government, one has to be aware of the complexity of the problem of nationality as it has developed throughout history.

Since the Middle Ages, the South Slavs of Europe have lived separately and under different foreign domination. The Serbs began to regain their independence in 1804, wresting it from the oppressive rule of the Turks. The Croats and Slovenes were subjugated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. Centuries of separate development and their different geographical positions have impressed upon them different national characteristics.

The Serbs are members of the Serbian Orthodox church, yet are not deeply religious. The Croats and Slovenes are devoted Catholics. The Serbs write in the Cyrillic alphabet, the Slovenes in the Latin alphabet. While the Croat and Serbian languages can be considered practically the same, with the exception of the alphabet, the Slovenes have a language of their own. The Slovenes understand Serbian, because in prewar Yugoslavia they were obliged to learn it in school, but the Serbs would not ordinarily be able to speak with a Slovene or read Slovenian.

The temperament of the people in the different states is also different. The Serbs lived under the influence of the Orthodox Orient and fought for their independence for centuries in costly battles against the Turks, Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Austrians. They hold freedom and independence in high esteem. The Serbian peasant is in substance very democratic, yet authoritative within the circle of his own family, which is the product of a long tradition of the patriarchal system. He was raised in the democratic unity of the village against the Turkish oppressor.

Having gained their national independence a hundred and
fifty years ago, the Serbs have developed a healthy appreciation of their own state and have, therefore, a good sense for a positive, creative policy. On the other side, they tend to have a domineering spirit and press their own policy upon other people. The methods of their public activities have been influenced by their previous oriental political associations. The degree of their culture and civilization left them behind their western brothers.

The Croats, and especially the Slovenes, have grown up in close association with western habits and culture. They are industrious, considerate, and their material standards are higher; those of the Slovenes remarkably high. Under German-Austrian and Hungarian domination, they employed methods of passive resistance, in the form of opposition and abstention in the Parliaments in Vienna and Budapest, to gain their ends. After 1918 they were faced with problems arising out of self-rule which could not be satisfactorily solved by the same methods as those used against a foreign rule.

Though closely linked together by common blood and ideals, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are distinctly different nations. History divided them in temperament, religion and culture, in material standards, and in the approach to daily life.

World War I brought the Yugoslav nations together. The twenty-three years of independence which followed, however, were not sufficient to erase all their differences or to unite them fully in support of a common state. Many Serbian politicians, supported by the Serbian national dynasty of Karadjordjević, continued to live and act according to the old pan-Serbian ideology. In the nineteenth century the aim of the government had been unity of all Serbs; now, in an independent Yugoslavia, it tried to establish Serbian rule over the other member nations.

The Croat representatives adhered to the out-moded methods of separatism. In this they disclosed a serious lack of statesmanship, which required a new, positive approach toward the problem of relations between the Yugoslav nations. They were in a constant state of preparedness, as if Yugoslavia were not their own state, but was a power to be feared.

The Slovenes constantly quarrelled among themselves. They
could not agree about the basic concepts of life, some holding to the narrowly religious view, others taking a broader, more liberal attitude. In questions of Yugoslav interests as a whole they were often induced to advance a third position which benefited from the differences arising between the Serbs and the Croats.

Thus, the old religious and cultural problems of the Serb and Croat nations became, after the founding of Yugoslavia in 1918, the most pressing problem of the new Yugoslav state. They even threatened the existence of the state itself. The Serbs were unwilling to solve them by reasonable concessions; the Croats were uncompromising in their struggle to establish an autonomous Croatia. The leading party in this struggle, the Croatian Peasant party, led first by Stephan Radić and later by Vlatko Maček, had the support of practically the entire Croat nation. The dictatorship of King Alexander, introduced in 1929, did not ease the situation. The Croatian Peasant party established de facto a Croatian state within the Yugoslav state, defying loyalty to the public authorities.

In August, 1937, the half-recognized democratic Serbian parties in opposition reached an understanding with Maček. This should have opened broad avenues to cooperation and understanding. But as this was an agreement between opposition parties it never became a reality, though undoubtedly it represented the wish of the majority of the Yugoslav population.

In the spring of 1939, the shrewd politician Dragiša Cvetković, under the pressure of a critical international situation, managed to sign an agreement with Maček who even joined the newly formed government. But it proved to be too late. The first stroke from aggressive Germany broke down the country in April, 1941. Many Croats followed, not unwillingly, the orders of Hitler and founded their own state, Independent Croatia, under the leadership of the traitor Ante Pavelić, who had been for many years in the service of the Italian Fascists and German Nazis.
The Partisans of Marshal Tito raised the slogan "Brotherhood and unity" against the Croat Ustaše, who wiped out thousands of Serbian families, and against the nationalistic and passionate resentments of the Serbs. These two words expressed the political program of equality of nations in a new Yugoslavia. They certainly appealed to everybody whose political judgment was not overshadowed by momentous sentiments.

Some adversaries accused Tito, because he was a Croat, of basing his movement on the Croat nation. But they were wrong. Tito defended himself against this accusation by proving that the Partisan movement started in Serbia. Also, he proved that after the attacks of Mihajlović forced his withdrawal from Serbia and Montenegro to Bosnia and Dalmatia the majority of the officers and soldiers who took part in the withdrawal were Serbians and Montenegrins. Only after the collapse of Italy in 1943, did the Croatian militia and other Croats join the Partisan Army in large numbers. This brought a change in the numerical relations of the nationalities in Tito's Army.

It was certainly to Tito's credit that he succeeded in saving Yugoslavia as a federated state. Who knows whether this would have been achieved had other political parties had the responsibility of administering the country, which had been so deeply involved in a fratricidal war. Among the political parties which formed the Yugoslav government in exile, there was no common program for solving the problem of nationalities.

"Brotherhood and unity" was, therefore, a good and profitable slogan. Under Tito the country was divided into six federal states: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Two autonomous regions, Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina, were created within Serbia. This division was met with strong objections from the Serbs. While willing to recognize the national individuality of the Croats and Slovenes, they could not accept the idea of a separate Montenegrin nation. The Montenegrins proudly called themselves Serbs, and even today it would be difficult to find people of the older generations who would say they are Montenegrin. Only young Communists accept and propagate the theory of a Montenegrin nation.
The same applies, to some extent, to the Macedonian nation. Macedonia has been, in modern history, more or less, a geographical expression. People who were natives of this part of the Balkan Peninsula lived in old Serbia, or Yugoslavia, in Greece, and in Bulgaria. Many of them spoke the local language, sometimes called Macedonian. They lived on the crossroad of many foreign interests and were successively exposed to Turkish, Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian pressure.

After World War I, some of the Macedonian minority representatives in Yugoslavia proposed the idea of joining Bulgaria, and some of those who lived in Bulgaria or Greece wanted to join one of the other two neighbors. The separatist movement in every part of Macedonia, whether Yugoslav, Bulgarian, or Greek, was strong, but it had no common program.

Many people in Macedonia, therefore, consider themselves either Bulgarians or Serbs. The latter, whether in Macedonia or elsewhere, strongly resent the creation of the Macedonian federal state as a separate unit, claiming they liberated the South Serbs from the Turkish yoke in the bloody Balkan war of 1912.

Macedonia had never had a literary language but one is now being propagated under the government of the Communists. There is only a small local intelligentsia, so teachers from other parts of Yugoslavia have to teach in the national Macedonian schools and at the newly founded Macedonian University.

The founding of a federal Macedonian state has actually become a hindrance to Tito’s republic. Recently the Cominform found in the eternal Macedonian problem a fine opportunity for subversive activity against the Yugoslav Communist government. The Cominform has started to foment a separatist movement in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia and to spread propaganda for joining Bulgarian Macedonia in order to create an independent Macedonia aimed against Tito’s Yugoslavia.

The Serbs also object to the formation of the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija. They claim that Tito, who is a Croat, by decreeing special Montenegrin and Macedonian nations and by creating federal or autonomous units in regions inhabited mainly by Serbs, wants to break up the Serbian nation and weaken its resistance to communism.
MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the inhabitants are Serbs or Croats by origin. History has divided them according to religious faith into Mussulmans, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. There are even exceptional cases of Catholic Serbs and Orthodox Croats. In order to avoid the dispute as to whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should form a part of Serbia or Croatia or should be divided between the two, Tito founded a separate federal republic. This was probably the correct solution, justified historically by the fact that the country had been annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908 and administered separately from either Serbia or Croatia.

It would be almost impossible even for a well-trained scholar equipped with all the historical, linguistic, religious, and sociological background to offer a solution which should be the basis of a federation of a country in which history has created such a labyrinth of ideas. The problem of national individuality, being a question of feelings and sentiments, is bound to remain a serious political controversy in Yugoslavia for many years to come. The question now is what progress has the government of Marshal Tito made toward solving this intricate problem.

As far as the Serbo-Croat problem is concerned, the Constitution gave the Croat nation full satisfaction by establishing a federal state. All the Yugoslav nations were granted equality of rights. There are no laws in Yugoslavia which make any national discrimination.

It is a fact that people are called upon to take up positions, not according to their nationality, but according to their natural inclinations and qualifications. Thus, one finds many Montenegrins among army officers, because the Partisan movement in Montenegro started very early after Yugoslavia was invaded, and the Montenegrins distinguished themselves by courage and attained high rank in the Yugoslav Army of Liberation. In the field of economics there are a considerable number of Slovenes, because they are better in business and administration than other Yugoslavs. In both cases, the number of Montenegrin officers and Slovenian economists is in great disproportion to their nations’ numerical strength.

In practice, the rights and duties of everyone are measured only by the form and scope of his utility to the regime. If one
comes into conflict with the Communist order, its laws or policy, then it matters little whether he is a Slovene, a Croat, or Serb. In this sense, at least, all are equal in the eyes of the government.

But if there is no national discrimination, there is a discrimination based on political affiliation. The nation is now divided into two categories: the ruling Communists and the rest of the nation, or 97 per cent of the population. If anyone attains membership in the Communist party, he is considered reliable, regardless of his nationality. Thus, political reliability has become a mark of division in Communist Yugoslavia.

But the Serbo-Croat problem has not been solved. The present Yugoslav leaders like to say, “The problem was solved in time of war. The nations of Yugoslavia fought side by side against the common external and internal enemy. Their ‘unity and brotherhood’ is not only a slogan but it is a reality which was forged in the trenches and sealed by common blood. The old prejudices have disappeared and people have learned to think in a different way. The problem does not exist any more and nobody mentions it.”

“Nobody mentions it,” is correct. No newspaper will print a single word about the Serbo-Croat problem and no politician will speak about it publicly. The program of unity and brotherhood is practiced in a way which even in the old days would have been considered proof of Serbian hegemony. Soldiers are sent to serve in units regardless of their nationality. Serbian and Montenegrin officers are stationed in Croatia; Slovenes are in high posts in Belgrade; Yugoslav youth, coming from all parts of the country, are beating the path of unity and brotherhood by common work on public constructions.

There is reason to believe, however, that the Serbo-Croat problem still exists in all its fatality and tragedy and probably in a measure which surpasses what was known in prewar times. It has ceased to be a question of power politics or a dispute between political parties, but it has grown to a national estrangement of serious dimensions.

There are still many Serbian families who remember the mass murder of tens of thousands of Serbs committed by the Croatian Ustaše. There are many Croats who throw the same accusation against the Serbs, alleging that the Serbian Četnici
of Draža Mihajlović killed masses of innocent Croats. The heritage of the civil war still hangs heavily over the relations between the two nations. People do not speak about it, because their minds are concentrated on problems of their daily life. What used to be a matter of passionate discussions seems to be buried by worries for daily bread. But it does not mean that the problem has been solved or forgotten.

Meanwhile, another phenomenon of a dangerous nature is gaining ground. There are politically-minded people in every part of Yugoslavia, who are seriously beginning to be convinced that the founding of the Yugoslav state thirty years ago was a fatal error.

I have met Serbs whom I know as sensible people who have told me that the continuation of Yugoslavia is out of the question when liberation comes. They say, "The Croats were convinced, by the very creation of Yugoslavia, that we oppressed them. It may be true. Well, let them go wherever they want. Old Serbia was a good country. We had several traditional political parties; we had good, rather progressive laws and a Serbian national dynasty. We had had the experience of running our own state for more than a hundred years."

"But for twenty years, after the First World War, we went downhill because of constant difficulties with the Croats. During the Second World War the Croats massacred so many of our people that there are streams of Serbian blood flowing between Serbia and Croatia. We cannot and we shall not forget it."

"Now, in new Yugoslavia, the Serbian element is being constantly weakened. The Croatian Communists threw our lads into the last offensive against the Germans to have them killed by the thousands."

"Tito, as a Croat, is trying to disintegrate the Serbian nation by artificially creating Montenegrin and Macedonian nations; by giving special autonomous status to the Serbian regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo; by compelling the Orthodox church to found a special, independent Macedonian Orthodox church; and by doing the same in Montenegro, though the Serbian Orthodox church's jurisdiction was for centuries extended over all these regions."
"Why didn’t he give an autonomous status to the vast regions of Dalmatia and Slavonia, which would be more justified historically? Because, while weakening the Serbian element, he wants to strengthen the Croatian rule. We have paid heavily for twenty years of association with the Croats. There is no sense in the constant dispute as to who is better off in Yugoslavia, the Serbs or the Croats. We have become strange to each other. It will be to our benefit, and perhaps to the Croats’ as well, if we separate after communism is overthrown. We prospered in old Serbia and we shall prosper again.”

These ideas were heard frequently in Belgrade and they did not come only from people of the older generation who were inclined to overestimate and oversimplify Serbian self-sufficiency. They came also from young Serbian students.

Similar words were uttered in Croatia. People would tell me, “Look at the Serbs. They have in their hands the police, organized by the Serb Ranković; Djilas governs the whole field of culture, and Popović the army. Here in Croatia, many Serbs joined the Partisans and as such have returned to important jobs in the administration, in the police, in the factories, bossing us again. It is the old story in a red edition. The Četnici killed thousands of our people. We do not need the Serbs. We have been living in this space for a thousand years, and though the independent Croatia during the war was a German and Fascist creation, it left its traces among the people who feel we can succeed as a state of our own. It will be much better to separate from the Serbs when Tito’s regime falls.”

I had no occasion to speak about the same subject with the Slovenes, but I have heard that some of them have a non-Yugoslav conception of their national future and would prefer to join some kind of a Central European federation which they expect to be founded when freedom returns to that part of the world.

These thoughts reveal the seriousness of the situation in Yugoslavia. They prove that the idea of a united Yugoslavia is far from being deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of the Yugoslav people and that the Serbo-Croat problem still exists in full strength.
There is no unity among the Yugoslav leaders living in exile, and marked tendencies even of separatism are appearing among them. These separatist inclinations are only strengthened by popular support for the idea of a future federalization of Europe. Some of the political exiles, however, attach a somewhat peculiar and dangerous interpretation to the plan of European federation as if it meant inviting every nation to break with its old associations and enter the future commonwealth of European countries as an independent, national entity. This is a trend of mind which involves grave dangers for the future consolidation and peace of Europe.

Not only Tito’s Yugoslavia but all Communist countries proudly claim to have succeeded in solving the problem of nationalities and minorities. They point to the example of the Soviet Union, asserting that some 150 Soviet nations live peacefully together. They criticize the democratic governments of the West, saying they have been unable to find a satisfactory and just solution to their countries' nationality problems.

By giving equality to all the minorities in their countries, the Communists claim before the world that only their system is able to pacify the nations. Overnight, according to them, the Serbo-Croat problem in Yugoslavia is no more; the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Serbian minorities live happily in Rumania; the same applies to the Greek minority in Bulgaria, to the Slovaks and Yugoslavs in Hungary, and the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. One single order was sufficient to brush aside problems which have worried generations. The explanation for this seemingly great accomplishment is simple: The Communist party has become a common denominator and a practice has been established whereby what is not mentioned does not exist.

There have been numerous national minorities in Yugoslavia. The strongest, the German, was liquidated during the war. They numbered some 700,000 people. A number of them were killed in fighting and the bulk of them fled with the retreating Germans, fearing the revengeful sentiments of the Yugoslav nation. The rest of them, some 80,000 who did not
succeed in escaping, were confined to camps where many of them died from hunger and severe cold. Out of some 500,000 Hungarians who lived in Yugoslavia before the war 200,000 left for Hungary, and according to Tito's explanation given to me, "those who stayed behind were small peasants and the working proletariat who were on the whole loyal to Yugoslavia."

There are some 500,000 Rumanians living along the eastern border of Yugoslavia, 140,000 Czechs and Slovaks, and an unspecified number of Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, and Turks. They are all Yugoslav citizens. The territorial gains on the western border brought to Yugoslavia Italians, the number of whom has not yet been officially given.

Before the war, the royal Yugoslav governments treated the minorities harshly. The Hungarian and German minorities, however, displayed a complete lack of loyalty to the country and when Yugoslavia was attacked they proved to be treacherous Fifth Columnists.

The new Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito offered the rights of national equality to all minorities, and in Article 13 of the Constitution confirmed "the right and defense of their cultural development and free use of their language." They enjoy their own schools and theaters; they have their own newspapers; their representatives sit in the Parliament, and their members take active part in public administration.

But a simple glance into the situation would show that the national minorities are given freedom only to serve Communist aims. Children are taught in Hungarian, Czech, or any other minority language only the things which are in accordance with the Communist ideology; theaters have to follow the directives coming from Communist quarters; their newspapers merely echo the Communist daily Borba; their politicians give full support to the Politburo; civil servants must produce evidence of their political reliability. Communist ideology is the final aim. If you are willing to serve it, you can use whatever language you choose.

To what extent the minorities in Yugoslavia welcome the new Communist regime has been convincingly shown by a widespread desire among them to return to their motherlands.
As Yugoslavia was the first country with a Communist government, her minorities were suddenly obsessed by a desire to return home. Not only was their sincere love for the motherland revived, as often happens in periods of trial and revolutions, but they felt that they could save themselves from the cruelties of communism by returning to a country which had not yet succumbed.

When, however, all Central European countries were communized, the enthusiasm of the national minorities in Yugoslavia to return to their native land disappeared. They felt that they would have to expect the same fate of proletarization in their motherlands as well.

The conflict between Tito’s Yugoslavia and the other countries of the Soviet bloc have put the national minorities in all these states in a delicate and complicated position. Every country claims that its minority inhabitants have remained faithful to it; the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, and Rumanians in Yugoslavia to Marshal Tito; the Serbs and Croats living in Hungary and Rumania, to the anti-Tito governments in Budapest and Bucharest, and so on. Both camps accuse each other of oppression of national minorities.

The Cominform countries try to use the minorities in Yugoslavia for subversive actions against Tito’s government, and the latter tries to spread Titoism in other countries through the Yugoslavs living abroad.

All this would be an amusing spectacle of inconsistencies in Communist politics if it were not tragic for the people concerned, for they do not know any more to whom they belong.
The Party and Its Leaders

The activities of every public institution, the work in factories and offices, and the life of every private individual are controlled by the Communist party of Yugoslavia. It is the party, which, in fact, prepares laws, instructs the ministers how to act, determines the sentences of courts, directs and controls the economic process, conducts culture and the arts, rewards and punishes, promotes and demotes. The party has members in public administration, the army, courts, offices, and factories. It is a homogeneous body made up of people with uniform ideas based on the same school of thought and action, subordinated to an iron discipline and sovereignly governed by the Central Committee of the party headed by the all-powerful nine members of the Politburo.

The history of the Yugoslav Communist party is still not fully known. The archives of the secret police of the old royal
Yugoslav governments could disclose many details, but those would not be sources of impartial information. Tito himself gave a nine-hour exposé at the Fifth Congress of the party, in July, 1948, about the development of the Socialist and Communist movements in Yugoslavia. But he should not be blamed if his description was neither full nor always corresponded with the facts.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia was founded in April, 1919. As all other Communist parties in most eastern European countries, it was in opposition not only to the legitimate government but to the existence of the state itself. At its Second Congress, in 1920, it declared itself for the struggle for a Soviet Republic of Yugoslavia. It was a strong party. In the election of the same year, it gained fifty-four seats in the Constituent Assembly. Some political writers claim that it obtained many votes not only among the working class and intellectuals, but also among the separatist elements of Macedonia, the irredentists of the Hungarian and defeated German minorities in Yugoslavia, which were all united with the Communists by a common hatred of the existence of newly created Yugoslavia. The party was dissolved in 1921, after the Communists were blamed for an attempt upon the life of King Alexander.

A period of illegality and hardship began. It lasted no less than twenty-five years. The local organizations were disbanded, the leaders arrested. The ranks of the party thinned out and underwent, as have all Communist parties, a process of tumult and change as ordered by the Moscovite Third Communist International. Leaders were accused of factionary opportunism and deviation and teams were liquidated according to the Moscow needs of the moment. Some party congresses were held in Vienna (at that time the Central European center of Bolshevik subversive activities), in Prague, and in Dresden; others were held secretly on Yugoslav soil. The leading agitators were in hiding, first in Yugoslavia, then in Austria or Czechoslovakia, and from time to time they passed through severe examination and schooling in Moscow.

In 1930 and 1931, as Tito puts it, "The life of the party in the country ceased to exist." Then a period of underground
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activities, limited to a few industrial centers only, followed. In 1937, the leader, Gorkić, was liquidated and it was at this time that the hitherto unknown Josip Broz Tito was ordered by Moscow to take over the function of the Secretary-General of the party and to get rid of all members of the Politburo and form a new leadership.

These were years of hardship for the adherents of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. Only a fanatical belief in the Communist ideology, courage, and self-imposed discipline could have helped to overcome so many obstacles. According to some sources, the party had, before the outbreak of war, only 4,000 organized members whose names were kept in strict secrecy.

Almost all Communist leaders had had long experience in Yugoslav prisons. Tito was imprisoned for five years. Ranković for eight, Moša Pijade for twelve, Djilas for five, and Hebrang (now in disgrace, again in prison, and perhaps liquidated) for twelve years.

World War II was a signal for the Yugoslav Communists to begin an aggressive and open struggle for their ideology. Up to June 22, 1941, when the German Army attacked the motherland of communism, Russia, they systematically undermined the morale of the Yugoslav nation, declaring the struggle of democratic Europe for survival was an imperialistic war with which the nations of Europe had nothing in common. They did not take part in the national uprising of the Serbian people on the historical day of March 27, 1941, when the pro-German government was disposed of and the national government of Dušan Simović took over. (Only later, in 1946, they began to claim to be the leaders of the March events.)

But on the day of the German attack on Russia the Yugoslav Communists, in accord with their comrades all over the world, found that the imperialistic war had suddenly changed into "a struggle for national existence and the liberation of nations, the defeat of nazism and the installation of democracy and freedom."

The Yugoslav Communists reorganized their ranks, and leaders returned from exile or from Moscow. Others were freed from prisons or appeared after years of hiding. The
party grew through fighting. It started to organize the Partisan movement from beneath, beginning with small groups of two or three Communists. The groups became army units, and finally a regular army consisting of several hundred thousand seasoned soldiers took part in the fighting under the leadership of the Communist officers. Every unit was under the control of Communist political commissars. According to official data, 91,000 people participated in the struggle for national liberation in 1941, and the number grew until in 1945 it had reached 793,000. Though the real figure of Tito's Partisans was considerable there is every reason to believe the official figure to be greatly exaggerated.

In the towns and villages which they liberated the Communists at once organized the public administration which was entrusted to local National Committees. A Communist secretary of the local community was actually in control of the place.

Good Partisans who showed promising talents either in fighting or political schooling were sent to special courses to receive an ideological and military education.

Well-trained agitators were sent among the population behind the enemy lines. They penetrated systematically into different institutions and succeeded in getting them under their control, until finally there was not a single branch of political, army, economic, and cultural life which was not infiltrated by these relentless fighters for communism. All this was done "on behalf of the nation," and the adherence to the Communist party or the final aim of a Communist rule was never mentioned. This was the first and one of the most important points of the theory of Communist tactics which the young agitators were repeatedly reminded to observe.

Whatever was the political issue and as unacceptable as were the cruel and deplorable means through which the Communist party liquidated its opponents, one thing does stand out. That is the courage of these men who did not impose any limits on self-sacrifice and risks of life. They followed one idea and one aim only: communism and its total victory.

The discipline of the members of the Communist party contained no uncertainty or doubt. It belonged to the basic
principles of the Communist organization and of every Communist. This discipline with its ruthlessness explains many successes which the Communist parties have achieved in Europe. It also accounts for their victories over democratic movements which lacked adherents as fanatically devoted, valiant, militant, and disciplined.

I once met a Croat woman, a Communist, who told me this: "I had a son who was a wonderful boy. He was a Communist, too, and naturally, a Partisan. One evening he was ordered to lead a small group of soldiers through the enemy lines. He decided to go by another way which he considered safer and quicker. But all of them were killed, with the exception of my son. He returned to his unit alone. He knew that a death sentence was awaiting him from the party tribunal. He went to his commander to ask to be allowed to express his last wish before the court pronounced the sentence. Do you know what he asked for? He wished to be shot on the spot by his best friend. The comrade did not hesitate to meet the last wish of my son. When I met this friend after the war, I thanked him for the last service he did to my boy."

Later, I found that innumerable tragedies of a similar nature occurred when the iron law of Communist discipline was violated. A wife was shot because she returned to her comrade-husband though she knew that married couples were not allowed to serve in the same army units. A soldier met his death before a firing squad because he took one slice of bread more than was his right.

Minister Leskovšek and some other members of the present Yugoslav government could give many examples from their experiences when they found it necessary to punish the slightest breach of discipline by death. They had executed the sentences themselves and they liked to speak about them, looking upon their military past with limitless pride and considering those acts of discipline the highest virtues of a real Communist.

The organization of the Communist party, its status, highest officers and number of members were secrets until the summer of 1948. Even after the war, the party remained a half illegal and half secret institution. This fact served in the spring of the same year as a good pretext for Moscow to attack the Com-
The Communist party of Yugoslavia. It was because of this Cominform accusation that the Minister of Interior and one of the main party secretaries, Alexander Ranković, gave the following figures about membership, at the Fifth Congress, in July, 1948: The party entered the war with 12,000 members, out of which only 3,000 survived. During the war and after, the number rose to 141,066 and, on July 1, 1948, there were 468,175 members, 51,612 candidates, and 331,940 members of the Yugoslav Communist youth organization called SKOJ. During the war 50,000 members of the party and a much greater number of SKOJ died.

Regarding the social division, Ranković disclosed that 29.53 per cent of the party membership came from workers; 49.14 per cent from peasants; 14.38 per cent from intellectuals and 6.68 per cent from other classes. In the army, 89.8 per cent of the officers were Communists and among the N.C.O., 70.4 per cent Communists. Out of all the officers there were only 4.1 per cent from the former Royal Army. Out of 524 members of the Federal Parliament, 404 were organized Communists while out of 1,062 members of the local Parliaments of the individual state republics, only 170 were not organized Communists.

This was an enlightening revelation and showed how misleading had been the propaganda that claimed the Yugoslav government and legislative institutions were representing an all-National Front.

If one compares the building up of the Communist party of Yugoslavia with other Communist parties one finds that, while these were products of the secretariats and agitation based mainly on class struggle, the Yugoslav party, as it stands today, is a product of the fighting in the war. It is above all a militant party, the ranks of which were steeled in the fire of four years' Partisan fighting. It is a selective party and membership means honor which brings not only responsibility but many advantages, as well.

In Czechoslovakia, for instance, at the time when the Communist party was competing with the democratic parties in free elections, the party tried to gain members by all kinds of pressure—bribery, promises, and denunciation of those who
entered another party. Everybody was welcomed to the ranks of the Czechoslovak Communists. The result is that the party there is morally rotten. In Yugoslavia, it takes years before anyone is accepted as a member and his political reliability must be beyond any doubt. But once the door into this organization is open to a thoroughly tested candidate, he enjoys the privileges belonging to the selected class. He receives a better salary, better clothing, better food, and a promising career glitters before his ambitious eyes. The party realizes that the existence of the Communist state depends on the iron backbone of Communist members, and it is, therefore, its conviction that those people with whom the Communist system stands and falls are entitled to special treatment.

The leaders of the party live in a luxury of which no minister of a democratic country could ever dream.

There is a district in Belgrade called Dedine. It lies in the hilly suburbs of the city, and it is practically the only place with refreshing grass and trees in this dusty, greenless capital. I believe there was not a single house in that part of the town before World War I. After 1918, when the King started to build his palace there, many Yugoslav ministers and nouveaux- riches constructed their villas in the vicinity. Dedine became an exclusive part of the town with handsome boulevards, a beautiful park, and huge villas, many of them built in an ugly combination of half western, half oriental style. The life of political, high business, and financial circles was ornamented with officers of the Royal Guards, the good-looking virile Serbians. An atmosphere of gaiety prevailed there as among all well-to-do families of a bourgeois monarchy.

Dedinje was the only place where one could breathe in the dry heat of Belgrade summers. Below the hills of Dedine the townspeople lived in dirty houses and no less dirty streets, but the atmosphere was as gay as up in Dedine. Tasty wines and colorful, sentimental national songs kept people awake until late at night.

The Communist revolution brought about a profound change in the life of the capital. The nostalgic voices of women
(pevačice) singing of the legends of the heroic fighting of Serbian forefathers have grown silent. The popular eating and drinking places are almost empty, wine is of a poor quality, and on the whole, this city of gaiety, often irresponsible and too frivolous, has turned into a sad, silent town of worries and uncertainty.

Only Dedinje has continued to be as merry as in the old days. Yet there is a fundamental change there, too. The occupants of the villas are different. Houses and property were confiscated, the former owners being accused of collaboration with the enemy. This was probably justified in many cases as there was undoubtedly a bad lot among them. Now the district is reserved almost exclusively for members of the Yugoslav government, high functionaries of the party, and generals. Some diplomats are still allowed to share the advantages of this beautiful part of the city.

The leaders of the party live in isolation. Very little is known about their private lives. They all work very hard, from early morning till late at night, and their comrade-wives are usually employed in government offices. When invited to a dinner, they are seldom accompanied by their wives; when they are hosts, their wives are usually absent. The meals are ordered from the central, state-owned hotel. They never speak about their children or private affairs and seldom mention public topics other than politics and economics. They are all passionate hunters and allow themselves time for hunting and shooting.

The furnishings of their apartments or villas have not been changed. The taste of the former owners is preserved in objets d'art, old paintings, a Bosnian Turkish style corner, and other such individual preferences. But the picture of the King has been replaced by that of Marshal Tito.

Automobiles are a passion of the Communist leaders. Hundreds of luxurious American cars rush through the streets of Belgrade at a crazy speed, and not a single day passes without some serious accident occurring. The Partisan drivers do not know how to handle a powerful machine; they are not technically-minded but they are pleased by the feeling that they control a motor which gives them the satisfaction of power.
In summer, open sport cars are substituted for the big limousines. They are bought in Switzerland or in Italy for prices many times higher than the normal market price.

This picture is a sad contrast to the daily life of ordinary citizens. The latter walk slowly along the streets of the city, worn out, silent, badly clothed. The tramways are overcrowded and it is a typical sight in Belgrade to see youngsters hanging on both sides of the tramways like grapes.

The greatest possible secrecy surrounds the non-official life of Marshal Tito. He is the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and Minister of National Defense. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav forces. But, above all, he is the Secretary-General of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, confirmed in this key position in 1948, after the breach with the Cominform.

His authority is built up by every possible means of totalitarian propaganda and the party machine. Mythology could not have veiled the Greek gods with so extensive a myth of almightiness. Children in schools, boys and girls organized in pioneer corps, youngsters in summer camps are taught to love, admire, and respect Tito with a fanatical devotion.

His war leadership is praised in hundreds of popularized songs which are sung all over the country and adapted to accompany ancient national dances. The legend of crossing the Romania mountains is celebrated in a song which continues on indefinitely and you can hear it in the streets of Belgrade, in the romantic villages of Dalmatia, in the huts of Montenegro, in factories in Slovenia—everywhere.

Tito is the supreme teacher, the beloved father, the heroic leader of the nation. He is “a violet white, and we shall be with him all right,” as one popular song says with a slightly comical touch. School children would shout on any occasion the appealing slogan: “Tito belongs to us and we belong to Tito.” Adults would yell at any meeting, “With Tito in war, with Tito in peace.” “Hero Tito” has been repeated a million times.

Streets, mines, factories, and towns are named after him. It is a bitter irony that the Montenegrin town of Podgorica, which was during one period of the civil war a nest of Mihaj-
lovčić’s “Fascist and reactionary” elements opposing stubbornly the Communist onslaughts, was renamed Titograd.

It is a part of the tactics of the party to make Tito an inaccessible ruler over millions of people. As in fairy tales, he suddenly appears and everything is settled. As in ancient monarchies, he is painted as a person of generous heart who loves children and helps poor people and rights injustices. Tito is the only Yugoslav leader who speaks openly about hardships brought upon the peasants by the regime. This serves to create the impression that he is well-informed about the daily worries of his fellow-countrymen and that he has their interests at heart.

When at Belgrade, Marshal Tito has two houses at his disposal. He receives official visitors in the White Palace where Prince Paul used to live. Nothing has changed in this palace in the eight years since Prince Paul left. But nothing has changed either in the other building where Tito spends most of his time. It is a private villa on Rumunska Street, surrounded by a thick wall. It is here that the most important decisions of the Politburo are made. Two strong guards stand at the main gate and others patrol the neighboring buildings. There are guards also in the garden and at the entrance to the villa. The moment a visitor enters the gate the next guard is notified by telephone of his arrival.

The villa is rather modest for an all-powerful person like Tito and the furnishings have not been changed. An ironic note is created by an old bourgeois lounge in which are kept the scores of presents bearing the sign of the Red Star which Tito has received from different organizations.

Tito is almost a charming host. He likes to smile, which is not the usual case for a Marxist, and knows how to talk about other things than the Five Year Plan. He is always properly dressed and cleanly shaven, which is not a rule in a Communist world. He wears a simple uniform when at work, but at official receptions his breast shines with orders of merit, among which the “Soviet Order of Victory” and the “Hero of the Soviet Union” used to be most cherished. Western bourgeois ladies would envy his big diamond solitaire, but not the Yugoslav Partisan women who have only contempt for
such decadent interests. Yet they look at Tito with love and respect and would never approach him without being asked.

Tito has his meals served on gold plates. His wines are specially selected. He is a passionate hunter, rides horseback, fishes, and swims, accompanied only by the closest friends and by the chief of his bodyguard, Colonel Žeželj.

Tito likes to show his friendly visitors the stable erected in the garden. Here he takes personal care of his four horses which he rode during the Partisan fighting but which are now old and crippled and live quietly on their past merits. He has constructed a bowling alley in the garden and he invited me once to join in a game. I took the ball in my left hand. Tito remarked that I was left-handed, and I replied that I had been a leftist ever since I was born. When I threw the ball, Tito exclaimed, "But just look at it. It goes suspiciously to the right!"

Tito's language is simple, whether at public meetings or in official conversations with distinguished representatives from other countries. Besides his native tongue, Croatian, he speaks German fluently, which he learned as a young man, and also perfect Russian, which he mastered in his five-year sojourn in the Soviet Union. During the war he started to learn English, but he could not use it in conversation with western diplomats. Sometimes I used to serve as interpreter for Tito and the American, British, and French Ambassadors at various social occasions. Later Tito acquired a considerable knowledge of English.

There is no official biography of Tito to give details about his past. He was born on May 25, 1892, in the small village of Klance, in Zagorje, the poorest region of Croatia. His name was Josip Broz. He started early to earn his own living as a bricklayer and later as a metal worker. During World War I, he had to join the Austro-Hungarian Army but at the first opportunity went over to the Russian side. He took part in the October Revolution in 1917, and after the war stayed in Moscow for five years. He was an ardent believer in communism and passed through the Moscow school of Marxist ideology.

He married a Russian by whom he had a son, Žarko. Nothing is heard today in Belgrade about his first wife, who, it is
believed, died somewhere in Russia. The boy was brought up in Russia, where a turbulent revolutionary spirit had driven the father. He had only Russian schooling and during the war fought in the Red Army, losing his left hand in the defense of Moscow, in the fateful winter of 1941. He is now about twenty-seven years of age.

When the son returned to Yugoslavia, after the war, he hardly spoke any Croatian. Like his father, he had married a Russian. They have one child, born recently.

The son is a collector of automobiles, and a crazy driver, too. He rushes through the lively towns, handling the car masterfully with one hand. When the government of Czechoslovakia presented Tito with a specially equipped car of Czech production, a Tatra, the father handed it over to his son to test it. As the car is easily overturned at great speed, I was constantly worried that the crazy, one-handed driver would be found some day under the wrecked car, which event would have stopped the Czechoslovak export of cars to Yugoslavia altogether. When the son received a present from the Czech Škoda factories, a small handy car, he just gave it to the officers of the Guard without getting into it. It was too small for him.

Tito has another child born during the Partisan fighting. But no one in the wider circles knows who the mother is, or even whether she is alive. Tito never appears in the company of women. Once, at a theater performance, a dark, nice-looking woman sat next to the wife of Tito’s son. People said it was Tito’s wife. Another story goes that the mother of the second child suddenly appeared in Belgrade, energetically threw Tito’s other wife out of the palace and decided to stay. Tito was impressed and did not protest.

Life and the Moscow Marxist school taught Tito to be hard. After his five years in Russia, he returned to Yugoslavia without his family and worked in the illegal Communist party. He was arrested several times, and spent five years in prisons. He also traveled in Central Europe contacting other Communist leaders, using different names, one of them Walter and another one, Tito.

Different interpretations have been attached abroad to this strange pseudonym, Tito. People with panicky inclinations
even explained that it was composed of the initial letters of the words, "Third International Terroristic Organization." The Partisans popularized Tito's ability of leadership and sense of organization by saying he used to give orders and say in Croatian: "You will do this, you this, you this." ("Ti ćeš da uradiš to, ti to, ti to.") Thus he was nicknamed Tito. There is really nothing mysterious about his name. A small child in Croatia may be called "tito" just as in America he is called "sonny." Tito picked it up for his illegal activities and retained it for later official purposes.

When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Tito recruited Yugoslav Communists for the International Brigade fighting against General Franco. He never went to Spain himself, as is sometimes wrongly stated.

It can be said about Tito that he led the tormented life of a typical revolutionary. He came out of years of hiding the day Russia was attacked by Germany, in June, 1941, took up the banner of communism and started to organize the Partisan movement. Since then, his story has not been veiled in secrecy, but has been written by his able propagandists in daily notes to be changed, one day, into a legend about the superhuman courage of the national hero of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito.

And Tito is a courageous man, indeed. He often appears in public, for every sort of occasion. Every year, in summer, he leaves the capital and makes an extensive tour of different parts of the country. He speaks to country people, visits their homes, inspects the construction of public buildings, spends hours with young people working on the construction of railroads, receives numerous delegations at his summer residence in the Slovenian Alps or on the island Brioni, and makes long speeches to the crowds.

He takes these risks as a part of his business, and this form of public approach appeals to the uninformed public. I say uninformed because people don't know that every public appearance of Tito is prepared beforehand with minutest detail by the secret police. The party secretary knows every inhabitant of the street or of the village which has been entrusted to his
control. He watches well every move of his master, but even more closely those of the people.

When Tito passes through the streets of Belgrade on his way to a meeting or to the theater or to Parliament, his heavy car is surrounded by armed bodyguards who drive in small cars in front of him, beside him, and behind him. They travel at a great speed and the front car pushes every passing car aside. Cars going in the opposite direction are compelled to stop or to run onto the sidewalk.

If there is a large gathering, as the celebration of May Day or a military parade, a huge platform is erected on a spot in the center of the city. Wide space around is cleared several days before the event takes place and the platform is carefully guarded so that no unknown person can approach it. In the early hours of the day, the inhabitants of all the houses on several streets surrounding the place are ordered to leave their apartments and soldiers take their places. The windows must be closed and on the roofs and at every window stand soldiers. No private citizen is allowed within hundreds of yards of the platform. Tito arrives exactly one minute before the performance starts, passing through some side street. Then, the parade begins. Thousands of people pass the platform shouting: "Tito is ours and we are Tito's," "We love our leader," et cetera.

The diplomatic missions at Belgrade are only rarely honored by Tito's presence. Before the deterioration of relations between the West and East, in 1945, and at the beginning of 1946, Tito used to accept, once a year, the invitation of the American, British, and French Ambassadors for official receptions. But after the world was divided into two blocs, diplomatic life in Belgrade also split into two camps, and Marshal Tito visited only the Embassies of the eastern bloc, first of all, the Embassy of the Soviet Union. This practice underwent a change later when another split occurred, this time within the Communist family itself. Since the Cominform assault against the Communist party of Yugoslavia, Tito has not gone either to the satellite Embassies or to the Soviet Embassy. But on July 4, 1950, he was guest of the American Ambassador, George V. Allen.
The last time Tito was my guest, something very unexpected happened. It was on October 28, 1947, the Czechoslovak national holiday. He usually did not attend big receptions, and on this occasion I was told by his office that he would not be able to come as he would be out of Belgrade. The reception was set for five o'clock in the afternoon.

At four o'clock, however, Tito's chief waiter suddenly appeared in our kitchen and his two aides brought baskets of food and drinks. My wife ran excitedly into my office, telling me the news and adding that when she asked the waiter what the meaning of his arrival was, he answered he had been sent to the Embassy and did not know whether the Marshal would be coming. The explanation came a few minutes later. The first secretary of our Embassy, a Party Communist, rang up to tell me that a colonel of the secret police had come to see him to ask him about the reliability of the Embassy officials and to inform him confidentially that Tito would attend the reception. I telephoned the office of the Marshal and it was confirmed. Meanwhile the building was already full of detectives and officers.

Tito came exactly at five. How improvised the visit was could be seen, also, from the fact that the other ministers arrived much later and were surprised to meet their boss. Tito was served exclusively by his own waiter with his own sandwiches and wine. My wife resented it strongly. She wanted to offer the guest some of the Czech national food, frankfurters, but the chief waiter refused to serve them. My wife then served Tito the frankfurters herself and he liked them so much that he asked for a second helping. Nothing happened to him, but the waiter was our deadly enemy ever after.

If Tito has been built up as an all-powerful figure in Yugoslavia, it has happened because he is the oldest member of the Politburo and because he concentrated in himself more than any other Yugoslav Communist the qualities of military and authoritarian leadership. This, however, does not mean that Tito alone governs the country and the party. Three other members of the Politburo are in the internal machinery
of the party and are probably as powerful as Tito. It is an association of four men: Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Ranković. For the external world it is always Tito whose decisions are final, but there is good reason to doubt whether that is the case in the secret sittings in Dedinje when these four comrades converse together till early morning about problems of the country and the world.

Edvard Kardelj is the most important man in the Yugoslav government. His is the post of Tito's deputy and foreign minister. As a Slovene he has a sense for administration and understands better than anyone else the system of bureaucracy which, in a Socialist system, is complicated beyond the limits of human imagination.

Though not yet forty years of age, Kardelj is considered as the most mature figure in Yugoslav Communist politics. He formulates the program of the party, based, of course, on Marxism and Leninism, the theory of which he has mastered to perfection. He has always directed Yugoslav foreign policy, but he preferred to do so behind the scene up until the summer of 1948 when he became, also officially, Minister of Foreign Affairs. After the break with the Cominform, the Yugoslav Communist party wanted to have the best man available in that office, through which coded messages come and go. At international meetings, such as the Peace Conference in Paris in 1946, and at some General Assemblies of the United Nations, Kardelj led the Yugoslav delegation and knew how to speak for hours in a Molotov-like emotionless manner to defend his country's case. He is a scholarly, bespectacled Marxist who speaks calmly and impresses his listeners with his knowledge and seriousness.

In the party, Kardelj is one of the three secretaries, Djilas and Ranković being the other two, and Tito is the General-Secretary. Kardelj enjoys the respect of the rank and file, but he does not possess the personal attraction which Tito has and, therefore, is far from being as popular among the Communist members.

Kardelj has several other official and party assignments besides the above office. He is, of course, a member of both the central and Slovenian Parliaments and has several functions
in different top organizations. His wife was a Partisan during the war and is now a member of the central Parliament in Belgrade. But I never heard her speak in public.

Milo\'van Djilas, another member of the Big Secret Four, is considered the most radical in matters of Marxism and foreign policy. Up until the Cominform conflict he enjoyed great favor with Stalin. His native country is Montenegro, which has wild mountains and still wilder manners. Even today when the Communist regime boasts about having put aside the old differentiation between men\'s and women\'s rights, a woman is still considered as an inferior creature in Montenegro.

When a boy is born, the proud Montenegrin peasant father goes from one local inn to another and informs everyone, "I have a son." Greetings are exchanged, toasts of rakija (whisky) held high and sometimes a few shots are fired to celebrate the fact that a soldier was born. If, however, the mother gives birth to a girl, it is considered a major catastrophe in the family. The father stays at home for several days and when friends come in to ask what happened, the peasant says, "She has a child."

Yet Djilas himself did not seem to be very unhappy when his wife bore him a daughter, in 1947. He was my guest shortly after the event and when I asked why his wife did not come with him, he said, "According to the old Montenegrin tradition I should say that Mitra has a child." When I proposed a toast he said, "Well, I\'ll join you, but if you were not a diplomat I would take this as an offense. As I have, however, to deal with diplomatic people, I have to behave, I suppose."

Djilas is the enfant terrible in Yugoslav politics and in the party. He is completely informal even in the company of Tito whom he calls in a familiar way "old man," ("Stari"). He is thirty-seven years old. Before the war he studied at the University of Belgrade but I think that he devoted more time to studying Marxism than law and spent more time in underground agitation than on the University premises. He also had five years of experience in Yugoslav royal prisons and four years of fighting in the Partisan movement.

Djilas is like a Russian Bolshevik. He never wears a hat, but always a cap, and puts on a necktie only for diplomatic
receptions which he hates to attend. That is the only occasion when he wears long trousers, considering high boots as more fitting for a Bolshevik leader. But, curiously enough, his jackets are cut by the best tailor and of an English material of the best quality. He does not miss any occasion to go shooting and hunting and possesses a large collection of guns. His dog is a specialty; he is not only an excellent chaser but he is also trained to run after tennis balls and to find them in the most entangled bushes which surround his master's spacious villa at Dedinje. Another of Djilas' weaknesses is watches.

Djilas, also, likes to drive automobiles. One can see him daily speeding through the streets of Belgrade when he goes to Madejra, the central building of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. He does not keep the traffic regulations and likes to tell a story about himself of how he saw a man in the middle of the most frequented crossroad of the capital, called incidentally London, signaled him to get out of his way, and only after having missed him narrowly, found that it was a traffic policeman.

Djilas and his wife are an interesting couple. She is not just the wife of a minister. She is Mitra Mitrović, Minister of Education of the government of Serbia, a gay young woman, intelligent and enthusiastic about waltzing. She met Djilas in her student years and in the party. She also spent four years in the forests, fighting as a Partisan. Even today she does not want her Partisan past to be forgotten.

To official parties Mitra Mitrović comes simply dressed, usually in an English suit. She spurns any feminine make-up and is aware that other Communist women see in her an example. She never wears evening clothes and likes to point out that her women followers do not wear them either.

On one occasion I invited her to a dinner but she did not attend. Later, she explained to me that I invited her together with her comrade-husband and that she was accustomed to accept only invitations addressed to her as Mitra Mitrović.

There has been a lot of speculation about who will take the mantle of Tito's leadership, time and politics permitting. My guess would be Djilas, for reasons described below.

Djilas seems to have in the government the modest position
of Minister without Portfolio. In fact, he is the most important person in anything connected with propaganda and culture. He issues daily directives to the Yugoslav press through the Communist party propaganda center called AGITPROP. He watches the publishing programs of the state-owned publishing companies and there is no theater or operatic piece which could appear on a stage without his approval. He controls schools and universities, which are his specialties.

As a member of the Big Secret Four, Djilas has decisive influence in the ideological line of the party and in all matters of internal and external policy. He is an impressive speaker. From time to time he writes articles of importance, signed or unsigned, for the party paper Borba. Articles answering the Cominform accusations against the Communist party of Yugoslavia were from his pen. He has been working for a long period on an epistle of several volumes dealing with the life and struggle of the Communist party, based on his personal story.

Djilas is undoubtedly a man of high intelligence. When he accompanied Marshal Tito on his official visit to Prague, in March, 1946, he sat at the luncheon given by the President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. E. Beneš, on the latter's left. After the luncheon, Dr. Beneš told me that Djilas was the only Communist leader he knew of who dared to think independently. I think Dr. Beneš was right. Djilas is an uncompromising Communist but he does not like to conceal from himself the situation as it really is, which most Communists do.

He told me once that he was well aware that the election, in which the government received 85 per cent of the popular vote, did not reflect public feelings and that people voted for the National Front because they were tired and did not want to be bothered by the consequences if they abstained from going to the polls or exposed their opposition in another way. In the correspondence which Stalin exchanged with Tito, accusing him of deviation from the Marxist theory, Djilas was attacked on the grounds that he had criticized the behavior of the Red Army in Yugoslavia in time of war, and in comparison allegedly had said that the morale of the British Army had been much higher than that of the Red Army. Although
Djilas denied this grave sin, the suspicion suggests his habit of independent thought and expression.

There is another line in Djilas' character. He is radical in his Communist belief and brutal in its execution. He does not count victims scrupulously if he decides to march on to achieve an aim. No sacrifice of other people is too great for him to score a victory for communism. In this only one man equals him. It is Alexander Ranković, called by his Communist comrades Marko.

Alexander Ranković is nearing forty years of age. He comes from a poor family and started his career as a tailor. He became a party member as a young man and spent the "obligatory" five years in the jails of royal Yugoslavia. Like Djilas, Ranković also finished the Partisan war with the rank of Lieutenant General.

Ranković has married recently for the second time. His first wife was killed in the Civil War and left behind a small boy. The second marriage was performed secretly and although Comradess Ranković appears at official gatherings, she is always in the company of other Partisan women and never with her husband.

Very little is known about Ranković's official duties, and still less, about his private activities. He is Minister of Interior and since the break with the Cominform is one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.

Any police state could envy Yugoslavia her Minister of Interior. Ranković commands the police—the militia—but more important, he directs the secret police, called the Organization for Protection of the Nation (OZNA), and since 1947 the Office of State Security (UDB). Through this secret institution Ranković controls every local party organization, the political trends in every factory, office, village and town, in fact, in every household. He has his men in the army, in the kitchens and among the servants of the diplomatic corps. This system of basic control is supervised by another net of control, so that controlling officials are themselves subjected to another control, and so on, till the pyramid reaches Ranković himself.

Ranković started his career as Minister of Interior by a ruthless eradication of opponents and soon after he had taken
office his methods succeeded in capturing the chief enemy, Draža Mihajlović, who had refused to leave the country after the war and had continued to have scattered groups of his Četnici in the deep forests.

Personally, Ranković is a somber figure. He speaks very little, is emotionless and enigmatic—a perfect Minister of Interior in a totalitarian state. The mere mention of his name makes one shiver.

These four men, Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Ranković, represent the top leadership in the Communist party of Yugoslavia, and the inner circle of the Politburo itself. They never appear in public together, probably for security reasons. They never leave the capital together. But they spend hours together in Tito’s private villa at Dedinje, discussing, planning, making decisions.

There were many visitors from abroad who tried to see in Tito’s milder appearance some signs of humanity and possibilities of a better understanding with him. I never believed that any special advantages came from this personal charm of Tito. It is well balanced by the straightforward actions of Djilas, by the coldness of Ranković and the severe, theoretical background of Kardelj. Each of them has his own temperament and their functions are divided accordingly. Communism and Communist methods of thinking and acting are common to all of them. Their actions are not based on personal inclinations but on decisions of the four men taken together, and whether in this or that case Tito or Djilas or the other two are chosen to intervene, it is the result of agreement among all of them. Nothing is left to improvisation or coincidence. The western world should be aware of this coldminded machinery of Communist thinking where no human approach opens avenues for real and better understanding.

It is not, therefore, Tito alone who governs the country. This is not a Fuehrer principle as in Nazi Germany when Hitler listened to opinions of politicians and generals, but, at the end, he himself made the decisions and took on the responsibilities. It is a system of oligarchy in a modern sense in which all power is concentrated in the hands of a small group whose decisions are collective. It is for reasons of propaganda only
that a single person is built up for the outside world as a legendary, almighty figure.

The Quadrumvirate of Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Ranković is enframed in the highest institution of the party hierarchy, in the Politburo of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. There are five other men who have reached this top in the party ladder. With the exception of the Minister for Heavy Industry, the Slovene worker and old revolutionary, Franje Leskovšek, they were elected to these highest party posts only in July, 1948. Lieutenant General Ivan Gošnjak is unknown to the larger public but it is through him that the party controls the army. He is Deputy Minister for National Defense. Another member of the Politburo is Blagoje Nešković, who was Serbian Prime Minister up until the Cominform and is now one of the Deputy Prime Ministers and Chairman of the Central Commission of Control.

Two names of the remaining five members of the Politburo deserve to be mentioned separately. The first is Moša Pijade. M. Pijade, nearing seventy, is a veteran of the Communist movement in Yugoslavia. It may be because of the twelve years which he spent in prison that he was not liquidated in the numerous purges through which the party went before the war. His influence, though considerable, is often overestimated abroad. It certainly does not equal the power of the members of the Quadrumvirate. Tito honors him by calling him "Moša, the old criminal." When in prison, he translated Marx's *Kapital*. In his brief periods at liberty, he used to paint and he keeps his paintings in his villa. He does not now have time, however, to cultivate his hobby. Through him, the party controls over 400 members of the Yugoslav central Parliament. No act of Parliament can be passed without his signature.

Moša's wife is a teacher at a high school and very active in different party organizations, especially in women's movements. They have a daughter who aspires to be an actress but apparently has not had much success as she was assigned to a local, second-rate theater only.

The other man who has been very much in the foreground of public affairs is Boris Kidrić, not more than thirty-seven
years of age. Kidrič is a Slovene and a descendant of a well-to-do family. His father was professor of Slavic studies at the University of Ljubljana and is now President of the Academy of Science. The young man studied chemistry but preferred to join the Communist movement and went through the usual school of underground hiding, Moscow training, prisons and illegal crossing of frontiers. He has a respectable library of Marxist literature and a good knowledge of it, too.

After the war he was the Prime Minister of Slovenia and the party’s secretary of that region. He distinguished himself by the ruthless organization of his country’s administration. I spent two days with him in the Slovenian Alps where he wanted me to take part in shooting. But as the weather was bad, we went to the castle Brdo, which previously belonged to Prince Paul. To satisfy his shooting inclinations, he had the guard throw empty bottles into the lake and shot them with rifles of different caliber, a revolver, and even a machine gun, with amazing exactness. On that occasion I found Kidrič to be a man of high intelligence, enormous energy and drive. I felt that this was the coming man.

Not long afterwards, in the spring of 1946, Kidrič disappeared from public life. He was sent to Moscow to study the methods of Soviet economy and Five Year Plans and, that summer, was appointed Chairman of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry. Then, his star started to rise quickly. He took the office from A. Hebrang, who fell into disgrace, and reorganized the administration of the vast economic apparatus. Later, he took over from Hebrang also the Central Commission for Planning and thus succeeded in concentrating in his hands more power over the economic life of the country than any other member of the Yugoslav government. The Ministry of Finance, of Agriculture, of Foreign Trade and all the economic ministries of the individual federal units were under his command.

Kidrič works day and night. He believes in the mathematical precision of scientific socialism and has no doubts but that everything can be achieved with perfect organization. He makes people work like slaves. He enjoys the feeling of the vast power he possesses and exploits labor in a way that no cap-
italist would ever dare to do. He annihilates without a moment of hesitation everyone who would dare to raise his voice against his Five Year Plan. He speaks in the Parliament, at public meetings, he writes articles, and all his speeches and writings are thoroughly based on quotations from Marxist and Leninist literature.

He prefers to work at home, using a dictaphone, which is an exception in that part of the world. He also takes advantage of other technical means which offer expediency of work. He gives orders only by telephone and telegraph. His energy seems to be inexhaustible.

I had to negotiate with him rather often. He preferred night visits in his villa to the cold atmosphere of his office or to the formal meetings of a commission. Discussions lasted usually till the early hours of the morning and alcohol was always a necessary prerequisite to satisfying negotiations.

All Kidrič's good features, however, were overshadowed by cruelty, which he used as his main weapon and without hesitation; this man was ready to use any means which he believed would lead him to victory in his Marxist economic world.

In this gallery of Communist leaders in Yugoslavia two names deserve special mention—Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović.

Both were members of the Politburo; Hebrang spent twelve years in prison and Žujović, five. Hebrang lost his eye in fighting with Ustaše when he tried to escape from jail. Žujović was seriously ill from suffering during the war.

Hebrang was made Minister of Industry and Chairman of the Economic Council and later Chairman of the Central Commission for Planning, but Kidrič ousted him and made him Minister of the newly founded and unimportant Ministry of Light Industry. Žujović was Minister of Finance. In May, 1948, both were unexpectedly "relieved from functions." Žujović was even deprived of his rank of Lieutenant General which he gained in four years of Partisan fighting as Tito's deputy in the high command. The public was amazed and had no explanation for this sensational reverse. It did not know that both former ministers were put in jail.

Had there been no conflict between Tito and Stalin, the
Yugoslavs would probably be ignorant even today about the real reason for the sudden decline of these two old and worthy members of the Politburo.

The Kremlin exploited the difficulties which Tito had with Hebrang and Žujović and in its accusation of the Yugoslav Communist party asserted that they were both expelled from the party because they opposed the anti-Soviet policy of Tito.

The Yugoslav Politburo denied these allegations by publishing two sentences which the Politburo had passed against Hebrang and Žujović. In the spring of 1946, a special party commission was created to investigate Hebrang's activities during the war and his personal conflict with Tito. The conclusion of the commission was that Hebrang had behaved like a coward and had even offered collaboration to the Ustaše. Ideologically, he had showed himself a "factionary" who followed a deviationist line within the party. He was punished by "severe re-buke" and dismissed from the Ministry of Industry and the Economic Council.

