
In order to be able to properly understand the activities (work) of the Ukrainian Section of the Abwehr III in G6, it is necessary first of all to get acquainted with its organisational structure. Late in 1939, immediately after the Bolsheviks occupied Galicia, and the remaining Polish territory was occupied by the Germans — the territory of General guberniya was flooded with Ukrainian refugees from Galicia. The Germans took care of them and provided lodging, food etc. for them. Many of the refugees were members of the OUN. Almost all members of the administrative personnel of the OUN were also located in the G6. The Germans knew that the OUN was a bitter enemy of communism and decided to make use of this organisation by engaging its members for intelligence and counter-intelligence work.

Friedrich von Tarkuk, a viennese, at that time still ranking as a major, was directing the work of the Abwehr III in KRAKOW city. During the 1st World War von Tarkuk took part in many military actions against the Russians, became acquainted with many Ukrainians serving in the Austrian army, and learned to look upon them as trustworthy people. It was his idea to organise an Ukrainian Section attached to the Abwehr III. With the aid of a former Ukrainian colonial of Austrian nationality, a fellow by the name BIZANSIAGI, he was able to establish connections with an administrative member of the OUN — a chemistry engineer, EUGENE WRECOMA, who for some time was in charge of the intelligence section of the OUN.

VON TARKUK asked EUGENE WRECOMA whether he would be willing to organise such an intelligence section for him. Engineer WRECOMA commented and began to organise such a section. He got in touch with various persons who worked for the intelligence or counter-intelligence sections of the OUN and engaged them to work for this newly created section.

At the beginning, the following individuals were staff members of the UKRAINIAN Section.

2. Eng. BLADIX, YAROSLAV - " Eng. TARAVGER TDGIF - deputy chief.
3. MYROVICH, ROMAN - (Pseudo. NOVAK TDGIF) - office chief
4. RAK YAROSLAV (I do not remember his pseudo) - technical director.
5. GLADIKY, VLADIMIR - V-man in KRAKOW
6. ROMANYUK YAROSLAV - V-man in KRAKOW
7. KORZHAN MIKHAEL - V-man in RUDNIA
The above 13 men were working steady with the Ukrainian section, and each of them had dozens of informers. The total boundary line of the Krakow sector, covered by the ABWEHR III, was divided into small strips for which individual men were responsible. These men were known as "HELDKOPF". Such HELDKOPF's were established in SANOK, PRZEMYSL, RAJTOM, YAROSLAV, LEZAYSK, AND MISK.

Each one of the above named men, stationed in the "Central" as well as on the boundary line, received an identification card and fire-arms. The text of the identification cards was as follows:

GRENADMITTENKOMMANDO III. D.A.T.E. . . . . .

Proof of identity . . . . .

The possessor of this legitimation Mr. . . . . . is employed by the German WEHRMACHT. All military and civil authorities are urged to help in every possible way the above named individual. The possessor of this legitimation is permitted to carry firearms.

I. A.

(signed) WIENER

This legitimation was made valid from 3 to 6 months. The serial number of the fire weapon carried was not marked. A photograph of the individual was pasted in the legitimation. The name which appeared on the legitimation was in most cases not the true name of the individual. Each HELDKOPF was identified by a letter and a digit - R, 1; R, 2; R, 3; etc. Each of the main, working for this outfit was obliged to send in reports to the "Central" twice a month. However, he could send in reports every day if the situation warranted such action. The "Central" would translate these reports into German and forward them to the ABWEHR III.

Each HELDKOPF (message center) received instructions how to conduct their cases. Twice a month HLANKI visited each HELDKOPF and issued instructions on the spot. Each HELDKOPF on his territory had connections with the District Custom Office (BEZIRKSZOLL KOMMISSARIAT), and by presentation of his identification papers, was permitted to visit each boundary post of the Frontier Guards.
as well as to remain on the frontier zone.

When everything was organized in accordance with the above mentioned, von Tabruk engaged major von Korab from Vienna, whom he knew well, as an aid in the capacity of a V-Num. Major Korab was not yet at the time mobilized. He worked in the office of the Ukrainian Section and acted as a liaison officer between Tabruk and the office.

**Material Security:**

Each man working for the Ukrainian Section in Krakow received a beautiful, two-room, fully furnished apartment, including a telephone and radio. Men, who were stationed outside the city, in the provinces, also were furnished with apartments or little houses, including telephones and radios.

