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FOREWORD

This manual is a much expanded and more detailed version of courses of lectures given earlier this year by a number of officers of the Security Service to many of the C.I. personnel, both British and American, who are now working in the field. It is intended both for the general guidance and use of C.I. officers in their work in the field and also for the training of C.I. personnel. The information in this manual is believed to be correct up to 1st June, 1944.

July, 1944.
The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (O.K.W.) under Feld-Marschall Keitel is the military staff of the Führer. It is responsible for the general conduct of the war, the financial control of the three service ministries and the arbitration of any disputes arising between them, the control of supplies and production and certain aspects of economic warfare. It is, or was until recently organized in the following five departments or directorates: Administration; the Führungsamt (W.F.A.) or operational directorate; the Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr; the Amt Allgemeine Wehrmachtsangelegenheiten (A.W.A.), which deals with training, personnel and equipment; and the Amt Wirtschaftsstaat (W.Stb.), which handles raw materials, supplies, economic warfare, etc. The Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr, commonly known as the Abwehr, was the intelligence department of the O.K.W. The position of its late chief, Admiral Canaris, must not, however, be equated with that of the Directors of Intelligence in this country. His department did not exist primarily for the evaluation or study of information but for the active discharge of those functions of espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage which in England are the responsibility (in the main) of three independent departments: M.I.6, S.O.E. and the Security Service.

Admiral Canaris' organization comprised two separate departments: the Amtsgruppe Ausland, under Konter-Admiral Bürkner, and the Abwehr proper. The former, which directed the Attache Gruppen of the three service ministries, may be said to have been responsible for collecting information from abroad by open and licit means. The latter was the secret service proper. It owed its name to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. They had stipulated that Germany should not possess an active espionage service but might possess an organization for counter-espionage and security. Consequently, when Germany did, notwithstanding the Treaty, organize an espionage service, she did so under cover of the security service allowed her by the Treaty and continued to use the term "Abwehr", or defence, to include all the functions, active or passive, of her intelligence department.

Recently, however, a general re-organization has taken place. At the end of February or the beginning of March of this year, Admiral Canaris was dismissed. Shortly afterwards the Amtsgruppe Ausland was separated from the rest of the Abwehr and now operates independently as a department of the O.K.W. The Abwehr itself has passed under the control of the Nazi Party's own Intelligence Service and has been absorbed into the police and security system controlled by Heinrich Himmler, which
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is more fully described in the next chapter. The present constitutional position of the Abwehr is not altogether clear; and a number of changes may also have taken place in its internal organization. More will be said on this matter below. First, however, in order that the position may be properly understood, it will be necessary to say something of the organization of the Abwehr as it was until the beginning of this year. This description has for convenience been given in the present tense. It must not be inferred from this, however, that the comparatively elaborate internal organization of the Abwehr will necessarily continue to exist in its old form or that substantial changes (of which we are still uninformed) have not already taken place. The reasons why some general reorganization was necessary and indeed overdue will perhaps become apparent from this account of the Abwehr in its heyday.

The Abwehr, as it has so far existed, is organized in four principal departments or Abteilungen: Abt. I, under Oberst d. G. Hansen, which deals with active espionage; Abt. II, under Oberst d. G. Freytag von Loringhoven, which deals with sabotage and political subversion; Abt. III, under Oberst Heinrich, which deals with counter-espionage and security; and Abt. Z., the Zentralabteilung, under Oberst Jacobson, which is a general administrative department serving the whole Abwehr. It would be true (in very general terms) to say that Abt. I performed the functions of M.I.6 in this country; Abt. II those of S.O.E. and to some extent P.W.E.; Abt. III those of the Security Service. Abt. Z. has no precise equivalent, which perhaps is to be regretted. These are, however, only approximations. In the Abwehr the unification of all aspects of Intelligence under a single head has resulted (at least in theory) in a simpler and clearer-cut division of labour between the three Abteilungen than has been possible between the equivalent departments in this country.

Abteilung I is further sub-divided into a series of sections, each of which is responsible for obtaining a particular type of information. Eins Heer collects information about foreign armies; Eins Marine about foreign navies and mercantile shipping; Eins Luft, non-technical information about foreign air forces, such as the strength and disposition of squadrons or the position of flying fields; Eins Technik Luftwaffe, technical information from the aircraft industry about new types of aircraft or engines, special equipment and so on; Eins Wirtschaft, general economic information with particular reference to the production of war materials. Each of these sections recruits, trains and runs its own agents. It is not usual for sections to share agents, but it is a common practice for one section to invite another to provide one of its
agents with an additional questionnaire or even a short course of specialized training. An Eins Luft agent, for example, may easily receive an additional assignment from Eins Marine, if it is supposed that his original mission will give him incidental access to information about ports or shipping. On the other hand, an agent always remains the property and responsibility of the section which originally recruited him; he will be so referred to in any official documents or correspondence relating to him; and officers of that section will throughout handle his affairs.

The remaining sections of Abt. I are not concerned directly with the handling of agents. First, there are two technical sections: Eins Heer (Technik) and Eins Marine (Technik), which discharge in respect of the army and navy the same functions as Eins Technik Luftwaffe in respect of the Air Force, but with the distinction that they rank only as sub-sections of Eins Heer and Eins Marine and are employed merely in an advisory capacity. Secondly, there are a number of sections designated by letters which perform certain administrative, technical and domestic duties, of which the most important are I i. and I g. The former manages the Abwehr’s wireless communications, staffs its W/T stations and, where necessary, trains its agents as wireless operators. The latter provides expert technical assistance in such matters as secret writing, photography and the production of real or forged identity documents or passports. Both, although Abt. I sections, in fact serve the Abwehr as a whole.

Abt. I must not be considered as a department engaged exclusively in the running of agents. Its business is to obtain information by open means or by secret as the case requires. In fact in the sphere of secret espionage its successes have been few and its failures many. It has more than once failed at vital moments to obtain advance information of the enemy’s intentions and most of the Allies’ strategic moves in the war have taken the Abwehr by surprise. The principal successes of Abt. I have been in a different field: the efficient organization of a reporting service for conveying to Headquarters information obtained by more or less open means. Thus, Eins Marine organized in the Western Mediterranean an admirable service, since curtailed, through which the enemy were kept well informed of the movements of Allied shipping. The bulk of this information was obtained by simple visual observation; its value lay in the speed with which it was collected and supplied to those who could use it. In much the same way Eins Wirtschaft maintained for a long period what was, in effect, a press-cutting
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service in Mexico which relied on Germany by air mail, cable and at one point by wireless. Summaries of all the information of interest appeared in the technical press of the Americas. Little or no attempt was made to obtain information from any more secret source; the value of the information (which was considerable) lay only in the rapidity of its transmission. Both services depended, of course, to some extent upon the use of agents. Neither employed or required spies of the kind about whom novels are written.

Abteilung II is organized upon different lines. It contains some sub-sections engaged in administrative or specialist work, such as IIa, which deals with personnel, or II Technik, which supplies the bombs and apparatus of physical sabotage; but does not recognize any division into service sections. Instead a distinction, though more of function than of organization, is drawn between two different types of operation: S or Sabotage and I or Insurgency undertakings. The former are projects of material sabotage. In November, 1941, for example, seven saboteurs in partial uniform were landed submarine on the Egyptian coast with a mission to destroy or damage the railway line near Dakar in support of Rommel's attack on Tobruk, which was due to start a few days later. The latter, which are more extensive and more important, are projects involving the exploitation of political discontent or the stirring up of insurrection. They may range from plain propaganda to the organization of dissident minorities behind the enemy's lines or the actual raising and training of groups of partisans or guerrillas. The finger of Abt. II used at times to be detectable in the broadcasts of the N.B.S., the dummy broadcasting station supposedly situated in this country, which the Germans used for propaganda purposes earlier in the war. Parachutists have been dropped within the last year both in Persia and Iraq in the hopes of raising a revolt against the Allied occupation. On the Eastern front and in the Balkans Abt. II has employed armed bands recruited, for example, from among Croats, Albanians or General Vlassov's White Russian legionaries.

It may be said of Abt. II, as of Abt. I, that its most secret enterprises are rarely its most successful. Like other branches of the Abwehr it is at its best in matters of planning and organization; at its worst in individual execution. On the other side of Insurgentur, Abt. II's most successful undertaking was the penetration of Yugoslavia immediately before the German invasion. The German minority was organized, supplied with arms and given covert military training. The help of Croat nationalists...
was enlisted and miscellaneous soldiers and politicians of doubtful allegiance were suborned. The invading German armies were thus provided with a full-dress Fifth Column which sowed discord, hampered the enemy's communications and prevented him from destroying vital bridges and railway lines in his retreat. The success of this operation is attributable first to its being only an adjunct of a military operation which would in any case have been successful; secondly, to the fact that Abt. II had leisure to organize beforehand under conditions of less than absolute secrecy. Similar undertakings attempted in the Caucasus in 1942 when these two conditions were lacking, were still-born. On the side of material sabotage the picture is the same. The despatch of eight saboteurs by submarine to the United States in June, 1942, was admirably conceived. The men selected had all lived for considerable periods in America; their training was adequate; the targets chosen (aluminium and magnesium plants) were of great importance, but by an oversight were low on the official list of vulnerable points. Nevertheless, the venture was a total failure and all its participants were captured within a short while of their landing. On the other hand, attacks on Allied shipping in the Mediterranean have achieved a fair success. In almost every case they have either taken a form indistinguishable from that of a miniature commando raid or been launched from a neutral country where Abt. II could operate under cover of no more than a decent modesty.

The organization of Abt. III follows precisely the same lines as that of Abt. I. First, there are the three service sections: III Heer, III Marine, and III Luft—collectively known as III Wehrmacht. They are responsible for the security education of troops, the static security of military installations and the enforcement of any standing controls which are necessary in a military area. For this work the executive arm of the Abwehr is the G.F.P. III Wirtschaft is a companion section to III Wehrmacht and is responsible for the security of factories engaged in war production. Next there are a series of sections designated by letters which perform various specialized functions. Of these the largest and most enterprising, at least in war time, is III F, the section concerned with counter-espionage as opposed to security. Its responsibilities extend from the investigation of all cases of espionage arising in Germany or Occupied Territory (when these are not handled by the S.D.) to the penetration and disruption of enemy Intelligence Services. III F is further subdivided on a geographical basis into a series of numbered sub-sections.

Abteilung III is the most successful of the Abwehr's three active departments. Of its merits in organizing a security system little need be said. This is a branch of activity in which the
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Germans are traditionally systematic and efficient, but the problem with which they are now confronted in Europe is too large for solution by these methods. No Security Service, however capable or extensive, could exercise more than a nominal control over the almost uniformly hostile inhabitants of a dozen occupied countries. For this reason the Abwehr has been driven more and more to rely on a technique of what must be called offensive counter-espionage. This is the province of III F. Its work of penetrating networks of Allied agents, escape routes and local resistance movements has been successful and its methods bold. The following is a typical III F operation. In 1942 the Abwehr succeeding in inserting an agent into or suborning a member of an Allied espionage organization in France. They acted cautiously and left the organization undisturbed for a number of months until an opportunity presented itself of rounding-up the entire group. Only two or three of the less important members escaped. The Abwehr, having seized the main transmitter and the necessary codes in their raid, proceeded to keep the organization alive on paper by sending messages purporting to show that the group was still in full operation. By means of one member of the organization whom they had won over, they next put themselves in touch with a second group which was temporarily out of communication with London, and whose messages they offered to pass over the captured transmitter. In this way they gained considerable knowledge of the second group and in particular identified its leader. Before the moment was ripe for a second round-up, the possibility of a still larger coup presented itself. London had proposed that the leader of the second group should return for a consultation, after which he was to go back to France as the co-ordinator of several groups, between which there had been differences of opinion. The Abwehr let him go, and even used the supposed facilities of the original organization to assist him. Their plan was that he should return to England with the traitor on whose services the whole scheme depended, so that later, when the two came back to France, a clean sweep could be made, not only of the second group but also of the other groups whose activities its leader was to co-ordinate. In the event, this plan miscarried because the fictitious traffic on the original transmitter had in the meantime aroused suspicion in London. Even so, both the whole of the first group and the greater part of the second were arrested, and from the Abwehr's point of view the whole operation was sufficiently successful. A similar combination of patience and boldness is characteristic of most III F work. When, for example, the Abwehr penetrate or uncover an escape route they are accustomed to leave it untouched and permit it to forward the escape even of a large number of genuine
refugees provided that they have the opportunity from time to
time to use the same facilities for their own agents. Louis de
Bray, a Belgian organizer of spurious escape routes, has been
well-known to us since the early part of 1942; during that time,
a number of genuine escapers have reached this country with his
assistance; so also have three or possibly four Abwehr agents.
There is a final extension of III F work to which some reference
should be made. This is the common practice of sending agents
to neutral or allied countries with the sole object of their being
recruited there by an Allied Intelligence Service and returned to
work in Occupied Europe. They are then employed for the
purpose of penetrating and breaking up the organization to which
they have been attached. Perhaps half a dozen agents of this
type have arrived in England since the outbreak of war. They
are exceedingly difficult to detect, for there is no necessity for
them to bring with them any of the incriminating apparatus
associated with an ordinary spy; nor have they any mission except
to demonstrate such loyalty to the Allied cause as will secure
their recruiting. There is no protection against this type of III F
agent, except a systematic and careful vetting of all candidates
for employment by an Intelligence Service, even though this
must often be done under difficult conditions and on the basis
of inadequate records.