At the beginning of 1948, Hebrang was accused again. This time for sabotage of the economic policy. Žujović joined him. They were tried by the party for lack of belief in the reality of the Five Year Plan, for careless administration of their offices and for factionary inclinations which undermined the unity of the party. The consequence was their expulsion from the party, termination of their ministerial offices, and arrest.

In November, 1950, Žujović was released from prison, after having recanted—in the usual way. In a letter published by the Yugoslav newspapers he acknowledged the error of following a pro-Russian policy and of wishing to see Yugoslavia become a Soviet republic. This is an interesting admission because according to the original accusation Žujović was not imprisoned for siding with the Soviet Union.

Some lines should be reserved for Colonel General Koča Popović. He is not among the first Yugoslav Communists, but he is a member of the Central Committee of the party and above all the Chief of the General Staff. He is small but always elegant and wears a mustache. He is a curious man. He comes from a wealthy Serbian family and as a student preferred to study surrealism in arts and literature. He speaks French per-
fectly. Before the war he flirted with communism as an intellectual but one day took it seriously and joined the International Brigade in Spain. In the Partisan fighting he commanded different units and was promoted to the rank of General. After the war he was appointed Chief of Staff.

When I paid my first official visit to General Popović, he impressed me by a keen interest in literature and music. I stayed two hours and when leaving remarked how encouraging it was to speak with a general about the arts. He answered frankly, "If we spoke about military affairs, you might find out that I do not understand them."

On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, a big reception was given at the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade. As usual, Tito and some of his closest associates and the Slav Ambassadors celebrated the occasion in a separate room. Many toasts were exchanged and many drinks consumed. General Popović played the violin and I admired his talent. He stopped playing, sat down beside me and, looking sharply into my eyes, started in his perfect French, though he always used to speak Serbian with me, "Mon Ambassadeur, vous me sous-estimez. You have always underestimated my knowledge and qualities. You have been here long enough to give me an opportunity to observe you and now I can tell you that I have no confidence in you. I give you another two years but no more."

I was amazed but replied quickly in a counterattack, "Mon cher General, do you realize that you have said all this to an Ambassador who represents an Allied country? It is a serious thing and I am going to report it at once to my government."

He realized suddenly he had disclosed something he never should have disclosed, and tried to retreat. But I insisted, "General, you have said 'A,' now you must say 'B'; I urge it most emphatically."

"Well," he said, "I have my files about you."

I replied, "That's all right; I have my files as well."

"But it is my duty, you will understand, and is a part of my legitimate activities to follow the life of diplomats here. You are in a foreign country and if you have some documents, it can only be the result of illegitimate contacts," he cleverly remarked.
As I still insisted upon an explanation, he offered to come to dine with me the following day "to discuss the thing in a clear atmosphere."

The conversation lasted five hours, the following evening. Popović gave me a long lecture on communism and then passed on to more concrete matters: "You know that I recently have been on an official visit to your country. I must say that I was highly disappointed. I saw that your political situation is not settled. Too many parties are taking part in political life. In foreign policy you have not decided whether you will go with the West or with us, and there is no campaign of hatred against western imperialism in your press which should systematically educate the nation for the war which is inevitable. You will understand that all this must deeply worry me as Chief of Staff of an Allied army."

At the end I insisted upon receiving an answer to my question of the previous day. He tried to evade it but when I repeated my wish he finally said, "But did you not find my answer in what I told you about the situation in your country? If you still want a straightforward explanation, then, here it is: I can have confidence only in a Communist, which you are not." The explanation satisfied me completely.

Around these top leaders of the Communist party of Yugoslavia thousands of Communist politicians and functionaries are concentrated. The Prime Ministers of individual federal republics are usually secretaries of the Communist parties in these countries. They are followed by other Ministers, Generals, factory directors, teachers, public employees, functionaries, journalists, local secretaries, members of the party. They all passed through the same school, they are one brain, from top to bottom. They think in the same way, they act in the same way, even if they do not get special orders on how to deal with daily problems. It is one single team. Democracies do not and cannot have such a team.

In this way, Communists of lower ranks show their qualities and abilities and a group is being slowly formed which will take over the leadership some day, if the regime lasts. One can already see the names emerging out of darkness and secrecy which are systematically prepared for promotion: the present Prime
Minister of Croatia, V. Bakaric, though gravely ill; Director of the propaganda office, Vladimir Dedijer; Colonel Vlahov, Tito's aide and temporarily one of the deputy foreign ministers; the brilliant Dr. Ales Bebler, Deputy Foreign Minister, a widely known figure abroad as a talented speaker at international conferences and United Nations General Assemblies; General Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the chief political commissar of the army and Minister of Mines; General Stefan Mitrovic in the Ministry of the Interior; and others.

The life of the second and third class party functionaries is rather sober, though far from being modest and self-renouncing. They like to eat well, to have nice apartments or villas, to travel in comfortable sleepers and American cars. No other members of the Yugoslav community can afford such living.

Yet all these material privileges have not affected the Communist morals of these lower officials. They do not drink much and personally are incorruptible, a virtue which was not usual in the old days of royal Yugoslavia. They work very hard, day and night, and they have only one interest and one devotion, to work for the party. If they are not at their desks in the offices or in factories or with their army units, they are taking part in different meetings, analyzing daily internal and international questions. The Communist education never stops.

Every important event is first judged by the Politburo. Then instructions go down to district party organizations and from them to local secretaries. Whatever happens in the world, the secretary of the party in the smallest village is told how to react. Thus, party thought reaches into the last hut in Macedonia and even peasants in the most remote corners of the country have to take part in this ideological and political education.

There is no private life for Communist party members. Women who fought as Partisans during the war work in offices and different institutions. Their children are taken care of in children's homes or by personnel chosen by the state. There is no member of the party who would not give the last of his energy to the sacred task of working for the party.

What are the financial means of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia? Nobody knows. Party functionaries do not speak about it and no paper publishes information about it. But it is a fact that the party organizes meetings, public gatherings and demonstrations, constructs huge platforms, authorizes the preparation of hundreds of drapes and flags, maintains a large personnel and many buildings, publishes many daily papers, booklets and books which do not bring in much money. All this costs billions of dinars.

The membership fees and obligatory deductions which are taken from the employees for the benefit of the party cannot cover the budget for such activities. Yet the party has limitless financial means. It is not difficult to provide them in a society where the state and the party mean the same thing, where no public control of state finances exists and the state budget presented yearly to the Parliament is nothing but a review of global figures and where the accountant and cashier are the same person or institution.

The methods of work of the Communist party are veiled in secrecy; only its results are seen and felt. In politics, cultural life, and the press nothing is left to coincidence. At meetings the same language is used, in papers the same terminology is used. Theaters, music, books serve one idea only—communism. The confidential character of the government and the party is strictly respected, which is a new feature in Balkan politics. Personal interests and private worries are pushed aside. All power, whether political, economic, military, or in the field of propaganda, is concentrated in the party and specifically in the hands of a few leaders. They have every means to declare sovereignly as truth whatever they wish and suppress whatever they want to. People who disagree have no opportunity to express their opinion publicly. Such methods make it possible to control every phase of Yugoslav life.

In no democratic state is there so much talking about the nation as in a Communist state, though in a democracy where a government is based on free elections it would be justifiable to speak at least on behalf of the majority of the nation.

In Communist Yugoslavia everything is done “on behalf of the nation.” The word “nation” is used and abused thousands of times a day. There is no speech or article in which this ex-
pression is omitted. The Republic of Yugoslavia is national; state authorities are called national; factories are national. "On behalf of the nation" railroads are constructed; "on behalf of the nation" meetings are convoked.

In "reactionary, capitalistic, and imperialistic countries" the term "police" is used to designate the institution which maintains public order. And as in a really democratic state the police serve the public, the term has no ominous flavor. In people's democracies this word was struck out of vocabularies. In Yugoslavia, the word police is forbidden and when people are being arrested, it is done "on behalf of the nation," by national militia, and they are sentenced by national courts and "on behalf of the nation" as well. Yet when a militiaman appears in a street, the citizenry has every reason to be afraid.

High officials of the party, however, in wooing their own ranks do not deceive themselves that they are acting actually according to the wish of the nation. It is one of the basic laws of communism to assume the nation's support. This is done by seeing that nobody has an opportunity to object. Communists have only disdain for the old-fashioned aim of democrats who seek support and confidence of broad masses. From the moment the Communists seize power, it is immaterial to them whether their policy is popular or not. The policy stands if it serves their Communist aims, and that fact convinces them of its final benefits to the nation. Everything else is subordinated to it.

Communists who have gone through a good Marxist school are substantially different people from those who have been educated in democracy. They are contemptuous of values created and cherished by long traditions. The idea of personal honor and civilian pride is strange to them. They discard any idealistic and religious approach to the problems of life. A materialistic conception based on Marxist teaching is a philosophy perfect enough to explain any historical event and to find a solution for any problem of our day. They speak a different language and they have developed a different system of thinking and evaluating events from those of the western world.

These people have nothing but contempt for democracy and hatred for democratic leaders. They have created a world
of their own and are intolerant toward others' beliefs. If they use the words "democracy," "freedom," "nation" as do people of western civilization, they are doing so for two reasons. First, to deceive the broad masses because they know that mankind has been fighting for hundreds of years for these eternal values which are so dear to it. They are aware that these expressions appeal to people and that they would not gain the sympathies of the uninformed if they developed in their agitation the old line of Lenin's dictatorship of proletariat. Therefore, they have substituted for it the term "National Front" which serves as a cover to hide the activities of the party. Secondly, they use the words "democracy" and "freedom" because they attach to them a different meaning from what people ordinarily do. According to the Marxist theory, there cannot be democracy and freedom in a liberal economy. True democracy and freedom are achieved only in a Communist country, in a people's democracy.

A word or two should be said about the non-Communist politicians who actively support Tito's government. They are many and it is a sad story to speak about them. They do not enjoy public confidence, but rather are looked upon with contempt. People can understand that a Communist who has fought for long years to achieve the victory of his ideology is satisfied with the result of his struggle. But they cannot forgive someone who believed in democracy and joined a Communist government for purely personal ambitions.

In Yugoslavia there are in this group of politicians people with names which have meant a lot in the modern history of Yugoslavia. The President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Ivan Ribar, who exerts formally powers similar to a head of the state, leads this rather unenviable gallery. His office is high, his esteem low, his influence nil.

The same applies to Vladimir Simić, the Chairman of the Federal Council, and his brother Stanoje Simić who was Yugoslavia's post-war Minister of Foreign Affairs and tried to be more radical than the Communist ministers themselves. Before the war, Stanoje Simić served as diplomat for any government of the old regimes, no matter how dictatorial, how Fascist or
reactionary they were. This did not prevent him from serving the Communists even more humbly.

Two other names can be mentioned only with feelings of sadness and shame. One is Alexander Belić, President of the Serbian Academy of Science; he is an old man now but not so old as not to remember that he used to organize and help Russian refugees who fled before the Red terror after the October Revolution, and that he was often the guest of King Alexander and supervisor of the young King Peter's education. It is painful to hear his beautiful Serbian language in the service of anti-cultural ideology. The poet, Vladimir Nazor, from Croatia, belongs to the same category. He is old and enjoys being the President of the Croatian Parliament, but I was told that he had sung the praises of the Fascist Quisling, Ante Pavelić, at the beginning of the war.
When in Belgrade, on Sundays I used to go for short excursions. Sometimes I stopped with a peasant family whom I had known for a long time. When the father wanted to talk politics he sent his children out of the room. Once his wife told him, "Milan, I don’t think you are doing well in sending the children out of the room. They know you want to talk about things we do not want them to hear. They may tell it to their Communist teacher. You had better stop and if you wish to speak freely I am sure the Ambassador will be glad to have you visit him in his Embassy."

After that he used to come to the Embassy from time to time. On one occasion he stopped overnight and we talked till early morning. He was a typical Serbian peasant, a figure which one often finds among peasants of eastern Europe who stick to their land, do not like to live in towns but have a nice library.
at home and read a lot during the long and monotonous evenings in winter. He was a well-read man, a kind of self-made philosopher. The conversation was so interesting that I took notes on it the following day.

"I am getting old and I try to control myself, and perhaps it is because of my age that I cannot accept this communism. I often return in thought to the past, which seems to me to have been better. But I am certainly not a reactionary or a capitalist. There are few people who have worked harder than I. I do not object to social reforms. On the contrary, I welcome them, and I think they are necessary and inevitable. But one thing I am not willing to sacrifice for any kind of social progress—my personal freedom.

"I do not object when the local authorities come to me and tell me that I must sell to the state the bigger part of my harvest. I understand that if there are regions where people scarcely manage to live, I have to help the country and the government supply them and not sell only to those who have enough money to pay. But what I detest is when I tell a Communist fellow who enters my house with an arrogant look that I cannot give him more than ten tons of wheat because I have no more, yet he continues to insist and shouts at me that I am a swindler, a reactionary, and a black marketeer. If there is no mutual confidence there can be no cooperation.

"I think the Communists hate the past because they subconsciously feel that it gave to many people a certain degree of satisfaction, and that there are still many of them who remember better times. They can easily falsify a long past history by confiscating old books and by writing their own history books. But every grown person would laugh if they wrote that the Yugoslav peasants, in the last fifty years, had gone through only suffering and privation. I realize that we are inclined to idealize our immediate past, as everybody does in difficult times, but that is one more reason why Communists constantly attack that past.

"Another point: take science. When I want to send a telegram, I go to the post office. I have no idea what this invention is based on but my relatives in town receive my message in two hours' time. I have introduced electricity into my house. To
plow my fields, I share a tractor with my neighbors. When my cow falls ill, I call a veterinary, he pumps some liquid into it and it is all right. All this is the result of scientific freedom, and we take it for granted.

“Our Communists drive in cars, they have radio sets, they journey by airplane, and they overlook the fact that all this is the fruit of the hated liberalism. All factories which must work for them today are only a product of liberalism.

“But what have they given to me? I shall tell you: When I want to speak as I think, I have to go to you, in a foreign Embassy. I cannot speak freely in my own house. That is what the Communists have done for me.”

These words were spoken from the bottom of the peasant’s heart.

Yugoslav citizens are humiliated by being deprived of their privacy. Their lives are controlled day and night, even their family life. Every town is divided into districts, which are a higher organizational set-up for the supervision of local or street or house secretaries. These secretaries are selected by the Communist party from its ranks or from the servile National Front and have the task of constantly watching everybody who lives in or enters their area of control. They visit families and inquire into every detail of their lives.

In villages where there are only a few members of the party, a secretary has all the inhabitants under his control, and sometimes even two or three villages. He is given appropriate communication facilities to appear unexpectedly at different places.

In larger places the street secretary is in charge of organizing street conferences which take place almost every day. He visits each family and announces the subject of the discussion. It takes place in turn in a home or in a courtyard and it concerns daily political matters. Participation is obligatory, and it consists mainly of old women and men who are unable to go to work. Somebody of the local Communist secretariat takes the lead and speaks about current internal or international problems or reads a headline of the Communist paper Borba. At the end, he invites people to take part in the discussion. They usually keep obstinately silent. One or two local agitators are
sometimes present to help in the "discussion" by uttering some strong words about western imperialism, capitalistic exploitation, and black marketeering reactionaries. After two hours the conference is over. The secretary can report to his superiors that he had a very successful meeting. Its participants return to their homes, fed up because their precious time was taken away from them. Children and housekeeping suffer from it. Thus a double Communist aim has been achieved by the conference: people were given a political lecture and family life was disrupted.

This is not the only kind of local conferences. Problems of greater importance are discussed at meetings organized by secretaries of blocks or districts. If the significance of an event and the political reaction to it have to be emphasized by a convincing demonstration, a mass meeting of the whole town is organized, in which thousands of people take part. This can be done with a few hours' notice. The secretaries order people under their command to leave home and go to a meeting place, the trade union functionaries issue similar orders in factories and offices, and within two hours the whole town is on its feet. It happens that a considerable number of participants do not know for what cause they are going to demonstrate until they reach the meeting place and the first speaker takes the floor.

Men and women working in factories and offices are also obliged to attend lectures. These are lectures of a higher political standard. At the end of the working day, the workers must remain at their posts while their superiors, or men especially trained for lecturing on theoretical problems, read the speech which has been thoroughly prepared or approved by the Communist propaganda center, AGITPROP. The slogans and the tone of all of these conferences are the same; to praise Marshal Tito and the Communist party of Yugoslavia and to spread hatred toward the West and its democratic institutions. Since Tito's break with the Cominform, another bold subject has been added: to defend Tito's stand against Moscow.

A special Communist school is organized for the higher ranks of the members of the party. Its work is secret and its existence is never mentioned in public. Its pupils are taught the Marxist theory, introduced into the practical questions of
politics and economics. They are given lectures on the political, military, and revolutionary strategy and tactics of the Communist party. The lecturers are the top leaders: Kardelj, Djilas, Kidrić, Generals Gošnjak, Popović, and Vukmanović-Tempo.

A teacher acquaintance of mine told me that he had been ordered to speak at a district meeting about colonial exploitation. He showed me the text of the speech he had made. It was full of abusive terminology. I remarked that he had perhaps gone too far and that certain basic laws of political morale should never be given up. He burst into anger, "I can see you still do not understand our problems. I was given the text prepared by AGITPROP to read. Had I refused I would have been thrown out of the school and my three children would have had nothing to eat from tomorrow onward. Anyhow 90 per cent of those who had to listen to my speech knew that I did not mean it."

Here is the text of a leaflet distributed to convince people individually to attend and participate in local meetings:

Comrade . . . [the name and address follows]. Our Yugoslav Army, adorned with glory, has brought us, together with the invincible Red Army, freedom and that most precious right, the opportunity to build our future by ourselves through the National Committees. Through the committees and the block organizations we can make secure all the successes gained in bloody battles. In these committees the highest authority, as you know, is the secretariat of the block. Our secretariat of the block XXII was founded several months ago and has held conferences at which questions of individual and general interests were discussed. In these activities the secretariat of the block has been supported by many inhabitants of the block. However, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the presence of the citizens and their active participation could have been better, since this is asked of us for our common task and purpose. It may be that the aim and importance of these meetings are not known to everyone, but also, there are people who consider it beneath their dignity to take part in these conferences and to have contact with poor and less educated citizens. This is to be condemned, because the presence of everybody is requested. It is the greatest sin for anyone not to participate in these
meetings, whatever the reason. Our work can benefit the whole community if we consult together about the interests of the nation.

The secretariat of the block decided at its last meeting to address this appeal to you, to invite you to a close collaboration, to give up two hours every second Saturday in the month for our common cause and to take part in the conferences at which the most important internal and general questions will be discussed and solved in a friendly way. By your presence you will prove that you value the freedom which has been brought to us by our valiant army, which even today continues to fight courageously to destroy our enemy, the Nazi tyranny. The fighters at the front need all kinds of help and this help we have to give them. The kind and quantity of this help is decided at the conferences of the block secretariats, and also in the committees. Today, when by quick and decisive actions the social injustice under which broad masses have suffered is being righted, nobody, including you, can stay out as a calm observer, but everybody has to work. "All for one, one for all." Let everybody give everything of himself. We expect you on the 28th of this month in the building of Obilicev venac No. 27-III.

The presence of every man and woman is necessary.

Your absence, after this appeal, will be kept in evidence and will be marked in the files [author's italics]; we believe that this is neither your wish nor ours.

Death to fascism—freedom to people!
Signed: The Secretariat of XXII Block
Chairman
Božo Vujadinović

This appeal was issued on April 25, 1945, when the war was still going on in the western regions of Yugoslavia. Though it started in a mild tone, it ended with a threat to people who would not comply with it. As this form of invitation did not produce the expected effect, it was abandoned and the street secretaries applied other methods of compelling people to take part in the conferences and meetings.

I traveled on one occasion by train from Belgrade to Ljubljana. Since the train was two hours late in the morning at Zagreb, a mass of people rushed to get seats. I noticed a girl
apparently exhausted and ill who had no strength to fight for a place. I took her to my compartment but the conductor wanted to throw her out because she did not have a first class ticket. Then we went to the restaurant car and she started to cry. She was ill and because of her illness she said she had received a fortnight's leave to recover on the coast. She feared all she had gained was now lost because she had to wait the whole night standing in an overcrowded waiting room. The door had been locked to let a special train of Marshal Tito pass through.

She worked in a Slovenian factory and described how hard people had to work. "We had a one-hour break for lunch," she said, "and once somebody came with a suggestion that it could be shortened to thirty minutes so that we could get home earlier or be able to shop. Everybody agreed with the proposition, as lunches were quickly over and people had nothing to do for the rest of the period. But when we referred the idea to the secretary of our trade union, he was surprised at the remark that we had nothing to do after lunch, and said that the free time could be used for reading from Marx and Lenin. Next day at the conference he put the proposition to the workers and, just imagine, not a single voice was raised against it. Three thousand workers bowed before one party secretary. Since then, we read the Marxist theory at lunch time."

The culminating point of "spontaneous" expression of the will of the nation is a mass manifestation arranged on May Day or on other occasions when the Communist party of Yugoslavia considers it particularly important to demonstrate before the nation and the world its power and the devotion of the masses to Marshal Tito.

After such a mass performance, on one occasion, I met at the reception in Tito's palace, Mr. Platts-Mills, a member of the British House of Commons. He spoke about the parade with boundless delight. He told me, "Never in my life have I seen such enthusiasm in a gathering. Marshal Tito is really beloved by his nation. Everybody wants to see him, to catch his wonderful smile, to prove to him how devotedly he is ready to follow him anywhere he is ordered. One could read from people's faces all the happiness they felt at seeing Tito, and es-
pecially the youngsters, they really belong to him. There must have been some 200,000 people at the manifestation. I must say that I would not succeed in getting a tenth of this number of silly Englishmen to attend my meeting.”

Then I said, “Do you know that almost all the peasants whom you saw this morning were brought to town by special army trucks? That all these masses who started to march past Tito at 9:00 A.M. had to be at fixed places at 4:00 A.M.? Men were told the previous day in their offices and factories that they would take part in the march as members of their trade union organizations, boys and girls with their schools or pioneer organizations, professors, painters, actors, singers as members of their trade unions, and the rest of the population were told house by house by the street secretaries to be on hand. Those hundreds of flags, standards, and inscriptions were prepared by the secretariat of the Communist party and distributed before the march began. Every group was headed by two or three members of the party who memorized slogans and when they came before Tito’s platform, they started to shout. Everyone else joined in; they were afraid not to.”

I have seen many of these demonstrations as it was my official duty. And this one had been a truly mass performance. At the beginning I also was impressed. It is remarkable that it is possible to concentrate hundreds of thousands of people in a place against their will, with relatively very simple means, and to get them to take an active part in expressing political sympathies for a political leader whom they actually and thoroughly dislike.

I had an opportunity to observe a May Day gathering at Dubrovnik, the well-known Adriatic port, which was considered to be the most “reactionary” town in Yugoslavia. But even these “reactionaries” attended the meeting in some tens of thousands and did not fail to shout: “Long live Tito and the Communist party! Down with black reaction.” I found that the slogans on the placards and standards were the same as in Belgrade, Zagreb, or Ljubljana, though these towns were hundreds of miles apart. Not only the slogans but even their melody and rhythm were the same.

After such an occasion a “reactionary” came to see me and
told me that he also went with his trade union to manifest his love for Tito. "But I had a rather bad afternoon," he told me. "After the parade a cousin of mine came to visit us. She is a student at the university and went with others to manifest for 'a progressive, free, and Socialist science.' She told us proudly that she did not shout the slogans. We considered it an act of high courage, but my old mother is worried that I will lose my job tomorrow."

Another feature of the "free will of the nation" is the so-called voluntary work.

The war considerably disrupted communications in Yugoslavia and many factories and houses were either destroyed or severely damaged. The nation had to face a tremendous task of reconstruction which alone would require a great effort on the part of labor. However, the government was more ambitious than to heal the wounds of destruction only. It enlarged the task of the nation by an additional aim to industrialize the country in five years according to a Five Year Plan. New factories were to be constructed, new mines opened, new roads, public buildings, and theaters built. For such a vast program an army of hundreds of thousands of laborers would be required, and to pay their wages would be a great burden on the state's financial resources. It was impossible to have the necessary labor overnight in an agricultural and primitive country such as Yugoslavia and to pay the workers adequately. But it had to be provided for.

Throughout the country a big drive for voluntary work started. First, the heavy barrage of the propaganda machinery—newspapers and radio—prepared the nation for the task. The Communist members formed groups of voluntary workers who started to work on a public project after their daily duties. Then, the street secretaries took a step further. They visited their "clients" and told them that the street next door or a public building would be repaired and that everybody would certainly be eager to help. Women and some children appeared on sites, digging and handing along bricks. The propaganda men followed, taking pictures and publishing them as
examples of patriotic duty. More people joined in. But it still had the character of improvisation.

After the first experiments, the voluntary work was properly organized. School children went to work under the control of their teachers, workers sacrificed Sundays, and the street secretaries proudly led their followers—women, who left their work in the kitchen. Results could be seen very soon. The debris was cleaned up and new buildings were constructed with amazing speed. And the government did not have to pay a single cent for it.

In the spring of 1947, the National Committee of Belgrade suddenly started to reconstruct the main street of the capital, Terazije. This was not the most urgent task of public works, for the street was in relatively good order. But the provincial fountains disappeared and the pavement was torn up. Thousands of voluntary workers were busy day and night and the noise of the machines did not let people in the vicinity sleep. In one month a beautiful, new, wide boulevard was built, worthy indeed of a capital.

Only on May Day, when masses of people marched along the boulevard and gymnasts, cyclists, and motorists performed their feats before Marshal Tito, did everybody understand why the work had to be finished so hastily. It was done in the prescribed period, but it did not withstand the next winter. Under the first frost the new pavement was torn to pieces. It had to be redone and this time not by voluntary groups of students and women, but by skilled workers.

Voluntary work became one of the most important factors of the political and economic life in Yugoslavia. People were organized in groups called work brigades, and went to work with flags, singing. Their commanders appealed to them to increase their efforts. The best brigades were given an official title, "Shock Brigades," and the most efficient individuals, "Shock Troopers." These were honorary rewards bestowed upon them in the presence of other brigades or other workers, and their names were widely quoted and their pictures published in every daily paper to serve as an example worthy of being followed.

The main task of the voluntary work was alloted to the
youth. In 1946, a new railway, Brčko-Banovići, was constructed, some 100,000 youngsters taking part. They were so successful that they were given a bigger task in 1947: to build a railroad in Bosnia between Sarajevo and Šamac, 150 miles long.

The terrain was exceedingly difficult. The railroad had to pass through mountains, to bridge deep valleys; rocks had to be removed and tunnels pushed through. The authors of the plan, in the Ministry of Communications, originally thought the work would take two years. The plan was handed over to the central organization of the Yugoslav youth. Its leaders offered to finish the task in one year, i.e., in one season, and to hand it over for public use on November 29, the anniversary of the republic.

The work started on April 1, after the snow had disappeared. The work brigades were composed of boys and girls between fourteen and twenty years of age. They came from all regions of the country and from all sections of the population. They erected their own wooden barracks, administration and conference halls. Individual brigades and barracks were scattered all along the projected track. The barracks' walls were decorated with Tito's pictures, and flags were hoisted outside.

The leadership of the youth decreed a six-hour working day but the boys and girls proposed to work seven hours instead. It was hard work in an exhausting southern sunshine. Rocks had to be dynamited, stones and dirt excavated, the soil fixed and gravelled, railroad ties and tracks put down. All this was done by young people, the majority of whom were not accustomed to heavy physical work.

The spirit of competition was introduced to increase the effort even more. Individuals competed among themselves and brigades with each other. This appealed to the mentality of the youngsters. They did not mind exhaustion. They wanted to be first on the list of rewarded working commandos. Everything was done, therefore, not at a normal speed, but in haste. Girls were hardly strong enough to carry stones, but they ran with them. Boys rushed with wheelbarrows loaded with heavy mud, to return as quickly as possible. It was like a motion picture going at abnormal speed.

I spent two days visiting different sections of the railroad
construction and traveled along fifty miles of the railroad tracks. The lads were poorly clothed. One could hear only the noise of the machines. The young people did not talk to one another. There was nothing but work; work at a killing speed. I stopped at several places to see their barracks. They were very clean. I chatted with some of the young people. Everybody told me in an apathetic manner he liked to be on the pruga (railroad track), as they called it.

I was asked to speak to two or three groups when they returned to their barracks. I expressed admiration for their effort. They answered with trained slogans: "Tito-pruga-Tito-pruga, Stalin-Tito-Beneš, or Tito-Komunistička partija." There was no spontaneous enthusiasm, and the slogans had no connection with my address.

After seven hours of work they went to a meal which other young men or women had prepared for them. It consisted of bread, beans or potatoes with gravy, and once or twice a week a piece of meat was added.

The brigades from abroad working at the pruga came from all European countries and the expeditions were organized by Communist-led youth organizations. These brigades worked only six hours and spent much time becoming acquainted with their Yugoslav colleagues. The quality and quantity of their food was much better. The foreign brigades were delighted by their rather romantic experiences and returned home as the most enthusiastic supporters of Tito's Yugoslavia.

After the physical work was finished, the rest of the day was spent in meetings or social gatherings conducted by young Communist leaders. The latter would lead the singing of political songs. They would begin to dance the national dance, Kolo, to the accompaniment of an endless song with the refrain: "We shall build the pruga before the end of this summer." Soon, other boys and girls joined in and then the whole camp was transformed into the picturesque scene of a joyful gathering.

The second part of the day was also used for teaching Marxism. This was, I think, the largest political school of the world. Three hundred thousand young people went through it and the fee was one or two months "voluntary," unpaid labor,
which would have taken years for skilled laborers and cost millions. Pruga grew—one brigade left and another arrived.

In the company of some Yugoslav youth leaders, I arrived at a tunnel construction called Vranduk, a tunnel to be some 1,300 meters (four-fifths of a mile) long, in very difficult rocky country. At the time of my visit the work was in its last stages. From the depth of the tunnel we could hear the steam-rollers, drilling machines, and iron carts. The artificial light radiated over the toiling and sweating bodies of the young working commandos. The air was heavy with dust and bad odors. I asked my guide if there were not many cases of accidents. He answered, “No, there have been only a few, but it happens that the boys sometimes faint. When the cutting of the tunnel was nearing its end, every working brigade wanted to make the final push, because it was announced there would be special celebrations and rewards for those who pushed it through. They knew that all the newspapers would write about the victorious, heroic brigade. Every brigade worked so feverishly in the last days that we had to drive them out by violence as the majority of the boys could not hold out and fainted at work.” The guide was very proud of his boys.

The rail construction was completed in a record period of seven months. The first train passed through three weeks before the time schedule, decorated with flowers and with the enthusiastic Communist organizers of the pruga on board. Masses of people were called out to welcome the train at every station. There were many speeches praising the Yugoslav youngsters for their achievement for the republic and Marshal Tito. These young people left the work as trained machinists, mechanics, and engineers. Thousands of young country boys went straight to factories as experts after having given to the nation millions of working hours for nothing.

The work was “voluntary.” Students were told that if they did not take part in the construction during their holidays, they would not be allowed to continue in their studies either at high schools or universities. Others were threatened with the loss of their ration cards. Factories accepting newcomers asked first whether the applicant for a job had the title of a udarnik
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(working commando). If the applicant had no certificate that he had been at the rail construction, he was turned away.

It seems that some Yugoslav leaders were disturbed by this strenuous effort on the part of their youth, for in February, 1948, Marshal Tito declared that it would be unjust to put too heavy tasks upon the Yugoslav youth in the future. But the warning was forgotten and that spring the agitation directed at the young people was resumed.

According to the newspapers, 60,000 boys and girls participated in voluntary work on the construction of the highway, Belgrade-Zagreb; 50,000 were engaged in making the new district of Belgrade; and 10,000 in building a new factory near the capital. Besides these big projects the youth worked on many local constructions of minor importance. In contrast to the railroad Sarajevo-Šamac, in which youth from all corners of the country participated, in 1948 their work was closer to their homes, and even greater numbers participated.

That year a new Belgrade was planned by the dictators. The old city had been built on the right bank of the confluence of the Danube and Sava Rivers. There were almost no houses on the other side because it is sandy and it was considered unnecessarily expensive to invest in a building program on that side of the river.

The war brought considerable damage to the old town. Many small houses constructed along shabby and narrow streets without any town-planning were smashed by bombing. Wide spaces were left after the debris had been cleared and opened possibilities for a new, well-planned building program.

The first task was to provide people with living space. Before the war the capital had 250,000 inhabitants. But there was an increase of administrative functions in Belgrade after the war and this brought in many new people. Newly constructed factories added more. Besides, many of the refugees who had come in did not wish to return to destroyed homes or to places where no relatives remained alive. So the city after the war had 450,000 inhabitants.

They lived under appalling conditions. A decree was issued entitling each person to one room, but even this modest requirement could not solve the housing problem. I knew of
cases where five families, each consisting of several members, lived in a five-room flat. But the Communist government was not interested in easing the fate of the population which, in a town like Belgrade, still consisted mainly of middle-class families. Though much repair work was done and new buildings constructed, these were mainly public administration edifices.

Tito was obsessed with the idea of a new Belgrade. He liked to speak about the new city which would rise on the sandy banks of the Danube and mark the era of his rule for posterity. In the Five Year Plan a respectable figure of 130 billion dinars (2.6 billion dollars) was reserved for the realization of this idea. It was allotted for the construction of such public representative buildings as the central building of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, government offices, the central Parliament (though the present house was built only twelve years ago) and later on, for an opera house and a big hotel. The preparatory work started in 1947 and the youth were to have a large share in this personal project of Marshal Tito.

I traveled through almost all of Yugoslavia. Everywhere I saw feverish work.

A Yugoslav Communist leader told me frankly what was the real significance of these mass actions organized for the youth. "It is, of course, very useful from the economic point of view," he said, "to have built a railroad which links the existing communication system with a Bosnian region where we expect to develop the center of our heavy industry, and it is a considerable economy for the state budget if this can be done by people who do not require any compensation."

"Far the most important thing, however, is the political purpose. At the pruga young people from all parts of Yugoslavia meet. If they had not been given this opportunity, they would not have seen any other part of our country perhaps throughout their lives. At the pruga boys and girls of all nationalities, shepherds with students, and children of all kinds of families live together and thus they help to create real brotherhood and equality among the different sections of our nation and to build a real democracy of a classless society."

"Then another point: In the villages we do not succeed in including everybody within our political education. We lack
people, and distances are considerable. Our instructors cannot cover the whole area and thus many young people escape our education. This is one of our greatest problems. In the towns we have somehow managed to get the political schooling organized and have practically solved that question. But the village is stubborn and the primitive conditions prevailing in the country do not make the task easier. At the pruga we have all of them together. For one or two months they belong wholly to us, and this gives us a unique opportunity to educate them systematically in political affairs. They return home or to other places properly coached and become active factors in spreading our political ideas. This aspect of the pruga far exceeds its economic importance."

To sum up the life of Yugoslav youngsters: They go to school from six to fourteen years of age. In this period they receive the basic political education and in the pioneer organizations, a militant political schooling. From the age of fourteen Yugoslav boys and girls either go to work, where the trade unions take over their "education," or they continue their studies. During holidays or free time they join the "voluntary" working brigades.

For the women of Yugoslavia, the Communists have organized the APŽ (The Anti-Fascist Front of Women). This organization was born during the war. The leaders of the National Liberation Movement organized women in liberated territory to help in the struggle against the external and internal enemies. They provided the army with food, they transported the military equipment to the front, they served in sanitary units, and many of them took an active part in fighting. Some became fanatical Communists and did not hesitate to undertake the most difficult task assigned them by the high command. They were promoted to the ranks of officers of the Partisan Army, and in every larger town today you can meet quite a number of women officers, proudly wearing the uniform, often decorated with high orders of war merits. Many of their faces are hard and many of them appear ill.

I witnessed a very sad scene when shopping in a Belgrade
shop. A Partisan woman standing near me suddenly started to cry and scream. The next moment she fell to the floor and tossed about as in an epileptic attack. In a minute or two it was over and she disappeared. The shopkeeper told me that such incidents happened often and explained that they were a consequence of the war where those women had seen acts of brutality which caused them still to suffer from shock.

Many Partisan women were crippled in the war, and it is very common to see a girl of twenty limping along the streets of Belgrade. These disabled women live near the city in a special home.

Partisan women work in many offices and different party and National Front institutions. They never speak about family life or children. If they have children, they leave their education to the pioneer organizations. The women serve the party and Marshal Tito with the same zeal as men.

The Anti-Fascist Front of Women functions very similarly to the youth organizations or other mass institutions of the National Front. It is headed by Communists, and in general it mobilizes material and physical resources which a woman can offer to the Communist cause. It organizes meetings and collects contributions. It takes care of the special political education of women and thus puts several million Yugoslav women firmly under the control of the government.

At the Second Congress of the AFŽ, held in Belgrade in January, 1948, Marshal Tito emphasized the importance of women’s organizations for the nation, praised their achievements during the war and their important role in the National Liberation Movement. He appealed for a greater number to take part in the work in factories and offices. He addressed words of criticism to those who thought their task was finished when the war was over, feeling they had no more obligations to work for the benefit of the community or to be politically active. He invited women to educate their children in the spirit of the new Yugoslavia, so that they might become good citizens worthy of their country. He finished his speech with the standard Communist sentence: “It is hatred for the warmongers which will be the rallying force of progressive people all over the world in the struggle for peace.”
After the Marshal had concluded his speech the women burst into an ovation of open adoration. Those who belonged to the Partisan Army looked at him with a kind of rapture and passionate love. In the speeches which followed Tito's appeal, the women were urged to give all their strength to hasten the reconstruction of the country and the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. They were asked to educate their children in a Socialist spirit.

Women's contribution to public works was considerable. In 1947, the women of Serbia gave 748,151 working hours to the nation by taking part in the regulation of rivers and channels and in the construction of schools and homes of culture. This figure, however, is very low in comparison with the achievement of the women of the other nationalities in Yugoslavia, and it would indicate that the women of Serbia are more stubborn in opposition to the voluntary work and to the regime.

The women of the Croatian capital, Zagreb, devoted 1,204,597 hours to construction of the highway to Belgrade. Women in the backward and poor country of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the majority of families live from hand to mouth, with days passing when they do not see a single cent, gave 25,706,140 working hours for the benefit of public interests.

One of the most pressing needs from which the Yugoslav families suffered was a constant lack of money. Women did not have the means to buy essential clothing for their children, nor to provide some decent clothes for themselves. Most of their evenings were spent mending and altering children's dresses. It was a problem to buy needles and thread, and they usually got them for black market prices. When the situation was at its worst, they sold pieces of silver or furniture or china. It was often impossible to provide milk or eggs for their small children, and when they could they had to pay twenty dinars (forty cents) for one egg and twelve dinars (twenty-four cents) for one pint of milk.

It used to be a tradition among Yugoslav families to gather often in one of their homes, and the hostess was always anxious to serve the guests her best. Their hospitality was prodigious. Once a year, on the day of a family's patron saint, the Serbian families celebrated their Slava and all their close as well as
distant friends came to congratulate them on the happy holiday. The celebration sometimes lasted three days, and food, wines, and coffee were in abundance. In the new Yugoslavia this tradition has been almost abandoned because Yugoslav women have nothing to serve their guests, and also because people are so busy they cannot spend time for leisure. It has now become a common feature for the newspapers to publish long columns of announcements by the families who choose not to celebrate their Slava. The older people feel greatly humiliated.

The women who did not work in factories or offices or who did not have small children did not get clothing coupons or rationing cards. The general proletarization of the nation was more apparent with women than with men. The men were somewhat better provided for because they all worked and received coupons and sometimes special suits for work. The women as a whole were shabbily dressed and lost interest in dressing properly. Psychologically, women who were at home suffered more under the totalitarian and Communist regime than did the men who met people at work and found some distraction in fulfilling their duties.

With these new conditions family life underwent a deep change. The home was full of worries and fear. Men returned home from their work usually late in the evening to a very poor dinner. The wives had to exert considerable effort to obtain even a low quality food.

The life of the family in a Communist state would deserve a special study. Based on mutual love and understanding, self-sacrifice and morale, the family would be philosophically opposed to the Communist ideology. So the family is actually a danger to communism. It is in the family circles where people develop their private interests and devote time to their hobbies. It is the authority of parents which exercises a profound influence on children. It is in the family that ideas flow freely.

But the Communist party needs and wants the whole of the human being—its body and soul as well. It wants all of one’s time. It ignores and suppresses human feeling and sentiment. Love is for Communists a discarded weakness of bourgeoisie. The parents represent an unwelcome authority which may endanger the sovereign authority of the party. Children
must know only one superior and that is the party. And so the ancient morale of family life has to be destroyed.

The pages which follow are devoted to a description of the life of various classes of society in Yugoslavia—the workers, the middle class, and the free professions. The largest class of the Yugoslav population, the peasants, because it is closely linked to the policy of the government in agriculture, will be dealt with in a later chapter.

The Marxist theory bases the rule of a Communist government upon the proletariat and considers the workers as its backbone. One would suppose that once the Marxists have achieved victory in seizing power, they would ensure a world of paradise for workers.

For decades, workers have been told that capitalists exploit them, refusing to give them the basic conditions of a decent life, abusing their financial power to dominate them, exposing them to crises of unemployment, rewarding their hard work with low salaries and driving them, on the whole, into a life without freedom and honor.

Many workers believed that communism could assure them of what they were rightly longing for in some countries—a better way of living, a freedom from want. Large numbers of European workers were organized for many years in the Communist party, and they were ready to strike against governments and employers. They understood the value of the party discipline and of the slogan "in unity is strength." They were willing to risk and sacrifice to help their Communist leaders achieve victory.

In the democratic and progressive countries of Europe the trade unions were powerful organizations in defending the interests of the working class and influencing social progress. More than fifty years of their history have witnessed many remarkable struggles for social justice.

Before World War I, they headed the workers' movement to fight for political freedom. When democracy emerged from the struggle, victorious against oppressive German and Austro-Hungarian imperialism, the trade unions, affiliated with Socialist
(non-Communist) parties, concentrated their activities mainly in the social field. They left to the democratic parties the task of guarding the fruits of political democracy. They achieved many improvements in wages, in sanitation, and in other working conditions, and when normal negotiations with the government or the employer did not succeed, they took up the most powerful weapon of the working class—they went on strike. To make the use of this weapon most effective and to achieve as complete a stoppage of work as possible, the trade unions possessed means to pay subsidies to the strikers.

The position and the role of the trade unions in a Communist country has changed fundamentally. I have not seen or read about an instance in which the trade unions in a Communist country have publicly raised the question of wages or other material interests of the workers. Never have they asked the workers to go on strike, and one of the most characteristic features of the Communist regimes is that strikes never take place there. They would be considered an act of sabotage of the Socialist economy.

I know of an exceptional case in a Czechoslovak factory near Prague. The workers did not realize that the Communist putsch in February, 1948, meant working without the right of protest, and they prepared a strike to achieve better wages. It happened soon after the Communists seized power in that country. The police locked all the gates of the factory and surrounded it. They turned off the electricity and the heat. For three days and nights they left the strikers shut in the factory premises without food or water. Then, emissaries were sent and an ultimatum was put to the strikers: to resume work at once unconditionally, or to be arrested. The workers accepted the first proposition offered them, after three days of starvation and cold; the leaders of the strike were put in jail and all the workers had to pay a high fine. The strike was not organized by the trade unions and was never mentioned in the newspapers.

In eastern Europe the function of the trade unions is now different from what it formerly was and what it still is in the democratic countries. In a Communist country the trade unions have become most ardent supporters of the governmental policy,
and they serve as one of the agencies of the Communist party to achieve the highest possible working effort.

Before the war the workers in Yugoslavia had many reasons for not being satisfied with a government which did not give them a fair deal and often pursued an anti-social policy. The trade unions enjoyed small power, and there were periods when they did not represent the interests of the working class but bowed willingly before the government's whips. The victory of communism did not change much this negligible influence of the trade unions. The leaders were changed, of course. Mr. Salaj, who lived for years in Moscow, was installed to lead them. But his position is like that of a high party functionary. He has to take orders from the Politburo, and his vast organization, embracing several hundreds of thousands of workers and employees, fulfills the same task as the National Front or the Anti-Fascist Front of Women, or the organization of the Yugoslav youth: it takes part in organizing meetings and lectures and exerts a constant pressure to make people work more. It issues declarations and has annual mass meetings, but there has not been an instance when a declaration has been issued stating: "We workers of Yugoslavia demand this or that, and the trade unions stand solidly behind this claim."

The life of Yugoslav workers is better than that of other sections of the Yugoslav population, however. They receive a larger quantity of food, especially the hard-working people; they can buy certain commodities cheaper, and from time to time extra working suits and shoes are sold to them; they receive cheap meals in the factory cafeterias; if they are skilled laborers, their wages are comparable to salaries paid high officials of the public administration. But they have to work very hard and if they have some money left, there is hardly anything to buy with it to improve their standard of living.

Not only laborers but every employed person is obliged to be a member of the trade unions. Employees of the public administration, teachers, actors, members of the artisan cooperatives, professors—all sections of the population who are in one way or another paid by the state or by any of its institutions, have to be organized in the trade unions, which have
complete control over their activities. This once powerful organization of the working class has become a police force.

In Yugoslavia, as in every Communist country, there is a group of out-classed people. These are the former middle class. Their numbers amount to tens of thousands. They used to be high government officials before the war, factory owners, small businessmen, managers, engineers, whose knowledge and experience the government refuses to take advantage of because it does not believe they would work loyally. They are unemployed and walk aimlessly in the streets of the cities, living from day to day. They make their living by selling their mobile property.

When I arrived in Yugoslavia and had to furnish the Embassy, I was advised to see some private homes, the families in which were selling their belongings. My wife visited several of those formerly rich families. In big apartments several families were crowded together and the owner lived in one or two rooms among a heap of furniture, china, linen, rugs, and pictures. Among them were very precious pieces of tapestry, classic French lounges, and objets d'art.

Once my wife went to see a family at lunch time. They were sitting around a beautiful old table at a simple meal of beans served on Sèvres china. My wife felt embarrassed and wanted to leave. But the lady told her, "Do have a look and don't bother about our lunch; if you could buy just a small thing you would make it possible for us to add a piece of meat to our beans tomorrow."

My wife's dressmaker used to have a big salon before the war, with many employees. In 1946 it was reduced to one room and the dressmaker had no help. She told my wife that she needed none because there was very little work for her, and that she would almost die from hunger if a wife of a minister did not give her some work from time to time. My wife asked her who the lady was, because as a rule, the Yugoslav women of the new high class society did not wear elegant dresses.

The dressmaker said, "I cannot tell you; it is a secret. She brings her own yard goods, a first-class French material, and her own thread. She can get it only by some irregular, illegal
way, but I have to charge her a very low, legal price for my work; otherwise she would denounce me."

In the professions things are no better.

There has always been a shortage of doctors in Yugoslavia. The war brought the problem to a critical point; the number of physicians had decreased and because the universities had been closed during the war by the Germans, as being the seat of anti-German activities, they had not provided any new doctors. But the number of cases requiring medical care increased alarmingly after the war. Besides over 1,700,000 people who died in the fighting, many returned home crippled or ill. Tuberculosis increased. The inhabitants of some regions were undernourished. Mortality in general was high and so also was the birth rate.

The government put a lot of effort into improving the sanitary service. It founded new hospitals, regulated the study of medicine, took care of the education of hospital nurses, opened local dispensaries, and did a remarkable work. But there were still not enough doctors.

According to official figures, in 1948 there were only 4,100 doctors in Yugoslavia. The census taken in March of the same year showed there were 15,751,953 persons in the country, which means that there was on the average one doctor for each 3,842 inhabitants. Certain mountainous districts had no doctors at all. Even in the capital, Belgrade, there was such a shortage it sometimes took several days before a doctor was free to see a patient. The hospitals were overcrowded although only serious cases of illnesses were accepted for hospitalization. Many patients had to lie in the corridors.

This situation indicates the seriousness of the problem of medicine in Yugoslavia. Yet, under the present regime, the work of doctors is not only the most difficult, it is also unbearably exhausting. They are overworked and badly paid. I know of cases where doctors arose every morning at five o’clock, went to a hospital to which they were assigned, could receive their private patients only late in the afternoon, and could visit patients in their homes only in the evening. Their salaries in the hospitals were low, from 3,000 to 4,000 dinars (60
to 80 dollars) monthly, from which taxes and "voluntary" contributions were deducted, and their private honorarium for a visit to the patient's home was fixed by the law up to 100 dinars (two dollars). We shall see in another chapter what can be bought for this income which, in general, does not exceed the salary of higher governmental officials. It is not only insufficient, but it is also humiliating.

There are hundreds of automobiles running in Belgrade, all state-owned. They are used by the government or the army or the party to make the work and life of the officials, officers, and functionaries more efficient and more agreeable. But the doctors don't have cars and you can see them in Belgrade streets carrying their bags in hot summer weather or in the muddy winter time.

When I was ill, a doctor from the university came to see me. The moment he sat down the discussion started. "It is an exception that I have put on a necktie," he said. "I do not wear one when lecturing."

I did not understand and he went on to explain, "It would be considered a sign of anti-social feelings and I would be exposed to the danger of an attack by Communist students. I might even be expelled from the university as an anti-social element. It is ridiculous."

"I receive 5,000 dinars (100 dollars) a month and besides lecturing at the university, I am responsible for a large department in the clinic which does not pay me anything. A colleague of mine, who is a Communist, governs the whole faculty and though it can be impartially ascertained that his scientific education and qualification are under average, he is paid twice as much as I am because he is a party member. He has an automobile, a large apartment, and lives well. I am in such financial difficulties that I have no money to buy scientific books. According to the party I am an anti-social element."

"When the students take their examinations, those who are Communists do not fail to emphasize their privileged position, and I must confess that I am afraid to let them fail. This is a crime that we are committing against the nation. In a few years time when the old generation of doctors will have gone, this policy will prove to be fatal for the health of the nation."
When I asked the doctor, after the visit had come to an end, how much I owed him, he replied, "According to the regulations I am entitled to get 100 dinars but I leave it to you, or better still, don't pay me at all."

The regime has succeeded in proletarizing the profession of doctors in its endeavor to create a classless society. As a result, it has caused doctors to run away from their responsibilities. Medicine is connected with politics and they feel that under the constant control of Communist doctors or secretaries, they are exposed to discrimination and punishment.

Much the same is the experience of hospital nurses. There is, according to official statistics, one nurse for three doctors. As many of the older nurses are members of religious orders they are considered the blackest reactionaries and are persecuted by the Communist administration of the hospital and often threatened even by Communist patients. I was told of a case when a Partisan was not satisfied with the treatment he received, and he threatened to send the nurse to prison, accusing her of being anti-Communist and wanting to harm him.

The government of Yugoslavia is aware that it must somehow solve the problem of the shortage of doctors in the country. According to the Five Year Plan, a number of new hospitals will be constructed, and it is assumed that the planned university education will yield 2,500 new doctors. Every graduate of medicine will be sent by the government to a place chosen by the state authorities. In 1948, a law was in preparation which would make all doctors available for the medical services of the state, making it a duty to work in hospitals and dispensaries as employees of the state. The Minister of Public Health told me that it was the intention of the government to abolish the private practice of medicine altogether.

In order to help the health of the nation the government ordered many doctors in big towns to serve in country hospitals. Doctors were sent to places hundreds of miles away from their homes and families. They were ordered to stay one year. When this period of service was nearing its end, the Communist directors of the hospitals tried to convince the doctors to remain for another year.
The following case happened: In a country hospital a doctor from Belgrade was preparing to return to his home. The director had not succeeded in convincing him to stay on. Two days before the doctor's departure a girl died in the children's ward of the hospital. The director immediately seized upon this occasion to place the responsibility for the death of the child on the departing doctor, and he threatened him with police action. The director added that he would be willing to reconsider if the doctor decided to continue his work in the hospital for another year. Aware of all the difficulties and dangers which he would have to face if he were accused of neglecting his duties, the doctor accepted the deal.

In Yugoslavia there is a law requiring employed persons to be insured against illness. Half of the insurance fee has to be paid by the employer and half by the employee. The fee is very high; in case of 1,000 dinars monthly income, it amounts to 260 dinars. But the doctors are so overworked that people, influenced by previous experience, generally believe the doctor will take better care of them if they come as private patients, rather than insured patients. I know of several cases of Yugoslav employees who, when ill, preferred to see a doctor privately, even though a considerable sum had been deducted every month from their salaries for the insurance fee.

The fate of lawyers in Yugoslavia is no better than that of the other free professions. I do not want to defend them for their behavior before or during the war. Their profession, because of its nature, connected many of them closely to those employers whose war-time record was not always good and who, before the war, abused economic liberties at the expense of other people. Hundreds of Yugoslav lawyers were arrested after the war for collaboration with the enemy, and others were deprived of the right to continue their practice.

In 1948, in the whole of Yugoslavia there were not more than 1,600 lawyers. Though in a Communist state the legal profession is considered to be parasitic, the government was faced soon after with the consequences of the purge; people appeared before district courts without a lawyer, because there were none. The courts had difficulty finding lawyers for defendants in cases where the law required the presentation of
the case by a lawyer. The Minister of Justice met the problem by issuing a decree establishing the minimum number of lawyers in every district court and, on the basis of this, the Chamber of Lawyers dispatched its members all around the country.

According to the law concerning lawyers, promulgated in December, 1946, their function was defined as "to help the state authorities in the right application of the law and in the strengthening of the juridical order in the state." It is up to the public attorney to define arbitrarily these ideas. If the lawyer does not offer to "help the state authorities," as required by the public attorney, he does not fulfill properly and conscientiously his function, and he may be deprived of the right to continue his work. It was on the basis of this law that the Chamber of Lawyers struck hundreds of its lawyers from its list by a simple decision of its Communist-controlled committee.

It happened in the case of a political trial that a lawyer tried to defend his client to the best of his abilities. Though his defense efforts were not reported in the newspapers, he was nevertheless severely attacked. The press reminded him of his duties in the new Socialist state, stressing the fact that he belonged to the old world and did not grasp the change which had occurred in Yugoslavia, which required a lawyer to follow a different approach to his task from that which he had used in reactionary Yugoslavia.

The aim of such public warning was achieved. Since then, lawyers have done everything possible to avoid defending a case in which politics were involved even indirectly, or in which the other side was known to belong to Communist ranks. In political trials the court appointed lawyers for the cases and their interventions were usually limited to their mere presence or only to formal questions.

In cases of civilian disputes, lawyers are exposed to risks of a different nature. One of them told me, "I had a very simple case of defending a peasant who accused a miller of cheating him. When the process was over I asked my client to pay me what I was entitled to get according to the rules. He, however, threatened to denounce me to the authorities, alleging I had tried to cheat him and had asked to be paid more than
was the legal tariff. And he was not a Communist. He just wanted to exploit the situation. This is the moral consequence of our progressive, Socialist system. I would rather be paid nothing than be involved in such complications.” (According to news reports,¹ there has been a change in the position of lawyers in the past two years. They are now more active in defending their clients.)

Other professions are faced with the same demands, the same restrictive regulations. Managers and engineers in state-owned factories, higher officials in an office or a state store are reluctant to make decisions. Mistakes are inevitably committed, but they are not explained as lack of experience or knowledge, but as lack of good will, and often people are accused of sabotaging the new order of Yugoslavia.

I received a visit from a Czechoslovak woman in Yugoslavia whose husband, an architect, had been condemned to five years in prison for collaboration with the Germans. She told me that after two years in jail he had been sent to supervise the construction of a public building. She begged that her husband be given permission to leave the country and go to Czechoslovakia. She explained that he was not actually released from prison but ordered to serve the term of the remaining three years by working on the building. When I remarked that it would be impossible for me to ask for her husband’s release because he was a Yugoslav citizen, she reiterated that he would prefer to return to jail. “In the prison,” she said, “he can be sure that he cannot be accused of committing an act of sabotage, but on the site, if anything happens he will be held responsible and put on trial again and the five years in prison may change into ten years, or something worse.”

This is the plight of all experts in new Yugoslavia. They are assigned to very responsible positions but they are actually afraid of them if they are not members of the Communist party. For this reason it has become a general practice that even minor decisions are left to the Communist officials.

Minister B. Kidrić, who governs the Yugoslav economic life, tried to simplify the administration of industry and on one oc-

occasion issued instructions that orders should be given by telephone. It did not take one week before general chaos resulted. The officials did not take the orders down properly and mistakes followed. When the superiors tried to trace them, they were unable to find who gave the telephone order, who received it, and what its original content was. Minister Kidrić had to withdraw his order as people were reluctant to comply with it. They were running from responsibilities.

The Communist theory puts great emphasis on criticism and auto-criticism. The press and the Communist speakers liked to stress that Stalin was the author of this theory.

In a Communist country this theory of criticism is not envisaged as an instrument of discussion and cooperation. It is reserved to members of the Communist party. People who do not belong to the privileged Communist party are excluded in advance. Any criticism coming from their ranks would be received under the assumption that it is not honestly meant and that its motives are based on a negative attitude toward the Communist system. I do not know of a case in which a non-Communist would have dared to raise his voice at a meeting or in the newspapers against any political institution or even express an opinion on purely technical or economic questions concerning production in Yugoslavia. He knows the consequences: he would be accused of reactionary thinking and of the intention to sabotage the Five Year Plan. As there are 468,000 organized Communists in Yugoslavia out of almost sixteen million inhabitants the right of criticism is, in practice, reserved to 3 per cent of the population. Ninety-seven per cent are silenced in matters of vital importance.

The Communists are invited constantly to criticize. By the rank and file, this notion is understood as an appeal to watch the non-Communists and denounce them whenever suspicious of their motives. The majority of them lack knowledge of economic or technical problems and, thus, in practice the instruction to criticize turns into a non-professional, political accusation.

Communists are very serious in fulfilling their duties and
try continually to improve their system, maintaining, of course, the basic methods and ideologies of communism. Self-criticism is aimed at improving their own ranks and if a Communist commits a mistake, and the party orders him to repent it publicly, he is expected to do so as a service to the party.