Men operating in Krakow, in addition to German food ration coupons, also received special consignments of whiskey, cigarettes, clothes, food, etc. In the provinces each Nebenkopf was regarded as an official translator for the Zollkommissar and received the same officer's rations, which were given to all civil service workers.

In addition each worker received a steady pay ranging from 300 to 500 Zlotych, an operating expense account, and extra compensations for reports, which varied, depending on the degree of their importance. Some valuable reports would bring in up to 2000 Zlotych. Ukrainian Sections located in Krakow as well as in the provinces were furnished with safe houses, where suspicious individuals were interrogated.

In addition to the official identification cards (Ermittlungsausweis) each worker was furnished with documents permitting him to walk around in the city or country at night (at the time ordinary citizens were not permitted to walk around at night after certain hours), to ride in German railroad cars, and also passes, which enabled free entrance to the Reich and Protectorate.

Having such material and technical aids, made it easy for the agents to operate. They were not hampered neither by time nor by boundary lines. Sometimes when it became necessary to investigate or get in contact with someone, whether it was in Krakow, Prague, or anywhere within the Reich, one could move about freely.
In those days it was known that the Soviet Intelligence used two methods in their operations. The first method was a short distance operation - penetrating a certain country to about 50 kilometers in depth. Such intelligence operations were performed by Soviet Intelligence officers, attached to the Frontier guards. Such officers were usually deputy commanders of the frontier outposts or central points of a given sector.

The second method of intelligence operations - deep penetration of a foreign country - was carried out by agents from the NKGB, stationed in KHERSON, KIYev or MOScow.

The work of the Ukrainian Section at first consisted of collecting detailed information on Soviet frontier posts, personnel, the names of Soviet officers, their functions, characteristics, residence addresses etc. Especially detailed information which were required from the agents of the Ukrainian Section to collect was to establish all pertinent data on each Soviet intelligence officer who was attached to a FOBANZASTAVA or a sector, which included several FOBANZASTAVAs.

The work and responsibilities of each NEIZERAPP consisted of covering the activities of the Soviet sector facing his own.

This work could be performed by two methods: one method consisted of sending men to the Soviet Territory. This was comparatively easy in those days, because many refugees on the German side came from areas, where Soviet frontier ZASTAVAs were located, and their families were still living on the Soviet side. These men would cross the boundary lines at night and collect desired information.

The other method consisted of rounding up all refugees crossing the borderline, and entering German Territory. From these refugees a lot of necessary information was collected. To this group belonged also various Soviet agents who were dispatched by Soviet intelligence officers, and who were caught on the German side.

The German frontier guards were able to apprehend only a few of these refugees, because two or four German guardsmen had to cover a stretch of three kilometers of the boundary line, while each NEIZERAPP had in his disposal dozens of men, and in addition, his men were stationed in various small villages, situated quite a distance from the frontier line.

If any of the refugees managed to cross the boundary line and pass through the first frontier zone, without being caught, they usually were apprehended in the second zone. Very few of them managed to slip through to the third zone.
About 75% of the refugees were caught by our men, and 25% by the frontier guards.

In addition each HVIDDEFOF had residents on the Soviet side, working for him. These residents were able to observe the individuals who were having contacts with Soviet frontier guards, or individuals who have been arrested, and later released and then crossed the boundary line. Usually such men were agents employed by the Soviet frontier guards as their agents. Such men, when caught, usually confessed their guilt because they were confronted with undeniable facts. Usually they were able to supply us with desirable information. By the middle of 1940 we were able to collect detailed information on all officers, serving on frontier posts as well as intelligence officers, attached to them. We were also able to collect a lot of information pertaining to the missions they were instructed to carry out on the German territory and what was of interest to them. The above mentioned constituted the first stage of our work. Later on we began with our second stage of work, namely, recruiting some of the Soviet agents to work for us.

For this type of work we used individuals who hated communism, but in order to avoid an arrest or incarceration, or under the threat of being exiled to Siberia, consented to work for the Soviet intelligence forces.

On my sector, between Yaroslav and Frunze, I managed to recruit five Soviet agents. Some of them crossed the border into the Soviet territory more than a dozen times. First I would find out what were the Soviet assignments given to each of the agents, then I would send them to the Central Office where they received individual instructions on assignments which they were supposed to carry out on the Soviet side.