The importance of Abt. Z may be gauged from the fact that
in the Abwehr hierarchy, Oberst Jacobsen ranks immediately
below Oberst Hansen, Chef I, and takes precedence over the
Chefs II and III. Its most important section, over which Jacobsen
personally presides, is Z.O., which is responsible for the planning
and setting up of the whole Abwehr organization in Europe. This
section also maintains the Abwehr's two vital central indices—the
Zentralkartei (ZK), the Abwehr's Central Registry which provides
the basis for investigations and to which reference is made, for
example, when vetting agents for employment; and the Zentral-
kartei Vertrauensmemnner (Z.K.V.), the central index of agents,
where the names, personal particulars and photographs of all the
Abwehr's agents are recorded. The remaining Z sections are
more of domestic importance to the Abwehr than of interest to
anyone engaged in combating it. There is Z.A., which deals
with all postings and transfers of personnel on behalf both of the
Abwehr proper and of the Amtsgruppe Ausland, Z.F. the finance
department, and Z.R. the legal section. Abt Z officers are to be
found in any Abwehr organization, but it should be noted that
they are generally not service officers but civil servants or civilians
holding temporary service rank.
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II.

The central offices of the Abwehr used to be in the O.K.W. building at 72, Tirpitz-Strasse, Berlin. Out of deference to the R.A.F., they have now largely removed to Zossen, a small town some twenty miles south of Berlin. The functions of the centre are co-ordination and planning; the executive work is done by a number of subordinate stations or Abwehrstellen scattered throughout Europe.

The organization of an Abwehrstelle reflects exactly the organization of the Abwehr as a whole. First, there is an officer in charge, the Astleiter, usually of the rank of colonel or its equivalent, whose functions correspond in miniature with those of Admiral Canaris. He directs the general policy, and is responsible for the administration and discipline of the Ast. Under him are three Gruppenleiter, responsible for the work of Abt. I, Abt. II and Abt. III. (With their sure instinct for complexity the Germans refer to the Abteilungen of an Ast as Gruppen.) They, in turn, will have subordinate officers in charge of the various sections of their respective departments, so that there will be a Leiter Eins, a Leiter III M, and so on. Finally, according to the size of the Ast, there will be a certain number of Z.F. officers. ZF, as the accounts department, will always be represented by one or more officers; other Z sections may be present on occasion. This is, however, only the ideal organization. In practice certain omissions and compressions are usual. It is a common thing, for example, for the senior officer in charge of an Abt. II section also to act as Leiter I. Thus, in Lisbon the Leiter Eins Marine and the Leiter I are the same person. Similarly, in a given Ast any section or even a whole department may be lacking if there is no scope for its activity. An inland Ast might dispense with Eins Marine and III M; an Ast in central Germany might have no use for Abt. II. In theory, however, all sections are always represented. If there is no separate officer in charge there will at least be a referent, an officer answerable for the work of the section. Thus in one Stelle during an interregnum the Leiter II was also for some months the referent Eins T.L.W.*

Within Germany there is one Abwehrstelle in each Wehrkreis or Army Command area. An Ast takes its name, either from that of the town in which it is situated or from the number of the Wehrkreis for which it is responsible. The Abwehrstelle at Hamburg is thus indifferentely Ast Hamburg or Ast X; that in Vienna Ast Wien or Ast XVII. There are in all eighteen Abwehrstellen in Germany (including the Protektorat); their disposition is shown on the map on page 113. In Occupied Europe a

* The term referent does not always imply a plural form. It is also used to mean the officer in charge of a particular section or a particular undertaking.
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A similar organization is in force, each occupied country being, for this purpose, regarded simply as an extra Wehrkreis. Abwehrstellen outside Germany do not, of course, have numbers; they take their names instead either from the country in which they operate or from the town in which they are situated. As Norway or Ast Oslo is responsible for Abwehr work in Norway; Ast Niederlande or Ast the Hague for work in Holland, and so on. Occasionally, however, it is necessary to provide an occupied country, if it is large, with a series of Abwehrstellen. They are then grouped together under a central Abwehrstellen or Ast, which is responsible for Abwehr work in the country as a whole. This arrangement always coincides with the grouping of the local army commands; any command outside Germany whose territory includes more than one Ast will also possess an Ast. In France, for example, before it became an area of active operations, there were a total of five Abwehrstellen, Ast Angers, Ast Dijon, Ast Lyons, Ast Amiens, and Ast Arras; they were united under the control of Abwehrstellen Frankreich in Paris.

All Abwehrstellen, whether in Germany or in occupied territory, are (at least in theory) equal and independent. Their allegiance, or rather that of the officers in charge of their component sections, is only to the appropriate headquarters section in Berlin. These are divided internally according to the part of the world with which they deal. Eins 11 Ost handles military information about countries lying to the east of Germany, Eins 11 West about countries lying to the west, Eins Marine Nord-West, naval information about Scandinavia, and so on. This geographical grouping is common to all three Abteilungen. It follows that the Leiter Eins Luft, Ast Hamburg, and the Leiter Eins Luft, Ast Belgien, both of whom are engaged (predominantly) in collecting information about British and American air forces, are, under their respective Asten, responsible only to Eins Luft West in Berlin. Similarly, the Leiter II, Ast Norweg, and the Leiter II Alst Paris, are each responsible to the section II West in Berlin.

Such a system leaves much to local initiative; and the limits within which that can develop are defined by local conditions. In practice, therefore, although the independence of Abwehrstellen is real enough, their equality is more in the world of precedence than of fact. Each Abwehrstelle tends to develop a particular sphere of work or speciality of its own; the importance of the Ast at any time, and therefore its size, will depend on the extent to which this speciality fills the contemporary needs of war. Before the war, by virtue of their geographical positions, Ast Hamburg and Ast Wiesbaden came to be associated especially with work against this country and work against France.
periods of their greatest importance and largest size were, therefore, in 1940 and 1941 respectively, i.e., at a time immediately before the invasion or projected invasion of the countries in which they had specialized. In the same way, though for different reasons, the fortunes of Ast Dresden and Ast Muenster have varied. The former is a considerable centre of economic, the latter of technical espionage, both subjects more important now than in earlier days when hopes were bright and the Blitzkrieg short.

Abwehrstellen may, and often do, set up within their areas subordinate stations known as Nebenstellen (N-st.), Aussenstellen or Meldekopfe (M.K.). Of these, a Nest is usually a replica in little of its parent Ast; all the departments or sections represented at the former will be represented also at the latter. Sometimes, however, a Nest will only be concerned with one particular aspect of Abwehr work. Thus Nest Kohn (a subsidiary of Ast Muenster) was at one time almost exclusively concerned with Eins Wi or economic espionage. Nest Boulogne (a subsidiary of Ast Belgien) was a purely Abt. III station engaged in counter-espionage and security work on the Belgian coast. Aussenstellen are smaller branch offices set up for some reason of administrative convenience and usually concerned with the work only of one department or section. The Aussenstelle which existed until recently at Antwerp was, for example, merely the Eins Maritime section of Ast Belgien, transferred from Brussels because it is more convenient that it should work in a port. The old Aussenstellen at Nantes and St. Jean de Luz (they were later moved and their status enhanced) were outposts and training schools maintained by the headquarters of Abt. II, Abst Frankreich in Paris. A Meldekopf is the smallest unit of Abwehr organization. It can be anything from a glorified post-box to a small liaison office with perhaps one officer and a secretary. Its characteristic is that it does not itself run agents or initiate undertakings. Before the war, for example, Ast Muenster set up a Meldekopf at Hellingthal near the Belgian frontier which served as a convenient rendezvous for agents working in the Low Countries. In 1941, Abst Frankreich maintained, as a subsidiary of what was then Ast Bordeaux, a similar Meldekopf at Biarritz near the Spanish frontier. Other examples can be found in Lisbon where more than one Abwehrstelle now finds it convenient to be represented.

The Abwehr extends its network to the neutral or unoccupied countries of Europe. There the organization differs slightly, though more in name than in fact. The expression Abwehrstelle is not used; instead, the whole network in any one country is referred to collectively as the Kriegsorganisation, or K.O. There is now a K.O. to be found in each appropriate country — e.g.
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Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria and Finland. Their organization follows the pattern familiar from Abwehrstellen. In the capital city there is the headquarters of the K.O., under a K.O. Leiter, with subordinate officers representing the various departments and sections; in the main provincial towns there are substations and branch offices which perform the functions of Nebenstellen or Aussenstellen without, however, being so called. Like an Ast, a K.O. is an independent unit responsible only to Berlin, but with this practical difference. It is a ruling (usually observed) that one Ast may not send agents to or set up offices in the territory of another Ast without first receiving its permission. The same presumably applies to K.O.s.; but the neutral territory in which they operate is often a hunting ground rich enough to attract all comers. In Portugal, for example, not less than five Abwehrstellen: Ast Hamburg and its subsidiary Nest Bremen, Ast Berlin, Ast Stuttgart and Ast Belgien, have all found it expedient to maintain outstations and sometimes considerable networks. These are the cause of some embarrassment to the K.O. Their multitudinous activities spoil the local market for agents; they entangle themselves with the local authorities; they quarrel and are compromised. So far, however, K.O. Portugal, despite vociferous protests, has not succeeded in removing any of them. Instead, their number and importance has increased as the war goes on, for they have this advantage over the K.O. They do not work under cover of the German Embassy and could, therefore, remain in being if, for example, Portugal were to sever diplomatic relations with Germany or to join the Allies.

The remaining class of country (now diminished almost to vanishing point) is that of Germany's allies. They are not or should not be invited to accommodate Abwehrstellen or K.O.s. Instead, they are provided with a Verbindungs-Offizier or V.O., who sets up an office in the capital for the purpose of keeping liaison with the local Intelligence Service. Earlier in the war the V.O. best known to us was, of course, Oberst Hellwich in Rome, who maintained a considerable office not dissimilar from an Abwehrstelle. Since then the status of Italy has declined; like any occupied country she now has her Ast Italien at Merano and the Italian Intelligence Service dispenses its wares elsewhere.

III.

What has been described above is the organization of the Abwehr on paper. It must not be supposed that the reality is quite so regular or neat. The Abwehr at work has often the appearance not of a single large Intelligence Service, but of a loose
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association or combine of innumerable smaller ones, competing
and sometimes conflicting with each other.

Any Abwehrstellen may send an agent to any part of the world
and will in fact embrace any likely enterprise even though it may
concern a country far removed from the Stelle's normal sphere of
work. Abwehr has set agents to work in Egypt; agents
recruited by Abwehrstellen in the Balkans have reached this
country. As the result, it is no unusual thing for two
Abwehrstellen to have agents working simultaneously in the same
country without either being aware of the other's existence. In
one instance two such agents were working in mutual ignorance
almost in the same town. One was in desperate straits for lack
of money, the other in some difficulty to know how to dispose of
the funds which he had. The machinery of co-ordination at
Abwehr headquarters was inadequate to solve either problem.
Sometimes Abwehrstellen are to be found at direct conflict in
the same field. Such a situation arose in Brazil shortly before
the final round-up of Axis agents. Two Abwehr organizations
were at work; one controlled by Eins Marine, Ast Hamburg, and
the other by Eins Wirtschaft, Ast Berlin. The jealousy,
dislike, and suspicion between them contributed largely to the demise of
both.