This is a very noble theory. But in practice very definite limits are put upon its use. The case of Ministers Hebrang and Žujović was a convincing demonstration that even among the highest circles of the Communist hierarchy, the application of Stalin’s theory was most rigidly restricted. Both ministers were members of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist party and as such, expressed their doubts in secret sittings of the Politburo as to the practicability of the Five Year Plan. They were assumed to understand something about it, as Hebrang was the economic dictator of Yugoslavia before Kidrić took over from him the Ministry of Industry and the chairmanships of the Economic Council and of the Central Commission for Planning. Žujović was the Minister of Finance.

In May, 1948, they were accused of factionary tendencies and in the accusation which the Politburo brought against them, and which was later published, one could read that, besides other crimes, they sabotaged constantly the Five Year Plan, criticizing some of its provisions and showing a lack of confidence in the abilities of the Yugoslav nation. A criticism expressed two years earlier was turned against them when the majority of the Politburo members found it desirable to get rid of them for other, quite different, reasons. What was considered as a primary duty of a good Communist served later as a proof that they were bad Communists, and they were chased out of the party and put in jail.

This practice of criticism and auto-criticism is called, in Communist language, party democracy.

I discussed the question of democracy with a general who was one of the top organizers of the political education of the Yugoslav Army. He was the chief political commissar of the Fourth Army. One would suppose that he would know by heart not only the main ideas of Marxism but be well-informed on general political ideology as well. He expressed himself severely about the political situation in Czechoslovakia, which
at the time of the discussion was still a democratic country. "I do not agree with the policy of your government," he said. "You have too many parties and each party has its own press; it organizes its own meetings and even presents its own list of candidates at the elections. Look at the situation in Yugoslavia. It is much better. The Communist party decides everything. Its members decide the policy of the government, they lead in Parliament, in the army, in public administration, on the collective farms, in industry—everywhere. As they act on behalf of the nation and in the interest of the nation, it is a democracy, a real democracy. It is a dictatorship of democracy."

A simple Yugoslav tells you, on the other hand, "I do not want to live in fear from the moment I wake till I fall asleep; I do not want to be afraid that what I am doing or not doing will lead me or my family into trouble. I want to live and work in peace. I want to read what I wish and to say what I feel and I want to educate my children in accordance with my conscience. This is how I understand democracy."
Two of the most powerful weapons of a Communist regime are the press and the radio. In Communist Yugoslavia they both either belong to, or are under the direct control of, the Communist party.

I have lived in the press world for many years. As Press Attaché and as a broadcaster I became familiar with the techniques of this kind of work. This gave me a good background to study the methods of totalitarian propaganda.

The Yugoslav Communists, as all Communists, attack the press and radio of the western countries as servants of capitalism; they deny that they are free. According to them, the newspaper and radio companies defend the interests of Wall Street and the City (of London).

The Communists maintain that it is only their press which gives free information about current affairs and provides the right political education.
In Yugoslavia the organization of the sources of information is strictly centralized. There is only one agency through which a Yugoslav paper can receive information. It is the telegraph agency, TANJUG. Any kind of news, whether from the country or from abroad, must pass through this agency. Its central office is in Belgrade and branches are in every capital of the six republics. The news coming from abroad can be handled by the Belgrade office only. It has its correspondents in the most important capitals of the world and receives the services of big agencies. No newspaper is allowed to subscribe to any foreign agency independently.

The chiefs of individual departments of the TANJUG are Communists. They receive daily instructions at conferences arranged for them by the AGITPROP, the central office of Communist propaganda, under the supreme control of Minister Djilas. Any matter of major importance is referred to AGITPROP separately. Confidential directives are issued as to which news should be specially publicized and which should be suppressed.

On the basis of these instructions TANJUG issues daily bulletins which are distributed to the newspapers and these contain only material which the editors are allowed to publish. Instructions are added on what page the news must appear, under which title and even in which type. Either the AGITPROP or TANJUG writes the commentaries and then usually orders them published as original articles of the newspaper. Only seldom do editors write articles and if they show such initiative, they do not fail to ask the AGITPROP for its approval.

News coming from abroad which is not favorable to the policy of Yugoslavia is printed on a special bulletin of TANJUG—a red bulletin—which is sent to high governmental circles and editors-in-chief for their private reading only. All information of this kind, which is generally published in the newspapers abroad, is considered highly secret in Yugoslavia.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia issues its official daily paper, Borba. It is printed in Serbian and Croatian and distributed all over the country. According to official figures some 700,000 copies are printed daily. All technical facilities are used in publishing this newspaper to show its superiority over
any other daily. It is printed in a modern printing house to which the Germans, in 1938, gave the machinery when they were buying the sympathies of Fascist Premier Stojadinović, and provided his newspaper, Vreme, with this equipment.

From time to time in Yugoslavia there may be a scarcity of paper which has to be imported from abroad; however, Borba never suffers from shortages. Also it is distributed by the air lines, the service of which is not allotted to other papers. It is given every advantage to become the only leading source of daily Communist information, because it is politically most important and provides a regular income to the party. Large advertisements coming from state-owned shops and other commercial and industrial state institutions contribute to the paper's income.

In almost every Yugoslav town there exists a local Communist paper the standard of which is low. To a great extent it reprints news from Borba, according to the instructions of the TANJUG. These reprints are often published after a delay of two or three days. The service of TANJUG is poorly equipped technically, and the distances between individual towns are considerable.

The delay in publishing news has become characteristic of the Communist press. It is a common occurrence for speeches by foreign politicians or important news from abroad to be published several days late. The delay is caused by the AGITPROP which makes a careful study of each speech or news item and then carefully prepares the text for publication. The aim of informing the nation as quickly as possible is not considered.

In every larger town there are also newspapers belonging, theoretically, to the National Front or sometimes to a National Front party. With the exception of Politika, published in Belgrade, which used to be a daily newspaper of nation-wide influence, other papers are of minor significance. Their content does not differ from that of the Communist party newspapers. The AGITPROP uses them as channels for the Communist propaganda. Prominent scientists or intellectuals are often instructed to write articles in these non-Communist papers to create the impression that they support the Communist policy.
On some occasions they print commentaries which the party does not want to support fully but which it still considers useful to have expressed.

These rules of the "free" press of Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito are very strict. They may, however, often serve as a guide for the experienced reader, who has no access to impartial information, in judging the significance of the material published and in guessing forthcoming developments.

The case of Minister Hebrang was illustrative. His quarrel with Tito, dating from 1946, was never mentioned in the newspapers. At that time nobody knew what was going on behind the scene. A systematic reader of the newspapers, however, found that Hebrang's speeches had started to appear on the third or fourth pages, giving the first indication that something was not in order. Later, Hebrang was transferred to the newly founded Ministry of Light Industry and finally in May, 1948, "relieved of the function" of this ministry, as the official announcement said. People who were able to interpret the Communist terminology realized that he was politically liquidated. Two months later his arrest was announced.

If a picture of a politician is published on the first page, one may be sure that the man is very important in the Communist hierarchy, regardless of the public function he performs. If his picture is shifted one day to another page, the man is going downhill.

The speeches and pictures of Marshal Tito can be published only on the first page. This rule must be strictly observed. Up to the break of the Yugoslav Communist party with the Cominform, it applied also to the Soviet leaders—Stalin, Molotov, and Vishinsky. Stalin's picture continued to enjoy this privilege for a certain time after the break, as the Yugoslav leaders felt that they could retain his sympathies and find, through him, their way back into the good graces of the Cominform. When, however, his picture was dropped from the front page, it was a certain sign that the Yugoslav hope for reconciliation had evaporated.

The Communist newspapers, as a source of information, are strongly one-sided. The speeches of Communist leaders of the Soviet Union used to be published fully, and as they often took
several hours to deliver, they covered three or four pages of the newspaper. The speeches of Molotov or Vishinsky or Gromyko or even less important Soviet personalities before the United Nations, were regularly published. The same applied to those of Dimitrov, Bierut, and even the Albanian Communist leader, Enver Hoxha. When, however, President Truman or other western world statesmen spoke, either nothing appeared in the Yugoslav papers or a short extract was provided with appropriate titles or comments about "American capitalism." Since the conflict with the Cominform, this has changed. The Soviet-bloc leaders no longer enjoy front page publicity and the news about "western capitalism" is somewhat less conspicuous.

Everything in the press serves the Communist policy and is meant to educate for communism and to support Communist aims. According to the instructions from the AGITPROP, this educational campaign concentrates periodically on standard issues. One week a campaign is launched against western imperialism; another time a crusade against illiteracy of the country is waged; then all efforts are turned to support of the Five Year Plan. Soon each subject is dropped as if it had disappeared and the problem were solved. Later on, it is brought up again.

A friend told me once, "If I were deported to an island where there was no living soul, and I was completely cut off from the outside world but was allowed to receive Borba, I would not know what was going on in the world. I would know, however, what was wrong in our country. These people from TANJUG have taught me to read 'between the lines' in newspapers."

Official Yugoslav circles and the Communists declare that there is no interfering censorship in Yugoslavia. Technically, this is true. No censorship is necessary in a country in which every bit of information has to pass through a central agency before it is distributed to the press and in which no original articles are written without a "spontaneous" consultation with the AGITPROP. Newspapermen have actually ceased to be journalists and have been changed into a kind of machine which gives the news only a technical shape. Many of them are aware of the humiliation through which they have had to
pass. In fact, the majority of the Yugoslav journalists are not Communists. But it is sufficient to have a Communist at the head of every newspaper and a Communist secretary in the paper’s trade union to guarantee that there will be no leakage of news which does not fit into the picture of Communist propaganda.

Communist politicians attack the “press magnates” of the western newspapers. But there is no magnate in the western countries who has such power and influence as Minister Djilas, who exercises limitless control over hundreds of Yugoslav periodicals of all kinds. He is doing so “on behalf of the nation” while a western magnate is said to “exploit and abuse the nation.”

I had continual difficulties with the Yugoslav press. It was my official duty to see that my country was properly presented in Yugoslavia, and I was dissatisfied because the Yugoslav press scarcely mentioned what was happening in Czechoslovakia. The reason was political. Up until February, 1948, when the Communists forcibly turned my country into a “people’s democracy,” Czechoslovakia was considered by the Yugoslav Communists as a half reactionary country because its government was composed not only of Communists but also of democratic parties. Therefore no favorable information was published about it, though it was an allied country. News of an economic nature was not published because the readers would see that there was steady progress in production, and prosperity in general, in a country which was not Communist. This would be a contradiction of the Communist preaching that all non-Communist countries are doomed to economic bankruptcy.

There was a woman employed at the Czechoslovak Embassy as assistant Press Attaché who was the daughter of Klement Gottwald, the Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist party, later the Prime Minister, and now President of Czechoslovakia. Curiously enough, the fact that she was married to a Yugoslav who held a high official position in the Yugoslav foreign service did not hamper her employment in the Czechoslovak diplomatic service. I was sure that she would tell her husband everything that happened in the Embassy, and I
used this channel whenever I wanted the Yugoslavs to get "confidential" information. She divorced her husband later and married Alexej Čepička, the Minister of National Defense in the Communist government of Czechoslovakia and one of the most hated men, who was responsible for the persecution of many patriots.

I entrusted the daughter of Mr. Gottwald with the special task of preparing for the Yugoslav press news about Czechoslovakia and I made it known to the editors that the material which was being sent them was written by somebody who could not possibly be suspected of trying to smuggle in "half reactionary information." She did the work for six months but with no success; not a single piece of news edited by her and supplied by the Embassy was published.

When I complained about it to Mr. Velebit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he pretended that the press in Yugoslavia was free and independent and that he could not do anything. I decided to visit "the Communist press magnate," Djilas, and put before him all the material which the Embassy had written in vain. Djilas was powerful and frank enough not to have to play up the story about the independence of the Yugoslav press; he seemed to accept my arguments and promised to give adequate instructions immediately. I was agreeably surprised when the following day his deputy, Vladimir Dedijer, came to see me and we agreed upon many things regarding the increase of publicity about Czechoslovakia in the Yugoslav press. Two months later, he came to see me again and proudly showed me the statistics of the AGITPROP giving Czechoslovakia first place in publicity. The articles were all quotations of the Czechoslovak Communist press attacking the democratic parties.

The Communist control of the radio is even simpler than that of the press. There are radio stations in every capital of the six republics and as they are also owned by the state, their supervision does not present any difficulties. I know, however, that only a few people turned on their sets to listen to the news given by the Yugoslav radio. They turned the dial to the Voice of America coming from New York and to the BBC from London, and to Paris. There was hardly any family which did
not listen regularly to the broadcasts from abroad, the only source of general information. This news spread quickly in the town, often in exaggerated, optimistic versions, expressing the hopes for the future to which these people clung.
An American friend asked me one day to tell him something about various Yugoslav schools I had visited. I had to shrug my shoulders and point out that there is a great difference between the attitude of a Yugoslav school administrator and that of his American counterpart. In Tito's country (as throughout eastern Europe) you don’t just drop in and look at a school. It is most difficult to get permission to visit classes, and the would-be visitor finds himself answering questions about his intentions, his background, and what he wants to do with the precious information he might receive. A deep-lying suspicion of investigators and their purposes lurks in the mind of Yugoslav officialdom and hinders even the most ordinary sort of interest in educational affairs.

The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia guarantees freedom of arts and sciences, and offers state
support for the development of national culture. Schools and cultural institutions are made accessible to all classes of society.

Throughout Tito's state, attention is concentrated on the education of youth. Considerable sums are reserved in the national budgets and in the budgets of individual states for education. According to official information the number of schools increases constantly. Every federal state has its own Ministry of Education, whose activities are coordinated by a Central Committee of Schools and Sciences which has its seat in the capital. General ideological directives and textbooks alike come from this center. Although the leadership of this office is in the hands of a non-Communist, V. Ribnikar, the party itself is the supreme arbiter of all questions concerning culture, science, and education. Propaganda Chief Milovan Djilas is the real fountainhead of the Yugoslav educational system.

Textbooks in a totalitarian country have always served as a convincing proof of the complete lack of freedom in matters of science and education. According to the tenets of historical materialism, such historical notions that events are conditioned also by moral, spiritual, and idealistic factors must be swept aside, leaving only the "solidly material" basis of society.

Textbooks in history must give this one-sided interpretation of the past and ignore all others completely. The "return to the past" which we have all seen in Russia, since the meanings of history have been adapted to the theory of historical materialism, has not yet been paralleled in Yugoslavia. It is little wonder that the Yugoslav Communists fail to find any inspiration and encouragement in the history of any of the component peoples. They cannot accept the idea that people were ever satisfied before communism was introduced, and they are committed to the philosophy that only communism can give happiness and prosperity to mankind.

Such textbooks are nothing but booklets of Communist teachings. Thus, Yugoslav children have no impartial knowledge of the famous epochs of their history. The relentless
struggles of their forefathers for liberation are interpreted solely as a class struggle of slaves against external and internal exploiters. Real life began for the Yugoslav nation only in 1941 when Tito and his Partisans opened the great fight for communism. Small children have to learn in detail the five counter-offensives which Tito’s army launched against the German attacks, but they know nothing about their famous rulers and about the struggle for nationalism in the past, unless it is some off-hand remark about royal drunkards and tyrants.

It is not so much what children are taught about the past as what they are told about present-day Yugoslavia and the outside world, that should cause us to be concerned with the consequences of such education. The classroom has become a barracks for political training. Children are being intoxicated by the *mythos* of Marshal Tito, the Communist party, and the Partisans. Nothing appeals to children more than legends about heroes; nothing creates greater love and devotion. The Communists know well the power of the legend, and they constantly portray the lives of their forefathers in darkest black, contrasting the past with the present, when the country is said to be marching along the bright road of communism, led by the father of his country and the greatest teacher of the nation, to a happy and prosperous future.

Such political indoctrination is enriched by uniforms which have always attracted the minds of children. Summer camps take care of their health and energy. Children take part in mass meetings and parades, and their enthusiasm is satisfied if they can see their hero, Marshal Tito.

Children are often instructed by Communist teachers to watch what their parents do or say at home. Such children are praised as the founders of the greater Yugoslavia which is to come, even though it creates in them a feeling of superiority toward their parents. This is not to say the majority of Yugoslav teachers are Communists. On the contrary, they, like the Yugoslav clergy, are closely linked with the simple village folk from which they sprang. They speak privately with parents about the common problems of education. But under the terms and methods of Communist control, one or two teachers in each building are the real masters of the whole institution.
Political control is stronger in the high schools. Only those students who take part in public works are allowed to attend these institutions. Here they are taught the Marxist theory and grow up into militant members of the Communist community. From time to time, the class struggle finds its expression in public denunciation of children of the former bourgeoisie: they are attacked by one or two Communist students who are members of the Communist Youth Organization of Yugoslavia, and "according to the wishes of all students" they are expelled from school.

University students are equally well regulated. Only pupils who can present a certificate that they have participated in summer "voluntary work" can enter the university or continue their studies. Students are not allowed to choose freely the school which they would like to attend or the course which they would like to pursue. The Five Year Plan has estimated the number of doctors, engineers, teachers, and lawyers which the state will need by 1951. Accordingly, students are told which courses they must undertake in order that a reasonable distribution of experts will exist when the Five Year Plan comes to an end. Needless to say, the universities are not only professional schools, but institutions for the teaching of Marxism above all. Professors and students are under the firm control of one or more Communist professors and a few Communist students. In public demonstrations they act as one body.

In Yugoslavia the student has always stood in the first ranks of the struggle for liberty, progress, and democracy; he has built a living tradition in popular movements. During the war, many of these students were attracted by the nationalism of Tito's program, and some of them became Communists. Since that time, many of them have felt that they were betrayed, but they are overcome by the hopelessness of their position since the regime is firmly entrenched. The Communist government now claims to have all the students behind it, but that is not a fact.

Many university students feel that for the present they can be silenced, but they know that their old fighting spirit is not dead. They still remember the fight of their older friends and brothers. They are, thus, not easy material to be molded. It is
in the generations of elementary and high school students that Tito's work is most effective.

Illiteracy has always been one of Yugoslavia's greatest problems, and here the new government has worked hard. In such regions as Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia, illiteracy had, before the war, reached more than 70 per cent. Even in Belgrade eleven people out of every hundred could not read or write. The government launched a strenuous campaign against illiteracy and organized courses among soldiers and peasants to teach them this basic condition of knowledge. Youngsters and old people participated by the thousands. By spring, 1950, the government claimed to have liquidated illiteracy in Montenegro completely.

The drive was a tremendous one. Most of us who were in the capital were greatly impressed with this work, and felt that here was one area in which the government must be commended.

I set out to see what the people felt about the results of the "New Learning." One village teacher came to see me, and heard me praise the government's drive against illiteracy. He said, "But you are completely mistaken, Mr. Ambassador. I had to teach the course in our village. It was attended by my old parents, and a miracle happened; my people who are over sixty can now read and write a bit. But the moment the course was over they had to subscribe to Borba, the Communist daily. "They can't read what they would like to because they haven't enough money to buy the old classics, and anyhow they are not accustomed to read books. Thus they are bound to read Communist papers and then to attend the party conferences and take part in the discussions over the newspaper articles. Don't you see the purpose of this 'education' which gives the gift of reading to simple people? They are taught to read because the government can work better on a person who can read their teaching than on people who cannot. I assure you that my old folks were much happier when they did not know how to read than now when they have to consume the daily dose of Communist propaganda."
Literature and the fine arts are well developed in Yugoslavia. I know of no city in western Europe which has as many bookshops as there are in Belgrade. In every street you find not one but several shop-windows shining through the night and displaying the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, in Serbian and Russian, books of a political nature, fiction based on Partisan fighting, even poetry based on the Five Year Plan.

A good deal of space is devoted to technical works on engineering and building, which are, incidentally, the only books in foreign language which may be sold. Some foreign books with an “acceptable” point of view can be bought at Jugoknjiga, which has its bookshop at the best corner of the central avenue in Belgrade, outfitted in the best “Fifth Avenue” manner. This state-owned center has a monopoly on the import of foreign literature and newspapers and on the export of Yugoslav books and papers. Private book stores have been gradually liquidated or absorbed by the state.

Every book is scrupulously censored before it can be published. The prices of books are high, and the intelligentsia can hardly afford to buy them. Yet, the number of bookshops would indicate that all the printed material is consumed somehow. The secret is that political (and some non-political) literature is distributed by the trade unions in factories and offices to people who are coerced into buying them.

The Embassies of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia established reading rooms in Belgrade and in some other cities. They displayed books and pictures which showed the life of their respective countries and which were not of a directly political character. These displays were usually crowded by local people. Before the conflict broke out between the Yugoslav Communists and Moscow, the western embassies had difficulty in keeping their reading rooms open. Since then, however, the government has forbidden the Russian and satellite embassies to display anything which would support a hostile attitude to the Tito regime.

Yugoslavia is a country of music. Her people have beautiful songs which used to be heard in the old days in the gay local taverns in towns and villages, in forests and fields. Almost all of this folk-music has stopped. The government feels
that songs about kings and knights, about love and nature are compounded of bourgeois reaction and sentimentality. The new music concerns itself with the feats of Tito and his Partisans, and is composed specifically for the purpose of instilling communism and party loyalty. The old folks are distressed to see the national *sevdalinky* (love songs) disappear and to see them replaced by songs glorifying the new order, aimed, in a large part, against all they hold dear.

Yugoslav music is strong and active, the product of a young and promising musical tradition. Zagreb and Belgrade are centers of a good deal of musical activity. The opera in Belgrade is one of the best in Central Europe and the Balkans, and its philharmonic orchestra brings to the people performances of a considerably high standard. Many of the young people who perform here have been trained in the fine schools of Prague. They work with unselfish enthusiasm. It was sheer delight for me to find that the audiences were well trained in music and critical appraisal and that they were spontaneously grateful for good music.

The dictates of communism are applied to music as well as to the other arts. The director of music, Oskar Danon, is a young conductor of average talents but of exemplary service to Tito in the resistance movement, where he fought in the ranks of the Partisans and composed several songs about Tito.

There is no opera in the world which could exist without classical Italian compositions, and the Yugoslav opera has observed this common rule. But the greatest attention is paid to Russian compositions. Even these, however, have been changed to conform to current political necessities. One example of this was the opera *A Life for the Tsar*, by the Russian composer Glinka, in which there were several scenes portraying the spiritual life of the Russian church. These were all deleted, without respect to musical harmony or the logic of operatic structure. It did not matter that the opera was written some 150 years ago about a theme several centuries old. The new order required a different approach, and this new transcription presented the opera as an apotheosis of Russian patriotism and heroism, even to the changing of the name to that of the hero, the Russian *mužik* (peasant farmer), Ivan Susanin.
There are other cases of intervention in musical life. The name of Peter Kònjević is well known to music lovers throughout Europe. He is a composer of considerable talent, and after the war he was appointed director of the Academy of Music in Belgrade. Long before the war, he had begun work on an opera which he finished in 1928. He was dissatisfied with the result of several years of intellectual and artistic toiling and put the work aside. After the war he returned to it, and in 1947 presented the opera to the Belgrade public. Called *The Knight of Zeta*, the libretto was based on an old Montenegrin ballad from the thirteenth century, and contained ecclesiastical processions and religious scenes of the times.

The first performance was unusually successful: the music was modern, powerful, and beautiful. Every Yugoslav must have been proud that out of the inexhaustible sources of the nation’s history and talents an original musical composition of great power could be evoked which would give the world a glimpse of his nation’s culture. The atmosphere in the corridors was one of enthusiasm and admiration, even though the audience was composed mostly of privileged civil servants and officers who could secure tickets for the special occasion.

The next day, when the unforgettable tunes were still echoing in the ears of the audience, there appeared an anonymous article in the official organ of the Communist party. The author attacked the composer and the opera itself, charging that the libretto approved of the reactionary figure of the Prince, that it revived the darkness of Orthodox mysticism and better-forgotten medieval religious notions. Here was a composer who was cultivating the blackest reaction in the musical world and trying to smuggle it on to the Belgrade theatrical scene. There was not one word about the music itself, nothing about the orchestra and the chorus, not a word of expert criticism, merely an ideological *dictum*, considering its politics and its economic background. Since then the opera has been given only once, and that to a selected number of the party’s chief officials, who decided that *The Knight of Zeta* should be removed from the boards. A few weeks later the author was transferred from his important position to a secondary place as secretary of the musical department of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art.
The concerts in the cities of Yugoslavia belong to the finest expressions of the cultural greatness of her people, and most cities have a permanent philharmonic orchestra. Concerts are always sold out, and they are attended by simple folk who usually go straight from the office to the music halls, spending a relatively large amount of their income for fine music.

The philharmonic orchestra of Belgrade merits a great deal of admiration. It is composed mainly of artists who are, at the same time, members of the National Opera, and who, therefore, have hardly a free evening during the week. Their income is far below standard, and one can see that they are overworked and poorly clothed. Yet the orchestra ranks high among Balkan symphony orchestras.

With very few exceptions, no western conductor was invited to present his work to the audience. An exception was made in 1947 when a Spanish conductor, whose inadequate qualifications were balanced by the fact that he was an adherent of the Spanish government in exile, was invited to Belgrade. Another conductor, a Rumanian Communist with the famous name of Mendelssohn, appeared long enough to give a disastrous performance. Although many professional musicians are well aware of the results of this domination of the state over musical production, their opposition is limited by the fact that their source of income is directly dependent on their acquiescence to the party line.

In February, 1948, the whole world read with astonishment about the severe judgment which the Russian government passed on the works of Shostakovitch, Khachaturian, and other musicians who were accused of following an anti-national and decadent western interpretation of harmony and musical composition. The musicians of Yugoslavia were more amazed than others, because for three years they had been urged to study and perform the works of these Russian composers and to give them preference over any other compositions. They were now told that Shostakovitch was a bad, cosmopolitan musician who had abandoned his national background. The musicians of Yugoslavia were at a loss to understand the meaning of such a complete shift of policy, and many believed that this single event has harmed international communism in Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav theater has never had a high level of performance, suffering as it did from provincialism and amateurism. It lacked good producers and was handicapped by the absence of creative and cultured criticism. Since the war, however, this art, too, has known the pruning-hook of official censorship. Old classical plays have been generally discarded, and the few texts of Molière and Ostrovski have been reshaped so as to cast ridicule on the “bourgeois reactionary class of society.” Other than these, the principal works were those of Russian playwrights, whose productions remained more like political meetings and agitations than solid theatrical works.

Tickets are sold through the trade union organizations, and it is almost impossible to buy a seat in the usual way. Workers and administrative officials know that when they are asked to attend a performance, they are asked to perform as well. When the play reaches its climax they applaud vigorously so that the house turns into a well-disciplined political arena.

The government has selected two Yugoslav playwrights from prewar times, because Tito’s experts felt they expressed the mood of his government. The Serbian author of comedies, Branislav Nušić, was especially valuable, as he exposed the “upper crust” of Belgrade society, and the Slovenian author, Ivan Cankar, praised liberalism and attacked the politics of the clerical party. Both are now dead, but certainly they would be surprised to find that their works are in the service of the Communist state.

The situation in the Yugoslav motion picture industry is similar to that of other arts. The business of making pictures is new, and is still passing through the inevitable diseases that accompany childhood. There are a few domestic films, all based on Partisan warfare and party ideology, which are of rather poor workmanship. Foreign film distribution was, up to 1948, strictly limited to Russian exports, as the films of the western countries were considered to be reactionary and of poor quality. Needless to say, all theaters, film studios, operas are state-owned.

By world standards, Yugoslavs, such as Ivan Meštrović, living now in the United States, have produced great art in sculpture. There is, however, no single private individual in Yugoslavia who could afford to buy a picture or a piece of sculpture;
only governmental offices and state institutions are customers of these arts. The painters and sculptors have to produce accordingly works of "Socialist realism." Every work has to fit in with Socialist purpose: no impressionist scenery or "dead nature" can comply with this order. Thus, paintings carry the themes of a bombed village, the construction of bridges, the killing of Germans, Partisan fighting.

This does not mean that the majority of artists are Communists. Sentimentally they have remained faithful to the nation of which they are a part. In 1947, the Soviet government sent a representative collection of Russian paintings for exhibit in Belgrade. Many painters felt they were humiliated to have to see and praise the examples of "Socialist realism" which has been prominent in Russia for years. They felt that this type of art would lead to the negation of all arts and to the ruination of free and creative work.

But the Yugoslav artists have to live. Their standard of living depends on their loyalty to the regime and on their adherence to the party and the arbiters of music and the arts: Oskar Danon for music, Radovan Zogović for literature, Augustinčić for sculpture, Vučo for motion pictures. They are well paid and with other devoted political friends are rewarded by high artistic prizes which are distributed among them every year. Those artists who have not succumbed to pressure have to live in poverty, pursuing an heroic internal struggle against the curse of "Socialist realism."

The break between Stalin and Tito brought an important change in the educational and cultural life of Yugoslavia.

Towards the end of 1949, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist party ordered the revision of textbooks to eliminate any counter-revolutionary conception of socialism. Kardelj, speaking to the Academy of Science in Slovenia, attacked Soviet science for its stagnation and dead dogmatism, with anti-dialectical and anti-scientific tendencies.

Russian films were not imported and Communist artists from other countries ceased to appear in Yugoslavia. A few cultural contacts were established with the western world; musicians came in from the West, and Yugoslav artistic groups were allowed to appear in Switzerland, France, England and
elsewhere. The British Embassy in Belgrade, headed by Sir Charles Peake, has been successful in providing a lecturer in English literature for the University of Belgrade.

This change in cultural orientation of the Yugoslav Communists from the previous unlimited acceptance of the Soviet culture to interest in cultural contacts with the West, as limited and opportunistic as they may be, is not one of the unimportant consequences of Tito's break with Stalin.
RELIGION

The Constitution: Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are guaranteed to citizens. The church is separate from the state. Religious communities whose teaching is not contrary to the Constitution are free in their religious ceremonies. Religious schools for the education of priests are free and are under the general supervision of the state. The abuse of the church and of religion for political organizations on a religious basis is forbidden. The state may extend material assistance to religious communities. (Article 25)

The Christmas tradition is deeply ingrained in the hearts of people in eastern Europe and they used to celebrate it as did other Christians in the world. Even politicians and political parties stopped disputing for a moment, and newspapers carried leading articles appealing to the fine sentiments of all people to bring peace, love, and tolerance into the world. The atmosphere was solemn and inspiring.

I felt deeply depressed during my first Christmas in Belgrade after the war. There was not a trace of Christmas in the
capital. The streets, which had looked joyful in prewar Christmas seasons, were no different now than on ordinary days. The shop windows were without Christmas decorations; people walking in the streets did not carry the customary parcels; only lighted candles in a window here and there disclosed that the Christmas tradition was still alive. The newspapers did not even mention the holidays.

I remarked on the situation to some of my Czech friends. They were glad to comment that the Communist paper in Prague, _Rudé Právo_, had published on its front page a drawing of Bethlehem and a poem by a well-known Communist poet, adoring Christ the Creator. They tried to console themselves by the optimistic belief that the Czechoslovak Communists were not following the anti-religious Communist agitation, and that they, even while keeping the Communist creed, were not completely estranged from national and human sentiments. This was in 1945. But at that time the Czechoslovak Communists had to compete with the democratic parties of the country for popularity in the nation. They realized how deeply the whole nation was attached to the Christmas tradition, and they could not disregard it. It was a matter of opportunistic trading with the nation's religious feelings. The moment they seized power, the Christmas tradition was abandoned.

In Communist Yugoslavia, Christmas was not celebrated as a holiday. Workers were told that they could stay home for one day if they wished, but they were warned that their salaries would be reduced accordingly. Notes were taken about those who dared to stay at home in spite of the warning.

In 1947, the Communist government had to retreat before the unspoken but deep public indignation over the complete ignoring of Christmas in the preceding years. It instructed the newspapers to publish articles and some literary contributions, but their content was of a negation of Christmas rather than its celebration.

Religious education in Yugoslavia is entrusted mainly to the Serbian Orthodox church and to the Roman Catholic church.
The Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians, approximately 7,000,000 in population, are Orthodox. Their church has played an important role in their tormented history. It maintained their Christian feelings and supported their national consciousness against the Turkish oppression. It was one of the most faithful guardians of national traditions and is, therefore, considered to be a national church. An Orthodox priest in a Serbian village would not limit his activities to church ceremonies, but would visit families and give them counsel in matters of daily life. He would sing and drink with them, talk politics, share their pleasures and sorrows. He would not be so anxious about their religious upbringing, leaving the religious education to a rather liberal conception of creed and would not insist on a deep piety. Clericalism is strange to the Serbian Orthodox church. Yet toward the Catholics, it is intolerant and full of mistrust.

During the war, the Serbian Orthodox church refused to collaborate with the Germans. The Nazis tried to induce it by threats and concessions but neither worked. The Patriarch, Gavrilo, was first interned in Serbia and after a definite failure on the part of the Germans to gain his support he was moved to Germany to a concentration camp. Similar was the fate of some of the other high dignitaries. Many Orthodox priests joined the movement of Draža Mihajlović and fought with rifles in hand.

After the war, people waited with anxious interest to see how the relations between the government of Marshal Tito and the church would develop. Knowing that any reconciliation with the Catholic church was out of the question, Tito tried at the beginning to overlook "the sins" of the Orthodox clergy which had openly associated itself with Mihajlović. The problem of the Serbian church was not publicly mentioned for some time. But the Patriarch's deputy, Metropolitan Josip, who acted in behalf of the absent head of the church, made clear his attitude toward the new regime the moment Tito victoriously entered the capital in October, 1944. He did not pay him the customary official visit, and the two men never met.

After having found that appeasement was impossible, the government took steps to split the unity of the church. It
initiated the foundation of a separate Orthodox church of Macedonia, gaining the support of some local priests, and tried to do the same in Montenegro. It ordered Metropolitan Josip, whose diocese was Macedonia, not to return. But the Metropolitan and the Assembly (Sabor) of the Serbian Orthodox church emphatically rejected the Macedonian separatist design.

A hard blow against the church was executed when, according to the Land Reform Law promulgated in the summer of 1945, each parish was deprived of its land exceeding thirty-five hectares. The land used to be the main source of income to cover the expenses of church activities. As a consequence of the land reform, the church became entirely dependent on private donations from the very poor population.

In the summer of 1947, Patriarch Gavrilo returned from exile to Belgrade. It seems that the government negotiated his return or was at least informed about it, preferring probably to have the head of the Orthodox Serbian church at home under its control rather than letting him spread hostile activities abroad. Gavrilo made an official visit to Marshal Tito who returned it a few days later. The papers carried pictures on the front pages and the official communiqué spoke about the cordial atmosphere which prevailed throughout the conversation. In December, 1947, Patriarch Gavrilo took the floor at the Slav Congress in Belgrade and to the astonishment of many Serbs spoke in a friendly manner about Slav Russia, Stalin, and Tito. At the Assembly of the Church, however, he fully endorsed the activities of his deputy who was known to be strongly anti-Communist. This was published in the internal bulletin distributed only to churchmen so that the masses of faithful received the one-sided impression of pictures of Tito and Gavrilo in a cordial chat. Only a few people knew that the visits lacked friendliness, and that the Patriarch spoke severely about the conditions in Yugoslavia and about the standing of the Serbian Orthodox church. It became clear that he had begun a high game with the authorities of the state.

The government did not stay behind in this game. One of the few adherents of Tito from the ranks of the Orthodox church, Prota Smiljanić, in December, 1947, initiated, undoubtedly at the request of the government, a congress of Orthodox
clergymen who founded "The Association of Serbian Orthodox Ministers of the People’s Republic of Serbia." It declared its task was to collaborate closely with the authorities of the state and to bring all Orthodox churchmen into the common national effort of fulfilling the Five Year Plan.

High official circles of the church condemned this docile action of a dissident group and considered it as undisciplined and damaging to the interest of the church. But this official point of view did not reach the broad masses, because the newspapers did not publish anything about it. They did, however, report widely the declaration of the dissidents.

I had an opportunity to speak with Patriarch Gavrilo only once. It was not the custom for members of diplomatic missions to make visits to the heads of the church, as such visits would have been interpreted politically. But I was offered a special opportunity which in itself is characteristic of the situation of the church in Communist countries.

In Czechoslovakia there is a small community of the Orthodox church. After World War I, when it was founded, it asked the Serbian Orthodox church to be its patron and after that became subject to its jurisdiction. The relations between the two communities were very cordial and brotherly. During the war, the Czech branch behaved in an exemplary way and its bishop, Gorazd, was sentenced to death by the Germans. After the liberation, relations between the two were renewed but the Russian Orthodox church presented to the Czechs the idea that it would be more appropriate if the Czech Orthodox church were released from the jurisdiction of the Serbs and went over to the Russian church. The Czechs opposed the suggestion and so did the Serbs. The Soviets, of course, wanted to have a direct influence on the church in Czechoslovakia and did not like the development in the Orthodox church in Yugoslavia.

Before long, official interventionists stepped in and a group of the Czech Orthodox clergymen, under the pressure of the Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedlý, accepted a resolution asking for the change of jurisdiction. The Serbs did not want to yield under pressure and wanted to know what the real wish was of the Czechs. At this moment the matter was referred to official quarters and I was instructed to explain the
position of the Czechoslovak government to Patriarch Gavriló.

This brought me to the head of the Serbian Orthodox church on a morning in November, 1947, at the time when Czechoslovakia was the last country of the Soviet bloc still resisting the Communist terror and enjoying democratic liberties. I was not yet seated when the old, long-bearded Patriarch started the monologue. "You Czechoslovaks are happy people. There is freedom in your country and everybody can worship freely. I am sorry to be unable to say the same about Yugoslavia. I returned from abroad to take over the leadership of the ecclesiastic affairs. According to some promises made me, I hoped that there would be an improvement in the situation of our church. The facts are different, however. These gentlemen [i.e., the government] promise one thing but they have something different in their minds, and they act differently. There were cases when demonstrations were organized against our bishops and some of them cannot work at their posts and are compelled to live here in Belgrade. In Montenegro a church was dynamited and blown up, under the pretext that it is necessary to build a house of culture on the same spot. Before the war my patriarchial office used to have 150 officials; today we can sustain only ten. Metropolitan Josip cannot return to his diocese in Skoplje, and government circles want to found in Macedonia and in Montenegro a special local church.¹ It is suggested we change our name to the Yugoslav Orthodox church. This is an impossible situation. We have been in existence for two thousand years and we cannot allow ourselves to be treated in such a way.

"In the summer there were some American ministers here and they gave declarations to the press that religion enjoys full freedom in Yugoslavia. They wanted me to receive them. I sent a message to them that they should have come before they gave untruthful statements to the press. Not long ago, I received the Archbishop of York and the Dean of Canterbury. I told both of them what my opinion was about the situation.

¹In summer, 1950, after the Patriarch's death, the government did succeed in convincing the Serbian Orthodox church to found a separate church in Macedonia, and in October, 1950, the United Press correspondent reported from Belgrade that the new Patriarch, Vikentije, declared to him that "Full religious freedom prevails in the country."
"I believe in the great mission of the Slavs. It is the first time in history that the Slavs are offered a unique opportunity to become a leading factor in the world, but they must know how to use this occasion. They must never abandon Christianity."

The visit of the American clergymen which was mentioned by the Patriarch was a peculiar and somehow a very sad affair.

In the first half of 1947, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Sava Kosanović, shrewdly arranged for an excursion of a group of ministers of different Protestant denominations to see Yugoslavia, to convince themselves that there are no restrictions on religious freedom in his country. The visitors arrived in July. Their visit was widely publicized and no effort was spared on the part of the government for the group to see different regions of deeply religious Slovenia and Croatia. In every village they saw fine, very attractive old churches. The visitors were especially impressed in mountainous Slovenia by the picturesque scenes of small churches dominating every hill. One of the churchmen even remarked that it was not a healthy sign to see so many churches in a relatively poor country and that this fact actually served to prove that the old regimes built them for the Catholic church, to keep it loyal to their non-democratic governments.

The visiting Americans saw that the church services were crowded and they spoke to some priests. No one told them that the Catholic church did not enjoy full freedom and no one complained that he was not free to serve the mass. The visitors were not alarmed by the attention which the official Yugoslav circles paid them by giving them the constant company of representatives of the government.

This experience led the naive American clergymen to believe that full religious liberty reigned in Yugoslavia. They gave enthusiastic statements to the Yugoslav press which published them on the first page carrying large pictures of the ministers' appearance in different towns and of their audience with Marshal Tito.

The Communists were delighted with the obvious success of the visit and scornfully laughed at the American victims of the clever Communist arrangements. But the Catholics of
RELIGION

Yugoslavia were deeply depressed and felt they were being abandoned by the outside religious world.

The Croats and Slovenes are 100 per cent Catholic. They number approximately 5,300,000. The church means everything to them. They have been educated for hundreds of years in piety, being deeply and truly religious. They cherish an unlimited respect for the Roman Catholic church and its priests.

After World War I, the Catholic church in Yugoslavia associated itself with a narrow-minded and provincial Croat nationalism. I spent two hours with the head of the Croatian Catholics, Archbishop Alois Stepinac, in 1937, in his palace in Zagreb. He impressed me deeply by his cultivated, spiritual outlook. He certainly had the right to claim to be a good Yugoslav, being one of the few Croats who had fought as volunteers along with the Serbian brothers on the Dobrudja front in 1915. Yet, his Croat national feelings overshadowed the other aspects of the complicated problems of Yugoslavia and Central Europe and the Balkans. Already at that time the threat of Nazi Germany was very grave.

The Communists assert that during the last war the Catholic church helped the Germans and the treacherous Quislings, and they blame Archbishop Stepinac for having given full support to these activities. The Catholic church, on the other side, has praised the behavior of the Croat dignitaries during the period of occupation. The complexity of the situation is shown by the fact that the mass baptizing of the Serbs in Croatia, which saved them from the massacres executed by the Ustaše, was severely resented by one part of the Serbian people, while it was explained by the other part as a deed of Christian love.

In Slovenia, the Catholic creed and piety have been most deeply ingrained. In the political sphere the priests have been involved in a constant and exhausting struggle between the liberal and the clerical elements of the country. During the war, it is said, the Catholics were divided into one group which sided with the Partisans, another which backed the local anti-Partisan forces, and still another which remained
passive. Abroad, the Slovenian Catholics were represented by a well-known Catholic leader, Miha Krek.

The Communist government of Marshal Tito was aware of the power of the Catholic church in Croatia and Slovenia. It rightly felt that religion and the church were the most dangerous enemy of communism, and that this hostility was centered in the Catholic regions of Yugoslavia in the militant and uncompromising character of the Catholic church.

After the liberation of Croatia and Slovenia, the Partisan Army and civil authorities launched a campaign of persecution against the Catholic priests; many of them were shot and still more were arrested. Archbishop Stepinac was among those put in prison. But Tito saw that this rough treatment would only add to the glory and respect which the church enjoyed in the nation and so he tried another plan.

When he first visited Zagreb, he ordered Archbishop Stepinac to be released from prison and in a public speech he promised the Catholics full freedom of religion. At the same time he announced his far-reaching aim of breaking the universality of the Catholic church and hinted that the Croat Catholics would serve their teaching better if they gave up their international character and refused to be influenced from abroad, and instead, based their activities on a national basis. The rejection of this suggestion was foreseen and soon the short interlude of calm was shattered by a new wave of persecution. Church services were often interrupted by riots arranged by local Communists; priests were physically molested in the streets and churches; and the press unleashed a brutal campaign of slander against the Catholic church, the Vatican, and the Catholic priests.

The church answered with an emphatic defense of its rights and of religion. It was led by Archbishop Stepinac and all the other bishops of Croatia and Slovenia. In September, 1945, the bishops issued a pastoral letter, putting their case before their followers.

The letter outlined the areas in which the Catholic church had most sorely felt Communist oppression, and called for correction of these wrongs as the only hope for creating "a constant internal peace in our state." The bishops accused
the government of sentencing to death for alleged political and military crimes 501 Catholic priests, among them twenty-eight from the Franciscan Monastery at Široki Breg not one of whom “had ever had a rifle in his hands, nor fought against the army of national liberation.” Admitting that some priests could be justly accused of “sinning against the sacred law of Christian justice,” they branded as calculated propaganda the majority of the government’s accusations against the priesthood, and deplored the vacancies created in the parishes by the internment of so many.

Of the hundreds of Catholic publications circulated before the war, not one is published today, said the bishops. And, they asked, if lack of paper was the reason for revoking the licenses (as the government claimed), what of the confiscation from the Archbishop’s palace of several wagonloads of paper belonging to the Catholic press?

Another grievance was the closing of the Catholic private high schools and many of the Catholic institutions maintained for the children of the working class. The introduction of legal civil marriage offended the church; charitable works were interfered with. The land reform confiscated so much land belonging to the church that what it retained “is insufficient to maintain seminaries, the central Bishop offices, cathedrals, churches, and the clergy.” Here, the bishops pointed out, their objection was to the arbitrary use of force in taking land rather than to the principle of land reform.

Finally, disclaiming any intent “to provoke a struggle against the government of this state,” the letter demanded, for the sake of

peace and the healing of the wounds of war in our state

. . . complete freedom for the Catholic press and for the Catholic schools, and the teaching of religion in all classes of the elementary and high schools; freedom for Catholic philanthropic activities and respect for the Catholic marriage; as well as the restitution of the Catholic institutions which were taken away from the church.

The government of Yugoslavia did not react at once to this severe attack by the Catholic bishops and tried to conceal it from the wider public. When, however, the clergy did not
TITO'S COMMUNISM

retract before the threats of the local Communist secretaries and read the pastoral letter from the pulpits of almost all churches, and when the letter was distributed in thousands of copies all over the country, the government felt that it could not keep silent.

The Communist party considered it necessary to engage Marshal Tito actively and publicly in the fight. At the end of October, 1945, all Yugoslav papers published Tito's article "About the Pastoral Letter." In his long article Marshal Tito antagonistically reproached the Catholic bishops for taking such a deeply hostile attitude toward the new federal Yugoslavia. He asked them why they did not issue a similar message against the mass murders of the Serbs in Croatia during the government of Pavelić and the Germans, since they were willing to sacrifice their lives in the fight against the new democratic Yugoslavia—against the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav nation. They were ready, the Marshal accused, for any sacrifice to save their land and personal interests, yet the bishops were spreading hatred among the population, although there was complete freedom of religion. He stressed that he never promised any concessions to the representatives of the church on the account of the nation, and concluded,

I would not like this to be understood as a warning, but I must bring to your attention that there exist laws which forbid the spreading of chauvinism and disunion and the endangering of the results of our great liberation struggle. These laws must be respected by everybody who has the good of his country at heart.

From that moment on, the open fight between the Catholic church and the Communist government was resumed. The newspapers began a systematic attack on the Catholic priests, bringing reports and pictures of their anti-national behavior in time of war and preparing the ground for a decisive blow. The Catholic priests continued to preach the words of the Gospel. Archbishop Stepinac preached in the old Gothic Cathedral in Zagreb against atheistic communism and the anti-spiritual philosophy of materialism. His prayers were spread over the country in thousands of leaflets.

Marshal Tito tried to stop this dangerous development by
steps which were meant to save the face of the government and silence the Archbishop at the same time. As he told me, and as it was admitted later publicly, he suggested to the Vatican representative in Belgrade, Nuncius Monseigneur Hurley, that the Vatican withdraw the Archbishop, warning him that otherwise he would be tried and material compromising the Catholic church would be made known to the public. It seems that Tito's counsellors in canon law did not tell him that there is no provision which could remove an Archbishop, and anyhow, the Catholic church would not have done it as this would have been interpreted as admission of guilt and a retreat.

After the failure of this diplomatic attempt to remove the audacious dignitary, the government took the usual step of liquidation of enemies. In autumn, 1946, Archbishop Stepinac was arrested and placed on trial. He was accused of treachery committed in the war by collaboration with the Germans and the Quisling Croatian government of Pavelić and of approving the cruelties of the Ustaše against the civilian population. His defense was as bold and courageous as his preaching. He did not shrink before the threats. The court which was presided over by a young Communist judge, whose Jewish mother Stepinac personally had saved from the Nazi fury, condemned him to sixteen years of hard labor in prison.²

Since then, very little has been heard about the struggle of the Catholic church and the government, though it has gone on silently as it inevitably has to. No prominent priest gave support to the Communists, with the one exception of Monseigneur Rittig. But every Catholic in Yugoslavia knew that this same gentleman served King Alexander and many anti-Croat governments before the war. His present loyalty to Tito was not esteemed either.

It would seem that the believers of any denomination in Yugoslavia are not limited in attendance of religious services. The churches are always crowded to full capacity and visited more than ever before. Yet, it is not a freedom of conscience and religion. People are afraid to pray for those whom they love, and they are aware of the fundamentally anti-Christian

²In the fall of 1950, Marshal Tito indicated his readiness to release the Archbishop if he renounced his bishopric office.
government to which they are compelled to express their loyalty. Religion is taught only in the elementary schools and in order to make the number of children who wish to attend the classes of religion as small as possible, parents are asked to sign a paper that it is their wish that their child attend them. It is an act of courage to do so. Children are obliged to participate in different political meetings, as the manifestations on May Day, but they cannot freely celebrate Christmas and other church holidays. On such occasions schools are ordered to take pupils for an excursion to prevent their going to church.
There were two important trials in Yugoslavia concerning people whom the government considered to be the two greatest war criminals. One took place in Zagreb in September, 1946, with Archbishop Alois Stepinac, and the other in Belgrade in June, 1946, with General Draža Mihajlović. The first was condemned to sixteen years in prison, the latter to death.

This chapter, however, is not concerned with trials based on crimes allegedly committed against the Partisans during the war, but with sentences which were passed against those who trespassed against the new Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito, once it was established.

At the beginning of 1947, eight Yugoslav citizens were put on trial for spying for a foreign secret service, for supplying
an Embassy with mendacious information, and for collaborating with the enemy during the war. The leader of the accused group was an octogenarian, Miša Trifunović, the chairman of the Serbian Radical party and a former Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government in exile. According to the indictment, they were charged with contacts with the American Embassy in Belgrade; with the first Counsellor of the Embassy, Harold Shantz; with the Deputy Agricultural Attaché, Pridonoff; and with Lieutenant Kasuvick, the aide to the Naval Attaché. It was said that the defendants were giving false information about the political and economic conditions in Yugoslavia, about shooting of citizens, concentration camps, removing of economic experts from the public administration, about a government of terror, continuation of the Partisan war, about Marxist courses, education of the youth in the spirit of the Hitlerjugend, about the terror in elections.

It is impossible for a person who is not acquainted with the real substance and details of these accusations to judge the accuracy of facts about the alleged activities of the defendants. But one sees what kind of activities or contacts can be considered a grave crime in a Communist country.

In a democratic country, it is a matter of normal life that diplomats have contacts with the population of the country to which they have been accredited. It belongs to the elementary duties of a diplomat to cherish these contacts and have many friends who would help him in getting better acquainted with the life, customs, and local peculiarities, and to give him an opportunity to inform larger sections of the population about the conditions prevailing in his own country. In the last thirty years, more and more emphasis has been placed on this part of a diplomat’s mission.

In a democratic country a diplomat does not need to try to elicit questions from a private individual. The press discloses to him, if carefully read, a great deal. Specialized economic periodicals publish news about the country’s production, exports and imports, employment, social conditions, and the like, and they accompany them with comments. No private individual can supply an expert diplomatic officer with better information than the press.
For diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union and other Communist states nothing is easier than to establish wide contacts with whomever they wish in democratic countries. Communist politicians living in such countries consider it their duty and highest honor to be in close, open and secret, contact with the Communist diplomats.

In a Communist country the diplomats are cut off from any normal contacts with the non-official world and from any normal source of information. The press avoids mentioning anything which would give a foreign observer an indication of affairs which are considered confidential. An atmosphere of distrust and fear prevails.

In Yugoslavia the diplomatic corps lived almost isolated from the outside world. The western diplomats were careful not to endanger private individuals by inviting them to their homes or by speaking with them outside.

The French Ambassadress had a small dog which she wanted to breed. She knew of somebody in the country who owned a dog of the same kind. She visited him, and the owner was summoned to the police the following day and kept in jail for some time.

After her arrival in Belgrade my wife visited some friends whom she knew before the war. They were very pleased to see her, but after a few minutes told her frankly that it would be better if she did not come any more. It evoked suspicion when an automobile with diplomatic signs stood in front of their home. They were embarrassed by a purely private visit and kept looking out of the window to see whether anyone was watching the house. With the exception of official parties, they preferred not to come to the Embassy either.

The process with M. Trifunović and other accomplices served as a warning to every Yugoslav to be careful in seeking contacts with, or in accepting invitations from, diplomats. Every Yugoslav fully understood its purpose. The warning was grave. M. Trifunović was condemned to eight years in prison but after some time was released. Three of the other defendants were condemned to death. The American Embassy was exposed to a series of offensive articles attacking its illegitimate activities.
Marshal Tito spoke with me about this process and said, "I brought to the attention of the American Ambassador the activities of some of his officials who were in contact with subversive elements in the country. I gave him a file about it, to redress it. With good will, it would have been possible to solve the question in a friendly way. But he did not even care to answer."

It would seem that the American Embassy in Belgrade had nothing to hide from Yugoslav public opinion.

It is curious that the Soviet Embassy was even more isolated from the outside world in Yugoslavia than the diplomatic missions of the western countries. The reasons were different in this case. People did not need to worry about safety when seeing the Soviet Ambassador who was free to seek contacts with anybody. But he was brought up in a Soviet diplomatic school which does not care about personal links of diplomatic officials with private individuals. He relied on information which he was given from official quarters.

Now, after the conflict of the Communist party of Yugoslavia with the Cominform, considerable change has occurred also in this sphere. People would not dare now to visit the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade. Such a contact would immediately raise the suspicion that they were plotting with the Soviets against the Yugoslav government.

At the beginning of 1947, three people were sent to death and thirty-five to prison after a trial in a southern Serbian town, Priština, for having organized armed bands which were preparing a violent political upheaval in Yugoslavia, this time with the help of British and Greek "reaction."

In the spring of 1947, Dragoljub Jovanović, a member of the Yugoslav Parliament, was arrested. Characteristically enough, the Yugoslav people were not told anything about it. Only the foreign correspondents in Belgrade were summoned to a confidential conference, and they could send the news to their papers. The Yugoslav newspapers were allowed to publish it only several months later when the official release announced that D. Jovanović was deprived of parliamentary immunity
and of the mandate itself, and that he would be tried for a crime of spying for a foreign power. The Deputy Prime Minister, E. Kardelj, told me in June that Jovanović was arrested because he was, according to extensive documentation, in contact with the American Embassy and the American service of espionage.

Dragoljub Jovanović is a Serb about fifty years of age, born in Pirot, a small town not far away from the Bulgarian frontier. He is a small unostentatious man. With his thick spectacles he looks more like a professor than a political figure, though he was, actually, both. As a peasant leader he attracted masses of his constituency by a popular approach to their problems, and as a professor of sociology at the Belgrade University he had a considerable following among the students who looked to him as to a courageous democrat and an excellent teacher. He was a man of penetrating intellectual strength.

Jovanović, for many years, had been one of the leading members of the Serbian Peasant party, but he did not always agree with the official leadership of Jovan Jovanović and Milan Gavrilović, which was too static for his restless temperament and too conservative for his socially progressive opinions. Finally, he left the party and founded his own, the National Peasant party. He based its program mainly on the idea of a progressive peasant policy to improve the material standards of the peasantry through radical land reforms, a cooperative system, and social laws. He followed the agricultural policy of the Soviet Union with great interest and made no secret of his sympathies toward the Soviets at the time when they were viewed with hostility by the Royal Yugoslav government.

Politically, however, Jovanović strictly adhered to his democratic convictions. His political and intellectual influence surpassed the circles of his own party and his popularity became too dangerous to the dictatorial government of Yugoslavia under King Alexander. He was deprived of his university position and sent to confinement for five years, at Sjenica. This should have been good reason for his acceptance by the post-war government of Marshal Tito.

His war-time story does not reveal much about his activities. Tito himself acknowledged, in an article written in 1944 for
the American press, that the group of Jovanović belonged to his first political allies, in the summer of 1941. But later Jovanović was denounced by Tito for his non-participation in the Partisan war and his complete passivity toward the enemy. It is true that he did not join the Partisan headquarters and stayed in hiding somewhere in Serbia.

After the war, the Communist party, aware of Jovanović’s influence and finding it impossible to brand a man with an unmistakable democratic record as a reactionary, accepted his party into the National Front and assigned to him the function of the secretary of the National Front of Serbia and made him a member of the highest representative political body, the Presidium of the People’s Assembly. The Communist leaders thought that this would be the best way to appease and calm his rebellious spirit and to let him serve the Communist purposes.

After a short time this proved to be a wrong calculation. Dragoljub Jovanović uttered some criticism in Parliament. He started to object to the government’s foreign policy which, according to his opinion, was directed only toward the Soviet Union. He also reproached the Communist party of Yugoslavia for representing its friendship to Russia as a matter of one party when the friendship should have been represented as that of the whole Yugoslav nation.

He severely criticized the economic policy of the government which carried out far-reaching reforms but did not inform Parliament and the nation about them. As a member of the Assembly he could not agree with a practice of the government which put the budget before the legislative body in the most general terms without any specifications and which expected it would be unanimously accepted after a short fake debate. He asked consistently and repeatedly for more detailed information about the economy of the country.

He attacked the government’s policy in the sphere of culture which he considered to be of national importance and not a matter to serve the objectives of the Communist party alone.

He burst into the most audacious criticism of the judicial system of the new Yugoslavia, which was actually in the hands of public attorneys serving the Communist ideology rather than adhering to the principle of impartial justice.
With two other members of the National Peasant party, Jovanović finally went into open opposition against the policy of the Yugoslav government. This was, however, confined only to parliamentary debates as no newspapers were allowed to print the speeches he made, and he was forbidden to speak at public meetings. Only people who were privileged enough to get a seat in the Parliament knew about Jovanović’s position and they could hear his statements with much difficulty as he was constantly interrupted by other members who tried to silence him by shouts of “traitor, reactionary, spy, servant of western imperialists.”