After crossing the frontier several times, these agents managed to gain the confidence of the bolsheviks, which made it still easier for us to collect various data pertaining to their work. We also had the opportunity to study individually each intelligence officer, and find out about his interests and tendencies. Quite often Soviet intelligence officers would unofficially request these agents to buy various small items for them on the German territory. For instance, quite often they asked them to buy electric bulbs, flashlight batteries, red and green inks, revolver holsters, wristwatches, etc. Of course, we arranged all these things for them in order to cultivate friendship between our agents and the Soviet intelligence agents, about whom we didn't know. For instance, one of our men, Visa Stefan, received a request to find out in a very discreet way who at the time was residing on Bialiskirch st. #308,
whether they are the same people, who resided there three months ago or were
they different people. If they were different people, what happened to the ones
who used to live there. If they are the same people, was any of them under arrest, and
who were the authorities that arrested them and what for. Stefan investigated and
found out that the people residing there were the same and that their son, a
former Polish officer candidate, Edward Skwareczynski was arrested and sent to the
prisoners camp. This gave me the idea that Skwareczynski was a Soviet intelligent
agent. I demanded his release from prison. He was released. As a motive for
his release it was pointed out that was actually not an officer but only a candi-
date and therefore cannot be held in prison.

After his release I kept his apartment under surveillance and I sent word
through Wiec that Skwareczynski was released from prison. A few days later at
about 10 o'clock at night three red flares were released on the Soviet side over
the border. On the following day our observation disclosed that Skwareczynski
crossed the border at night and spent three days on the Soviet side, after
which he returned home. Further surveillance disclosed that the bolsheviks have
more than a dozen Polish agents working for them in Budynek, where three restau-
range were kept and financed by the bolsheviks. The purpose of these restaurants
was to entertain and get drunk Polish ex-soldiers and officers, and to obtain
various information from them.

Skwareczynski is a resident. Further observation disclosed that Skwareczyn-
ski was on very good terms with the deputy chief of one of the boundary posts
in the locality of Sosnica. Through this post the German military intelligence
was dispatching the majority of their spies to the Soviet territory.

After Skwareczynski and his companions had been arrested, we managed to find
out that Skwareczynski was requested by the bolsheviks to establish a contact with
the officer Schmidt, boundary post deputy chief.

This he accomplished. Schmidt, before the annexation of Austria to Germany
took place, was a member of the communist party in Austria, the bolsheviks knew
that. Schmidt agreed to work for them, and through Skwareczynski was revealing
to the bolsheviks the names of all the men he knew were German agents and were
going to cross the border and enter German territory.

During the third phase of our work we decided to establish connections not
only with intelligence agents operating on short distance areas, but far distance
as well. I initiated the first step in this direction. During the early part of
April a fellow by the name Teodosij Stasinskyj crossed the borderline of my sector and told us that he fled from Lwów city. Stasinskyj was a school pal of mine in Lwów, and a member of the CKW organization. During our first conversation he told me that he crossed the border illegally at a point opposite Os- 

taw city, that he crossed the river with his clothes on, and that he dried his clothes in a house of a Polish family living right at the border. At that time I was already informed by my men, who were operating as double agents, that at this specific locality the Bolsheviks were transporting their men over to our side in rubber boats. The Polish fellow, with whom Stasinskyj spent the night, was one of my informers, and he immediately reported to me that a man stayed in his place overnight, who crossed the border and was completely dry. So, naturally, I was sure that Stasinskyj was transported through the river San by boat. I listened for a while to his stories and then abruptly told him that everything he said was a lie, because he was transported in a rubber boat by the frontier guards, and I also presented him with the names of the guards. Stasinskyj confronted with all this evidence, confessed, and told me that he was an agent of the NKGB, and received his training in Kiev. He was apprehended and arrested as a member of the organization, and told them about everything he knew. He was then hired by the Bolsheviks as an agent and put to work.

He told me about all the assignments he was delegated to carry out on the CKW sector, and all about their military intelligence. As soon as we hired him to work for us as a double agent, he supplied us with all sorts of information pertaining to the agents working for the NKGB in Lwów city, and their methods of operation.

Other Walsheinke had similar experiences.

When the German — Soviet war began, the tactics of the Abwehr III (3) had to be radically changed. The old methods were not effective any longer. We realized that to establish connections with the Soviet side was an extremely difficult proposition, and that only the Bolsheviks were able to communicate by radio. We had to find some old, well informed Soviet agents. Our main task was to find permanent residents and radio operators. In this we were very successful. We had to also reorganize our agency. Eng. Woczok's, Kladkij Wlodaimiers, Matia Jayola and Myrnyj Rosan were moved to Lwów city. Shortly before the War started I was transferred to Sanoka city under the name of Eng. Lorens Vorkheim, and to carry my real activities, I was assigned to a business establishment. This establishment was a brewery owned by a man named Zarelnski,
and I was supposedly his representative, covering the districts of Krosno and Sankt. This enterprise netted us approximately 7000 złotych a month.