In any service as loosely organized as the Abwehr, the per-
sonality of individual officers counts for much. The older Abwehr
officers were of the type of their chief, Admiral Canaris, a man
of Greek origin, a regular officer and a notorious right-wing
intriguer after the pattern of the late General Schleicher. They
are not Nazis, but rather conservatives of the military caste.
Among them are to be found some men like the late Freiherr
von Wedel of Ast Hamburg who, having been compelled to
abandon a normal military career, have found it expedient to start
afresh in the world of Intelligence under another name; but such
Phillips Oppenheim characters are comparatively rare. In the
years immediately preceding the present war, the Abwehr
expanded rapidly. The new officers fell, broadly speaking, into
two classes: Army officers of the reserve who had been recalled
to the colours; civilians with business connections abroad or who
had lived for long periods in a foreign country. The former,
mostl
y too old for more active service, did not represent any
great increase of strength to the Abwehr, though some of them
(such as the present Leiter Ast Belgen) have attained positions of
fair importance. The latter, though perhaps more energetic, have
certainly served the Abwehr far less well. They have introduced
an element of corruption into the organization which might other-
wise have been lacking.
Korvetten Kapitän Strauch, at one time Leiter Eins Marine, Art Niederlande, is an outstanding example of this type of officer at his worst. For many years before the war he was in the tobacco business in Holland, during the latter part of this time he probably acted unofficially as an informant or talent-spotter for the Abwehr. Shortly after the invasion of Holland he took up the post of Leiter Eins Marine, with the rank of Korvetten Kapitän. His first act was to organize a network of agents of the vessels of the fishing fleet plying from the twin ports of Ijmuiden and Scheveningen. In theory, these men turned in (first verbally at the conclusion of the voyage and later by wireless) valuable reports on the movements of Allied shipping and aircraft in and over the North Sea. In practice, since most of the fishing was done close inshore, the bulk of the reports was of negligible value. This was a matter of little concern to Strauch. He was able to obtain fishing licenses and supplies of fuel for those vessels which carried his agents and to deny them to those which did not. By this means he rapidly obtained a monopoly of the local fish trade, and by selling the produce on the black market through a Dutch commercial firm bought for the purpose, was able to realise a handsome income. It is symptomatic of the slackness of Abwehr organization that this racket should have continued unhindered until the early part of 1943.

Corruption, financial and professional, must now be accepted as a common feature of the Abwehr. Instances can be cited in which Abwehr officers, for reasons of personal prestige or to cover some illicit transaction in Abwehr funds, have continued to run agents after they knew their information to be false or acquired under enemy control or have even fabricated reports notionally received from wholly fictitious agents. Other instances can be cited in which Abwehr officers, for a cash consideration, have agreed to engage as agents persons with some reason to escape from occupied territory whom they knew to have no intention of carrying out their mission. In one such instance an agent was sent to this country (at a certain price) with the derisory mission of reporting on the Hungarian legitimist movement in a secret ink composed of unequal parts of lemon juice and cherry brandy.

This is, of course, the darker side of the picture, but the obverse is not bright. The Abwehr has been described by one of its own officers as a motley crew with little tradition and no esprit de corps. Although its associations are with the fighting services, it has not shared to any great extent in the long record of their successes in the present war. Apart altogether from the Abwehr's failures, the enhanced importance of aerial reconnaissance and other technical sources of information, has seriously (18275)
The Abwehr.

1.

reduced the value and therefore the morale of the secret service proper. Most of its officers are only lukewarm supporters, if not covert opponents, of the Party; a general pessimism seems to possess them; and many (like the late Leiter Eins II/West) openly proclaim their belief in Germany's defeat. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Abwehr should have been engulfed in Himmler's acquisitive maw. The dismissal of Admiral Canaris was followed by a general purge of Abwehr officers. The three heads of departments, first von Lahousen, Chef II, then Oberst Pickenbrock, Chef I, and finally von Bentivegni, the Chef III, all lost their jobs. They were followed into retirement by a number of their senior officers. The present position is that the Abwehr has been compelled to sever its connection with the O.K.W., despite the latter's resistance, and to forfeit its existence as an independent organization. It has become simply a department of Himmler's security and intelligence organization, the Reichsicherheitshauptamt. It is probable that even so, the Abwehr will retain a certain autonomy. It will remain a separate department of the R.S.H.A. concerned specifically with the acquisition of military intelligence and possibly discharging also certain limited functions within the field of military security and the strictly military or operational aspects of counter-espionage. It is impossible to say as yet to what extent the old divisions into Abteilungen and sections will still survive within the new department. On the whole, it is probable that they will remain almost intact, though certain sections may be absorbed into their opposite numbers in the R.S.H.A.

IV.

A number of different categories can be discerned among the agents, as opposed to the officials, employed by the Abwehr. The most obvious and in some ways the most important is that of German or Austrian nationals. This class, though numerically the smallest, contains many, if not most, of the Abwehr's high-grade agents. Such men are used with caution; it is more usual for them to receive missions in neutral than in enemy territory. Of upwards of a hundred agents caught in or brought to this country since the outbreak of war, only three or four have been Germans. Even of these, two were impelled here by events having little connection with espionage. One was involved in a triangle-drama which ruffled the serenity of Ast Hamburg and suggested his speedy removal elsewhere. The other, after a rash outburst in which he gave his unqualified opinion of the Nazi Party, was offered by his superiors the choice between a mission abroad and the care of the Gestapo. In neutral countries, however, these
German-born agents flourish and expand. Most are business men with long-standing connections in the country concerned, such, for example, as Kuno Wiltzien, until recently Krupp's agent in Lisbon, whose private trade was the suborning of Allied seamen. But rarely they are pro- or anti-Germans (of the type of Prince Liechtenstein), who are thought to be equally at home in the antechambers of half Europe. It is on the gossip picked up by persons of the latter type that Canaris himself was understood chiefly to rely.

Something should here be said of the position of dual nationals—men, for example, who by some technical accident are British subjects but whose natural sympathies lie with another country. Several such persons have been employed by the Abwehr, from Vlotho to Latvia, the boxers sent to South Africa to raise the breeza Brandwaag for Hitler, to an indomitable old lady of seventy who served (from disinterested motives) as a paymaster of agents in this country. These agents are at an obvious disadvantage; whatever their status de jure, de facto they will always be regarded as aliens or enemies and will draw suspicion on themselves thereby. But, even when their sympathies fit rather ill, they have their uses, particularly for Abt. II work, or in a country (like America) where a substantial alien-born population. Their advantage is that they act, or at least it is supposed that they will act, from patriotism rather than from gain. It is this which fits them especially for Insurgency, which is rarely successful when undertaken by persons with rented convictions.

The agents sent to enemy territory are most often nationals of an Occupied Country. The employment of neutrals is comparatively rare; those that are used come for the most part from countries so much under German influence at the time as to be neutral in name rather than fact. During this war, for example, several Spaniards have visited England in the German interest, particularly during the years 1940-42, but few Portuguese. It seems in general to be the policy to employ neutrals either in their own countries or in those closely linked with them—e.g., Spaniards or Portuguese in South America—rather than to venture them within the direct grasp of the enemy. This is perhaps attributable to a kind of political modesty among the neutrals themselves.

In recruiting agents from Occupied Countries, the Abwehr has put itself in a certain jeopardy. These men are engaged in the admittedly mean trade of assisting their conquerors to extend their conquests. It is not an occupation likely to attract recruits of the first grade; the loyalty or perseverance of those whom it does attract is scarcely weatherproof. The Abwehr has, therefore,
The Abwehr accepted the tactic of the mass assault. According to the calculations of one Abwehr officer, eighty-five per cent. of the agents despatched were never heard of again; ten per cent. turned in information which was either worthless or false; the remaining five per cent. provided sufficient accurate reports to justify the expense of the remainder. The first two clauses of this sentence may have a greater validity than the last. Nevertheless, the system has something to recommend it. It is possible, at any rate over a short period, to saturate the security, as the anti-aircraft defences of a country. In the turmoil caused by the arrest of twelve worthless agents a more valuable thirteenth may escape detection.

The exigencies of this system explain why, for example, the Abwehr has used, or attempted to use, so many agents in this country who were manifestly unsuited to their task: a locksmith who could speak no English; a bewildered engineer who had once delivered a lecture in Swansea; or four Cubans who were inarticulate even in their own language. They also explain why many Abwehr agents have received a wholly inadequate training, and why during 1940-41, a vintage year for parachutists, it seemed to be a matter of policy only to employ those who had never jumped before. In general, however, these technical matters are better ordered. An agent may expect to receive adequate training in secret-writing or the coding and transmission of wireless messages. The course of instruction will last anything from three weeks to three months, according to circumstances. The latter is perhaps the average time; a longer course usually implies some hitch or breakdown in the arrangement for despatching the agent. What is weakest in the system is the almost total lack of any general training in what becomes a spy or particular instruction in the field in which the agent is to operate.

The foregoing paragraph is valid for the general run of agents; but one main exception must be noted. The agents employed by the technical sections of the Abwehr, Eins Wirtschaft and Eins Technik Luftwaffe, are commonly of a higher grade. They possess (almost invariably) certain professional qualifications for their work, which make them largely independent of the Abwehr’s training system. Eins Technik Luftwaffe, for example, has employed demobilized pilots of the French and Belgian air forces, the correspondent of a Dutch aviation journal, an American engineer of German extraction. Eins Wirtschaft has employed business men, commercial journalists and over-astute financiers. Such men, besides being well-equipped for their task in knowledge and intelligence, have often a good chance to establish themselves in a position where they can do effective work. In any belligerent country a trained pilot, for example, can readily find employment where a spy would most like to have it.
2. The R.S.H.A.

I.
The German police system is traditionally elaborate. There are municipal police and country police; police who live in barracks and police who do not; political police, criminal police and frontier police; police to patrol the inland waterways and police to protect the railways. There appears to be no branch of human activity unprovided with its body of uniformed guardians. This complex of self-protection is partly an outcome of the Germans' deep-rooted fear of anarchy and settled belief that anything which is not controlled must be disorderly and harmful. It is also partly the result of a conception of police duties strange to this country but more familiar on the continent. Here the police are regarded merely as the protectors of the public; they hold the ring outside, while the ordinary citizen follows his life undisturbed within. The Germans see their police as the active regulators of any and every form of communal life. A number of duties, therefore, fall to them which we should regard as outside police jurisdiction. They run the fire brigades; they enforce regulations about the price and sale of goods; they are concerned with public works and the control of the building trade; they exercise certain functions in the field of public health. They are, in short, to an extent unthinkable in this country, the general executives of government.

This tradition of police omnipresence is far older than the Nazi Party. Himmler may be quoted on the subject: "We National Socialists found ourselves in the presence of a police force which had originally been created as the obedient instrument of power in an absolutist state but which had subsequently lost this complete power". It was to Himmler that the German police owed not only the total restoration but the enhancement of its power. By 1936, after a series of intrigues in which he challenged even Goering with success, Himmler had emerged as the supreme chief of all German police forces. Since then his efforts have been directed towards securing and confirming an absolute control at the centre. Under the Weimar Republic the German police were to a great extent raised and maintained by individual states, and the central government exercised no more than an overall financial authority. To-day, though some outward Federal flourishes still remain, effective control proceeds only from Berlin; the German police is for the first time a wholly unified force. Himmler is not only the Chef der Deutschen Polizei but also, in succession to Frick, the Minister of the Interior. In that dual capacity there is practically no sphere of German life over which he cannot claim to exercise surveillance. But, before the full extent of his power can be understood, he must also be considered in his third capacity as Reichsfuehrer S.S.
The R.S.H.A.

Originally the brown-shirts of the S.A. formed the strong arm squads of the Nazi Party; they were the active instruments of Hitler's struggle. By 1925, however, the S.A. had become so large and politically so amorphous a body that it was necessary to create within it a smaller corps d'élite. This new formation was the S.S., or Schutz Staffel, of which Himmler became the deputy Führer in 1927, and the Reichsführer two years later. Its first duties were to provide stewards or cutters out at political meetings and to serve as the personal bodyguard of the principal Nazi leaders. Under Himmler, its size and authority expanded rapidly. By 1933 its numbers had grown from under three hundred to nearly fifty thousand. Its members were distinguished by their loyalty to their master Himmler and to their leader Hitler. The motto which they carried on their belts was Meine Ehre heisst Treue—(In my Loyalty is my Honour). The functions of the S.S. had developed proportionately. From a gangsters' bodyguard it had become the chosen political instrument of the Party which governed Germany.