The opposition of Jovanović was not allowed to last for long, though. As everything in a Communist country is done “in behalf of the nation” the action against Jovanović had to start from below.

So, when Jovanović, usually called only by his first name, Dragoljub, returned one day to his constituency at Pirot, where every child knew him and where he enjoyed great popularity, a few Communist local agitators made it physically impossible for him to appear before his political adherents. They compelled him to return to the railway station, mobbed by youngsters hurling insults at him and pelting him with rotten eggs. He had to mount the train and return to Belgrade. The following day the newspapers carried a story that the inhabitants of Pirot were angered at the mere appearance of Dragoljub and that the national militia had to protect him from the fury of the people.

A further step followed. People in the Pirot region were presented with a declaration that Dragoljub was a traitor and that they did not recognize him any more as their representative in Parliament. They were asked to sign it. Several thousands did sign, the majority of them undoubtedly his adherents of long standing. Once faced with the choice either of joining in this public persecution or remaining faithful, with all the consequences which such an act of courage would have meant for them, they felt that the only thing to do was to denounce their leader.

Measures which followed were a matter of routine. The will of the nation had been ascertained, and it was considered
a logical consequence that Jovanović was no longer worthy to speak on behalf of his voters. First, his own party, of which he was the founder and the chairman, excluded him from its ranks. His closest associates in the executive committee were compelled to perform this act of shame although some of them did it gladly to satisfy their ambition to become the leaders of the party. They later paid the penalty of complete subservience to the Communist party.

Then, Dragoljub was excluded from the Parliament and arrested, put on trial and condemned to eight years of prison for collaboration with a foreign service of espionage and for serving a foreign power.

The real background of Dragoljub's condemnation was revealed to me by Minister Milovan Djilas, in his usual frank way. It was shortly before the election for the Parliament in Italy, in April, 1948, which was considered, and was later proved, to be of historical importance. I met Djilas and asked him what would be his guess about the results of the Italian election. He answered: "I do not think that the Italian Communists and Neni's Socialists together will gain 50 per cent. But if they succeed in receiving only 40 per cent of the votes it will be a considerable blow to the government. Can you imagine to what difficulties a government would be exposed which has against its policy almost one-half of the nation? It would be a very powerful opposition. We had in our Parliament one Dragoljub only and we could not bear him. We had to silence him."

In the summer of 1947 Yugoslav public opinion was excited by another political process, this time held in the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana. Again a foreign power was involved, Great Britain. Among the defendants was Professor Furlan, a man well-known in England from World War II. He had defended Tito and his Partisans against attacks of the Yugoslav government in exile and had not missed an occasion to popularize Marshal Tito in British political and intellectual society. He sincerely believed in Tito's democratic convictions, and when the war was over, was nominated a member of the local Slovenian government. After his first disillusionment with governmental service, he left the government and his activities
were limited to university life. He did not keep secret the contacts he maintained with his old British friends which, however, in the eyes of the secret police were acts of espionage. Furlan was condemned to death but the sentence was later changed to life imprisonment. Some of the other defendants did not escape the rope. The issue was, as in all other political cases, to warn every Yugoslav that there was no mercy for people who cherished contacts, of whatever nature, with the representatives of western powers.

In January, 1948, a trial was opened in another section of Yugoslavia, in the capital of the Macedonian Federal Republic, Skopje. Seventeen men were put on trial for acts of espionage, for preparations of terroristic actions, and for attempts to overthrow the constitutional democratic order of Yugoslavia. Among the defendants were two professors, one minister of the Orthodox church, one former judge, two teachers, several officials, businessmen, and two artisans. The prosecutors had found out almost three years after the war that these people had served the Germans and incited the members of the Turkish minority against the Partisan fighting. Besides, they were accused of maintaining contacts with a foreign power, Turkey, supplying the Turkish Consul with false information about the situation in Yugoslavia, and developing, in agreement with and aided by the Turkish Ambassador, activities against the democratic authorities of the new Yugoslavia. They acted, it was said, on the assumption of an approaching war which would allow them to stab the Yugoslav Army in its back, waiting for the invasion of the Americans and the British. Four defendants were condemned to death and the rest to jail for terms extending from four to twenty years.

Politically the most sensational trial was held in April, 1948, in Ljubljana. It was the first time in Communist Yugoslavia that members of the Communist party had been put on trial. Fifteen well-proved Communists were accused of collaboration with the enemy during the war, of espionage for western powers, and sabotage of the Socialist economic order of the new Yugoslavia. The majority of them had participated as volunteers on the side of the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War, a record which by itself is considered good evidence of
a political creed that can be relied on. Also during World War II they were all in a concentration camp at Dachau, Germany, where they founded a secret anti-Fascist organization. After the liberation, they were assigned to important functions in the public administration and in the nationalized industry. One of them became Deputy Minister of Industry; others, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, university professors, inspector-generals of the economy in Slovenia, etc.

The accusation stated that while in the concentration camp all fifteen defendants had been in the service of the German secret police, the Gestapo, that they had denounced other imprisoned patriots, had participated in the criminal bacteriological experiments performed on political prisoners, and that their anti-Fascist organization had served as a cover for their crimes. After the war, also, they had worked as agents of the British espionage service which, it was said, had discovered their wartime activities and threatened to hand them over to the Yugoslav authorities if they declined to serve its purposes. Further, they were said to have sent information to the espionage centers in Belgrade and in Vienna, Austria, about production and economic plans in Yugoslavia, and had tried to hinder the economic reconstruction and rise of Yugoslavia.

The main part of the trial was secret, but the sentence was public; eleven people were condemned to death and four to jail to serve terms from twelve to twenty years. The condemnation was accompanied by the usual series of articles attacking the obscure activities of the western powers against the new, socialistic and democratic Yugoslavia.

The first half of 1949 widened the scope of political processes in Yugoslavia. Since Marshal Tito and the Communist party of Yugoslavia have been expelled from the Cominform and have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the Kremlin, the tide of accusations of spying activities has turned to the East.

In Macedonia, several Bulgarians were tried and condemned for serving in the Bulgarian Army during the war and for committing acts of cruelty against the population of the Yugo-
slav part of Macedonia, which had been occupied by Bulgaria. The Yugoslav authorities had not considered it opportune to expose these crimes in a public trial when the two people's democracies lived in a deep friendship, but these considerations were dismissed when Premier Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria abandoned the policy of friendship and joined with other Soviet satellites in attacking the Yugoslav party and Tito's government.

Another political trial took place in April, 1949, in Novi Sad, the capital of the Serbian province, Vojvodina. Again a Communist power was involved—Hungary. Eight people were accused of distributing anti-Tito leaflets in Yugoslavia and spying for Hungary. They had been sent to Yugoslavia by the Ministry of Interior of the Hungarian government which was ready to free them of charges of fascism if they would enroll in an espionage service for Hungary.

In December, 1949, ten Soviet citizens, former refugees, were sentenced to from three to twenty years of prison for espionage, on behalf of the Soviet Union. The following month ten Albanian nationals were brought to trial for espionage, subversive activities, and terrorism. In the spring, 1950, two Yugoslav officers, Major General Branko Petričević and Colonel Vladimir Dapčević, were sentenced to twenty years for treachery and espionage for Russia.

Some people are inclined to conclude from these political trials held in Yugoslavia or in other Communist countries that the totalitarian regimes are weakened and perhaps even threatened by an underground opposition. They believe that the political trials are an expression of a growing activity against the government. I think they are wrong.

One should not fail to understand the purpose of these trials. If people are for one reason or another publicly accused and a public trial is held, it is not because the Communists respect the basic principles of justice. The culprits could be dealt with secretly, as is often the case. But the publicity given from time to time to such trials follows a distinctly political aim: it serves as a warning addressed to three sections of public life—to the democrats, showing them what kind of a fate awaits them if they dare raise their heads;
to the Communists, when party members appear before a tribunal, showing them that there is no mercy for those who violate the iron party discipline; and finally, to the diplomats and foreign correspondents, showing them that they should avoid any contacts outside the strictly selected group of officials who have been given permission to seek acquaintance with foreigners.

It is difficult to judge the real background of political trials because the evidence produced is one-sided. The documents are not accessible and what is presented to the court is carefully scrutinized so as not to make public what should remain a secret of the Communist party. The defense of the accused people is practically non-existent. The whole proceeding offers, therefore, a very partial picture.

I am of the opinion that organized opposition to a Communist government within the borders of the country is actually impossible. The broad masses may be, as they certainly are, very hostile to the Communist usurpers of power and they represent potentially a constant and great danger which, at a moment of a culminating international conflict, might burst into a national upheaval and finally tear the totalitarian machinery to pieces. But in the time when the Communist government feels relatively safe from an external threat, no organized opposition can grow and turn into a revolt from the midst of the nations which live under its constant control. The people can barely crawl under systematic personal and economic oppression. They are tired and the notion of old heroism aimed against tyrants, which so often used to fill the pages of history, has evaporated from the spirits and bodies of men who have to struggle for their daily life.

Modern techniques have given to a police regime many advantages in detecting, following, and suppressing any sign of opposition. In the old days, it was a simple matter for a few audacious men to prepare secretly and execute an overthrow of a bad ruler. Their movements passed unnoticed, their whereabouts being uncontrolled. In modern times, however, rapid means of communication have given to the police instruments which facilitate the control of practically every corner of the country. Administrative measures, enforced by these technical
means, make it impossible for any individual to leave a town and move somewhere else without permission. Otherwise, he gets involved in a conflict with the law. The political monopoly of the Communist parties makes it impossible for democratic politicians to take an active part in public life and keep up the spirit of discontent. And above all, there are too many rifles in the hands of the Communists.

By years of practicing oppression, police methods have been developed to perfection. This has been proved in the last thirty years by the Fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, and Spain, by the Communist regime of Soviet Russia, and more recently by the Communist governments in eastern Europe.

It is a sad and discouraging assertion, but hopes and faith should not be fed by wishful thinking.
POLITICS AND THE LAW

The Constitution: Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of person. No person may be detained under arrest for longer than three days without the written and motivated decision of a court of law or of a public prosecutor. The maximum period of detention is determined by law. No person may be punished for a criminal act except by sentence of a competent court on the basis of the law establishing the competence of the court and defining the offense (ARTICLE 28).

The law courts are independent in their dispensing of justice and mete out justice according to the law. The courts are separate from the administration in all instances (ARTICLE 116).

IN THE EARLY DAYS AFTER THE LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, Lenin’s slogan that "splinters fall if a forest is cut down" came to be a true and dreaded expression. The Partisan police marched through the streets of Yugoslav towns, and people were taken into custody without a warrant being issued or without any reason being given. Revolutionary justice worked
at full speed. Hundreds of people disappeared and were never seen thereafter. Relatives were not told where the alleged delinquent was nor what had happened to him. Perhaps a Partisan officer would ask a former friend who was not then in the Partisan movement what he had been doing during the war. The answer to such a question could well mean disaster for that friend. The state authorities needed only to receive a letter reporting that somebody had not behaved properly for that person to be removed.

In the newspapers and motion pictures official advertisements were published, appealing to the nation to help the national militia in finding collaborators. Denunciation was officially encouraged. In a country where civil war had been cultivated, hatred and personal vengeance beyond imaginable limits were in full swing.

It is, perhaps, understandable that in cases of political delinquency the organs of justice were not always scrupulous in proving guilt. Political trials are often based on subjective judgment. But here I have in mind simple cases of justice where no politics were involved.

Before people accused of a crime succeeded in being brought to trial, they had to endure a long process of dealing with the secret police. The secret police, after the war called OZNA and now UDB, are an all-powerful institution. People are apprehended in the streets, in offices and factories, in their homes, usually at night. If they are released, they are afraid to mention their experience. The Constitution says the maximum detention period is three days, at which time the police must free the suspect or hand him over to the courts. This clause has been violated a thousand times, but I do not know of a case where a Yugoslav citizen appealed against the procedure of the secret police. There is no lawyer who would dare act as counselor to a man who is on bad terms with UDB.

Only reliable Communists can be members of UDB. They are usually Partisans who have proved their devotion to the party by fighting during the war. They are fanatical believers in the Communist ideology and endorse fully one of the main rules of communism: that every means is good and justified if it serves the aim of Communist teaching.
Members of the secret police are everywhere, in every branch of life. They are also in every Yugoslav Embassy abroad. They themselves are above laws.

A Yugoslav of Czech origin used to come to see me regularly once every six weeks at the Embassy. Then he did not appear for several months. When finally he came again, and I asked him what he had been doing, he tried to avoid an answer. I felt something must have happened to him. I inquired whether he had been to Czechoslovakia to visit his relatives. He only smiled and said that he would never get a passport and permission to travel. I asked him whether he had not been ill. He touched wood to show that as far as his health was concerned everything was in order. Then, he murmured something about having had too much work and that he would not be able to come as often as before. I did not understand this man who used to be jovial and talkative. He did not come again.

Immediately before my departure from Yugoslavia, almost two years after I had last seen this man, another Czech friend of mine came to see me. "Mr. X sent me to speak to you," he said, "because he did not want you to leave without knowing why he had not come to see you any more. He had been arrested under the pretext that he had done some smuggling, but they could not prove anything. The real reason why the secret police had put him in jail was to frighten him, and then he was ordered to spy on you as it was known that he used to visit you. He promised to try but emphasized the fact that he was no longer on good terms with you, because he disagreed with your political opinion and, therefore, had interrupted contacts with you. Before he was released he had to sign a statement saying he would not tell anybody the reason for his absence. This is the reason he tried to avoid your questions and why he did not return any more. But he has sent me to tell you all this now when you are about to leave as he would not like you to feel bad about him."

I can tell this story without endangering my friends because they are in Czechoslovakia now. There are many instances similar to this, but I cannot tell them for the obvious reason of the security of the persons concerned.
One day I received a diplomatic note from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcing that "a Czechoslovak citizen who tried to cross the Yugoslav frontier illegally was caught and, pending trial, arrested. He tried to escape," the note said, "but the guard prevented him from doing so. The Czech used some iron object and a fight started between the two men. The guard had to use arms and in self-defense killed him." That was the official communication, and nothing more.

I inquired incessantly whether a protocol had been written about the death of the Czechoslovak citizen and said if there had been I wanted to see it immediately, to learn whether the guard had been summoned to trial and where the corpse of the victim was. In spite of several queries I never received an answer.

One night a member of UDB attempted to steal money from a factory. He was discovered by the watchman so took out his pistol and shot him. When the national militia came to arrest him, he shouted, "Comrades, be careful what you are doing, I am an UDB man." Three days later, people saw him walking in the streets of Zagreb.

Immediately after the liberation of Yugoslavia, many people escaped the attention of OZNA because the police registers had been partly destroyed and were also partly obsolete. The secret police thus lacked detailed administrative material. But this did not last for long.

The system of karakteristika soon covered almost all the inhabitants. During the war, the Partisan authorities introduced this system of identification called "the characteristic." Anyone who applied for a government job or wanted to travel had to ask for a recommendation from OZNA. The document was not given to the applicant but sent to the employer or to the Ministry of Interior which issued passports and travel documents.

This system later became a general practice. The karakteristika has become an identification paper which the citizen never sees but which goes with him wherever he moves. At present it does not list his wartime activities only, but his political opinion as well. Finished is the man whose karakteristika is negative. There is no hope for him to get a job.
In a country in which the highest and only binding rule is the law of communism, the courts must adapt their interpretation of civil and criminal codices to the needs of the Communist state. Judges are instructed that sentences must not be in contradiction to the Socialist form of life.

Once on a holiday in Slovenia, I made the acquaintance of a Yugoslav judge. He was an ardent Communist. I remarked that I deplored the practice of the Yugoslav courts and told him of some instances of outrageous injustice of which I knew from my own official experience. I tried to convince him that everything is at stake if elementary principles of justice are not respected. The answer was a cynical laugh. Then he gave me a lecture on Marxism and told me that my scruples were the old-fashioned, bourgeois kind and that I failed to understand the ideological background of the courts' activities. It is not the role, as he put it, of a Communist tribunal to find out impartially what is called justice in reactionary countries; its duty is to contribute to the building up of communism.

Judges themselves are not independent in their office, according to this man. Though they pronounce the formal sentences, it is the public attorney who governs the proceedings and instructs the court as to what sentence it should pronounce.

The Yugoslav public attorney is, according to the Constitution, also an organ which "exercises control over a proper fulfillment of laws" (ARTICLE 124) and who "has the right of complaint and accusation... and the right to apply for the defense of legality" (ARTICLE 127). In fact he is an authority to control the fulfillment of Communist law and to see that Communist interests are respected.

These attorneys are always reliable Communists, often young fanatics who are not qualified as good jurists but are devoted entirely to the party. The judge would not dare act against their proposals.

In the Yugoslav Parliament Dragoljub Jovanović described the situation of public attorneys as it existed in Yugoslavia:

It is the task of the public attorney to defend people, their institutions, property, and their democratic rights and freedoms. It is within his orbit to follow not only questions
of criminal law but also of civil law . . . to watch and strengthen the conformity to law and to oppose an invalid decision, whether it comes from a court, ministry, commission, or committee . . . . It is his duty to secure a good organization and functioning of the state administration. All institutions must open their doors to him and put all files at his disposal . . . . In our country the public attorney also fulfills the function of an institution which in America is called The Supreme Federal Court which estimates the justice of individual laws and gives interpretation of laws . . . . My question is whether our office of public attorney is well-prepared for all this work, which in other countries is carried out by federal courts and state councils . . . .

The institution of public attorneys in the present form is something new. It exists only in the Soviet Union and with us. But similar mechanisms of distrust existed before in all regimes which were approaching their fall. At the end of the Roman Empire all citizens were divided into "corporations" so that the state knew where everyone was and what he was doing. Everywhere delatores were active, following everybody in every move, reporting on what he spoke, thought, and felt. The same happened in medieval history.

The institution of public attorneys is strange to our nation when it restores an atmosphere of suppression and creates a mechanism of distrust . . . . I want to defend our regime before the attorney because it does not need him as long as it does not continue in the tradition of old regimes which were afraid of the people. I do not ask a complete abolition of the public attorney, but I wish to see the nation freed from fear of public authorities and attorneys freed from fear of the nation.

A nation means much more than our activists think. There are very few people in our country who are enemies of the new state of things and who would not be good members of our community. Our regime is strong in its basic forms. It is much stronger than its guardians think . . . . It is, therefore, not necessary to keep the whole nation in fear and mutual distrust because of some few persons who, in fact, are not dangerous. The enemies of the new order are floating on the surface but there is, on the other hand, something which is deeply ingrained in our
nation, and it is its longing for freedom, for a calm and quiet life. Our people have a deep desire to be allowed to work in the daytime and to sleep at night in peace. They do not want to be accused all the time.

The net of public attorneys is wide. Besides the attorney of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, there are attorneys in every federal republic, every autonomous region, every district and quarter of town. But that is not enough. There exists also an institution of so-called national attorneys. They are in the villages, factories, offices, institutions, in town streets, in homes, and in schools. They are voluntary associates of public attorneys. The law, however, goes further: national attorneys can organize around themselves groups of people to help them in their work.

I thoroughly disagree especially with that part of the law which takes the investigation of a delinquent from a court and gives it to the attorney. I admit that it is a step forward in comparison with the past when rights of investigation were in the hands of the police—and those of us who were persecuted by the old regimes know what it meant... But our leadership must go another step forward and leave the whole process of investigation to the courts.

In our judicial system a public attorney represents more than a party. In all law-suits, he is very powerful, really all-powerful, and this especially in the courts of today before inexperienced judges who are exposed to the influence of authorities and more experienced people. In practice, the public attorney enjoys power with which the Constitution did not want to entrust him... There are many people who perform public functions only formally, but the real public authority is in the hands of the attorney. He is all-present and almighty. He is jurist, politician, and artist. He is writer, doctor, and veterinary. He knows everything and understands everything. He can do anything and he wants everything. He is a member of National Committees [local administration] and even a member of executive committees with full rights. He has advisory voice, it’s true, but we know the effect of the voice of a man with such powers as the attorney has. In large and small towns, but especially in small communities, he represents fear and horror. In the eyes of the people, he represents the state.
Finally, the public attorney has a qualification which is not official but actual. He represents the Party, the state, the only Party, with a capital “P.” There cannot be opposition to the existence of political parties, even to a certain party [the Communist party], except under the condition that it is not the only party. If one says “party” it means a party to something. Therefore, a party cannot be alone. It is physically and psychologically impossible. In our country public attorneys are, without exception, members of the Communist party. The law does not say anything about it, but it is the case in practice. The institution of public attorneys is similar to a dictatorship of one party. It secures a one-party system. I cannot agree with it, because the one-party system is against life itself, particularly against the tradition, spirit and wishes of our nation . . . .

Dragoljub Jovanović made this courageous speech in the Yugoslav Parliament. Two months later in the spring of 1947 he was arrested, deprived of parliamentary immunity, put on trial, and sentenced to eight years in prison for espionage for a foreign (i.e., American) power.

It would seem that the work of the courts dealing with property questions would not be affected by political systems and regimes. But as the Communist theory and policy is deeply interested in the liquidation of private ownership, courts have a vast field of activity and a prominent role in the sphere of property rights.

The Yugoslav government found different ways and means of liquidating private property without applying the laws of nationalization and without paying indemnities. Many owners of factories were proclaimed and sentenced as “collaborators with the enemy during the war” and their property was confiscated. The question whether the collaboration with the enemy was forced or voluntary was irrelevant. If that question had been considered the judge would not have been able to forget that a factory could not work without the participation of workers.

To accuse a worker of collaboration with the Germans would be against the tactics of the Communist party which needs
the working class in its revolutionary aims. Yet it must be said that, not only in Yugoslavia but all over occupied Europe, workers, who could by idleness have deprived the German war-machine of military equipment of all kinds, never used strikes to paralyze or weaken the German military potential.

I do not reproach the workers for not striking against the Germans; the odds were too heavy against them. But it is only honest to state facts when all other classes of society in the countries behind the Iron Curtain are condemned for their behavior during the war.

In Zagreb an owner was accused of using his factory for the benefit of the German Army. The defendant proved that from the moment the Germans occupied Yugoslavia he had not entered his office and that he had lived in hiding somewhere in the country. In spite of this he was sentenced and his factory was confiscated. The sentence was based on the grounds that he had not fulfilled his patriotic duty which was, according to the court, to stay in the factory and sabotage its production.

In another case, three firms were asked, shortly after the war, to present their bids for some work to the state authorities. It was given to the cheapest firm and the other two were accused of unlawful speculation, the owners put under arrest, and their property confiscated.

In one region of Croatia, all mill owners were summoned to the local authorities one day and accused of collaboration. They were, however, advised that they could escape punishment if they presented their mills as gifts to the state; in that case they would be rewarded by the state by being appointed managers of the mills.

I had to deal with questions of property laws officially and to defend the rights of many Czechoslovak citizens who had property in Yugoslavia.

There were several thousands of Czechoslovaks who had moved to Yugoslavia before World War I or shortly after it. They came as highly qualified workers, artisans, businessmen, and small industrialists. They brought in their knowledge, diligence, experience, and sometimes small capital. They began to work humbly but, thanks to their abilities and considerable
production possibilities in a naturally rich but technically undeveloped Yugoslavia, they succeeded in working themselves up as managers and leading experts in Yugoslav mines and factories. Also, in many cases they founded their own businesses. According to Communist terminology, they became bourgeois.

Some factories in Yugoslavia were in the hands of big Czechoslovak industrial concerns and banks.

During the war these Czechoslovaks living in Yugoslavia behaved, in general, in an exemplary way. As Czechoslovakia was occupied by the Germans already in March, 1939, many Czech proprietors and managers, although in Yugoslavia, were fired by the Germans long before the latter occupied Yugoslavia in April, 1941. Many of them returned to Czechoslovakia.

Others devotedly supported the Czechoslovak patriotic movement which organized secret transports of Czechoslovak soldiers from Czechoslovakia through Hungary and Yugoslavia to join the forces of the Czechoslovak Army abroad. Tito's Partisans also received from them quantities of textiles, shoes, sugar, and other supplies. Their factories often worked far below the production capacity in defiance of German orders.

After the war almost all Czechoslovak industrial property in Yugoslavia was speedily confiscated or put under sequester of the state.

One day the Czechoslovak Consulate in Ljubljana sent me a telegram revealing that a big Czechoslovak textile factory had been confiscated and its two owners sentenced to death in absentia for collaboration with the enemy. They allegedly manufactured textiles for the German Army. I sent a message to Prague and asked for particulars about the owners. The Czechoslovak Consul had not been informed that the trial would take place nor had he been given the text of the sentence as he should have been, according to an international custom and a convention signed years ago between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

A few days later, I received a telegram from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me that one of the owners had not been in Yugoslavia for the last twelve years and that the other had died in a concentration camp in Germany, in the spring of 1941, when Yugoslavia was not yet at
war with the Nazis. Thus, a victim of a concentration camp was proclaimed collaborator. But these facts did not hinder the Communist judge from sentencing both former factory owners to death, because the ownership of a big factory was at stake.

I protested vehemently against such a procedure and insisted that an international scandal would come out of this case if the error was not put right immediately. The answer of Minister Kidrić was, “Don’t be angry, Mr. Ambassador, this is a revolutionary justice. It works quickly. I shall put it right.” The sentence was abolished but the factory was still subjected to confiscation because “if the owners did not collaborate the factory certainly did.” There was no use to argue that the factory had been under the administration of Germans.

In another case a Czechoslovak was sentenced to ten years in prison and his factory confiscated. All interventions were useless. But finally the public attorney proclaimed the solution by saying, “But do you think that we are interested in your man? If he gives up his property something can be done.” The following day an application for a revision of the trial was presented to the court, stating emphatically that the prisoner did not require the restitution of his property rights. The revision went as smoothly as could be and the defendant was acquitted and released.

A Yugoslav law set up a principle that any judicial act committed under the pressure of the occupying powers was to be considered null and void and a restitution of the situation as it existed before should take place. In some Czechoslovak enterprises the Germans ordered the owners to “sell” the property to a German industrial concern. Later, after the war, it proved very difficult and sometimes impossible to convince the Yugoslav authorities that they should act according to their own laws. They insisted that the enterprise was of German ownership and, therefore, subject to confiscation.

In cases of shareholding companies, it was impossible to convince the Yugoslavs that it was unjust to confiscate a factory because a German manager maintained its production while the shareholders, living somewhere in Czechoslovakia, had no voice in the activities of their factory.
Another effective way the Yugoslav state became owner of vast properties was through the institution of the war profit tax. The law prescribed that any property or increase in property which had been gained in time of war should be considered profit. This war profit was taxed 100 per cent. Special commissions were set up in towns and villages to investigate the war profiteers, put them on trial and pronounce sentences. In theory, it was possible to appeal to regular courts and, in 1947, the whole problem was handed over to the competence of courts.

The procedure was simple. People were publicly urged, in newspapers and motion pictures, to announce the names of war profiteers. Denunciation flourished. Workers denounced factory owners and managers; apprentices denounced shopkeepers; have-nots denounced well-to-do neighbors. Class hatred, one of the most powerful motives of Communist agitation, grew. Commissions sat permanently. They did not study commercial books and did not hear any experts. Evidence of one or two witnesses presented by the attorney was sufficient to pronounce a sentence on war profit, often amounting to tens of millions of dinars. These were fantastic figures. The owner was unable to pay the tax and the consequence was that the state confiscated his property. Factories, shops, stores, artisan workshops came into the insatiable grasp of the Communists. Day by day in Belgrade one could see private shops closing down because the owners could not pay the war profit tax.

A Czechoslovak sugar refinery was assessed 120,000,000 dinars of war profit by the commission. The representative of the owner appealed to a regular court hoping that a tribunal would have to respect at least the most elementary rules of justice.

The trial took place. The public attorney presented his witnesses—a worker, a coachman, and a railwayman. They had to prove that the factory had made a big war profit and sold sugar on the black market. The lawyer of the factory presented witnesses for the defendant—a director of the factory, an accountant, another administrative employee—and offered proof by commercial books and experts that the factory worked below its capacity, that it had made no war profit, and that even
its turnover did not reach the amount described by the commis-
sion as war profit.

The attorney proposed that the court decide about hear-
ing the witnesses of the defendant only after having listened
to the witnesses of the attorney. The court accepted his propo-
sition. The factory worker, coachman, and railwayman knew
nothing about the commercial side of the business and they
were able to testify only about things which were of irrelevant
value. But in spite of this, they answered questions under pres-
sure of the attorney so that the factory showed enormous profits.
After hearing them, the court decided that the case was suffi-
ciently clarified and that it was, therefore, not necessary to hear
the witnesses of the defendant. The proof by commercial books
was, according to the court's decision, inadmissible because it
must be assumed that in capitalistic Yugoslavia and during the
enemy occupation the books were not kept correctly. A few
days later, the sentence was delivered in writing to the Em-
bassy. The war profit tax had been raised from the original
120,000,000 to 160,000,000 dinars. The value of the whole
factory did not amount to this figure.

There were many cases of this kind and to have accepted
the courts' decisions would have meant a loss valued in billions
for the Czechoslovak economy.

I intervened again and again but without success. The Yugo-
slav ministers argued that the courts were independent and the
government would be acting against the Constitution if it tried
to influence their work or change their decisions.

The Czechoslovak government, at that time still democratic,
was aware of its responsibilities to defend the interests of its
citizens. As the Yugoslav government at this period of con-
fiscation of Czechoslovak property wished to negotiate with
the government in Prague a long-term commercial agreement
to secure deliveries for its Five Year Plan, there was a possibility
of linking the Czechoslovak approval of the agreement with a
satisfactory solution of this painful problem of Czechoslovak
property. The governments of Britain, Sweden, and Switzer-
land had made such an agreement.

The Czechoslovak government did not use this opportunity,
however, as it would have been in opposition to the spirit of alliance which linked both countries closely together. But when negotiations for long-term commercial agreement took place in Belgrade early in 1947, the question of Czechoslovak property in Yugoslavia was also thoroughly discussed.

Minister Kidrič tried to delay every case by one means or another. When the conversation reached a crisis, I remarked that his tenacious attitude could not but influence, in general, our trade relations with Yugoslavia. He understood. After a struggle which lasted until four o’clock in the morning he promised to send me a letter in which he would enumerate the Czechoslovak factories which would be subsequently released from confiscation, those from which the war profit tax would be removed, and he also offered to declare that no new trials would be set up against Czechoslovak citizens for collaboration with the enemy.

But the fight was not entirely won. Experience showed that a promise of an active minister did not offer full guarantee that the promise would be turned into reality. Innumerable difficulties arose. Local authorities did not receive the instructions in time. New trials were started. I intervened most emphatically, and this time it worked. An order by telephone was strong enough to stop the proceedings of an “independent” Yugoslav court in the middle of its work.

The case of the sugar refinery which was ordered to pay 160,000,000 dinars as war profit tax was among those which Minister Kidrič promised to settle by complete abolition of the tax. I urged the renewal of the trial. After a sitting which did not take more than thirty minutes, a decision was handed down by which the original sentence was revised and no war profit tax prescribed at all.

A case from a different sphere: In a large Belgrade hospital there was a famous chief surgeon. In the catastrophic lack of doctors in Yugoslavia, this man meant everything for the health of the capital. He had to perform on the average of twelve operations a day. Out of the hundreds of operations he performed in the two years after the war, he had the misfortune to lose seven patients within a short period. He was accused of having neglected his duties because it was allegedly
found that the instruments were not properly sterilized. He defended himself vigorously, and a professor at Belgrade University had the courage to write an expert report with the conclusion that the accused doctor was not responsible for the death of seven patients. It did not help. The doctor was sentenced to four years in prison. The case stirred up the spirit of the town. Everybody criticized it severely.

What was behind this case? The accusation was based on a denunciation coming from a Communist doctor who worked in the same hospital and wanted to take over the surgery department. Because he was a member of the party the court believed he was right.

A few days after the sentence was passed, I met a doctor and we discussed the case. "These people do not realize what harm they are doing to the nation and to themselves," he said. "From now on, we shall be afraid whenever we have to make a decision about a patient. We shall not be sure that a Communist will not accuse us of wrong treatment of patients. Next time, if I must recommend whether or not an operation should be performed, I shall hesitate to do so, and the surgeon will be most reluctant to perform it."

On February 26, 1951, the Parliament opened debate on a new criminal law. A voice of criticism was raised for the first time from the ranks of the Communist party. Vladimir Bakaric, the leader of the Communists of Croatia, stressed, according to the New York Times,\(^1\) the necessity of the law to protect the rights of citizens before those of the state. He also criticized the practices of public attorneys. This was an unprecedented event, but utmost caution is called for not to precipitate any judgment. The Yugoslav Constitution offers guarantees for human rights, but the deliberations of the courts have been disastrous to them.

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\(^1\)M. S. Handler, February 27, 1951.
Before the war, Yugoslavia had less than 16,000,000 inhabitants, about 80 per cent of whom were peasants. The natural resources were sufficient for the entire population to secure a fairly comfortable living. Yugoslavia possesses agricultural regions which are among the most fertile in the world; other parts of the country, on the contrary, are very poor. Among the former are Vojvodina, Srem, and Slavonia, while among the latter are Montenegro, Herzegovina, parts of Bosnia, and Dalmatia. Yugoslavia is wealthy in minerals, possessing all the precious raw materials with the exception of good-quality coal. Some regions are covered by vast old forests and throughout the country there are innumerable water resources, the Danube among them. Yugoslavia has a several-hundred mile shore on the Adriatic Sea which opens a highway to the world and also attracts thousands of tourists every year.
Yet, the majority of the Yugoslav people have always lived at a very low standard. Agriculture has been primitive; mineral resources have been left unexploited. The explanation can be found in the history of Yugoslavia. The Serbs were dominated by the Turks until the year 1804, while the other peoples of Yugoslavia were subjected to Austro-Hungarian domination until 1918. The oppressors were more interested in keeping the natural abilities of the oppressed nations latent than in helping them in cultural, technical, and material development.

The governments of independent Yugoslavia, between 1918 and 1941, are also to be blamed for having neglected the economic progress of the country. They did not grasp the importance of industry for the improvement of the population's standard of living. It was actually foreign capital which opened the gates to the industrialization of Yugoslavia. Big British, French, Swedish, German, and Czechoslovak firms established branches or mixed companies, erected factories, and opened mines. American capital was engaged to a smaller extent.

Parallel with the foreign firms some Yugoslavs, enlightened by the experience of foreign investors, founded factories. The foreign companies brought in a number of technical and administrative experts and qualified workers under whose guidance the ranks of domestic qualified labor were formed and grew. Because of the participation of foreign capital, many technical values were created on which the present Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito depends.

The war deeply disrupted the economic structure of Yugoslavia. Mines were ruthlessly exploited by the Germans and later inundated either by Tito's Partisans or by the retreating German Army, and mine installations were demolished. Ships and port installations were, to a great extent, destroyed. Numerous factories were left in ruins or badly damaged by bombing or acts of sabotage. Rail bridges were torn down, and tracks torn out. Rich forests in many sections of Bosnia were burned. Hundreds of towns and villages were leveled to the ground. Agricultural reserves were exhausted and a great percentage of the country's cattle and horses were killed. The financial system was in chaos.

After the war the government authorized an ambitious plan
of reconstruction and no effort was spared to place the country's economy in a working condition. Railroad bridges and tracks were temporarily, but quickly, repaired. The work in many factories was resumed; villages were temporarily built up and—the greatest miracle—the Yugoslav currency, the dinar, escaped the danger of inflation. All these results were achieved at a tremendous sacrifice and by the laborious efforts of the population.

Before long, the government set its course toward a Socialist economy. The legal basis for the action was provided in the Constitution: Its fourth chapter deals with the new social and economic order of the country. According to it the means of production can be in the hands of the state, cooperatives, or private individuals. Mines and other mineral resources, and communications—postal service, telegraph, telephone, radio, waterways, railways, and airlines—are all in the hands of the state. The state arranges the direction of economic life by elaborating a general economic plan, basing it upon the state and the cooperative sector of the economy and pursuing a general control over the private sector. Private property and enterprise are thus guaranteed. The inheritance of private property is also guaranteed. Nobody is allowed to use the right of private property to the detriment of the national community. Private property can be limited or expropriated on the basis of the law only.

The land belongs to those who work on it. A law fixes the amount of land which can be owned by a person who is not a peasant. Under no circumstances can vast agricultural properties be in the hands of private individuals. The maximum of privately owned agricultural property is fixed by law.

After the war the Yugoslav government made good use of the opportunity to avail itself of as much industrial property as the chaotic situation and its political power allowed. It took under state administration all foreign property which had to be abandoned because of the war as well as the property of Jews who were massacred or deported by the Germans. It confiscated, of course, the property of the Germans. The property
of collaborationists also fell under the action of confiscation, regardless of its nature or size. All these measures brought a fundamental change in the legal position of Yugoslav industry.

In a few weeks after the war, the Yugoslav state became one of the largest owners in the world. It gained mines, factories, and smaller enterprises valued in the billions of dollars. But this was only the beginning.

The Yugoslav government came to realize that it couldn’t succeed in taking over all the industry, and especially foreign factories and mines, without introducing some legal measures of nationalization.

One day in the autumn of 1946, foreign observers were confused when they read a government decree, according to which all industrial enterprises were divided into two categories: (1) Enterprises of state significance. This category included every object of industry considered by its productive capacity or specific nature important to the economy of the country as a whole. (2) Enterprises of republican significance. This category embraced almost every factory of local importance. The division implied the control of production by the central Ministry of Industry in the first case and by individual ministers of the republics in the second case.

The names of factories were published partly in the central official organ, partly in the organs of the republics. Nobody knew at what the government was aiming, and questions were answered in a way to signify it was a purely administrative measure to make the control easier. Many factories had been renamed, usually with some revolutionary title, without the knowledge of the original owner, so that the tracing of the fate of the factory became even more difficult.

In December, 1946, Parliament met and in one afternoon session voted the Law about the Nationalization of Private Industry in the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The same day, representatives of the government entered all the enterprises which a few months ago had been declared of state or republican significance, and took over, without any previous notice or any explanation, the management. Now it became clear what was the purpose of the autumn decree.

Every preparatory step for the nationalization was made in
greatest secrecy. The owners of factories did not know anything about the coming nationalization, and some diplomatic missions, as far as foreign capital investments were concerned, were repeatedly assured that the government did not envisage such a policy. The day after the nationalization was proclaimed, factory owners read in the newspapers that their factories had changed ownership overnight. Only a few reliable officials, who prepared the text of the nationalization law, knew what was going on. The executive organs were simply ordered to take over the management. Even the members of the Parliament, which is supposed to be the highest legislative body, obtained the information for what they were asked to vote only at the moment when they found the text of the bill on their desks.

The government prepared in the same atmosphere of secrecy another bill and in April, 1948, put it before Parliament for adoption. By this law, all credit and insurance companies were nationalized, although previously all finance transactions and insurance business had been run by the state. Further on, the law nationalized all ships, fishermen’s boats with a tonnage over fifty tons, transport ships for more than fifty passengers, all sanitariums, hospitals, spas, printing houses, motion pictures, storage houses with a capacity of over a hundred tons, and business cellars with a capacity of over three wagons of goods. All immovable property of foreigners, including their houses, was also taken over.

According to the declaration of Minister Kidrić, the new law nationalized 3,100 enterprises, among them 550 hotels and 530 mills, so that according to his declaration, there was no longer in Yugoslavia an enterprise which had not been taken into the Socialist economy.

What was not taken by the nationalization laws, but still represented a certain economic value, was exposed to a law about expropriation which gave the government the right to expropriate anything in the public interest.

As regards foreign property, the original owners had to respect the law and they had to be satisfied with the provision that they would receive indemnity. The interested governments entered into prolonged negotiations, but so far only the United States, Swedish, and British governments have succeeded in
concluding agreements based on the idea of a global indemnity.

The laws of nationalization liquidated the last remnants of private investments in Yugoslavia. But even after the laws were promulgated small workshops were nationalized, though according to the law only those factories which were listed as enterprises of state or republican significance were subjected to nationalization. Here again the original owners were assured that, according to a provision of the nationalization law, indemnities would be paid them in due course. According to the law, indemnity was to be fixed at the sum of actives of the property on the day of the nationalization, and this was to be exclusively stated by the new owner, the Yugoslav state. There was another provision by which the state refused to take any guarantees for the debts of the nationalized properties.

Though it would not be right to speak about a class of capitalists in Yugoslavia, because the country was industrially undeveloped, their liquidation hit a considerable portion of the Yugoslav population; it concerned not only the factory owners but also owners of small workshops, artisans, and thousands of employees who could not be depended upon not to sabotage the nationalized industry and who were therefore deprived of work.

The newspapers boasted of the government’s success and praised highly this decisive step toward socialization. The town population, however, did not share the enthusiasm of the government propaganda. It felt that its daily life was getting more and more closely connected with the state machine.

The fate of the victims of nationalization was not enviable. They were deprived of sources of income, and the monetary reform had taken from them almost all cash. Today, if they are not in exile or in prison, they go here and there through the streets of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana trying to spend the day somehow, without any work or any aim.

If the Communist regime boasts about having removed any danger of unemployment, it can speak only about the working class, and even that is not fully correct, as will be shown later. It certainly does not take into account the unknown number of people of the middle class who were thrown out of their shops, workshops, and offices.
Every observer of developments in Yugoslavia must have been surprised when he read in the declaration of the Cominform, in June, 1948, that the Communist party of Yugoslavia had abandoned the working class and refused to admit that capitalists in Yugoslavia were increasing.

The Yugoslav Communists answered this accusation by proving, statistically, that the capitalist elements were actually liquidated. The official organ of the Communist party, Borba, disclosed figures which otherwise would not have been accessible. It said that already in 1945, immediately after the war, 55 per cent of private industry had been nationalized by the confiscation of the property belonging to collaborationists, 27 per cent had been taken by the state under a forced sequestration, and only 18 per cent was still allowed to stay in private hands.

By 1947, after the promulgation of the first law about nationalization, 100 per cent of the industry of state or republican significance had been nationalized, 70 per cent of industry of local significance, all financial institutions, all wholesale stores, and 90 per cent of retailers.

By 1948, all industry was in state hands regardless of its nature or size.

Concerning the handicrafts, 61.5 per cent worked without any help and 38.5 per cent used both apprentices and paid workers. The paid workers averaged only one to every two workshops. All handicrafts were organized as cooperatives.
A special section of the Five Year Plan is devoted to agriculture. The principle of a planned cultivation stresses the obligation of peasants to cultivate products which the government considers as most profitable from the point of view of the national economy. Studies are being undertaken in that respect and peasants are ordered what to cultivate.

The cultivation of crops for industry (tobacco, sugar beets, hemp, flax, cotton) is particularly important not only for domestic purposes but especially for export, for which the government plans to import the products of heavy industry. Therefore, the Five Year Plan instructs the peasants to increase the production of these crops to 2.4 times what it was before the war, in 1939. The production of cereals is supposed to be maintained on smaller areas by a more intensive agriculture.
The Plan counts further on extensive works of amelioration, irrigation, the draining of 400,000 hectares (988,400 acres), reforestation 100,000 hectares (247,100 acres) of land, and on providing forestry with tractors, trucks, locomotives, electric saws, funicular railways. The Plan promises a high degree of mechanization of agriculture by all sorts of agricultural machines.

It is impossible to evaluate fully, at the moment of writing, the first results of the Five Year Plan in the agricultural section. As will be shown later, Yugoslav agriculture is undergoing a fundamental change in its structure. Naturally, at such a time there is not much incentive to increase production. However, the statistics published in the second half of 1947, and embracing the first half of that year, speak about a 100 per cent fulfillment of the Plan in the field of agriculture.

The main question is how the Yugoslav peasant lives. What is his legal and factual position? Is he satisfied, and what is his attitude toward the far-reaching changes he is passing through?

As every peasant in the world, the Yugoslav peasant clings to the land with a deep, exhausting, and often selfish love. No work is too hard for him if his eyes can see his own fine wheat. He is an individualist to the bottom of his heart. In sweat and toil he plows, sows, and harvests.

Politically, the Yugoslav peasant is very intelligent, democratic, and highly conscious nationally. He is rather reserved before any new inventions, though not conservative, and internally he maintains a sentiment of mistrust toward towns and their population. The conclusion is that the Yugoslav peasant can only be strongly anti-Bolshevik. How can he comply with the laws which try to fetter everything for which he has lived and worked?

The basic laws of the agricultural life in Yugoslavia are the Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization, of August, 1945, and the Law of Agrarian Cooperatives. These laws emanate from the principle that the land belongs to those who are cultivating it.

After the war the state acquired scores of thousands of acres of land which belonged to half a million German peasants
who fled with the retreating German Army, and to some two hundred thousand Hungarian peasants who crossed the frontier to settle in Hungary before the end of the war. Vast agricultural properties were gained by the confiscation of land belonging to big landowners who were declared collaborationists. All this land was in the most fertile area of Yugoslavia.

More land was acquired by the state by confiscating the big agricultural and forest estates which were larger than 35 hectares (86.48 acres). It took also the land properties of banks, industrial enterprises, shareholding companies, cloisters, religious societies, churches, and foundations, regardless of the extent of the property. To owners of land who were not working it, the maximum of 3 to 5 hectares (7.4 to 12.35 acres) only were left. The law allowed the peasant, who was to cultivate the land by his own and his family’s labor, the maximum of 35 hectares (86.48 acres) of land as his personal property. This policy amounted to a vast confiscation for which the government did not pay a cent of indemnity.

Out of these areas of land the government created a Land Fund which served as a basis for its policy of collectivization of Yugoslav agriculture.

The Yugoslav government did not create, as the Soviets did, the sovkhozes, i.e., big state-owned estates, though some smaller estates were run by the Ministry of Agriculture as model farms. It colonized the evacuated areas by internal colonizers. It moved families from the poorest and mountainous regions of Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia, and settled them in the plains of Vojvodina and Slavonia. In some parts of the colonized country, the land was formally given as private property to the newcomers in the maximum amount of twelve acres; in other parts, the colonizers settled in a village and formed a kolkhoz (collective farm) to which the land belonged.

The policy of colonization is one of the most daring acts of the Yugoslav government. It was a just and good policy where people, who had had a very low standard of living because their land was poor and rocky, were brought down from the mountains to fertile soil, which the war had left unoccupied.
This policy may pay later when the coming generation will have become accustomed to the new circumstances.

But the results of the first years of colonization could only be negative. A mountaineer accustomed to a primitive way of living couldn’t take the place of an experienced and hard-working peasant. He did not like the hard work or the climate of the plains. He did not know how to handle agricultural machines and he did not appreciate living in clean and well-built houses, which the former owners had left behind. There are stories that the Montenegrin colonizers did not know how to make a fire in a stove, and that they cut a hole in the roof and built the fire in the middle of the living room.

On the whole, the colonizers felt unhappy in their new settlement, and many of them secretly returned to their mountain homes because of fear and homesickness.

The inevitable consequences of this kind of colonization were that vast stretches of land were left uncultivated and that agricultural production suffered most in regions which were supposed to give the best results.

The government tried to find a remedy by sending instructors to the villages of colonizers, but according to many reports, that did not help very much because old customs were too deeply ingrained in their minds. Besides, the instructors were political agitators rather than agriculturalists.

The government, however, saw the main significance of the colonization policy in another field rather than in that of agricultural production. In many cases, it gave the land only formally to the colonizers and the moment they moved in, it instructed them to join or found cooperatives which were in fact kolkhozes and did not differ from the Russian pattern except in name. These cooperatives were meant to be a nucleus for a general collectivization of the country.

The Communists thought that the cooperative system would appeal to Yugoslav peasants as it had a good traditional record. It had been the practice for decades for Yugoslav peasants to organize themselves in cooperatives in order to buy more easily agricultural tools, machinery, and other industrial
products; to sell their own products, and to secure better conditions of credit. And so they created buying, selling, and credit cooperatives.

The new law about cooperatives enlarged the field of cooperative activities and especially changed their purpose and aims. The policy of selling, buying, and credit has become an exclusive right of the state and the original function of cooperatives has thus become obsolete. They have ceased to be defenders of the small holders who had formerly used them to defend themselves from the competition of big estates, from the unhealthy influence of the town, and from the financially strong businessmen. They have changed into an institution which facilitates the state authorities in controlling the peasant's work, his financial position, the results of the harvest, and the selling of the agricultural products. The different types of cooperatives were maintained but their activities are no longer in the hands of elected officials. The whole control is manned by Communist secretaries.

To the usual types of cooperatives a new type was added by the Communist government, the peasant-working cooperative. This has become the organizational basis of the agricultural policy of the government.

According to the law the peasant-working cooperative is made up of peasants who themselves work the land and bring a part or the whole of their property as a deposit in the cooperative. So far, there have been four different types of these peasant-working cooperatives: (1) Peasants to whom land was entrusted by the Land Fund form a cooperative which is also formally its owner. The members of the cooperative are entitled to work on the land and, at the end of the year, they divide the profit gained from the selling of the products. They do not possess any property of their own. This type of cooperative resembles the Russian kolkhozes and the official propaganda considers them the ideal and most perfect form of a peasant cooperative. (2) The members of a cooperative work together on the land belonging to the cooperative, and are allowed to own a small field or a garden around their house. This type of cooperative has developed in some regions of Russia. (3) Peasants give up "voluntarily" the ownership of
their land in favor of the cooperative which they found. They all work together, dividing profits exclusively on the basis of the productivity of their individual work, regardless of how large their farm was. (4) This type of cooperative differs from the previous one only by methods of dividing profits which, in this case, are based on how much land was brought to the cooperative by a member.

The land reform, colonization, and cooperatives laws gave the government a powerful weapon, making it possible to change the structure of Yugoslav agriculture. In Slovenia, for instance, according to official statistics, 417,199 acres had been before the war in the hands of 88,500 small holders. That means that in this mountainous part of the country one family had, on the average, less than 5 acres of land. This could not provide a living. On the other hand, there were in the country, 1,308 owners of what in Europe are considered large estates, possessing together 416,850 acres of land, which means an average of 317 acres per family. In the fertile regions of Vojvodina, some people owned more than 2,500 acres, though the fertility of the country gave a decent standard of living with even 30 to 40 acres.

By the end of 1946, the Land Fund had acquired 1,549,632 acres of land from the German and Hungarian minorities and from collaborators whose land was confiscated. Out of this Fund a third, 448,897 acres, was distributed among agricultural workers and the smallest peasants as private property. This represents an average of two acres for one family which was insufficient for providing a living. So, this newly created proletarian peasant had to seek it elsewhere. Other peasants were not, however, allowed to take him as an agricultural worker, because the law decreed that every peasant must work only by himself on his own field. This was the surest way to create a class of agrarian proletarians who saw their only salvation in creating or joining a kolkhoz which would give them hope that by the collective cultivation of the land they could achieve better production.

Two-thirds of the Land Fund property was still free to be used for the government policy of collectivization. This
land was partly distributed among the peasant-working co-operatives, in other words to kolkhozes, and partly given to the colonizers. To 65,775 colonizer families were given 359,729 acres of land, roughly, 5 acres for one family.

Peasants who owned more than the smallest pieces of land, but no more than 86.48 acres, had to be, at least temporarily, calmed by the law which offered them a guarantee of private ownership. The amount did not exceed in the most fertile regions an average of 25 acres.

To make the life of individual peasants hard and to ease the work of cooperatives, the government soon introduced a number of provisions which made a drastic discrimination in the policies between the cooperatives and individual peasants. It gave to the cooperatives various privileges. It provided them with agricultural machinery, cattle, and chemical needs. It offered them favorable credit and markets to buy various commodities.

What is the life of individual peasants like? After the Land Reform cut their land down to 86.48 acres, there could not be any capitalists or exploiters among the Yugoslav peasants. The law does not allow them to hire help, so they are forced to work hard, very hard.

The Yugoslav peasant is not a master on his own land. He may be still formally the owner, but a number of laws and other measures have deprived him of the right to dispose freely of his property, have ordered him what to cultivate, what amount to sell to state authorities, and for what price.

In March, 1948, the Yugoslav government published an ordinance forbidding any transfer of property rights over immovables and any mortgage of immovables without the consent of the state authorities. The Yugoslav citizen cannot, therefore, either sell or buy a field or a house; he cannot borrow money; any change of his material status depends on the good will of the authorities. Thus, the state has acquired complete control of the peasants' immovable property.

Foreigners are not allowed to acquire immovables at all.

According to another government decree, the property in
Yugoslavia of a Yugoslav citizen who has acquired the citizenship of another country is forfeited in favor of the Yugoslav state without any indemnity. This measure has been directed against thousands of Rumanians, Bulgarians, Italians, Czechs, and Slovaks who either emigrated or wanted to emigrate to their mother countries.

The Yugoslav peasant is not free to move. He is obliged to stay where he is and to work where he lives. Even if his material position would allow him to move, he cannot do so without exposing himself to the loss of his land which, according to the Land Reform, can belong only to people who work on it personally. And he is forbidden to sell it.

Another measure instructs the peasant how to cultivate the land properly. In 1947, a decree was issued about an obligatory sowing of the land, forbidding the people to let it lie fallow. The government fixed periods in which every peasant was obliged to sow his field. Persons who would not comply with this obligation would be open to condemnation according to the Law about Forbidden Business, Speculation, and Sabotage, and their property would be confiscated.

The Yugoslav government also decrees the kind of cultivation and demands an obligatory sale of cereals and cattle for fixed prices to the state authorities.

The government elaborates every year a plan in which it sets up preliminary figures of agricultural production. Basing its calculations upon information from local authorities about the productivity of the soil and technical and other abilities of the peasants of a certain region, the government prescribes to each federal republic a quota of production specified for each branch of agriculture. This general plan goes to the governments of the republics which work out the details for every district, and so it comes down to the village authorities who tell every peasant in a very clear way how much he is expected to harvest in wheat, cotton, or other crops; how many pigs and cows he must have at a prescribed period.

Wheat production is planned in every detail. When the harvesting is over the peasant is obliged to hand over to the state authorities a large part of the harvest which he was expected to raise according to the official figures of production.
He receives in return partly cash, partly bonuses for which he can buy industrial products needed in agriculture. He is allowed by law to retain a small part of the harvest, but this does not exceed the bare needs of his family.

This planning and organization of obligatory agricultural production requires an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. In the federal, republic, district, and local offices thousands of people are employed to work out the plan, and perhaps tens of thousands are needed to take part in the final disposal of the harvest. Special attention is devoted to political propaganda. Agitators of the party travel from one village to another and they arrange meetings in which they explain to the peasants the purpose of agricultural planning and obligatory sale. They try to convince them of the political and economic importance of these measures and of the practical advantages they bring to agriculture and the peasants.

The newspapers publish daily information about the delivering of the quota in certain villages and regions. Pictures are carried of peasants who exceeded the amount of their obligation, and a spirit of competition is introduced to see which community or region will be first in fulfilling this national duty.

Local political authorities are ambitious to outstrip realities, and as a consequence the general Plan is often wrong and unjust. People who work on its elaboration lack, in many cases, expert knowledge, and then, being educated in Communist theory, they have a deep mistrust of the peasant. They assume the peasant would deceive the authorities by submitting too low figures about the conditions of production and about production itself. They proceed, therefore, intentionally one-sided. They fix the preliminary figures of the harvest too high and the consequence is that the obligatory quota is too high, surpassing reality. The state authorities who work at these plans do not always make corrections even when the harvest is affected by unfavorable weather or suffers from some unexpected misfortune. (In 1950, Yugoslavia was hit by a catastrophic drought which did compel the authorities to reduce the quota.)

I followed the problem of Yugoslav agriculture under Tito's government with special and systematic attention, because I considered it the central political problem. I was well informed
about the situation in the villages. The Czechoslovak minority in Yugoslavia consisted mainly of peasants. I often used to receive delegations of Czechs and Slovaks and I often went to visit the Slovak villages which were not far from Belgrade. I knew of heartbreaking cases in which honest and industrious peasants were driven to desperation.

They were instructed to produce wheat in a quantity which the soil could never yield. No interventions were of use. To avoid dispute they often handed over to the authorities even the part of the harvest which they were allowed by law to retain for their family. Or they sold to the state grain which they were supposed to retain for sowing next season. They knew their fate if they did not fulfill their duties.

The government admitted that peasants were arrested for failing to act according to the decree. Accusations of sabotage were attached to such failures. In fact, thousands of peasants were arrested at the time of the delivering of the wheat. They were kept in prison for a fortnight, threatened and tortured, and then they were released on the condition that in a week’s time they would bring the quantity of wheat which they had failed to hand over before. If they did not come back, they were told, they would serve a sentence of one year or more in prison.

Sometimes it happened that the condemned and conditionally released peasant would go to the kolkhoz in the neighborhood and buy the wheat from it, for an illegally high price. Often he would sell to the kolkhoz his most precious possession, his horses, to provide the wheat and avoid prison.

The severity of these measures went so far that in some regions the state authorities raised the quota rates several times regardless of the results of the harvest. They would, for instance, fix the first estimate of production at twelve bushels per hectare; then they would raise it to twenty-four bushels and then again to thirty bushels.

Similar measures of control and obligatory quotas were introduced in the raising of cattle and pigs. As, however, this kind of agricultural production cannot be so easily controlled as the wheat production, the government often changed its policy. Once it ordered a quota only to abolish it a few months
later. The frightened peasants were convinced that it was only a scheme to find out how much they raised. They were, therefore, careful not to fall into the trap and did not raise more than necessary. The result was that the production did not rise and ordinary consumers suffered from a lack of meat. At the beginning of 1949, the government authorities suddenly confiscated the pigs all over the country.

The cooperatives are subjected to a different policy. Their quota obligations are considerably lower than those of individual peasants. It is not difficult for them to fulfill their requirements. Newspapers and political speakers can praise their efforts and prove to the public that collective farming brings better results than individual agriculture.

For a long time it was impossible to find out how many Yugoslav peasants or families had entered the kolkhozes. The Yugoslav government did not issue any statistics on the subject. Only occasionally published information would reveal that the collectivization had been proceeding on a large and accentuated scale.