In order to be able to work in accordance with our newly adopted methods efficiently, all of us were transferred to the frontier counter-intelligence offices. Eng. Hladij Jaroslaw was attached to the Abwehrkommando III of the Heeresgruppe Sud. This was the sixth German army which was moved later to the Stalingrad area, where for more than a year we had a good chance to learn how the bolshevistic intelligence forces carry on their work by wireless stations, their codes etc., and returned to Krakow. Lieutenant colonel was Jaroslaw was mobilized and sent somewhere near Smolensk. Koroń was drafted to the army and continued with his work in Krakow.

Eng. Hladij became the chief of the section, and I became his deputy.

During the middle of 1942 we managed to effect the return of Władysław Hladij and Mate Aleksandr, hired a few new men, and started to work.

One of our men, an informer, who was stationed in Lublin, (I do not remember his name) told us that an elderly man, an Ukrainian, was parachuted down from a Soviet plane. This man was dispatched as an agent, but he had no intentions to work for the bolsheviks. The man was brought over to Krakow, where it was disclosed that he was an engineer-electromechanics by the name of Peter Đakó. He was sent from Moscow and equipped with a radio. During the interrogation he disclosed that he had connections with a Soviet resident living in Krakow, by the name of Stepan Wlodarz, a Bulgarian by birth, an agronomist by profession. He told us also that the radio, which he brought with him, was to be used by this man. On our request Stepan Wlodarz was arrested, and a full confession was obtained from him. He told us that for a long time he worked as a bolshevist agent in Lvov, and maintained contact with the Soviet Consulate. Later he was sent to France, where he worked up till 1935. During 1936 and 1937 he was in Switzerland, and in 1939 came to Krakow, where he became the secretary of the Bulgarian Agronomical Society. Someone was supposed to contact him in Krakow, but the war with Germany began, and nobody showed up. He told us also about the training he received in Moscow, gave us the code he was using etc.

We decided to start a game with Moscow. I took the place of Stepan Wlodarz and became the resident. I was given the assistance of a German wireless operator, and we began to dispatch false information to Moscow. Peter Đakó also began to broadcast dispatches. Moscow was very pleased.

After a while we decided to go still a little further, I, pretending to be,
Stojan Wlodek, requested from Col. Suszenko in Moscow a special wireless set or a wireless operator. Moscow agreed to this. A few months later a radio set arrived to Krakow. It was parachuted down to a section in Lublin city where Soviet partisans were operating. They brought the set to Krakow where one of them, a woman, delivered it to me. I pretended to be Stojan Wlodek, and she believed me. We worked together for a half a year. I managed to find out her code, and thus we were able to know the content of her dispatches. She usually crypted her transmissions only then it was of a technical nature. All her radio transmissions were monitored by an Abwehr III station.

Six months later she was "accidentally" arrested on the street and sent to labour camp into Germany. All this was, of course, carefully planned by us. I dispatched a request for another radio operator. I asked for a woman who could speak German freely, so she could pass as a German national, because it was difficult to operate with a Polish woman— they were to easily picked up in Krakow. Good identification papers were hard to get, and even if you had such, they didn't amount to much.

In about a month, following my request, the Bolsheviks furnished me with another radio operator, a German woman from Czechoslovakia. I worked with her also for about six months, posing as Stojan Wlodek.

During this work I received a request to contact a certain Polish fellow, residing in Somesec city, Upper Silesia. I was supposed to send him a telegram, which was picked up by a female radio operator. Thus I found out about the existence of such a resident. I went to Somesec city, located the resident and disclosed that he too had a warm, radio operator. They were sent from Moscow several months ago but so far did not establish contacts with Moscow, because their radio set was dismantled in landing. I made three trips to Somesec before I was able to decode their cryptographic system. Before they were able to get a new radio set they were sending their telegrams through our station. Before sending their messages, we decoded them and altered them in accordance with the desires of the Abwehr.

My second radio operator brought with her, among other things, money and radio parts, which I was supposed to deposit in a "shohok," a hiding place, about which I have notified Moscow beforehand. This "shohok" was under surveillance all the time, and we managed thus to discover still another radio station, located in Radom city—the resident from Radom came to the "shohok" to collect his things. In Radom he was arrested and confesses everything. He gave us his cryptographic code and began to work for the Germans.
I also know that in Warsaw the Germans had two Soviet residents, working for them in radio stations.