With the growth of the S.S. grew Himmler. By 1933 he was already on the road to become what in effect he is now: the spiritual director of the German people. His conception of his duties can be defined in his own words: "In carrying out my tasks, I am guided fundamentally by what my conscience tells me is the nature of the work I am undertaking for Führer and People". The dictates of Himmler's conscience were given effect by the S.S.: the S.S. dominated the Party; and the Party dominated Germany. Even before 1933, however, the S.S. had grown too numerous a body to remain by itself the sole custodian of Nazi doctrine. A smaller and still more select body was therefore created to preserve and direct the political faith of the larger. This was the Sicherheitsdienst des R.f.S.S., the Security Service of the Reichsführer of the S.S. This was the private Intelligence Service through which Himmler informed himself about the external enemies and the internal weaklings or heretics of the Party. Its members were drawn from the ranks of the S.S., to which body they stood in much the same relation as the S.S. to the Party as a whole. The S.S. is still Himmler's most powerful instrument. It has expanded steadily with every year of Nazi Government. By the outbreak of war, the Allgemeine S.S., that is its ordinary part-time members, alone numbered upwards of two hundred and fifty thousand; the Waffen S.S., its militarized formations, equipped with artillery, tanks and all the apparatus of the fighting soldier, were at a strength of fifty thousand more. The numbers of the latter have since been greatly increased—to a considerable extent by the recruiting of non-Germans who have no loyalty to anything if not to the Party.
2. The R.S.I.I.A.

Waffen S.S. units have distinguished themselves on the Eastern front and in Italy by the tenacious bitterness with which they have fought. The grip of the S.S. upon the German people as a whole has steadily tightened. Himmler's uniforms have intruded themselves into every function of civil government; in particular, the fusion between the S.S. and the police is now virtually complete. Certain branches of the police are recruited exclusively from the S.S.; in all, the officers now hold a dual rank; first, as members of the S.S.; secondly, as policemen. Thus a Major der Schutzpolizei is now also a Sturmbannfuehrer der S.S. and will appear in uniform with insignia appropriate to both organizations. By a similar process the Intelligence Service of the S.S., the Sicherheitsdienst, has been absorbed into the security machinery of the State.

In his dual capacity as Reichsfuehrer S.S. und Chief der Deutschen Polizei, Himmler now has three administrative centres under his direct control: the Hauptamt Orpo; the various central offices of the S.S.; and the Reichsicherheitshauptamt. It is with the first and last of these that we are principally concerned. The Hauptamt Orpo, under S.S. Oberguppeführer und Polizei-General Wurmenberg, controls the Ordnungspolizei or uniformed constabulary, the auxiliary police forces and police training schools and hospitals. The forces which it commands may be considered in three classes. First, there are the Schutzpolizei, or Schutzpolizei, or Gemeinde Polizei and the Gendarmerie, who are the uniformed constabulary in large towns, small towns and country districts respectively. The Schutzpolizei and the Gendarmerie have certain formations (the Kaserniertes Schutzpolizei and the Motorsierte Gendarmerie) who are, both in training and equipment, para-military units and are so used in Occupied Territory; the peace-time role of the former is the suppression of riots, of the latter the patrolling of motor roads. Secondly, there are various bodies of specialized police, such as the Feuerschutzpolizei, the civilian fire-fighting service of Germany; the Wasserschutzpolizei, who police inland waterways; and the Marinekuestenpolizei, who fill approximately the same role as the coastguards in this country. Thirdly, there are certain auxiliary services: the Technische Nothilfe, the Luftschutzpolizei and the Stadtwacht and Landwacht. Of these, the first was originally a strike-breaking organization created under the Weimar Republic; it has since developed into a body of technicians equipped to take over or restore essential public services in an emergency. The Luftschutzpolizei is the permanent staff of Germany's A.R.P. services. The Stadtwacht and the Landwacht are auxiliary bodies of part-time civilians in some sense analogous with the Home Guard. They are both wartime creations; the former was recruited in country
districts with the primary object of assisting the police to round up escaped prisoners of war or Allied airmen who had been shot down and were still at large. The Stadtwaehlt, a later addition, operates only in towns; its personnel are drawn from among reliable Party members and it is presumably intended to reinforce the Schupo in the event of an internal crisis.

The Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or R.S.H.A., controls the security forces of the German Government, that is to say the Geheime Staatspolizei or Gestapo, with which the Grenzpolizei is now incorporated, the Kriminalpolizei or Kripo and the Sicherheitsdienst or S.D. The first two of these bodies, the Gestapo and the Kripo, are collectively known as the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo). The Gestapo is an invention of Hermann Goering's, created when he took over the administration of Prussia in 1933. It is, therefore, in origin a Prussian rather than a German institution. But, almost since the beginning, its powers have in effect extended over the whole Reich. For nearly three years after its inception the Gestapo functioned solely on the authority of the Nazi Party and without legislative support. It was engaged during that time in extirpating from German political life every movement, institution or individual that was or might become a centre of resistance to the Party. In 1936 came the Gesetz für die Geheime Staatspolizei, which defined its functions and endowed it with legal authority. This law, framed in the broadest terms, stated that the decisions and acts of the Gestapo were valid throughout the Reich and were not subject to review or restraint by any court of law. The functions of the Gestapo were to receive all political information requiring police action; to take such action; and to administer the concentration camps. To these were later added, by the absorption of the Grenzpolizei, that of controlling the frontiers of the Reich. The Kriminalpolizei may be compared with, though they do not exactly correspond to, the C.I.D. in this country. They are concerned exclusively with the prevention or investigation of crime and provide the Orpo with all the expert and technical assistance which is required in this field. It may seem curious that this should be regarded as an aspect of security, but it must be remembered that Nazi doctrines, and in particular the Nazi view of biology, have created in Germany a number of criminal offences unknown to other countries. Thus, though the execution of anti-Jewish laws, as a political matter, is handled by the Gestapo, the pursuit of gypsies, vagrants and the chronically unemployed is within the competence of the Kripo. The last component of the R.S.H.A., the Sicherheitsdienst, remains in essence what it always was, the Intelligence Service of the Nazi Party. The difference is that it has now been raised to the status of a government agency and acts, in effect, within Germany as
the director and advisor of the Gestapo. The latter is the open executive arm of political repression; the former is the secret Intelligence Service which assembles the information upon which action is taken. Everyone in Germany and most people outside it have heard of the Gestapo. The S.D., the more potent instrument, is still known only to a minority.

To understand the regional organization of the German police requires some knowledge of the various administrative areas into which the country is divided. The most important of these are, first, the Länder, the component states of the old federal Germany, and their administrative equivalent, the Prussian provinces; secondly, the Gau, the political and economic units into which the Nazis have divided their country; thirdly, the Wehrkreise or Army Command areas; and lastly, the S.S. Oberabschnitte, the territorial divisions on which S.S. organization is based. With the exception of the last two, which are usually coterminous, these regions overlap; one Wehrkreis, Land or Gau may contain parts of more than one of the other two units. The organization of the Orpo is based on the Land, or, in Prussia, on the Province. This is a survival from the days when the constabulary were a state, not a federal, body. Although all authority is now concentrated at the centre, the pattern of local organization is still preserved for convenience. The Sipo, though it has always been an organ of the central government, accommodates itself to the same framework. The administrative town of each Land, and in Prussia the seat of each Oberpraesident of a province, has, therefore, a main Gestapo and a main Kripo office; its Staatspolizeileitstelle or Stapolstelle and its Kriminalpolizeileitstelle. For this purpose the newly created Reichsgaue—e.g., in Austria—rank as Länder. Every Leitstelle, whether of the Gestapo or the Kripo, controls a number of subordinate stations in each Bezirke or district within the region. Posts of the Grenzpolizei, where they occur, are annexed to the local Gestapo station. The S.D., on the other hand, being wholly a Party organization in origin, ignores the older federal divisions and bases its network on the S.S. Oberabschnitte. Each of these, and therefore each Wehrkreis, contains a Leitabschnitt or head office of the S.D., which in turn controls a variable number of subordinate Abschnitte within its area.

In practice, this rather patchwork organization works more smoothly than might be supposed. The local offices of the Gestapo and the S.D., though their respective areas may not always be coterminous, work together as a team; the Kripo and the Orpo, though responsible to different headquarters, are in equally close liaison. Central control over the whole field of police activity is secured through an officer, the Hoherer S.S. und
The R.S.H.A.

Each Wehrkreis. This man is in effect Himmler's deputy. He combines the office of chief of the Allgemeine S.S. within the area with that of local police chief. In concert with the General Commanding-in-Chief in the Wehrkreis and the local Gauleiter, he is the responsible authority in all matters of civil defence. He has under him two officials: the Inspekteur der Orpo (I.d.O.) and the Inspekteur der Sipo und des S.D. (I.d.S.). Their functions, like those of the H.S.S.Pf. himself, are, as their title implies, supervisory rather than executive. They do not, in the normal course, interfere directly in local police administration, though they bear a general responsibility for its efficient conduct. In a time of crisis, however, the H.S.S.Pf. and his subordinate officers can assume a direct control of all the forces of the S.S. and the police within the Wehrkreis. After a severe air raid, for example, they can concentrate on the damaged town virtually all the civilian forces of the area: the Frundschaftspolizei, the Luftschutzpolizei, the Technische Notenhilfe, units of the Schupo and the Gendarmerie, the local formations of the S.S. and (especially if there has been any question of grumbling or a failure of morale) the repressive forces of the Gestapo and the S.D.

In occupied territory the pattern is similar. Each occupied country has its local and immediate H.S.S.Pf. Outside Germany, however, his functions and those of his officers are directly executive; they are the actual administrators of the German police forces stationed within the country. To mark this difference, the officials corresponding to the I.d.O. and the I.d.S. are known respectively as the Befehlshaber der Orpo (B.d.O.) and the Befehlshaber der Sipo u. S.D. (B.d.S.). In the hierarchy of the R.S.H.A., the B.d.O. is junior to the B.d.S. On occasion, in times of acute disturbance (as now in Yugoslavia or in countries, such as Poland, where the indigenous police have been virtually displaced, he may have a considerable number of Schupo formations under his direct command. More often, his main work consists in supervising in the German interest the activities of the national police force concerned. The office of the B.d.S. on the other hand, is of ever increasing importance. He is directly responsible for the political security of the country and his activities may include anything from the more secret forms of counter-espionage to open physical conflict with guerrillas. In occupied territory there are no separate offices of the Gestapo, the Kripo and the S.D. but only combined Dienststellen der Sipo und des S.D. Of these, there may be an

* It is symptomatic of Himmler's tightening grip upon the German people that there is now a tendency to refer to the corresponding officials inside Germany as Befehlshaber rather than Inspekteur.
2. The R.S.H.A.

Indefinite number in any one country. In France, for example, there is one such Dienststelle in each of the seventeen regions into which the country has now been divided. They are under the command of a local functionary, the Kommandeur der Sipo u. S.D. (K.d.S.), who commonly holds the rank of S.S. Obersturmbannführer or Major. He will have at his immediate disposal, as his executive instrument, a composite police unit perhaps fifty or sixty men strong, known as an Einsatzkommando. These units are on a military footing with appropriate weapons and transport. They may contain (according to local conditions) elements of the Gestapo, the S.D. or the Schupo, and will usually have attached to them for guard duties personnel of the Waffen S.S.

II.

Unlike the Abwehr, the R.S.H.A. and therefore its component the S.D., is a highly centralized organization. Its local representatives in Germany, in occupied territory or (as will be seen) in foreign countries, receive their instructions directly from and turn in their reports to the appropriate department of the R.S.H.A. in Berlin. An Abschnitt of the S.D. in Germany or a Dienststelle of the Sipo u. S.D. abroad does not enjoy the same local autonomy as an Abwehrstelle or K.O. Moreover, although the S.D. is in some sense a separate department and has certain specialized duties of its own to perform, it must be considered not as an independent unit but as an integral part of the German police system as a whole. In this context a warning is appropriate about the use of the term S.D. It is freely used by the Germans in each of three senses: first, to mean the S.D. proper, that is the Intelligence department of the R.S.H.A.; secondly, as an abbreviation (in occupied countries) for the expression Sipo u. S.D.; thirdly, as a loose general term to describe the German security machine as a whole. The two latter uses sometimes give rise to confusion. Thus, in occupied territory what is called an "S.D. undertaking" may, in fact, have been carried out by the Gestapo. Similarly, the statement that a police officer was "attached to the S.D." may only mean that he was employed outside Germany on security duties.

The R.S.H.A. is organized in the following seven departments or Amter:

I. Personal.
II. Organization, Verwaltung u. Recht.
III. Deutsche Lebensgebiete.
IV. Gegnererforschung u. Bekämpfung.
V. Verbrechensbekämpfung.
VI. Ausland.
VII. Weltanschauliche Forschung u. Auswertung.
The R.S.H.A.