Marshal Tito announced in his New Year's message of 1948 to the Yugoslav nation that the Five Year Plan was fulfilled in the area of cooperatives by 146.4 per cent, and that there were at that date 10,296 cooperatives of all types in the country. As far as the peasant-working cooperatives were concerned, the number of 400 in 1946 was raised to 783 in 1947. The Croatian Prime Minister, Vladimir Bakarić, announced that at the beginning of 1948 in Croatia there were 143 kolkhozes embracing 2,358 families, with the ownership of 33,664 acres of land. This represented a double increase in comparison with 1946. He stressed on the same occasion, speaking to a congress of the peasant-working cooperatives, that members of this type of association represented the most progressive, the best educated section of the agricultural class, and that they formed the most suitable type for removing the inherited backwardness of agriculture.

Under the pressure of the Cominform accusation, the Yugoslav propaganda service finally published a booklet in which the following figures were quoted: In 1945, there were in Yugoslavia 31 peasant-working cooperatives, including 1,736 house-
holds; in 1946, the figures rose to 454 and 25,062 respectively; in 1947, to 774 and 40,590 respectively; in 1948, to 1,318 and 60,156 respectively; and on May 1, 1949, there were in Yugoslavia 4,197 peasant-working cooperatives with 210,920 households. According to a newspaper report,1 41 per cent of the richest land in Yugoslavia, in Vojvodina, was collectivized. The Communist paper Borba announced in October that by the middle of September, 1949, there were in Yugoslavia 5,000 peasant-working cooperatives, containing 250,000 households, with a total of 3,459,400 acres of land. In March, 1950, the Ministry of Interior announced that there was at that time 25.9 per cent of the total arable land in Yugoslavia in the hands of peasant-working cooperatives and state farms. The number of cooperatives was 6,798, embracing 353,872 families.

It is difficult to give credit for accuracy to official Yugoslav statistics, but it can be at least safely stated that the process of Communist nationalization of farming has been systematically pursued.

It is hard to find an explanation for the accusation which the Cominform addressed to the Yugoslav Communist party in June, 1948, when it objected to the fact that the Yugoslav government was giving support to the kulaks and to reactionary and individual peasantry. This fact only reveals that the real background of the Cominform outburst against the Yugoslav comrades lies somewhere else than in the ideological field.

It would be wrong to say that the situation of the Yugoslav peasants is desperate. Psychologically, it is at best very depressing. But politically, the village is bound to escape much of the constant control exercised by Communist secretaries in the larger towns. Materially, the situation has not yet brought starvation to the peasants.

Poor peasants in the mountains live no better than before. Nothing has changed in respect to their material standard. If anything, their misery has been increased by the loss of personal freedom.

The peasants living on the plains are certainly much worse off than before the Communists fettered them with a series of laws and decrees and made their work harder than ever before,

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but they can still secure a living. They do not need to suffer from the lack of essential food as the town population does. They do acquire some money or commodities other than food when people living in towns come to them to buy the flour, butter, and eggs which they do not get with ration cards or get only in insufficient quantities. The barter system has become a widespread custom and the peasants often prefer to be paid by clothes, china, glass, and silver. So it happens that a peasant stores in the garret two or three pianos which he received from the townspeople for pigs. On the whole, the Yugoslav peasants do not belong to a class which would materially suffer most.

Yet the Yugoslav peasant is the most obdurate enemy of the Communist regime. He has a deep suspicion toward anybody who tries to limit his personal freedom. Personal dignity he cherishes above everything else. He also has a feeling of greater resistance to the pressure of the authorities than other sections of the population because the soil is his background. He knows that the nourishment of the population and the success of the government policy in other economic fields depend upon his work. He can never accept the teaching of communism because he sees it is against everything that he was taught to live for. He is aware that an all-out collectivization is the final aim of the government policy and he will never accept it spontaneously. But he will not be able to oppose it effectively because his resistance lacks organization. In that respect he is in the same position as the townsfolk.
The law about the Five Year Plan of Development of National Economy of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was prepared politically, organizationally, and technically for many months before it was published. Its authors were given basic lessons about economic planning in Moscow. In the spring of 1946, Boris Kidrič, the secretary of the Communist party of Slovenia and Prime Minister of this province which was industrially the most developed among the Yugoslav republics, left with a staff of economic and technical experts for Moscow to study the system of the Soviet economy. The public did not know about this trip, which was supposed to be secret. The first news about the idea to run the Yugoslav economy on the basis of a planned economy was published in June, 1946, when Marshal Tito returned from a three weeks’ official visit to Moscow, and an official announcement informed the
Yugoslav nation that a plan had been prepared for a close economic collaboration between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. Shortly afterwards, Kidrić left Slovenian local politics and was appointed Minister of Industry in the central government, and chairman of the even more important Economic Council.

To open a planned economy, it was first necessary to lay down a certain organizational basis. Late in the spring of 1946, a Law of the State Economic Plan was promulgated and new institutions were established and entrusted with the task of planning. The highest body to prepare and work out the Plan was the Central Commission of Planning, to which all state authorities and all enterprises were ordered to give any information which might be required. Within every state government, local Commissions of Planning were established. The powers of the Central Commission went so far as to be able to give to any member of the government an order to suppress any measure which would be in contradiction to the economic plan.

The Chairman of the Central Commission of Planning, Hebrang, gave me the following information about the Plan: "We asked every enterprise to supply us with information about its capacity and the status of production. This gave us basic figures for our task. Then, we set up aims of production and fixed the task of individual factories, counting either on their enlargement or bigger allotment of raw materials and thus, on an increase of production or, in some cases, according to the needs of the envisaged plan, on a limitation of production. Then, we fixed how many new factories would be erected and how they would be successively opened for production. This was the basis for elaboration of the Five Year Plan.

"In the second phase, we fixed figures of production in the individual sections of industry for the whole of Yugoslavia, and we counted how much of the basic raw materials would be needed to achieve these figures of production. The result of this phase of the work gave us general figures of a plan of production and consumption of raw materials for the whole country."

"Then, we divided these figures in two categories: one which concerns the general management of production which is under the control of the central Ministry of Industry, i.e., which is economically, financially, and administratively under
the centralized competence of this Ministry, and the other which concerns production under the competence of the individual republics. To the governments of these republics, we handed an elaborated plan of production and consumption of basic raw materials as we envisaged them.

"The whole plan was first worked out for a period of five years and then divided into individual years according to the growing production as foreseen by us. With this, the initial task of the Central Commission of Planning was finished.

"The general managements of the central Ministry of Industry and the individual ministries of the republics then prepared detailed plans within the limits of their competence. They divided the figures of production and consumption of basic raw materials among all the enterprises for a period of one month. Every enterprise received an order stating how much it is prescribed to produce and consume in raw materials during a month. Every factory then divided this task into daily tasks."

This was the information offered by the author of the Five Year Plan. It sounded simple and logical.

After one year of intensive work in which hundreds of experts participated, the Five Year Plan Law was solemnly proclaimed on April 28, 1947.

It is a book of economic figures. In its introduction it is boldly stated that the main purpose of the Plan is to liquidate the economic and technical backwardness of the country, to strengthen its economic and defensive power, to aid the Socialist development in economic life, and to increase the general prosperity of the working people.

To be able to judge the magnitude of the Plan it is necessary to quote at least some of its figures:

The national income has to double, after five years, in 1951, what it was in 1939, reaching the figure of 255 billion dinars (5.1 billion dollars). The state has to invest in the national economy 278.3 billion dinars (5.566 billion dollars) in five years. The value of production in general has to rise from the prewar 1939 value of 116.3 billion dinars (2.326 billion dollars) to 266.7 billion dinars (5.335 billion dollars). The value of the industrial production has to rise from the prewar 25.5 billion (.51 billion dollars) to 126 billion dinars (2.52 billion
dollars). The production of coal, for instance, has to rise 273 per cent, oil 450 per cent, pig iron 550 per cent, steel 350 per cent.

In the area of agriculture, according to the Plan, the production of plows must reach, in 1951, the figure of 68,000 and outstrip the prewar production ten times. Agricultural production must rise 20 per cent above the prewar figures.

The Plan further orders the state to see to an uninterrupted rise in the productivity of labor. It envisages a system of technical and economic normalization of production. It requires the most severe economy of raw materials and fuels, and foresees that through all these measures production prices will be reduced during the five years in all sections of industry, building industry, and transport from 25 to 40 per cent. The working masses must be mobilized to the highest possible efficiency by methods of competition. Their salaries are to be based on a system of differentiation. The food rationing of workers and their housing must be improved and special attention is to be given to the education of cadres.

The population must be supplied with articles of daily consumption, especially with food, clothing, and shoes. The Plan envisages the production of eight million pairs of shoes a year. To achieve the fulfillment of this part of the Plan light industry factories have to be built.

The production of lard is to increase one and a half times in comparison with 1939, sugar more than twice, textiles more than twice, shoes more than two and a half times, and furniture four times. The retail turnover of goods of this kind is to reach the value of 102 billion dinars (2.04 billion dollars) in comparison with 55 billion dinars (1.1 billion dollars) in 1939.

A new system of distribution must be organized and commercial expenses are to be lowered to 10 per cent under the retail selling price.

The sum of 5.9 billion dinars (.118 billion dollars) is to be invested in the construction of new schools and 5.4 billion dinars (.108 billion dollars) in the construction of 110 new hospitals.

The Five Year Plan gives a detailed picture of the production of the individual branches of the national economy as it
was in 1939 and also the figures which are to be achieved in the last year of the Plan, in 1951. In all sectors a substantial increase is envisaged; in the production of coal 250 per cent, black metallurgy 344 per cent, colored metallurgy 157 per cent, electricity production 400 per cent, metallurgical industry 688 per cent, electro-industry 1,000 per cent, chemical industry 911 per cent, building industry 113 per cent. The value of artisan production must increase 150 per cent.

To achieve these aims a number of power plants are to be erected; old constructions have to be modernized; new factories must be built and new production introduced, such as the production of trucks, tractors, locomotives, boilers, building machines, tool machines, pipes, synthetic rubber. The mining industry is to be enlarged. Transportation is to be improved and several thousand miles of new tracks constructed. Sea and river navigation and air transport must be considerably increased.

The number of qualified workers must rise from 350,000 in 1946 to 750,000 in 1951.

The material standard of the working population is to be raised by increasing the value of wages and by lowering the prices of goods for daily consumption.

Individual enterprises must provide detailed reports about their work, the production and consumption of raw materials and fuels, and also must ensure the productivity of the production and the lowering of its costs.

The Plan deals separately with the problem of different economic standards existing among the republics, and it takes care of the task of helping the backward regions.

The increase in the standard of living will offer in 1951 the following picture: the Yugoslav citizen will receive the same quantity of cereals as he did in 1939, 113 per cent more fats, 215 per cent more oil, 111 per cent more fish and meat, 200 per cent more textiles, and 200 per cent more shoes.

The production prices in mines must be decreased by 31 per cent in comparison with those of 1946, industry by 25.2 per cent, transportation by 33 per cent, and the productivity of labor must increase in the same sections of economy by 90
Such are the main features and aims of the Five Year Plan. They certainly represent a revolutionary move in the structure of Yugoslav economy. An agricultural country is to be transformed in a period of five years into an industrial country. And it has already been announced that after the fulfillment of the first Five Year Plan a second and third plan are to follow.

The Plan is concentrated mainly on mines and factories. Agricultural production is to be intensified but without substantial investments. The final aim followed by the Plan is to achieve an economic self-sufficiency in the area of heavy and light industry and to maintain the self-sufficiency in agriculture as it existed before.

If, in 1951, investments are to amount to 278.3 billion dinars and if, as it is envisaged, they represent 27.3 per cent of the whole national income, the first question which arises is where will the government get the financial means to cover such enormous investments?

Yugoslavia does not possess the means of production to bring about such a vast and universal program of investments. To raise the production of the mines she needs new installations which can be provided only from abroad. To improve the capacity of the ports, to found new factories and enlarge old ones, she needs tools and machinery of heavy and light industry, which she, again, has to import. Her own factories for machine production are small, few, and of low standard. That means that the Yugoslav Five Year Plan depends almost entirely on foreign trade.

Lacking, naturally, foreign exchange or gold, Yugoslavia can provide all these products only by exporting her own products. If the investment program reaches on the yearly average, $5.66 billion dinars (1.1132 billion dollars) and its fulfillment depends almost entirely on import, it is not difficult to discover the figure the Yugoslav export should have to achieve to cover the needs of import. A loan from the West was out of the
question before Marshal Tito's conflict with the Cominform. The eastern countries were unable to offer it to the Yugoslav government because of their own financial difficulties.

The Yugoslav government does not publish any statistics about the Yugoslav exports and imports, and it does not publish any information about the content of trade agreements. It is, therefore, impossible to state reliably what has been the Yugoslav export and to what extent it has covered the government's needs as envisaged in the Plan. According to some confidential information, it can be stated that in the first two years of the Plan, in 1947 and 1948, the export did not reach the figure of 10 billion dinars a year (200 million dollars). If the main part of the huge 55 billion dinars a year investment program has to be supplied by import, it is not illogical to conclude that it cannot be fulfilled.

The figures of the Five Year Plan are very impressive but after one tries to find an answer to this first, most important question, one doubts whether its authors had both feet on the ground when they worked out the Plan.

The Plan itself was worked out in a way which lacked responsible seriousness in an economic field. Mistakes were committed from the beginning of the preparatory work. I have learned from people who worked in factories that the first figures concerning the capacity and actual status of production were unrealistic. The Communist managers of the factories had the ambition to report to Belgrade very high figures, which were not based on correct and conscientious analyses. They did not consult the experts of the factory because of lack of belief in their zeal to see the factory at its best production, and they gave too high figures of production possibilities and too low figures of consumption of raw materials, just to meet the expectations of their bosses in the capital.

The same process of wrong evaluation of the Yugoslav industry was repeated on a higher level, in the Central Commission of Planning. Basing their calculations on wrong assumptions, the Communist planners raised the figures more, in a

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1The *New York Times* reported on December 6, 1949, that the foreign trade in 1949 was 20 per cent lower than in 1948 when it reached the figure of 618 million dollars.
firm belief that under strong control and organization anything can be achieved. The non-Communist experts were ordered to serve as technical administrative staff. I learned from conversations I had with some of them that they considered the figures as fantastically exaggerated, but none of the Communist officials asked them for opinions, and they were afraid to express them voluntarily because of the danger of being accused of trying to sabotage the Plan.

Another objection is that the authors of the Plan took an amateurish viewpoint in regard to the problem of labor. They count on the education of cadres, meaning the education of qualified workers, technicians, administrators, and tradesmen. This is again nothing but mere theory. Everybody who has been connected in any way with industrial life knows that the secret of expert work lies not only in the theoretical schooling but in long years of experience.

What other nations achieved in a period of fifty or more years the Yugoslavs are expected to learn within five years. All over Yugoslavia courses are arranged to educate in a few months ordinary workers to be qualified workers, school people who have only recently learned to read and write to be administrators, and to make out of peasants, who perhaps have never before seen a machine, leading technicians.

The Plan itself is full of contradictory goals. It is impossible to satisfy several interests and aims from one and the same source: to improve the standard of living and at the same time to take away from the population a greater part of the national income for financing big investment programs, the rentability of which can show itself only after many years; to undertake an obligation for an enormous export in contradiction to the needs of the home industry, which will be dependent upon raw materials to an increasing degree; to build up one factory after another, without having qualified labor to run them; to fix high aims for the investment program, without having any guarantee that the state treasury will have funds to cover all expenditures; to count on an increased efficiency of labor and the labor efforts without providing the working class with the elementary commodities to satisfy their just needs and their personal interests; to promise a better standard of living while
calculating increased export of agricultural products upon
which the standard of living mainly depends.

From all that has been said about its contents and methods
of preparation one can safely state that the Five Year Plan
does not represent a serious work. It is unrealistic.

There is one economic area which is not mentioned in the
Plan, though it represents, from the economic point of view,
another considerable amount of expense. It is the maintenance
of the Yugoslav Army. The government devotes great atten-
tion to this question and maintains a large army. The country
has no military industry of its own worth mentioning, with
exception of the production of rifles, Bren guns, and muni-
tions. Everything else has to be imported.

Any information concerning the army is considered to be
strictly secret, and the import of armaments does not figure in
any trade agreement. Up until spring, 1948, Yugoslavia im-
ported this material from Russia and Czechoslovakia. I did
not know, in my official capacity, with what and for what
Czechoslovakia supplied the Yugoslav Army, as confidential
negotiations were held directly between the representatives of
the two Ministries of National Defense. But I do know that
the Yugoslav generals were insatiable in their demands.

When the Five Year Plan was put before the Yugoslav Par-
liament, Marshal Tito evaluated its ideological and economic
significance in a speech of fundamental importance, and it is
of use to quote it rather extensively:

The government presents to the National Assembly the
Five Year Plan of the industrialization and electrification
of our country. The Plan is a fruit of a thorough and ex-
hausting work of the Commission of Planning which took
many months. The success of a planned economy is nat-
urally linked with the new social order in the new Yugo-
slavia. Without the existence of this new order, without a
transfer of the means of production from private owner-
ship, without a new democracy, without a real people's
democracy, a planned economy would not be possible . . . .

What is it that compels us to electrify and industrial-
ize our country? Above all, our country suffered so heavily
during the war that a complete reconstruction without a powerful industry of our own is simply unthinkable. It is impossible to restore and reconstruct by buying and importing the needed machines only from abroad. That would require gigantic financial means and our country would be subjected to a political and economic dependence on capitalistic countries. The old Yugoslavia was a semi-colonial state. She was only an object of exploitation by capitalists of many countries. The former corrupt rulers of Yugoslavia, headed by the King, distributed the national richness to various foreign capitalists by giving them concessions. Consequently, the state and the nation were becoming poorer and poorer.

Let us have a look at what the situation of Yugoslavia was from the economic point of view. Up to the war, there were many capitalists here: German, Austrian, Hungarian, English, Swedish, French, Belgian, Swiss, American, Italian, Czech, Dutch, et cetera. I can say that had we done nothing else but liberate our beautiful country from foreign exploitation we would have done more for the people than all the old politicians have done during their whole life.

The foreign capitalists invested their capital in our country in a way which brought them enormous profits.

Copper ore, for instance, from the mines of Bor was not refined here but it was exported to France, and then we had to buy copper from the French. Later it was found this copper ore contained a considerable quantity of gold. This ore was taken away also and the gold extracted in France. The value of the exported gold was equal to the invested capital and thus the copper ore was gained free. The same was the situation with the lead and zinc ores from Trepca which contain silver. In this case, the profit far exceeded the invested capital.

Or, take the example of petrol. Why were there in Yugoslavia very few industries for the exploitation of petrol? Is it because the foreign capitalists did not know that there is a considerable richness of petrol in the interior of our country? Shell and Standard Oil, having a monopoly of petrol, oil, and gasoline in our country wanted to maintain high prices for the petrol, oil, and gasoline which they imported from various countries. Therefore,
with the help of the corrupt ministers of former regimes and through the mediation of the Royal family itself, they made it impossible for naphtha to be exploited in our country, though they knew exactly where it was.

The textile industry was also, to a great extent, in the hands of foreigners. The foreign capitalists constructed for us only weaving-mills, but not spinning-mills. They had the latter in their own countries and so they sold yarn to our factories at high prices. Doing this, they made our industry dependent upon other countries.

The same was the case with the electric power plants which also were in foreign hands and brought high profits to foreigners. These power plants depended on foreign countries because the machines and spare parts had to be ordered from abroad.

I could continue enumerating many similar cases, but I think these are enough to see why our country was so poor and why its industrialization is so necessary . . .

Our Five Year Plan takes care not only of every section of industry but also of the craftsmen and peasants . . . . Some people are even today of the opinion that we do not need craftsmanship when building up a strong industry. They think that this private sector of production holds back a regular development of Socialist production. This is a wrong idea. Craftsmanship is useful and necessary for us. In many branches, our industry will be unable to satisfy all the needs of our nation for a long time. Our craftsmanship is qualitatively on a very high level and in view of its specific character we shall support it so as to develop it further. We shall organize it in cooperatives so that it can contribute as much as possible to the general development of our country.

In the Five Year Plan we further speak about the development in agriculture from a system of extensive to a system of intensive agriculture. We shall not progress if we maintain the old methods of cultivation, as we are told by those people who, for demagogic reasons, fight against the industrialization of our country, alleging that by industrialization we neglect our agriculture. To be able to help our peasants in modernizing agriculture, we have to have the industries which will produce fertilizers, machines, and tools. And to have such factories we must first build heavy metallurgical industries. We have to modernize
coal mines, pig iron, and other mines which will supply foundries and other heavy industry, et cetera. Without industrialization and electrification we would achieve none of what I mentioned . . . .

There have been some reactionary elements who have tried to undermine, by different methods, the materialization of the Plan . . . .

The most ridiculous reactionary elements in our country are those who do not stop babbling that Yugoslavia cannot economically prosper without the support of American or English capitalists, that our country will be unable to prosper if we do not accept political and economic subservience to Anglo-Saxon forces . . . .

The faintheartedness and distrust of those who do not believe in our own strength and who cry over the difficulties which we have to face when putting the Plan into force deserve severe criticism. We certainly shall have many difficulties but we must master them all. I am deeply convinced that we shall succeed. This conviction is shared by all those who firmly believe in the creative forces of our nations—our working citizens. The guarantee that we can do it lies in what we have done so far in an incredibly short period and with very poor means . . . .

All danger of unemployment among the working class has passed in our country. The industrialization of the country will make it possible for hundreds of thousands of poor citizens and workers to gain a decent living. Our poor people will not have to go abroad any more to find work. The industrialization and introduction of a planned economy in the new Yugoslavia mean for our nations also a certain improvement in the standard of living. In the capitalistic countries, industrialization and an increase in productivity of work carry misfortune to the working class; it will be the opposite in our country . . . . During the forthcoming five years our industry will need 170,000 new workers who are acquainted with the production process. That represents twice as many as we have today. Later on, our economy will need in this period of five years some 60,000 highly skilled employees, seven times more than we have today. As far as specialists with university education are concerned, we shall need 20,000 more than we have today. To provide these specialists is a very heavy task, but we must master it. . . .
The materialization of the Plan will entirely change the face of our country. It will not only be richer from the material point of view but the Plan will make possible a quick cultural development. We shall have not only more factories, mines, railroads, machines, good communications, cattle, foodstuffs, but we shall also have more schools, high schools and universities; more scientific institutions, reconstructed villages, towns, et cetera. Just as without this Plan, without the industrialization of our country, there would be no prosperity for our nation, so also there would be no basis for our political and economic independence. It is, therefore, the duty of every citizen to put forth every effort to help in the task which we have to face in connection with the Plan. Aware of all difficulties, we are convinced that with the help of the whole of our nation we shall accomplish our goal, which will lead us to a better and happier future.

After the Five Year Plan had been made public and the government spokesmen had made their enthusiastic speeches, the drum-fire of the totalitarian propaganda started to hammer into everyone's head the significance and advantages of the Plan. Newspapers, radio, and public lectures every day poured out information about the figures of the proposed production. The Plan became the daily theme of conversations in offices and at home. Poets published verses singing of the Plan and composers produced apotheoses of labor. A formidable labor drive swept all over the country.

In towns, public buildings were constructed with amazing speed, and on the outskirts new factories grew up. Railroad tracks were laid down and roads built. The atmosphere seemed to be imbued with an enthusiastic spirit of work. Appeals were made to workers to put forth a maximum of production, and factories invited rival factories in different regions of the country to enter into competition, to see which of them could produce more. Newspapers published names of individual workers and factories which succeeded in surpassing the prescribed aim of production and these workers and factories were rewarded with an honorary title of udarnik (shock worker). Engineers,
administrative officials, and workers were incited to simplify and improve production, and the honorary title of novator (innovator) was bestowed upon them, while their names were published in the papers.

The whole country was seized by a fever of work. An uninformed observer who followed life only as he saw it on his walks through the streets or from a train window would have been deeply impressed and could not have spared admiration.

I visited some factories and had the opportunity to speak to some engineers and officials who were directly or indirectly connected with the deliveries of material to Czechoslovakia or were connected with the installations of Czechoslovak machinery delivered to the Yugoslav industry. It was not easy to visit a Yugoslav factory. No foreigner was allowed to enter, and even as an Ambassador who represented an allied country which had close trade relations with Yugoslavia, I found it almost impossible to see a factory in operation.

I asked Minister Kidrić several times for permission to make a tour of the Yugoslav factories which had new installations from Czechoslovakia. He always readily promised to arrange it for me and suggested that we could go together. He never kept his promise. Yet I did have the rare opportunity to visit some factories when I was on official visits to the individual republican governments. I asked local officials to give me an opportunity to address the workers and this made it possible for me to see the machinery, life in the factories, and to be able to chat with people there.

Production, as I saw it, was burdened with a heavy bureaucratic apparatus. For years and years the Communists, while in opposition, have criticized the heavy, unproductive system of state officials in capitalist countries and have used the argument that workers had to pay high taxes to make it possible for the government to support large numbers of employees. Now the Communists have introduced such a system of bureaucracy that the most unworkable team of non-Socialist officials seems to be very flexible in comparison with their administration.

Production in Communist Yugoslavia is fettered by endless regulations about rules of work, production expenses, maximum consumption of raw materials, fuel, different funds, cal-
calculations, evidence of the work, etc., etc. One regulation followed another, and officials had to study them and adapt the work accordingly. I know in many cases they failed to understand them, partly because they were not acquainted with the Marxist terminology, partly because many of them have only recently learned to write and read. Instead of establishing an exemplary order in production, the regulations led to increased chaos in the factories.

In theory, it seems to be worked out logically. Every factory receives an order stating what it is expected to produce per month. The superior authorities decide for what prices it should buy raw materials and fuel, and at what price it should be allowed to sell its products. In this price are calculated the production expenses, the profit of the factory which is divided into various funds, the turnover tax (which is being handed over to the treasury), the amortization, etc.

The management of the factory divides its monthly task of production into every-day tasks. Every day it makes note of what has been achieved in production, what was the consumption of materials, how many workers took part in the production, and whether the tasks were fulfilled or possibly surpassed. All these data are posted daily on a blackboard so that the workers can follow the results of their labor. They are also telegraphed to the Ministry in Belgrade so that Minister Kidrić can proudly say that he knows every evening what was produced all over Yugoslavia on that day. All figures are then passed over to the Central Commission of Planning which checks to see whether the Plan is progressing properly. Figures fill the air and infatuate the minds of all Communists, beginning with the dictator of Yugoslav economy, Boris Kidrić, and ending with the local controllers of production in every factory.

Nobody knows, I presume, how many people are employed by this unproductive side of production, which is called evidence, and the real background of which is a constant Communist control based on a lack of trust in anybody. But local people know that in spite of the strictest control and all theoretical

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2The centralization of industry was theoretically changed at the beginning of 1950 when the functions of some ministries in the capital were transferred to local authorities.
calculations there is considerable disorder in factories. The management of factories is entrusted to people who, though politically reliable, do not understand the expert side of running an enterprise. These political directors are interested mainly in reporting to their superiors in the capital that they have achieved the goal and possibly surpassed it.

There is a general lack of experts of all kinds. Engineers are overworked. I know of a case in a factory where before the war fifty-five engineers were employed and now the factory has to be satisfied with eleven. The rest of them were declared reactionaries whose work would be detrimental to the factory. Out of twenty technical designers, now only three are employed. Yet, the factory has to produce, according to theoretical figures, more than ever before. The result is constant fear and complications. Technical experts are shirking responsibilities which have been imposed upon them against their will. They are afraid of punishment if the factory does not fulfill its task. They leave it, therefore, to the political management to report about the figures of production, regardless of what the facts are.

Experts cannot be trained overnight, though there are hundreds of special courses to prepare all kinds of qualified workers. Courses for illiterates are organized all over the country. Great importance is attached to these. The story goes that a highly qualified engineer once applied for a job. He was asked to appear before the Communist manager who questioned him about the schools he had attended. The applicant answered that he had a degree from the technical faculty of the university at Prague. The interrogator was not satisfied and asked what other schools he had attended. The engineer was puzzled and did not know what to say. Finally, he said he had gone to the high school in Belgrade but the manager became impatient and inquired further. Then the engineer, quite in despair, said that he had gone to the elementary school in his village. The manager was less and less satisfied and exclaimed, "The Technical School in Prague, high school in Belgrade, elementary school in your village are all right, but have you had a course for illiterates?" The engineer had to admit that he had not attended a course and he did not get the job.
The great lack of experts was met at least partly by employing German prisoners. They are employed as qualified workers, administrators, and technicians. Before the Yugoslav Communists quarrelled with the Cominform, hundreds of German technicians were sent from the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany to Yugoslavia. Also, the Communist Ministry of Interior of Czechoslovakia had a secret arrangement with the Yugoslav government according to which German technicians from the Sudetenland, instead of being moved to the Reich, were given the opportunity to enroll for work in Yugoslavia. Hundreds of them accepted rather well-paid positions and signed contracts for five years. There were university professors among them and general managers of big industrial firms which used to be in German hands. They took with them the knowledge of Czechoslovak industry and production secrets. When I discovered this I did everything in my power to stop it, because it seriously endangered Czechoslovak economic interests.

These Germans were employed in factories, ministries, and even in the Central Commission of Planning, and thus became acquainted with Yugoslav plans and the actual situation in Yugoslav industry. When I tried, one day, to show Minister Kidrić that he was introducing these people to all the secrets of production and that he should be aware of the possibility of their espionage creating a network of spies for the future time when Germany would again export to the Balkans, he answered with a cynical smile that he had had this in mind, and that the Yugoslav government would know how to deal with these Germans to make it impossible for them when their contracts expired to take back to Germany what they had seen and learned in Yugoslavia.

I know from reliable sources that these German technicians spoke about the Yugoslav Five Year Plan and its practical application with contempt.

Up until the break with the Cominform, Yugoslav industry worked under the guidance of experts coming from another country, Russia. Soviet technicians and administrators could be found in every important office, bringing with them considerable experience from the Russian Five Year Plans. They had no contact with the outside world and their engagement with
the Yugoslav government was never mentioned in public. When the Yugoslav Communist party was about to be excommunicated they were withdrawn within twenty-four hours. When, later on, the correspondence exchanged between Marshal Tito and Joseph Stalin was published, it was disclosed that the employment of the Russian experts was also a point of friction, though a very small one. Tito complained to Stalin that these Russians were paid ten times bigger salaries than the Yugoslav technicians.

Control of people and control of work are among the most pronounced characteristics of the Communist regime. No person trusts another person, and a scale of control, from the top to the bottom, installs a system of constant vigilance. This applies also to industry.

A Communist secretary, who is usually the chairman or secretary of the local trade union organization, watches the workers and other employees. A political manager of the factory controls the work of the enterprise and all of them are controlled by a special central organ called the Central Commission of Control. The head of this institution was, until 1948, one of the "Big Four" men of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, Edvard Kardelj, which indicates the importance attached to this office. The members of the Central Commission of Control enjoy the unlimited right of inspection of all documents in offices and factories. They visit them secretly at night, open the rooms and desks of officials and take files. Employees coming to work in the morning often find their desks empty. They know what happened, and the only thing for them to do is to wait for an order summoning them for investigation. Parallel- ing this clandestine form of control is a legal investigation of files and books lasting many days. On such occasions everybody in the office and factory trembles in fear of what will be the result of the Commission's findings.

Also, special control is entrusted to the Communist press. It is considered very democratic that the press follows production and goes after failures and the sinners against the new So-
cialist order. Editors of *Borba*, armed with special identification cards, have the right to visit any factory unexpectedly and to inquire about its production, working morale, health conditions, and political education. The fruits of their studies are then published in the newspaper, and the management and employees are either highly praised or severely condemned. In the latter case, an official investigation follows and the people responsible for lacks are accused before tribunals. The press is proud of having discovered reactionaries and saboteurs of the Socialist economy.

Irregularities in the field of production occur in spite of the Communist enthusiasts. Production, after all, does not depend upon amateurish zeal and improvisations, but upon the knowledge and devotion to work of hundreds of thousands of workers, technicians, and administrators. These in an overwhelming majority do not belong to the ranks of the Communist party and are latently its bitter opponents. All the regulations, control, mistrust, bad living, political pressure, and physical exploitation have deprived them of personal interest to contribute to smooth production. When disturbances occur they are not interested in removing them as long as their personal responsibility is not involved.

In one instance it happened that the management forgot to order one of the needed raw materials on time and the work had to stop. Nobody cared because the factory was state-owned and the non-Communist employees were glad to see that their Communist manager would have trouble. Or in a factory where wooden boxes were made, for example, the management did not order nails in time and so stores of wood lay for weeks in the open air exposed to rain. Again, in an automobile factory, a machine for the making of one part was not delivered and installed and the cars were not finished for months. But in the statistical reports concerning the Plan these cars were calculated in and the report said that the Plan had been fulfilled. There were many cases of a similar nature; machines were idle, workers were unemployed.

In April, 1948, the Ministry of Communications decided to raise the tariffs for railroad passengers by 33 per cent and for freight by 100 per cent, effective at once. Protests started to
pour into the Ministry from every factory, explaining that calculations about production expenditures were made on a certain basis, including the railway tariffs, and that this unexpected rise would turn all these calculations upside down. Consultations followed among the higher authorities and finally Minister Kidrić intervened; five days later the decree of the Ministry of Communications was abolished.

Production in Yugoslavia has been greatly hampered by disturbances in foreign trade. Its increase, as foreseen by the Plan, depends largely on imports of heavy machinery from abroad. I know from my official experience about belated deliveries by Czechoslovak firms which were by contracts bound to export turbines, sugar refineries, half-finished automobile parts, cables, and railroad tracks to Yugoslavia. Under socialization they were unable to keep up their own production, so were from twelve to eighteen months late in their obligations to Yugoslavia. It was the same in the case of imports from Russia, Poland, and Hungary.

Minister Hebrang admitted to me, when he was still in office, that the government had to face in its economic policy a serious obstacle, namely, the uncertainty of deliveries from abroad. But, he said, it planned to eliminate this difficulty by creating reserves of imported products from which Yugoslav industry would be supplied in case of delays in imports.

In spite of all the apparent and flagrant obstacles to production, which the Communists are unable to remove, the newspapers daily publish information that this or that factory has surpassed the Plan by 20 to 30 per cent and it is held up as an example of Socialist achievement.

Once every six months the Central Commission of Planning publishes official data about the fulfillment of the Plan in the most important sections of production. The public was told that in the first half of 1947 the income of the treasury was 8 per cent higher than the Plan had foreseen, that industry and mines fulfilled the Plan up to 97.8 per cent, timber industry up to 95.1 per cent, agriculture over 100 per cent, and the plan of investment up to 81.7 per cent. Then a long list of figures followed, giving the production in 1946 in comparison with the production achieved according to the Plan.
In many cases the statistics stated that the production had been raised by 100, 150 to 250 per cent.

However, the report is meaningless if it mentions only by what percentage the production was raised without giving the basic figures. It would not have been difficult to raise the production 100 per cent or more, if in 1946 this was negligible.

In his 1948 New Year message, Marshal Tito announced that the Plan for the whole of 1947 had been fulfilled by 104 per cent, that the productivity of work had been raised 120 per cent, the mining industry had fulfilled the Plan 104 per cent, the timber industry 93.6 per cent, other industries 105 per cent, state income 101.7 per cent.

There were, however, failures which even the Communist regime could not conceal if it wished to find a remedy for them. Marshal Tito mentioned some of them. He criticized the people, saying they had not taken proper care of the machines, that they had not always had the right attitude toward their work, and that they celebrated too many holidays; the factory administration had not taken care of the workers, food provisioning had not been good, the service of statistics had been unbelievably insufficient; there had been much mismanagement in distribution so that it happened that stores were full of goods but consumers suffered from want, or that in the winter summer textiles were distributed and in the summer, winter ones. This was a testimony given by Tito himself.

The break between the Communist party of Yugoslavia and the Cominform was an almost mortal blow to the Yugoslav Five Year Plan. Russia and all her satellites started to pursue a policy of economic strangulation of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs were reluctant to admit the failure in planning and kept the news about the economic blockade by the East in strict secrecy, still cherishing hopes of reconciliation with Moscow. At the end of 1948, however, the economic situation became critical. Many Yugoslav factories were idle and unemployment was increasing. The Communist theory that there is no place for unemployment in a Communist economy proved to be futile. The Politburo felt it necessary to explain the situation to the confused and puzzled ranks of the party and to revise the Plan.
In November, 1948, Marshal Tito declared that because of the hostile attitude of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia would have to seek trade contacts with the western countries, and he complained bitterly that the East was behaving worse toward his country than toward the capitalist states. He also indicated the necessity of revision of the Plan.

In February, 1949, a government order published a list of priorities in the program of industrialization and electrification of the country, stressing the need of putting first things first and dropping secondary objects of the Plan. This meant continuation in construction of heavy industry and abandonment of the minimum program of improvement in the production of consumer goods.

Despite the inevitable consequences of the economic isolation of Yugoslavia from the East, the government maintained that the program of the Five Year Plan for 1948 had been fulfilled. In January, 1949, the Central Commission of Planning announced that in the over-all industry the Plan was fulfilled by 100.8 per cent, out of which the heavy industry achieved 97.3 per cent and the light industry 103.2 per cent. The section of agriculture achieved 99 per cent. The industrial production was 61 per cent higher than in 1947, but no evaluation of these figures was possible because absolute figures of 1947 production were never published. At the same time, the government boldly announced the goal for the production in 1949 to be 30 per cent higher than it was in the preceding year.

To defend its stand against Moscow and to explain failures in production, the Yugoslav Communists disclosed in August, 1949, that the eastern Communist countries had delivered defective machinery to them. Czechoslovakia, it was said, sent a defective Diesel power plant, Hungary supplied defective Davy lamps for mines and electric motors; both Czechoslovakia and Hungary sent to Yugoslavia centrifugal pumps which broke after one hour of operation; Soviet Russia sent an old, worn-out centrifugal pump which broke after thirty minutes of work. The Yugoslav government accused the Cominform countries of sabotaging Yugoslav industry, aimed at an economic breakdown of the Yugoslav economy.
In fact, there was no sabotage in these defective deliveries. I can testify that long before the conflict with the Cominform, the Yugoslav government complained of the bad quality of Czechoslovak machinery which was caused by the nationalization of Czechoslovak industry. It was a common feature that under the Socialist system the quality of production dangerously suffered. This was concealed as long as Yugoslavia and other Communist countries remained friends, but after the break it turned into a political argument of sabotage.

The western countries were, for political and economic reasons, interested in stepping in and taking the place of the eastern exporters. Negotiations were opened with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and other countries of the West, and they gave new hope to the Yugoslav government to save the Five Year Plan. A wave of optimism brought back the figures of the Plan which, it was said, would be fulfilled and even surpassed. According to Marshal Tito's New Year message of 1950, "we had topped what we planned to achieve [in 1949], and with our own forces only." But in December, 1950, Minister Kidrić, finding an excuse in the drought which had fallen upon the country, announced that the Five Year Plan was being prolonged into a six year plan. Newspapers informed the public that the structure and target of the Plan had to be changed and limited to projects of heavy industry.

One asks, how could the Yugoslav people trust statistics asserting the increase of production and the rise of the standard of living? They know what their daily life brings them.

They do not get even the simplest goods for daily consumption. The Plan has limited the production of consumer goods to a minimum in the first years, and it assumes that the standard of living will be held at a very low level so that the bigger part of the financial means of the country can be concentrated upon the construction of heavy industry. But according to the figures of the Plan, even the production of consumer goods is supposed to rise steadily.
Information about the situation of Yugoslav economy is kept strictly secret. Other countries regularly publish statistical data about all sections of economic life. National banks give figures about the currency and their active and passive accounts. State authorities publish indexes of prices, salaries, standards of living, texts of trade agreements, figures of import and export, reports about the production capacity and the real production, about labor markets and movement of prices.

No figures of that nature are published in Yugoslavia, or in Russia, or in other Communist countries. Only a very limited number of politicians and high state officials are acquainted with these figures, which are indispensable for every economist who wants to analyze the situation.

The Yugoslav government does not publish these figures for several reasons. First, they would disclose the fact that the economy of the country is far from being what the propagandists claim; second, they would prove several discrepancies to which the economy is subjected; and last, the official circles live in a sphere of secrecy and are afraid that any disclosure about the national economy would facilitate the work of enemies of the new Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav officials consider as highly confidential even the simplest information.

One instance is especially characteristic. The district court in Novi Sad forbade the distribution of a commercial booklet called Calendar of Vojvodina. In the pronouncement of sentence it was said that the booklet contained a list of all the towns and villages in the region of Vojvodina, giving the population of each, with addresses and telephone numbers of the inhabitants; a list of factories and firms with their addresses and telephone numbers; and further on, a series of advertisements containing information about individual firms' products.

The accused publisher defended himself in vain, insisting that the book did not disclose any confidential information. The court decided that "according to the Law about Criminal Acts against the Nation and the State, no information of that sort is allowed to be published as it could be used by the enemies of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." This happened on March 21, 1947, and the document bears the number K 241-47.
Failures in a Communist-run industry should not lead to the conclusion that they must inevitably lead to a final breakdown of Communist economy and possibly even of Communist regimes. These would be wrong conclusions.

All the privations and mistakes of Communist economy are balanced by several factors. People are condemned to constant want and sacrifices. Their needs become very low. Political and economic power entrusted to a single body—the Communist government—make it possible to concentrate on the production of certain products only, and thus results are finally achieved.

In Russia, many values have been lost through years of Soviet-planned economy; people have suffered, material has been wasted, the quality of products has been bad, but through a concentrated effort to produce the most important things, the Soviet government has succeeded in providing farmers with tractors, the army with tanks, guns, planes, and rifles, and has built big industrial centers.

It matters little to the Communist leaders that housewives cannot have refrigerators, that children have no toys, and that many people have to wear rags instead of decent clothes and shoes. The people are promised all good things later on when the Communist regime is safe from any danger of internal or external disruption. But from its very nature a dictatorial regime can never feel safe.
A Communist system of government cannot stop halfway. Its principles must penetrate all sections of the economic life of the country. And so, along with the declaration of laws about the nationalization of industry and the law of the Five Year Plan, the Yugoslav Communist government prepared several bills affecting the financial system of Yugoslavia.

In the first two years after the war, Yugoslavia operated under a state budget, covering the incomes and expenses of the state administration. Factories which the government took over either by confiscation or sequestration financed their own production and were administered as private firms, though under the control of public authorities.

Immediately after the war, the government concentrated all its efforts on avoiding inflation and financial chaos, to
which all the other Balkan and almost all the Central European countries had succumbed. Its efforts were crowned by success. The new currency, the dinar, though not a recognized international currency of high and stable value, developed into good money on the internal market of Yugoslavia, and the population trusted its value. At first the peasants preferred to receive goods for their agricultural products sold on the black market but later gladly accepted the dinar. This certainly was an achievement worthy of praise.

The government was successful because it took the most drastic measures when the old wartime currencies were withdrawn from circulation. There were, during the war, six different currencies circulating in the territory of Yugoslavia. The Serbian dinar, the Croat kuna, the German mark, the Italian lira, the Hungarian pengoe, the Bulgarian lev. The exchange rate of these wartime currencies for the new Yugoslav dinar was very low and nobody was entitled to receive more than 5,000 dinars (100 dollars) in cash of the new currency.

This sum hardly covered one month’s current expenses, and people who were not regularly employed had no guarantee that after having spent these 5,000 dinars they would find a way to get more. For the rest of the old money, which was handed over to the treasury, the government returned bonuses which were progressively so radically devaluated that any great amount of money delivered to the treasury in this way was practically confiscated.

The first step taken to avoid the danger of inflation, therefore, was to place only a very small amount of the new currency in circulation. The next step was to keep wages and salaries very low. Thus, a stable currency was gained by a general impoverishment of the population.

From the standpoint of the treasury policy, the financial situation of the country seemed to be stable, because the government had confiscated and later nationalized the mines and factories without paying indemnity to the original owners. It also gained by postponing the payment of the prewar and war obligations.

The government based its calculations on the assumption
that the new dinar had the same value as the prewar currency. This was a wrong assumption. In 1938, for instance, one pound of beef of the best quality cost 13 dinars; in 1948, on the regular, controlled market (vezane cene) it cost 28 dinars, and on the free market 150 dinars. In the summer of 1938, an egg cost 1 dinar; in 1948, 5 dinars (on the regular market), or 8 dinars on the free market; in the winter 20 dinars; one pound of butter, 13 dinars in 1938, and 150 and 300 dinars respectively in 1948; a chicken, 15 dinars in 1938 and 150 to 200 in 1948; one pound of beans, which is a Yugoslav national meal used in the poorest families, in 1938 cost 1.5 dinars, in 1948, 10 to 15 dinars; a bottle of wine, 8 dinars in 1938, 80 dinars in 1948; one liter of milk, 2.5 dinars in 1938, and 9 dinars for controlled price and 20 to 25 dinars on the free market in 1948; one pound of sugar, 7.5 dinars in 1938, and 33 and 150 dinars respectively in 1948. Prices of agricultural products and raw materials exported abroad have risen much more.

Before the war the dinar was exchanged on a scale of 1 dollar for about 48 dinars; 1 pound sterling for about 225; 1 Swiss franc for about 11 dinars. The present (1951) exchange is 1 dollar for 50 dinars; 1 pound sterling for 200 dinars; and 1 Swiss franc for about 11.2 dinars. Though the internal buying power of the dinar is at least four to five times smaller than it was before the war, the foreign exchange has stayed almost the same.

The Yugoslav population does not know what the circulation of the currency is. This is a well-kept secret. The National Bank does not publish any information about its activities and when the budget is presented to the Parliament, the minister responsible for the state finances does not feel he is bound to say how much money actually circulates among the population. In March, 1946, he made only the general remark that it was being kept at the prewar level.

This statement, however, did not disclose very much, because it is general knowledge that the amount of circulating currency changes according to the intensity of the economic life. At my disposal I have no information what the prewar circulation was but I think it did not exceed eight billion dinars.
I know, however, from a reliable source that in the spring of 1946, it was fourteen billion, and in June, 1947, over twenty billion. In normal conditions, when the intensity of economic life is rising, this would not foretell any signs of inflation as under such conditions the national income increases, the exchange of goods is lively and requires a larger circulation of money.

But in Yugoslavia the exchange of goods is now very limited, the circulation of currency is rather slow because the majority of the people receive low salaries and wages, and the peasants, who always use little cash, depend on state redemption.

The rising tide of currency in 1947, the first year of the Five Year Plan, can be explained by the rising needs of industry, which invested large sums in different enterprises. There are, therefore, symptoms that the government might be unable to keep the sound basis of the currency.

From 1947 on, the Yugoslav budgets have been of a different structure from what they were before. They are determined by the Communist system of economic life. The government, or the treasury, is not only the center of income from taxes, customs, etc., and of expenses for the state administration, but it also represents the main bartering center of the nation as the one and only employer and entrepreneur.

Before this new type of budget could be introduced the government had to take several preliminary measures in the field of public finances. It established a new law about taxes and a new organization of banking and the insurance business.

The system of taxes was simplified. The law of 1946 provided for only a few taxes: a turnover tax, income tax, inheritance and gift tax. A number of taxes which exist in the western countries were abolished and all levels of income have been subjected to income tax.

The nationalization of industry led to the first fundamental characteristic of the new Yugoslav budget. Eighty per cent of the income of the treasury is based on the nationalized industry while only 20 per cent is derived from taxes
paid directly by the population, mainly by peasants and employees. The state-owned industry is, therefore, the main source of taxes.

The most important tax, the turnover tax, is not like it is in some European countries where it is paid as a part of the price of goods whenever they change hands. In Yugoslavia it is a tax paid by the industrial enterprises which calculate it in the price of the products, and it moves from 20 to 100 per cent of the production price, according to the nature of the products.

The spokesmen for the Yugoslav government like to emphasize that this system has taken the heaviest burden away from the shoulders of taxpayers. In practice, it means that instead of individual private industrialists, wholesalers, retailers, and buyers having to pay the turnover tax when acquiring the goods, now the state industries concentrate the payment in their hands alone. As this tax often reaches 100 per cent of the production price, it is not difficult to imagine how much it affects the final price of goods. And the consumer has to pay the price, the turnover tax included.

The state authorities establish the price of every product. They fix what is called the basic production price, i.e., the amount for which a factory is allowed and supposed to produce a certain product. To this sum they add the profit which the factory is allowed to retain and use for various political, social, and hygienic purposes; the whole amount is increased by a fund for the treasury, investment program, and, finally, by the turnover tax. All these items together form the selling price of the product. The turnover tax is actually nothing but a clear profit for the treasury, above the profit of the factory. If a capitalist would calculate on a 100 per cent profit, he would be called the greatest exploiter of all times.

The budget for 1947 claimed thirty-eight billion dinars of income from the turnover tax alone, and the budget for 1948, forty-six billion. In theory, the state should have plenty of money, which should be used for the benefit of the people.

Where are all these billions? A Communist would answer that the budgets themselves indicate that they go for the construction of factories, roads, railroads, hospitals, cultural
and social institutions, for the army, for public administration. But a glance through the budget would disclose that it is a very general statement about the government program, that it is impossible to discover from it what new constructions are planned, how much they would cost and what is allotted for the personal expenditures of the army and the administration. My personal guess is that, first, the state’s income stays far below the preliminary figures because the nationalized industry does not produce as much as it is expected to and, therefore, cannot hand over to the treasury the assumed sums. Second, the state, though a collector of enormous sums, swallows a good deal of income in its huge bureaucratic apparatus of public and economic administration; and third, unknown and never-mentioned sums go to the Communist party of Yugoslavia to keep up its extensive party personnel and propaganda machine.

In November, 1946, a law concerning the organization and activities of the credit system formally allowed for the existence of private credit institutions on the condition of a yearly license issued by the Ministry of Finance. Since 1947 no license has been issued, either for an existing bank or for a new one. All domestic and foreign banks were obliged to liquidate their business.

The second law concerning nationalization has also formally nationalized all credit institutions. In a Socialist economy it is only natural, as all private banking loses its raison d'être.

There are several types of state-owned banks. As in other European countries, the functions of issuing bank notes, of studying and regulating the development of currency, of managing the commerce with gold and foreign currencies, and of the organization of payments connected with foreign trade are under the exclusive control of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. Other banks have various tasks, according to the decision of the government, and their titles reveal what kind of business has been entrusted to them. They include the Postal Savings Bank, State’s Investment Bank, Cooperative and Agricultural Bank, Industrial Bank, Craftsmen Bank, and the State Insurance Institution.

The most important law in the sphere of finances is, of
course, that of the budget. In Communist terminology, as defined by Minister Kidrić, the budget represents "the coordination of organization and method of the financial system with a Socialist content and substance" and it is "a plan for the creation of a concentrated fund of the state finances and a plan for using these means in harmony with the all-state economic plan for the purpose of the economic reconstruction, the material and cultural advancement, and social security of the broad masses, with the aim of strengthening national independence and the maintaining of the state administration of the country."

The budget of Yugoslavia is formally divided into two parts, one dealing with the income and expenditures of the country as a whole, and the other containing income and expenditures of the individual federal republics. From the figures published in both parts and from the organization of industry, one can draw the conclusion that in the highly centralized Yugoslav economy very little authority and financial means are left to the republics. It is known that the same system of thorough centralization of economic power and financial means is applied in Soviet Russia. However, both countries, and other Communist states as well, like to emphasize that the Communist governments have given full national autonomy to every nation and federated unit and that they do not exploit one region for the benefit of another. From the Yugoslav budget it is clear that, for instance, the well-balanced economy of Slovenia with its industry, health resorts, and sea spas has to pay heavily for the central government's daring undertakings in the mountainous and economically passive Montenegro and Bosnia.

The budget for 1947 reached the high sum of 85 billion dinars. It can be explained by the new system of budgeting in the Communist economy. Income and expenditure were in balance but the general presentation of the budget, which does not give specific figures for individual branches, does not allow an accurate analysis. Thus, the Ministry of Industry foresaw only a general expenditure of ten billion, the Ministry of Mining, six billion; some thirty-two billion were reserved for different capital investments without any specification. The army asked
for an expenditure of ten and one-half billion dinars, which represents 12.35 per cent of the budget, etc. As to the income foreseen by the budget, it is stated in general terms only, the main item being the turnover tax which represented thirty-eight billion dinars and was expected to cover 44 per cent of all expenses.

The size of the budget for 1947 gave good reason to believe that it far surpassed the possibilities of the national wealth. Prices of all agricultural and industrial products actually did go up considerably, as the government was in need of an enormous amount of money to finance its investment program and fixed the turnover tax so high that it necessitated a considerable rise in prices of finished products.

The budget for 1948 jumped up to the dizzy amount of 124,841,338,000 dinars, i.e., an increase of 45.2 per cent over the budget of 1947. The members of the government defended this rise with the argument that the second year of the Five Year Plan assumed a vigorous growth of the investment program, representing sixty-six billion dinars, or 72 per cent more than in 1947. Army expenditures were increased by 35 per cent.

These extravagant figures could be covered only by another increase in the turnover tax which was supposed to contribute 36.86 per cent of the state income. The consequences were inevitably the same as in the previous year: the selling prices of all products rose again.

Economic dictator Kidrić began to be rather worried about the development, and the government ordered a severe control of all financial means, a lowering of production expenses, and announced a national loan amounting to three and one-half billion dinars. According to official reports the loan subscribed 11.45 per cent more than expected. It was never explained who were the main subscribers of the loan. It certainly could not be individuals or the common people who were not in a position to subscribe any larger amount of money. It must have been state-owned industry and banks and shops which were ordered to buy the bonds. The means were provided by the treasury, or in other words, the money went from one state pocket into another. The loan had, on the whole, no other than propaganda purpose.
Minister Kidrić supported the budget before the people who must have been amazed by its size. The budget was duly presented to the Parliament, and Kidrić did not need to fear that it would meet with opposition. By 1948, Dragoljub Jovanović, the only opponent of the government, was already in prison. Kidrić felt, however, that people would be shocked and so tried to brush any opposition aside by attacking “reactionaries” who would see in the budget signs of weakness or failure.

The speech is so characteristic of the Communist financial policy that it is of importance to quote the most pertinent passages of it:

. . . . Many open enemies and hidden sceptics have invented theories that the Yugoslav government was plunging into an inflation, that it was lowering the standard of living of the population, that it was preparing itself to attack the peasants, that the Yugoslav leaders have lost ground and have given themselves up to fantasies which must inevitably end in a complete breakdown. But impartial figures show that the reality is different from these theories and slanders.

The coefficient of this year’s turnover of the consumers’ goods and money is in comparison with the last year [1947] at least 15 per cent higher. The enemies who cherish hopes for an inflation will be disappointed deeply. The value and buying power of the dinar will increase this year. Equally disappointed will be the ill-willed people who think that there cannot be a rise in the budget on account of the standard of living of the working masses. By the end of this year we shall achieve, assuming an average harvest and materialization of the basic tasks of the industrial production, a standard of living index of 107 in comparison with the index of 100 in 1939, 54.88 in 1945, 78.72 in 1946, and 86.87 in 1947. . . .

We answer all slander that claims we are preparing an attack against the peasants by increasing the budget with a statement that we have already contributed to their betterment by 16 per cent by introducing fixed prices and that the income tax of working peasants will be reduced by 40 per cent in comparison with 1947. We shall attack, of course, speculators and all capitalistic elements in villages and it is true that the standard of speculators will fall.

The increase of the present budget has its background
in the increase of the national income. The economic plan foresees for 1948, 191.9 billion dinars in national income, 44.4 per cent higher than that in 1947 when we achieved 132.9 billion dinars. . . .

The rise in the national income is based, first of all, on an enormous rise of production in our industry, mining, power stations, forestry, and building industry. . . . People who have doubts should know the figures not of what is planned but what has been achieved: In comparison with 1939, we produced in 1946, 104 per cent of electrical energy and in 1947, 132 per cent; of coal 112 per cent in 1946, and 153 per cent in 1947; of steel hardly 85 per cent in 1946 but 132 per cent in 1947; of cement 88.4 per cent in 1946 and 188 per cent in 1947; of glass 103 per cent in 1946 and 191 per cent in 1947; of sugar 65 per cent in 1946 and 141 per cent in 1947; of building wood 140 per cent in 1947; all this uses 1939 as 100 per cent.

Here we have to confront these optimistic figures of Minister Kidrić with the facts. It is difficult to pass judgment about his estimate of national income because it is not clear what is considered national income in a Communist country. If, in general, the rise of national income should reflect an improvement in the living standard of the population, then his figures certainly do not correspond with reality. The same applies then also to the quoted index figures of the standard of living. It is true that conditions improved slightly in 1947, in comparison with 1946 and 1945 which were the postwar years and had particularly weak harvest, but 1948 was again worse because so much of the national income was drawn into the investment plan. Altogether there is no comparison with 1939 when people lived much better than after the war. It is hardly possible to understand the whole approach of Minister Kidrić to the point in question when he declares how much has been produced in every branch of industry, yet people know that there was an appalling lack of coal, glass, sugar, and wood. Was it all allotted to the investment program?

Again Minister Kidrić said,

The reason for the rise of the national income is to be found in the change of the political and social conditions in our country. First, the new Yugoslavia, politically
and economically free and independent, got rid of foreign imperialists and financial magnates who hampered in the old semi-colonial Yugoslavia the development and full use of production forces. Then, also, the working masses have been socially and nationally liberated, while in the old Yugoslavia they hated to work for reasons of the class and national oppression and exploitation. Thus planned economy showed great advantages over capitalistic anarchy in the field of increasing general production and in that of using fully all economic possibilities.

The rise of national income is a result of socialism in our country. The capitalistic elements enjoyed in the last year 9 per cent of the national income. . . this year they will have only 4.5 per cent. . . .

Then follows a long enumeration of figures on the quantity of every product to be produced in 1948 and a list of articles which Yugoslavia is already able to produce by herself, while before she was obliged to import them. Minister Kidrič continued, touching the thorniest problem of Yugoslav industrialization:

A great task of 1948 is the question of labor and new qualified groups of workers.