Of these, Ämter I, II, V and VII can be briefly dismissed. The first two are concerned with matters of domestic administration. Ämter I also contains the legal department which occupies itself more busily than one might suppose in discovering the technical justification for the extra-legal acts perpetrated by the organisation as a whole. It is curious but true that the Germans, having placed the Gestapo above the law, should still be minutely concerned to veil its activities with all the semblance of legality. Ämter V is the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt and has, therefore, jurisdiction over the Kripo. Ämter VII is purely a research department. From it proceed the political, economic, or psychological surveys, theories, or ideological studies upon which the actions of the R.S.H.A. as a whole are ultimately based. To this end it collects statistics, books of reference or documents of political and historic interest which may bear on or relate to the work of any of the other departments.

Ämter III administers the S.D. Abschnitte and directs the activities of the S.D. within Germany. These are multifarious. The S.D. maintains a very considerable network of agents throughout the Reich and, through the S.S. and the Party can also draw upon an equally large number of voluntary informants. From them it obtains regular reports on the state of public morale, the attitude of various classes of persons to the war, the effects of current propaganda and similar matters. These reports are collated and the final results laid before Himmler. They are certainly the most objective and best informed reviews of the home front accessible to any department of the German Government. Ämter III also watches the behaviour of foreign workers, the attitude of German workers towards them, and any manifestation of political activity which is or might become inimical to the Nazi Party. It is, in short, the eyes and ears within Germany of Hitler's administration. That is its only role; it observes but does not take action.

Ämter IV is the old Gestapoamt and is still known by that name; its essential functions have not changed. It is responsible for the combating of all political opposition whether at home or abroad to the Nazi Party or the German State. Its duties range from the enforcement of anti-semitic laws or the suppression of Communism to the surveillance of Germans abroad who are suspected of dealing with the enemy or the investigation of foreign espionage. In many respects, therefore, the functions of Ämter IV overlap with those of Ämter III of the Abwehr. At the beginning of the war a comparatively simple ruling was in force. Counter-espionage proper was the sphere of Ämter III; political investigation that of Ämter IV. Any case of espionage handled by the Abwehr which involved a political organisation was to be referred to Ämter IV who would, if necessary, co-operate in the
enquiry. Conversely, any political investigation handled by Amt IV which revealed a case of espionage was to be referred to the Abwehr. It was the same in the field of security. The S.D. (in this instance Amtr III) would have a number of agents placed, for example, in factories engaged on war production. Their duty was to report on the morale and political reliability of the workers. Any reports alleging a breach of security or commenting on the security arrangements in force were to be passed to the Abwehr. From the beginning, however, the S.D. interpreted this ruling with an eye to its own advancement. It did not hesitate to embark on and carry through ventures wholly in the field of counter-espionage, if any colourable political aspect could be given them. The notorious Venlo incident (the kidnapping of the two British officers, Stevens and Hest) is a case in point; there the only political element was the supposed participation of an anti-Nazi underground movement which served to bait the trap. During the last two years the S.D. has encroached more and more upon the Abwehr’s field of counter-espionage. This development has been particularly noticeable in occupied territory, no doubt because the existence of so many indigenous resistance groups could give a quasi-political aspect to almost any counter-espionage investigation. It can now be accepted that, at least in occupied territory, it is Amtr IV of the R.S.H.A. not Amt III of the Abwehr which an Allied agent has most to fear. Their methods do not differ materially, but Amtr IV has a record of brutality in interrogation which the Abwehr (on the whole) is without.

The relations within Germany of Amtr III and Amtr IV are not easy to define, at least on the basis of the information available at present. In crude terms the former is an S.D. and therefore an Intelligence, the latter a Gestapo and therefore an executive department. But, while it is clear that Amtr III seldom or never takes executive action itself, it is not equally clear to what extent Amtr IV actively gathers intelligence. Outside Germany it certainly runs agents and performs (on the side of counter-espionage) all the normal functions of an intelligence service. Inside Germany it presumably relies, at least for general information, on Amtr III, but would, of course, undertake itself the investigation of a particular case and might in the process retain the services of its own informants. For these reasons, although Amtr IV is in essence the Gestapo, the influence of the S.D. proper is as great upon it as upon any other department of the R.S.H.A.

Amt VI of the R.S.H.A. is the S.D. in its capacity of an active intelligence service. Its primary duty is to collect political information. Here also at the beginning of the war the division of function between the Abwehr and the S.D. was comparatively
The R.S.H.A.

clear-cut. Any political information acquired by Abt. I of the Abwehr was to be passed over to the S.D.; any military or operational information incidentally acquired by the S.D. was to be passed on to the nearest Abwehrstelle. In fact, in this field as in that of counter-espionage, the encroachment of the S.D. has been continuous and progressive. From the beginning the S.D. claimed, as was natural, certain functions in the field of political subversion which conflicted or overlapped with those of Abt. II. As early as 1940, for example, Amt VI was active, if not very successful, in the business of organizing dissident Arabs in North Africa. With the opening of the Russian campaign the scope of Amt. VI's activities in this field increased very greatly. Mobile Einsatzkommandos on the eastern front undertook on a large scale the task of organizing behind the Russian lines, the national minorities and political groups who might be supposed or could be induced to be hostile to the Soviet régime. How successful these operations were is difficult to assess. So long as the German armies were advancing the organization of the disaffected was a matter only of speed and energy; when the retreat began no amount of skill could turn it to much service. What was certainly the most ambitious of Amt VI's projects—the wholesale raising of Caucasian tribes—miscarried for this reason. Curiously enough, it was in part this failure which accelerated the next development of Amt VI work. During the retreat, S.D. organizations behind the Russian lines, no longer valuable for projects of subversion, were employed to report straightforward military and operational intelligence. This was the S.D.'s first direct incursion (on any considerable scale) into what had hitherto been the exclusive province of the Abwehr. Another similar incursion must be referred to the same date. Both on the eastern front and in Italy, the S.D. are now systematically training and despatching parties of actual saboteurs who receive missions exactly similar to those given to agents of Abt. II. It can, therefore, be said that although its main duty remains the collecting and exploitation of political information, Amt VI has become, at least wherever operations are in progress, a serious rival to the Abwehr in the fields of military intelligence and physical sabotage. This is not accidental. It is the measure both of the Abwehr's failure and of Himmler's ambition.

Both Amt IV and Amt VI maintain representatives abroad both in neutral and in occupied territory. The office of the B.d.S. in any occupied country will contain specialists from Amt IV, Amt V and Amt VI, responsible (in broad terms) for security, criminal investigation and political intelligence, respectively. Of these the Amt VI official is a man of considerable consequence. As the political advisor of the Militärbefehlshaber
or Reichskommissar, he is responsible for seeing that the administration of the country proceeds in a manner agreeable to Party doctrine; he is also Himmler's local spy. In any European country where some vestige of independent political life still remains, the Amt VI representative is equally important. The S.D. have or had, for example, political observers in Finland, Hungary, Vichy France and Italy. These men are, of course, provided with cover, e.g., as members of the German diplomatic mission, and are invariably selected for the excellence of their local contacts. Dr. Reiche, the German consul-general in Vichy before the total occupation of France, was a typical Amt VI man. His political reports were of the greatest interest and accuracy; he was in relation with all the more important politicians of Vichy; his information was sufficiently up to date and comprehensive to enable him on more than one occasion to advise Laval of impending moves. It may be said of anyone who can keep even slightly ahead of Laval in the interplay of French politics that he is an informant worth having.

The forces of the S.D. are to a great extent deployed in Europe and particularly in those parts of Europe immediately subject to Nazi influence; but it also has certain wider commitments. In a neutral country the senior representative of the R.S.H.A., whose authority corresponds with that of a B.d.S. in occupied territory, is the Police Attaché at the German Embassy. He is commonly an Amt IV man but he will have associated with him a specialist from Amt VI and possibly one or two other officers. There is thus in each neutral country a complete S.D. stelle, equivalent to but in general far smaller than the Abwehr's K.O. Its duties include the political surveillance of local German institutions; liaison (in what may be called Special Branch matters) with the indigenous police; the cultivation and support of political parties serviceable to Germany; the combating of enemy intelligence services operating in the neighbourhood; and the organization of active political espionage. In the last capacity the S.D. extends its influence outside Europe. From its bases in Spain and Portugal, for example, it has made persistent efforts to establish a political network in South America. Up to a point it has been successful. The story of S.D. work in the Argentine, which culminated in the arrest at Trinidad of the S.D. envoy Helmut, illustrates the technique exactly. Not content with having established a political information service of some merit, the S.D. played politics itself, even to the extent of making a sustained effort first to curtail and finally to supplant the local influence of the German ambassador and his staff. This attempt (which in the event was unsuccessful) owed more to the enthusiasm of the agents concerned than to instructions from Berlin. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of the growing importance and self-assertiveness of the S.D. that it should have been made at all.
The R.S.II.A.

To the original seven Amter of the R.S.II.A. must now be added the rump or successor of the Abwehr. It is not yet clear how the assimilation of this new body will be contrived, nor to what extent it will occasion any changes in the existing organization or functions of the R.S.H.A. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the new body will specialize in the acquisition of purely military information and to that extent be the successor of Abt. I of the Abwehr rather than of the Abwehr as a whole. It may also retain certain functions of counter-espionage and security where these lie wholly within the military sphere.

III.

The foregoing paragraphs will have made it clear that, while our theoretical knowledge is considerable, we are not so well acquainted with the S.D. in practice as with the Abwehr. The S.D. agents whom we have received in this country during the war have been by comparison extremely few. The reason is obvious. England does not contain any handy materials for Insurierung; in wartime it is a comparatively barren field even for the political spy; and the S.D.'s interest in the more accessible forms of espionage is of recent origin. It would, therefore, be misleading to base any general conclusions on our own experience. But some comfort may legitimately be drawn from the fact that one of the few S.D. agents to operate in England (a clerk in a neutral embassy whom the threadbare salary of five pounds a month had exposed to certain temptations) was no more fanatical or dangerous than his normal counterpart in the Abwehr.

In general, however, the efficiency of the S.D. is markedly greater than that of the Abwehr. This may be assigned to a number of causes. Unlike the Abwehr, which had to rely so largely on retired officers and miscellaneous Auslandsdeutsche, the S.D. has been able to recruit its staff to a great extent from men with at least some experience of police work. Moreover, all (or nearly all) those whom it did recruit were ex hypothesi fanatics if nothing else. The career of Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, now, in succession to Heydrich, head of the R.S.H.A., is in many respects typical of that of his subordinate officers. He is a man of forty-one, born in Upper Austria, and by training a lawyer. His family were traditional upholders of the pan-German movement; and his early life was passed either at Graz, then a centre of German nationalism, or at Linz, which later became the headquarters of Nazi activity in Austria. He was called to the bar in 1933, the year of Hitler's triumph, and became very shortly afterwards the Party's legal representative in Austria. Later, through his association with Dr. Franz Huchner, Goering's
2. The R.S.H.A.

brother-in-law, he was brought into touch with the leaders of the movement and added personal to idealistic ties. Kaltenbrunner was twice arrested by the Austrian police, once immediately after Dollfuss' murder (in which he was implicated) and once a few months later. Each time his influential connections secured his release, though, on the second occasion, not for ten months. His reward came with the Anschluss, when he entered Seyss-Inquart's cabinet as the Minister of Security. At the same time, he took over command of the S.S. in Upper Austria. By May, 1939, he was reported as the head of the S.D.—more probably the Sipo u. S.D.—in Austria. In May, 1942, he succeeded Heydrich in full charge of the R.S.H.A.

Kaltenbrunner is essentially a man who has pinned his faith to the Party. If he survives a German defeat, his occupation will be gone; the profession in which he was trained and even his own country will be closed to him; and he himself will have joined the fugitives. It would be odd if he were not keenly conscious of the value of employing under him men in the same case. Indeed, any assessment of the German police as a whole would be incomplete which did not draw attention to the unifying qualities of its reputation. The record both in and outside Germany of the Sipo and outside Germany of the Orpo also, has been so dark that none of their members, even the most sanguine, can reasonably expect anything but vengeance to follow a collapse of the present regime. Whether they like it or not, their future subsists in their past actions. They are bound to their masters as much by a feeling of collective guilt as by any doctrinal attachment or sense of benefits received.

Other considerations bolster the morale and, therefore, the efficiency of the S.D. Its primary function, as its name, has so far been that of a security service. The conditions of modern war, in espionage if not in active operations, are such as to give decisive advantage to the defence. Aerial reconnaissance and similar technical developments have diminished the value, and therefore the status, of a spy; rapidity of transport and especially of communications has hampered rather than eased his task; the multitudinous checks and controls which are now a part of every day life surround him with dangers undreamt of, for example, in the last war. If only for these reasons a security service is always likely to defeat an espionage service of equal efficiency. It is natural that the S.D.'s record should compare favourably with that of the Abwehr. Whether it will continue to do so is a matter for speculation. The greater part of its active espionage has so far been conducted in the most favourable conditions, e.g., among the collaborators of Vichy or the sympathetic Fascists of Rome. Amt VI will already have found that the collection of
The R.S.H.A.

military information on the Russian front presents other and more difficult problems. Nevertheless, the S.D. starts with one advantage denied to the Abwehr. It is an organ of the Party not of the O.K.W. It is, therefore, still in the sunlight of comparative success and untouched by the shadow of disaster which, during the last eighteen months, has overcast Germany's purely military operations.

The imposing facade of the R.S.H.A. is, however, not altogether without its flaws. Fanaticism is not necessarily complemented by, still less is it a substitute for ability and experience. A number of S.D. and Gestapo officers owe their appointments more to their Party record (in which brutality is an asset) than to any deep knowledge of their trade. In other instances, the very grossness of the crimes that men have been ordered and encouraged to commit has sown the seed of disaffection. Certain members of the Schupo, employed to operate the asphyxiating vans (the labour-saving invention of a Dr. Becker) which are now used on the eastern front for the mass disposal of Jews and Russians, have preserved sufficient niceness of sense to go mad. Others have kept their sanity but lost their faith in the Party which drove them to these excesses. A more dangerous weakness of structure lies in the fact that not all members of the Gestapo were recruited voluntarily. The great expansion of this force during the war, and in particular that caused by its taking over the work of frontier control, sometimes made press-gang methods necessary to fill the ranks. In Austria, for example, the existing frontier police were compulsorily transferred to the Gestapo almost en bloc; at the same time, by a simple paper transaction they became sworn members of the S.S. It is not to be supposed that they are more loyal to their new faith than those of his followers whom an enterprising Chinese general used to baptise with a hose. There are, therefore, though comparatively few and unevenly distributed, some uncertain elements even in the Gestapo. The same is probably true, and perhaps to a greater extent, in both the Kripo and the Orpo. Only the S.D. remains so far as we know, wholly contaminated or (from a Nazi point of view) uncontaminated.
3. German Intelligence Services in the Field.

I.

As the Intelligence Service of the O.K.W., the Abwehr was as much a part of the German armed forces as the Signals or any other specialist corps. Its specific aim was to deliver the information collected as rapidly as possible to the operational headquarters best able to make use of it. It is a reasonable assumption that under the new regime the Abwehr department in the R.S.S.H.A. will continue and even develop this system. The following description of the Abwehr's relations with the field army, although it relates to the past and the days of the Abwehr's independence, is likely to remain valid even under the present dispensation. Some minor changes may be made, but it is now too late and times are too critical for any wholesale re-organization of a system so directly connected with actual operations.

The normal route taken by an Abwehr report or item of intelligence is as follows: from the agent who acquires it to his controlling Ast; from there to the appropriate section (e.g., Eins Heer West) at Abwehr headquarters; then to the evaluating section of the General Staff (e.g., Fremde Heer West); and then, as part of a consolidated report, through normal intelligence channels to the operational headquarters concerned. In practice, as may be supposed, this route is often too circuitous and slow; various arrangements are in force to abbreviate it when necessary. In peacetime, for example, any Abwehrstelle in Germany is in close touch with the I.c. or Intelligence Staff at the corresponding Wehrkreis headquarters; the Ast, indeed, is usually housed or at least has an office in the local Command H.Q. It must be considered not only as part of a centrally organized Intelligence Service but also (in some respects) as an under-cover branch or section of the I.c. staff at Wehrkreis headquarters. In wartime, when the Wehrkreis is not an operational headquarters, this relationship becomes unimportant. A parallel can, however, be found in the relations between an Ast in occupied territory and the military, naval or air-force headquarters associated with it. The Ast will be in close relations with the I.c. staff (or its equivalent) at these headquarters, will pass reports to them direct and will receive from them instructions and questionnaires. This may have the effect of shortening considerably the route taken by reports.

The same system of direct liaison can be extended to field formations. The Abwehr may attach to any formation which requires a rapid information service one of its own men in the form of an N.B.O. or Nachrichtenbeschaffungsoffizier. This officer, as his title implies, is concerned exclusively with the acquisition and distribution of Intelligence; he is, therefore, (whether actually drawn from the ranks of the Abwehr or not)
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an officer with Abt. I training. He is normally in direct communication with all the Abwehrstellen who can regularly supply information about the area in which his formation is operating. He receives their reports in the original and interprets them to the I.c. Staff. He also acquires information himself—e.g., by reconnaissance, interrogation or the study of captured documents—and when necessary passes back reports from his own sources to the Abwehrstellen concerned. An N.B.O. is by definition an Abt. I man; he is most likely to be found at the headquarters of an independent formation (e.g., of the Luftwaffe) who does require information but does not need the specialized assistance of the Abwehr in other respects. At the headquarters of an army or any higher formation the N.B.O. may be supplemented or succeeded by a more important functionary, the I.c./A.O. He was originally no more than an attached I (b) officer, either from the Abwehr or with Abt. III training, who was responsible for the maintenance of security within the formation. Within the last two years, however, his duties have expanded; he is now the Abwehr's representative with the staff and exercises a general supervision (in the interests of the staff) over any Abwehr activities which are carried on within the formation. Unlike the N.B.O., he is not exclusively concerned with information; the functions of Abt. II and Abt. III are equally within his province.

An I.c./A.O. may have at his disposal the services of mobile Abwehr units attached to his formation. The basic unit is the Abwehrkommando. This is a mobile detachment, usually commanded by a major or lieut.-colonel and made up of a small headquarters section with its attendant wireless station and a variable number of component Abwehrtruppen. The latter, which are also wireless-equipped, have their own transport and are intended to operate as independent units. The functions of an Abwehrkommando may be compared with those of a Gruppe at a fixed Ast in the sense that each Kommando is concerned only with one branch of the Abwehr's work. A single formation may, therefore, have attached to it three separate Kommandos, engaged respectively in the work of Abt. I, Abt. II and Abt. III. Similarly, a specialized Luft or Marine Kommando* may be attached to an independent air force formation or naval command. The nature of the work in which any particular Kommando is engaged is reflected in its official title. Each Kommando is allotted a three-figure number, the first figure of which indicates its function; Truppen are similarly numbered out of blocks of numbers allocated to the parent Kommando. Thus Kommando 327 is necessarily engaged in counter-espionage and security.

* See also page 41 below.
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Kommando 227 in sabotage and subversion; and Abwehrtrupp 127 Luft is necessarily part of a I Kommando attached to a formation of the Luftwaffe. In practice, however, all Kommandos are apt to be known either by cover-names or by the names of their commanding officers rather than by their official titles. For this reason their respective functions are not always immediately apparent.

The Abwehrkommandos attached to a field formation perform collectively on its behalf the same functions as a fixed Abwehrstelle. It must be emphasized, however, that these are not exclusively Secret Service functions as that term is normally understood. A I Kommando collects information; partly, it is true, by the operation of secret agents, but equally by interrogating local civilians and deserters, tapping telephone lines, scrutinizing captured documents and even (on occasion) by personal reconnaissance. A II Kommando may be said to exist for the purpose of making trouble in any way likely to assist military operations. It may do so by organizing acts of physical sabotage such as the destruction of a vulnerable point behind the enemy's lines. Its work may equally well be preventative—e.g., the seizure in advance of regular troops of some target, such as a bridge, which the enemy would otherwise destroy. Such acts are, however, the exception rather than the rule; the staple of a II Kommando's business is the organization on both sides of the fighting line of active political sympathy for the German cause. Sometimes this involves no more than propaganda designed to rally support on one side and incite to disaffection on the other. It may extend, however, to the infiltration of agitators through the enemy's lines or even the raising and staffing of bands of partisans for guerrilla warfare. A III Kommando is concerned with security in all its aspects; its functions are far wider than those of the S.C.I. unit attached to a British or American Army Group. It engages in counter-espionage; but it also supervises W/T security and the censorship of letters and publications, suppresses careless talk, watches over the physical security of documents and enforces measures to counter enemy propaganda. For all these purposes its executive instrument is the G.F.P.

There is no fixed establishment for an Abwehrkommando; its size depends entirely on the number of its component Truppen and the nature of the work in which they are engaged. An Abwehrtrupp at its smallest (e.g., a reconnaissance Trupp of a I Kommando) may consist only of a wireless truck manned by one officer or Sonderführer, an interpreter and a driver; at its largest (e.g., a Trupp of a II Kommando engaged in guerrilla warfare) it may have a total strength, partisans included, of
anything up to 80 or 100 men. In the same way, a single Kommando may consist of as few as three or four or (in the case of a III Kommando) as many as ten or twelve constituent Truppen. The size of Kommandos and Truppen is also regulated to some extent by the manner in which they are centrally organized.

At one time the practice was to attach to each Army Group a corresponding Abwehrgruppe composed of a minimum of three Kommandos representing the three different Abteilungen of the Abwehr. The headquarters of the Gruppe were necessarily at or near Army Group H.Q.; the constituent Kommandos were disposed among lower formations within the Army Group on a basis of convenience. Each Kommando attached itself for rations, supplies and protection to whatever formation, an army, a corps or even a division, was at the time most conveniently situated for its work. The point of unified control was the headquarters of the Abwehrgruppe, which were themselves in direct communication with Abwehr headquarters in Berlin. This form of organization was employed where the German armies were advancing and, therefore, bringing new territory within the Abwehr's sphere. For this reason it was convenient to attach to each higher formation what was, in fact, a mobile and self-contained Abwehrstelle, capable of operating independently however far forward the German armies were carried. In Italy, and more recently in France, Belgium and Holland, the Germans have faced a different problem. They are not breaking new ground, but falling back towards their own central organization in Germany itself. There is no longer the same need for Abwehr field formations to be independent and self-contained; it is more convenient and satisfactory to link them with an existing Abwehrstelle behind the zone of operations. The system of Abwehrgruppen is, therefore, dispensed with. Instead, individual Kommandos are attached to Army Groups and dispose their component Truppen among the lower formations. This has two results. First Abwehrkommandos tend to be larger than was previously the case, in the sense of comprising more and larger Abwehrtruppen. It may even become necessary for an individual Kommando to delegate the control of some of its Truppen to an intermediary headquarters. Such control troops are usually to be found co-ordinating the work of Abwehrtruppen at some independent or semi-independent formation. Secondly, the I, II and III Kommandos attached to an Army Group operate independently of each other and not as part of a unified Abwehrgruppe. The ultimate centralized control is vested in a fixed Abwehrstelle in the rear or in Germany itself, which assumes for the purpose the status of an Alst. This station then becomes the
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co-ordinating point through which all Abwehr reports, whether from Berlin or from other Asts in Germany or elsewhere, flow forward to the operational command. Similarly, it receives, where necessary, copies of reports flowing back from the Kommandos and Truppen in the field. An immediate co-ordination for strictly operational purposes is secured by attaching to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief (e.g., Field Marshal Rundstedt’s H.Q. in Paris) forward liaison sections from each of the three Gruppen or Departments of this parent Ast. They severally receive reports from and generally control the work of the I, II and III Kommandos attached to the Army Groups under the Commander-in-Chief’s control.

A system of mobile Kommandos and Truppen replaces the Abwehr’s customary static network in any country which is or is about to become an area of active operations. Within the last six or nine months, therefore, the Abwehr has had to remodel its standing organization, first in the Balkans, then in Italy and finally in France and the Low Countries, either in anticipation or as the result of an Allied attack. In each of these areas there are now only vestigial remains of the network of Asts and their subordinate Stellen with which we were familiar between 1941 and the end of 1943. It must not be inferred from this that the detailed knowledge of the older system which accumulated during that period is now entirely worthless. Kommandos and Truppen in any area necessarily draw their personnel to a great extent from the Abwehrstellen or Nebenstellen which preceded them. All the women and some of the older men of the earlier staff will be sent back and distributed among static Abwehrstellen in Germany or elsewhere; some new men with previous experience of Kommando work in Russia or Italy will be brought in; but the central core of the staff will remain what it was. Kommandos have also a natural tendency (so far as operational requirements permit) to settle down on or near the sites of the static Abwehrstellen whose heirs they are. This enables them to keep in touch more readily with existing agents and informants and also, no doubt, to continue to make use of established offices, post-boxes and other addresses. The change-over from a static to a mobile system calls for fewer readjustments than might be supposed, nor is the cleavage between the two so fundamental in practice as it may appear on paper. Moreover, as will be seen at the conclusion of this chapter, there is one respect in which the original static organization continues to be of importance even under conditions of active service.