This year, we shall have to mobilize some one hundred thousand new workers, apprentices, and half-qualified workers. This problem cannot be solved on paper, by planning only, as it affects deeply the whole economy and the whole social life. The capitalists tried to solve it by impoverishment and proletarization of villages, by a tremendous oppression of the poorest peasant. We cannot mobilize the labor in that way though there were some tendencies of this kind. On the contrary, with the mobilization of tens of thousands of new forest, building, and industrial workers recruited from villages, we have issued over eight hundred thousand ration cards to the poor peasants. We have made it possible for the passive regions to buy industrial products for fixed prices [vezane cene], crediting up to 40 per cent. We have made it possible for the poor peasants to sell all their goods without exception for fixed prices.

Another problem of a Communist system in industry is revealed in Minister Kidrič’s complaint and warning:
we have to remove the practice of our economic institutions and even of the republics which, for reasons of lack of labor, create unjustified reserves of labor and intentionally overplan the need of labor. This damaging practice has gone so far that altogether it represented seven times more than the real need of labor.

Another worry:

We have had great success in the industrial production and building industry. Those were, however, mainly quantitative achievements. Today, we have to go forward also in quality. There were branches in which the quality suffered greatly, and it has been in contrast to the quantity. It is a very dangerous feature and should it increase, it could lead us into a dead-end street out of which it would be difficult to get later.

Then follows another series of figures about production of consumers' goods which promises to the population everything in much bigger quantities than it used to get, and a warning that the distribution does not work as it should because stores of goods are left in storage and do not reach the market.

It must have required considerable courage on the part of Minister Kidrić to present to the Parliament such bold figures of envisaged production for 1948, at the time when the conflict of his government with Moscow, though still a secret, was in full swing.

Kidrić either did not know about the threatening break, though he was a high-ranking Communist, or he hoped that the conflict would be straightened out. Or he did not envisage the reprisals which the Soviet bloc would take against the disobedient son in Belgrade by enforcing economic isolation. As a student of Communist theory, he fell into an ecstasy of almost poetic surrealism when he quoted all the economic figures. As a central figure in Yugoslav planning and production, though, he must have been aware of all the obstacles and difficulties. But he thought the dictatorial power he held would make it possible to overcome all troubles. Impressed by his position, which gives him power over millions of working people whom he exploits to the last drop of their working strength, he believes that he can change his extremely high figures into reality. He himself has become their prisoner.
Even after the break with the Cominform, this megalomania of figures continued. The budget for 1949 was increased again. It reached the figure of 162 billion dinars (3.24 billion dollars), surpassing the preceding budget by 37 billions, i.e., by 22.83 per cent. The budget for 1950 jumped to 173.746 billion dinars (3,474,920,000 dollars). It has been maintained at approximately the same level for 1951 (3,453,240,000 dollars). The inevitable consequence could only be an increase of prices of all commodities and further impoverishment of the population.

Official figures of Communist finances are unreliable and disclose only general trends of financial policy. In a liberal economy the same figures would open a dangerous road to inflation and to bankruptcy of the treasury. This is not the case in a Communist country in which conflicting economic interests are covered by orders coming from the only existing economic center, the government. However, the standard of living of the population remains a pressing problem.
MARKETS, SALARIES, PRICES

Now, we come to the practical side of economics: what people in Yugoslavia can buy to carry on their daily life.

The Yugoslav state, which owns factories and to which peasants have to sell their products, has the exclusive right of disposition of all these products. It can decide how and through whom goods will reach consumers.

In order to liquidate private business, the state authorities simply did not sell any goods to private shops; they allotted them to state-owned business centers only. Thus, private shops had nothing to sell. But the shopkeeper still had to pay the rent, and his family and he had to live. He did not get any ration cards to buy daily commodities at controlled prices because as shopkeeper he did not belong to any "productive" category of the population to be entitled to possess ration cards. He had to supply himself from the black market, or the so-called free
market, where the prices were far too high for him. He was forced to liquidate his shop and hand it “voluntarily” to the state. He was fortunate when he could get a minor job in his former business. And so in 1947, according to official reports, 90 per cent of retail and 100 per cent of wholesale businesses were nationalized.

On one occasion I had a long discussion with a high Czechoslovak Communist functionary about my experience with the Communist economy and gave him a number of examples of how badly it works in Yugoslavia. This discussion took place shortly after the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia. I warned him against all the excesses which occurred in the distribution system. He maintained, however, that the communization of the economy must be carried through in all sections of life. “We shall have to face many difficulties,” he said, “because people have to be educated first to work and live according to our doctrine. There is no doubt that many mistakes are committed, but this is not the case because the system is wrong but because people act wrongly. If, for instance, vegetables come rotten to the markets in Prague, it is because the organization is bad, which means that people entrusted with the transport do not fulfill their duty as they should, and it is not because the transport and the selling of vegetables have been nationalized.”

I said to my Communist opponent, “How would you then explain that exactly the same things happen in Yugoslavia? You know that Yugoslavia is a country of very good grapes. Before the war we used to get them in abundance, cheap, and of first class quality. Now, it is difficult to buy grapes even on the free market for excessive prices, and the quality is poor. Before they reach the market they are half rotten. The peasant who cultivates grapes does not care what happens to his crop because he does not know to whom he sells. People who work in the state-owned transportation companies are interested only in keeping up the prescribed number of trips from the village to the town. They do not mind whether grapes are properly packed and carefully transported, and so before the fruit reaches the market it is half rotten.

“Or how would you explain that in a period when eggs are
scarce, wagonloads of them lie rotten for days and days somewhere in a station and cannot be offered for sale at all?

"Another example: Oranges come from Albania. Communist propaganda speaks loudly about the brotherly cooperation of the two people's republics, praising one nation for sending oranges for the undernourished children of the other country. But before the train is unloaded, all the oranges are rotten.

"This does not apply only to perishable foods. Textiles are exposed to moths in stores and shops because the employees don't care what they are going to sell; straw rots in open stores, exposed to rain. Goods valued at billions are lost because of bad distribution."

Wages and salaries are decreed by the government for all categories of employees: public servants, university professors, hospital doctors, workers, and all sorts of other employees. As free professions have almost disappeared and industry has been 100 per cent nationalized, the government's decrees embrace almost the whole non-agricultural population. As for peasants, the situation is much the same. They have to sell their products to state authorities for prices fixed by the government, which is like a salary paid for their labor.

A worker in Yugoslavia earns monthly some sixty dollars, a university professor some one hundred and twenty dollars. Workers earn, according to their special qualifications, from eighteen cents to thirty-two cents per hour. Specially qualified workers and people doing hard manual work in mines and metallurgy can receive special contributions. An ordinary unskilled worker, then, earns thirty-four dollars in four weeks, a skilled worker earns sixty-one dollars. If he has a family, he earns for each child three and one-half dollars more. These are the wages prescribed for areas in the first category, i.e., only for towns where the cost of living is higher; as, for instance, in Belgrade. At places in the second category wages are 10 per cent lower. The working time is eight hours a day and forty-eight hours a week.

For overtime, Sunday and holiday work, normal wages are
paid, plus 50 per cent. But here the Communist economy strikes very severely. It often happens that workers and officials are appealed to for "voluntary" overtime work. For this "voluntary" work they are not paid. Or they are asked to work for the benefit of the Communist party, for Greek children, for a fund for national reconstruction and so on. Then the newspapers announce that employees of this or that factory have given a number of hours for a noble cause. The "voluntary" work is organized by the Communist secretary of the factory and nobody dares to protest. It may happen that a factory offers high rewards for those who achieve the best production, and the management announces it will pay these rewards on the first of May, the national holiday. On that day all workers assemble in the yard and the names of the ten best workers are solemnly announced and their achievement is highly praised. One of the workers is a well-trained and coached Communist. When his name is read he proposes to give the reward to the Communist party. The rest of the rewarded workers have to follow suit. The general tendency is to stimulate overtime work but to pay as little as possible for it.

An agricultural worker who is constantly employed on collective farms earns monthly thirty-two to sixty-four dollars. Public servants have seventy to one hundred and forty dollars a month. The highest salaries are, however, reserved only for some few heads of departments of ministeries. They can receive also as special contributions for their work from four to eighty dollars a month and a special personal contribution of from six to sixty dollars. Theoretically, therefore, a public servant performing a special and responsible function and giving exceptional work could earn much more than other categories of employees. Here a Communist system creates a new, privileged class of well-to-do people who, however, have to have the full confidence of the party, i.e., it is reserved for the members of the party only. The purpose of this clause of the government decree is to ensure in the budget a sum of money which is then deliberately distributed by the minister among high officials in the Communist party. If a public servant does not belong to this privileged class, he cannot earn monthly more
than one hundred and forty dollars even if he has had thirty years of service and would offer the best possible work. I know that in practice the non-Communist officials do not receive more than one hundred dollars a month.

All these wages and salaries are subjected to different deductions taken from the income by the treasury: the income tax, insurance against illness and accident, and pensions. In some offices and factories “voluntary” deductions are taken for the Communist party, regardless of whether an employee is or is not a member of the party.

In January, 1950, the income tax for state employees, industrial workers, collective farmers, artisans, and craftsmen was abolished. According to an official announcement, the income tax used to be 11.5 per cent (presumably of gross earnings). However, to prevent inflation the income was cut by 9.1 per cent so that the net income was increased by only 2.4 per cent after the abolition of the tax.

Salaries and wages alone do not tell very much about how people live in Yugoslavia. The standard of living can be judged only by the comparison of salaries and wages with existing prices.

In general, I would say this: I lived two and a half years in Yugoslavia, up to May, 1948. I knew the conditions of living in my own country, Czechoslovakia, when it was still democratic. In 1948, I was on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and I spent a month in London, three months in Delhi and Karachi, two months in Geneva and one month in Paris. I stopped for a day or two in Rome and Athens. In the latter case, my impressions can be only very casual and on the surface, but as to the other places my conclusions are based on knowledge and study. There is not a single city which I have mentioned in which living was as expensive as in Belgrade, the capital of Socialist Yugoslavia, though some of these countries, according to Communist propaganda, have suffered and been “marshallized” by the exploitation of the United States.

To understand what people can buy for their money in Yugoslavia it is necessary to know that prices of food and other commodities are regulated for different categories of the population.
In February, 1948, the government issued a number of decrees introducing a system of threelfold distribution, and threelfold prices: (1) fixed prices (vezane cene) of goods for the non-agricultural working population; (2) fixed prices of goods for the peasants; (3) free market prices for every citizen.

The first category concerns working people. Only working people have a fixed rationing as, according to the well-known Communist theory, every citizen is obliged to work according to his abilities, and he who does not work for the benefit of the national community has no right to receive anything from it. The fixed rationing embraces laborers and employees who are divided into several sub-categories according to the kind of work they do, its importance, their age, etc. They can buy a fixed, though minimum, quantity of basic goods, such as food, textiles, and shoes on ration cards and for a low price. This is the most important category of consumers, and the state takes care of them because they contribute through their work to the Socialist construction of the country. Prices are low in comparison with what other people have to pay for the same commodities, but still substantially higher than in 1939. Another advantage enjoyed by the first category of people in Yugoslavia is that as workers and employees they buy their lunches in factory and office cafeterias for much lower prices than they would have to pay in a restaurant. But all these privileges are considerably lowered in their relative value by the fact that their wives, children, and aged members of their families receive an insufficient quantity of rationed food, and the worker or official of the first category has to share his rations with the family. Besides—and this is a point of decisive importance—it often happens that people cannot buy even the commodities the rationing and low prices of which are fixed by law. They are not always on the market.

The Yugoslav peasantry forms the second category of the population. Peasants do not receive ration cards for foodstuffs because they are allowed to keep part of their own products for the family and themselves. But on selling their harvest to the state authorities, they receive partly cash and partly bonuses for which they can buy needed agricultural tools for fixed prices, which are lower than those on the free market. These
advantages are of a somehow problematic nature because the prices for which the peasant has to sell his products are very low, and, therefore, he can buy only very few of the industrial commodities.

The third category is formed by all the consumers who do not contribute directly to the Socialist upbuilding of the country by their work in industry or agriculture, so do not get any ration cards or bonuses. They are the former businessmen, the artisans, craftsmen, women who do not work and have no children. They have to buy on the free market.

A free market does not mean either a free business or a black market. It is a perfectly legal state-owned business, and prices are regulated by state authorities. Its prices are fantastically high and their purpose is (a) to prevent any black marketing which loses its justification if people can get legally commodities for which they would also have to pay high prices illegally, and (b) to take away from people any free cash they might still possess.

In April, 1948, for instance, the prices of the free market were the following: one pound of pork cost one dollar and twenty cents; one pound of flour, one dollar; butter, three dollars; bacon, two dollars and forty cents; smoked meat, two dollars and sixty cents; sugar, one dollar and five cents; apples, one dollar and ten cents; one pint of milk, thirty cents; one egg, sixteen cents in the season and forty cents in the winter. A lunch in an average restaurant cost two dollars and one pint of wine of low quality, two dollars. A room in a hotel cost four to six dollars; a shirt, eighteen dollars; one yard of woolen cloth, thirty-five dollars, of cotton cloth, six dollars; one pair of shoes, forty to eighty dollars. The quality of most of these articles was poor and western people would not buy them. The Yugoslav people could not buy them, for they had no money. I failed to understand for whom actually these free market articles were destined; probably for peasants who had to buy a pair of shoes or a shirt from time to time and who still earned some money. But for a former businessman, artisan, or craftsman to buy a shirt or a pair of shoes was a problem which he usually solved by selling some of his furniture or china.

In the autumn of 1948 the prices of food rose again, in
spite of a good harvest. The government decided to continue its policy of privation of the Yugoslav population so as to have in store the biggest possible quantities of agricultural products for export. At that time it still believed in uninterrupted trade with the eastern bloc.

When, however, at the beginning of 1949, Soviet political and economic pressure had brought the Yugoslav hopes of reopening foreign trade with other Communist countries to a definite end, the government released reserves of agricultural products and prices went down. This proved to be a temporary measure, however. In the summer, prices sharply increased, probably in connection with the opening of trade negotiations with several western countries which offered new hopes for the Yugoslav government to place agricultural products on foreign markets and buy with them machinery for the Five Year Plan. The price of one pound of lard jumped from six to eight dollars; butter went to five dollars; potatoes to sixty cents; beans to one dollar; flour to two dollars; white bread to two dollars; pork to three dollars; smoked meat to three dollars and sixty cents; one liter of vegetable oil to eight dollars; wine to three dollars; whiskey (rakija) to six dollars; one chicken to eight dollars.

In the spring of 1950, there was in Yugoslavia a catastrophic lack of food supplies due to the passive resistance of peasants to the regime. The people did not receive basic rations for weeks, and no meat was on the market for two months. The high prices of commodities on the free market made these practically unobtainable. A pair of shoes cost forty to one hundred dollars; a shirt, thirty dollars; a suit, three hundred to five hundred dollars; a pound of butter, six dollars. There continued to be a complete lack of needles, buttons, combs, soap, and shoe polish.

One can imagine what these prices mean for a family of five persons—and in Yugoslavia, families are often larger—the head of which does not and cannot earn more than from three thousand to five thousand dinars (sixty to one hundred dollars) a month.
FOREIGN TRADE

The foreign trade of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is monopolized by the government and no firm is allowed to export or import goods on its own initiative. Foreign trade is planned and manned by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and controlled by the Economic Council, under the supreme power of Minister Kidrić.

The centralization and monopoly of the foreign trade is not limited to negotiations of trade agreements and the control of export and import. Officials of the Ministry negotiate even individual contracts with importers and exporters from abroad, and the trade itself is entrusted to special state institutions. The firm then gets the order to export or receive what is planned and ordered by the Ministry.

The Ministry also fixes the price of exported goods, regardless of the price of the same goods on the internal Yugoslav
market. The same article is also offered for export to different countries for different prices according to the general trend of prices between the two contracting countries and regardless of the price on the world market.

Raw materials and agricultural products which Yugoslavia has in abundance should predetermine her foreign trade. For many years Yugoslavia's traditional export articles were corn, wheat, pork, fruit, wine, eggs, fish, tobacco, leather, timber, iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, and copper. Agricultural products were first in importance, as mines were hardly developed and were owned mainly by foreign firms (French and British).

In the summer of 1949 the Yugoslav newspapers announced large discoveries of new ferrous and non-ferrous mineral resources, deposits of a good quality coal, previously very much lacking, and deposits of oil. Yugoslavia ranked first in the production of copper in Europe and eighth in world production; first in the production of lead in Europe and seventh in world production; third in the world output of mercury (because of the acquisition of Istria from Italy, according to the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1946).

Every industrialized country which needs raw materials for its industry and agricultural products to feed its population and which is interested in exporting finished products of its own industry is, in theory, the best partner for Yugoslavia, which country needs to import industrial products. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the production and needs of which complement the production and needs of Yugoslavia, all natural partners of Yugoslavia are west of the Iron Curtain. It would have been only natural had Yugoslavia had the best trade contacts with Great Britain, United States, France, Belgium, and Switzerland. But up until the conflict between the Communist party of Yugoslavia and the Cominform, the practice was the opposite, as even foreign trade was governed by political and not economic aspects.

Yugoslavia needs, first of all, products of heavy and light industry. She could not get them from Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, which are also mainly agricultural and economically primitive countries. The Soviet Union was very busy with its own Five Year Plan and imported industrial products itself.
Besides, it followed in its foreign policy strictly authoritarian methods of ordering from Yugoslavia and the other satellite countries what best suited its needs, and delivered in return only inferior products of its own.

Poland could deliver to Yugoslavia mainly coal. Hungary, though industrially rather important, was busy delivering to Russia most of her production on the account of reparations based on the Peace Treaty of Paris. The only country of the Soviet bloc able to satisfy to a considerable extent the Yugoslav need of heavy and light industry products was Czechoslovakia. On her deliveries depended the Yugoslav Five Year Plan.

But the government in Prague suffered from the same megalomania of economic figures as did the Communist countries. Czechoslovak factories were engaged in production for Czechoslovakia’s Two and Five Year Plans, so that the government was unable to meet the demands of the export. It could not meet Yugoslavia’s demands either.

In 1947 a new partner became important to Czechoslovak foreign trade, namely, Russia. Up until then, Czechoslovak-Russian trade had been negligible. Moscow applied strong pressure upon Czechoslovakia to increase considerably her export of heavy machinery to Russia. Czechoslovak industry was obviously unable to satisfy the two conflicting interests, that of Yugoslavia and that of the Soviet Union, at the same time. The powerful Soviet Union won out and deliveries to Yugoslavia and the other satellite countries were delayed.

All this would normally have favored a reorientation of Yugoslav foreign trade toward western countries. But under existing conditions, only a complete political breakdown between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Communist countries could bring such a result about.

In 1945 and 1946, there was a poor harvest all over eastern Europe and the Balkans. Even the corn bread rations had to be reduced. According to official reports the rations of food in Yugoslavia dropped to under 650 calories a day. Tuberculosis spread dangerously. Four hundred thousand cases of the disease were registered and a great number were not registered.
Marshal Tito asked the United States for help. The American authorities studied the urgency of this need. It did not, however, escape their attention that some seven hundred thousand soldiers were fed with good wheat bread and that two thousand wagonloads of wheat were exported to Rumania and one thousand wagonloads to Albania for political reasons. They could also read in a Swiss paper, published in Bern, that the Yugoslav government exported five thousand pigs in 1947 to Switzerland, though Marshal Tito stated publicly that it did not export a single pound of pork and was not going to do so as long as the country itself did not have enough for its needs. The American government could not help knowing about the systematic campaign of hatred which the Yugoslav press and spokesmen had led for months against "American imperialism, American reaction and capital, American warmongers, Fascists, and American dollar-diplomacy."

The awaited help did not come, and Marshal Tito answered in April, 1947, in the Parliament with a feverish attack against the government of the United States.

The western press speaks about terrible hunger in Yugoslavia. It claims that Yugoslavia exported its own wheat and corn although the nation suffered from hunger. The Yugoslav government asked for 200,000 tons of wheat from America and from England to prevent, it is reported, a tragedy which would befall our people. The same Yugoslavia, it is said, exports pigs and fats abroad. On one side we are refused help; on the other there is weeping because our country is suffering terribly. . . .

We informed the Allies through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that we were not humbly begging on our knees for charity, but that we were asking for the help to which we were entitled. If help is given to Germany, Austria, and other countries which fought against us and against the Allies during the war, why should we not have the right to such help? They [the western countries and press] are, however, making propaganda out of our request, saying we fell on our knees and that the Yugoslav government is incapable because it has led the nation to the edge of an abyss of hunger. They are trying to damage our reputation abroad and to prove that Yugoslavia is not a consolidated state. If, however, we allowed them to be our
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guardians, they would give us 200,000 tons of wheat. But we do not want any guardian. We have done everything in our power to prevent anyone from dying from hunger. We ask those who have bread to give to those who do not have it. If there is a lack of understanding or there is resistance [to our demand] then the whole of our honest nation will approve of the most severe measures against those who oppose us in these difficult moments.

They [the West] say that we gave 20,000 tons of wheat to Rumania and 10,000 tons of corn to Albania. Last autumn, when the whole world knew that there were regions in Rumania where people really were in danger of dying from hunger, the Secretary of the Rumanian government came to see me and asked if we could help Rumania with a loan. I told him that we could neither sell nor give. If we had enough for ourselves we would be only too glad to give. But, I said we would lend to Rumania, though we were in need ourselves. He agreed and said this help would be of great importance to Rumania, as it would prevent hunger. We lent Rumania 20,000 tons of wheat and corn. Nothing but a humanitarian, friendly, the most friendly, gesture of our government which is now being used by the reactionaries against us and our government.

As far as Albania is concerned, we shall not forget that she was our ally in the war and that her sons were killed in the Sandjak and fought together with us on their and our territory. We helped the Albanian people as much as we could and if need be, we shall help again. But it is ordinary slander to say that we export foodstuffs, wheat, corn, pigs and fats, et cetera. We have not exported a pound of fat, and we shall not do so as long as we do not have enough for ourselves. I declare solemnly that we shall never ask anybody for mercy but only for the help to which we are entitled.

In 1947, Yugoslavia had a very good harvest of corn and an average harvest of wheat. The output of raw materials was better than in the years immediately following the war. There was no more need for urgent help from abroad and foreign trade could have been governed by customary rules of economics. In spite of this the commercial contacts with the West were limited to negligible barter trade.
The attitude of the Yugoslav government toward the Marshall Plan made it clear that Yugoslav foreign trade was influenced primarily by political factors. Yugoslavia’s participation in the program of the European economic recovery would have been in the highest interest of the country, but it was declined for political reasons.

The government concluded trade agreements with various countries, some of them short-term, one-year agreements, others long-term, five-year agreements.

With Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia concluded the so-called investment treaty, for a period of five years (1947-1951). Czechoslovakia promised to deliver products of heavy industry, while Yugoslavia, in return, was expected to export raw materials and agricultural products. The volume of the exchange was seven and one-half billion dinars (one hundred and fifty million dollars) each way.

Similar treaties were signed with Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Sweden. The arrangements with the satellite countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary) came to a standstill after the break with the Cominform because of the Moscow order to stop deliveries to insurgent Yugoslavia. (The agreement with Italy was, until the summer of 1949, of a general character, the fulfillment of which has been hampered by the unfriendly relations between the two countries because of the question of Trieste and because of the general unfriendliness of Yugoslavia toward democratic Italy.)

The same fate met the commercial arrangement with Russia, about which no information was available. It was generally believed that in amount it ranked very high. In March, 1950, Marshal Tito threw some light into the Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations, when he declared that “Yugoslavia actually gave more to the USSR than she received, exporting goods valued at about 84 million dollars—including precious ores—and importing goods valued at 75,367,000 dollars. Three trade agreements were concluded between the two countries. Under the first, concluded in 1946, Yugoslavia was given credits amounting to 9 million dollars at 3 per cent interest, payable within five years . . . . The second agreement, of 1947, called for a ten-year credit of 78 million dollars for the purchases of armaments.
and military technical supplies... Under the third agreement, also concluded in 1947, the USSR extended a credit of 135 million dollars for the purchase of industrial installations. While Soviet propaganda contends that the USSR gave the entire amount to Yugoslavia, in fact Yugoslavia received only 800,000 dollars worth of materials...

Besides these long-term conventions, Yugoslavia had one-year agreements with many European countries. If all the obligations of Yugoslavia, arising out of these negotiations, were summed up they would lead to an enormous figure of export, exceeding the capacity of Yugoslav production. But Yugoslavia insisted on voluminous deliveries, being driven by the aims of the Five Year Plan. She offered the same goods to several countries, aware of her inability to fulfill her obligations to all of them, and this practice made commercial negotiations more and more difficult.

The Communists, maintaining a deep secrecy about commercial arrangements with other countries, look with great suspicion upon any non-Communist connected with foreign trade. In Ljubljana, for instance, a Czech official, employed in a Czech firm, was sentenced for industrial espionage. It was charged that he gave information to his central office in Prague, before the factory was nationalized, concerning the number of employees and production. As the factory manufactured, among other articles, shirts for the Yugoslav Army, the man was tried before a military tribunal.

While guarding severely its own industry and foreign trade against any danger of espionage, the Yugoslav government engaged in a wide industrial espionage abroad. It sent hundreds of Yugoslav officials to countries which, according to trade agreements, had to negotiate a number of technical details concerning deliveries of heavy industry products. These people had free access to factories, their offices and shopworks. I read an order signed by Minister Kidrić which I could not retain, for reasons of security, in which he instructed the so-called delegates, going abroad to negotiate individual contracts with firms,
to secure secrets of production, formulas, and technical designs. Bulja, the chief of the delegates in Prague, threatened some of his subordinates with denunciation if they relaxed in this particular duty.

Before the Yugoslav party was excommunicated, all other Communists saw in Tito the greatest hero of communism and in Yugoslavia the most progressive Communist country. Communist functionaries in high positions in Czechoslovakia were, therefore, only too glad to open the doors to these Yugoslav spies. The Yugoslav officers had free access to secret workshops of the armament factory, Škoda, as the highest military authority in Prague issued an order that there should be no secret kept from the Yugoslav comrades. Thus, it happened that a military secret of high importance passed into the hands of the Yugoslav general staff with the knowledge of the Czechoslovak general staff.

Another feature of inter-Communist economic relations was the penetration of Soviet influence in Yugoslav industry.

The Soviets abused their political predominance in eastern Europe and established in all satellite countries mixed companies composed of local representatives and of Soviet representatives. In Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia numerous mixed companies have been established, divided as a rule evenly between the local nationalized firms and the Soviets. The local firms brought in, as capital, installations of the factory and its reserves; the Soviets contributed general management and control. In some cases they claimed the right to former German factories and turned them into mixed commercial companies.

This has been one of the most interesting features of post-war development in Europe. The Soviet Union, a country which for thirty years had preached the economic liberation of the backward areas in Central Europe and in the Balkans from the exploiting capital of the West, now infiltrated itself into the economy of the satellite countries.

In Yugoslavia were founded mixed Soviet-Yugoslav companies, such as the airline company, Justa, and the Danube navigation company, Juspad. The Yugoslav government brought to these mixed companies its airplanes, ships, airports, Danube
ports, and labor. What has the Soviet Union brought in? Nobody knows, as no data on the subject were ever published. Nevertheless, this policy was called a policy of economic democracy and equality of nations. The break with the Cominform, however, freed, at least temporarily, Yugoslavia from this economic burden, as the mixed companies were dissolved in the summer of 1949.

Another consequence of the break was that Yugoslavia lost her economic position in Albania. This was a rather curious and to some extent amusing feature of the postwar relationship between the two countries. Yugoslavia, exploited by the Soviets, could not resist the temptation of investing in weak Albania, in spite of all Marxist teaching to the contrary. In 1947, six mixed companies were founded in Albania with the participation of the Yugoslav government: companies for the exploitation of naphtha, mines, electrification, companies for import-export, construction of railroads, and a bank for financing these enterprises.

When the companies were first established the two governments worked closely together to prepare the economic fusion of both countries. Hundreds of Albanian officials were trained in Belgrade and a special airline was maintained to get representatives of the two governments quickly over the mountainous region of Albania, as it formerly took several days to reach the capital of Albania, Tirana.

In November, 1946, an agreement was signed, which was assumed to include Albania economically as the seventh federal republic of Yugoslavia. The economic plans and production were coordinated and directed from Belgrade; the Albanian currency was valorized to the level of the Yugoslav dinar to be ready for amalgamation with the Yugoslav currency at a later stage; the system of prices in Albania was adapted to that of Yugoslavia; a customs union was proclaimed; the foreign trade of Albania was officially performed by the Belgrade authorities; in 1947 Yugoslavia gave Albania a credit of two billion dinars, and for 1948 a sum of three billion was reserved in the Yugoslav budget to support the Albanian economy.

It was pathetic to see how exhausted Yugoslavia, herself in need of help, credit, and investments, was sending wheat and
lending money to Albania and even organizing a financial collection among the impoverished Yugoslav population for Albanian regions hit by floods.

Then, overnight, when the Yugoslav Communists were branded as traitors of socialism and Russia, the whole picture changed, and ungrateful Albania opened a general attack against the Yugoslav heretics. Yugoslav officials in high positions in Albanian industry and Yugoslav officers in charge of training the Albanian Army were insulted and ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours. The climax was reached when the Albanian government accused the government of Marshal Tito of exploiting Albania as a colony.

A similar close economic cooperation had been planned between Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. In the summer of 1947 the two Prime Ministers, Dimitrov and Tito, signed several agreements concerning coordination of the planned economy, collaboration in planning foreign trade, the exchange of technical and commercial experience, and the preparation of a customs union.

All these plans were healthy from the economic point of view. But politics gained the upper hand. The break with the Cominform brought them to an end. The whole Yugoslav foreign trade policy suffered a terrible shock. All agreements signed with other Communist countries proved to be futile.
FOREIGN POLICY

World War I brought freedom to the Yugoslav nations and led to the founding of an independent country.

As is usually the case after a war, the victors of World War I were interested in maintaining the status quo as it was determined by the peace treaties. Yugoslavia's interest was focused on maintaining conditions created by the treaties signed with her three neighbors: Austria (the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, signed September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, signed November 27, 1919), and Hungary (the Peace Treaty of Trianon, signed June 4, 1920).

Yugoslavia found two other countries deeply interested in the same political aims of maintaining a state of tranquility and peaceful development in Central Europe and the Balkans, namely Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In 1921 and 1922 the
representatives of these three countries signed bilateral treaties,\(^1\) pledging each other assistance against renewed aggression by Hungary. The latter had put its signature to the Treaty of Trianon only under duress, and continued to emphasize that it would "no, no, never" (*nem, nem, soha*) be satisfied with the frontiers drawn by the Peace Treaty. The alliance of the three countries was called the Little Entente, to indicate its supplementary character to the Grande Entente (Triple Entente), formed before the war by the big powers, France, Great Britain, and Russia. It found cordial support in the policy of France which was following a similar course to maintain the peace.

The longing of France for *securité* from a new German aggression found favorable echo in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia which, too, wished to be secure from an attempt of the defeated powers to change, by means of violence, the conditions created by the Peace Treaties. The Little Entente strengthened its structure in 1933,\(^2\) when a permanent organization was created to seek closer political and economic cooperation among its member states. It followed a policy of solidarity in Geneva, at the League of Nations, and in close collaboration with France gave to each country a feeling of relative calm and security for almost twenty years. Czechoslovakia signed a treaty of mutual assistance with France against Germany on October 16, 1925, as one of the international arrangements of Locarno, while Yugoslavia and Rumania based their policy on declarations of friendship with France as they did not feel they were directly threatened by the danger of a renewed German attack. But feeling threatened by the restless revisionist policy of Bulgaria, they signed on February 9, 1934, bilateral pacts between themselves and the other two Balkan countries, Turkey and Greece, pledging mutual assistance in case of Bulgarian aggression. Thus, the Balkan Entente, as this group of nations was called, and the Little Entente assured, together with France, peace in southeastern and Central Europe.

\(^1\)The Treaty of Alliance between Rumania and Czechoslovakia of April 23, 1921; between Rumania and Yugoslavia of June 7, 1921; between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of August 31, 1922.

\(^2\)The Statute of the Little Entente of February 16, 1933.
However, under the impact of German policy originating with the seizure of power by Hitler in January, 1933, the structure of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente began to crumble, and traditional ties of friendship with France were weakened, partly because of a defeatist foreign policy of the French government.

After the assassination of King Alexander (October 9, 1934) and under the new leadership of Prince Paul, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy began to change fundamentally. The Balkan Entente was turned into a scrap of paper when the Yugoslavia of Prince Paul and Prime Minister Stojadinović signed a Pact of Eternal Friendship with Bulgaria on January 24, 1937, thus giving a free hand to her new partner against the other Balkan Allies. The “eternity” of the friendship broke down four years later when the Bulgarian troops joined the German Army in invading Yugoslavia.

In the spring of 1937 the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, visited Belgrade and an Italo-Yugoslav pact of non-aggression was signed on March 26. A few months later, von Neurath, the Foreign Minister of the all-powerful Germany, paid the first official visit to the Yugoslav government. The President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Beneš, tried to put a stop to what he called “the slipping of the Little Entente” by visiting Belgrade in April, 1937. He did not succeed, however, and when the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance was put to the test in the Munich crisis of 1938, it proved to be another scrap of paper. Czechoslovakia, threatened by Hungarian aggression, asked the Yugoslav government whether it would fulfill its obligations in case of a Hungarian attack, but a very evasive answer, tantamount to refusal, was received. The alliance broke down and two years later, on December 11, 1940, Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Perpetual Friendship with Hungary.

Official Yugoslav propaganda boasted that Stojadinović succeeded in making friends of all former enemies and neighbors—Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany—in making Yugoslavia’s frontiers secure on all sides and in building up Belgrade as a center of international cooperation. In the spring of 1941 all these friends launched a simultaneous attack against Yugoslavia.
The same opportunistic policy was followed toward Soviet Russia. At the eleventh hour, in 1940, Prince Paul opened diplomatic relations with Moscow. One of the ablest Yugoslav politicians and a former diplomat who served in Russia before World War I, Milan Gavrilović, was sent to the Kremlin as the first Yugoslav Ambassador. Russia answered this policy by opportunistic maneuvers of her own. So far she considered the war to be a struggle between two imperialist camps. When, however, its turn toward the Balkans heralded a development dangerous to Russia, the Soviet government was anxious to give at least indirect encouragement to the Yugoslavs, and a Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed in Moscow on April 5, 1941—on the eve of the German invasion of Yugoslavia and the mass-bombing of Belgrade.

The Russian-Yugoslav friendship was put to a test. It did not withstand German pressure, and only a few days later the Soviets withdrew recognition of the existence of Yugoslavia. After Russia was attacked by Germany in June, 1941, diplomatic relations were reopened and Yugoslavia was again recognized by the Kremlin.

During the war the Yugoslav government and young King Peter II were in exile in London, later in Cairo, and in 1944 back again in London. Their foreign policy corresponded with the aims of the great war coalition.

In agreement with, and under the auspices of, the British government, the Yugoslav leaders in exile opened discussions with the Greek government in exile to prepare closer cooperation between the two countries after the war. In January, 1942, a declaration was issued envisaging the creation of the Balkan Union. Similar activities were pursued by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments in exile to lay foundations for a Central European Union. Both propositions were dropped under the pressure of the Soviets who did not wish to see the Balkans and Central Europe consolidated.

Meanwhile, the position of the Yugoslav government became very complicated. Draža Mihajlović and Marshal Tito, fighting for Yugoslavia on the soil of Yugoslavia, turned out to be implacable enemies. Mihajlović was backed by the Yugoslav Royal government in London and by the western Allies; Tito,
by Moscow. In the delicate international situation the United States and Britain agreed with Russia at the Teheran Conference in November, 1943, to give military support only to the troops of Marshal Tito. This sealed the fate of the Yugoslav government in exile and decided also the foreign policy of Yugoslavia in the fateful years to come.

The war brought fundamental changes in the geopolitical and ideological situation which influenced the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. It was almost reversed. The neighbors on the east, northeast, and south—Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania—became friends of Yugoslavia, bound by common ties to communism. The only exception was Greece where the election of the spring of 1946 brought to power the Royalist Populist party and returned the King. The western neighbors, Italy and Austria, were enemy countries against which Yugoslavia had territorial and reparation claims.

The main driving power of the Yugoslav foreign policy after the war was, however, ideology. The ideological affinity with the Soviet Union lay in the background of every Yugoslav move in the field of international relations, and this continued to be the case for one year even after her expulsion from the Cominform.

Yugoslavia had the "privilege" of being the first country in which the Communist party was firmly entrenched in power immediately after the war. The devotion of its leaders to the Soviets seemed to be beyond any doubt. The Communist government of Yugoslavia understood better than any other eastern European country the foreign policy of Soviet Russia and its aims, and it possessed the best ideological and military means to contribute to the general policy of Russian imperialism and Communist expansion.

As a neighbor of Italy, which was the first target of the expanding communism, Yugoslavia smuggled arms to the Italian Communists. As neighbor of Greece, she gave considerable help to the Greek Communist rebels. As neighbor of Austria, she fomented disorders in the adjacent British zone of occupation. At various international conferences, at the Peace
Conference in Paris, at the General Assemblies of the United Nations, the representatives of the Yugoslav government gave full support to the Russians, regardless of their own national interests. The economic interests of the country were, to a great extent, subjugated to Moscow.

Hundreds of Yugoslav officers studied at Russian military academies, and Russian officers served as instructors with every larger unit of the Yugoslav Army.

In all public places, in schools and in almost every shop window, hung pictures of Stalin. Theaters presented mainly Russian plays, concerts played chiefly Russian music, movies showed principally Russian films, bookshops sold Russian and Communist literature.

At every public meeting, the Soviet Union, Stalin, and the Yugoslav-Soviet friendship were objects of endless ova-

tions, and it became an obligatory custom to finish a speech by glorifying them in ecstatic declarations.

The newspapers were inundated by news from Russia, by her success in economic reconstruction, in international politics, in arts and science; and the speeches of the leaders of the Soviet Union were published in full on the first page. This was an ideal alliance of spirit and policy.

Soon after the war it became clear that the Kremlin wished to knit the eastern European countries into a system of alliances. Three countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, which were in the allied camp during the war, had signed Pacts of Friendship, Postwar Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance with Russia even before the hostilities ended. They were based on the idea of Slav solidarity and defense against a future danger of German aggression. Slav solidarity, hitherto unknown to the international Communists, became a powerful weapon in the fight against the Germans.

The fear of a new German expansion was justified by his-
tory, and this policy of making treaties was in conformity with similar treaties signed between Russia and Great Britain in 1942 and between Russia and France in 1944. Later on, however, when the Peace Treaties with former enemy satellite countries had removed the obstacle of differentiating between victorious and defeated countries, the Soviet Union signed
similar bilateral treaties of mutual assistance against Germany with other eastern European countries—Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary. The only exception was small Albania, where the disproportion of the eventual mutual assistance was much too obvious.

With these alliances the system of knitting eastern European countries together was not exhausted. Another number of alliance pacts soon followed, and Yugoslavia, acting on Soviet instructions, was only too willing to take the lead.

Here, I propose to go into some detail, as I can offer some authentic information which throws light on Soviet foreign policy and helps to prove that the Soviets, by creating the eastern bloc, are solely responsible for the division of the world into two hostile camps.

I was appointed the Czechoslovak Minister Plenipotentiary at Belgrade in September, 1945. Before leaving Prague, I was received by President Beneš. He did not give me any special instructions as regards Czechoslovak policy toward Yugoslavia. His wish, in general, was to watch the internal development, as he had no illusion about the democratic character of Tito’s government.

I received the same instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk.

Neither of my superiors mentioned that a pact of alliance between the two countries was foreseen. After I arrived in Belgrade the Yugoslavs did not mention the idea of an alliance treaty with Czechoslovakia either.

Early in 1946, Vladimir Velebit, the Deputy Foreign Minister, informed me “privately” that Marshal Tito would visit Poland in the near future. “The Polish government,” he said, “has repeatedly asked the Marshal to come to Warsaw. He has accepted in principle, but the fixing of the date has been postponed several times. This cannot go on indefinitely, and it has been decided now that Tito will leave for Warsaw sometime in the spring.”

When I asked what would be the purpose of the visit, Velebit
replied, "Nothing but to manifest the solidarity of our government with the Polish government which faces tremendous internal difficulties and which wants Marshal Tito to come to strengthen, by his visit, the position of the Polish progressive factors, as he is very popular in Poland.

"In principle, Tito is only too glad to help but, on the other side, we have to take into consideration also the reaction of our people at home to such a visit. Our people know very little about Poland. In the past, we have had no special contacts with the Polish nation and before the war we condemned the Fascist policy of their government. If Marshal Tito went on his first official trip abroad just to Warsaw, our people would not understand it and they would ask, 'Why didn't he go to Czechoslovakia? That's a country with which we have been in close friendship for hundreds of years. But about Poland, we know nothing.' It would be interpreted as an inter-party visit.

"There is another aspect. If Tito went to Poland only, people would think that the Czechoslovak government had some reserves toward Tito's Yugoslavia and this might have a bad effect on Czechoslovakia's popularity in Yugoslavia. Besides that, your relations with Poland are at present very bad [because of Těšín] and if Tito went only to Warsaw, somebody might think that we are siding with the Poles.

"I wanted, therefore, to put before you, as a personal, purely private suggestion whether it would not be of common interest to both countries, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, if Marshal Tito were invited to pay an official state visit to Prague as well."

I promised to inquire and, a few days later, conveyed first to Velebit and then to Tito the official invitation of the Czechoslovak government for Tito's visit. The date was not fixed and nothing further was heard about it for some time.

At the end of February, 1946, I accompanied Velebit to Prague where the Foreign Under-Secretary, Vladimir Clementis, wanted to discuss with him mainly the question of Czechoslovak claims toward Hungary as regards the transfer of the Hungarian population from Slovakia to Hungary and, in general, the question of Czechoslovak policy toward Hungary. The Council of Four Foreign Ministers was preparing the drafts of the peace
treaties and the Peace Conference was in sight. Clementis wanted to harmonize the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak policy toward Hungary.

While Velebit was in Prague the news came unexpectedly that Tito would depart for Warsaw in a few days. The following day, the commander of Tito’s bodyguard, Colonel Žeželj, appeared to investigate security requirements. Velebit left for Belgrade, and I stayed in Prague to take part in the preparations for the visit.

The visit was to be purely a friendly and social one. The usual official receptions, a visit to a factory, a parade of the Czechoslovak Army, and a special performance of the National Theater were planned and prepared. Not a word about a pact of alliance.

Meanwhile, Marshal Tito went to Warsaw. There was some trouble in Slovakia, through which his special train had to pass on the way to Poland. The Yugoslav escort insisted that the Yugoslav locomotive must pull Tito’s train through the whole of the journey, but the Czechoslovak railroad authorities were afraid that the provisional bridges in Slovakia, which were constructed after the Germans had destroyed the iron constructions, would not stand the heavy Yugoslav machine. The controversy about the matter cost the official party twelve hours of delay.

The Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs received regular telegrams from its Minister in Warsaw, Mr. Josef Hejret, during Tito’s visit which lasted over a week, but no information arrived that a pact of alliance would be signed on that or any other occasion.

It was from the telegraphic agencies’ reports that the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and the Czechoslovak nation were informed that, during Tito’s visit in Warsaw, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed.

Masaryk and Clementis immediately felt that Tito would suggest signing a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia. The Communists were ready to sign if a suggestion came from Tito. But Dr. Beneš and all the democratic ministers in the Cabinet were strongly against it and severely criticized the fait accompli before which they were put by the Polish-Yugoslav treaty.
From Warsaw, Tito traveled to Prague. It was in the second half of March, 1946. He was accompanied by Milovan Djilas, Minister without Portfolio; Vladimir Ribnikar, Chairman of the Committee for Culture and Arts; and by Velebit.

Security measures were enormous. The newspapers were given the information about Tito's coming only on the day of his arrival. The railroad was closely guarded for some two hundred miles, from the border to Prague, by the army patrols. Tito's special train was preceded twenty minutes by a train loaded with his bodyguards. Behind him, another train followed, loaded with Tito's specially equipped automobile and several jeeps, with food and drinks. A hundred and fifty members of his bodyguard accompanied Tito. The Czechoslovak security police arrested everybody suspected of hostile intentions. There was a report from the Czechoslovak-German (Bavarian) border that a group of Ustaše or Četnici tried to cross the frontier to attempt to kill Tito, but they were caught and put in prison.

Clementis and I went to greet Tito at the Czechoslovak-Polish frontier. As the train passed through the coal and steel area of Moravská Ostrava, Djilas was deeply impressed by the amount of industrialization in Czechoslovakia. He remarked that it would take Yugoslavia fifty years to reach such a level of production. I replied that by that time, we might be some few steps further.

He spoke highly about the Poles and indicated that he was influenced by the Polish arguments concerning the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Těšín. Polish-Czechoslovak relations were running very low at that time, and Djilas told me that Tito went to Warsaw with the intention of trying to mediate but discarded the idea when he saw how passionate the Poles were about Těšín.

After having prepared the ground, Djilas asked me what the Czechoslovak government thought of the Polish-Yugoslav pact and whether "we are not going to sign something similar."

I replied that the Czechoslovak government was surprised by the signing of the pact and reminded him that we were reproached by the people's democracies for being "a slow coach." Djilas confessed that they had had no idea of signing
anything before they left for Warsaw but that they readily agreed when the question of the pact was opened in Warsaw. I could not discover who took the initiative; Djilas only said that "we were, of course, in constant contact with Lebedev [the Soviet Ambassador to Poland]."

After our arrival in Prague, Tito was placed in a nearby castle at Zbraslav. He went speedily through the streets in his own car, surrounded by the jeeps of his bodyguards who refused to follow the regulations and arrangements of the Czechoslovak police and insisted that they would take all the precautions for Tito's safety.

On the evening of Tito's arrival the Communist leaders, Gottwald and Široký, accompanied by Clementis, saw Marshal Tito privately in the castle. The following day they tried, once again, to convince Dr. Beneš and the democratic ministers of the necessity of signing the pact immediately. There was a long private meeting with the President about the subject, but the Communists did not succeed. It was finally agreed that after Tito's departure the official communiqué would mention a pact of alliance that would be signed in the near future, and the Legations of both countries were raised to Embassies.

When I saw the President after this conference, he was angry with Tito and Gottwald, and declared that "a pact of alliance means something extremely serious for the nation and the government, and though I am not in principle against a treaty which would be of a defensive character against a renewed German aggression, I could never agree to bind the country in an alliance for life and death just like this, overnight, without thorough study. I want the thing to be prepared through normal diplomatic channels and then the treaty could be signed in due course."

Other political gains which the Tito government and the Czechoslovak Communists expected from the visit did not come through either.

People in Prague were amazed at the extreme precautions taken by the police wherever Tito went. For the first time in the history of a free Czechoslovakia, the inhabitants of Prague were ordered to keep their windows shut in the houses
of the streets through which Tito and his party drove. Armed soldiers were posted in a dense line along the sidewalks, their faces turned toward the public when Tito passed solemnly from the Wenceslaw Square to the President’s castle, Hradčany. Trade unions and school children were placed at selected spots so that the cordial welcome would be well organized. People were thinking of the spontaneous ovations which Prague gave General Eisenhower and Montgomery when they visited the city in 1945. They compared these visits with this first visit coming from a people’s democracy.

The official lunch given by the President was not cordial, and Tito and the Czechoslovak Communists were irritated because Dr. Beneš pronounced a formal toast without making a political speech.

The purely official character of the lunch at Hradčany did not pass unnoticed and people were glad that the visit turned out to be an inter-Communist manifestation and a rather unsuccessful one.

When I returned to Belgrade I found that people in Yugoslavia thought the same way as Czechoslovaks and were especially delighted that the Czechoslovak government had escaped the signing of an alliance treaty. They were deeply disappointed two and a half months later when a Czechoslovak delegation, led by Prime Minister Zdeněk Fierlinger, came to Belgrade and on May 9, 1946, signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration.

At the time of the signature of the pact and until February, 1948, the Yugoslav government viewed the Czechoslovak internal and external policy with suspicion. It criticized the Czechoslovak Communist party for not having succeeded in eliminating the existence and the policies of the democratic parties, and it followed with distrust the friendly relations which the Czechoslovak government had with the western democratic powers.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, in February, 1948, brought a change in the appreciation of the Czechoslovak Communist party by the Yugoslav Communist leaders. They were delighted to see the last democratic country in the eastern bloc join the Communist front. They valued highly the
ideological consequences of transforming this industrialized and western-oriented country into a Communist pattern. The enthusiasm did not last long. Four months later the Yugoslav Communists saw this youngest member of the Communist family join others in accusing them of betraying socialism.

In their relations toward Bulgaria the Yugoslav Communists were seeking a permanent solution before the end of the war. In the winter of 1944, after Bulgaria had been liberated, a declaration was ready for signature and publication proclaiming the federation of the two countries. The western powers intervened as Bulgaria was formally still in the enemy camp; the war was still going on, and the solemn declaration was, therefore, postponed.

Discussions about a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation were resumed in 1945. Only in January, 1949, Ranković, the Minister of Interior, who is one of the four leading members of the Yugoslav Politburo, disclosed that the two parties had held different views about the composition of the federated state. The Yugoslavs wanted to see Bulgaria incorporated into a South-Slav federation as the seventh federal republic and to leave the structure of the Yugoslav federal republic of six states untouched. The Bulgarians, fearing Yugoslav predominance in the proportion of 6:1, wanted to base the federation on two equal units only: Yugoslav and Bulgarian.

Ranković further revealed that the dispute was brought before Stalin for final decision, and he was in favor of the Yugoslav concept of the federation. This, however, was not put into force, for international reasons. The Yugoslav Communists felt that a unique opportunity had been missed. They did not abandon the idea and tried to achieve its realization by way of a subsequent consolidation of the Communist parties' positions in the Balkans and by closest political and economic cooperation.

In the summer of 1947 the Bulgarian Prime Minister, accompanied by several members of the government, paid the first official visit to Belgrade. Hundreds of thousands of people were called out to receive him along the railroad at almost every station from the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border to Belgrade. Two old revolutionaries, Dimitrov and Tito, who had met
before only under the protection of their Soviet teachers in Moscow, met for the first time as leaders of two governments. The embracing at the station had no end.

In Tito's summer residence at Bled several documents of importance were signed: protocols about a pact of alliance in preparation, about a close economic collaboration, about a common procedure against the so-called Greek monarcho-Fascists, and last but not least, a protocol according to which Yugoslavia generously renounced the claim of twenty-five million dollars in reparations which were assigned to her by the Peace Treaty of Paris.

In November, 1947, Tito returned the visit and the Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed, bringing in for the first time a new formula of defense. Again the Yugoslav government was privileged to initiate a new concept of eastern European alliances.

So far, the pacts of alliance signed by Russia with all the satellites and those of Yugoslavia with Poland and Czechoslovakia had been aimed against the danger of a renewed German aggression. This time, however, the formula of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty was widened to be against any aggressor. This change was of historical importance. It disclosed the policy of the Soviet-governed countries and of Soviet Russia, namely, to work toward the formation of an eastern bloc directed against the western countries.

At the time of his visit to Bulgaria, Tito declared that there were no frontiers between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and that the question of a federation between the two countries was only a matter of formality. This idea was carried on by Dimitrov in January, 1948, when he enthusiastically expressed himself publicly about a forthcoming Balkan and Central European Federation.

At this moment the Soviets considered it necessary to intervene. They did not like the idea of a closer association between any powers, even their own satellites, feeling it would be more difficult to deal with a federated bloc of countries than with each of them separately. Pravda taught Dimitrov a severe lesson and rejected his idea of federation in an article which amazed many people, including Communists. But Dimi-
trov understood its significance and publicly repented. Though the attack of Pravda was addressed to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, political observers interpreted it as being addressed also to the Yugoslav Prime Minister. Tito, however, kept silent.

In 1947 the capital of Yugoslavia played host to other distinguished visitors from neighboring countries. Besides Dimitrov, Prime Ministers of Rumania, Hungary, and Albania came to manifest the solidarity of the people’s democracies and to prepare texts of treaties of alliance which were later signed when Marshal Tito visited their capitals.

As before World War II, Belgrade became once more the center of international activities; receptions and mass ovations were arranged. Pacts were signed again. But the set-up was much different. The Fascist or semi-Fascist host and visitors of ten years ago were replaced by Communists. The friendship was, however, again “eternal”—only to end a year later. So far the pacts of alliance had been signed between Slav nations and the texts had referred to the idea of Slav solidarity. When the non-Slav satellites joined the ranks of the Communist countries and pacts had to be signed, the idea of Slav solidarity against German imperialism was abandoned and the real nature of an ideological bloc against the western democracies was fully revealed.

In the Hungarian, non-Slav capital, Budapest, in December, 1947, Marshal Tito for the first time advanced the idea that ideological solidarity surpassed that of Slav affinity. He declared that the idea of Slav solidarity should be, above all, filled with the spirit of mutual progress. It did not matter whether one was a Croat, a Pole, a Serb, a Czech, or an Hungarian; the first question was whether he was a good democrat (i.e., Communist).

Then the second series of bilateral treaties of alliance followed. They were signed among the rest of the satellites, all of them, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland, “against any aggressor.” By 1949 the number of pacts signed among the countries of the eastern bloc reached the respectable figure of twenty-four.

In Yugoslavia, as in other Communist countries, this inundation of treaties was greeted with deep mistrust. Overwhelmed
at every official visit by bombastic propaganda and a stream of official speeches, and exhausted by obligatory participation in mass celebrations of the occasion, the Yugoslav people realized how irresponsible the Yugoslav foreign policy was. The government was signing one international document after another, binding the nation to march eventually with other nations to fight the West, should Moscow consider that necessary to help the spread of an ideology with which they had nothing in common. They considered all these treaties as declarations of solidarity among Communist parties.

It is an historical fact that the government of Yugoslavia, led by Marshal Tito, took the lead in this aggressive policy aimed against the West, meeting more than enthusiastically the desire of the Soviet government to close the ranks of the eastern powers. Thus, next to Moscow, a grave responsibility is borne by Marshal Tito before mankind and history for having contributed actively to the division of the world.

The Yugoslav government presented at the Peace Conference in Paris and at several sittings of the Council of Foreign Ministers far-reaching territorial and economic claims. It wanted to incorporate Trieste; it asked considerable adjustments of the frontier with Italy and Austria; it claimed reparations from both. According to the Potsdam agreement, for reparations from Germany, it depended on deliveries from the western zone of Germany. UNRRA, which literally saved the Yugoslav population from hunger, was mainly subsidized by the United States. A loan for which Yugoslavia asked could come also only from Washington. None of these claims or needs could have been solved by Russia, but only by agreement of the Big Powers or by the West. Yet the Yugoslav government adhered faithfully to its ideological hatred of the West.

The Yugoslav Communist party expected their Italian comrades to come to power soon, and it offered them help, while it continuously attacked the legitimate Italian government. In November, 1946, the leader of the Italian Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti, visited Marshal Tito in Belgrade, and the
two Communist leaders were reported to have reached an agreement on Trieste, a problem which neither their governments, the Peace Conference, nor the Security Council had been able to solve because of the persistent opposition of the Soviet and Yugoslav governments. But an agreement along a Communist party line was possible as it was meant to help the Italian Communists in their struggle for power.

Similarly, Tito met the desire of the Italian Communists to release Italian war prisoners, while the government of de Gasperi repeatedly failed to achieve anything in this thorny problem. The Austrian Communists had the same success regarding the Austrian prisoners. The Communist press of these countries highly praised these negotiations, making it clear to public opinion that all questions in dispute between neighbors could easily be solved if the Communists were in power.

In the Yugoslav press almost daily the United States and Great Britain were cursed as the worst possible capitalists and imperialists. American and British diplomats were insulted, accused of espionage and contacts with subversive elements in the country.

Every international event served as a good pretext to attack the wilful West. When a soldier was killed in a border incident on the Yugoslav-Greek frontier his body was transported throughout the country. The special train stopped at every large town; the people were ordered to go to the station, and speeches were made denouncing “the Greek murderers and their western accomplices.” Such a demonstrative journey was made with the remains of the Yugoslav consul who was murdered when visiting a camp in which the soldiers of the former Yugoslav Royal Army were interned.

When the United Nations established the Balkan Commission to investigate the situation on the frontiers of Greece, the bordering countries, Communist Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, refused to cooperate with the Commission. Every man and woman of Macedonia, through which transports bound for Greece had to pass, knew that Yugoslavia was actively supplying the Greek Communist partisans with ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies; that she offered the Greek rebels refuge and re-armed them on Yugoslav soil, and that the secret
radio station, "Free Greece," was actually operating from Yugoslavia. The fury of hatred was intensified when the United States offered help to the Greek government to fight the Communists.

Soon after the Truman doctrine was proclaimed, Marshal Tito spoke to the Yugoslav Parliament, in April, 1947. He formulated the ideological approach to international problems in the following way:

The western reactionaries usually speak about two blocs, western and eastern. This is the way people speak who wish a war. There are, in fact, two fronts in the world. One front is numerically small, but it is dangerous. It is the front of the imperialist warmongers. The other front is tremendous, composed of peoples of all countries, and this wishes peace. To this second front belong the invincible Soviet Union, new Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the democratic forces of Greece, Hungary, as well as a great majority of the people of America, England, France, Italy, and of all other countries of the world. Constant vigilance, the detecting of all warmongers, the discovering of the various imperialist maneuvers, etc.—that is the best and most efficient form of fighting for the strengthening of peace in the world. Yugoslavia will consistently adhere to her foreign policy and will continue fighting for the strengthening of peace in close collaboration with all countries which accept this collaboration.

The Marshall Plan was the final test of the good will of Soviet Russia. It was the last offer to find out whether Russia was willing to take part in the common economic reconstruction of Europe or whether she preferred to see and foment misery which—according to the Communist slogan "the worse, the better"—was meant to hasten Communist upheavals in western Europe.

All European countries were invited by Great Britain and France to take part in the opening conference in Paris, at the beginning of July, 1947.

When the French and British Ambassadors presented the invitation to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Marshal Tito and the Deputy Prime Minister, Kardelj, and the Deputy Foreign
Minister, Bebler, were at their summer residence at Bled, Slovenia. I was there as well.

One evening I received a message from Prague that the Czechoslovak government had decided unanimously to attend the Paris Conference. Late at night I went to see Bebler to give him the message. He seemed to be very satisfied upon hearing it and he told me that Tito and Kardelj were just considering the answer. He indicated that there was a possibility that Yugoslavia would accept the invitation as well. Two days later, Yugoslavia refused to attend the Conference.

I met Bebler again. He told me that a positive decision had been actually taken and even the delegation named, to be headed by Kardelj. But the night before, Djilas had telephoned from Belgrade expressing himself strongly against the participation of Yugoslavia in the Conference. And, as Bebler told me, Foreign Minister Simić was even more vehemently against it. The opinion of the latter mattered very little. It was clear that Djilas was only conveying to Tito and Kardelj an order from Moscow to refuse the invitation, as Czechoslovakia and Poland finally did.

The Soviet press and those of all satellite countries presented the Marshall Plan as another move of the "American imperialists" to subjugate Europe. Ignoring his own original decision, Marshal Tito explained the procedure of the Yugoslav government in an interview saying, "In a note addressed to England and France we expressed our point of view and the reasons why we could not attend the Conference in Paris. I think that this stand of ours, which is similar to that of the other brotherly and neighboring countries, is understandable to everybody. I cannot say that we would not welcome frankly offered aid for the reconstruction of our devastated country. But the experience we have had so far with the western countries, and first of all with America, or better to say, with the governmental American circles, shows that from these circles we cannot expect unselfish and frank help for the reconstruction of our country.

"On the contrary, according to the Marshall Plan, we would probably have to take over obligations to the detriment of our country; our Five Year Plan, our industrialization and
electricrification would be in danger. These obligations would also threaten our economic development. This is a certainty, as much as some gentlemen may be amazed by these assertions of ours. . . . Let nobody think that we have refused to participate in the Paris Conference for any other reason. We did so only because of what we stated in our note and of what I have said just now. . . ."

After the eastern bloc refused to participate in the European Recovery Program, the international situation rapidly grew worse. I met Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj on July 22, and this is what he told me: "Since the Paris Conference the international situation has deteriorated considerably. Before long, there will be other complications, social upheavals, and perhaps even bloody revolutions. Look at the situation in Greece, China, and Indonesia. Other countries will follow suit."

"The Americans have the atomic bomb, but this weapon might prove to be very problematic. If there is a war, the Soviet Army would occupy western Europe in a short time, and the Americans would not, after all, bomb their own western allies. In all these countries, people's governments would be installed and they would mobilize the masses and production. Besides, we have the ideological atomic bomb which would ruin the whole liberalistic world. The Soviet Union and we are not so weak as the West thinks. Our soldiers are able to fight even with limited needs and they do not have to have chocolate every day. In spite of the seriousness of the situation I do not believe there will be a war."

In a conversation which I had with Tito on October 10, 1947, he told me, "We frankly want peace. Personally, I do not believe there will be a war. It will be proved that American methods lead nowhere and that they do not frighten anybody; within a year American aggressiveness will start to drop."

On another visit, on January 20, 1948, Tito continued in the same spirit, "The Americans are sending ships to Greek and Italian ports and armaments to the Near and Middle East. In western Germany they are building up military and economic bases. In Greece they follow a policy of various provocations. I assume that these provocations will increase and that they will be aimed mainly against Albania. These provocations har-
bor considerable danger. We are keeping calm and shall keep calm, however, for we want to do everything to maintain peace. It would be a mistake though, if this were interpreted as a weakness. I think that everybody who lives in Yugoslavia knows that we are not sitting with hands crossed. The Americans are pursuing an impossible, brutal policy. Look at the British, how reasonably and cleverly they proceed. In spite of all this, I do not believe there will be war. In China, the Americans suffer one failure after the other, and their public opinion is against war. I think that everybody who lives in Yugoslavia knows that we are not sitting with hands crossed. The Americans are pursuing an impossible, brutal policy. Look at the British, how reasonably and cleverly they proceed. In spite of all this, I do not believe there will be war. In China, the Americans suffer one failure after the other, and their public opinion is against war. I attach considerable importance to the Wallace movement. It is one thing to make a war, and another to make provocations. If the Americans really meant to go to war, they would be getting ready secretly and would not limit themselves to noisy provocations."

In September, 1947, the leaders of nine Communist parties met in Poland and formed the Information Bureau of Communist Parties, called briefly Cominform. Besides the seven parties of the eastern bloc countries, the Communist parties of Italy and France took part in secret sessions. The Third International, which was formally dissolved in 1943 to create an impression that the Kremlin had abandoned the policy of using other Communist parties for Soviet foreign policy, was revived, in another form. Moscow felt the moment opportune to demonstrate the strength of the solidarity of the world proletariat and to frighten the West by a renewed nightmare of international communism. Widespread strikes in Italy, and particularly in France, followed to paralyze the effects of the Marshall Plan, to foment general unrest and fear.

The speech made at the Cominform meeting by Ždanov, the representative of the Soviet Communist party and one of the most influential figures in Russia, contained orders to other Communist leaders on how to proceed in the field of the cold war. One of the main points of Ždanov's appeal was to detect the western imperialists who wanted to push the world into war. But the democratic front, i.e., the Communists, Ždanov said, was stronger and bigger and it would break the efforts of the imperialists. This was the key to the Soviet propaganda strategy. While disrupting the elements of consolidation by Communist activities, Moscow wanted to create at the same time
the impression in the frightened democratic world that Russia was the only country defending the cause of peace while the western “capitalist” governments were about to drive the world into another catastrophe.

Ždanov’s speech became the ten commandments of all Communist parties. The Yugoslav Communists were represented at the Cominform meeting by two of the most outstanding members of the Yugoslav Politburo, Kardelj and Djilas. Soon after their return from the meeting, the directives of Ždanov were noticed in all public utterances. The Communist speakers and newspapers paraphrased Ždanov’s speech, creating the impression that the Soviet Union would succeed in stopping western warmongering. However, in private conversations the leaders of the party did not conceal their conviction that war was inevitable. It was necessary to gain time, though, until France and Italy fell into Communist hands without open fighting, if possible, and until the Soviet Union was better prepared. The anti-western propaganda of hatred reached a culminating point at that time, in the autumn and winter of 1947, and the Yugoslavs felt proud to be among the first and most important allies of Soviet Russia.

At the beginning of 1948, the Yugoslav Communist leaders were still convinced that their foreign policy of being faithful to Russia guaranteed Yugoslavia an honorable place in the association of eastern countries and gave her the highest possible security.

In January, at the occasion of the ratification of pacts of alliance with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, Kardelj declared:

For many decades, the Balkans were called a barrel of gunpowder. And so they were, especially because various reactionary and anti-national forces in the Balkan and Danubian countries were in power and sold themselves out to various masters. The nations were thrown against each other and against their vital interests so as to fight for foreign interests and not their own. . . Tito and the leading personalities of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania accomplished by the alliance pacts great deeds about which the best men of these nations have dreamed and fought. The Balkans have stopped being a barrel of gunpowder because
the treaties have put down the foundations of a strong, lasting peace and of a brotherly collaboration between the Balkan-Danubian nations.

To prove how Greece was suffering because of being unable to join the Balkan people’s democracies, Kardelj continued,

The heroic Greek nation, which sacrificed so much and fought bloodily for its independence during the Second World War, has become a victim of a foreign imperialistic enslavement. This is the reason why it cannot cooperate in the great work of peace and brotherly collaboration in the Balkans. The fate of the Greek people offers a picture of what the imperialists would like to impose on the Balkan-Danubian nations. But not only in the Balkans or in the Danube area is there no way back to old times; in Greece and in many other countries nobody can prevent the victory of the people who are fighting for peace and perpetual peaceful collaboration among nations. Mistaken are those [people] who think they can create out of Greece a springboard for a struggle against the freedom-loving nations of the Balkans and of eastern Europe.

These treaties have also created a very favorable situation for Yugoslavia which will be even clearer if we think of the situation before the Second World War when Yugoslavia was encircled by hostile countries only, among which were also the Hungary of Horthy, Rumania of Antonescu, Bulgaria of Boris, and the Italian Albania. . . . Putting their signatures to these treaties, the responsible statesmen of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia have completed the firm system of security of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, which leans on the great Soviet Union, and which has made similar treaties with brotherly Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. Never before have the nations of Yugoslavia reached such a degree of national security as today, thanks to the right policy of comrade Tito and our national government.

This speech was given on January 8, 1948. It was not more than six months before this national security disappeared because of the quarrel between Stalin and Tito. Yugoslavia then stood alone, estranged from her traditional friends of the West, and with all the people’s democracies turned into ruthless enemies.
THE HERESY

In June, 1948, began one of the most exciting developments of modern history. Two Communist countries, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, began an ideological and political struggle which may yet develop into a military conflict. Thousands of reports have been sent to world newspapers about this extraordinary event, hundreds of speeches have been made, positions have been taken. The issue itself has been clouded by propaganda, the real background of the conflict has been veiled in secrecy, and the democratic world has slipped into sentiments of sympathy, nay friendship, for Marshal Tito, admiring his courageous stand against the increasing pressure of Moscow and its satellites.

I was in Geneva working on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan when, on June 29, 1948, newspapers published on front pages in big headlines the news that Tito
and his closest associates, Kardelj, Djilas, and Ranković, were accused and condemned by the Cominform for the heaviest crime that could be committed against the sacred law of Marxism and Leninism. I could not believe it and quickly went to buy all the newspapers which this international town offered. The headlines announced the sensation: "Tito sentenced by the Cominform!" "Tito declared traitor!" "Moscow appeals for revolt against Tito!" "The Cominform ousts Tito!" I read them again and again.

In the declaration of the Cominform which met in Rumania, Tito was accused of pursuing a policy hostile to the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist party were said to have followed a false internal and foreign policy. They had abandoned the position of the working class and were becoming a party of nationalistic kulaks; they were revising the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, according to which the Communist party is the basic and leading power in the country. They had suppressed the principle of elections in the party and the principle of autocriticism. They had refused to confess their mistakes and were obsessed by megalomania and ambitions. They had oriented themselves wrongly in the international situation and, being afraid of imperialistic threats, they believed that they would gain the favor of imperialistic powers by a number of concessions. They had accepted the well-known bourgeois theory, according to which capitalist states represent a smaller danger for the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito accused of an anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist policy! It seemed to me to be nonsense, after what I had seen in that country for two and a half years of my assignment there. I assumed that the declaration of the Cominform was ordered by Moscow, knowing that the other Cominform parties would not dare do anything on their own initiative. I was sure that there must have been something very serious which compelled the grim, conspiratorial figure of the Kremlin, Josif Visarionović Stalin, to open a public attack against the most devoted and so far the most respected pupil of Communist teaching, Josip Broz Tito.

The conflict was brought to light only a few days after I
left Belgrade, and I must confess that I had not had the slightest idea that anything of historical significance was under way. There was some kind of tension in the highest governmental circles but it was felt very vaguely. There were some significant incidents but it was impossible to form a clear picture of them and to reach any conclusion.

I knew, for instance, that all Russian officers had been given an order from Moscow to leave Yugoslavia within twenty-four hours. At the time my guess was that the Soviets wanted them to be back with the Red Army because of the tense international situation which had developed after the Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia.

In April, 1948, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Dimitrov, passed through Belgrade on his way to pay an official visit to Prague. I went to the station to greet him and there met Minister Djilas and Minister of Foreign Affairs Simić who had come for the same purpose. Djilas talked with Dimitrov for half an hour in the usual cordial and informal manner. Later, I was confidentially informed that on his way back Dimitrov would stop twenty-four hours as Tito’s guest in Belgrade.

It was about seven o’clock in the morning when I went again to the station. I was surprised that Djilas was not there this time, and that Tito’s guest was being met by a second-rate minister and non-Communist, Stanoje Simić. But my surprise rose even more when I heard that Dimitrov was not going to interrupt his journey. He did not even care to get up, and Simić had to wait until the elderly Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Kolarov, came out of his compartment to exchange a few words with his Yugoslav colleague.

At the time of the Dimitrov incident Simić told one of his subordinates, Ivan Vejvoda, that Velebit, the Deputy Foreign Minister, had suddenly fallen gravely ill and had been ordered by Tito to take two months’ leave. This must have caused everybody who knew Velebit’s exceptionally strong physique to do a lot of thinking. My suspicion was only confirmed when I paid him a visit before departing and found him flourishing.

In the second half of April, 1948, a delegation of the Yugoslav Parliament visited Prague. The journey had been arranged some two months beforehand. The delegation was led by the
Communist veteran, Pijade. According to the usual ceremony, the delegation was supposed to be received by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald. But the audience was cancelled at the last minute. Mr. Pijade felt bitterly about it and complained to me later that this was intolerable.

In May, two members of the Politburo, Hebrang and Žuvo-vić, were relieved of their ministerial functions. This was a grave step and a very strong sign that something was wrong. A dismissal of a minister in a totalitarian government is always a sign of internal trouble. Under normal circumstances only death can relieve him of his office.

A few days after the official announcement of the dismissal I heard that Hebrang had been arrested. But I was highly privileged to secure this information. The cook of our Embassy was a friend of Hebrang’s cook who came crying because one day the secret police had arrested her master, the following day his wife and then his three children, the eldest of whom was no more than five years old.

Another significant event was the stopping of all Yugoslav airlines.

When I went to make my last call on the Soviet Ambassador, Lavrentiev, he mentioned that “the Yugoslav comrades still have a lot to learn.” This was an unheard of remark by a Soviet diplomat who was always eager to know everything, but most cautious not to say anything.

All this was convincing, though indirect, evidence that something was going on, but I think none of the foreign observers knew the real, grave implication.

Later, after I left Yugoslavia, two other incidents occurred. On Tito’s birthday when hundreds of congratulations poured into the city, Stalin’s greetings, which were always published on the front page, were noticeably lacking.

When the western powers, the United States, Britain, and France, agreed upon Belgrade as the place for the Danubian Conference which was to take place in July, Moscow surprised them by opposing their proposal.

Then, on June 29, 1948, the bomb exploded. The Cominform published its sentence. The world was amazed. Everybody waited with anxiety for the next happening while the
proclamation of the Cominform appealed to the Yugoslav rank and file Communists to overthrow Tito’s leadership.

This, however, did not take place and it was undoubtedly the Kremlin which was most surprised that the unity of the Yugoslav comrades withstood the first wave of pressure.

The seat of the Cominform, which had been so far in Belgrade in recognition of the special merits of the Yugoslav Communists, was abruptly transferred to Bucharest.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia did not fail to answer the accusation immediately. Its declaration revealed that correspondence had been exchanged between Stalin and Tito since the end of March; it rejected emphatically all the accusations and attacked the Soviet Communist party and the rest of the Cominform for serious misbehavior toward Socialist Yugoslavia. The appeal of the Cominform, addressed to the Yugoslav comrades, was counter-attacked by a proclamation from the Yugoslav Central Committee, asking all members of the party to strengthen their ranks.

The same day, June 30, a decision of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist party was published regarding the case of Hebrang and Žujović. They were accused of factious tendencies and of sabotage of the Five Year Plan, expelled from the party, and handed over to justice. A campaign was organized to prove the solidarity of the members of the party with the leadership. Thousands of telegrams were sent from different organizations and from all corners of the country to manifest the unity among the rank and file standing firmly behind Marshal Tito. Other telegrams were addressed to Premier Stalin as it was hoped the excommunication might have been the work of Comrade Ždanov, who directed the activities of the Cominform. This hope was, however, soon abandoned as Stalin made it clear that he stood behind Ždanov’s decision.

On July 21, 1948, the Fifth Congress of the Communist party of Yugoslavia was opened in Belgrade. Not a single guest representing other Communist parties was present. The Congress had been planned before the conflict broke out, but now
it had to answer the Cominform accusation and try to have the Yugoslav party readmitted into the Cominform. It had to prove that the Yugoslav comrades were worthy followers of Marxist and Leninist teaching, that they pursued the right policy in towns and villages, that they were deeply devoted to the idea of fidelity to Moscow, that they would never abandon the united front of Socialist states in the struggle against the western imperialists, and that they represented a party with democratic status, program, and regular elections.

Marshal Tito described in his speech, which took nine hours, the history of the Yugoslav Communist party, its difficult beginnings, the period of illegality, its struggle and leading role in the fight for the liberation of Yugoslavia. He aptly emphasized that while teams of Yugoslav Communist leaders were often changed in the period from 1920 to 1937, following orders of the Third International which accused them of treachery to socialism, factious deviationism and bourgeois nationalism, it was he himself who was given an order by Moscow, in 1937, to liquidate the Politburo and to create a new leadership. He was the only leader who had escaped the last purge. Now he was being accused of the same crimes for which he had been chosen, eleven years ago, to liquidate his closest associates.

One point of the accusation was answered by Tito with special stress. This was a provocative statement by Stalin in which Tito was reminded that the Red Army had saved Tito and the Partisan movement from annihilation after the German parachutists descended on his headquarters in May, 1944, at Drvar. It was thanks to the successes of the Red Army that the Communist party of Yugoslavia came to power, Stalin stated.

Tito did not hesitate to answer openly and, to a great extent, correctly Stalin's humiliating statement. He declared that the Red Army had reached the Yugoslav border in the autumn of 1944, when the Yugoslav Army already numbered several hundreds of thousands soldiers, and that it, the Red Army, had participated only in the liberation of Belgrade, eastern Serbia, and Vojvodina. Concluding his speech, Marshal Tito expressed the hope that the Russian Communists would give the Communist party of Yugoslavia an opportunity to prove by deeds that they were being faithful to Lenin and Stalin.
After Marshal Tito, all the leading members of the Yugoslav party took the platform and spoke about the party's organization, status, program, propaganda, and analyzed, point by point, the accusations brought against them by the Cominform. It was a university of Marxism. The Yugoslav leaders proved they knew the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin by heart and they refuted the Cominform's attack by quotations from the books of the founders of Communist teaching.

Kardelj defined the Yugoslav foreign policy. He declared that it was based on the following principles:

(1) An all-out activity in the struggle for peace and peace-loving collaboration between states on the basis of equality and within the frame of the United Nations. (2) Economic collaboration with everybody who wished it, on the basis of equality and maintenance of mutual obligations. (3) Political support to forces which are fighting for peace, democracy, freedom, independence, and socialism. (4) Close collaboration with, and all-out support to, the peace-loving, democratic, anti-imperialist policy of the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. (5) Development of an all-out collaboration with the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy in the sphere of economics and culture for the purpose of strengthening and coordinating a common economic development and mutual cultural understanding among countries of the Socialist world.

Kardelj made it clear that Yugoslavia would stay faithful to the Soviets and to the idea of world Communist solidarity and emphasized that

the action of the Cominform could under no circumstances change our policy. . . and nothing can affect the basic fact that our Socialistic country belongs to the Socialistic camp led by the Soviet Union. On the other side, we are deeply convinced that neither the Soviet Union, the countries of people's democracy, nor the whole international anti-imperialist workers' movement can withdraw support from a country of socialism which is exposed to attacks by the enemies of socialism. To do anything else would mean exposing that country to imperialistic pressure.

The man of economic figures, Kidrić, proved in his long exposé that Yugoslavia socialized her industry in two years
while the Soviet Union needed ten years. He analyzed the case of Hebrang and Žujović and characterized their theory as Trotsky-Bucharinist.

In conclusion, the Congress of the Communist party passed a resolution inviting again the Bolshevik party of Russia to come and study on the spot the accusations of the Cominform to convince itself that they were unjustified.

The Congress voted also the status of the party and accepted a wide program of action. This was to serve as an answer to the accusation that the party worked in semi- legality. Its “democratic” principles were confirmed by elections of the Politburo in which Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Ranković were solemnly re-elected. The unity of the party was convincingly manifested.

When the Russian Bolsheviks saw that the original appeal launched by the Cominform to overthrow Tito’s leadership found no echo in Yugoslav Communist ranks, they turned to subversive actions. They persuaded a few Yugoslav diplomats stationed in Moscow and the satellite countries to raise the banner of counter-revolution. This move, however, made a very poor showing because these diplomats played no significant role in Yugoslav political life.

At the time of the Communist Congress in Belgrade, Russian agents secretly distributed leaflets and spread rumors about the early liquidation of Tito’s heresy. In September, 1948, Pravda published a feverish attack against “Tito’s group,” and the article was distributed in Yugoslavia as a separate sheet. Some letters which Stalin addressed to Marshal Tito preceding the action of the Cominform were translated into Serbian, in Moscow, and sent to Belgrade and secretly spread among members of the Yugoslav Communist party.

The Yugoslav Politburo retaliated by publishing in booklet form a series of letters which Stalin and Tito had exchanged, and sent it to its followers as a confidential document.

This correspondence is still not fully known abroad. It is a most interesting document. It reveals, partly, the truth which lies behind the conflict and offers a picture of the relations which exist between the Kremlin and the Communist parties of other countries. It shows that Moscow speaks to them in an imperative, dictatorial manner and expects from them a blind
subservience. The tone of Stalin’s letters is amazingly arrogant but, on the other hand, Tito’s answers show his pride and firmness.

From what was published one can ascertain that at least two letters still remain strictly secret. Two of Tito’s letters, one of March 18, and another of May 20, are mentioned but their text is unknown. It can be assumed that these two documents contain material which is of special importance.

But the letters which were published give sufficient evidence that the original reason for the conflict lies elsewhere than in ideological matters as the Cominform tried to pretend, and they throw some light on the perplexity of the situation.

The main points of this correspondence deserve to be commented upon.\(^1\)

The first letter dated March 30 and signed by Tito is addressed to V. Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. It contains information that a Russian general, Barskov, had notified the Yugoslav government about a decision of Moscow to withdraw at once all Soviet military advisers and instructors because they were surrounded by unfriendliness; also, that all civilian Russian experts had been recalled from Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav economic authorities had refused to give the Russian commercial mission in Belgrade important information.

In his letter Marshal Tito denies the statement about unfriendliness toward the Russian officers. As to the question of the Russian commercial mission, he emphasizes that there was no special agreement according to which Yugoslav authorities were obliged to give information of a confidential nature to the Russians. He asks to be told the real reason why the Soviet government took such important steps.

It is of interest to note that the name of General Barskov was not on the list of the diplomatic missions in Belgrade, but he apparently played an important role in the military affairs of Yugoslavia. He headed the Soviet military teams which were stationed with the Yugoslav army units and which lived like masters in an occupied country, enjoyed all sorts of privileges,

and were paid four times better than the Yugoslav officers. At social gatherings they were given special honors.

The letter from Tito was answered by Moscow on March 27, and signed CKSKP (b), the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party (of Bolsheviks).

The letter begins with a domineering statement that Tito’s answer is untruthful and completely unsatisfactory. It mentions the question of the Russian officers who, according to the Yugoslavs, are too expensive for the Yugoslav budget and recalls a declaration which Minister Djilas allegedly made, in 1945, that “Soviet officers stand, from the point of view of morale, below officers of the British Army.”

The answer from Moscow gives further reasons why the Russian Communists are not satisfied with the Yugoslavs.

First: There are among the Yugoslav Communists types of doubtful Marxists like Djilas, Vukmanović, Kidrić, and Ranković, who have made anti-Soviet declarations that “the Soviet Bolshevik party alienates itself”; that “in the Soviet Union an all-national chauvinism governs”; that “the Soviet Union wants to dominate Yugoslav economically”; that “the Com-inform is an instrument of the Soviet Bolshevik party to dominate other parties”; that “Socialism in the Soviet Union has stopped being revolutionary,” and that “only Yugoslavia is a real upholder of a revolutionary Socialism.”

Second: The Communist party of Yugoslavia still lives in a stage of half-legality and lacks democracy within the party ranks. The secretary of the party’s department of personnel is at the same time Minister of the state’s security, which means that he controls that department. Then follows a sentence which warns, “According to the Marxist theory, the party must control all the state organizations of the country, including the Ministry of the state’s security, while in Yugoslavia the opposite is the case.”

In the Yugoslav party, the Russian letter continues, there is no spirit of class struggle and the capitalist elements in villages and towns continue to grow rapidly. In Yugoslavia it is the National Front which is considered the basic leading power and not the party.
Three: Deputy Foreign Minister Velebit, whom the Yugoslav comrades know to be an English spy, is still in the Yugoslav Foreign Service.

These were grave accusations and the Yugoslav party took some time to answer them. In a letter addressed to J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, dated April 13, Tito and Kardelj flatly rejected all the Moscovite charges, and, wishing to prove that they had the full confidence of the party, they signed the document “as ordered by CKKPJ,” the Central Committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

In the introductory part of the letter, Tito and Kardelj expressed their surprise at the tone and contents of the Russian letter, which in their opinion was based on denunciations coming from two former Politburo members, Hebrang and Žujović. They emphasized, for the first time, their patriotism by saying that “no matter how much a person loves the country of socialism, the Soviet Union, still in no case could he diminish his love for his own country which is also building up socialism.”

The letter then deals with each of the Russian points. It denies the charge against Djilas and deeply resents that people who have been fighting and suffering for years for communism and the Soviet Union can be accused of enemy feelings toward Communist Russia and can be compared to Trotsky. It quotes figures showing that the Communist party is democratically governed and represented, it stresses the leading and decisive role of the party in Yugoslavia and proudly compares its achievements during and after the war with the activities, organizational forms, and achievements of other Communist parties.

As regards the case of Velebit, the Yugoslav comrades stress his merits during the war, offer to investigate his past and make a concession that he will be transferred to other duties without delay. (This is the explanation of Velebit’s sudden illness.)

Then, they pass over to an attack of their own: The Soviet organs of espionage try to recruit Yugoslav citizens for their service and they create a net of espionage in Yugoslavia. They remind the Soviets that they have in Tito’s Yugoslavia a most faithful ally and that the closest collaboration between the two countries is of vital interest to both of them, but for this absolute mutual confidence is needed.
At the end of this letter of 4,500 words, Tito and Kardelj propose to liquidate what they call a grave misunderstanding by mutual clarification on the spot, i.e., in Yugoslavia, and they invite representatives of the Russian Bolshevik party to their country.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party answered on May 4 with a letter of 7,600 words.

The Russians again resent the tone of Tito’s answer and qualify it as “exaggeratedly ambitious.” They recapitulate, point by point, the old accusations and add some new. They defend the privileged position of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, asserting that he had, as a representative of the Soviet Union and member of the Russian Bolshevik party, the right to know everything. They indirectly flatter the U. S. Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, by writing:

It is also impossible to understand why the Minister of the USA in Belgrade behaves as the master of the house and his “informants,” the number of whom grows, enjoy freedom.

The Soviet letter rejects the accusation about the activities of the Soviet agents in Yugoslavia and stresses that in no other country have the Soviet civilian or military representatives met with such difficulties as in Yugoslavia. Stalin asks:

Why do the Yugoslav comrades refuse to confess their mistakes as the French and Italian Communists did? . . . They certainly do not suffer from modesty even though the merits and successes of other Communist parties are no smaller than theirs. The leaders of the other parties are modest and do not make any noise about their successes, while the Yugoslav leaders have deafened everyone by their exaggerated boastfulness.

It must also be noted that the French and Italian Communist parties have, as regards revolution, greater not smaller merits than the Yugoslav Communist party. If they have been, so far, less successful than the Yugoslav Communist party, it cannot be explained because of some special qualities of the Yugoslav party, but because the Soviet Army, after the German parachutists had smashed the headquarters of the Partisans and when the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia had passed through a heavy crisis, hastened to help the Yugoslav nation, broke
down the German occupie 3, liberated Belgrade and thus created conditions which were necessary for the Communist party to come to power. Unfortunately, the Soviet Army did not and could not give such help to the French and Italian parties.

In conclusion, the Soviet Communists did not accept the Yugoslav suggestion to discuss the problem in Belgrade but they announced that they would present it to the Cominform.

Another letter from the Yugoslav Central Committee, dated May 17, followed. It simply said that the Yugoslav Communists could not agree to present the conflict to the Cominform, the individual members of which had already expressed their opinion about the matter. It proposed to liquidate the thing by proving by deeds that the accusations are unjust. We shall stubbornly build up socialism and stay faithful to the Soviet Union, to the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The future will prove, as the past has done, that we shall do what we promise you.

The last official and published correspondence which Stalin had with Tito is dated May 22, 1948. The letter imputes to the Yugoslav Communists that they wanted to escape the criticism of the other Communist parties and thus secure a privileged position. After what had happened, the Russians have no more confidence in the promise that the Yugoslav comrades would correct their faults.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj have given promises to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party many times but have not kept them. . . . The Politburo of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, and especially Comrade Tito, should know that they have, through their anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy. . . done everything to undermine the Soviet party’s and the government’s confidence toward them.

By refusing to appear before the Cominform, the Yugoslav Communists were accused of betraying the cause of the international solidarity of the working class and of embracing a nationalism which is hostile to this cause.

To explain its attitude, the Yugoslav Politburo sent a declaration to the Cominform, making it clear that under the circumstances it could not take part in the Cominform sittings.
This was an act of unprecedented disobedience by a Communist party to the Kremlin. The fundamental principle of prestige was dangerously involved and the structure of inter-Communist hierarchy was threatened. The Soviet Communist party felt that no other solution was possible except to excommunicate the Yugoslav comrades from the Cominform. At the same time, it took it for granted that, according to its thirty years of experience, it would be a simple matter to change the leadership of the Communist party in Yugoslavia.

The problem was handed over to the Cominform. To create an impression for the outside world that the issue was of an ideological nature Moscow prepared a declaration and had it adopted by eight Communist parties.

But any accusation of an ideological deviation was unfounded. The chapter in which I have dealt with the situation of the Yugoslav peasantry proves that the Yugoslav Communist policy in agriculture was far from strengthening kulaks, i.e., individualistic elements in the country. On the contrary, it had been suppressing them systematically.

Likewise, the argument that bourgeois elements were gaining in influence in towns was completely false. It could be easily seen how completely the Yugoslav party had liquidated the middle class and impoverished the whole nation and how radically industry had been turned over to the state. No other satellite had gone so far in this field of communization as the Yugoslavs.

The objection about the predominant position of the National Front in Yugoslav politics can be definitely discarded because of the all-powerful influence of the Communist party, of which the National Front is nothing but an instrument to be used by the Communists.

In view of Yugoslavia's open loyalty to Russia, to accuse the Yugoslavs of pursuing a policy hostile to the Soviet Union was simply out of place.

The objections concerning the non-democratic and half-legal status of the Yugoslav Communist party made a very hypocritical argument. To respect democratic principles would be against the very substance of Communist policy, and to
pursue half conspiratory activity belongs to the basic methods of Communist activities.

Another point of the Moscow accusation offers more help in finding the real reason for the break. This was the dissatisfaction of Moscow with the position of the Soviet officers and civilian experts in Yugoslavia. This was the only point which was mentioned in the first letter.

There must, also, have been leakage from the conferences of the Politburo, and the correspondence discloses that it came from Ministers Žujović and Hebrang. Their star had been in decline for a long time and out of personal hatred for Tito and especially Djilas, they either informed the Soviet Ambassador, Lavrentiev, of the most confidential critical remarks of other members of the Politburo about the Soviets, or, out of sheer vengeance, just invented them.

Various ideas have been advanced as to the real reasons for the conflict. The Yugoslav Communist leaders gave as the reason that they stood for the principle of equality among the nations of the Soviet bloc and couldn’t bear the economic exploitation of Yugoslavia by Moscow. The western political writers, have, in general, accepted these assertions. It is, however, difficult for someone who had the opportunity to observe Tito’s policy on the spot to share their opinions.

I reached the conclusion that the real background of the conflict was mainly psychological and not ideological or economic. At the bottom of the conflict lay the Soviet’s lust for power and its imperialistic aims for world domination. The Communist party of Yugoslavia gave full support to this policy of the Soviet Union. But Moscow failed to understand that Marshal Tito, Prime Minister of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Army, Partisan leader, national hero and dictator, was a different person from Josip Broz, once underground agent of the Third International.

In Paris, in November, 1948, I received from Aleš Beblér, Deputy Foreign Minister and a member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist party, the following infor-
mation: "There is not a single word of truth in the Soviet accusation that ideologies divided us from the Russian Bolshevik party. The Soviets know it as well as we do. But they invented all sorts of objections of an ideological nature to make the break appear plausible when they found that we were not ready simply to obey their orders.

"The real reason for the conflict arose out of the different views which we and the Soviets had about our mutual relations. Stalin is convinced that war is coming and, therefore, he wants to tighten up Soviet relations with the people's democracies. I cannot see any other reason for his ordering Russian officers to penetrate deeper and deeper into the organization of our army. This is how the trouble started. You know that there were among us hundreds of Russian officers who acted as instructors in our army. They were placed all over the country. Everybody liked them as long as they continued their jobs. It was nonsense when Stalin reproached Tito for having shown an unfriendly attitude toward the Russian officers stationed with our troops.

"But, on the other hand, you know our Partisans. When the Russian officers started behaving as if they were masters of our army and wanted even to command our units, our officers did not like it and began to protest. I do not need to tell you how proud our officers are. They were all Partisans who fought in the war and they naturally objected to being deprived of their command. This is how the conflict started. Local quarrels were brought to Tito and he agreed with the opinion of our officers. All the rest which was subsequently added in the letters which Stalin sent to Tito was meant to serve as a screen for the Cominform."

This is an authentic testimony and it offers a convincing explanation of the real background for the slur which the Russians cast upon the Yugoslavs.

Stalin himself helped to elucidate this policy of military penetration in the satellite countries. In his letter to Tito he stated,

The Soviet Union has military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We cannot but emphasize that so far we haven't heard any complaints from our military advisers in these countries. . . . The Soviet
Union has many civilian experts in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and has no misunderstanding with the governments of these countries. The question is: why have difficulties and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia?

This is really the important question and an answer to it offers an explanation of the background of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. As to other Communist countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania—their Communist governments depend entirely upon Moscow, politically, psychologically, and intellectually. They are real puppets in the Kremlin's hands. They came to power thanks to the Red Army or Soviet pressure only. They disregard their nation's interests in order to help the Soviet Union, believing that only a strong Communist Russia can bring communism to all the world.

The same was true with the Yugoslav Communists; let us not be mistaken about it. They were ideologically better trained than any other Communists in the satellite countries. They could not possibly underestimate the leading and decisive role of Russia in the expansion of communism against the West. They proved constantly that they knew how to sacrifice their nation's interest for the Russian policy. There was nothing patriotic or even nationalistic in their policy and sentiments. They were more internationalistic than the Russian Communists, who in fact use international Marxism for chauvinistic Russian imperialism also.

Yet, when the Yugoslav Communists were ordered to hand over the command of their army to Soviet officers they objected. The reason for this stand of Tito has an overwhelmingly psychological background.

Before the war, the Communist parties of Europe were in fierce opposition towards the governments of their respective countries. Some of them, as in Czechoslovakia and in western Europe, were allowed to have their party organizations and their own press, and they took part in elections. They had their representatives in Parliaments. Others were outlawed, either shortly after World War I, or later, after having displayed a complete lack of loyalty to their own countries and an unrestricted respect for the Soviet Union only.
One thing was common to all Communist parties: they had their master in Moscow and obeyed his orders without any hesitation. At that time, communism was established in one country only, in Russia, which directed the activities of the other Communist parties through the Third International in Moscow. These were relations between an all-powerful Bolshevik party which was well entrenched in power, on one side, and the rest of the Communist parties which were either in opposition or underground, on the other side. They depended upon Moscow not only ideologically and intellectually, but materially as well.

These were easy years for Stalin. Financially poor and often politically powerless, party leaders listened devotedly to the mighty voice of Moscow. One telegram from the Moscovite center followed by a check was sufficient to bring overnight a change of the Politburo of any Communist party abroad.

The teams of Communist leaders came and went. Favorites of yesterday were proclaimed traitors of socialism today. Only the ablest opportunists survived repeated purges.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia was one of the most pitiful before the war. As described in a previous chapter, it was dissolved in 1921 and went underground. In an agricultural country, with deep religious feelings and a working class of undeveloped class-consciousness, there was no fertile soil for Communist activities in Yugoslavia. Many leaders were liquidated, others put in prisons, and there were periods of complete passivity and practically non-existence of the party.

The war changed many things and many people. Some Communist leaders in Europe were put into concentration camps in Germany, some escaped before the German Army occupied their countries and found refuge in Moscow. The latter spent four years in comparative comfort and had a good opportunity to receive another period of training in Marxism and subservience to the Bolshevik party of Russia. Once more they were under the complete control of the Soviet Politburo.

The only contribution they made personally to the war effort was to broadcast to the people in the occupied territories and incite them to take up arms against the Germans. They saw the successes of the Red Army and applauded its victorious
march toward their subjugated countries. It was thanks to this army that they could seize the governments against the wish of a good majority of the nations.

The story of the Communist party of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Marshal Tito was very different. He spoke about it in the following terms: "From that time [1938] till now [1948], the Central Committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia stayed uninterruptedly in the country, working illegally underground, not just until 1941 when Yugoslavia became an occupied territory." The implication of these words, which were pronounced after the conflict with the Cominform broke out, is clear. They were addressed to the other Communist leaders who fought from Moscow for the victory of their common ideology, instead of staying with their rank and file as was the case of Tito and his lieutenants.

The Yugoslav Communist party was probably the only Communist organization which took part in the fighting as an organized entity. As already described, its members fought valiantly. Tito and his Partisans went through many dangers and did not shrink from risking their lives. Tito himself was once wounded. They fought simultaneously against the German and Italian armies, Serbian Četnici and Croat Ustaše. One idea only obsessed the fanatical minds of these men: Victory for communism all over Yugoslavia.

Once the aim was achieved, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communists realized the material change which followed in their personal positions and in the situation of the party itself. The underground conspirator and prisoner who had been afraid of the mere appearance of a policeman and had had to disguise his identity under different names now became the leader and manager of the state machinery. He bore the distinguished title and wore the decorative uniform of Marshal of Yugoslavia. He lived in a huge palace formerly inhabited by kings and princes. He had a large bodyguard. He started to receive diplomats and graciously greeted respectable guests at official parties.

His associates—ministers, generals, party secretaries—underwent parallel changes. Only yesterday they were persecuted, outlawed agitators and hard-fighting Partisans. Now, they have ministerial chairs and live in comfortable villas. Illegal crossings
of the frontier were exchanged for official journeys in special trains and luxurious American automobiles. Hot and tasty meals and good wines were substituted for dry bread and water. All this was a change which would influence the mind and mentality of almost anyone.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia, once prohibited and persecuted, powerless and without any financial means, became a party identified with the state itself, and actually above the state, all-powerful and all-rich.

It is true that other Communist leaders in eastern Europe also reached these high levels of state functionaries and comfortable living. But Tito and his party people were the only men who somehow deserved it; they personally fought for their positions. They were well aware of this fact. They were seized by an immense pride in their war achievements.

It is not unusual that people like to speak about moments of their lives when dangers had to be faced and risks taken. This tendency of narration has, however, grown geometrically with the Yugoslav Partisans. With time the reality of arduous fighting changed into a legend, and pride has grown into conceit mixed with an unconcealed scorn for the achievements of others.

Tito and the Yugoslav Politburo had great contempt for the other Communist leaders with the exception of Stalin and the Russian Politburo. It grew into a superiority complex. The Yugoslav comrades liked to teach ideological lessons to the rest of the members of the Communist family. They felt they had carried the Communist revolution through better and quicker than others, and that communism was best and first consolidated in Yugoslavia. This was fully recognized in Moscow. Up until the beginning of the dispute with Moscow in the spring of 1948, the Soviet government did not conceal its preference for the Yugoslav Communists.

The Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the rest were heavily afflicted by this attitude. They suffered from another complex: that of inferiority, feeling rightly how small their contribution toward the common cause of communism was and to what extent they owed their power to the Russians.

Gottwald, the chairman of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, and now President of the Republic, always blushed
with anger when I told him, with malicious satisfaction, that the Yugoslav Communists criticized the Czechoslovak party for not having eliminated the democrats from Czech political life. Only one month before the Communists made the putsch in Prague, Gottwald shouted at me at a lunch in his private villa: “I’ll show them how we shall win. And it will not be by the comical ballot as they do in Belgrade.” This significant, and for a Communist, unusual frankness can be explained by the jealousy and hatred which he felt toward Tito and which were, at the moment, stimulated by several drinks of brandy.

These feelings of Gottwald toward Marshal Tito were fully shared by Bierut, the President of Poland; by Dimitrov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria; by Rakosi, the Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary; and by Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister of Rumania. They have all been top leaders of their respective parties and their prestige within their own parties has been high. They felt uneasy, however, when they met with Tito on various occasions and had to bend their obedient spirit to the fighting will of the Yugoslavs. When Tito conversed with these leaders, either in Yugoslavia or when paying them official visits in their own countries, he never missed an opportunity to speak with enthusiasm about “the famous five offensives” which the Partisan Army went through. His guests or hosts listened courteously, trying hard to conceal how annoyed they were that they could not offer any soldierly story about their own contribution to the common cause.

This atmosphere contributed largely to the last phase of the conflict between the Yugoslav party and the Cominform, the leaders of which were more than satisfied that at last Tito had been taught a lesson by Moscow. Their inferiority complex found its compensation in the dethronization of Tito.

Tito was accused of bourgeois nationalism. The adjective can be easily discarded. This is shown by observing how far he had driven the country into communism, whether in the political, cultural, or economic field. I do not share, however, the thesis which has been generally accepted that he had manifested a kind of nationalism which caused the friction. Tito
was an internationalist. His speeches started to sound a nationalistic tone only after he had been definitely isolated by the Cominform. It was his Partisan background and Partisan mentality, not nationalism, which led him into the conflict with the Cominform. It could be called Partisan chauvinism, if a formula for his heresy is needed.

There was, however, nothing nationalistic in the behavior or policy of the Yugoslav Communists. They had their Partisan pride, it's true, and they wanted to serve the idea of communism, world revolution, inter-Communist solidarity and Moscow-uncontested command with their necks straight and not bent humbly in the manner of the other satellite servants.

This is what I call the specific situation of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. Stalin missed it completely, thinking that he could give orders to Tito and his associates in the same brutal manner he had used for many years when they were only miserable agitators.

Dictators are weak in psychological matters. They often commit grave mistakes when they have to face a problem which requires a distinct psychological approach. They become victims of their own lies which, in the end, nobody believes but themselves. They overlook the real situation in their own countries and are wrongly informed about what is happening abroad. The system is built on fear, and judgment is based on information received from diplomatic representatives who are afraid to report impartially on disagreeable matters.

This was the case of Yugoslavia. Stalin's ambassador at Belgrade, A. V. Lavrentiev, is a mathematician by profession. It might have been a good qualification for checking up how much precious copper, zinc, and lead Yugoslavia delivered to Russia, but no algebraic formula could interpret the minds of the Yugoslav Communists.

When we met in Paris, in the fall of 1948, Aleš Bebler told me further, in effect, "We consider Lavrentiev as the person most responsible for the conflict. He did not inform Moscow properly. He failed to understand that we in Yugoslavia could not be given orders just like this. Had he studied our Partisan movement and had he realized how high was the authority of Tito in the party and with the nation, he would have come to
the conclusion that we could not be handled in that way. But he either did not understand the situation or did not report truly to Moscow. He is mainly guilty for the turn things took. Now, however, his position is almost untenable. You know how he was received everywhere before. Now, nobody speaks to him."

Actually, he was absent from his post for several months and in the summer of 1949 was recalled from Belgrade to be promoted to the high function of one of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union.

It can be safely assumed that Stalin, when opening the question of Soviet officers and technical experts assigned to Yugoslavia, did not realize that it could develop into a conflict. It was a problem of prestige. Later, when the conflict grew and other accusations were added and answered in the same bold manner, Stalin was still convinced that it would be easy to settle it by a simple reshuffle of the Yugoslav Communist leadership. He was sure that Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Ranković would be liquidated overnight. This kind of change had been arranged often before; why shouldn't it work this time?

But Stalin was fundamentally wrong. There can be no stronger bonds of friendship between men than those which have been forged in trenches. The Yugoslav Partisans lived for four years in forests during the war, and were bound together by inseparable links of common danger and suffering, success and setback, and also by a feeling of immense responsibility for the death of many countrymen. This experience of Partisan friendship enriched the prescribed party discipline by a factor which is unknown to the Marxist theory and technique, namely, feelings of faithfulness and solidarity among themselves and especially toward their war-time leader, Marshal Tito.

This situation was neglected by Moscow. The conflict grew, and so far Stalin has not succeeded in liquidating the present leadership of the Yugoslav party. He has lost, at least temporarily, his best ally.
After the war, the Soviet armies helped to liberate Europe from the evils of nazism, but the Soviet government did not keep the promise given at Yalta, in February, 1945, and on different other occasions, that Russia would leave the internal development of the liberated countries to the nations themselves. Thinking of her further aggressive move toward the West, she established full control over all eastern Europe and on the Stettin-Trieste line built up springboards for further conquest.

Yugoslavia was considered the most important bastion in this system of ideological aggression. She was to play a role which no other Communist country could possibly undertake. Not only was the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito considered to be the best consolidated state under Communist rule but, also, her geographical position opened possibilities which no other
satellite could offer to the Russian policy aiming to conquer first Italy and then France.

Poland and Czechoslovakia are separated from Italy and France by several hundreds of miles. Western Germany and Austria lie in between. They are occupied by the American, British, and French armies. Though these armies are kept small and could not possibly be a match for the huge armies which Russia keeps on her western border, the Soviet government is aware that a military move through these countries would represent an act of aggression and more than a risk of an open conflict with the United States and other western countries. As the Soviets seem to be, for the moment, anxious to avoid a war, the way through Germany or Austria would not be appropriate to force the issue in France and Italy. Czechoslovakia and Poland do not offer, therefore, strategical advantages to Russia, in this case.

Moreover, their armies are not yet up to the standard. Both countries, during the war, had units both in the Soviet Union and in western Europe. When these units returned to their motherland, they brought with them their experience from fighting side by side with the Americans and British on the West, and with the Russians on the East. They were also given a very enlightening opportunity to see how people live under Russian socialism and in British democracy. This experience was not without influence upon their minds. The westerners, or Londoners, as they are called, were impressed by the British way of living, the easterners were deeply disappointed and even many Communist soldiers were shocked. Though the new Communist regimes have purged the ranks of officers in the Polish and Czechoslovak armies, it will take a long period before they can be sure about the moral and political reliability of these armies.

Two other countries within the Soviet bloc—Rumania and Bulgaria—with shores on the Black Sea are certainly important for the Russian system of defense. But in the ideological penetration of Russia toward the West, they are too far away, and because of their negligible political influence cannot play any decisive role in spreading communism outside their own bor-
ders, though Bulgaria is of some importance because of lying adjacent to Greece.

The same applies to Hungary which, as a completely inland country surrounded by other Communist states, is not important to the ideological strategy of the Soviets.

Albania of Enver Hoxha borders only on Greece and Yugoslavia, being cut off from any direct contact with the Russians.

There was, however, one country of the Russian bloc which was supposed to take active and decisive part in the infiltration of Communist and Russian elements into Italy and France. This country was the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito. Her geographical position and military disposition offered unique advantages.

Yugoslavia has a common frontier with Italy and Austria, and Italy is adjacent to France and Switzerland. Yugoslavia has a long coast on the Adriatic and through this an outlet to the Mediterranean and Africa. The valley of the River Vardar often in history brought the Serbian armies down to Greece. Albania is militarily in Yugoslav hands. The Yugoslav Army numbers 700,000 soldiers and this figure can be doubled, from a population of almost sixteen millions. A good number of Yugoslavia's soldiers are seasoned fighters who have gone through many tests of fire in the Partisan war. The army is exceedingly well disciplined and trained, though not equipped sufficiently for modern warfare. The officer corps is composed almost exclusively of organized Communists and former Partisans.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia is far the most homogeneous of all the satellites. Even the terrific pressure brought upon it by Moscow and the Cominform did not split it as would certainly have been the case in any other country. It is, above all, a combative party, steeled in active fighting and devoted to the idea of world revolution.

Also, Yugoslavia is rich in iron ore, copper, chrome, zinc, lead, and other raw materials which are indispensable to war production.

Nobody was better acquainted with the irretrievable value which Yugoslavia represented for the Kremlin policy than Stalin himself. There was, however, one man who valued the
role of Yugoslavia in the Communist strategy just as much and considered it just as high as Stalin did—Marshal Josip Broz Tito.

Tito did not forget the real reason for the conflict. He knew that the Russians wanted to take over the command of the Yugoslav Army because of their expansionist plans. He felt he could afford to be firm and cherished the hope that Moscow would have to forgive him one day, when she needed what his country could bring to the common pool for a Communist onslaught.

The possibility of reconciliation hung for several months in the minds of foreign observers. Many people in western countries even suspected that the whole conflict was faked to deceive the western world.

It is well to remember that there is no opportunism which would be too low and which the Soviet government would refuse to use if it felt it served its policy. It has been a pronounced feature of Soviet policy to change its concept of settling international problems according to the need of the immediate situation. The pupils of Lenin have been taught that no means must be neglected, however miserable, if the idea of world revolution can gain from it. They follow fanatically their final aim, and it is just this fanaticism which allows, nay dictates, that they proceed in short-term matters without any scruples.

It would not be entirely strange to the minds of the Soviet Bolshevik leaders to consider the idea of reconciliation with Tito. He could always be liquidated later.

Yet, a reconciliation is out of the question now. The Russian Bolsheviks can seemingly forgive a western democrat whom they need in a momentous situation. The case of Winston Churchill is typical: For twenty years, Moscow considered him as the worst example of British and western dark reaction, capitalism, and imperialism. During the war he was in high esteem and Stalin addressed him at Yalta as "the bravest governmental figure in the world . . .," as one of the "few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world . . .," as his "fighting
friend."

Only one year later Stalin started to call Churchill chief warmonger and enemy.

But it would seem impossible to pardon a Communist leader whose violation of inter-party discipline had exposed the structure of the Communist movement itself to grave dangers. Party discipline belongs to one of the first commandments of the Communist methodology of work, and a lack of respect for this principle represents a very serious crime. I know of no case in the history of the Communist movement in which Moscow readmitted any member who was publicly declared a traitor to socialism.

The Yugoslav Politburo counted on the possibility of reconciliation up until the winter of 1948. As Bebler told me, "We hope that the conflict will be somehow settled, some day, when the Soviets find out that they were wrong in trying to give us orders.

"You can see the big successes of the Chinese National Army. This may help us in our situation. The Soviets may find out that it is not so easy to give orders to a people's government which came to power through the fighting of its own nation. This applies to China as well as to us. This will compel the Soviets to reconsider the methods of collaboration between them and the people's democracies.

"We hope for the best. But the Cominform countries have offended us so deeply that we could not simply return to the Cominform. Now, we put conditions for reconciliation: (1) Injustice done to us must be undone. (2) Our Partisan liberation movement and struggle must be recognized as a revolution of independent value. (3) The party must retain the right to choose its leadership as it pleases. You can see that our Partisan spirit has not abandoned us."

These hopes faded out with the increasing pressure of the Cominform, and by January, 1949, the Yugoslav Communists abandoned them definitely.

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The Soviets apparently did not contemplate at all pardoning the Yugoslav heretics. The moment Tito was excommunicated they began a concentric action to bring about the overthrow of his leadership. They unleashed a campaign against him, using simultaneously all sorts of diplomatic, political, and economic pressure combined with subversive, underground activities on the soil of Yugoslavia. No means, short of an open war, has been neglected to liquidate this unbearable schism.

Using its methods of work and previous experience the Russian Bolshevik party first thought it would be possible and easy to find some traitors within the ranks of the Yugoslav party to split the party itself and get rid of Tito and his closest followers in the usual way.

There was one person in whom the Russians put many of their hopes. He was Lieutenant General Arsa Jovanović. He was a young, nice-looking man, one of the few former active officers of the prewar Royal Army who had joined the Partisan movement and had become, for a period, the Chief of Staff. He was considered the most talented officer of Tito’s army and after the war was sent to Moscow to receive the highest possible education in military affairs. This included also an education in Communist ideology. General Jovanović received proper and thorough teaching in this field as well, and when the conflict with the Cominform broke out, the Soviet secret service arranged for Jovanović to escape from Yugoslavia to organize a movement against Tito from abroad. The Yugoslav secret service was, however, vigilant and Jovanović met his death from a bullet when he tried to cross the Yugoslav-Rumanian border clandestinely.

Then the Russians tried to find some subversive elements in the Yugoslav Army and among local politicians of the individual federal republics. They succeeded in some cases but these were quickly dealt with by the Yugoslav police. It is certainly remarkable that as far as the leadership is concerned, not a single Yugoslav Communist has succumbed to Moscow pressure. The members of the Politburo have stood firmly and unitedly behind Tito.

As to the reaction of the rank and file Communists, Bebler told me, “We had some difficulties in the local organizations
of the party. When the conflict broke out and local cells discussed our stand, there were some places where local functionaries expressed the opinion that we should not have driven the conflict into the open by refusing to attend the Cominform conference. They thought it would have been preferable to take part in the session of the Cominform and to defend our policy there. But these people changed their minds when they were told that this would not have changed the trend of things and that Tito would have been pressed to give up the leadership of the party. They were especially angry when we showed them the correspondence between Stalin and Tito concerning the history of Drvar.

"We certainly do not deny the Russians credit for taking part in the liberation of Yugoslavia, but you know that our people will never agree to being deprived of their own merits. The allegation of Stalin [that the Russian Army rescued the Yugoslav Partisans from complete annihilation] deeply offended our people who are proud of their war achievements.

"There were also some difficulties among the politicians and officers from Montenegro. The tradition of friendship toward Russia has been deeply rooted in Montenegro. Some people thought that whatever were the reasons of the conflict and whatever the issue, we simply shouldn't under any circumstances oppose Russia. The Montenegrins like to think along the line of the old proverb: 'We Montenegrins are, together with the Russians, two hundred million people.' But this dissension was quickly dealt with, and some people were arrested. Among them was the Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, Ljumović, who was against Tito for purely personal motives because he had not been appointed at least Prime Minister after he returned home from Poland [where he had been Yugoslav Ambassador]. The party is now absolutely firm and Tito enjoys full confidence and authority."

Things continued to develop but Tito was always in control. One of the oldest Macedonian Communists, Bane Andrejev, was deprived of his function as Minister of Mines, allegedly for opposing Tito's policy; almost all local governments were reshuffled and many high functionaries and officers were imprisoned. According to some reports, which, however, cannot
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be confirmed, some 30 per cent of the party members are in secret opposition to the Politburo, and the number is increasing. Reliable reports confirm that large scale arrests are constantly taking place. Anybody, regardless of his former standing, who directly or indirectly expresses a reserve as to Tito’s policy, is persecuted without mercy. Prisons are overcrowded. This can be easily explained: The Yugoslav Communists have been fanatically devoted to Marshal Tito. But, at the same time, they professed the same fanaticism toward the idea of international communism led by Russia. Now they face a sort of a conflict of Communist conscience. They still believe in Tito but they have come to realize what a heavy blow international communism has suffered from his heresy.

As for attempts to liquidate Tito, a period of almost three years has proved how difficult the task is. Tito’s personal bodyguard has been constantly increased. The Minister of Interior, Ranković, made it known in May, 1949, in a speech addressed to the security police corps, that any Yugoslav who might try to take part in an attempt to overthrow Tito’s regime would be exterminated. The national militia has been increased by tens of thousands. There were reports that several attempts on Tito’s life were made in the summer of 1948, but these could not be confirmed. It is not technically easy to liquidate a dictator. Tito knows the methods of liquidation, as he was taught them in the best school in Moscow, and he personally took a prominent part in liquidating his opponents. He can, therefore, take careful precautions and arrange his own defense.

Besides, Tito is not alone. There are nine members of the Politburo and they all seem to stick together as one man, well aware of the necessity to stand or fall together. Among them are Ranković, the Minister of Interior; the omnipotent Djilas; and the severe Marxist and Foreign Minister, Kardelj. Together, they have good control of the army, police, and secret service, and through their devoted agents, they follow cautiously every breath and move of their own comrades and subordinates. It would not, therefore, solve Stalin’s problem if Tito alone were removed, though admittedly it would be a grave blow to the party’s resistance.
The Communist press and radio everywhere launched a series of attacks against the Yugoslav party. The Communist leaders in Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, and Tirana began to curse Tito, the man who only a few weeks earlier had been praised as the example of a Communist fighter.

Comradess Anna Pauker of Rumania was the first to open fire against Tito. After the outbreak of the conflict, she immediately ordered all pictures of Tito removed, started to persecute the Yugoslav minority in Rumania, and appealed to the Yugoslav nation to overthrow Tito’s dictatorship. It was Mrs. Pauker who tried to organize the escape of General Jovanović.

Small Communist Albania did not lag behind. Within forty-eight hours, hundreds of Yugoslav teachers, officers, and technicians lent to the Albanian administration were brutally expelled from Albania. Agreements concerning common Yugoslav-Albanian commercial enterprises, valid for thirty years, were nullified. Forgotten was the gift of Yugoslavia to the Albanian economy, amounting yearly, according to Yugoslav sources, to a sum of four billion dinars, almost half of it going to the benefit of the Albanian Army (excluding military equipment). The name of Tito was no longer permitted to be mentioned in schools, and songs about “the hero Tito” disappeared. The import of Yugoslav newspapers and books was forbidden.

The Communist party of Hungary, which did absolutely nothing during the war to contribute to the common victory over nazism, was the first to begin press and radio attacks threatening reprisals against the Yugoslav Communists. This although Yugoslavia had been the first after the war to offer a fraternal hand to the defeated Hungarian nation and to give support to the Hungarian Communist leaders.

The Czechoslovak Communists were pleased finally to have an occasion to pay Tito back for the contempt he had shown for them. Two years before, when he paid a visit to the Prague government, a large factory was named for him. A dormitory for Yugoslav students, called after King Alexander, was solemnly renamed Marshal Tito Dormitory and the same act changed the name of a street in Prague. Now Tito’s name was effaced.