To complete the picture of the Abwehr in the field, something must here be said of the Division Brandenburg, a military or para-military formation closely associated with it. It was originally formed shortly before the war as a special service
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...
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In the field, units of the Brandenburg Division have a semi-autonomous status; they are immediately subordinate to the I.c. staff of the Army Corps to which they are attached, but in practice receive and act upon orders from their own headquarters. They do not, unless in exceptional circumstances, come under local unit commanders nor may they be used except in an emergency as ordinary fighting troops. In any continental operation, it is very probable that units of the Division will be encountered in the field, operating either independently or in conjunction with the II Kommandos. Personnel captured from these units will not necessarily admit to any special status and may have been provided with uniforms and pay-books showing them to belong to some ordinary military formation. Apart from any actual units of the Division which may be present, it is probable that a number of officers and N.C.Os. attached to Kommandos, and particularly II Kommandos, will either belong to or have been trained by the Division.

Finally, apart from the Abwehr and the Division Brandenburg, it is necessary to consider a third organization whose units may be encountered in the field. This is the M.E.A., or Marine Einsatz Abteilung, a special formation of the German Navy which was recently created under the command of Admiral Heye in order to take over certain duties of coastal reconnaissance. A number of its officers have been drawn from Abwehr Eins Marine and its operational units or Marine Einsatz Kommandos (M.E.K.) appear to have taken over, at least to a great extent, the naval intelligence duties formerly discharged in the field by Abwehr Marine Kommandos or Truppen. The M.E.A. must not be regarded, however, only as an Intelligence Service. Much, perhaps most, of its work lies within the field of straightforward naval reconnaissance, e.g., the type of active patrolling in search of information which has always been a function of light naval forces or coastal craft. It no doubt intends to enlarge, or has already enlarged, its functions so as to include something in the nature of Commando raids or small combined operations. It is certainly reasonable to expect that there will be a flavour of marine sabotage in the M.E.A.'s activities.

II.

The S.D., or rather the R.S.H.A., also attaches mobile units to the field army organized on a pattern not dissimilar from that of the Abwehr. There is, however, this difference. The R.S.H.A. is in no sense subordinate to the O.K.W., nor is it primarily concerned with assisting military operations or obtaining operational information. If it attaches units to the army, it does so for its own purposes: to ensure the security of conquered
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3.

territory; to obtain political and economic information; and
to fish (like Abt. II of the Abwehr) in troubled political
waters. In the course of these activities, S.D. mobile units may
be concerned in undertakings which directly affect military opera-
tions and may acquire information of operational importance. If
so, their liaison, like that of their opposite numbers in the Abwehr,
is with the appropriate I.c. officer. In all other matters their
control proceeds directly from R.S.H.A. quarters in Berlin. They
are not, in the same sense as Abwehrkommandos, the servants
of the formation to which they are attached.

Like the Abwehr the R.S.H.A. modifies its field organization
to accommodate the different conditions of advance and retreat.
During an advance each Army Group may have attached to it a
complete Einsatzgruppe, commanded by an S.S. Brigadeführer
or Oberführer and having a total strength of four or five
hundred men. Each Gruppe is divided into a variable number of
Einsatzkommandos of a strength of sixty or seventy men, com-
manded by an S.S. Sturmbannführer or Obersturmbannführer.
The Kommandos in turn are sub-divided into Teilkommandos,
small mobile detachments which may be regarded as the equiva-
lent of Abwehrtruppen. Einsatzgruppen are usually known by
the same letter as designated the Army Group to which they were
attached. An Einsatzgruppe is a composite formation and its
personnel a cross-section of all the forces at the disposal of the
R.S.H.A. The bulk are drawn from the Sipo with a certain inter-
mixing of S.D. officers; but units of the Schupo and the
Waffen S.S. are also attached. The functions of the Einsatz-
gruppen are purely defensive; they are concerned only with
security in the rather liberal (or perhaps reactionary) sense in
which that term is usually interpreted by the R.S.H.A. They
round up Jews, members of the Communist Party and enemy
officials who have remained or been left behind in newly occupied
areas; they investigate cases of political espionage; they are
active against partisans; and they are responsible for the sorting
and interrogation of civilians who had been interned. Their
methods appear to have been summary and brutal. They are
in a position, without reference to higher authority, to imprison
or execute suspects or to consign them to forced labour in
Germany. The usual division of duties between the Sipo or S.D.
personnel and the attached Schupo and Waffen S.S. units is for
the former to conduct investigations, interrogate suspects or
captured partisans and examine documents; guard duties and the
mass disposal of the convicted or the unwanted fell to the latter.
Individual companies or battalions of the Schupo or (less
frequently) the Waffen S.S. are also used sometimes with and
sometimes without infantry support, in direct military action
against the partisans. Their losses have been heavy.
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In some cases at any rate, the offensive or Amt VI aspects of the R.S.H.A.'s work were kept apart from the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. A number of special mobile units (known generally as Sonderkommandos) took over this work under the direct control of a section of Amt VI. There are two types of Sonderkommandos: Hauptkommandos attached to Army Groups, and subsidiary Aussenkommandos attached to Armies or lower formations. These units are linked with the corresponding Einsatzgruppe and are generally responsible to its commanding officer; in practice, however, they occupy a position of almost complete independence. They are mainly engaged, at least during the early stages of the campaign, in work of Insurgierung; that is to say the organization behind the lines of national minorities who were, or could be persuaded to become, hostile to the enemy. They are also occupied, though to a rather lesser degree in obtaining economic information, e.g., about the extent to which factories or factory equipment had been successfully transported to the rear. When a German retreat begins the functions of the Sonderkommandos change. Attempts to organize insurrection are no longer practical or even desirable. Few people are willing to resort to arms in support of a liberator on the defensive and nothing alienates political sympathisers so readily as an ill-timed and unsuccessful rising. The dissident groups organized by the Sonderkommandos are therefore used, so far as possible, not for trouble making but for the reporting of straightforward military intelligence. One cannot say to what extent Sonderkommandos succeed in adapting their agents to this new role; it is probable that the results are good enough to bring the S.D. for the first time into direct rivalry with the Abwehr as a source of operational intelligence.

In Italy at the present time, or in any other campaign in which the German armies are falling back through a country that has previously been occupied, there is no need for the elaborate organization of Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos. With very little difficulty the normal standing organization under the H.S.S.Pf. and the B.d.S. can be adapted to the needs of the field army. The B.d.S. becomes the advisor of the Commander-in-Chief instead of the Militärbefehlshaber or Reichskommissar, but his status is otherwise unaltered. He can continue to work either from his old office in the capital or (if circumstances dictate a move) from an office at or near G.H.Q. The K.d.S. in charge of a district or region continues his normal functions; the only difference is that the Einsatzkommando under his control will be placed on a mobile footing and may find it convenient to abandon its previous static headquarters and attach itself instead to some neighbouring military formation. As the battle progresses, it may
become necessary to draft additional Einsatzkommandos into the area, e.g., to assist in a mass round-up in the back areas of persons whom the Germans consider likely to assist the enemy. If so, they also will come under the control of the B.d.S. The offensive functions of espionage and political subversion will continue to be discharged by the Abt. VI staff at the offices of the B.d.S. Certain special undertakings may make it necessary to reinforce this section with one or more Sonderkommandos which, while under the control of the B.d.S., can work directly with or be attached to a formation in the field. The seizure or recapture of Mussolini, for example, was the joint work of a detachment of General Student's parachutists and an S.D. Kommando under the leadership of an Amt VI officer sent from Germany for the purpose. The systematic looting of documents and records of political, economic or historical interest is equally within the province of Amt VI and may call for the services of a special Kommando. Lastly, there is sabotage now increasingly a preoccupation of Amt VI, not only as an adjunct to or extension of political insurrection but also in the form of isolated sabotage operations carried out for their own sake after the manner of Abt. II of the Abwehr. In Italy the S.D. has been responsible for the infiltration through the Allied lines of a number of lone saboteurs of this type. These undertakings appear to have been organized from the office of the B.d.S. rather than by an S.D. unit actually operating in the field. It is probable that they are in the nature of an improvisation only. The sudden collapse of the Fascist regime and the Allied landing which followed, caught the S.D. like other German authorities, unprepared. They had no opportunity to organize an effective network. Had they been able to do so, these excursions into military sabotage might have tempted them less. If, however, a definite development in S.D. policy is in question, it would be reasonable to expect in any future operation to find attached to forward formations S.D. Kommandos specifically charged with sabotage.

III.

There are two types of German agent who may be encountered during active operations in the field: the "stay-behind" agents and the later arrivals. The former will be agents (whether of the Abwehr or the S.D.) who have been recruited, trained and placed in position during the German occupation with instructions to remain where they are, and permit themselves to be over-run by the Allied armies so that they may subsequently report to the Germans from behind our lines. The latter will be agents who have been passed through or landed behind the Allied lines after
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operations have begun. In one sense there will be little difference between the two. For the most part, no doubt, it is a matter of accident only whether a man is recruited as a stay-behind agent or for a subsequent venture set on foot during the progress of operations. Younger men are perhaps more likely to be employed in the latter capacity since the physical hazards are greater; but it would certainly be unreasonable to expect the two types to differ very greatly as individuals or even to be aware themselves that any distinction could be drawn between them. From an investigator's point of view, however, there are certain distinctions—

which it is of practical value to draw.

Both the Abwehr and the S.D. began to prepare a stay-behind network in western Europe as long as a year or eighteen months ago. Consequently, the majority of these agents, in so far as they have any knowledge to impart of the organizations which recruited them, will be able to describe not the field organization of the Abwehr or the S.D. but the static organization which preceded it. Moreover, their lines of communication will tend to run back not to the Abwehr or S.D. Kommandos attached to the German armies, but behind them to fixed stations in the rear or in Germany itself. These facts, though simple in themselves, may tend to complicate investigation if they are not fully understood. A stay-behind agent captured in Belgium might be found, for example, to have been recruited by and be familiar with the personnel of the old Nest Lille. If he were operating a wireless transmitter he might be in communication with Nest Cologne, from which Stelle his effective control would now proceed. Another agent arrested at the same time and in the same part of Belgium who was not a member of the stay-behind network might never have heard of Nest Lille or Nest Cologne because he had been recruited in the field by an Abwehrkommando and his communications formed part of a different system. An investigator who did not understand the workings of the Abwehr or the nature of the change over from static to field conditions would be tempted to assume that the two agents belonged to separate Intelligence Services. In fact, they are properly to be regarded as units in the same organization, likely to behave in the same way, to have received similar instructions and (very probably) to be or have been in contact with each other. The apparent dissimilarity between their backgrounds need not confuse the issue once the reasons for it are appreciated.

It is probable that all or almost all stay-behind agents will be equipped with wireless. They will mostly use sets of the types normally issued to Abwehr or S.D. agents which are described in some detail below. It is possible, however, with this type of agent that some more elaborate installations such as wireless sets
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disguised as gramophones, or ordinary commercial receivers inconspicuously converted for use as transmitters, will also be found. On the whole, such refinements are likely to be rare. Wireless equipment is short in Germany at the moment and becoming increasingly so. The Abwehr and the S.D. may feel that they have done well to provide enough wireless sets of any kind to satisfy the needs of a fairly extensive network. Wherever possible, stay-behind agents will also have been given an alternative means of communication for use in the event of their losing wireless contact. This may take the form (as is usual with agents sent to this country) of secret ink and a cover address in a neutral country. The Germans will, however, expect and intend their agents to be most active while they are actually in or near the operational zone; their value will necessarily diminish as the battle leaves them behind. For this reason not much reliance will be placed on secret writing as the Germans will expect the necessary postal facilities to be lacking, or at any rate lacking at the crucial time. A similar argument applies to communication by courier unless conditions of warfare should develop (as in some parts of Italy) in which the privy passage of the Allied lines becomes a comparatively easy matter. The alternative sometimes adopted by the Abwehr is to form agents into groups of four or six round one principal agent (presumably the most capable wireless operator or the one who has the securest cover) who acts as a central reporting point. The other agents will normally be in direct communication with Germany; but, if their wireless sets fail them or become too dangerous to use, they have an alternative means of communication through the central reporting point to which they can deliver their messages personally, through an intermediary or (if circumstances permit) by post in secret writing.