Two years before this, the Czechoslovak government had
received, at its own expense, three thousand Yugoslav apprentices to train in Czechoslovak factories. Now they were expelled. A Yugoslav motion picture showing Partisan heroism was excluded from participation in an international competition of films arranged by Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak tourists, who for decades had gone to the Adriatic shores to spend their holidays, were forbidden to travel any more to Yugoslavia.

In the international field, Yugoslavia was isolated. At an exhibition of the Slav nations arranged in the Soviet zone of Berlin, the Russians ordered the removal of the picture of Tito. At the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, in 1948, no delegation of the Soviet bloc contacted the Yugoslav delegates and nobody applauded Kardelj, though he still kept to the common line of the eastern bloc and attacked “western imperialists.”

The Yugoslavs living in Russia and the satellite countries, partly spontaneously, partly under pressure, joined the Cominform in attacks against Tito. They formed associations pledging fidelity to Russia and with the financial help of the Communist governments started publications in Serbian of periodicals and leaflets which were smuggled into Yugoslavia. In Prague appeared Nova Borba. In Sofia was founded a “National Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria,” and, oddly enough, one of the points of its program was declared to be a federation of South Slavs. Yugoslav minorities in the satellite countries were forced to declare their loyalty to the respective governments (as, on the other side, their nationals in Yugoslavia were forced to pledge loyalty to Tito), and individuals were sent clandestinely to Yugoslavia to spy and foment disorders.

How did the Yugoslav Politburo react to all these attacks? In the first months after the break, the Yugoslav press did not answer the satellite propaganda. It published a series of articles, the authorship of which was ascribed to Djilas, trying to prove by quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin that the Yugoslav Communist party acted according to Communist teaching. Stalin’s pictures were still displayed in public places and all meetings ended with the customary slogans, “Long live Soviet Russia. Long live the great leader and teacher of all nations,
Stalin!” The press continued to maintain the regular column about the Soviet Union.

In August, 1948, when speaking to the soldier-members of the party, Tito deviated for the first time from the obligatory formula. There was no more “glory to the heroic Red Army and to Stalin.”

The second deviationist statement followed in November, 1948. The old veteran of the Yugoslav Communist movement, Moša Pijade, declared in a solemn speech pronounced on the anniversary of the foundation of the Yugoslav Republic and in the presence of diplomats, that Britain and the United States had given help to Tito before the Soviets during the war. This was a very radical change. Up until then, only the merits of the Soviet Army were stressed, and the contribution of the West was mentioned with contempt.

The year 1949 brought more flame into the struggle, from both sides. The fiercest battle developed in the economic field. Yugoslavia was to be strangled by a gradual economic blockade. She was to be made to break down and capitulate before Russian pressure through increasing misery, hunger, and economic chaos. She was to pay for her own shortsightedness in her foreign trade which had been subordinated to political and ideological interests and was, therefore, now closely linked with the economy of the eastern bloc. The Soviets assumed that Tito would be forced to revise or abandon the Five Year Plan if the Communist countries stopped exporting to Yugoslavia, and that economic frustration combined with other methods of pressure would finally induce potential opponents of Tito to liquidate him.

At the end of 1948, Moscow announced a curtailment of foreign trade with Yugoslavia by seven-eighths because of the “unfriendly policy of the Yugoslav government toward the Soviet Union.” Yugoslavia was not invited to join “the Marshall Plan of the East,” the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance.

Other Communist countries slowed down their exports to Yugoslavia, under various pretexts, and by the spring of 1949, the commerce between all the satellite countries and Yugoslavia was brought practically to a standstill. The Hungarian government stopped paying reparations (70 million dollars) in
spite of the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Paris. The Yugoslav mission in Hungary, dealing with the problem of reparations and restitution of the Yugoslav property looted by the Hungarian Army during the war, was expelled. Deliveries of military equipment from all Communist countries had been stopped even before the Cominform break with Yugoslavia was made public. To counteract the Yugoslav move of opening commercial contacts with the West, the Russians, following a policy of dumping, offered some goods below the price of Yugoslav products.

The Yugoslav government was not slow to detect the grave dangers threatening their economy by the Soviet strangulation. In December, 1948, Marshal Tito informed the Parliament about the economic break between Yugoslavia and the other countries of the eastern bloc. He warned the latter that he was compelled to switch the export of raw materials from the East to the West. By quoting the figures of the Yugoslav export to the Communist countries, he made it clear that by the discontinuation of this export, they would suffer from the break at least as much as Yugoslavia herself.

This statement opened a new period of trade relations between Yugoslavia and the western countries. After three years of the trying experience of artificial foreign trade with the East, the economic structure of which was not complementary to Yugoslav needs, the Yugoslav government finally was forced to find its natural partners in trade among the western countries.

The United States authorities were cautious in their estimates of the idea of expanding the trade with Yugoslavia. It was felt that such an expansion would have to be supported by a loan, as Yugoslavia had no reserves of dollars, and politically, the Yugoslav Communist policy was not being forgotten. "... it will not be the policy of the United States to greet the leader of totalitarian Yugoslavia as if he suddenly had become a 'Jeffersonian democrat.'"\(^2\)

A few days later, it was reported that the Yugoslav government was negotiating to ship to the United States copper and lead worth fifteen million dollars.

Meanwhile, trade negotiations with other western countries were hastened. In December, 1948, a voluminous one-year trade agreement with Britain, amounting to one hundred and twenty million dollars, was signed and conversations concerning a long-term agreement, pursued for one and a half years, intensified. They were brought to a successful end in December, 1949, and an agreement was signed amounting to a respectable figure of one-hundred million pounds sterling and making provision for a British loan to Yugoslavia of eight million pounds.

In May, 1949, a one-year trade agreement was signed with France. Though of small volume (six billion francs), its significance lay in a protocol attached to the agreement, providing for negotiations for a five-year agreement which would ensure exchange of goods to the amount of twenty billion francs.

In August, 1949, an important trade agreement was signed with Italy. It provided for an exchange of goods to the value of ninety-four million dollars a year. The act of signature was accompanied by friendly words of good neighborly relations between the two countries which before had been tense and unsettled. (Other countries which opened closer trade contacts with Yugoslavia soon after the war ended were Sweden and Switzerland.)

To avert at least partly dangers caused by economic isolation, Yugoslavia turned her eyes to the United States, which was the only country in a position to give immediate help. The Yugoslav government approached the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Import-Export Bank, asking for loans.

The State Department, foreseeing the far-reaching impact that the saving of Tito's shattered economy would have upon his ability to withstand the Soviet pressure, decided to feed the conflict with Moscow and revised its policy of granting export licenses for goods to Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1949,

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4The year of 1950 saw an important opening of trade relations with Western Germany, and also with Latin America.
several American companies negotiated contracts with the Yugoslav government concerning the export of mine installations and heavy machinery. In August permission was given by the State Department to sell a steel-finishing mill worth three million dollars to Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, the shipment of raw materials—lead, copper, and zinc—from Yugoslavia to the United States increased, and it was expected that the year of 1949 would double the total figure of Yugoslav-American trade of 1948.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development sent a delegation to Yugoslavia to study on the spot the conditions for a loan. The Import-Export Bank extended, in September, 1949, to the Yugoslav government a loan of twenty million dollars and the International Monetary Fund gave a credit of three million dollars.

The fury of the Soviet government against Yugoslavia increased when they saw that Tito was seeking salvation from the West. They accused him of selling his country's independence to western capitalism. Their anger was natural. First, the purpose of the economic strangulation had been frustrated, and second, they found that the blockade worked both ways economically. The Soviet-Czechoslovak armament industry was deprived of precious and indispensable raw materials which it had received from Yugoslavia. There have been indications that Czechoslovakia tried to overcome this problem by buying the Yugoslav copper and lead through a third, neutral country (Switzerland).

In order to justify to the members of the Yugoslav Communist party its turning toward the West, the Yugoslav government accused the Soviets of exploitation of the Yugoslav economy. This was not unknown to the world abroad, but figures were kept in strict secrecy. Up until the break with the Cominform, the Yugoslav government was only full of praise for Soviet generosity, stressing that there would not have been any reconstruction of devastated Yugoslav territories and no Five Year Plan if the Russians had not helped the Yugoslav economy. Even the correspondence between Stalin and Tito did not give any indication of Yugoslav complaints about Russian exploitation.
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With the increasing hostilities of the Soviet bloc against Yugoslavia, Tito's government, however, started to lift the veil of secrecy covering inter-Communist relations, and the world was shown how Russia understands trade among Communist countries. In March, 1949, the Communist paper Borba disclosed that the Soviet Union had put pressure on the Yugoslav government to sell Russia raw materials according to world prices, which were many times below the production price. Yugoslavia suffered enormous losses. In April the same newspaper revealed that the Yugoslav government had to pay Russian technicians working on the construction of a bridge up to 1,000 dollars a month, while the highest salary of a highly qualified Yugoslav technician was known not to surpass 100 dollars. Figures were quoted on raw materials which Yugoslav had to export to the eastern bloc in exchange for tractors, automobile spare parts, steel tubes, tires, to show the disproportion of exchanged goods to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia.

The most convincing proof of the Russian "capitalistic" penetration into the Yugoslav economy and of its ruthless exploitation was offered when two Yugoslav-Soviet mixed companies—one for the Danube navigation, Juspad, the other for the civil aviation, Justa—were dissolved in September, 1949, and the Yugoslav government published figures on the partnership. It was announced that at the time of the foundation of the companies, in February, 1947, the Yugoslav government brought in 80 per cent of the capital and investment. The Soviet government invested only 3,400,000 dinars (68,000 dollars), in the Juspad company, and the Yugoslavs had to purchase abroad equipment to keep the port installations in working order. There were three-fold freight rates operating on the Danube, according to which Yugoslavia had to pay for shipping on her vessels a rate of 52 per cent higher than the Soviet vessels and 30 per cent more than other countries (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria). As to Justa, the Yugoslavs had to bear the expenses of the airfield constructions.

In both companies, it was a Russian who was appointed as general manager, and the shares were equally divided between the two governments.

These "friendly and Socialist-based" relations between two
Communist countries were revealed by the Yugoslav delegate, Joža Vilfan, at a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet bloc delegates angrily denied his statement, branding it as a lie and giving their own figures on commercial contracts with Yugoslavia. There is no reason to believe fully either of the opposing sides. But the Yugoslavs are undoubtedly right in the main that they were exploited by Russia.

The same cannot be said about another argument advanced by the Yugoslav government to explain its change of foreign trade policy. In December, 1948, Marshal Tito declared the main cause of the trouble between Yugoslavia and other Communist countries to have been "that we want to bring socialism to our people, industrialize our country as rapidly as possible and that we are not remaining a backward rural country which only sends out raw materials."

This statement does not correspond with the facts, as I know them from personal experience. There were some democratic politicians and non-political economic experts in Czechoslovakia, for instance, who expressed doubts about the scope of Yugoslav industrialization when the long-term trade agreement was negotiated in 1947. But they were overruled by the Communists who insisted fiercely on meeting the Yugoslavs' unreasonable requests. They did everything in their power to contribute to a quick reconstruction and industrialization of Tito's Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs brutally attacked every Czechoslovak who dared oppose Yugoslav claims, accusing him of a reactionary and hostile attitude. They used to denounce these people to the Czechoslovak Communist leaders who were only too willing to make concessions to the detriment of the basic interests of the Czechoslovak economy.

A study of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav trade agreements would show that as a result of Yugoslav insistence and of the eagerness of Czechoslovak Communists to help Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia delivered a disproportionate quantity of heavy machinery, trucks, railroad cars, coke, and steel tubes in exchange for Yugoslav prunes, apples, wines, and tobacco. Only in June, 1949, when political aspects pushed the Czechoslovak delegates to the limit and they finally broke commercial contacts with Yugo-
slavia, the Czechoslovak government started to insist on putting the relations "on a purely commercial basis" and revised the whole qualitative structure of exchanged goods.

The same was the case and experience with Poland. Bulgaria and Rumania could not contribute to Yugoslav industrialization. Russia's relations toward Yugoslavia were accompanied by factors of exploitation, but it is certainly untrue that the Soviet bloc hampered the industrialization of Yugoslavia.

Simultaneously with the economic blockade, the political pressure pursued by Moscow had been systematically intensified. Rumors had been cultivated to the extent that it was expected that the Russians might take over the rule any day.

The Moscow and satellite broadcasting stations have poured out attacks against Tito and the Yugoslav Communists. According to Tito's statement, in March, 1949, alone, the eastern bloc propaganda delivered 240 onslaughts against Yugoslavia. Border incidents (219 cases were listed during July and August, 1949,) have taken place almost daily and many Yugoslav soldiers have been killed. Disorders have been fomented among the minorities in Yugoslavia. Macedonia has become once again a hot spot of the Balkans. This federal republic, which was to serve as a nucleus of unification of all parts of Macedonia (the Yugoslav-Vardar, the Bulgarian-Pirin, and the Greek-Aegean) within the Yugoslav federation, has been turned into a cockpit for anti-Yugoslav separatist activities.

In summer, 1949, the pressure received a new impetus. A number of diplomatic notes, packed with mutual accusations and formulated in abusive language unheard of in diplomatic practices, were exchanged between Russia and the other Cominform countries and Yugoslavia. The Russians and their satellites called their former Yugoslav comrades bandits, satans, criminals, assassins, malicious deserters, agents of imperialism, wild Fascists, Fascist lunatics; the Yugoslavs called their Communist enemies slanderers, liars, imperialists, hirelings, pseudo-Marxists, dictators, double-crossers. Never in history have relations between countries, which at the time still had diplomatic relations, sunk to such shocking vulgarity.

These were only words, but they were accompanied by a
fury of political actions and counter-actions. The Russians accused the Yugoslav government of having arrested thirty-one Soviet citizens, and when the Yugoslavs answered that they were spying under the leadership of a counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade, Moscow threatened repressive measures.

In the international field, Molotov and Vishinsky for two years blocked the negotiations of the Council of Four Foreign Ministers on the peace treaty for Austria. One of the main obstacles was their insistence on territorial concessions by Austria to Yugoslavia. To hit the Yugoslav government hard and further undermine its authority in Communist ranks, the Soviet government dropped its backing of Yugoslav claims from Austria. Once the Yugoslav government proved to be hostile to Russia all previous arguments about territorial changes fell to pieces. The Yugoslavs reacted sharply to this Soviet move and several diplomatic notes full of mean accusations were exchanged on the subject.

With increasing Soviet pressure the resistance of the Yugoslav government stiffened gradually. In April, 1949, Moša Pijade, a member of the Politburo and the chief organizer of the Yugoslav counter-campaign, made it clear that “no resolution [of the Cominform] can have any effect against a people’s state. . . which can be affected only through the use of guns or through being conquered.” In July he accused the Soviet government of having “transformed the right of self-determination of peoples into a thing of barter and Shylockian commerce with the imperialists,” and he hit the Soviet leaders on a spot where they are most sensitive, saying that “They have brought their diplomacy, foreign policy, and methods to the line that existed in Russia before the October Revolution.” In September he went as far as to compare Stalin to Hitler in his policy toward small nations.

One article of Pijade deserves special attention. Writing about the trial of Laszlo Rajk, former Hungarian Foreign Minister accused and sentenced to death in September, 1949, for plotting the overthrow of the Hungarian government in co-operation with Yugoslav Communist leaders and American espionage service, Moša Pijade wrote that the trial reminded the
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world of the Moscow purge in 1936 and was "a penetration into Europe of the dark methods of the Soviet intelligence service." He also recalled the ugly Soviet move when the Soviet government signed a pact with Hitlerite Germany in August, 1939.

When several people were accused by a Bulgarian tribunal of spying for Tito, the Yugoslav newspapers ridiculed the procedure of the court as an illustration of a complete lack of justice and as an illustration of methods of terror.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations in October, 1949, the Yugoslav delegates led their political counter-offensive so far as to propose a resolution to the effect that

...Every state has the duty to refrain from fomenting, organizing, encouraging, or assisting civil wars and disturbances, or acts of terrorism, within the territory of another state, and to prevent the organization within its territory of activities calculated to foment, organize, encourage, or assist civil wars and disturbances or acts of terrorism in other states.

A superficial observer might be caught in how justified all these accusations are. But one is bound to ask, "Who is the accuser?" It is the same Yugoslav government whose members applauded Moscow trials, who considered the pact between Hitler and Stalin as an act of high statesmanship, who used and are using the dark methods of intelligence service, who gave help to Italian Communists, who sent money to the French Communists, who had spies in Czechoslovakia, who have no respect for basic rules of justice before their own tribunals, who assisted considerably the civil war and acts of terrorism in Greece. For years the democratic politicians and the western democratic press have criticized the Communist countries for the policy and methods they use, and the Yugoslav Communist leaders and press branded them as capitalists, liars, imperialists, and warmongers. Now when the Yugoslav government has become victim of these ruthless methods of Communist policy, it joins the western democracies, even surpassing their accusations. This is moral insanity.
In August, 1949, the situation seemed to be packed with dynamite which might explode any minute. The Soviets concentrated troops on the borders of Yugoslavia; high military officials of the Cominform countries met ostentatiously in Sofia; appeals were repeated to the Yugoslav nation to revolt; Yugoslavia was officially denounced as an enemy of the USSR, which it was said "will be forced to more effective measures necessary to defend the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia and call to order the violators." A Russian monitor passed provocatively through the Yugoslav part of the Danube ignoring rules of navigation.

Tito made it clear that no pressure would compel him to retreat. Speaking in the Macedonian capital, Skoplje, he appealed indirectly to the Bulgarian and Albanian nations to rise against the Communist governments, expressing the opinion that "eventually the time will come when the Bulgarian people, overcoming these low and impudent slanderers, will be able to extend their brotherly hand to us, and we will help them remove everything which individuals today have placed as obstacles to the creation and preservation of fraternal relations. The situation today is the same with Albania."

Speaking to officers of the Yugoslav Army guarding the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, Tito warned the Russians that no pressure can frighten the Yugoslav Communists as "we are not men to be frightened by such things. We can only be afraid of such things as elemental upheavals, droughts, hail, etc."

In October he answered the impending threats of war by a statement that "it is better to die honestly in battle, fighting for justice and truth, than to allow yourselves to be trampled upon, than to bend your necks like slaves. . . ."

Another wave of pressure came at the end of September, 1949, when the Russians and all the satellites abrogated their treaties of alliance with Yugoslavia, signed in the period of 1944 and 1947 for twenty years. This was only a formal confirmation of conditions which had existed ever since the Cominform declaration, namely, that the pacts were nothing but a scrap of paper.

At this point, one cannot abstain from quoting from a speech which Marshal Tito made in March, 1947:
Western reaction slanders with incredible persistence the Soviet Union as if it influenced [the policy of] small nations in eastern Europe and among them also Yugoslavia. It slanders Yugoslavia as an ordinary satellite. Yugoslavia, however, and some other eastern countries march together with the Soviet Union just because they know that it does not threaten their independence. Yugoslavia has gone along with the Soviet Union since the war also just because she is deeply convinced that it is only the Soviet Union which understands her suffering and sacrifices brought on by the great struggle for liberation. We and other small countries of eastern Europe march together with the Soviet Union just because we are convinced that out of all the big and small allies, only the Soviet Union sincerely and persistently fights for the strengthening of peace in the world.

Under the grave dangers to which the Yugoslav government was exposed, its delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1949 voted for the first time against some of the Soviet proposals and was elected, backed by the United States but not by Great Britain, to the Security Council against the Soviet candidate, Czechoslovakia. Thus the events which started as an inter-Communist quarrel have been brought to a point where they are an international problem of great magnitude and unforeseeable dangers. This is exactly what Tito wanted, once the conflict couldn’t be settled within the family of Communist countries.

The year of 1950 brought new developments in the international position of Yugoslavia: the Soviet bloc intensified its attacks against the government of Marshal Tito; the latter re-formulated its foreign policy, but reaffirmed its adherence to communism; the United States increased its support to Yugoslavia.

The economic blockade was intensified by depriving Yugoslavia of international use of the Danube river, which following the Danube Convention of August, 1948, fell under the domination of the Communist countries.

Political attacks, subversive activities, and military threats continued. As Foreign Minister Kardelj stated before the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1950, the Yugoslav
diplomatic representatives in eastern European countries have been persecuted; Yugoslav minorities are being displaced; Rumania has severed all rail and postal traffic with Yugoslavia; trenches are being dug along the borders; troop movements are taking place; measures of mobilization are being taken. The Communist governments have broken forty-seven treaties concluded with Yugoslavia. In the course of two years 896 frontier incidents have taken place; 6,732 anti-Yugoslav broadcasts have been beamed from the eastern European countries to Yugoslavia in the first six months of 1950.

The concept of the Yugoslav foreign policy underwent a material change. The Yugoslav Communist leaders made a virtue out of necessity and embarked upon a policy of defending the cause of peace and the rights of small nations. They couched in friendly words their relations with Greece, Italy, and Austria, and were inevitably led to a rapprochement with the western powers, particularly with the United States. They announced the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Athens and promised to return the Greek children to their homes.

On the other side, the Yugoslav Ambassadors in the Communist countries were withdrawn and the Legation in Albania closed. In the United Nations the Soviet policy was increasingly attacked. But otherwise Tito avoided having to compromise his Communist beliefs.

The Yugoslav government recognized the Communist regime in China and exchanged letters of recognition with the Indo-Chinese Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh. It continued to fight for the unseating of the Chinese Nationalists in the Security Council. It voted in the Security Council against the draft resolution submitted by the United States and appealing to all nations to render assistance to the victim of the Communist aggression in Korea, though Marshal Tito later condemned the Communist action in Korea.

On September 25, 1950, Kardelj reaffirmed the new Yugoslav foreign policy before the United Nations General Assembly:

Responsible Yugoslav representatives have stated time and again, and I am stating it once more on behalf of the government I represent, that Yugoslavia belongs to no blocs, that she has not concluded any public or secret military
alliances with any country, that no foreign power possesses, either directly or indirectly, military bases on Yugoslav territory, and that no foreign power participates in any form in determining Yugoslav defense policy.

Further, neither the peoples of Yugoslavia nor their government nurture any aggressive intentions with regard to any neighboring country and do not in any way menace the latters’ peace and independence.

I am besides authorized to state here on behalf of the Yugoslav government the following:

The peoples of Yugoslavia have defended in the past, and will defend in the future, the independence and integrity of their country against all aggressions and against all attempts to endanger their right to be masters in their own house. The peoples of Yugoslavia, however, do not want to take part in any aggressive war and wish to live in lasting peace and peaceful cooperation with all nations and especially with their neighbors. In accordance with this consistent peace-loving attitude the government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia declares that it is ready to conclude an agreement on lasting peace and non-aggression with each neighboring country.

This declaration of policy certainly represents a great advance since the days when the same Yugoslav government of Marshal Tito directly supported the Greek Communist guerrillas and assisted the Italian Communists in their revolutionary activities against the legitimate government in Rome.

The United States government followed a policy of giving economic help to Yugoslavia to make Tito’s opposition against the Soviet pressure possible. According to the declaration of the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George V. Allen, the United States policy toward Yugoslavia was based on strict non-interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. No political conditions were attached to the credits already extended to Yugoslavia and no such conditions are attached to the credits now under consideration.5

By fall, 1950, the Export-Import Bank extended to Yugoslavia three loans, totalling the sum of fifty-five million dollars. The negotiations concerning a loan from the World Bank have not as yet led to positive conclusions.

Weakened by unprecedented drought Yugoslavia asked the United States in the fall of 1950 for aid in food to the amount of 105 million dollars. The American government in November, aware of international dangers which would ensue from denying assistance, extended to Tito through various channels aid in the amount of 33.5 millions, and in December the Congress voted the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act under which Yugoslavia received a grant of food valued at 38 million dollars. According to an agreement signed on January 6, 1951, the Yugoslav government pledged to give full publicity to the American aid and to permit supervision by American authorities of the food distribution which was going to be equitable. Toward the end of January the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) announced its decision to distribute in the most drought-stricken regions of Yugoslavia food worth 35 million dollars.

In political and military matters the Yugoslav government has been able to enlist limited support from the United States. In November, 1949, the State Department announced partial lifting of the ban on shipment of some materials to Yugoslavia, clearing export of gasoline and lubricants for aircrafts. In January, 1950, a decision of the National Security Council was reported, concerning limited military help to be given to Yugoslavia in case of invasion.

Ambassador George V. Allen formulated, before his departure to Yugoslavia, the American policy toward the government of Marshal Tito in generally encouraging terms, "I shall tell Marshal Tito that the United States opposes aggression wherever it takes place. It appears that the spearhead of Soviet aggression is directed at Yugoslavia as to anywhere else."

As a result of this policy, Tito has been able so far to withstand Soviet pressure. He also spoke in more friendly terms about his non-Communist neighbors. He opened the Yugoslav airfields to American aircraft, according to an agreement signed in December, 1949. In the spring of 1950 he agreed to solve the painful problem of "dual nationality," which embittered

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7Ibid, January 14, 1950.
American-Yugoslav relations when he had refused to give exit visas to American citizens of Yugoslav origin.

In November, 1950, Tito publicly praised the United States policy toward Yugoslavia, stressing the fact that no strings have been attached to the American assistance. He also promised to follow the United Nations stand against any aggressor.

This reorientation of the Yugoslav foreign policy and the concrete concessions Marshal Tito has made are not without considerable importance, but in the basic aspects and concepts of the Communist dictatorship, Tito has firmly remained faithful to his Communist creed and practice.

Marshal Tito has not relieved the democratic world from anxiety and suspicion, which it must have toward dictatorship of any kind. These feelings were expressed in a leading article, published in the New York Times on December 26, 1949, on the occasion of signing of the pact concerning the landing of American aircraft in Yugoslavia. “It would be, of course, a mistake to construe this pact as an act of endorsement of Tito’s dictatorship. . . . But Marshal Tito will have to understand, if he wishes ever to be included among such friends, that friendship is a two-way proposition. We will deal with him if he makes and keeps mutually advantageous promises. But on the basis of experience we will be wary of him so long as he calls himself a Communist and behaves like a dictator.”

And Communist he is and dictator he remains.

For months the Yugoslav Communists declared that nobody had the right to eject them from the family of people’s democracies. In December, 1948, Kardelj declared in the Yugoslav Parliament that “the United Front of the Socialist and people’s democratic countries headed by the Soviet Union remains unshaken in the struggle against the enemies of peace, against imperialist expansion and against the attacks of the enemies of Socialism.”

The Yugoslav Communists continued to assert that they were faithful Marxists. They joined the Soviet bloc in attacking
the North Atlantic Pact and continued to brand the Marshall Plan as a threat to the independence of European countries.

In March, 1949, the Paris newspaper, *Le Monde*, published an interview with a high Yugoslav official, according to which "Yugoslavia is and remains an integral part of the Socialist bloc and could under no circumstances become a link between the two camps." In April, Marshal Tito reaffirmed that "no intimidation from the West or East can divert us from our principles as determined followers of Marxism-Leninism or from our road to Socialism." On May Day, 1949, the official proclamation attacked "imperialists . . . threatening a new war against the Soviet Union." In June, a statement of the Yugoslav Communist party reassured "that Yugoslavia would remain faithful to the Soviet Union despite all that had taken place, because the Soviet Union represented the main strength of the international workers' democratic movements." Then on October 3, 1949, Tito declared that "it is better to die honestly in battle . . . than to see the great principles of Marxism and Leninism being destroyed without resistance."

Returning to the United States from Yugoslavia, the American Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, declared the conflict between Stalin and Tito to be "just as genuine as it could be," but characterized Tito's regime as "just as communistic as before. Tito has not turned toward the West in a doctrinal sense. . . . Make no mistake about that."

In spite of the increasing dependence upon the United States, and regardless of increasing threats by Communist Russia, the government of Marshal Tito made no ideological concessions to democracy, but continued its Communist policy.

In November, 1949, Minister Djilas declared to the French Press Agency, AFP, "Yugoslavia is a Socialist country and considers herself under obligation to lend moral support to every workers' democratic and peace-loving movement standing for the principles of the equality of states and peoples, the equality of workers' and democratic movements."

The Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Popović, was tactless enough to publish in the official periodical
of the Yugoslav Communist party, *Komunist*, an article in which he accused the United States of imperialism.

In the parliamentary election in March, 1950, the main emphasis was put on the Communist program of the government, and Marshal Tito made it clear that no opposition would be tolerated. "Two programs cannot exist in our country. . . . Revolution is a brutal thing . . . if something should hamper us on this road [of revolution] it must be vanquished and eliminated," declared Tito in February, 1950.

Milovan Djilas went further in an election speech in March, 1950, "Our Socialist regime is so contrary to the western capitalist world that its very nature does not permit us to agree to anything, nor expect anything, other than the trade relations which are common to capitalism. Therefore it is clear that we cannot make any political or economic concessions to the western capitalist world because of trade relations or because of this or that temporary need, because that would mean returning to capitalism, and we have passed a just sentence on capitalism."

Tito does stand for communism and he continues to practice it in Yugoslavia. He can not do otherwise. The only force which supports Tito's regime is the Yugoslav Communist party. Tito is not only its leader, but its prisoner as well. He receives its backing in his life-and-death struggle, as long as he sticks to communism. He would probably lose it the moment he would compromise his Communist belief and policy.

There is a general tendency to applaud and even to admire Tito's audacious stand, and many people are inclined to overlook things for which they judged him severely only recently. They forget that Tito is a Communist with the Communist ways of thinking, with the Communist methods in politics.

However, the international and possibly also the ideological implications of Tito's heresy have proved to be of such far-reaching significance that it appears to be, as it is officially called, a well-calculated risk to feed the break which is bound to weaken the position of Soviet Russia.

In the international field, Soviet Russia has lost its most
fidelous ally; in the military field, its most important strategic outpost in the whole area of eastern Europe; in the economic field very precious metals.

Ideological consequences of the conflict may prove to be, in the long run, of an even graver nature. The conflict has opened a new problem for the Communist movement. Before the war the Communist movement was limited to inter-Communist relations between an all-powerful Bolshevik center in Moscow and the rather powerless Communist parties in other countries. Since the war, this has changed into relations between the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and the would-be statesmen of other Communist countries.

Minister Djilas foresaw this problem. When I met him in March, 1948, after the Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia, he spoke with enthusiasm about this event. "Victory of socialism in Czechoslovakia is of special importance for the West. Liberal theoreticians and politicians like to say that socialism is not good for the West which is economically more advanced than we are. It is a fact that Russia did not pass through the period of liberalism but jumped from feudalism straight to socialism. Her peasant population is far more backward than ours. We, in Yugoslavia, have a very intelligent peasant class but our industry is still undeveloped. The Poles have considerable industry but their peasants are reactionaries. As to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the West has always regarded these countries as a negligible quantity which cannot have any influence on European developments.

"But Czechoslovakia is a country which has always attracted the attention of the West. You have a long tradition of freedom, you have had old contacts with the West and you have a highly developed industry. Socialism is now being introduced in Czechoslovakia and all these arguments about 'socialism in primitive countries' cannot hold. The change of government in your country is of historical significance. The West will see that socialism can best flourish in a country with a high industrial potential. Success in the economic field in Czechoslovakia will exert great influence in all western countries and it will help the working classes of Italy and France in their struggle." (Now, much later, Czechoslovak economic
life, continuing to disintegrate under Communist rule, has proved how wrong Djilas was.)

Then, Djilas advanced another interesting idea, "The top leaders of the Communist parties are now studying the principles which should govern the mutual relations of people's democracies. Personally, I am of the opinion that a period is forthcoming, and it may last several decades, when the individual Socialist states will develop independently but closely linked together. They will form a bouquet of Socialist flowers bound by common ideals but of different scents because of their different tradition, culture, economic standards, and ways and means of solving their political and economic problems. Lenin's theory dealt with the question of how to materialize socialism by different approaches, but as in his time there was no other Communist state besides the Soviet Union, he did not envisage the problem of what the relations should be among countries which have established communism already. This is a new idea which I am studying now."

Three months after Djilas had spoken about the bouquet of Socialist flowers, the Yugoslav blossom was thrown away as a treacherous weed.

The problem of relations among Communist countries was brought into the open. The uniformity of thinking which has been so essential for the totalitarian Communist policy is in danger and may be slowly but systematically affected by the bad example of Tito's schism. The politburo of Moscow is faced with a very complicated problem, the solution of which might bring a deep rift in the Politburo itself. The loss of prestige which would be involved in any concession is almost fatal to a dictatorial regime. But a new structure of Communist hierarchy cannot be reached without concessions from Moscow.

One is tempted to make an historical parallel. In the fourteenth century John Wycliffe of England and Jan Hus of Bohemia led a reform movement against the Pope. It was later followed by Martin Luther of Germany. The consequences are known: an ecclesiastic schism and the foundation of the Protestant church.

One cannot carry the analogy far. The dispute between
Rome and the Reformation preachers was of a spiritual character and about high moral values. The Stalin-Tito dispute is nothing but a ruthless struggle between two dictators about a materialistic issue. But technically, the present dispute is analogous to the Reformation in the sense that here, as well, a local leader, though respecting the same ideals based on the same books of teaching and claiming the same aims, has been driven to elaborate his own interpretation of the ideology. He is in opposition to the highest and officially infallible central authority, thus taking away the universality of their common creed.

I consider the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade as one of the gravest mistakes the Kremlin has committed since the end of the war. Whatever solution the Kremlin finds to solve the Yugoslav Communist problem, the rift itself must inevitably weaken the structure on which the strength of the Communist movement was built.

There has been a lot of speculation about the development of Titoism, as Tito's heresy is called, in other Communist countries. In November, 1948, two of the closest associates of the Albanian Prime Minister, Enver Hoxha, were arrested and later executed: General Koci Xoxe and Pandi Christo. Both were accused of being agents of Yugoslavia. In Poland, Wladyslaw Gomulka, General Secretary of the Polish Communist party, and once the most powerful and talented figure among the Polish Communists, was deprived of his functions for siding with Tito. He repented publicly, but was never returned to his former position.

In February, 1949, the Greek guerrilla Communist leader, General Markos Vafiades, was deprived of command, officially for reasons of bad health, but allegedly for sympathies for Tito. His fate is unknown. In Bulgaria, the Deputy Prime Minister, Traicho Kostov, one of the most influential figures of the Politburo, was arrested in April, 1949, condemned, and later hanged. The reason: national deviation and adherence to a policy hostile to Russia. But in this case, Tito denounced Kostov as an agent of capitalism.
The crucial struggle

In September, 1949, Laszlo Rajk, the former Hungarian Foreign Minister and a member of the Politburo, was sentenced to death for association with the Yugoslav Communist leaders. Tito emphatically denied the charge. In the Soviet section of Berlin a "Free Communist party" under Karl Heinz Scholz was founded in August, 1949.

There have been other reports about Titoism appearing here and there, and the arrests that followed. It is of interest that no prominent cases of leanings toward Tito have been so far officially announced from the Communist parties in western countries. The local revolt of the two Italian Deputies, Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi, which developed in February, 1951, has not affected as yet the leadership of the Italian Communist party, and its significance cannot be evaluated at the moment of writing.

Tito himself counts on further progress in this direction and already can see himself as a founder of a new national, but internationally spread movement of Communist parties, based on the principles of equality. Should this occur, it might prove to be even more dangerous to democracy than Stalin's communism.

It might be more attractive to uninformed masses than the international communism which, especially in the western countries, has been considerably compromised by a fifth-columnist subservience to Moscow and Russian imperialism. It would be a no less brutal dictatorship, with the same communization of industry and land, abolition of private property, and eradication of basic moral and human values of mankind. In the long run, experience may show that the applause which Tito enjoys today will be turned into deep sorrow.

It seems to me, though, that the possibilities or hopes of Titoism in the satellite countries are remote. Too much importance is being attached to symptoms of Titoism as manifested by the liquidation of some prominent Communists behind the Iron Curtain. Their indictments may have been based on false accusations. Before the war, one was used to seeing old leaders of Communist parties liquidated, for Trotskyism, factionary tendencies, deviation, etc., and new leaders appeared only to be liquidated later also. The world did not, however,
attach any special importance to these violent changes. The Communist parties were in opposition in their countries and changes of leadership passed almost unnoticed. It is bound to create more attention if and when a Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of a Communist country is liquidated.

It is evident, however, that Moscow is aware of this danger, for Stalin follows a systematic policy of securing all key positions in the satellite countries for leaders who were thoroughly trained in Moscow and have never shown any signs of independent thinking. One can assume that the Soviet Politburo was taught an important lesson by Tito’s heresy.

There is another reason why I am not inclined to expect Titoism to occur in a measure which would threaten the ruling circles of the Communist parties. In the satellite countries conditions do not seem to exist for a move such as was possible in Yugoslavia. As described before, Tito’s Communists and Tito himself were and are fighters; other Communist leaders in eastern Europe are hotbed functionaries who were artificially cultivated in Moscow during the war, and then, with the bayonets of the Red Army, transplanted into their respective countries. They do not have either the background or the courage of Tito.

As to Yugoslavia, there is no way back on either side. Tito cannot return to Moscow and Moscow cannot withdraw the pressure. Tito will continue in his stand against the Cominform and fight for it if attacked. Internationally the significance of this position, as it appeared to be at the beginning of 1951, was well expressed by a complete reversal of language used by Tito: he now calls Americans friends and the Soviets imperialists. He is undoubtedly sincere as to the latter part of this terminology. Militarily, his army of three-quarters of a million soldiers has taken its place in the calculations of the defensive potential of the western powers. In the words of President Truman contained in his message to Congress asking for emergency aid to Yugoslavia, on November 29, 1950, “The continued existence of Yugoslavia is of great importance to the security of the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic organization, and to all nations associated with them in their common defense against the threat of Soviet aggression.”
For the first time since the break, a member of the Yugoslav government and Politburo, Milovan Djilas, paid an official visit to a western country. He spent ten days in London, in February, 1951. And the United States Assistant Secretary of State, George W. Perkins, went on an official trip to Belgrade, in February, following reported consultations in Washington concerning coordination of the defense of the Balkan countries, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, against possible Communist attack.

According to Tito's estimate presented to the Yugoslav Parliament on December 28, 1950, the Yugoslav Army was facing a combined force of 660,000 soldiers from Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria equipped, trained, and complemented by the Soviet Army. Their threat to Yugoslavia has been increasingly alarming.

Should Yugoslavia be attacked directly there is no doubt that her army would put up a valiant resistance, after initial withdrawal from the undefendable borderland plains. Should an all-out European and world war follow this attack, the Communist Tito would become an ally of the West, contributing to the defense of western heritage and culture.

But the unforeseen may happen: Should the Soviets attack western Europe they may choose to bypass and isolate Yugoslavia to spare their forces, for the time being, the necessity of fighting thirty to forty divisions. In such a case they would make it more difficult for Tito to make up his mind to associate himself with the "western reactionaries against the progressive forces of communism." He would undoubtedly obtain support from the party and his Communist officers in case of an invasion of Yugoslavia. But it might not be so easy for him to get backing for an attack against the Russian armies if they were not an immediate threat to his country. So far Tito has promised to abide by the decisions of the United Nations against any aggression. Experience has shown, however, that the word aggression can be subjected to various interpretations.

The crucial question now is whether, with the mounting pressure from the East which increases Tito's need of help.
from the West, he can be induced, in the long run, to ease the plight—political and economic—of the Yugoslav nation.

The Communists in Yugoslavia say that Marshal Tito and his government are more popular among the Yugoslav people than ever before. I wonder if this is true. Undoubtedly, many party men are delighted to see the proud stand of Tito against the Soviet giant; others are impressed. There are certainly people who in their souls were ashamed to serve Tito's regime but, once compromised, there was no possibility of withdrawing their support to his government and they had to declare themselves publicly as his adherents. They are numerous, and they are not party members. Their conscience may be relieved by the self-deception that Tito has proved to be a good Yugoslav.

But what of the broad masses of the Yugoslav nation? This Tito-Stalin conflict has not brought any improvement in their daily lives. They are watched as before, with this difference, that now also Communist comrades are subjected to control. They do not enjoy more freedom or have more food than before the conflict. They have to continue in their "voluntary" work. They are well aware that their life won't be better until Communist rule, of whatever shape, is entirely eradicated.

The Yugoslav people will have to continue their suffering and struggle. This heroic, and unfortunate, nation has been fighting for its independence for centuries. But the high reward of real liberty has always escaped them. It seems to be the fate of this part of the world that because of the short-sightedness and selfishness of democratic leaders, and because of the lack of understanding from abroad, the privileges of democracy, freedom, and progress cannot come to Yugoslavia for some time to come.

"Do not worry," people used to tell me, "we have so far always succeeded in dealing with tyrants. We have survived many bad governments. Tito will go, one day, as well."

But patriots who had thought deeply about their country's history and its experience in modern times used to add: "Tito will go, but who will come instead? It is difficult for us, as good democrats, to imagine a government in Yugoslavia against which we would not be in opposition."
This sounds like a sad joke. But people who understand the problems of Yugoslav politics and have the fate of its people sincerely at heart will sense its tragic appeal. They will also be aware that peace in the Balkans and in Europe depends, to a considerable extent, upon a strong, united, and democratic Yugoslavia.
POSTSCRIPT

While adding the last touches to my manuscript I felt that it would be of use and importance to compare some of the judgments and conclusions contained herein with those of a person who read the first draft of this manuscript and who has had a very good knowledge of present conditions in Yugoslavia. He has been a student of international affairs of long and high standing. He has spent many years in the Soviet Union, the Balkans, and Central Europe.

I asked him whether, after his recent research in Yugoslavia, he thought my own opinions still valid, and I asked him several questions covering Yugoslav politics and economics. He answered, "You do not need to make any substantial change in the manuscript," and then continued:

"There is practically no change in the police and political methods of Tito's government. Hence, there is no change in
the political life of Yugoslav citizens. One aspect, however, is of importance: I have noticed that there is a little more 'freedom' in the air. You can't define it but you feel it. I have put the word freedom in quotes because the beautiful word is too big to be applied to that weak and very precarious wind which has been refreshing slightly the atmosphere in Belgrade during the last few months.

"But it is a fact that people are less afraid to speak with a foreigner. When I was in Belgrade, some of my old acquaintances greeted me on the streets and even had the courage to come and see me in my office. During my previous visits, they had done everything to avoid meeting me.

"In general I would say this: People are now allowed and even ordered to curse Russia just as loudly as they curse America; Russia, of course, can be criticized only in the sense that she betrayed communism—communism which only in Yugoslavia is good and authentic. Within these limits criticism is allowed; but already that means much for our good old friends in Belgrade who just love discussions, and now, after all, they are allowed to speak loudly on politics. Communists themselves are most active and ambitious in this respect. They have to defend themselves against the 'slander' of the Cominform, and that means they have to convince the people and bring up arguments, or in other words—to discuss. Discussions are going on all the time everywhere. The theory of Marxism, Leninism à la Tito—these are the themes being elaborated and discussed. All this is somehow better than the previous terrifying silence. But you understand that this is still far away from our freedom.

"Another point is the disappearance of pictures of Stalin. The Soviet idolatry is being mocked. But the consequence is that, to some extent, the portraits of Tito have to be taken away also.

"You asked me whether there is any opposition within the Communist party, and what I had heard concerning the democratic opposition. If there are any anti-Titoists left after a long and hard anti-Cominform-purge, they are thoroughly hidden and silent. According to some sources of information, they follow orders from Moscow to stay for the time being in deep
illegality [Communist terminology for inactively underground]. As to the other part of your question, I must state that I have not heard a single word about activity among the democratic opposition. I didn’t hear anything of remarkable interest about the Orthodox church. I would say, in general, that it does not help the regime, but neither does it seem to cause trouble.

“The economic situation is worse than ever before. The contacts with the West are developing well and offer a small hope for improvement at a later period. The Yugoslav peasants apparently follow a policy of passive resistance. This is how I explain, for instance, the almost unexplainable fact that the Belgrade people have not had meat for months. They have to pay enormous prices for commodities on the free market. Perhaps people have better clothes and shoes than a year ago, but they eat less and worse. . . . To put it briefly, politically and economically it is still the same communism and in many aspects worse and even more inhumane than the Soviet one.

“I don’t think, therefore, that Tito is more popular than before the break with Stalin. There may be people who have been impressed by Tito’s opposition to Moscow, but in general they have no illusions about the continued hardness of the regime. I hope I don’t need to tell you in detail about the last election which was nothing else than another totalitarian election.

“People are, of course, following with greatest interest the American policy toward Tito. If they [non-Communists] agree with it, then it is only because they hope that the Americans will, in the long run, compel Tito to give up something of his communism. I did not notice, at least not to the extent that I did elsewhere [behind the Iron Curtain], that the Yugoslavs see in a new war the only hope to change the regime.

“You asked me also about the future. In case of an attack upon Yugoslavia [by Russia], Tito’s government will definitely defend itself. The abyss between Tito and Moscow has become too deep to take their ideological affinity into consideration. Tito has gone so far in his struggle against Stalinist ‘revisionism’ [of Marxist-Leninist theory] that Kardelj, for instance, now speaks explicitly about Soviet imperialism, a thing which he, until recently, has been anxiously avoiding in view of the
orthodox Marxist definition of imperialism. Up till now they [the Yugoslav Communists] have been admitting that the U.S.S.R. is all the same a Socialist country. But recently they have begun to criticize even the Soviet Constitution as non-Socialist—though their own is nothing but a copy—and the Soviet social system as state-capitalistic. I consider this very significant. By this the last ties are being severed, and there remains no reason for acting towards the Soviet Union other than as towards an enemy. I therefore consider it as certain that the Yugoslavs would defend themselves against a Soviet or satellite invasion.

"It would be quite another thing to determine what Tito's government would do should the Soviets attack Germany or Austria. I think it will try, as long as possible, to remain neutral or at least not to intervene militarily. But as such an attack against Germany or Austria would lead to a European and world war, Yugoslavia would be inevitably dragged in—on the side of the West, I think."
Text of the agreement (and of two annexes) between Marshal Tito and I. Šubašić, Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav government in exile, signed on December 7, 1944.

A. THE AGREEMENT:

In compliance with the principle of the continuity of the Yugoslav state from the point of view of international law, and the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations, demonstrated by their four years' struggle for a new, independent, and federal state, built up on the principles of democracy, we desire and make every effort for the people's will to be respected at every step and by everybody, both with regard to the internal organization of the state and to the form of government, and therefore intend to comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government proper to all truly democratic states.
Yugoslavia being acknowledged among the United Nations in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall continue to represent our country abroad, and in all acts pertaining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time when our state, the democratic federative Yugoslavia of the future, assumes by a free decision of the people, the definitive form of its government.

In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in the country, we have agreed that King Peter II shall not return to the country until the people have pronounced their decision in this respect, and that in his absence the royal power shall be wielded by a Regency Council.

The Regency Council will be appointed by a constitutional act of the King, on the proposal of the Royal government, and in agreement with the President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav government, Ivan Šubašić. The Regency Council take their oath to the King, while the government take their oath to the people.

The President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav government, I. Šubašić, with the full concurrence of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, agree that the government be formed as follows:—

President (Prime Minister); Vice-President; Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, National Defense, Justice, Education, Finance, Trade and Industry, Communications, Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, Forests, Mines, Agriculture, Social Welfare, National Health, Public Works, Reconstruction, Food, and Information; Minister for Settlement of Populations; Minister for the Constituent Assembly; and Ministers of State for Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i.e., until the final constitutional organizations of the state will be established. The new government will publish a declaration proclaiming the fundamental principles of the democratic liberties
and guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and association, will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and, in the same way, the right of property and private initiative. The sovereignty of the national individualities within the state and their equal rights will be respected and safeguarded, as decided at the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia. Any predominance of one nation over another will be excluded.

B. ANNEX 1:

1. Elections for the Constituent Assembly will be decided upon within three months of the liberation of the whole country. The elections will be held in accordance with the law on elections for the Constituent Assembly, which will be enacted in good time. This law will guarantee complete freedom of elections, freedom of assembly and speech, liberty of the press, franchise for all and a secret ballot, as well as the right of independent or united political parties, corporations, groups, and individuals—who have not collaborated with the enemy—to present lists of candidates for the election. All those whose collaboration with the enemy will have been proved will be deprived of both the right to elect and to be elected.

2. The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia will wield the legislative power until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

3. The government will be responsible for the organization of the executive power.

4. One of the first and foremost tasks of the new government will be to organize the judiciary power in the country in a democratic spirit. The courts of justice will be independent in their proceedings and the judges will decide according to the law and their conscience.

C. ANNEX 2:

1. His Majesty King Peter II can dispose of his estates and property in the country during his absence. The superintendence of the Royal Estates will for that period be under the supervision of the Regency Council.
2. Regular intercourse between his Majesty the King and the Regency Council will be established and guaranteed.

3. In case of disability, ill-health, death or resignation of one of the Regents, his Majesty the King will, on the proposal of the government, appoint another Regent in his place.

NOTE: This translation of the agreement appeared in the London Times, January 24, 1945.

APPENDIX 2

The Letter of Milan Grol to Marshal Tito
(Translation from Serbian)
To the Office of the Prime Minister, Marshal Josip Broz Tito:
Mr. Prime Minister:

When exchanging opinions with you and with your closest associates in the government and in the presidium of AVNOJ, I brought to your attention several times the fact that the government followed an exclusive [Communist] party program which was not in harmony with the assurances given me in our first exchange of ideas on the occasion of my entrance into the government and reaffirmed later. During all these discussions, regardless of the interests and ideas of the [Democratic] party which I represent, I stressed my view that these exclusive tendencies were out of place for they made more difficult the solution of our internal, political, and economic problems and
the consolidation of the hard-hit [by the war] country—a question, grave within itself, which for me today still remains the decisive one.

The question, which has appeared to be one of dispute and which has remained so, concerns the national authorities who, in the first place, were not elected by the nation in a normal [democratic] way, who were then deliberately changed, who did not proceed according to the law, and who were not competent, yet whose political position remained exclusive. The same applies to the question of justice. The serious difficulties experienced in the general administrative and economic order and in other public affairs have confirmed as justified the complaints against this state of affairs. To pacify aroused feelings and to calm the country, a just and effective amnesty would have served.

After the end of the military operations these questions and questions of political freedom would have been first in order. I discussed them with you when we exchanged ideas, Mr. Prime Minister, a month ago and then I repeated them in writing, formulating my opinion as to the only possible way to organize and to give a definite basis to the new situation [as created by the war].

There are three tasks emanating from the situation in which the country finds itself today, from the Tito-Šubašić agreements, from the Crimean Conference, and from the Declaration of the [Yugoslav] government of March:

1. The establishment of a provisional Parliament by enlarging AVNOJ with former members of the Parliament and political groups for the purpose of widening the political basis of public life.

2. The promulgation by this provisional Parliament of political laws which secure the freedom of the press or association, and the right to hold public meetings and to organize political parties—in general a free exchange of thought in the period preceding the election, and a free electoral law.

3. In the spirit of these laws concerning political freedoms, it is absolutely necessary to create a situation which would guarantee a just application of these laws, an atmosphere of freedom, patience, calm, mutual trust, and order without the
exceptional Draconian measures applied in the preceding war period, without the exclusive [Communist] party power derived from revolutionary times. To create such a situation in the period preceding the election presupposes the establishment of national authorities which would be freely elected by the nation; the establishment of a qualified and impartial justice which has, like the national committees, an important role to play in the preparation of the election; the establishment of a regular civil police, and the realization of far-reaching amnesty. One cannot imagine an election in the situation which exists today.

These three points, the enlargement of AVNOJ, the political laws, and the establishment of freedom, are closely interrelated and cannot be solved one without the other. An agreement about the enlargement of AVNOJ presupposes an agreement as to what AVNOJ should declare as law. It would have been necessary to reach an agreement upon the content of these laws and upon the general conditions under which these laws would be applied in the pre-election and election periods. In order to reach this agreement it would have been necessary to agree upon the ways and the aims to follow. I repeated all along and also repeat today that an agreement between the progressive political parties was and is still possible if the leading Communist party desires such an agreement. This would be proved if it [the Communist party] decided to put limits to its program and to share its power with the other political parties which today only have a share in the responsibility [of the government]. Without such broad agreement on the program there is no real solution. The difficulties which are growing into dangerous dimensions prove this today only too clearly.

All the statements of my position have remained unanswered. During the past one and a half months there has been no conclusive personal exchange of opinion between you and me, nor has there been any meeting of the government before which I would have been able to raise these questions.

At one time I was given some hope of reaching an agreement when the Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj declared himself to be of the opinion that before AVNOJ could make a decision it would be necessary to reach an agreement upon a pro-
gram, and, when he pledged several weeks ago that there would be a meeting of the government "in a couple of days."

Instead of this, after a pause of three months, the meeting of the government was arranged for the last week preceding the convening of AVNOJ and a few days before this, members of the government received a great number of proposed bills: the electoral law, the law of electoral lists, the law concerning the punishment of crimes against the state, the law about the Constitutional Assembly, about citizenship, about the press, public gatherings, and freedom of association.

All these important drafts, which are of decisive importance for solving present-day problems, have been worked out without a wider agreement of principle, and suddenly, at the last minute, presented to the Council of Ministers on the eve of the session of AVNOJ, the transformation of which into a provisional Parliament has not been agreed upon.

In this kind of work one can see a very expedient appraisal of the basic political questions and a very technical execution of the policy as if this policy had proved to be good and one of integrity which excludes any difference of opinion. In one way or another these laws limit or destroy the rights of the citizens; they are a denial of the agreement establishing a definite form of government and are a negation of the basic principles upon which they are supposedly based. For instance the expression "the sources of struggle for liberation" or the expression "national authorities" carries a connotation of a deliberately exclusive one-party program. The role of the Constituent Assembly, a supposedly sovereign body, is limited to an institution which merely takes note of actions already completed and interpreted as the sources of the struggle for liberation. This opinion has been repeated by leading [Communist] persons, defended even before the Committee of Ministers when the law about the Constituent Assembly was being discussed. The exclusive opinion that the second session of AVNOJ at Jajce was an expression of national sovereignty proves to be fatal although no progressive group has been against accepting its decisions as the basis for discussion.

The law about the electoral lists, although revised and made milder in the Committee of Ministers, can deny political rights
to many thousands of people who were pardoned from the mistakes committed during the four years of occupation, those turbulent and chaotic times. The sword hanging over the head of those accused for political reasons or those whose position is in doubt is in the hands of the electoral commissions and national committees which, not having been regularly elected and with the state of affairs as it is today, do not give a guarantee of impartial work.

This exclusive [one-party] opinion has inspired all drafts and it reveals a tendency to achieve through such technical means that which couldn’t be secured by agreement. The exclusive rule of “national authorities” who were not elected by the nation has to receive tacitly the sanction of political laws which are being applied by the same national authorities, political laws which should have been enacted in the same spirit and way in which a [truly] national government is achieved. However, the newspaper of the Communist party incites the members of the [National] Front to take the lead in making out the electoral lists.

There is a general tendency to accuse people, to threaten them and to put their position in doubt, to question their basic citizen’s rights, and this tendency was illustrated by the draft concerning the punishment of crimes against the state, and it also appeared in the law regarding citizenship. The first law [of those mentioned] is nothing but a re-written project about “punishments for crimes against the national authorities” which, after protests from the legislative Committee, was withdrawn six weeks ago. Purged from the drastic formulations of the first project but still written by the same author, it has retained the same ideas. Upon entering a new political era, which should be an era of consolidation and calm, this law makes provisions for continued persecution as a weapon for securing order and it undermines the hope that this order can be secured by the agreement and endeavors of progressive groups and thoughts.

It is being stressed at public meetings of the [National] Front and in the press that the essential task of today is “to purge” and “to complete the work of destroying fascism.” A deliberate accusation of fascism of everyone who, in the last
chaotic and disorderly years, did not find himself on the liberation front [of the Partisans] in the country itself, or in the concentration camps, or in exile, threatens thousands of people among whom are not only those who are actually responsible for bloodshed, but also masses of innocent people. Continuing with an uninterrupted incrimination of [people's] behavior during the period of occupation, that law sets up a basis not only for the perpetual trials of delinquents, but also for continuous error, prejudice, and the eruption of national sentiments in a terrible period.

This law had been distributed to the members of the Legislative Committee already by the end of July before the drafts, which were distributed last, concerning the press, freedom of association, of assembly, and of organization of political parties. The law about the press proclaims formally in its first article the freedom to be given to the press. Meanwhile, however, there can't be any guarantee of that freedom if the technical conditions and judgment about what can and what cannot be discussed continue to depend only upon a one-party policy. As far as the drafts regarding free association, political parties, and assembly are concerned these are being presented on the eve of the very announcement of the date of the election, and include all the conditions regarding the thousands of [necessary] signatures and affidavits without giving means of information to the other parties (in spite of their many years of existence). Without giving citizens the right to move freely from one place to another such a law obviously follows the aim to make parties impossible, or to limit them to the narrowest local organization without the opportunity to influence the development of thinking in the entire country.

Political laws which do not guarantee a free exchange of thoughts do not lead to a free election for the Constituent Assembly, nor do they build up, through the work of the Constituent Assembly, a sound foundation for the new order. They only give impulse to reactionary and underground movements. And, in this series of arguments I have not mentioned the most difficult and decisive fact which causes the hostile sentiments of the people—the economic crisis.

Not a single one of these arguments has been impartially
considered [by the government], and the brutal and unconceding manner followed in the discussions in the Legislative Committee and in the Presidium of the Provisional Parliament has confirmed the uncompromising tendency of the leading [Communist] group which excludes the idea of cooperation.

My position as a member of the government has been difficult from the beginning as I had not taken part in the preparation of these drafts except in criticizing them. With the proposal of these political laws my position has become impossible.

Resigning from the government, I consider it my duty to express to you personally, Mr. Prime Minister, an acknowledgment that if I have found any understanding and any broader consideration of the problems it was with you, and I consider it necessary, Mr. Prime Minister, to assure you that my withdrawal from the government does not imply any lack of readiness on the part of the Democratic party, which I have represented in the government, for cooperation under conditions which would make such cooperation possible and justifiable. As always the cooperation of the progressive groups remains conditio sine qua non for pulling the country out of the situation in which it finds itself today.

Belgrade, 19 August, 1945

(signed) Milan Grol
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