Most stay-behind agents, having been recruited six months or even a year ago, will have had ample opportunity by now to establish themselves in their place of work and arrange their cover. In this sense they will be at an advantage over those who arrive later; at the same time they will encounter certain difficulties of their own. It is not psychologically possible or expedient to keep an agent idle for any long period after his training has been completed. For this reason the Germans, while awaiting an Allied attack, have tended to use a number of their stay-behind agents in western Europe in casual counter-espionage work of various kinds. It is, therefore, not improbable that some of them at any rate will already have become locally conspicuous as German informants or denouncers. C.I. officers may perhaps be inclined to assume that persons who have acquired such a reputation are unlikely to be members of the stay-behind network, since the Germans will have been careful to
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select only the inconspicuous as their agents. In theory, no doubt, this is true; in practice, not necessarily so. The argument that a man cannot be a spy because he is publicly known to be one is more ingenious than sound.

There are few practical distinctions to be drawn between stay-behind agents of the Abwehr and those of the S.D. The Abwehr's stay-behind network will certainly include agents of all three Abteilungen. Agents of Abt. I will be there primarily to collect operational information; agents of Abt. II for sabotage or as political propagandists and agitators; agents of Abt. III to hamper the work of resistance groups and to penetrate Allied Intelligence Services by offering themselves as recruits. S.D. agents will be there primarily for purposes of political subversion and in order to keep the Germans in touch with any collaborationist movements or minority groups whom they hope still to be able to turn to some practical account. S.D. agents may also have been instructed to report items of military or operational information and will certainly do so if opportunity serves. Similarly, they may have received missions involving sabotage. The broad distinction will, however, remain between Abwehr agents whose interests are those of the German armed forces and S.D. agents whose interests are those of the Nazi Party. The disposition of the Abwehr's stay-behind network will have been governed by considerations of strategy and tactics; that of the S.D. to a greater extent by political considerations. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that in western Europe the Abwehr will have put their main strength into the coastal belt (any part of which is likely to be the scene of fighting) and will have manned more lightly those inland districts which may be off the main current of operations. The S.D., on the other hand, will have disposed their agents in the areas (whether strategically important or not) in which the instruments of political subversion lie most easily to hand. A similar distinction may be observable between the types of person employed as agents. The Abwehr in general care little about the political sympathies of their agents. They have employed non-Nazis and even anti-Nazis as often as pro-Nazis. The S.D., as befits an organization responsible to Himmler, insists as an absolute condition of employment that any agent shall have a record of sympathy with, if not active support of, the Nazi Party. It follows that, in occupied Europe, almost all S.D. agents are drawn from the ranks of collaborationist parties such as the P.P.F., the Rexisten, the N.B.S., and so on; no similar consistency in political opinion can be noted among Abwehr agents.
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IV.

The later arrivals, that is the agents who are passed through or dropped behind the Allied lines during an operation, may be divided for convenience into two classes: those who arrive clandestinely, and those who declare their arrival but pose as innocent refugees or travellers. From the German point of view there are advantages and disadvantages in either method. A declared arrival must necessarily submit to interrogation about his past life, the purpose or occasion of his journey, and his friends and contacts within the Allied area. If he arouses suspicion, his subsequent movements (even if he is not actually arrested) may be so hampered as to render him useless as a spy. On the other hand, if he satisfies his interrogators, he is provided with valid papers of identity and can assume a legal and unquestioned status as a resident within the area. An agent illicitly landed, has no such advantage. Apart from the risks of discovery to which he may be exposed on his first arrival, he has subsequently to establish himself either without papers or with papers which are false or have been acquired illegally. He cannot at any time be wholly secure; indeed, the longer he remains in the area the more danger of his discovery. His greatest compensating advantage is in respect of the equipment which he can bring with him. No declared arrival, who must expect to be searched, can hope to conceal more on his person than (at the most) a strictly limited quantity of money, the materials for secret writing or perhaps one of the smaller items of sabotage equipment. There can be no question of his carrying bulky equipment such as a wireless set or even the substantial supply of money which may be necessary for his own work or may be required to pay already established agents.

It is not surprising to find that most of the agents who were clandestinely landed in this country arrived during the period between the defeat of France and the early part of 1941. They were all equipped with wireless sets and intended to provide the rapid information which the Germans required for offensive operations against England. After the beginning of 1941, when invasion was no longer in prospect, the Germans generally preferred the safer, but in its nature slower, method of sending their agents as refugees or travellers. In a continental operation, conditions will be more closely analogous to those of 1940-1941 than to those of the later period. It must be remembered, however, that in 1940 the Germans had no standing network in this country worth the name. The spies which they sent in had, therefore, to be equipped to operate on their own. The same will not necessarily be true on the continent; it will be possible there to send in agents to reinforce or to make contact with the existing stay-behind network. The fact, for example, that a new
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Arrival does not himself possess a wireless set will not always mean that he was not intended to have access to one. A spy who arrives without money, without equipment and without apparent means of communication, may have been instructed to put himself in touch with an existing network which can supply these deficiencies.

There are only a limited number of ways in which spies can be illicitly landed. They can drop by parachute; they can row ashore from submarines, E-boats or seaplanes; they can attempt to pass secretly through the lines or across the frontier from a neighbouring neutral country. It is obvious in each case that they are most vulnerable at and immediately after their moment of landing. They will, almost certainly, have brought with them a quantity of incriminating material (e.g., false papers, sabotage equipment, a large sum of money or a wireless set); it will be a matter of some hours at the least before they have an opportunity to bury, conceal or otherwise rid themselves of these embarrassments. Those who land on the coast or drop by parachute will have certain peculiar encumbrances of their own. A spy who lands from a seaplane is commonly under the necessity of destroying the rubber boat in which he rowed ashore. The customary German instructions to puncture holes in the buoyancy tanks of the boat and push it out to sea are something less than practical. More than one unhappy agent has found that rubber boats were tougher than he expected, and that as he had rowed ashore on the incoming tide nothing would induce his craft to drift out to sea. Parachutists are in a similar case; they have their parachute and its harness to dispose of. This is, in itself, a comparatively simple matter. In our experience, however, few German agents are expert in parachute jumping. The majority of those who have arrived in England by this means were making their first attempt when they landed. A high proportion of the enemy agents dropped by parachute in this country have injured themselves on landing. Their subsequent efforts to conceal their gear have been hampered by sprained ankles, damaged shoulders or a temporary concussion.

Standing controls of every kind, e.g., police, sentries, coast watchers or frontier guards are what illicit arrivals have principally to fear. In this country, at any rate, the majority of agents who have landed clandestinely have been captured within a few hours of their first arrival. A parachute imperfectly concealed or a rubber boat abandoned on the beach has started the hunt or they have themselves attracted the attention of some policeman, official or member of the public during the period before they had been able to rid themselves of their equipment or of other signs of their recent arrival. It is most important not only that standing
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control should be efficiently maintained, but also that all military personnel should be instructed to be on the watch for suspicious strangers who appear to have no business in the area. In this country the co-operation of the general public has been of great value. In parts at any rate of the continent an equal readiness to help should be forthcoming and every effort should be made to encourage it. When any suspicious person is brought in for examination the first questions to be addressed to him are: "Where are you?" "Where have you come from?" and "Where are you going to?" It is the common fate of all illicit arrivals to be uncertain of their precise whereabouts during the first few hours in which they are at large. This applies almost universally no matter by what method the agent has been landed. The Germans are accustomed, for example, to drop their parachutists from a considerable height. Anything up to 4,000 feet is common practice and there can, therefore, be no question of dropping an agent with absolute accuracy at a selected point. Many parachutists have found themselves as much as twenty or thirty miles from where they expected to be. Similarly, agents who row ashore from seaplanes, submarines or E-boats, are often deflected by the tide or by adverse currents from the point at which they intended to land. In one typical case, two agents landed in a state of partial exhaustion after several hours rowing with no clear idea at all what part of the coast they had reached. Even those who attempt to slip secretly through the lines or across a frontier frequently lose their sense of direction in doing so. It may well be a matter of some hours or more before they succeed in orientating themselves correctly. In a recent exercise in this country, one man who was playing the part of an enemy agent was caught in precisely this way, even though he was an Englishman and operating in his own country. Actual German agents have found themselves in a worse case. One, who had succeeded in burying his parachute and concealing the rest of his equipment, aroused suspicions which led to his arrest by his clumsy attempts to discover, in a newspaper shop, the name of the village in which he found himself. Two other agents who had been landed by seaplane encountered a similar difficulty while attempting to buy a ticket at a railway station. They were completely lost and excited the suspicions of the booking clerk by their obvious ignorance how much even in approximate terms a ticket to their destination should have cost. These difficulties will not, of course, be so marked during a continental operation, there the Germans will be able to draw, as they could not in England, upon an adequate supply of agents with intimate local knowledge. Nevertheless, even a well-instructed agent familiar with the district in which he has been landed is very liable during the first few hours to betray himself in this way.
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So far as this country is concerned, the Germans have always found great difficulty in supplying their agents with the necessary false papers. In almost every case, illicit arrivals have been inadequately documented. They have arrived, for example, with passports which contained no visa for entry into this country and no stamp showing that they had been formally landed. Moreover, the documents which they did possess, such as identity cards or ration books, have for the most part been ‘indifferent forgeries which could not have escaped detection by any but the least well qualified or most careless official. It is unlikely that this experience will be repeated on the Continent. During the period of their occupation, the Germans will have had opportunities to provide themselves with the means of reproducing any pass or document of identity which is at present in use. They are only likely to trip up in respect of passes or papers issued by the Allied authorities after they have re-assumed control of the area. It is probable that even these will present less difficulty to them than equivalent documents issued in England. It is a comparatively simple matter to prevent examples of identity cards, ration books, etc., from becoming available in quantity outside these islands. In Europe, however, where operations may be very fluid and one or more land frontiers may also be involved, the physical security of such documents presents far greater difficulties. In the long run, it will be almost impossible to prevent the Germans from possessing themselves of accurate copies of whatever documents they may require.

Lastly, there is the question of money. Most illicit arrivals will have been provided with enough money in bank-notes to maintain themselves for a period of at least two or three months. Parachutists and others landed in this country were usually supplied with between two and three hundred pounds in notes of small denominations. In a Continental operation, it is probable that many illicit arrivals will be carrying larger sums destined to supply the needs of some existing network. The Germans will no doubt have arranged, so far as possible, for stay-behind agents to have their own source of financial supply. Our experience is, however, that this is a branch of their work in which the Germans are singularly unimaginative or singularly inept. Certainly, they have experienced great difficulty in keeping agents in this country and in America supplied with funds, not because the funds were lacking but because they failed to find a convenient and safe method of transmitting them to the agents concerned. It is probable that they will encounter the same difficulties in Europe and tend to rely to a considerable extent upon the services of couriers to keep their network in funds. Consequently, any person found at large with substantial sums upon him in cash.
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will be, *prima facie,* suspect. He will be particularly so if there are any large number of dollars among the money in his possession. This is the standard currency of the black market, and it is on the whole easier and more profitable to supply an agent operating in Europe with dollars than with the currency of the country in which he is actually working. It must, however, be remembered that in the disturbed conditions which are likely to follow an Allied invasion of the Continent a number of innocent persons may be carrying large sums in cash for their own legitimate purposes. Whereas in England the possession of two or three hundred pounds on the part of an ordinary individual admits of few plausible explanations, on the Continent the possession of a similar sum can often be explained as a reasonable and natural precaution.

What has been said so far applies only to agents landed illicitly. Those who arrive openly and declare themselves as refugees or travellers present an entirely different problem. The only protection against them is the consistent thorough interrogation of all new arrivals in the area. This subject and the principles which should guide the interrogators are discussed at greater length in the next chapter: it is only necessary here to lay stress upon two points. The Germans may employ agents clandestinely landed for any purpose: the activities of those who arrive openly are circumscribed by the fact that they can bring so little with them. It is likely that the Germans will use the method of open arrival mainly for two types of agents: those who are charged with some mission of penetration and those who are intended to reinforce an existing network. The III F agents referred to in an earlier chapter are the typical penetrators. They bring nothing with them: their only mission is to attract the attention of an Allied Intelligence Service and to cause themselves to be returned to German-occupied territory in the character of Allied agents. Interrogators must, therefore, be on their guard not only against those who appear pro-German but also against some who are enthusiastically pro-Allied, especially if they show any signs of offering themselves for secret work. Agents intended to join an existing network are similarly placed. They need not necessarily bring anything with them except perhaps verbal instructions or some small object such as a spare part for a wireless set or a detonator which is susceptible of concealment. What they must have, whether memorized or in writing, are names and addresses of the members of the standing network with whom they are to get in touch. Particular interest, therefore, attaches to the district within the area to which they intend to go (and the fact that they do or do not go there); to any friends or acquaintances that they claim to have in the area; and to any names or addresses that may be discovered among their papers.